Technological Forecasting & Social Change 78 (2011) 217–230

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Technological Forecasting & Social Change

A framework for mapping industrial emergence

R. Phaal ⁎, E. O'Sullivan, M. Routley, S. Ford, D. Probert
Institute for Manufacturing, University of Cambridge, 17 Charles Babbage Road, Cambridge, CB3 0FS, UK

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The industrial landscape is becoming increasingly complex and dynamic, with innovative
Received 8 December 2009 technologies stimulating the emergence of new applications, business models and industries.
Received in revised form 9 June 2010 This paper presents a framework for mapping science and technology-based industrial
Accepted 26 June 2010
emergence, in order to better understand the nature and characteristics of such phenomena,
as a basis for improved strategy development. A full lifecycle perspective is included,
Keywords: emphasizing early stage phases associated with scientific and technological developments,
Industrial dynamics together with key transitions between phases related to the conversion of scientific knowledge
Roadmapping to technological capability, application, industrial activity and economic value. Roadmapping
concepts are used to map industrial emergence phenomena from various perspectives that
cover value creation and capture activities together with demand and supply-side factors. The
framework has been tested by developing more than 25 diverse ‘emergence maps’ of historical
industrial evolution, building confidence that the framework might be applicable to current and
future emergence. Common characteristics of industrial emergence have been identified,
including key events and milestones, focusing on a chain of demonstrators that delineate the
various phases and transitions.
© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Many managers and policy makers are aware of the strategic importance of science and technology in delivering value and
competitive advantage to their organizations, industrial networks, regions and nations. Such groups should be aware of the
dynamics associated with the emergence of technologies, markets and organizations if they are to be effective. These issues are
becoming more critical as the cost, complexity and rate of technology change increase, and competition and sources of technology
globalize.
Both managers and policy makers (funding agencies) have to make decisions about which technological areas to focus
investment on and which strategic options to pursue. Such decisions are challenging, owing to the complex and dynamic nature of
market, technological and industrial developments taking place, compounded by scarcity of information and uncertainty of
forecasts. Considerable time can elapse between key decisions to fund technology developments, and the economic, social and
environmental benefits sought through the exploitation of the technology in applications, products and services.
While many specific processes and tools are available to support organizations develop and implement innovation strategies,
there is a need for holistic, integrating frameworks that can provide context and support for navigating this turbulent process from
initial concept to market, throughout the industry lifecycle. Porter [1] defines emerging industries as “newly formed or re-formed
industries that have been created by technological innovations, shifts in relative cost relationships, emergence of new consumer needs, or
other economic and sociological changes that elevate a new product or service to the level of a potentially viable business opportunity”.
This highlights the broad scope of issues that need to be considered, while also focusing on specific factors that enable or hinder
emergence processes.

⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1223 765828.

E-mail address: rp108@cam.ac.uk (R. Phaal).

0040-1625/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2010.06.018
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The framework presented in this paper is based on the application of roadmapping concepts (a technique developed for
supporting future-oriented strategy and innovation) to historical industrial emergence [2], focusing on technology-intensive
product-based sectors. The aim is to improve understanding of the dynamics and characteristics of emergence, with the intention
of developing approaches that can be applied to inform strategy and decision making for current and future industrial emergence,
at both firm and public policy levels.
More than 25 ‘emergence maps’ of historical industrial evolution have been created to support the development and testing
of the framework. These have been selected to cover a diverse range of industrial domains, applications, technological and
scientific areas, and phases of industrial emergence: automotive, battery, catalytic converter, cheese, computer, digital camera,
displays (TFT-LCD), ink jet printing, low-temperature technology, mobile phone, medical imaging (including MRI, ultrasound,
tomography and X-ray), optical fiber, orthopedic trauma, photovoltaics, portable entertainment, regenerative medicine, semi-
conductors, silicon gyroscope, software, stem cells, synthetic diamond, video messaging and wireless communications.
The conceptual foundations for the proposed framework for industrial emergence are reviewed in Section 2 and the framework
is described in detail in Section 3, illustrated with reference to one particular case in Section 4 (synthetic diamond). The paper
concludes with a discussion of the patterns of industrial emergence that have been observed, and recommendations for further
development and application of the framework.

2. Conceptual foundations

The scope of industrial emergence is large, covering many areas of research and practice. The following sections focus on three
key perspectives that underpin the proposed framework for mapping industrial emergence: 1) patterns of industrial dynamics,
with particular reference to time-based models; 2) the underlying principles of emergence, relating to the behavior of complex
systems and their evolution; and 3) the technology roadmapping approach used as a basis for mapping industrial emergence.

