Constructivism, Cognitive Psychology and The Epistemology of Immanuel Kant

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LOYOLA UNIVERS ITY CHICAGO
CONSTRUCTIVISM, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF IM M AN U EL KANT
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
PROGRAM IN CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL POLICY STUDIES
BY
JAMES-PATRICK O’ SHAUGHNESSY
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
DECEMBER 2006
UMI Number: 3243420
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES vi
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 1

Purpose 6
Methods 10
Organization 11
CHAPTER TWO: Constructivist Theory 13

Condition One: Learners use contextual symbol systems to 16
represent their unique reality
Condition Two: Learners interact, cooperate and negotiate 19
meanings using symbol systems
Condition Three: Learners are cognitively active participants in 25
the learning process
Condition Four: Learners reflect on internalized and 27
a cco m m o d a te d structures and information from their world
Condition Five: Learners determine the viability of their 37
knowledge within the social context in which it is created
Summary 40
CHAPTER THREE: Cognitive Psychology 45

Schemata 49
Information Processing 53
M etacognition 59
Summary 66
CHAPTER FOUR: Immanuel Kant 68

Summary 108
CHAPTER FIVE: Alignment of Theories 111

First and Second Hypotheses 112
Third Hypothesis 116
First C om ponent 117
Second C om ponent 122
Third Com ponent 126
Fourth C om ponent 130
Fifth Com ponent 134
Summary 137
CONCLUSION 139
Explanation 139
Implications 140
Limitations 141
Further Study 142
APPENDIX A 143
APPENDIX B 145
APPENDIX C 149
BIBLIOGRAPHY 153
VITA 155
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 - Axes of Constructivist Theory
v ii
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
In the past several years it would appe ar that interest in
constructivist pedagogies has increased. This increase can been seen
with the publishing of several textbooks based on the constructivist
m ethod including, but not limited to, BSCS Biology: A Human Approach
(Biological, 2004), Chem com (American, 2000), EarfhComm (Smith, 2000),
and IMP (Rubenstein, 1994). It could be that this interest in the
constructivist theory of learning, and pedagogies based on this theory,
which will be defined as the belief that the human mind learns by
com bining or constructing knowledge through the interaction between
the external world, as apprehended through the senses, and the internal
cognitive structures present in the mind of the individual, has risen
because educators believe this theory of learning is, in some way, better
than other learning theories and pedagogies. Often, constructivist theory
is set apart from w hat will be referred to in this study as traditional learning
theories, defined here as the belief that the human mind can com e to
know by such things as rote memorization or repeated behavior.
However, in order to make a claim that one theory of learning or
pe dagogy is better than another; two things should be examined and
understood: 1) the differences that separate constructivist learning theory
and pe da go gy from other learning theories or pedagogies; 2) w hat is it
about constructivist learning theory and pedagogy that could make it
better than other theories or pedagogies.
In this study the philosophical, cognitive psychological and
pedagogical theories that will be discussed all maintain that the human
mind learns by an interaction between either the external, internal (i.e.
mental or physical) world of the learner and the learner's internal
cognitive structures, subsequently making changes in the internal
cognitive structures (learning) about the world. Therefore, based on the
theories used in this study, it will be argued that all learning is constructivist,
and there is no difference in the learning processes when using different
pedagogies. Put another way, all pedagogies, regardless of the learning
theory they are based on, are constructivist by virtue of the manner in
which the human mind comes to know the world.
If the human mind can only com e to know the world via the
construction of knowledge, the question can then be asked w hat
separates constructivist learning theory and pedagogies from other
theories of how the human mind learns (learning theory) and methods
3 •
teachers use to teach students (pedagogy), in terms of the learning
experience they provide the learner.
To answer this question this study will examine constructivist learning
theory to more fully understand the process by which learning theorists
believe humans construct knowledge. This study will show, through a
com bination of learning theorists, such as Dewey, and constructivist
theorists, such as von Glasersfeld, all human learning is done through the
construction of knowledge. This study will argue that no m atter how
learners are taught, regardless of the pedagogy, they will learn
something. However, as will be argued below, the difference between
pedagogies based on different learning theories lies not in the cognitive
processes of learning, but rather in the opportunities for broader variety,
higher quantity and quality and more significant interactions with the
world. Therefore, this study will argue that the quality of the learning
experience, defined by the quantity of mental schematic connections,
the ease of recall, the ability for transference, and the endurance of the
learned experience, is greater when pedagogies based on constructivist
learning theories are used. This study will argue that the alignment
between a learning theory or pe dagogy and the process by which the
4
human mind constructs knowledge affects the quality of the learning
experience.
Specifically this study will examine: w hat is m eant by constructivist
methods; the variations within the pantheon of constructivist theories; and
w hat characteristics are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the
inclusion of a theory within this constructivist pantheon. Constructivist
theory will also be examined from a cognitive psychological standpoint to
understand the processes posited by ecological psychology, action
theory and cognitive information processing theory, to explain the way
these theories believe the human mind comes to know the world.
Constructivist learning theories will be shown to m atch with those
processes. Additionally, constructivist theory will be examined from an
epistemological standpoint, specifically using the epistemological theory
of Immanuel Kant, to more fully understand how that which comes to be
known can be valued as knowledge and not simply belief.
