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J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 5, 2, 247-269 Printed in Great Britain 247
by JOHN G. CONKLIN
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248 John G. Conklin
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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 249
ments to us and in key documents such as national plans '." The title of the
project's second volume, The Failure of Elites, indicates the basic finding of
the VENELITE researchgroup.
From the point of view of the social sciences, this projecthas larger method-
ological implications. It applies ' scientific' researchtechniques to socially and
politically volatile questions. Moreover, the current Venezuelan elite, whose
responses made the study possible, can hardly view the project's conclusion
as 'friendly'. Indeed, Bonilla writes that the domestic elite within the
' national armies, national parties, national bourgeoisies all have fallen short
of the immediate challenge '.1 Only the cultural elite, led by the university
community, seems to understandadequatelythe programsneeded for the long-
term development of Venezuela. Whatever the merits of this conclusion, it
can be read as a call for revolutionary upheaval. Where social scientists are,
even implicitly, prescribing such courses of action, the validity and reliability
of their methodology is of crucial importance. In other words, this book
directly raises the question of whether we are engaged in political science or
political philosophy and whether or not one can be divorced from the other.
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250 John G. Conklin
chief executive.17He covers its formal legal aspects completely and discusses
informal powers as well.
Since I96I, two articles have suggested another direction for studying the
Latin American chief executive. The first, authored by James Busey, con-
cerned the major presidents of Costa Rica, their backgrounds, means of
achieving office, and the conditions surrounding their leaving office.18How-
ever, Busey's purpose was not a full description of the Costa Rican executives.
His background data is limited and his list of thirty-five presidents excludes
provisional, interim, and acting executives, of which there have been twenty-
five. In I969 Gray and Kirwin published an article on the Chilean
presidents.'9 Their background material included birthdate, place of birth,
education, and occupation. They categorize changing administrations into
two groups, stable and non-stable, and use the background and succession
data in comparison with U.S. executives. Their sample includes all Chileans
who have served as chief executive.
This article is a continuation of the direction initiated by Busey and by Gray
and Kirwin. Its substantive purpose is to describe the backgrounds and
successionpatternsof the Mexican chief executives. For comparativepurposes,
I have integrated into this paper the data on the Chilean presidency made
available by Gray and Kirwin. Methodologically, this paper touches upon the
utility of positional analysis, the advantages and disadvantagesof categorizing
people and events, and of quantification. It is in an exploratory spirit that I
have included a developmental scale among my categories.
MEXICO: A CASE STUDY
Occupationand Tenure
Since 1822, Mexico has had 58 presidents or an average of one every 2 2
years.20Of course, not all presidents served an average term. In fact, 40 held
office for a period of less than 2 2 years and 32 of these presidents were in
office less than a single year. The median term, o1 months and i days, more
accurately reflects the high turnover rate characteristicof the Mexican Presi-
dency.21The shortest length of time spent in office was one day, the longest
was Porfirio Diaz's 26 years,5 months and 25 days.
17 Alexander Edelmann, Latin American Government and Politics (Homewood, The Dorsey
Press, I965), pp. 393-427?
18 James L. Busey, ' The Presidentsof Costa Rica ', The Americas, xvIII (July I96I), pp. 55-70.
19 Richard B. Gray and Frederick R. Kirwin, ' Presidential Succession in Chile: 1817-I966 ',
Journalof Inter-AmericanStudies, xi (Jan. 1969), pp. I44-59.
20 See Table
I for a list of presidents. This study concerns the Mexican presidents to I970.
21 The turnover rate is much greater than the total number of presidents indicates. Ten
presidents occupied the office two or more times. G6mez Farias, for example, was president
for a total of about 9 months, but was in office on five different occasions. Santa Anna was
the chief executive ii times, more than any other Mexican president.
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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 251
TABLE I
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252 John G. Conklin
TABLE I (contd.)
Elite Type Time Means
President Age Occupation in Office to Office
Yrs Mths Days
Francisco Carvajal 43 f 1 28 p
Venustiano Carranza 54 f h 5-IO- 6 v
Eulalio Gutierrez 34 f m/i 2-Io i
Roque Gonzailez Garza 29 f m/i 4-24 i
Francisco Lagos Chazaro 36 p g/l 6-25 i
Adolfo de la Huerta 39 p g 6 v
Alvaro Obreg6n 40 f m/i 4 i
Plutarco Elias Calles 47 f m/i 4i
Emilio Portes Gil 38 p g/1 I- -28 p
Pascual Ortiz Rubio 53 f m/i 2- 8--II i
Abelardo Rodriguez 44 f m/i 2- 2-4 p
Lazaro Cardenas 40 f m/i 6 i
Manuel Avila Camacho 43 f m/i 6 i
Miguel Aleman 44 P g/1 6i
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines 6o p g 6i
Adolfo L6pez Mateos 48 p g/1 6 i
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz 53 p g/1 6 i
Explanation:
The first column (age) refers to each president's age upon assuming office for the first time.
