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Elite Studies: The Case of the Mexican Presidency

Author(s): John G. Conklin


Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Nov., 1973), pp. 247-269
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 5, 2, 247-269 Printed in Great Britain 247

Elite Studies : the Case of the


Mexican Presidency

by JOHN G. CONKLIN

Introduction: Elite Studies of Latin America


Many studies of Latin American elites are compilations of biographical
sketches.l These increase understanding of various personalities, but tend to
be unsystematic and unrelated. Frequently, no attempt is made to draw the
data together into meaningful generalizations about elite background, recruit-
ment, behavior, and the like. Many other studies that take a group approach
also concern elites but often this is not explicitly recognized by the author.
Much of the literatureon the Latin American military falls into this category.2
Merle Kling has written a study of a particularelite group.3 He examined the
origin, membership, leadership, objectives, and political influence of a con-
servative Mexican business group. In i967, a study of group elites edited by
Lipset and Solari was published.4 This book includes chapters on business
elites, political leaders, military leaders, religious elites, cultural elites, labor
and peasantleaders, and student and education elites. In some of the selections,
particularly those concerning military and educational leaders, the authors
employ quantitative methods.
In addition to the work edited by Lipset and Solari, there are perhaps seven
or eight explicitly elite analyses concerning Latin America. There are short
social background articles of governmental elites in Argentina, Peru, and
Mexico.5 In the Peruvian and Mexican cases, the authors found that educated
1 For
examples, see Robert J. Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution (New York, Macmillan,
i962), and Harold E. Davis, Makers of Democracy in Latin America (New York, H. W.
Wilson Co., I945).
2 For
example, John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford,
Stanford University Press, I964).
3 Merle Kling, A MexicanInterestGroup in Action (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 196I).
4
Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds.), Elites in Latin America (New York, Oxford
University Press, I967).
5 Kalman Silvert, ' Political
Leadership and Institutional Weakness in Argentina ', in The
Conflict Society (New York, American Universities Field Staff, i966); Arnold Payne, ' Peru:
Latin America's Silent Revolution ', Inter-American Economic Affairs, xx (Winter I966),
pp. 69-78; James D. Cochrane, 'Mexico's " New Cientificos": the Diaz Ordaz Cabinet',
CurrentHistory, xxI (Summer I967), pp. 6I-72.

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248 John G. Conklin

middle class individuals were now occupying high government positions.


Silvert's positional analysis of the Per6n era showed that no dramatic turn-
over had occurred, and he concluded from this that Peronism was not a truly
revolutionaryphenomenon. JamaicanLeaders by Wendell Bell is undoubtedly
one of the outstanding studies of elites in a single Latin American country.6
While the focus is on social backgrounds and attitudes, Bell places his findings
within the context of Jamaican politics. His familiarity with the Jamaican
system, combined with the quantitative methods, results in a balanced, infor-
mative book which is methodologically explicit. Daniel Goldrich, in his study
of Panamanian and Costa Rican elite youth, surveys the attitudes of 16 to i8
year olds towards their respective systems.7His study is particularly interest-
ing becausehe polled each country twice at two-year intervals.8Goldrich used
quantitative methods, but his sampling and administering procedures were
very different from those employed by Bell.9 He selected his sample simply by
going to educational institutions attended by the sons of elites. Surveys were
administered directly in controlled situations and the response was over go
per cent. On the whole, Goldrich exercised greater care in accumulating his
data.
The Venezuelan project directed by Frank Bonilla is a benchmark in the
study of national elites. In Volume II of Politics of Change in Venezuela,
Bonilla notes:
To our best knowledge the VENELITE research has managed to collect more
informationabout more of .the very top people in an actively operativenational
powersystemthanhas everbeenobtainedbefore.10
The VENELITE team used the positional, reputational, and decision-partici-
pation methods in selecting their sample. They categorized elites into three
groups-economic, political, and cultural. The interview data were organ-
ized along five lines-social characteristics,biography-careerlines, power-role
activities, personalqualities, and socio-metricdata.
The purpose of the study was to inquire into 'the potential capacity of
leadership to help bring about the new Venezuela prefigured in their state-
6 Wendell Bell, Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation (Berkeley, Univ. of
California Press, 1964). Two other works on West Indian leaders are Charles Moskos, The
Sociology of Political Independence (Cambridge, Mass., Schenkmann, I967), and Ivar
Oxaal, Black Intellectuals Come to Power : The Rise of Creole Nationalism in Trinidad and
Tobago (Cambridge,Mass., Schenkmann, 1968).
7 Daniel Goldrich, Sons of the Establishment: Elite Youth in Panama and Costa Rica (Chicago,
Rand McNally & Co., 1966).
8 Since Goldrich wrote his book the survey has again been repeated in Panama: Douglas A.
Brown, The Political Orientations of Panamanian Students: A Republication (unpublished
thesis, Chapel Hill, Univ. of North Carolina, i967).
9 For Bell's sampling and administeringtechniques, see pp. 7 and 8 of JamaicanLeaders.
l0 Frank Bonilla, The Failure of Elites (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1970), p. 14.

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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 249

ments to us and in key documents such as national plans '." The title of the
project's second volume, The Failure of Elites, indicates the basic finding of
the VENELITE researchgroup.
From the point of view of the social sciences, this projecthas larger method-
ological implications. It applies ' scientific' researchtechniques to socially and
politically volatile questions. Moreover, the current Venezuelan elite, whose
responses made the study possible, can hardly view the project's conclusion
as 'friendly'. Indeed, Bonilla writes that the domestic elite within the
' national armies, national parties, national bourgeoisies all have fallen short
of the immediate challenge '.1 Only the cultural elite, led by the university
community, seems to understandadequatelythe programsneeded for the long-
term development of Venezuela. Whatever the merits of this conclusion, it
can be read as a call for revolutionary upheaval. Where social scientists are,
even implicitly, prescribing such courses of action, the validity and reliability
of their methodology is of crucial importance. In other words, this book
directly raises the question of whether we are engaged in political science or
political philosophy and whether or not one can be divorced from the other.