In explaining how the human mind comes to know the world this
study will show a com m on link am ong constructivist pedagogies; the
cognitive theories of ecological psychology, action theory and cognitive
information processing theory; and the epistemological project of
Immanuel Kant as undertaken in The Critique of Pure Reason. These three
5
lines of inquiry, namely the pedagogical, psychological and
philosophical, support and reinforce the argument that pedagogies
based on constructivist learning theory allow the learner the opportunity
for a higher quality learning experience, because constructivist
pedagogies prom ote a higher quantity and quality of interactions
between the learner’s world and mind.
This study will seek to support the overall thesis that learners com e to
know their world through the active process of interaction of internal
cognitive structures with the world. Additionally, constructivist
pedagogies allow for the creation of the opportunity for rich, broad, and
deep active participation and interaction between the learner and their
world, thereby allowing for a qualitatively richer learning experience.
Also, during the process, the learner gains evidence of the world, thereby
allowing for the learner to move beyond a mere belief of something
about the world, to com e to knowledge of something in the world. As will
be discussed below, the learner can be assured of the validity of this
knowledge because the process of the construction of the knowledge is
the only manner in which the human mind can com e to know the world.
Therefore, the knowledge must be valid as it was com e to in the only
manner in which the learner can possibly have com e to know the world.
6
Purpose
The purpose of this study was to argue that pedagogies based on
constructivist learning theories can more effectively facilitate students’
pursuit of com ing to know. This greater efficiency of constructivist
pedagogies can be understood as a learning experience that leads to
more enduring and deeper understanding of concepts, along with a
greater ability for transference to novel situations. This greater efficiency
can be explained by the cognitive theories noted above by creating a
classroom environment that is more conducive for, and aligned with the
processes by which, the human mind learns. In this manner, learners,
rather than simply memorizing something told to them by an expert
source, like the teacher, thereby creating a single connection to prior
cognitive schema, create a more intricate w eb of mental connections
caused by more internal and external interactions. These additional
connections, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, allow for more enduring
knowledge and greater ease of recall and transference. The cognitive
theories discussed below, ecological psychology, activity theory, and
cognitive information processing, all claim, in one form or another, that
the human mind comes to know through the interaction of the external
and internal world of the knower. Therefore, it will be argued that all
7
learning experiences occur because of the manner in which the human
mind functions to learn, according to the above listed cognitive theories,
and that classroom methods based on constructivist learning theories
allow for a more effective learning experience.
Finally, that which learners com e to know during the learners'
experiences of their internal cognitive structures interacting with their
world will be shown, through the epistemological project of Kant, to not
be subject to skepticism or dogmatism, and therefore, have a foundation
as the only possible reality of the learner. Rather than deferring to an
expert source and subsequently, dogm atically acce ptin g a belief as
knowledge, the learner experiences the world for themselves. In doing so,
learners build experiences that are incorporated into their minds’ internal
cognitive structures and these build up over time. Learners experience
and reason evidence for beliefs through this process of interaction.
Because of this, these beliefs could be a cce p te d as knowledge, as the
reasoning for a c c e p ta n c e becomes greater than reasoning for rejection
or dogm atic deference to an expert source. Additionally, because the
evidence for acce ptin g the knowledge cam e to be known within the
framework of the only manner in which the learners' mind could com e to
know it, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, it must be a cc e p te d as more
8
than possibility or illusion because there is no other manner in which
learners could experience or understand this evidence for the knowledge.
This epistemological basis for w hat the learner comes to know is
im portant because if the argument can be a cc e p te d that the purpose of
education is for teachers to assist students to gain knowledge of the world
around them, then w hat constitutes knowledge must be examined. From
a philosophical standpoint, an epistemological basis for knowledge is
entailed in any claim of w hat constitutes knowledge. If the
epistemological basis is not established, w hat constitutes knowledge for
any individual or group can be questioned using skeptical or dogm atic
arguments. As examples, a belief in an Intelligent Designer (ID) is a belief
and cannot be epistemologically established, other than dogm atically, as
knowledge. This is because beliefs in an ID are based in the notion that
there is no relativity of this knowledge (my belief is correct, all others are
incorrect), nor is it ever changed by real-world experiences (any
evidentiary experience that runs counter to my belief must be false on its
face, or merely a test of my faith). Additionally, without a sound
epistemological foundation to claim otherwise, our experiences in the
world can be skeptically dismissed as possibly mere illusions or incorrect
sensations of the world (I could be dreaming or hallucinating).
9
Consequently, everything learned can be questioned and students can
never truly claim to know the world. Therefore, it can be argued that it is
necessary to form a foundation for knowledge, philosophically.
As will be discussed in detail below, in the Critique of Pure Reason,
Immanuel Kant attem pted to establish an epistemological foundation for
knowledge. In this work, it can be argued, that Kant was successful in
creating a foundation for knowledge that is not subjected to skepticism or
dogmatism. Kant’s work claims that knowledge is constructed in the
individual through the interaction of the individual’s external world, as
apprehended through the senses, and the individual’s internal cognitive
structures, both a priori and a posteriori. Kant also argues that it is not
possible for the human mind to interact with the external world in a way
other than it does. Therefore, if it is a cce p te d that Kant was successful in
establishing an epistemological foundation for knowledge in this manner,
the construction of knowledge through an interaction of the internal and
external is the only manner by which the human mind can com e to know
the world, therefore any knowledge constructed from the interaction must
be correct because the human mind has no other w ay to know reality
other than the w ay it does. Additionally, all other beliefs claim ed as
knowledge, which do not arise as a result of the interaction betw een the
10
external and internal, can be called into question by either the skeptical
or dogm atic arguments or both.