Column two (elite type) categorizes each president as a multi-functional elite (f) or a political
elite (p). Political elites are professionals in government and politics, whereas multi-functional
elites possess leadership positions outside the political arena. See the text for a further discussion.
Column three lists the occupationsof each president. The symbols read as follows:
m/i = military insurgent b = business
m = military e = educator
g = government/publicman j = journalist
I = lawyer h = hacendado
=
p physician
Time in office (column four) refers to the total number of years-months-dayseach president
served.
The last column (means to office) lists four ways in which individual presidents have come
to power. The symbols translateas:
v = violencia
i= imposicion
e = election
p provisional
See the text tor a fuller explanationof these terms.
Sources: Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (New York, Atheneum Press,
I965); Manuel Garcia Pur6n, Mexico y sus Gobernantes (Mexico, Libreria de Manuel Porrua,
S.A., 1964); Percy Alvin Martin (ed.), Who's Who in Latin America (Stanford, Stanford
University Press, I940); and Current Biography, 1940 to 1968.
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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 253
TABLE 2
that all three occupational categories were about equally represented during
the initial period, professional soldiers and civilians (930%) dominated the
Juarez/Diaz epoch, while military insurgents and civilian (95%) dominated
the third era. When the same factors (occupation and numbers of presidents)
are correlated with tenure, an interesting pattern emerges.23 Taking the
civilians in each historical unit, it is seen that although 30.5% of the presidents
during the Santa Anna period were civilians they all served less than one year.
During the Juarez//Daz era civilians came to power 35% of the time, but
more significantly, they began to serve for more prolonged periods. Finally,
during the Revolutionary era civilians became the predominant group both
numerically(57%) and with regard to tenure.
If one assumes a positive relationship between office, tenure and the actual
exercise of power, the pattern is clear. The history of the Mexican Presidency
has been one of growing civilian control of the position itself and, hence, of
the political system. Given their short durations in office, civilians during
the Santa Anna era might well be considered puppets for various professional
and insurgent generals. Political power, then, rested primarily upon coercive
instruments. In the Juarez/Diaz period civilians were able to exercise power
and control for the first time. This suggests an increasingly sophisticated
system in that crude force was no longer the sole requisite for the effective
22 See Table 2. In all of the tables the letter c will be used to refer to civilian, m to denote
professional soldier, and m/i to indicate military insurgent. Military insurgent refers to
individuals who began their career as guerrilla soldiers or with irregular forces rather than
with the standing army. Of course, irregular forces were usually formed to fight against
the regular army.
23 See Table 3.
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254 John G. Conklin
exercise of presidential power. In the final era, for the first time in Mexico's
history there were more civilian than soldier presidents. Moreover, the tenure
pattern begun during the Juarez/Diaz period became more pronounced as
31% of the presidents were civilians serving more than a single year. (Com-
parable figures for the first and second historical periods were 9% and 2I%
respectively.)
TABLE3
Within the civilian groups the majority of the Mexican presidents have
been government officials/public men, and/or lawyers. 3I% of all Mexican
executives were governmental or public men and 27% lawyers. Among them
have been a sprinkling of physicians, businessmen, educators,journalists, and
hacendados.
The occupations of the Chilean executives are considerably different from
those of the Mexicans. At least go% of the Chilean presidents had extensive
office-holding public careersprior to achieving the presidency, and 47% were
lawyers. However, the most significant difference between the occupational
experiences of the Mexican and Chilean presidents concerns the incidence of
military executives. In Mexico, a majority of the presidents (58%) have been
either professional or insurgent soldiers whereas only 20% of the Chilean
executives fall into these categories.
These occupational differences in recruitment patterns undoubtedly reflect
the different political traditions of Mexico and Chile. Chile has been notable
for its adherence to the formal aspects of constitutionalism and particularly
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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 255
for its civilian institutions that have historically 'contained' the country's
political struggles. These institutions, the parties, legislatures, and executive
departmentsand agencies have regularly and continuously enveloped Chilean
politics and have served as 'feeders' to the presidency. On the other hand,
Mexico's political history has been characterized by lengthy periods of tur-
bulence, punctuated by the rise of strong individuals who have been able, by
the weight of their personality,to subsume individual and group antagonisms.