Latin American Elites : the Chief Executive


Two key features of Latin American politics are executive predominance
and military intervention.l3 While the literature on Latin America is, rela-
tively speaking, full of information on the military, almost nothing is to be
found concerning the presidency. Hence, one of the two most important elite
structuresremains practically ignored. Rosendo G6mez's article is one of the
few studies dealing specifically with the Latin American presidency.14 How-
ever, this article was written largely to outline a classificatorysystem. Data
were not systematicallygathered and they were used to illustrateeach classifica-
tion rather than to test or generate hypotheses. There are some studies of the
executive of various countries. Leo Lott's essay is a good traditional descrip-
tion and analysis of the formal and informal powers of the Venezuelan presi-
dency.l5 The power of the Peruvian presidency is treated in a cursory article
by Martin Needler.l6 Other studies of the Latin American presidencies are in
textbooks. Alexander Edelmann's text has one of the better treatments of the
11 Ibid., p. 62. 12 Ibid., p. 322.
13 Martin C. Needler, 'Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America',
American Political ScienceReview, ix (September1966), p. 6I6.
14 Rosendo Gomez, ' Latin American Executives: Essence and Variations ', Journal of Inter-
American Studies, III (June I96I), pp. 81-96.
15 Leo Lott, ' Executive Power in Venezuela ', American Political Science Review, i (June
1956), pp. 422-4I.
16 Martin Needler, 'Cabinet Responsibility in a Presidential System: The Case of Peru '
ParliamentaryAffairs, xviii (Spring, 1965), pp. I56-6I.

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250 John G. Conklin

chief executive.17He covers its formal legal aspects completely and discusses
informal powers as well.
Since I96I, two articles have suggested another direction for studying the
Latin American chief executive. The first, authored by James Busey, con-
cerned the major presidents of Costa Rica, their backgrounds, means of
achieving office, and the conditions surrounding their leaving office.18How-
ever, Busey's purpose was not a full description of the Costa Rican executives.
His background data is limited and his list of thirty-five presidents excludes
provisional, interim, and acting executives, of which there have been twenty-
five. In I969 Gray and Kirwin published an article on the Chilean
presidents.'9 Their background material included birthdate, place of birth,
education, and occupation. They categorize changing administrations into
two groups, stable and non-stable, and use the background and succession
data in comparison with U.S. executives. Their sample includes all Chileans
who have served as chief executive.
This article is a continuation of the direction initiated by Busey and by Gray
and Kirwin. Its substantive purpose is to describe the backgrounds and
successionpatternsof the Mexican chief executives. For comparativepurposes,
I have integrated into this paper the data on the Chilean presidency made
available by Gray and Kirwin. Methodologically, this paper touches upon the
utility of positional analysis, the advantages and disadvantagesof categorizing
people and events, and of quantification. It is in an exploratory spirit that I
have included a developmental scale among my categories.
MEXICO: A CASE STUDY

Occupationand Tenure
Since 1822, Mexico has had 58 presidents or an average of one every 2 2
years.20Of course, not all presidents served an average term. In fact, 40 held
office for a period of less than 2 2 years and 32 of these presidents were in
office less than a single year. The median term, o1 months and i days, more
accurately reflects the high turnover rate characteristicof the Mexican Presi-
dency.21The shortest length of time spent in office was one day, the longest
was Porfirio Diaz's 26 years,5 months and 25 days.
17 Alexander Edelmann, Latin American Government and Politics (Homewood, The Dorsey
Press, I965), pp. 393-427?
18 James L. Busey, ' The Presidentsof Costa Rica ', The Americas, xvIII (July I96I), pp. 55-70.
19 Richard B. Gray and Frederick R. Kirwin, ' Presidential Succession in Chile: 1817-I966 ',
Journalof Inter-AmericanStudies, xi (Jan. 1969), pp. I44-59.
20 See Table
I for a list of presidents. This study concerns the Mexican presidents to I970.
21 The turnover rate is much greater than the total number of presidents indicates. Ten

presidents occupied the office two or more times. G6mez Farias, for example, was president
for a total of about 9 months, but was in office on five different occasions. Santa Anna was
the chief executive ii times, more than any other Mexican president.

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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 251