By using the epistemological project of Kant and the above listed
cognitive theories, it will be shown that all learning experiences, even rote
memorization, consist of an interaction between the world and the
internal mind. If both Kant and the above listed cognitive theories are
correct, that would mean that all pedagogical methods would lead to
learners to com e to know reality by the construction of knowledge
through interactions between their minds and their internal and external
worlds, as that is the only w ay they can com e to know reality.
Methods
1) This study will engage in a discussion of the variations of the
theories within the genre and argue for the five conditions necessary and
sufficient for the inclusion in the genre of constructivism.
2) Next, this study will examine the literature on contem porary
cognitive psychological theories, specifically ecological psychology,
activity theory and cognitive information processing theory. The
discussion of this literature will focus on the cognitive processes believed
to be performed by the human mind in order to com e to know something
of the world.
11
3) This study will next examine two analyses of Immanuel Kant's
The Critique of Pure Reason to discuss Kant's epistemological project. The
discussion in this chapter will focus on the epistemological basis of how
the human mind can com e to know something of the world and be
secure in the validity of that knowledge.
4) Finally, the study will make connections betw een the three
previous chapters to illustrate how constructivist methodologies create a
classroom situation in which learners have a greater opportunity to
engage in activities that allow them to construct knowledge of their
world. At the same time the study will show that the learners can be
epistemologically certain of their understanding of that world because of
the manner in which they have com e to know about it, and it is the
constructivist methods that allowed for that certainty.
Organization
The organization of the study is as follows: Chapter 2 examines the
variations of constructivist theory and w hat conditions this study proposes
are necessary and sufficient for inclusion to constructivist theory. Chapter
3 is an overview of the cognitive psychological theories of ecological
psychology, activity theory and cognitive information processing theory,
and how researchers in the field believe that the human mind comes to
12
know reality. Chapter 4 examines tw o analyses of Kant's The Critique of
Pure Reason and the epistemological basis of the human mind com ing to
know reality. Chapter 5 is a discussion of the connections between the
theories presented in Chapter 2, 3, and 4. In Chapter 6, the study
concludes that based on the works of many prominent theorists, as
discussed below; constructivist pedagogies create a classroom situation
by which learners have a greater opportunity to com e to know their
reality in a manner that provides a strong epistemological basis for
certainty of that knowledge.
CHAPTER TWO
Constructivist theory
There are many theories of human learning including behaviorism,
reductionism, cognitivism, and constructivism. Each of these theories has
a set of beliefs about how the human mind learns. This chapter will discuss
beliefs of constructivist theory and how those beliefs are thought to allow
the human mind to construct knowledge. In addition, this chapter will
argue that even though there are different variations of constructivist
theory, there are five conditions that are individually necessary and jointly
sufficient for inclusion in the genre of constructivist learning theory.
There are different theorists and theories that can be considered
part of the constructivist genre, and within the tribe of theorists that are
considered constructivists there are many camps, each with their own
ideas about the construction of knowledge. D.C. Phillips has divided
these theorists along three different continuum axes (1995, p. 5):
14
Individual cognition
Individual psychology
Humans as
creators
Public
discipline Social and
political
process
Figure 1 - Axes of
Constructivist Theory
(axes labels, p. 7-9)
The first continuum [diagonal] divides theorists, such as Lev
Vygotsky, who are interested in individual cognition, and others, such as
many feminist theorists, who are more interested in how knowledge is
com e to by social and political processes (Phillips, 1995, p. 7). The second
continuum [horizontal] separates those theorists, such as von Glasersfeld,
who believe humans are the creators of knowledge from those, such as
15
John Locke, who believe the knowledge is always there and nature
instructs humans in this knowledge as we live (Phillips, p. 7). The third
continuum [vertical] separates theorists, such as Jean Piaget, who believe
knowledge is constructed by individual cognition, from others, such as L.H.
Nelson and T.S. Kuhn, who believe knowledge is constructed through a
struggle between groups or communities as a public discipline (Phillips, p.
9).
Constructivist theorist can be found along the continuum of all
three of these axes and two theorists being aligned near each other one
axis does not ensure they are aligned similarly on another (Phillips, 1995, p.
7). As an example theorists A and B may both believe that humans
create knowledge [aligned along the horizontal axis], but A believes
knowledge is a product of individual cognition, while B believes
knowledge is created by social processes [polar opposites along the
vertical axis].
At this point it can be asked: If there are many different variations of
constructivisf theory, w hat are the necessary and sufficient characteristics
to be considered part of the constructivist genre?
This study argues that the individually necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions for inclusion to the constructivist theory genre are:
16
1) Learners use contextual symbol systems to develop
meanings to represent their unique reality.
2) Learners interact, cooperate and negotiate
meanings using symbol systems.
3) Learners are cognitively active participants in the
learning process.
4) Learners reflect on internalized and acco m m o d a te d
structures and information from their world.
5) Learners determine the viability of their knowledge
within the social context in which it is created.
Condition One: Learners use contextual symbol systems to develop
meanings to represent their unique reality.
A pe da go gy that would not include this com ponent would assume
the information relayed to the students by either the teacher or the
textbook would have static, pre-packaged meanings. These meanings
would be derived from, and representative of, the teacher or author's
interpretations, experiences and contexts. The meaning for the
information may be outside of any of context, interpretation or
experiences of the student and would not afford students the opportunity
17
to develop their own meanings for the information within their unique
context.