2.1. Patterns of industrial dynamics

There is an increasing awareness that the interaction between science and industry is an important aspect of the innovation
ecology [3]. Information available on the topic of emerging industries is disparate and dispersed amongst several fields of research
[4,5]; economics [6], marketing [7], socio-technical systems [8–10], and industrial dynamics [11] have all published models and
theories relating to industrial evolution. However these focus on evolution rather than emergence [4]. Within the models of
industry evolution, knowledge of the early stages is much sparser than within the later stages [12].
Describing the nature of industrial emergence is made all the more challenging by a lack of consensus about how to define the
term ‘industry’. Several authors have acknowledged this difficulty [1,6], that the nature of an industry evolves over time [13], and
the definition is linked to perception and cognitive frames [14]. It can be difficult to define exactly when an industry begins, and
specifically what stage an industry is currently in [15], as “all firms within an industry need not be in the same stage of the industry
lifecycle” [16]. Due to the complex coupling within industrial emergence, the process is not linear, as described in traditional
economics literature, but instead there are many iterations and interactions between different factors [17,18].
To simplify the understanding of the dynamics involved within industrial emergence, several time-based models have been
proposed, breaking down industrial evolution into phases or stages within a ‘lifecycle’ [13,19–21]. Amongst publications in this
area, there is confusion and overlap between different terminology used, such as ‘industry lifecycle’, ‘product lifecycle’, and
‘market and industry evolution cycle’ [1,16].
Most lifecycle models divide into stages, with a recognized difficulty in defining the boundaries of each stage. Often turning
points in the rate of growth of sales are used [13], however this is difficult to apply in an emerging industry, where the definition of
the industry, and the sales data can be difficult to access. Jacobsson and Bergek [22] define two lifecycle phases: formative and
growth, which can be extended to maturity and decline. Suarez [23] defines five phases in the process of technological dominance:
R&D build-up, technical feasibility, creating the market, decisive battle and post-dominance; emphasizing that both firm- and
environmental-level factors are important at each phase. Meijer et al. [24] discuss the different perceived uncertainties seen by
different groups of actors when transitioning from the earliest phase. Key characteristics of emerging industries are uncertainty
[25], the fact that different groups are involved in different phases [24], and the need for organizational structures [26] and
competitive strategies [20] to evolve through the phases.
To assist with progression through the different phases and navigation across the transitions, there are several factors which
can act as enablers; similarly there will be barriers, which will need to be removed or reduced [27]. Due to the non-linear and
specific nature of particular technological developments, there is little point in generic advice [9]. Each case is contextual, industry-
specific, and related to the phase of emergence in which the industry or firm is operating. The interaction between market
(demand side) and technological (supply-side) forces and events is a key driver for industrial emergence, as a co-evolutionary
process. This is explored further in the next section.

2.2. Emergent behavior in complex evolutionary systems

The dynamic patterns of industrial emergence discussed in the previous section are the result of complex interacting and
adaptive processes. Two key theoretical perspectives provide a basis for understanding the behaviors observed in the emergence
maps: industry as a complex system, and industrial emergence as an evolutionary process.
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While our understanding of evolution owes great debts to the biological sciences, there is now broad appreciation that its
application extends to the socio-economic domain [28–30] and that evolution is a ‘generic generative mechanism’ explaining
processes of change in a wide variety of systems [31]. Evolution can be understood as the discrete operations of variation
generation, selection, inheritance and competition, which can all be interpreted in the context of industrial emergence. For
example, within a sector the various business models, strategies, decisions and actions of firms define which are successful and
which fail. However, unlike biological evolution, variations seen in industrial evolution are not blind, but rather are a result of
complex coupling interactions between cognitive, economic and social factors [32]. To understand the dynamics involved within
emerging industries it is important not to focus solely on a demand pull or technology push perspective, but to adopt an approach
which concentrates on the interaction of both these effects [33,34], and the complex interactions between agents and processes
that give rise to co-evolutionary dynamics and emergent behaviors.
Variation is the source of evolution and what makes a system dynamic [35]. Variety in socio-economic systems is generated by
entrepreneurs and organizations by creating new products, processes, markets and organizational forms through processes of
discovery and recombination [36]. This process is not blind or random; agents anticipate market selection forces in the pursuit of
competitive advantage and adapt their strategies as a result of these interactions [35,37]. Those innovations and firms that are able
to adapt to their selection environment have greater ‘fitness’ and are retained; those that fail to adapt to the environment are
eliminated [31,38].
The emergence maps enable the decisions, activities and achievements of the key actors to be depicted (organizations and
individuals), including both market and technological events and their interactions, and how businesses succeed or fail over time.
This is illustrated in Section 4 for the emergence of the synthetic diamond industry, showing how the actions of specific individuals
and organizations play into the broader sweep of industrial competition and development. Behaviors and dynamics at various
levels of the industrial system interact, ranging from actions of individual people to firms, clusters and entire industrial sectors.
Mechanisms for generating microdiversity at the lower levels of the system select for systems that retain these mechanisms
within them [39]. Accordingly, it can be seen that variety generation and selection mechanisms are mutually influential. Through a
process of adaptation, the selection environment shapes the development of innovations by entrepreneurs and firms, while the
variety generated in turn shapes the selection environment [40]. As March describes “… the convergence between an evolving unit
and its environment is complicated by the fact that the environment is not only changing but changing partly as part of a process of
coevolution. There is mutual adaptation between the unit of evolution and the environment” [41].
The reciprocal and non-linear interactions between agents and their strategies lead to co-evolutionary, complex systems and
behavior [35,42]. Such systems can adapt to their external environment, generating coherent structure without the intervention of
a centralized form of internal control but through a process of self-organization [43]. The capacity of complex systems to self-
organize “…enables them to develop or change internal structure spontaneously and adoptively in order to cope with, or manipulate,
their environment” [44].
Self-organization represents a search for ‘attractor solutions’ within a complex system [45] — for example, the development
of industrial clusters and sectors. Describing the ‘crystallization’ of massively disordered systems to a high degree of order,
Kauffman [46] comments how “much of the order we see … may be the direct result not of natural selection but of the natural order
selection was privileged to act on”. Order emerges from unpredictable interactions between entities in physical and socio-economic
systems. This emergence can be described as occurring through two stages; the correlation of entities with one another through
interaction, followed by the catalyzed aggregation of the initial interaction [47]. Self-organization arises through the result of a
complex interaction between the environment, the present state of the system and the history of the system [44].
The history of a system is important for understanding further self-organization and co-evolution because complex systems
exhibit path dependence [48,49]. Existing technologies and institutions are an important precondition for novelty because they
provide the basis for devices and techniques to be modified, along with a rich set of intellectual resources that can be applied to
new settings [50]. Schumpeter was alert to this fact because he saw innovation as occurring through the recombination of existing
products, processes, materials and organizational forms [36]. Similarly, in describing how innovations are a product of what has
come before, Metcalfe [31] comments that “the creation of novelty involves guided variation within perceptions of a limited set of
possibilities. Innovations are never entirely novel; they are always prefigured in some of their dimensions”. New technologies and
industries can therefore be understood as resulting from the existing structure of opportunities and constraints, with path
dependency meaning that initial conditions can have significant impact on the trajectory followed by a technology-based industry
[4,51].
Emergence maps depict the dynamics of how industries evolve and develop, including growth, consolidation, maturity, decline
and failure. New technologies enable waves of application development and market activity, with periods of convergence and
stability, and periods of rapid change. The synthetic diamond case in Section 4 shows how two firms came to dominate an industry,
following a path-dependent trajectory influenced by technological and market developments and events.

