MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY

The notion an accountable, responsible and limited government is closely tied to the rule of law,
constitutionalism and to what Anthony Kng describes as a small ‘c’ constitution. Accountablity is an
integral component of legitimacy as it generates public confidence in in the processes and decisions of
public and administrative authorities, which according to Andrew Le Sueur is indicative of the existence
of conditions of legitimacy. In fact, one of the justifications of the Westminster model requiring ministers
to be MPs is so that they can effectively be held to account. Accountability can be explanatory and can
also entail political sanctions. It also described in terms of political and legal accountability. This essay
focuses on political accountability and its explanatory nature, and on political sanctions. A major
convention regulating the UK's uncodified constitution that is based on maintaining a responsible and
accountable government is that of ministerial responsibility. The two limbs of this convention are
individual ministerial responsibility and collective ministerial responsibility. According to Hilaire
Barnett, there can be vagueness in the distinction between these two limbs which are both interrelated
and complementary.

COLLECTIVE MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Collective responsibility requires that all Ministers must accept cabinet decisions and action consequent
thereon, or dissent privately, or speak out and resign; unless the doctrine is waived on any given occasion.
CMR increases party discipline and unity within the government and also serves to strengthen the
authority of the PM in relation to his colleagues. The doctrine of collective responsibility involves three
rules:

The rule that the government must resign if it loses the support of the HC- the PM and his ministers are
collectively responsible to Parliament for the conduct of national affairs. If the PM loses support in
Parliament he must resign or seek dissolution of Parliament. However, only two governments, both in a
minority in the Commons, have lost the confidence of the House; first one is in 1924 and the second one
in 1979.

The rule that the government must speak with one voice: All members of the government share in the
collective responsibility of the government and ministers may not publicly criticise or dissociate
themselves from the government policy. Examples of such resignations include Sir Anthony Eden’s in
1938 over Chamberlain’s policy towards Mussolini, and arguably Michael Heseltine’s in 1986 due to
disagreement with government policy in respect of Westland plc. In March 2003, Robin Cook, the Leader
of the House of Commons, resigned as he found himself unable to support the government's decision to
go to war in Iraq. Clare Short, the International Development Secretary, also resigned that same year as
she could not support the government's plan to establish a new Iraqi government after the war. In 2014
Baroness Warsi, dissatisfied with the government's response to Israeli attacks on Gaza, resigned. The year
2016 saw the resignations of lain Duncan Smith, the Work and Pensions Secretary, due to the cuts to
disability benefits proposed by the Chancellor and of Lord O'Neill of Gatley due to the government's
economic policy. As all ministers must support government policy it is desirable that the process by
which such policy decisions are made be kept secret. (AG v Jonathan Cape)

*** YOU MAY ADD 2 RECENT RESIGNATION EXAMPLE***

INDIVIDUAL MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY

The doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility encompasses ministers' personal conduct, financial
probity as well as ministers' responsibility for the actions and policies of their departments. Ministers are
required to display the highest degree of propriety in their conduct. In 1963, Mr John Profumo, the
Minister of War, had to resign due to contempt of the House committed through lying about his affair. In
2016, Sir Michael Fallon resigned as Defence Secretary due to an incident where he repeatedly touched
the knee of a journalist. The Nolan Committee has distinguished between the requirement for rules
relating to financial conduct and those relating to sexual conduct stating it was not possible to formulate
rules to govern the latter but that it is in the hands of the Prime Minister to determine if ministers have
upheld the highest standards of propriety.

Propriety is also required of the financial conduct of ministers. The law and custom of Parliament requires
that ministers declare financial interests in the Register of Members' Interests as well in debates and
committee proceedings where they may influence their impartiality. In addition, the Ministerial Code
requires that ministers consult the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments about any business
appointments they may take up within two years of leaving office. David Blunkett breached this
requirement in 2005 and consequently resigned. David Mellor also resigned after breaching the
Ministerial Code by accepting a gift from a woman associated with the Palestinian Liberation
Organisation. In 2009, it was revealed that a number of ministers had misused parliamentary funds and
many resignations followed. One of these was that of David Laws who was Chief Secretary to the
Treasury.

*** YOU MAY ADD 2 RECENT RESIGNATION EXAMPLE***

ARE THE MINISTERS INCREASINGLY RELUCTANT TO RESIGN?