A point that constructivist theorists make is that knowledge does not
exist outside the mind of the knower, as an individual or within a social
group. In other words, there is not a book of knowledge that is universal,
static and com plete. Constructivist theory instead believes that
individuals construct meanings for that which they encounter in their
reality; by doing so they construct a mental representation of their outer
reality inside their own minds and that reality is unique to the individual
(Nuthall, 1997, p. 20). As an example, most people have encountered a
furry, four-legged creature that barks. In doing so, they construct a
mental representation of that encounter and this representation is
individual and unique to the learner. This mental representation is
constructed, as will be discussed in the next chapter, through the
interaction between the perceptions of the learner and internal cognitive
schema that exist prior to the perceptions. This process also applies to
abstract concepts. Learners internally construct representations of these
concepts by the same processes as concrete objects, only without
sensory input to con ne ct to the representation. Teachers, or others such
as parents, can assist children in connecting those representations of the
18
world to symbols that have been agreed upon and that are generally
a c c e p te d by the wider society, but they cannot give the learner their
representation or build it for them. Building on the prior example, at some
point someone around learners explained to learners that the
representation learners created is called ‘d o g ’ in the spoken English
language, and in written English language it is represented by the symbols
‘d \ ‘o ’, and ‘g ’, in that order. As a society learners share these formalized
symbols for concepts so that the members of the society have a set of
tools and symbols with which to work and convey notions between
themselves (Central, p. 1). Without these tools and symbols, society would
sink into relativism, as each individual would give a different meaning to
concepts and representations and no one would be able to share these
ideas. This can be seen when two people who each speak a different
language try to share ideas. Because they have no com m on symbol
system, they cannot share the concept. If they can find an alternative
symbol system, such as m athematics or chemistry nomenclature,
concepts could be shared. Because the symbol system was created
within a social system, there is a level of shared meaning associated with
parts of that symbol system, thus eliminating com plete relativism. With
these symbol systems anyone who understands the English language
19
should understand w hat is generally m eant when they hear or see the
word ‘d o g ’ . However, even with a set of shared meanings for concepts
and notions, the teacher cannot give the child his or her representation of
the concept, only the symbol used to identify the concept. Learners all
generally know w hat is m eant by the word ‘d o g ’, but learners each have
their own, personal interpretation of the co n ce p t based on the
experiences [someone’s interpretation of the symbol ‘d o g ’ is like a
Pekingese, while another's may be like a German Shepard]. The learner
develops a unique and personal interpretation of the co n ce p t of ‘d o g ’
based on the learner’s unique context and experiences using the
appropriate symbol system. By using the appropriate symbol system this
unique interpretation and meaning for the co n ce p t can be shared with
others who also use the symbol system. This passing of shared ideas from
one person to the next creates a continuity of experience within the
society and means that the learner can learn something from those who
have gone before and can give something to the experience of those
who will follow after.
Condition Two: Learners interact, cooperate and negotiate
meanings using symbol systems.
20
If a person were to walk into a classroom that did not use this
com ponent that person might see the students sitting in their assigned
seats, in neat rows, listening to the teacher lecture to them, or possibly
working on reading and answering questions from their textbooks. The
information derived from the teacher or textbook would be considered
indisputable and the students would be expected to memorize
information from the teacher or textbook as unquestionable facts. There
would be little or no interaction between the students and their teacher or
am ong students questioning the validity or meanings of the information.
Philosophers and educational theorists have wrestled with the
notion of language and how humans use language to com m unicate
ideas to one another. Some theorists, am ong them Vygotsky (Rieber,
1997), believe language is used to transfer ideas from one individual to
another. In other words, a co n ce p t is an individual cognitive construct
and as a com plete entity this construct cannot be used or given from one
individual to another, like a hammer. Instead individuals must form their
own cognitive representation of the concept. As noted above from
Vygotsky, it is the symbol systems, such as language, mathematics, etc.,
that allows the sharing of information that can be used by individuals to
form concepts. O nce individuals share the information via a symbol
21
system each individual can construct the co n ce p t for themselves, as
discussed in com ponent #1.
Some theorists, like Vygotsky, also believe that knowledge is first
negotiated between individuals [interpsychological], and then created
within the individual mind [intrapsychological]. So, it can be argued that
social environments create a space in which groups of individuals can
collaborate on the negotiation and sharing of notions of knowledge. This
is the idea that an individual cannot know something outside of the
context of a social dimension [i.e. a learner cannot have knowledge of
‘d o g ’ outside of the social dimension that created the English language
symbol system], as the social dimension could construct knowledge of a
different form [i.e. if a learner were in Russia the same co n ce p t used as an
example above would not be ‘d o g ’, but ‘sobaka’]. This social dimension
of knowledge can be thought of as Paul C o b b ’s expression, ‘‘taken-as-
shared" (Cobb, 1991, p. 14), where individuals can share notions of
knowledge. This means that, within a social group, learners can share
knowledge and that knowledge can change as the social group
changes. As an example, owners of different breeds of dogs may form a
co n ce p t of ‘d o g ’ that is similar only to the breed they own, and that
co n ce p t will change as the breed they own changes.
22
With a strong belief in the social aspect of the construction of
knowledge, much of Vygotsky’s (Rieber, 1997) work dealt with the
question of how humans develop language and other symbol systems to
think and to transfer ideas to other humans. In conjunction with this idea,
another of his theories was the separation of concepts into two varieties:
spontaneous, those concepts developed by the child in everyday life;
and scientific, those concepts developed and learned primarily in a
school setting (Gardner, 1991, p. 135). According to Vygotsky, the
developm ent of knowledge was a m ovement from purely spontaneous
concepts to more scientific concepts within the child’s mind through the
use of symbol systems [linguistic and m athem atical] (Gardner, 1991, p.