2.3. Technology roadmapping

The technology roadmapping approach is widely applied at both firm and sector levels to support innovation, strategy and
policy development and deployment [5,52–63]. It provides a structured approach for mapping the evolution and development of
complex systems.
Previous research in the application of roadmapping [64,65] has demonstrated the flexibility of the approach, leading to a
generalized framework for strategic appraisal, illustrated in Fig. 1. Time is represented explicitly on most roadmaps, which take a
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Fig. 1. Future-oriented roadmapping framework.

forward (future) view, thus providing an holistic framework within which integrated strategy can be represented. The concept
of the emergence maps in this paper extends the time line to the past, enabling the historical evolution of complex industrial
systems to be mapped.
Roadmaps can be thought of as ‘dynamic systems frameworks’ [66], enabling the development and evolution of complex
industrial systems to be mapped. Roadmap frameworks generally comprise two key axes which both require configuration for
application to the mapping of industrial emergence:

1) Time on the horizontal axis, running forward into the future for roadmaps, but extending to the past for emergence maps, to
depict historical events, developments and achievements.
2) A set of themes or perspectives that characterize industrial innovation represented on the vertical axis as layers (and sub-
layers), using the same organizing principles for both future-oriented roadmaps and historical emergence maps.

Extending the time axis to include the past enables the future-oriented roadmapping technique to be used to map historical
activities in a way that is compatible with future strategy. This principle has been demonstrated by Mills et al. [67] for
manufacturing strategy, enabling key learning points to be identified and included in strategic deliberations. The framework
described in this paper is an extension of roadmapping concepts to include principles, structure and content that accounts for the
nature of industrial emergence, identified through a combination of literature review and mapping of historical industrial
emergence, development and evolution.
It is worth noting that there is little evidence in the literature of the extension of roadmapping methods to map and learn from
past events in order to inform future strategy, although many simple linear timelines have been produced. This concept was tested
as part of a previous research project [68], creating a map of how silicon gyroscope systems were developed and exploited within
an aerospace company. This exercise was the inspiration for the emergence mapping approach presented in this paper, and the
associated framework that characterizes patterns of technology-based industrial emergence.

3. Framework for mapping industrial emergence

The industrial emergence mapping framework incorporates three main elements, compatible with roadmapping principles
and methods, described in detail below:

1) Phases and transitions associated with science and technology-based industrial emergence (horizontal axis of the mapping
framework).
2) Key themes that are required to represent industrial emergence, including demand and supply-side drivers, together with
value creation and capture activities and systems (vertical axis of the mapping framework).
3) Significant events and milestones that demarcate the progression from science to technology, application and market.

3.1. Phases and transitions of industrial emergence

Defining the phases and transitions associated with historical industrial emergence is important for understanding the
underlying dynamics, and for providing improved guidance for organizations concerned with current and future emergence. Fig. 2
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Fig. 2. Phases, transitions, milestones and trajectories of technology-intensive industrial emergence.

summarizes the key phases and transitions that have been observed in the mapping studies, reflecting management and
investment focus in terms of technology, application and market development, associated with the content and general patterns
observed in the maps.
The industry lifecycle shown in Fig. 2 is similar to many others that have been proposed in the literature (see Section 2.1), but
with the following additions and features:

- An emphasis on the early stages of industrial evolution, associated with emergence, including a ‘precursor’ phase to represent
the scientific developments that act as the initial conditions for technology-based industrial emergence, and an ‘embryonic’
phase associated with the translation of applied science proof-of-concept demonstrators into technology prototypes and early
application demonstrators.
- A focus on the transitions between phases (science-technology, technology–application and application–market). These
transitions are of particular interest, as they are associated with significant shifts in perspective and stakeholder interests, but
are rarely emphasized in industry lifecycle models.
- The identification of particular milestones (demonstrators) that delineate the various phases and transitions.

Although all phases and transitions of industrial emergence generally have some level of activity and interaction between
technology, application and market, the broad phases of emergence tend to be progressively dominated by activities and events
related to science (S), technology (T), application (A) and market (M).
The proposed phases and transitions of science-based industrial emergence are:

1) Precursor phase (Science dominated emergence): Activities that establish the supporting scientific phenomena (and/or
underpinning technology platform), extending through to the first demonstrator(s) of application potential, which stimulate
industrial interest and investment in particular market-directed technology feasibility studies.
2) Science-technology transition (S-T): Demonstrating the feasibility of a scientific phenomenon (and/or underpinning
technology) to support a new market-directed technology platform, showing the feasibility of the supporting science and
technology to be integrated into an application-specific functional technology system.
3) Embryonic phase (technology-dominated emergence): Improving the reliability and performance of the market-directed
technology to a point where it can be demonstrated in a market-specific environment.
4) Technology–application transition (T–A): Developing the technology and application to a point where commercial potential can
be demonstrated through revenue generation.
5) Nurture phase (application-dominated emergence): Improving the price and performance of the application to a point where
sustainable business potential can be demonstrated.
6) Application–market transition (A–M): Translating price-performance demonstrators into a market with mass growth potential.
7) Growth phase (market-dominated emergence): Marketing, commercial and business development leading to sustainable
industrial growth.
8) Maturity phase: Refining established applications, production processes and business models.
9) Decline / renewal phase: The industry either declines (through competitive disruption) or is sustained or renewed through the
development of new science-based technologies that repeat the above phases.
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It should be noted that the boundaries between these phases and transitions may be ‘blurred’, as a result of aggregating
activities in sub-sectors and the many organizations involved in an industry. This may not be apparent in historical maps, where
the ‘lead wave’ is mapped and the ‘winners’ are clear with hindsight. It should also be noted that the patterns of emergence and
the particular events and milestones that characterize this behavior will depend on the type of sector, requiring customization
of the framework – for example, if the industry is influenced significantly by regulation, or if the application is process intensive.
The emergence mapping framework provides structure that can be applied to current and future emergence, in terms of key
themes, phases, transitions and demonstrators (see Fig. 2 and following sections). These provide the potential for creating an ‘early
warning system’ for managers and policy makers to support strategic decision making, depending on the position in the S-T-A-M
progression, the characteristics of the sector they operate within and other contextual factors. Furthermore, the boundaries of the
phases and transitions described above point to key stages of emergence which managers and policy makers might use as review
and decision-making points for filtering ideas, refining projects and programs, prioritizing investments, and developing policies
and strategies.

3.2. Thematic representation of industrial emergence

The phases and transitions, described in Section 3.1 and Fig. 2, can be used to structure the horizontal axis of emergence maps,
as shown in Fig. 3. These phases and transitions can also be used to position current emergence, with the demonstrator milestones
enabling practical goals to be established for strategy and innovation using roadmapping techniques (Fig. 1). The systems-based
organizing principles that are used to structure roadmaps [66] can be directly applied to emergence maps, ensuring compatibility
of the methods, with the layers and sub-layers representing the key themes and perspectives necessary to understand and depict
industrial emergence and strategy. As for roadmaps [64], the themes used to structure emergence maps need to be customized to
suit the particular focus, scope and type of emergent behavior. Defining the unit of analysis is important (‘value system focus’ and
boundaries in Fig. 3), recognizing that factors external to the industry also influence its development.
The themes (vertical axis) fall into three broad categories, defining an hierarchical taxonomy that is used as a checklist to
design the structure of the map:
1) Value context: The industrial landscape within which opportunities for creating and capturing value occur, including con-
sideration of the broad market trends and drivers (social, economic, environmental, political and technological) that influence
industrial emergence, together with specific industrial dynamics, such as competition, regulation and standards, as well as

Fig. 3. Themes, phases and transitions for emergence maps (past) and roadmaps (future), highlighting system focus and scope.
 R. Phaal et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 78 (2011) 217–230 223

customer needs. Collectively these factors (market demand dynamics) drive the evolution of the industry, in conjunction with
supply-side dynamics.
2) Value capture: The mechanisms and processes used by organizations to appropriate value through delivering products and
services, including consideration of the business models and strategies adopted by firms, the applications developed and the
systems and processes for in-service support, sales, marketing, distribution, operations and supply. Value capture activities are
influenced by both market demand (pull) and capability supply (push) dynamics.
3) Value creation: The competences and capabilities used by organizations to generate products and services, including
consideration of design, development and research activities, financial, human and other resources, management systems and
relationships. Collectively these factors (capability supply dynamics) drive the evolution of the industry, in conjunction with
demand side dynamics.
In roadmapping (strategy) terms [64], the S-T-A-M phases correspond broadly to the following three fundamental time-based
questions: 1) Where do we want to go?, 2) Where are we now?, and 3) How can we get there? The value-based perspectives
described above correspond to three other fundamental roadmapping questions: a) Why do we need to act?, b) What should
we do? and c) How should we do it? (see Fig. 1). These fundamental questions apply at multiple foci and levels of strategy
(e.g. technology, product, firm, sector), enabling scalability of the approach [66], with both the vertical and horizontal axes being
adapted to suit the particular focus and scope, associated with system level and boundaries, respectively.
The primary focus for most of the maps described in this paper is an industrial sector defined on the basis of a class of
application or product (value capture), although a greater emphasis on value creation is normally required at earlier stages
(science and technology), shifting towards market aspects at later stages. Thus, most roadmaps and emergence maps depict a
broadly diagonal pattern from bottom left to top right for each ‘wave’ of emergence, shown schematically in Figs. 1 & 3. This overall
pattern is the product of complex, non-linear, iterative and interactive processes of emergence occurring at different levels of the
system, discussed further in Section 3.4.