TABLE I

Presidents of Mexico 21 May, 1822, to I December, 1970


Elite Type Time Means
President Age Occupation in Office to Office
Yrs Mths Days
Agustfn de Iturbide 34 f m 9-28 v
Guadalupe Victoria 38 f m/i 4- 6-io e
Vicente Guerrero 45 f m/i 8- 7
Jose Marfa Bocanegra 42 P g/l 5 P
Pedro Velez 42 P g/l 8 p
Anastasio Bustamante 49 f m/i/p 6-10-2I e/i/p
Melchor Muzquiz 42 f m/i 4-I2 p
Manuel G6mez Pedraza 42 f m 4- 7 v
Valentin G6mez Farfas 52 P g/p 9- 7 p/e
L6pez de Santa Anna 38 f m 5- 9- 4 v/i
Miguel Barragan 45 f m/i I- 1-12 i
Jose Justo Corro 51 f 1 i-i6 p
Nicolas Bravo 52 f m/i 4-22 p
Francisco Javier Echeverrfa 44 f g/b i8 p
Valentfn Canalizo 49 f mn Io-II p
Jose Joaqufn de Herrera 56 f m 3- 8-14 p/e
Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga 48 f m 7- i v
Jose Mariano Salas 49 ff m 4-17 v
Pedro Marfa Anaya 52 f m 3- 3 P
Manuel de la Pena y Pena 58 p g/l 6-28 p
Mariano Arista 48 f m I--I--9 e
Juan Bautista Ceballos 41 p g/l I- 2 p
Manuel Maria Lombardini 60 f m/i 2-I3 p
Martin Carrera 58 f m 28 p
R6mulo Diaz de la Vega 54 f m 21 p
Juan Alvarez 65 f m/i 2- 6 v
Ignacio Comonfort 43 f 1/m 2- I- 9 v
Fdlix Zuloaga 54 f m 11-19 p/v
Manuel Robles Pezuela 41 f m 28 p
Miguel Miramo6n 26 f mrn -10-IO-II v
Jose Ignacio Pav6n 69 p g/l 2 p
Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada 49 p g/l/e 4- 3-10 p/e
Jose Marla Iglesias 53 P g/l/j 2-19 p
Benito Juarez 51 p g/1 I4- 5-2I p/e/v/i
Porfirio Diaz 46 f m 26- 5-25 v/e/i
Juan N. Mendez 52 f mn 2-II p
Manuel Gonzales 47 f m 4 i
Francisco Le6n de la Barra 47 P g 5-II p
Francisco I. Madero 38 f h I- 3-12 v
Pedro Lascurafn 54 f 1/e I p
Victoriano Huerta 67 f m I- 4-28 v

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252 John G. Conklin

TABLE I (contd.)
Elite Type Time Means
President Age Occupation in Office to Office
Yrs Mths Days
Francisco Carvajal 43 f 1 28 p
Venustiano Carranza 54 f h 5-IO- 6 v
Eulalio Gutierrez 34 f m/i 2-Io i
Roque Gonzailez Garza 29 f m/i 4-24 i
Francisco Lagos Chazaro 36 p g/l 6-25 i
Adolfo de la Huerta 39 p g 6 v
Alvaro Obreg6n 40 f m/i 4 i
Plutarco Elias Calles 47 f m/i 4i
Emilio Portes Gil 38 p g/1 I- -28 p
Pascual Ortiz Rubio 53 f m/i 2- 8--II i
Abelardo Rodriguez 44 f m/i 2- 2-4 p
Lazaro Cardenas 40 f m/i 6 i
Manuel Avila Camacho 43 f m/i 6 i
Miguel Aleman 44 P g/1 6i
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines 6o p g 6i
Adolfo L6pez Mateos 48 p g/1 6 i
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz 53 p g/1 6 i

Explanation:
The first column (age) refers to each president's age upon assuming office for the first time.
Column two (elite type) categorizes each president as a multi-functional elite (f) or a political
elite (p). Political elites are professionals in government and politics, whereas multi-functional
elites possess leadership positions outside the political arena. See the text for a further discussion.
Column three lists the occupationsof each president. The symbols read as follows:
m/i = military insurgent b = business
m = military e = educator
g = government/publicman j = journalist
I = lawyer h = hacendado
=
p physician
Time in office (column four) refers to the total number of years-months-dayseach president
served.
The last column (means to office) lists four ways in which individual presidents have come
to power. The symbols translateas:
v = violencia
i= imposicion
e = election
p provisional
See the text tor a fuller explanationof these terms.
Sources: Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (New York, Atheneum Press,
I965); Manuel Garcia Pur6n, Mexico y sus Gobernantes (Mexico, Libreria de Manuel Porrua,
S.A., 1964); Percy Alvin Martin (ed.), Who's Who in Latin America (Stanford, Stanford
University Press, I940); and Current Biography, 1940 to 1968.

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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 253

Occupationally, 24 presidents have been civilians, I8 professional soldiers,


and I6 military insurgents.22By dividing Mexican history into three periods:
the era of Santa Anna (1822-55), the period of Juarez and Dfaz (I855-1910),
and the Revolutionary era (190o-70), and correlating occupation, one finds

TABLE 2

Presidential Occupationsin Three Historical Periods (Mexico)


Occupationsby Numberand Percentage
Era m m/i c
Santa Anna 9 39%' 7 30.5% 7 30.5%
Juarez/Diaz 8 58% I 7.0% 5 35.0%
Revolutionary I 5% 8 38.o?% 12 57.0%

Totals i8 31% i6 27.0% 24 42.0%

that all three occupational categories were about equally represented during
the initial period, professional soldiers and civilians (930%) dominated the
Juarez/Diaz epoch, while military insurgents and civilian (95%) dominated
the third era. When the same factors (occupation and numbers of presidents)
are correlated with tenure, an interesting pattern emerges.23 Taking the
civilians in each historical unit, it is seen that although 30.5% of the presidents
during the Santa Anna period were civilians they all served less than one year.
During the Juarez//Daz era civilians came to power 35% of the time, but
more significantly, they began to serve for more prolonged periods. Finally,
during the Revolutionary era civilians became the predominant group both
numerically(57%) and with regard to tenure.
If one assumes a positive relationship between office, tenure and the actual
exercise of power, the pattern is clear. The history of the Mexican Presidency
has been one of growing civilian control of the position itself and, hence, of
the political system. Given their short durations in office, civilians during
the Santa Anna era might well be considered puppets for various professional
and insurgent generals. Political power, then, rested primarily upon coercive
instruments. In the Juarez/Diaz period civilians were able to exercise power
and control for the first time. This suggests an increasingly sophisticated
system in that crude force was no longer the sole requisite for the effective
22 See Table 2. In all of the tables the letter c will be used to refer to civilian, m to denote
professional soldier, and m/i to indicate military insurgent. Military insurgent refers to
individuals who began their career as guerrilla soldiers or with irregular forces rather than
with the standing army. Of course, irregular forces were usually formed to fight against
the regular army.
23 See Table 3.