135).
To make this move, Vygotsky and his colleagues found that young
children used talking to themselves or “ egocentric” (Rieber, 1997) speech
to help them solve new or difficult problems, or to move from spontaneous
to scientific concepts. The more novel or difficult the problem, the more
they spoke to themselves as they worked their w ay through the solution.
As they worked to solve the problem, they used their hands and eyes to
m anipulate the materials, experimenting as they went. As new
information was gathered [i.e. this works like this, this w o n ’t go here, etc.]
23
they told themselves new possible solutions to try. Vygotsky believed that
this egocentric [talking to themselves out loud] speech is the basis for
intrapersonal [talking to themselves internally] and interpersonal [talking to
others] speech (Rieber, 1997). He found that when children were denied
the opportunity for interpersonal speech to solve problems, they
im m ediately engaged in the egocentric form. At some point in the
developm ent of each child a transformation takes place and the child
begins to turn egocentric speech inward to its intrapersonal form. As
adults, learners engage in the use of language to help us solve difficult
problems. The only difference between the child's use of it and ours is
that the child speaks out loud, while adults carry out the conversation in
their minds. This, according to A. Potebnya, is "the inevitable
interdependence between human thought and language" (Rieber,
1997). In other words, humans cannot think, or by extension, solve
problems outside the use of a symbol system like language.
With such a strong connection between thinking and the use of
language, it would seem appropriate to allow students to talk to
themselves or others while solving difficult or novel problems. With this
idea in mind, Vygotsky developed the notion of the zone of proximal
developm ent [ZPD]. The ZPD is the place where children's spontaneous
24
concepts meet their ability to understand and a c c e p t the logic and
symbol system of the scientific concepts as presented by more cap ab le
peers or adults (Fosnot & Anderson, 1997, p. 18, 2000, p. 1042). By allowing
students to work together collaboratively, less able [students with a
stronger spontaneous concept] students could be able to more quickly
develop their abilities by talking to and imitating more able [students with
a stronger scientific concept] peers. There may be limits to this zone. If
the less able child is not yet within the same developm ental stage, in
other words has not developed the ability to understand the logic or
symbol system, as the more able, no learning can take place. As argued
above, once a child has been exposed to new notions, this learning could
bring about changes in the structures of the child’s mind and in the
internal cognitive developm ent processes. For Vygotsky, this is a case of
how the outward interpsychological relations becom e the inner
intrapsychological mental functions, "...how culturally prescribed forms of
language and reasoning find their individualized realization...how
culturally sanctioned symbolic systems are rem odeled into individual
verbal thought (Kozulin, 1986, p. xxxv). In other words, for Vygotsky,
learning and knowledge begin with social constructs. O nce the individual
learner understands the socially constructed symbol systems, the learner
25
can turn that which has been socially constructed, inward, to form
individual thought and knowledge. As an example, whereas a child can
have the perceptual experience of a furry, four-legged creature that
meows, because of the connection between language and thought
discussed above, the child cannot have thoughts or knowledge of thaf
creature as being a ‘c a t’ until that child understands the English language
symbol system. Vygotsky believed that this internalization of symbol
systems and the social constructions within the symbol system would only
happen when the child was interacting with peers, not simply doing w hat
they are told to do by adults (Rieber, 1997).
Condition Three: Learners are cognitively active participants in the
learning process.
A pe da go gy that does not include this com ponent might have
students sitting quietly in their seats, taking notes and passively trying to
absorb information given to them by the teacher or textbook. There may
be very little interaction am ong the teacher, students and textbook of the
sort discussed above in com ponents #1 and #2.
As argued above, constructivist learning theory supports the idea
that the individual is always a cognitively active participant in the learning
26
process. However, as discussed above and below, there can be a
quantitative and qualitative difference in the cognitive participation. As
an example the com pletion of a “ cookbook" science lab [a lab in which
the student follows a series of directions, like in a cookbook, in order to
com plete the lab with the correct, preplanned results] does require active
cognitive participation by a student. However, if the student creates and
subsequently executes the lab, this would require a higher quantity of
cognitive participation. In this case the student is working on the lab from
the creation stage to final report, instead of only on the execution portion.
The creation of the lab would necessitate the determination of variables,
controls, materials, methods, etc., in addition to the lab set-up, execution,
and lab report write-up. This m ethodology can increase the quality of the
learning experience by: starting with a problem [to access the learner's
prior knowledge and schema]; increasing the number of interactions
between the learner’s mind and the world [thereby increasing the
schematic connections formed in the learner's mind]; transfer between
concepts and symbol systems [by necessitating the transfer from
concepts to symbol systems to share with others, thereby requiring
accessing more prior knowledge and schema, while forming more
27
connections between concepts]; and possibly the use of ZPD as learner's
work with others to com plete the problem solution.
Condition Four: Learners reflect on internalized and accom m odated
structures and information from their world.
In a classroom that does not use this com ponent the teacher would
focus on covering the breadth of the content within the subject rather
than putting the focus on the depth of student understanding. Because
of this students would be given little or no opportunity to reflect upon
information encountered in the class and then to subsequently internalize
and make accom m odations for the new information. Instead, they would
be exposed to steady stream of information and be expected to
memorize it as indisputable facts.
Constructivist theory centers on the notion of internalization
developed by Piaget, Vygotsky and other theorists. It is thought that
knowledge can only be created when it is internalized and
acco m m o d a te d within the structures of the individual mind. The
internalization is not only of the information but also of the organizational
structures to which the information belongs. As noted above, concepts
are understood by the mind within a socially constructed symbol system.