3.3. Characterizing industrial emergence

The phases, transitions and themes described above provide a ‘canvas’ (horizontal and vertical axes) for mapping industrial
emergence. The ‘narrative’ represented by the content of the maps incorporates notable events, milestones and other factors that
can be used to characterize and demarcate the emergence process (see Fig. 2).
A chain of demonstrators delineates the phases and transitions, signaling key achievements that generate interest and
potential investment in subsequent stages:
- Supporting science and technology demonstrators: Demonstration of fundamental new scientific knowledge or generic platform
technology, normally via experiment and/or simulation. Generally disseminated via peer-reviewed primary academic
literature and conferences. Often the basis for science or engineering researchers to make the case for further research fund-
ing from public research agencies, in order to develop fundamental understanding, leading potentially towards useful
application. Associated with the supporting science and technology (S) precursor phase.
- Applied science and technology (feasibility) demonstrators: Demonstration of the feasibility that the underpinning scientific or
generic technology has practical potential within a market-directed application domain, normally via proof-of-concept
experiments. Generally disseminated through mechanisms such as peer-reviewed scientific or engineering research journals
and conferences. Often the basis for applied science or engineering researchers to obtain industrial and public funds to explore
the potential exploitation of the research. Associated with the end of the science and technology-dominated (S) precursor
phase and beginning of the supporting science and technology core technology (S-T) transition.
- Technology demonstrators: Creation of prototypes demonstrating that the technology is sufficiently robust to be integrated into
functional systems. Depending on the complexity of the system environment associated with the technology and/or
application, prior ‘technical demonstrators’ may be necessary within the technology-dominated phase in order to address
system-deployment issues (for example, systems components and modules). Often the basis for technology champions to gain
further funding for technology development. Associated with the end of the S-T transition and the beginning of the technology-
dominated (T) embryonic phase.
- Application demonstrators: Demonstration of the potential functional benefits of a system under non-laboratory conditions.
Depending on the complexity of the application environment, prior application demonstrators (‘field demonstrators’) may be
necessary to address environmental and/or real world performance issues. Often the basis for application champions to make
the case for investment in product development. Associated with the end of the technology-dominated (T) embryonic phase
and beginning of the technology–application (T–A) transition.
- Commercial application demonstrators: Creation of a sustainable business venture with market growth potential. Depending on
the complexity of the market environment (such as required levels of customer sophistication), additional commercial
application demonstrators (for example, demonstrating issues such as manufacturability, market acceptance and regulatory
compliance) may be necessary within the application-dominated phase in order to address any potential commercialization /
market-readiness concerns of investors. Associated with the end of the technology–application (T–A) transition and beginning
of the application-dominated (A) nurture phase.
- Price-performance market demonstrators: Demonstrate the feasibility of a mass market, in terms of price and performance. Often
the basis for application champions to gain alignment of business resources (for example, production and marketing).
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Associated with the end of the application-dominated (A) nurture phase and beginning of the application–market (A–M)
transition.
- Mass market demonstrators: Demonstration of substantial industry, market and business growth. Associated with the end of the
application–market (A–M) transition and beginning of the market-dominated (M) growth phase.

In addition to demonstrators, other factors are important for characterizing and enabling industrial emergence, including:

- Precursor market activity: Existing market activities that may influence the entry of new technology-based applications (for
instance, by demonstrating market demand for analogous products or advancing core technologies within different markets).
- Specialist markets: Evidence of customized sales within limited markets (for example, consulting services and provision of
specialist research equipment). Generally associated with highly customized sales to specialist customers (such as national
defense agencies, research hospitals and university research departments). These markets may be associated with any phase or
transition, although early activity is of particular interest as evidence of potential value.
- Early adopter market: Evidence of sales to sophisticated users who will pay a premium for new or improved functionality and
performance, associated with application-dominated (A) nurture phase.
- Market stimuli: Demand side market drivers that accelerate technology and application developments in the sector of interest,
including both internal (within the industry) and external (other sector) factors.
- Technological stimuli: Supply-side technological drivers that significantly accelerate industrial emergence in the sector of
interest, including both internal (within the industry) and external (other sector) factors.
- Enablers: Any activity, event or process that advances or accelerates industrial emergence.
- Barriers: Any activity, event or process that stops or significantly inhibits industrial emergence.
- Regional perspectives: Regional and national activity relating to value creation and capture, of particular interest from a policy
perspective.

3.4. System focus and aggregation

The S-T-A-M phases, transitions and demonstrators described in the previous sections are related to the ‘technology readiness
level’ (TRL) framework used by NASA [69] and other organizations (most commonly in the aerospace and defense sectors,
although the approach is more broadly applicable). This 9-point scale ranges from TRL 1 (“Basic principles observed and
reported”) to TRL 9 (“Actual system ‘flight proven’ through successful mission operations”). The concept has been adapted to
include, for example, manufacturing, design, interface and system readiness levels [70]. However, the relationship between S-T-A-
M and TRL depends on the system level and focus (unit of analysis), as summarized in Table 1. In addition to TRLs, other time-
based readiness / maturity and lifecycle frameworks describe the dynamics associated with industrial emergence, applicable to
particular system perspectives (layers) depicted in Fig. 3, including technology S-curves [71], product, process, firm and industry
lifecycles (see Section 2.1).
Emergence maps have been produced at industry sector, sub-sector, firm and application levels (system focus – see Fig. 3),
demonstrating scalability of the approach. For industry-level maps the S-T-A-M phases are related to periods of time where the
main emphasis of activity is associated with science, technology, application and market development. This represents the
aggregate behavior of the many individual organizations operating at the micro-level. The individual innovative efforts of these
organizations follows a similar pattern, where activity can be characterized as predominantly relating to science, technological,
application and market developments (denoted s-t-a-m, to differentiate this micro-level behavior from the macro-level industrial
behavior).
Similarly, interpretation and application of the TRL framework depends on the system level, with the TRL range 1-9 associated
with the progression of individual technologies through to integration into components, modules and complete operational
systems. As new and more complex systems are developed, the TRL must be redefined to allow for further integration, testing and
demonstration. It is for this reason that the concept of system readiness levels (SRLs) has been developed [70], so that the TRL
framework can be used to track (and de-risk) individual technological contributions to complex systems, with the overall system
readiness tracked (and de-risked) using the SRL framework. TRLs are primarily concerned with technical functionality and
performance, while SRLs include other factors associated with successful development and deployment of the entire system, as
shown in Table 1.