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254 John G. Conklin
exercise of presidential power. In the final era, for the first time in Mexico's
history there were more civilian than soldier presidents. Moreover, the tenure
pattern begun during the Juarez/Diaz period became more pronounced as
31% of the presidents were civilians serving more than a single year. (Com-
parable figures for the first and second historical periods were 9% and 2I%
respectively.)

TABLE3

Presidential Occupationsand Tenure (Mexico)


Numberand Percentage
Less than I to 22 Over 2
Era * I Year Years Years
Santa Anna
m 6 26% I 4% 2 9%
m/i 4 17% I 4% 2 9%
c 7 31%
Juarez/Diaz
m 5 37% I 7% 2 I4%
m/i I 7%
c 2 14% I 7% 2 14%
Revolutionary
m I 50
m/i 2 9% I 5% 5 24%
c 5 24% 2 9% 5 24%
* Each of the three eras is treatedas an individual analytical unit.

Within the civilian groups the majority of the Mexican presidents have
been government officials/public men, and/or lawyers. 3I% of all Mexican
executives were governmental or public men and 27% lawyers. Among them
have been a sprinkling of physicians, businessmen, educators,journalists, and
hacendados.
The occupations of the Chilean executives are considerably different from
those of the Mexicans. At least go% of the Chilean presidents had extensive
office-holding public careersprior to achieving the presidency, and 47% were
lawyers. However, the most significant difference between the occupational
experiences of the Mexican and Chilean presidents concerns the incidence of
military executives. In Mexico, a majority of the presidents (58%) have been
either professional or insurgent soldiers whereas only 20% of the Chilean
executives fall into these categories.
These occupational differences in recruitment patterns undoubtedly reflect
the different political traditions of Mexico and Chile. Chile has been notable
for its adherence to the formal aspects of constitutionalism and particularly

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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 255

for its civilian institutions that have historically 'contained' the country's
political struggles. These institutions, the parties, legislatures, and executive
departmentsand agencies have regularly and continuously enveloped Chilean
politics and have served as 'feeders' to the presidency. On the other hand,
Mexico's political history has been characterized by lengthy periods of tur-
bulence, punctuated by the rise of strong individuals who have been able, by
the weight of their personality,to subsume individual and group antagonisms.
Mexico's political fabric has only become institutionalized in the last thirty or
forty years. Not surprisingly, where civilian political institutions remain
embryonic and turbulence prevails, the military services, both regular and
irregular, become important avenues to the executive.

Birthplace and Age


Of Mexico's 31 states and territories, 19 have produced presidents.24As
might be expected, more presidents (io) were born in the metropolitan area
of Mexico City than any other region. A majority of the presidents, (36 or
62%), came from five states, Veracruz, Sonora, Coahuila, Michoacan, and
Puebla, plus the Federal District. Surprisingly, none were born in the popu-
lous states of Chihuahua or Sinaloa, while smaller states such as Campeche,
Queretaro, and Sonora have contributed a number of presidents. While state
distribution is very uneven, regional patterns are not so disparate. Table 4
shows the distribution of presidential birthplaces according to four regions.25
The percentage of presidents from the core or heartland of Mexico is about
equal to the percentage of the population there. Both the South and the West

TABLE 4

President's Birthplace by Region * (Mexico)

Percentage of Number of Percentage


Area Population 900o Presidents of Presidents
Core 54 33 57
South I7 6 o1
West I4 4 7
North II 15 26
* See Appendix II for list of states in each area. The percentage of population in each area
in 900o is taken from Howard Cline, The U.S. and Mexico, p. 436. The figures from
Cline are rounded off.

24 The State of Mexico and the Federal District, i.e., Mexico City, are treated as a single unit
because the only president from Mexico State, Adolfo L6pez Mateos, was raised in a town
on the outskirts of Mexico City. All his formal education was inside the city itself. See
Appendix I for a listing of the states and towns of presidents.
25 See Appendix II for a list of states in each region.

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256 John G. Conklin

have proportionatelyfewer presidents than their populations would indicate.


The North, on the other hand, is 'over-represented' having produced more
than twice as many chief executives as its numbers would 'warrant'.
Table 5 categorizes presidential hometowns by size. Cities with popula-
tions of Io,ooo to 50,000 have been the most productive, followed by towns of
2,500 to I0,000, and the large cities with populations of over 50,000. The
thousands of villages and hamlets throughout Mexico have produced propor-
tionately few presidents.26
TABLE 5

President's Birthplace by Size (Mexico)

Percentage of
Number of Percentage Population in
Population Presidents of Presidents Cities *
Up to 2,500 8 14 65
2,500 to I0,000 I5 26 13
10,000 to 50,000 20 34 8
Over 50,000 15 26 14
* Source for this column, Howard Cline, The U.S.
Percentage of cities, nation is for I940.
and Mexico, p. 436.