28
Therefore, the structure of that symbol system must be internalized with the
co n ce p t in order to be internalized correctly. To not internalize the
structure with the co n ce p t could cause a lack of understanding of the
co n ce p t within that symbol system. As an example, the word ‘le a d ’ can
have at least three meanings. The syntactical structure surrounding the
word is necessary in order to internalize the correct meaning [i.e. is the
word being used as a noun, a present tense verb, or a past tense verb].
At the same time, the understanding of something like a w avelength of
visible light [a color] necessitates the simultaneous internalization of the
structure that equates that particular wavelength of light to the color our
linguistic symbol system refers to it as. As noted above there are
constructivist theorists who believe that the social environments in which
learners exist influences these structures; therefore, how the learners
assimilate and interpret information from their world is also dependent on
their social environment. As a simple example, a learner reading the word
‘g a y’ from a text in the year 1900 would interpret that word to have a
com pletely different conceptual meaning than a learner would reading it
in the year 2000. Because of this, without any structure surrounding
information, learners have difficult time internalizing information in a
coherent manner. Learners also know this from their everyday
29
experiences that it is much easier to remember a list of words when they
contextualize them in some sort of structure rather than simply trying to
memorize the list.
To internalize the co n ce p t with a different structure than generally
a c c e p te d by the society within which the individual exists could be
considered to be creative, such as the use of a word in a different
manner. However, until other individuals within the social group using that
symbol system also internalize the co n ce p t using the ‘creative’ structure,
no one will be able to share the understanding with the creator. This can
be seen in the use of slang references. The first person to use the term
"cool" needed to explain the structure surrounding the use of the symbol
to others as not meaning a low tem perature as previously understood.
Though there are many notions of how knowledge is constructed in
the individual, constructivist theory appe ar to be closely aligned with the
theories of Piaget and Vygotsky of how the individual child internalizes
knowledge. Piaget’ s work shows that when a child is learning something
new, w hat is being internalized is the information and the structure that
organizes that information and not only the information or only the
structure of the information. Piaget's work also shows that the
internalization of the information and structures occurs simultaneously with
30
the application of that information and structures, not independent of it.
A slight addition occurs with Vygotsky’s theory in that he believed that the
symbol systems involved in that behavior are also internalized. As he said,
"[o]ur analysis accords symbolic activity [i.e. language] a specific
organizing function that penetrates the process of tool use and produces
fundam entally new forms of behavior" (Rieber, 1997, italics in original).
Both Piaget and Vygotsky seem to have believed that these
structures could be learned by children by trial and error, guided practice,
or imitation of others. The imitation of others is w hat Vygotsky believed
was a primary purpose of children playing. When a child was playing, he
believed they were actually mimicking adult behavior along with the
language and structures that organize the behavior. While the child is
learning these structures and the elements [tools necessary and unique to
that behavior] required for the structure, they recognize the structures as
being separate from the context in which they are being learned, and
thus, transferable to other situations. Therefore, Vygotsky believed that
the end result of play was actually the further developm ent of abstract
thought and, as such, a very im portant aspect of learning. This is because
as learners learn, play becomes a primary situation for the child to transfer
31
those structures into new situations, further developing their ability for
abstract thought (Rieber, 1997).
Noam Chomsky also believed the structure of information was
highly germ ane to the acquisition of knowledge and separate from the
information. In Chomsky’s enigm atic m onograph “ Colorless green ideas
sleep furiously” (Chomsky, 1968, p. 15); learners can derive some sense
simply by having the symbol system structures [syntax or schemata] of the
English language. The syntax of the English language can be applied
even to a senseless sentence like Chomsky's monograph. Even though
the m onograph is senseless, learners can pick out the noun, verb,
adjectives and adverb. Chomsky simply w anted to show “ ...the syntax of
a language could be examined independently of other aspects of
language" (Gardner, 1987, p. 184). O nce the structure is internalized,
abstract thought allows us to apply it to novel situations, i.e. creating an
endless variety of sentences in English.
As the child is internalizing the structure surrounding the new
information, (s)he is also assimilating the information itself. As this happens,
the child's mind creates a mental representation or mental m ap of that
information within the organizational structures or schem ata of the mind
to be stored in the memory where it will remain for a few days (Nuthall,
32
1997, p. 13). As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, the short
term memory acts as storage space for a few bits information for several
minutes, and is waiting to receive other information or for connection to
other information and storage into long-term memory. If concepts
directly relevant to the new information are encountered, that new
information will remain in the memory for a longer period of time. When
concepts that are directly relevant to the new information are
encountered the mental representation of the new information begins to
be transferred to long-term memory (Nuthall, p. 19). This is why, as stated
above, the information and structures of that information are internalized
simultaneously with the application of them. As they are being applied to
other relevant concepts and connections between new and old
concepts are being m ade, the likelihood of them being internalized for a
longer period of time occurs.
These ideas may lead educators to believe there is a single m ethod
a teacher can use to cause students to make connections between new
and old concepts. However, because students pay attention to, give
priority to, and perform neural pruning on, differing information collected
by their senses during a classroom activity, each student encounters and
creates different concepts to be connected to existing information, and
33
therefore creates different connections between new and prior
knowledge.