Table 1
Typical system focus and aggregation levels for industrial emergence mapping.

System level Industry value system focus and aggregation

System (macro-level) Sector S-T-A-M Firm s-t-a-m Product SRL

Sub-systems (meso-levels) Sub-sectors Business units Modules
System elements (micro-level) Firms s-t-a-m Products SRL Components TRL
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4. Case study

The use of the framework for mapping industrial emergence is illustrated below by means of a case study, focusing on the
synthetic industrial diamond industry. The emergence mapping approach is iterative, and most of the maps are the product of
a rapid first iteration (‘quick scan’), where a first draft map is created in a few days, based on readily accessible data, via desk
research, interview and/or workshop. This has the benefits of efficiently providing an overview of the field, of sufficient detail to
provide context and focus for identifying the next steps, usually to gather more information to improve the map in specific areas
of interest (e.g. transitions). This quick scan approach is similar to ‘fast-start’ roadmapping approaches, which adopt a rapid
iterative approach for future-oriented strategy and innovation [72].
Adopting the quick scan approach has had the benefit that many diverse areas of industry, application and technology could be
mapped and examined, to identify common (and specific) patterns. The emergence maps have been developed to a range of
depths, depending on the focus and scope. Each case does not necessarily include all features of the framework, which represents
a synthesis of patterns observed across the set listed in Section 1.
The synthetic diamond case was selected for incorporation in this paper partly for pragmatic reasons, because of its relative
simplicity. The emergence map (Fig. 4) and associated narrative are presented here in full, illustrating the emergence mapping
approach, covering the complete lifecycle of an industry. The case illustrates a range of patterns and phenomena associated with
industrial emergence, as described in Section 3. It shows how specific events at the micro-level can have a key role to play in how
the sector evolves (for example a relationship between an academic and industrialist).
The case also demonstrates the effectiveness of emergence mapping as an ‘instrument’ for case-based research, to capture
personal narrative accounts of industrial emergence, based on a short (1.5 hour) interview, emphasizing the ‘narrative style’ of the
emergence mapping approach, where the diagram and supporting text (or presentation) go hand-in-hand. The arrows connecting
events and activities on the map depict the logical flow of the narrative, which is structured according to the broad phases of
emergence. A number of objects are used to code the significant events depicted on the map (see key in Fig. 4), as a basis for
developing the framework described in Section 3. For example, ‘technical milestones’ and ‘market milestones’ are associated with
the demonstrators depicted in Fig. 2, with the enablers, barriers and country perspectives highlighted to understand other as-
pects of emergence (for example, industry-specific patterns, success factors and national and regional focus).

Fig. 4. Emergence map for synthetic diamond industry, highlighting key events.
226 R. Phaal et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 78 (2011) 217–230

Synthetic diamond is widely used in manufacturing for grinding, machining and cutting processes, as well as other applica-
tions, due to its unique mechanical, thermal, chemical and optical properties. The industry has been largely dominated by
Divisions of General Electric and De Beers, both part of substantial corporations. The case takes a company-level view, based on
an interview with a senior manager (retired) of De Beers Industrial Diamond Division, who was personally involved in both the
early research and subsequent development of the business and industry, from the 1950-1990 s. Further work would be needed to
provide a more comprehensive view of this industry (for example, GE and customer perspectives). The discussion was guided by
the structure of the framework, forming the basis for the industrial emergence map. This personal perspective was supplemented
with information extracted from a published historical account of the early scientific advances in diamond synthesis [73].

4.1. Precursor phase

A long history of precursor activities preceded the first synthesis of diamond, which can be traced back to 1772 when the
French chemist Lavoisier demonstrated that diamond was composed of carbon (science demonstration). Diamond deposits were
discovered in extinct volcanoes in South Africa in the late 19th century, demonstrating that diamonds could potentially be made
in the laboratory under conditions of high pressure and temperature. Many subsequent experiments failed, as the apparatus of
the time was not capable of reaching the required levels of pressure and temperature (of the order of 50,000 atmospheres and
1000 °C), and nobody knew what these targets were.
The key breakthroughs came with a combination of:

1) Development of a theoretical phase diagram that defined the graphite-diamond transition, published by Rossini and Jessop in
1938 (science demonstration).
2) Development of high-pressure experimental equipment by Prof Percy Bridgman at Harvard University, culminating in a Nobel
Prize in 1946 (applied science demonstration).

4.2. Embryonic phase

Aware of the above developments, several companies began serious applied research programs to synthesize diamond. General
Electric was widely credited with this first achievement in 1954 (technology demonstration), leading to the first commercial sales in
1956-7 of a limited quantity of low quality material (application demonstration). However, ASEA (a Swedish electricity company)
actually achieved the first successful synthesis of diamond in 1953, without publicizing the fact.
During the same period, De Beers actively pursued research into the properties of diamond, with interests in both gem and
industrial diamond applications (there was already a market for natural diamond in industrial applications, which emerged in the
1940 s). In 1947 Sir Ernest Oppenheimer founded the Diamond Research Laboratory (DRL) in Johannesburg, building a formidable
competence in the physics, chemistry and properties of diamond.
Stimulated by the success of GE (and the threat it posed to its diamond business), De Beers began an accelerated program
of research into diamond synthesis, resulting in success in 1959 (70 carats), using high pressure presses developed by ASEA
(De Beers later acquired the ASEA Division).