This might be explained by the differing optimal levels of 'life chances'


found in the villages, towns, and cities of Mexico. Historically, the villages
(up to 2,500 population) contained peasant populations and had very little
wealth and almost no education facilities. For the most part, village popula-
tions have been apolitical and the few existing religious-governmental offices
have been filled by the members of a few families who undertook these offices
as a matter of tradition, status, and duty. Towns (2,500 to Io,ooo), small cities
(Io,ooo to 5o,ooo), and cities (over 50,000) possess greater wealth and offer
more in the way of educational opportunities. Assuming that most political
activism usually requires a minimum material and/or educational level, cities,
and even towns, are more likely to provide them than are villages.
The fecundity of the small city is particularly striking in Mexican recruit-
ment patterns. In I940, there were eighty-four cities of this size with eight
per cent of the population.27Yet, they produced thirty-sixper cent of Mexico's
presidents. This contrasts with the Chilean case where most of the presidents
26 See Table 5 for the percentage of the total population represented by each category. It is
interesting to compare this finding with that of Donald Matthews in U.S. Senators and Their
World (New York, Random House, I960). He found the small and medium sized town
(2,500 to 50,000) to be consistently over-representedas a senatorial birth place. Rural and
metropolitanareas were under-represented,pp. I4-I7.
27 Cline, The U.S. and Mexico, p. 436.

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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 257

(62%) were born in cities of over 50,000. In the mid-I920s only fifteen to
twenty per cent of the population lived in such cities. Even more striking in
Chile is the great number of executives from Santiago. Around fifty per cent
of Chile's presidentswere born there.
The youngest man to enter the Mexican presidency was 26 years old, the
oldest, 69. Almost half (47%?)entered office in their forties, and the great
majority (74%/)were in either their forties or fifties. The ages of the Mexican
presidents are summarized by the historical period on Table 6. The Table
indicates that during the Juarez/Dfaz era the chief executives tended to be
older than during the two other periods which are similar with regard to
age. In Chile, the youngest office-holder was thirty-five and the oldest
seventy-five. Almost half were in their fifties. Table 6 shows that as a group
Chile's presidents have been older than the Mexican executives.

TABLE 6

President's Ages in Mexico and Chile


Numberand Percentagein
Era 20'S 30's 40's 50's 6o's 70's
MEXICO
Santa Anna 3 I3% I3 57% 6 26% I 4%0
Juarez/Dfaz I 7% 5 36% 6 43% 2 I4%
Revolutionary i 5% 5 24% 9 43% 4 19% 2 9%

Totals 2 3% 8 I4% 27 47% i6 27% 5 9%


CHILE 3 6% I4 3%/ 20 45% 7 i6% I 2%/o

Education
Appendix IV lists the Mexican presidents and their educational back-
grounds. This shows that 42% of the Mexicans attended or graduated from
college. In Chile, 78% of the presidentswere college graduates. A majority of
the Chilean college graduates (71%) received their degrees from the Univer-
sity of Chile. An additional 15% in each country had formal training in mili-
tary cadet school. 37% of the Mexican presidents received only a primary or
secondary education while only 4% of their Chilean counterparts were so
educated.

Violencia, Imposiciones and Elections


There have been four basic methods by which the presidents of Mexico
have come to power-violencias, imposiciones, elections, and provisionally.28
This section concerns all but the latter avenue to the presidency. Violencia
28 For a discussion of basic means to
power, see William S. Stokes, 'Violence as a Power
Factor in Latin American Politics ', Western Political Quarterly (Sept. 1952), pp. 445-69.
L.A.S.-6

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258 John G. Conklin
refers to any situation in which a presidential candidate uses armed force
directly to achieve office. This can take many forms, from a bloodless golpe
to a violent revolution. One can discern violencia by locating evidence of an
armed action undertaken to achieve immediate power. As used here an
election means a contest between two or more candidates. For a contest to
exist more than one candidate must have a 'reasonable chance' of winning.
number of
occupation violencia imposicioon election
m 9 3 3
m/i 2 9 2
c 5 6 3

Imposiciones are all power turnovers that fall between violencia and elections.
Normally these are election charades in which there is a single candidate or
only one candidate with a chance for victory. Tables 7, 8, and 9 list the
presidents according to means to power. Occupation and means to power are
outlined below.29
TABLE 7

PresidentsAchieving Power by Way of Golpe (Mexico)


President Age Area * Size t Occupation
Iturbide 34 I C m
Guerrero 45 2 B m/i
G6mez Pedraza 42 I C m
Santa Anna 38 I C m
Paredesy Arrillaga 48 I D m
Salas 49 I D m
Alvarez 65 2 A m/i
Comonfort 43 I D c
Zuloaga 54 4 B m
Miram6n 26 i D m
Juarez 51 2 A c
Diaz 46 2 C m
Madero 38 4 B c
Huerta 67 3 B m
Carranza 54 4 A c
de la Huerta 39 4 C c
* the numerical
symbols refer to:
I = Core 3 = West
2 = South 4 = North
t the letter symbols refer to:
B =2,500 to IO,000 C-=IO,000 to 50,000
A = to 2,500 D=over 50,000
29 A similar analysis of modes of attaining power and executive age indicates that no relation-
ship exists. The same is true of means for achieving power and area and size of birthplace.