Because students have different sets of prior experiences, students
have a unique organizational structure present in their mind when they
encounter new information, which means that students will interpret
information and the implications of that information, and how it connects
to other information in a unique manner. Students are receiving, w hat
may seem to them, a stream of disorganized information and concepts
with no apparent connections. Along with this, students bring to the
classroom a unique set of concepts previously learned, and based on
their own life experiences. As the students are sitting in a classroom, their
mind is conducting an active search for information, during which their
mind “ frequently shifts its focus between external events and internal
memories and interests" (Sylwester, 1995, p. 80). Because of these facts,
the minds of students are continuously organizing new information with
the use of existing mental structures and trying to make connections
between the new and existing information. If the mind cannot create any
connections between new and old information, Piaget believed that
forgetting would occur.
34
According to Piaget as the child is constantly collecting new
information and structures, the information is being organized, interpreted,
and com pared by the structures already present in the child’s mind.
Depending on this new information the mind can assimilate the
information into the existing structures, reject the information based on
existing structures, or use the information and structures to alter those
existing structures to better acco m m o d a te the new information.
As m entioned briefly above, Piaget developed a theory of how the
mind alters existing structures to better acco m m o d a te new information.
To Piaget, the human mind seeks equilibrium. The mind creates structures
through which to perceive, interpret, and understand the outside world.
Piaget referred to this as assimilation. If new information is encountered
through the assimilating process that runs counter to the structures and
organization present, disequilibrium occurs in the mind (Piaget, 1970, p.
140). Piaget, as will be discussed below, referred to this process as the
formation of cognitive dissonance or disequilibrium in an individual and,
...disequilibrium facilitates learning. “ Errors" need to be

perceived as a result of learners’ conceptions and therefore
not minimized or avoided. Challenging, open-ended
investigations in realistic, meaningful contexts need to be
offered, thus allowing learners to explore and generate many
possibilities, both affirming and contradictory. Contradictions,
35
in particular, need to be illuminated, explored and discussed

(Fosnot, 1996, p. 29).
In other words, it is the use of problems and perturbations to create
this disequilibrium or dissonance that will cause the need for assimilation of
new information and structures. Piaget proposed that because humans
w ant to remain in cognitive equilibrium, the process of accom m odation
occurs. This is a process whereby reflective, integrative behavior occurs to
alter the structures and organizational patterns in the mind so as to allow
humans to function in cognitive equilibrium in relation to the new
information (Fosnot, p. 13).
This process is similar to John Dewey's notion of reflective thinking.
Dewey theorized about the nature of thinking and how it relates to the
formation of knowledge in the individual. Dewey believed that thinking
itself was merely everything that passed through our minds and could not
be perceived by our senses, but thinking, by itself, did not create
knowledge. O nce thoughts are in the individual’s mind, if the individual
accepts or rejects a particular thought as being possible or impossible, it
becomes a belief for that individual. If that belief then has some
im portance to that individual they may perform a conscious inquiry into
the nature of that belief. It is im portant to note that Dewey believed that
36
the belief should be of some im portance to the individual for them to
make that conscious inquiry. This inquiry includes the examination of
information that supports or discounts the belief. If the supporting
information obtained outweighs the discounting information, the belief
can be a cc e p te d as valid. It the reverse is true, the belief can be
rejected as invalid. O nce individuals carry out this inquiry and examine
the basis of that belief, they have performed critical, reflective thinking to
reduce the cognitive dissonance caused by the belief (Dewey, 1938, p.
41). This is the w ay knowledge and understanding is created in the
individual. Therefore, obtaining knowledge is actually a constructive
process of making meaning from reflective thought. These meanings
becom e part of the learner’s organizational structures of knowledge and
can be used later for further reflection.
Vygotsky also had similar thoughts as Dewey on this subject. He
believed that reflective and abstract thought were required by the
individual to internalize information and the organizational structures of
that information (Nuthall, 1997, p. 17). Only this process of internalization
could facilitate the process of the construction of knowledge.
This is a dynam ic process that does not occur in such a simple,
sequential fashion as illustrated above, instead, "...it is a dynam ic ‘d a n c e ’
37
of progressive equilibrium, adaptation and organization, growth and
cha ng e” (Fosnot, 1996, p. 14). In addition, because these
accom m odations create structural changes in the mind, patterns occur in
cognitive functioning, enabling generalization to new and similar
experiences to occur. Piaget called this process "reflective abstraction"
(Fosnot, p. 16) and is the basis for the transference of knowledge to novel
situations.
Condition Five: Learners determine the viability of their knowledge
within the social context in which it is created.
A pe dagogy that does not use this com ponent would expect that
students a c c e p t the information presented to them as facts even though
the only basis for that a c c e p ta n c e is that it was presented to them by the
teacher or textbook. The students would be given little or no opportunity
to neither question and validate the veracity of the information
encountered through their own prior knowledge and experiences, nor
investigate the information further if they believe something in conflict with
the information given.
If learners each create their own representations of reality in their
mind how could learners be sure that their representation of reality is
‘corre ct’? Dewey's analyses of reflective thinking and Piaget's
38
description of accom m odation, as they pertain to the interaction
between a learner and their world, address this dilemma. Our
representation might be different from another's, but it may still be
correct. A person can hold a certain representation of reality in their
mind. As new information and structures are encountered, that person
can com pare the new information with the old through the process of
reflective, critical thought as described above. After this time of reflective
thought the person can a c c e p t or reject a new belief or set out to explore
for more information. In general, a belief can be a c c e p te d if the support
for accepting the belief if greater than the support for rejecting the belief;
with a belief being rejected if the opposite is the case. The representation
of reality may be different than the representation of reality others have,
but if it can be a c c e p te d after being critically examined for its validity
through the process described below, it may be as valid as the
representation reality of any other person, only different.