4.3. Nurture phase

Although both GE and De Beers had successfully synthesized diamond, this was only on a small scale in the laboratory. The
process had to be scaled up to produce commercially viable quantities of diamond at a competitive price (commercial application
demonstration). Since there was already a market for natural industrial diamonds (precursor market activity), there were few
barriers to adoption of the new synthetic substitute in existing markets. However, synthetic diamond has considerable advan-
tages in terms of both quality and reliability, including the ability to tailor diamond properties for specific (and new) applications.
Also, once scale-up challenges were overcome (price-performance demonstration), there were few practical limits to the volume
that could be produced. As markets expanded (mass market demonstration), the position of natural diamond in industry
applications became almost irrelevant.
GE invested heavily in production expansion and R&D, challenging the De Beers natural industrial diamond market,
establishing a successful business by the late 1960 s. However, the De Beers initiative had a slower start. Pilot plants were
established in South Africa and Ireland in the early 1960 s (taking advantage of the special tax benefits available in the Shannon
region). Significant scale-up and production problems were encountered in the early years (De Beers, essentially a mining
company, had little experience in manufacturing). To compound these difficulties, a management decision was taken to disband
the successful research team. This turned out to be a very costly decision as it left GE with very little competition for almost a
decade.

4.4. Growth phase

Management changes in De Beers in the early 1970 s resulted in substantial re-investment and expansion of its research
activities. However, it took many years to close the 10-year lead GE had acquired in both ultra high-pressure engineering and
 R. Phaal et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 78 (2011) 217–230 227

market position. Developments in numerical modeling technology (finite element analysis) and control systems played a major
role in developing a new generation of high-pressure systems (external technological stimulus).
By this time the demand for industrial diamonds had far exceeded the availability of natural diamond. Both GE and De Beers
invested heavily in stimulating and expanding the market (internal market stimulus), including sponsoring conferences and
participating in trade shows. The tool making industry is inherently conservative, and it was necessary to adopt a risk-sharing
model where diamond was supplied free of charge, collaborative development programs were established, and favorable payment
terms were provided to stimulate toolmakers to adopt the new materials.
The investment that De Beers had made in R&D started to pay off, catching up with GE and then taking the lead in terms of
both technology and product portfolio. By the late 1980 s De Beers had established a leading position in the market place.

4.5. Maturity phase

By this stage, both GE and De Beers synthetic diamond businesses were firmly established, and the industry could be
considered to be mature. The main technical advance during this period was the development of composite diamond products,
where diamond grit is fused together using small amounts of metal solvent. This lead to a tough, abrasion resistant material that
could be produced cheaply in a variety of shapes and sizes covering many applications from the automotive industry to
woodworking, ceramics, glass, oil drilling and mining.

4.6. Decline / renewal phase

By the late 1990 s synthetic diamond could be considered as a commodity product, leading to pressure on profits. GE divested
its synthetic diamond business (seen as non-core, and also not of a scale that fitted with its corporate strategy). The business was
sold to a private equity firm, which was not successful, and the business was eventually acquired by Sandvik (a Swedish abrasives
company).
For many years, De Beers was aware of developments in a potential alternative low-pressure technology that might be used for
synthesizing diamond (chemical vapor deposition – CVD). The first attempts to synthesize diamond using this technology were
made in Europe as early as 1911 (applied science demonstration). In the late 1980 s it was considered that the technology was
sufficiently advanced to warrant a major R&D effort, leading to synthesis in 1989 (technology demonstration). A research program
was initiated and rapid progress was made, resulting in the first commercial product in 1992 (commercial application
demonstration). This has lead to substantial new business opportunities. As the diamond can be grown in the form of large sheets it
is possible to produce a wide variety of products from surgical knives and cutting tools to optical windows at low cost (specialist /
early adopter markets).
The synthetic diamond case illustrates how the mapping approach can be used to depict and describe the events and
interactions associated the emergence of an industry from the science base. The structure and features of the framework are based
a diverse set of such cases, which collectively cover a wide range of emergence phenomena. For example, other cases have
illustrated more complexity in terms of the number of organizations involved, applications and technologies; the role of regulation
and standards; direct consumer interaction; impact of government subsidy and policies; and the influence of exogenous events
(demand- and supply-side).

5. Conclusions

The framework presented in this paper provides a means for mapping industrial emergence in technology-intensive sectors,
as a basis for improved understanding and communication of the complex dynamics associated with such systems. The framework
is coherent with theoretical perspectives, and has been developed and tested through application in a wide range of industrial
sectors and contexts. The historical emergence mapping approach (Fig. 4) is adapted from, and compatible with, future-oriented
roadmapping methods (Fig. 1), enabling learning to be applied to current industrial emergence, supporting strategy and
innovation processes.
The approach has been demonstrated to be flexible and scaleable, where the focus can be on any ‘value creation and capture’
system, at levels ranging from entire industrial sectors (S-T-A-M) to particular firm-level activity (s-t-a-m). Defining the focal
industrial system and its boundaries (the unit of analysis) is important, to understand the dynamic push and pull (supply and
demand) forces acting on the system. The framework is broad in scope, enabling the evolution of complex industrial systems to be
mapped across the full industry lifecycle, emphasizing the early stages of emergence from the science and technology base.
Science, technology, application and market oriented demonstrators form key milestones that demarcate the phases and tran-
sitions of emergence.
The creation of multiple emergence maps for a range of diverse sectors, contexts and units of analysis illustrate a range of
phenomena and patterns associated with technology-intensive industrial emergence:
- Funnel-like patterns of emergence: the variety and number of events related to scientific and technological development decline
over time as promising technological ideas are filtered and focused on successful applications and products. Uncertainties
associated with both technological and commercial aspects decrease as the industry emerges. This industry-level funnel is
analogous to well-known product development and open innovation funnel models that account for firm-level interactions
228 R. Phaal et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 78 (2011) 217–230