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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 259

TABLE 8

Presidents Achieving Power by Way of Imposicion (Mexico)


President Age Area Size Occupation
Bustamante 49 I B m/i
Santa Anna 38 I C m
Barragan 45 I B m/i
Juarez 51 2 A c
Diaz 46 2 C m
Gonzales 47 4 B m
Gutierrez 34 4 A m/i
Gonzalez Garza 29 4 C m/i
Lagos Chazaro 26 I B c
Obregon 40 4 A m/i
Calles 47 4 B m/i
Ortiz Rubio 53 I C m/i
Cardenas 40 I B m/i
Camacho 43 I C m/i
Aleman 44 I B c
Ruiz Cortines 60 I C c
L6pez Mateos 48 I D c
Dfaz Ordaz 53 I B c

TABLE 9

Presidents Achieving Power by Way of Election (Mexico)


President Age Area Size Occupation
Victoria 38 I A m/i
Bustamante 49 I B m/i
G6mez Farias 52 3 D c
Herrera 56 I C m
Arista 48 I D m
Lerdo 49 I C c
Juarez 51 2 A c
Diaz 46 2 C m

In the history of Mexico, I6 presidents have used violencias to gain the


executive office, i8 have used imposiciones, and 8 have come to power through
elections. Surprisingly, civilians who are often associated with the electoral
process have not used election any more than have military men. The most
significant finding here is the marked difference in the behavior of profes-
sional soldiers and military insurgents. By and large, professionals have
relied upon violencia to attain power (60%) while insurgents have used the
imposici6n most of the time (69%). This may be explained by the democratic
ideology that often pervades insurgent movements. Having justified rebellion

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260 John G. Conklin

with democratic slogans, the insurgent can hardly be blatant in replacing an


authoritarian government with one of his own. Hence, the use of civilian
provisional presidents until an 'election' can be held. We can only speculate,
but it does not seem unreasonableto suggest that insurgents are more sensitive
to the art of mass manipulation and the use of symbols than are professional
soldiers. Another factor is the powerful position of individual civilians in
insurgent movements. Juarez, Madero, and Carranza were the acknowledged
leaders of insurgencies and with victory they naturally assumed the presi-
dency. Soldiers came to power only after these leaders died.
Table IO summarizes the extent to which violencias, imposiciones, and
elections were utilized by executives in three historical time periods. This
Table indicates that during the Santa Anna period violencias and elections
were the primary routes to office. During the Juarez/Diaz time, the incidence
of all three modes remained about constant although the percentageof imposi-
ciones and violencias increased slightly and elections declined somewhat. In
the Revolutionary era the use of violencia declined markedly and elections
disappeared completely, and imposiciones emerged as the primary means for
transferring the executive office. Indeed, we know that all violent turnovers
occurred early in the Revolutionary period (I9IO to I920), so that the
imposicion has clearlybecome institutionalized.

TABLE IO

Modes of Attaining Office by Historical Period (Mexico)


Numberand Percentageof
Era Violencias Imposiciones Elections
Santa Anna 6 43% 3 21% 5 36%
Juarez/Diaz 6 50% 3 25%/ 3 25%
Revolutionary 4 25% 12 75% o
Totals i6 38% I8 43% 8 Ig%

Mexican Development : An Elite Analysis


One way of differentiating between elites is to consider them as being either
multi-functional or political/governmental.30 Political/governmental elites
are professional politicians and government workers. Multi-functional elites
cross back and forth between various elite roles. Two variables, career span
and career crossover, are used to differentiate between elite types. Political/

30 This distinction is based largely upon Robert Scott, ' Political Elites and Political Moderniza-
tion: the Crisis of Transition ', Lipser and Solari (eds.), Elites in Latin America, pp. I20-I.
Scott distinguishes between functional and political elites. Here the terms are changed so
that they relate more directly to the distinction being made.

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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 261

governmental elites include anyone with 15 years of political/governmental


experience. However, those individuals who cross over between elite roles
during the i5 years period are consideredmulti-functional elites. A non-politi-
cal/governmental occupation is not taken as evidence of crossover. Valentin
G6mez Farias, for instance, was a physician and at one time he practiced
medicine. However, his medical career was obviously peripheral to his
political career. Throughout his adult life he was the acknowledged leader
of the Liberal Party and for 30 years he served in various government posts.
Any president with a non-political occupation but with a career such as this
is considered a political elite. The easiest political/governmental elite to iden-
tify is the individual who has spent his life in politics and government and
who has no social or economic resources. Benito Juarez, for example, was a
political/governmental elite. His whole life was spent in various political/
governmental roles, and his power was based solely upon those political roles.
He never moved into business, journalistic, or military roles. Unhappily, not
all presidents are so easily categorized. However, each president has been
coded and the results are in column 2 of Table i. It is assumed here that
political development occurs when multi-functional elites are replaced by
political/governmental elites. That is, the greater the incidence role/elite
congruence-political elites filling political roles-the more developed the
system. Table ii indicates that Mexico has been increasingly recruiting poli-
tical elites to the presidency. When measured in terms of years in office, the
improving position of the political/governmental elites becomes even more
apparent, so that, by this scale, substantial political development has occurred
in Mexico.
TABLE I I

Functional and Political Elites (Mexico)


Number of Presidents Years in Office
Era f p f p
Santa Anna 74% 26% 96% 4%
Juarez/Diaz 72% 28% 66% 34/
Revolutionary 62% 38% 55% 45%

Mexico also evidences considerable political development when compared


with four other Latin American countries. In Tables I2 and 13 the incidence of
political/governmental elites filling the Mexican executive since 1940 is com-
pared with the Argentine, Venezuelan, Colombian, and Paraguayan cases.
Every president who served between I940 and I965 is included, and even if
he served only one day in I940 or I965 his whole consecutive term is counted.
Forty-three men constitute the survey. Each has been coded as a multi-func-

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262 John G. Conklin

tional or political/governmental elite (see Appendix III). These Tables show


Mexico to be the most politically developed of the five countries. Moreover, the
percentile distance between Mexico and the other countries is strikingly
wide.
TABLE 12

Levels of Political Development : Numbers of Presidents


Numberand Percentageof Presidents
Country Multi-functional Political/Governmental
Mexico 2 33% 4 67%
Argentina 7 64% 4 36%
Venezuela 6 67% 3 33?
Colombia 7 77% 2 23%
Paraguay 7 88% I 12%