It cannot be concluded with certainty when or whether a minister will resign due to departmental failures.
According to Professor SE Finer, this depends entirely on the minister himself, the Prime Minister and
his political party. Richard Scott led an inquiry into the Arms-to-lraq affair and writing in 'Ministerial
responsibility' (1996) distinguished between ministerial responsibility and accountability. Accountability
requires a minister to give an account to Parliament and answer questions while responsibility requires a
minister to accept blame. According to Richard Scott, accepting responsibility and then resigning were
not at the heart of the effectiveness of accountability but rather it was the obligation of ministers to
provide information regarding their departments and civil servants. According to a Public Service
Committee report, it was not possible to distinguish between matters of ministerial responsibility and
ministerial accountability. It is becoming increasingly impractical to hold ministers responsible for every
action of their departments as prescribed by the classical doctrine. This is due to the growing size of
departments, short tenures of ministers in any one department and the complex and extensive
administrative framework.

OTHER METHODS OF ENSURING MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY

The accountability of ministers can be practically achieved through select committees, parliamentary
questions and debates on the floor of each House. A new and improved system of select committees was
introduced in 1979. Ever major department has its own select committee which comprises between 12
and 15 MPs. They conduct inquiries and function in an advisory capacity. Ministers are subjected to
rigorous questioning by these committees. Select Committees are comprised in a way as to prevent them
from being influenced by party politics. These factors purport to these committees playing an effective
role but there is another side to the coin. Though departments are obligated to respond to committee
reports, the findings of those reports are not binding on them. In 2011 the UCL Constitutional Unit
studied the impact of select committees and found that around 40% of committee recommendations were
implemented by the government while two-thirds of those prescribing a major policy changed were
unsuccessful. The House of Lords Constitutional Committee conducts inquiries on broader constitutional
issues and also scrutinizes all government bills. There has been criticism that very little time is allowed
for debating committee reports on the floor of the House.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it may be argued that the present understanding of ministerial responsibility relies upon a
series of distinctions which are open to manipulation and abuse by government, and that Parliament
appears to be currently deprived of the ability to challenge and to challenge such manipulation and make
its own determination as to where responsibility should be located from a position of comprehensive
knowledge. It may be further contended that the dogmatic application of these rules to chief executives
and the continued accountability of ministers for the workings of the Next Step Agencies seems illogical
and likely to undermine the demarcation of duties between ministers and officials, which the Agencies are
supposed to follow and uphold.

ALTERNATIVE CONCLUSION

In light of these considerations, it appears that the doctrine of ministerial responsibility along with
parliamentary procedures have had significant success in promoting a limited, accountable government.
However, inadequacies remain and Parliament and the Prime Minister must collaboratively work on to
ensure greater ministerial responsibility.

WORDS-1270

EXTRA ACADEMIC OPINION

 The fact that many other ministers do not offer to resign should not be taken as evidence that the
convention of individual ministerial responsibility does not exist. Diana Woodhouse (1999) has
observed that `[b]y the time the Conservative government left office in 1997, the convention of
individual ministerial responsibility had been distorted to the point where evasion and half-truths had
replaced any notion of giving an account and the acceptance of responsibility for political errors or
misjudgements were seldom' (p. 127). The government had witnessed a number of scandals.

 Powell and Gay (2004) observed that the convention was fluid as it is unwritten and that “in practice
few senior politicians are likely to base decisions affecting their political careers solely, or even
mainly on some uncertain constitutional convention, the exact details of which they may not be fully
aware of’. • Rhodes, Wanna and Weller observed that, “The convention is often said to be honoured
only in breach. Ministers often seek to evade responsibilities and not "answer" for actions taken it
their name. They rarely resign or stand aside unless the prime minister feels it expedient for them to
depart than remain. Politics, not ethics, governs the convention. There may be a "smoking gun", it
may be in the minister's hand, but that does not mean he or she will resign' (Comparing Westminster,
OUP: Oxford, 2009), p. 37).

***NEW CASES GIVEN IN UOL RECENT DEVELOPMENT***

 The Secretary of State for International Development, Priti Patel, resigned in November
2017 following revelations that she had held unauthorised meetings with Israeli ministers and
others in 2017.
 The Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Fallon, resigned on 1 November 2017 following
allegations had he had behaved ‘inappropriately’ towards a female journalist 15 years ago.
 The First Secretary of State and Minister for the Cabinet Office (and de facto Deputy Prime
Minister), Damian Green, was forced to resign on 20 December 2017 over allegations that
he had made ‘inaccurate and misleading’ statements about pornography found on his
parliamentary computer. There was also an allegation that he had behaved ‘inappropriately’
in relation to a female journalist. His resignation was controversial, being caused principally
by the disclosure by the police of information obtained during a police operation in 2008 (the
disclosure of which is against guidelines and now the subject of a police inquiry).
 These incidents and other allegations that male MPs have been guilty of sexual harassment,
have led to an enquiry into the conduct of MPs. It is expected that the disciplinary powers of
the House of Commons and/or those of the Commissioner for Standards are to be increased
to deal with findings of sexual harassment.