Mexico's political fabric has only become institutionalized in the last thirty or
forty years. Not surprisingly, where civilian political institutions remain
embryonic and turbulence prevails, the military services, both regular and
irregular, become important avenues to the executive.
TABLE 4
24 The State of Mexico and the Federal District, i.e., Mexico City, are treated as a single unit
because the only president from Mexico State, Adolfo L6pez Mateos, was raised in a town
on the outskirts of Mexico City. All his formal education was inside the city itself. See
Appendix I for a listing of the states and towns of presidents.
25 See Appendix II for a list of states in each region.
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256 John G. Conklin
Percentage of
Number of Percentage Population in
Population Presidents of Presidents Cities *
Up to 2,500 8 14 65
2,500 to I0,000 I5 26 13
10,000 to 50,000 20 34 8
Over 50,000 15 26 14
* Source for this column, Howard Cline, The U.S.
Percentage of cities, nation is for I940.
and Mexico, p. 436.
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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 257
(62%) were born in cities of over 50,000. In the mid-I920s only fifteen to
twenty per cent of the population lived in such cities. Even more striking in
Chile is the great number of executives from Santiago. Around fifty per cent
of Chile's presidentswere born there.
The youngest man to enter the Mexican presidency was 26 years old, the
oldest, 69. Almost half (47%?)entered office in their forties, and the great
majority (74%/)were in either their forties or fifties. The ages of the Mexican
presidents are summarized by the historical period on Table 6. The Table
indicates that during the Juarez/Dfaz era the chief executives tended to be
older than during the two other periods which are similar with regard to
age. In Chile, the youngest office-holder was thirty-five and the oldest
seventy-five. Almost half were in their fifties. Table 6 shows that as a group
Chile's presidents have been older than the Mexican executives.
TABLE 6
Education
Appendix IV lists the Mexican presidents and their educational back-
grounds. This shows that 42% of the Mexicans attended or graduated from
college. In Chile, 78% of the presidentswere college graduates. A majority of
the Chilean college graduates (71%) received their degrees from the Univer-
sity of Chile. An additional 15% in each country had formal training in mili-
tary cadet school. 37% of the Mexican presidents received only a primary or
secondary education while only 4% of their Chilean counterparts were so
educated.
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258 John G. Conklin
refers to any situation in which a presidential candidate uses armed force
directly to achieve office. This can take many forms, from a bloodless golpe
to a violent revolution. One can discern violencia by locating evidence of an
armed action undertaken to achieve immediate power. As used here an
election means a contest between two or more candidates. For a contest to
exist more than one candidate must have a 'reasonable chance' of winning.
number of
occupation violencia imposicioon election
m 9 3 3
m/i 2 9 2
c 5 6 3
Imposiciones are all power turnovers that fall between violencia and elections.
Normally these are election charades in which there is a single candidate or
only one candidate with a chance for victory. Tables 7, 8, and 9 list the
presidents according to means to power. Occupation and means to power are
outlined below.29
TABLE 7
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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 259
TABLE 8
TABLE 9
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260 John G. Conklin
TABLE IO
30 This distinction is based largely upon Robert Scott, ' Political Elites and Political Moderniza-
tion: the Crisis of Transition ', Lipser and Solari (eds.), Elites in Latin America, pp. I20-I.
Scott distinguishes between functional and political elites. Here the terms are changed so
that they relate more directly to the distinction being made.
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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 261
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262 John G. Conklin
TABLE 13
CONCLUSIONS
Substantive
Who governs? At the outset of this paper this question was posed as a focal
point for political research. Who governs Mexico? Unfortunately, this paper
addressesthis question in a very narrow sense, that is, from the perspectiveof
the office of the chief executive. It does, however, tell us who fills the presi-
dency and suggests long-term recruitment patterns. In Mexico, the 'typical
president was born in a town or city, likely in the Core of the country or in one
of the Northern states. He probablycompleted secondaryschool and there is a
good chance he is a college graduate or finished his training as a military cadet.
There is a strong chance he is either a soldier or a politician with legal train-
ing and in his forties or fifties. The 'typical' Chilean president was born in
the heart of the country, probably Santiago, graduated from college, probably
the law school at the University of Chile, had an extensive careeras a politician
and in government service, and assumed the chief executive in his fifties or
sixties.
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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 263
Method
There are a number of practical advantages to the positional approach in
studying elites. First, it greatly reduces the problem of elite identification,
especially when the position represents the pinnacle or near-pinnacle of the
political system. Here the office of the chief executive in Latin America is
used as the unit of analysis, and it seems safe to assume that even the obscure
personalitieswho served short provisional terms are representativeof an elite.