TABLE 13

Levels of Political Development: Years in Office


Numberand Percentageof Yearsin Office
Country Multi-functional Political/Governmental
Mexico 12 33% 24 67%
Argentina 17 61% II 39%
Venezuela 27 66% 14 34%
Colombia 27 79%i 6 2I

Paraguay 24 84% 5 I6?/

CONCLUSIONS

Substantive
Who governs? At the outset of this paper this question was posed as a focal
point for political research. Who governs Mexico? Unfortunately, this paper
addressesthis question in a very narrow sense, that is, from the perspectiveof
the office of the chief executive. It does, however, tell us who fills the presi-
dency and suggests long-term recruitment patterns. In Mexico, the 'typical
president was born in a town or city, likely in the Core of the country or in one
of the Northern states. He probablycompleted secondaryschool and there is a
good chance he is a college graduate or finished his training as a military cadet.
There is a strong chance he is either a soldier or a politician with legal train-
ing and in his forties or fifties. The 'typical' Chilean president was born in
the heart of the country, probably Santiago, graduated from college, probably
the law school at the University of Chile, had an extensive careeras a politician
and in government service, and assumed the chief executive in his fifties or
sixties.

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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 263

A major difference in the backgrounds of the Mexican and Chilean execu-


tives is the comparativelylarge number of military presidents in Mexico. But
the most significant difference lies in the relative homogeneity in the back-
grounds of the Chilean presidents.Compared with the Chileans, the Mexicans
are a much more heterogenous lot. Whether we are talking about age,
occupation, or birthplace, it is easier to talk of a 'typical' Chilean than a
'typical' Mexican chief executive.
Over the long haul, there has been a definite trend toward the ' civilization'
of the Mexican presidency. Moreover, the occupations of the civilian presi-
dents are increasingly political/governmental. Taking this as an indicator of
political modernization, Mexico's political history has been characterized by
'
'development,' and the country has attained a degree of development' not
yet achieved by some of her southern neighbors. Simultaneously, there has
been a shift away from the use of violencias and elections to gain office. Today
the imposicion seems to have been institutionalized.

Method
There are a number of practical advantages to the positional approach in
studying elites. First, it greatly reduces the problem of elite identification,
especially when the position represents the pinnacle or near-pinnacle of the
political system. Here the office of the chief executive in Latin America is
used as the unit of analysis, and it seems safe to assume that even the obscure
personalitieswho served short provisional terms are representativeof an elite.
This method of identification is particularly useful in large countries where
the researcher is concerned with national elites. The problems encountered
in identifying national elites reputationally or decisionally in a country the
size of Mexico are formidable and time-consuming. The accessibility of the
'positional tool' enhances its utility. The investigator can identify and
analyze elites without having to operate in the field. Along these same lines,
positional analysis lends itself to comparative work. The observer can move
cross-nationally,examining a single position without totally immersing him-
self (or herself) in the government and politics of each country or visiting
every country personally. Finally, a positional study is relatively easy to
design becauseits parametersare more easily defined.
Not all data is equally suited for coding and quantification. Some of the
variables used in this study such as years in office, age, and education, result
in 'hard' data that is virtually irrefutable. However, other variables such as
elite type, occupation, and means to office, are ' soft' in the sense that the
data results from the researcher'sjudgment of how an individual took office,
his occupation, and his elite type. This inspective data is impressionistic and,

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264 John G. Conklin

lacking the precision of hard data, is more subjectto errorand criticism. Sadly,
'hard data variables' tend to concern relatively unimportant questions,
whereas ' soft data variables' tend to deal with matters of greater significance.
For instance, the average age of the presidents of a country is obviously less
important than the type of elite he represents or the means he used to gain
office.
Both types of data can be criticized when the researchercombines classes of
variables into aggregates and uses the aggregates for generalizing. Inevitably,
distortions are introduced, particularly when the number of observations is
limited. Quantification is, however, a useful tool for bringing a semblance of
order to a large number of observations. Unless various classes of people are
aggregated the raw data may well 'engulf' the researcherand its significance
might be lost.

Social Background Studies


The backgrounds of politically powerful people are useful for descriptive
purposes. But, what is needed are studies that link backgrounds and behavior.
This paper includes a behavioral variable, means to office, and I have attemp-
ted to identify any relationship that might exist between background and how
individuals achieve the presidency. This is simply suggestive of what might
be done. Another question that needs to be researched is the relationship
between background and policy. Does an individual's class origins, education,
or occupation affect his policy orientation? Does it matter if an executive is a
military man or a civilian? If it does matter, what are the policy conse-
quences of these occupational types? These are the sort of questions to which
we might addressourselves.

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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 265

APPENDIX I

States, Towns, and Populations : Birthplace of Mexican Presidents


Statesand Towns Populations
Aguascalientes 113,978
Hacienda de Troje 88
Campeche 85,795
Campeche 17,109
Coahuila 367,652
Ciudad Muzquiz 4,622
Parras 6,476
Cuatro Cienegas 2,278
Santo Domingo 59I
Saltillo 23,996
Durango 436,147
Durango 3I,092
Tamazula 639
Guanajunto 1,075,270
Guanajuato 41,486
Guerrero 605,437
Chilpancingo 7,497
Tixtla 6,316
Santa Maria de la Concepci6n Atoyac 2,009
Hidalgo 641,895
Huichapan ,o070
Jalisco 1,202,802
Guadalajara (2) 101,208
Colotlan 4,850
Michoacafn 991,649
Morelia(2) 37,278
Jiquilpan (2) 4,436
Nuevo Leon 368,929
Monterrey 62,266
Oaxaca 1,04I,035
San Pablo Guelatao 354
Oaxaco 35,049
Puebla ,o092,456
Puebla 93,52I
Ocampo 4,96I
Tezuitlan I 1,625
CiudadCerdain 7,346
Queretaro 243,5I5
Queretaro (2) 33,I52