with the external industry sector [74,75]. Funding associated with the phases and transitions of the industrial emergence
framework are somewhat similar to ‘stage-gate’ models that are widely used to manage innovation and new product de-
velopment at the firm level [76,77], and thus the framework has the potential for structuring funding agency decision-making
processes at the sector-level.
- Transitions as key characteristics of industrial emergence: although many lifecycle frameworks identify phases, few highlight the
importance of the transitions between these, or the specific demonstration milestones that delineate them. Exceptions include
Rogers' ‘Valley of death’ [78], Moore's ‘Chasm’ [79], and the ‘milestones of technological dominance’ identified by Suarez [23].
These transitions are characterized by changes in focus, activity and funding [24], and the emphasis on demonstrators of
various types linked to the phase and transition boundaries provides a set of tangible intermediate milestones that may help to
overcome these barriers.
- Push–pull ‘engine’ of industrial emergence: demand and supply-side factors, and their interactions, are primary drivers that
impact on the process of industrial emergence [33]. Demonstrations provide a vehicle for linking these perspectives, enabling
positive feedback that influences the direction of both technological and commercial activities. External factors can also be
important, with developments in other sectors influencing developments in terms of both supply (technological
developments) and demand (exploitation opportunities). The scale and degree of synchronization of these drivers influence
the rate of industrial emergence.
- Initial conditions matter: scientific and technological investments and developments that occur before a recognizable industry
has emerged have a significant impact on the trajectory of emergence [12]. Understanding the history and prior evolution of
an industrial area of interest is a valuable input when considering its future development, and how to navigate forward [80].
The framework for mapping industrial emergence emphasizes these early phases and transitions, providing increased gran-
ularity to support decision making at this early stage, informed by the full lifecycle model incorporated into the framework.
- Catalytic events: small events can have dramatic effects on industrial emergence – the ‘butterfly effect’ [81] – for example,
chance conversations between key individuals.

The phases, transitions and demonstrators defined by the framework for mapping industrial emergence provide a potential
basis for developing practical approaches for supporting the management of innovation emerging from the science base, at firm
and sector levels. The demonstrators in particular act as a focal point for strategy development, goal setting and review, creating
a set of ‘stepping stones’ from science to market, as summarized in Fig. 5.
The framework for industrial emergence has been developed and tested through the analysis of historical cases. The diverse
set of cases provides a degree of confidence that the same structures and concepts will be applicable to current and future
emergence, where uncertainties are clearly much greater.

Fig. 5. Phases, transitions and demonstrators associated with technology-based industrial emergence.
 R. Phaal et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 78 (2011) 217–230 229

The framework provides a platform for developing several management ‘tools’ for supporting strategy and decision making,
including:

1) Environmental scan: the mapping method can be used to improve understanding of the broad industrial context that influ-
ences the outcomes of investment decisions that a company or funding agency makes, combining historical data with
futures information from public-domain roadmaps and other foresight reports. Such maps would be compatible with road-
mapping methods, providing an improved source of market and technology intelligence for strategy processes.
2) Organizational scan: the mapping method can be used to capture and assess historical data and experience at the organiza-
tional level, to identify strengths, weaknesses and other learning points as an input to strategy, decisions and action. The
importance of learning from history is often given scant attention in strategic planning processes, and extending roadmaps to
include the past provides a convenient means of achieving this, incorporating data from documented sources and expert
knowledge collected in interviews and workshops.
3) Emergence roadmapping: the structures and principles in the framework can be directly used to enhance existing roadmapping
methods for application to the early stages of industrial emergence [72,82], where uncertainties are high and the strategic
impact of decisions are large.
4) Collaborative research strategy framework: program design, consortium formation and management: the framework provides
principles and structures around which integrated multi-stakeholder research programs could be organized. The phases
and transitions, the demonstrators that demarcate them, and the thematic perspectives identified in the framework, could
help to design, form and manage such initiatives in a more aligned fashion, extending stage-gate concepts [76,77] to industrial
emergence.

Acknowledgements

Financial support from the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and the Gatsby Foundation is
gratefully acknowledged.

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Robert Phaal is a Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Technology Management, University of Cambridge, UK. He conducts research in the area of strategic
technology management, with a particular interest in the areas of technology roadmapping and evaluation, emergence of technology-based industry and the
development of practical management tools. Rob has a mechanical engineering background, with a PhD in computational mechanics, and industrial experience in
technical consulting, contract research and software development.

Eoin O'Sullivan is a Senior Policy Fellow at the Centre for Industry & Government, University of Cambridge, UK. He conducts research in the area of public science &
innovation policy, with particular interest in the development of practical policy frameworks that underpin effective public R&D programmes. Eoin has a B.Sc. and
D.Phil. in physics, and several years of experience as programme director and senior advisor to national science and innovation agencies.

Michèle Routley is a Research Associate at the Centre for Technology Management, University of Cambridge, UK, investigating emergence of technology-based
industries. Michèle has an MSci in Physics with Electronics, a PhD in Microelectronics, an MBA in Technology Management and several years of consultancy
experience in manufacturing and business process support.

Simon Ford is a Research Associate at the Centre for Technology Management, University of Cambridge, UK. His current research activities include the
development of guidelines to assist firms with technology acquisitions, and understanding the complex co-evolutionary dynamics underpinning the emergence of
technology-based industries. Simon holds a PhD in Engineering.

David Probert is Reader in Technology Management, at the Centre for Technology Management, University of Cambridge, UK. Current research interests include
technology and innovation strategy, technology management processes, technology intelligence, industry and technology evolution, software sourcing and industrial
sustainability. David is currently one of five co-Investigators for the EPSRC Innovative Manufacturing Research Centre, based at the Institute for Manufacturing.