This method of identification is particularly useful in large countries where
the researcher is concerned with national elites. The problems encountered
in identifying national elites reputationally or decisionally in a country the
size of Mexico are formidable and time-consuming. The accessibility of the
'positional tool' enhances its utility. The investigator can identify and
analyze elites without having to operate in the field. Along these same lines,
positional analysis lends itself to comparative work. The observer can move
cross-nationally,examining a single position without totally immersing him-
self (or herself) in the government and politics of each country or visiting
every country personally. Finally, a positional study is relatively easy to
design becauseits parametersare more easily defined.
Not all data is equally suited for coding and quantification. Some of the
variables used in this study such as years in office, age, and education, result
in 'hard' data that is virtually irrefutable. However, other variables such as
elite type, occupation, and means to office, are ' soft' in the sense that the
data results from the researcher'sjudgment of how an individual took office,
his occupation, and his elite type. This inspective data is impressionistic and,
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264 John G. Conklin
lacking the precision of hard data, is more subjectto errorand criticism. Sadly,
'hard data variables' tend to concern relatively unimportant questions,
whereas ' soft data variables' tend to deal with matters of greater significance.
For instance, the average age of the presidents of a country is obviously less
important than the type of elite he represents or the means he used to gain
office.
Both types of data can be criticized when the researchercombines classes of
variables into aggregates and uses the aggregates for generalizing. Inevitably,
distortions are introduced, particularly when the number of observations is
limited. Quantification is, however, a useful tool for bringing a semblance of
order to a large number of observations. Unless various classes of people are
aggregated the raw data may well 'engulf' the researcherand its significance
might be lost.
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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 265
APPENDIX I
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266 John G. Conklin
APPENDIXI (contd.)
Statesand Towns Populations
San Luis Potosi 624,748
Ciudad(Valle) de Maiz 4,266
San Luis Potosi 61,0I9
Sonora 262,545
Guaymas (2) 8,658
Hermosillo I0,6I3
Alamos 6,i8o
Siquisiva 76
Tamaulipas 249,253
Matamoros 8,347
Ciudad Victoria 11,25
Veracruz 1,124,368
Jalapa(3) 20,388
Veracruz(3) 29,164
Tlacotalpan 5,089
Sayula 3,667
Zacatecas 475,863
Zacatecas 32,866
Federal District (io) 468,705
Source: The population for each town is from the census of I900. This is the earliest census
data available. Ministeriode Fomento, Censo Generalde la RepublicaMexicana(Mexico, I90I-6).
The state figures are also from the I900 census and are taken from Pan American Union,
Mexico: A General Sketch (Washington, Pan American Union, I9II), p. 333.
APPENDIXII
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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 267
APPENDIXII (contd.)
North West
Baja California, Norte Colima
Baja California, Sur Jalisco
Coahuila Nayarit
Chihuahua Zacatecas
Durango
Nuevo Leon
Sinaloa
Sonora
Tamaulipas
Source: Howard Cline, The U.S. and Mexico, pp. 433-4.
APPENDIXIII
Argentina Mexico
Roberto Ortiz f Lazaro Cardenas f
Ramon Castillo p Avila Camacho f
Arturo Rawson f Miguel Aleman p
Pedro Ramirez f Ruiz Cortines p
Edelmiro Farrell f L6pez Mateos p
Juan Per6n f Diaz Ordaz P
p
Pedro Aramburu f
Eduardo Lonardi f Paraguay
Arturo Frondizi J. Estigarribia f
p
Jose Marfa Guido Higinio Morinigo f
p
Arturo Illia Juan Frutos f
P
p
J. Natalicio f
Colombia Raimundo Rol6n f
L6pez Pumarejo f Molas L6pez f
Eduardo Santos f Federico Chaves p
Lleras Camargo f Alfredo Stroessner f
Ospina Perez f
Laureano G6mez f
R. Urdaneta p
Rojas Pinilla f
Gabriel Paris f
Le6n Valencia p
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268 lohn G. Conklin
APPENDIXIII (contd.)
Venezuela
L6pez Contreras f
Medina Angarita f
R6mulo Betancourt p
Gallegos Freire f
Delgado Chalbaud f
German Suarez p
Perez Jimenez f
W. Larrazabal f
Raul Leoni p
APPENDIXIV
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Elite Studies: the Case of the Mexican Presidency 269
APPENDIX IV (contd.)
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