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266 John G. Conklin

APPENDIXI (contd.)
Statesand Towns Populations
San Luis Potosi 624,748
Ciudad(Valle) de Maiz 4,266
San Luis Potosi 61,0I9
Sonora 262,545
Guaymas (2) 8,658
Hermosillo I0,6I3
Alamos 6,i8o
Siquisiva 76
Tamaulipas 249,253
Matamoros 8,347
Ciudad Victoria 11,25
Veracruz 1,124,368
Jalapa(3) 20,388
Veracruz(3) 29,164
Tlacotalpan 5,089
Sayula 3,667
Zacatecas 475,863
Zacatecas 32,866
Federal District (io) 468,705
Source: The population for each town is from the census of I900. This is the earliest census
data available. Ministeriode Fomento, Censo Generalde la RepublicaMexicana(Mexico, I90I-6).
The state figures are also from the I900 census and are taken from Pan American Union,
Mexico: A General Sketch (Washington, Pan American Union, I9II), p. 333.

APPENDIXII

States of Mexico by Region


Core South
Aguascalientes Campeche
Federal District Chiapas
Guanajuato Guerrero
Hidalgo Oaxaca
Mexico QuintanaRoo
Michoacan Tabasco
Morelos Yucatan
Puebla
Queretaro
San Luis Potosi
Tlaxcala
Veracruz

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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 267

APPENDIXII (contd.)
North West
Baja California, Norte Colima
Baja California, Sur Jalisco
Coahuila Nayarit
Chihuahua Zacatecas
Durango
Nuevo Leon
Sinaloa
Sonora
Tamaulipas
Source: Howard Cline, The U.S. and Mexico, pp. 433-4.

APPENDIXIII

Presidents of Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay and Venezuela


(1940-65)

Argentina Mexico
Roberto Ortiz f Lazaro Cardenas f
Ramon Castillo p Avila Camacho f
Arturo Rawson f Miguel Aleman p
Pedro Ramirez f Ruiz Cortines p
Edelmiro Farrell f L6pez Mateos p
Juan Per6n f Diaz Ordaz P
p
Pedro Aramburu f
Eduardo Lonardi f Paraguay
Arturo Frondizi J. Estigarribia f
p
Jose Marfa Guido Higinio Morinigo f
p
Arturo Illia Juan Frutos f
P
p
J. Natalicio f
Colombia Raimundo Rol6n f
L6pez Pumarejo f Molas L6pez f
Eduardo Santos f Federico Chaves p
Lleras Camargo f Alfredo Stroessner f
Ospina Perez f
Laureano G6mez f
R. Urdaneta p
Rojas Pinilla f
Gabriel Paris f
Le6n Valencia p

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268 lohn G. Conklin

APPENDIXIII (contd.)
Venezuela

L6pez Contreras f
Medina Angarita f
R6mulo Betancourt p
Gallegos Freire f
Delgado Chalbaud f
German Suarez p
Perez Jimenez f
W. Larrazabal f
Raul Leoni p

APPENDIXIV

Education of the Mexican Presidents

Agustfn de Iturbide Secondary


Guadalupe Victoria College
Vicente Guerrero None
Jose Maria Bocanegra College
Pedro Velez College
Anastasio Bustamante Secondary
Melchor Muzquiz Unknown
Manuel G6mez Pedraza Primary
Valentin G6mez Farfas College
Santa Anna Military Cadet
Miguel Barragan Unknown
Jose Justo Corro College
Nicolas Bravo Unknown
Francisco J. Echeverria Some Secondary-Level Unknown
Valentin Canalizo Unknown
J. J. de Herrera Military Cadet
Mariano Paredes Military Cadet
Jose Marfa Salas Some School-Level Unknown
Pedro Marfa Anaya Some School-Level Unknown
M. de la Pena y Pena College
Mariano Arista Military Cadet
Juan Bautista Ceballos College
Manuel Maria Lombardini Some School-Level Unknown
Martin Carrera Military Cadet
R. Diaz de la Vega Military Cadet
Juan Alvarez Tutorial
Ignacio Comonfort College
Felix Zuloaga Unknown
Manuel Robles Pezuela Some School-Level Unknown

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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 269

APPENDIX IV (contd.)

Miguel Miram6n Military Cadet


Jose Ignacio Pav6n College
S. Lerdo de Tejada College
Jose Maria Iglesias College
Benito Juarez College
Porfirio Diaz Secondary
Juan N. Mendez Unknown
Manuel Gonzalez Some School-Level Unknown
Francisco L. de la Barra Attended College
Francisco I. Madero Attended College
Pedro Lascurain College
Victoriano Huerta Military Cadet
Francisco Carvajal College
Venustiano Carranza Secondary
Eulalio Gutierrez Some School-Level Unknown
Roque Gonzalez Garza Some School-Level Unknown
Francisco Lagos Chazaro College
Adolfo de la Huerta Secondary
Alvaro Obregon Some School-Level Unknown
Plutarco Elias Calles Secondary
Emilio Portes Gil College
Pascual Ortiz Rubio College
Abelardo Rodriguez Secondary
Lazaro Cardenas Primary
Manuel Avila Camacho Secondary
Miguel Aleman College
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines Secondary
Adolfo L6pez Mateos College
Gustavo Dfaz Ordaz College

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