It can be argued that the validity of a representation [knowledge] is
generally based on the relationship between the specific knowledge in
question and the mental schema of knowledge contained either within
the individual mind or the collective minds of the com m unity of minds in
which the knowledge was created. The specific criteria to determine if a
39
representation is valid vary am ong theorists along the third axis mentioned
above. Some theorists, like Piaget and von Glasersfeld, assert that the
individual knower determines the validity of knowledge. At the other end
of the continuum are theorists, like Thomas S. Kuhn and Nelson (Phillips,
1995, p. 7) who assert the validity of knowledge is based on a
collaborative consensus of w hat is valid knowledge within the com m unity
of knowers in which it was com e to be known. The former group asserts
validity changes based on changes in the context and structures of the
individual. Theorists who support the idea that knowledge is the product
of individual psychology believe that concepts, models and notions are
viable only if the are proven ad equate in the context of the individual in
which they cam e to be known (Murphy, 1997). Therefore, notions created
in one time or place that are a cc e p te d by the individual to be
knowledge are not necessarily knowledge to other learners in other times
or places or even the same learner in other times or places. Knowledge is
considered to be relative to the context of the particular individual that
participated in com ing to the knowledge. The latter group believes
knowledge changes based on either changes in the context and
structures of the com m unity or changes in the membership of the
com munity (Phillips, 1995, p. 9). Theorists, like Kuhn, believe the social and
40
historical context are so im portant for com ing to know that the titles of
‘truth’ and even ‘reality’ will only be given to those constructions on which
a majority of people in a particular context can agree as such (Phillips,
1995, p. 9).
Instead of a learner’s acce ptin g or rejecting the validity of
knowledge based on authority, constructivist theory encourages learners
to reflect on their beliefs and to develop the viability of those beliefs
based on evidence they have encountered.
Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss constructivist theory and
w hat are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a learning theory to
be included within the constructivist genre.
This chapter has argued for the idea that the human mind comes to
know the world through the interaction of the learner’s mind and the
learner’s world. C onnected to this argum ent is the idea that there is no
fundam ental difference am ong learning theories or pedagogies, as the
human mind can learn no w ay other than by the processes of
constructing knowledge through the interaction of the internal and
external worlds of the learner. It was also argued, however, that there is a
41
difference in fhe quality of the learning experience provided by the
various learning theories and pedagogies.
As discussed above, within the field of constructivist theory there are
many different camps. This study has argued that there are several
com m on threads of thinking that link these different camps. This study
argues that constructivist theory contain five necessary and sufficient
conditions for inclusion to the genre: learners use contextual symbol
systems to represent their unique reality: learners interact, cooperate and
negotiate meanings using symbol systems; learners are cognitively active
participants in the learning process; learners reflect on internalized and
acco m m o d a te d structures and information from their world; learners
determine the viability of their knowledge within the social context in
which it is created.
These five com ponents are individually necessary and jointly
sufficient tor inclusion to the constructivist theory genre and encompass
several im portant beliefs that will be shown in Chapter 5 to be connected
to the cognitive psychological theories listed above and the
epistemological philosophy of Immanuel Kant.
As argued above, constructivist theory proposes that
representations of concepts are constructed through interaction between
42
the learner’s internal and external worlds, as an individual or within a
social context, and these concepts are transferred betw een individuals
through the use of symbol systems. Constructivist theory also asserts there
is a connection between the processes of cognition and the use of
language and other symbol systems, and the products of cognition
[representations of concepts] are processed within the mind and
transferred betw een individuals as concepts using symbol systems. It was
also argued in this chapter that constructivist theory proposes the belief
that the more a learner is an active participant in the learning process,
the greater the quantity of interactions between the mind of the learner
and the world, therefore the higher the quality of the learning experience
can be for that learner. In addition, constructivist theory proposes the
cognitive structures of information are internalized by a learner along with
the information. This is done for the learner to create a mental m ap of the
structures and information and to connect the structure and information
to schem ata already present in the mind of the learner. Also argued in
this chapter, constructivist theory proposes that learning begins with
cognitive dissonance of some sort: a problem; perturbation; lack of
understanding; etc. Because the human mind desires to remain in a state
of cognitive equilibrium, once new information and structures are
43
encountered, the mind goes through the process of accom m odation, as
it integrates this new information and structures in order to return to
equilibrium. It was also argued that a similar process, known as reflective
thinking, allows the learner to determine whether the new information
should be a cc e p te d or rejected, based on supporting and discounting
information. In this w ay the new information and structures are not
a c c e p te d or rejected dogm atically, but on the basis of evidence
encountered by the learner. This new information and structure is also not
subjected to a skeptical argument as it is validated on evidence
encountered by the learner in the only manner by which the learner
could encounter it. O nce this new information has been a cce p te d ,
changes are m ade within the cognitive structures of the mind. These
structural changes cause a change in cognitive functioning in future
encounters with information. As these changes occur, patterns may
emerge allow the mind to generalize and transfer information and
structures to new situations. Finally, it was argued constructivist theory
proposes the validity of changes m ade in cognitive structures [learning] is
not done dogm atically, but rather by individuals or social groups
determining the validity using evidence either supporting or dismissing the
changes.
44
Above, it was argued the process of learning in humans is
dependent on the use of symbol systems and the structures of those
systems and that learners use the tools of symbol systems to organize and
direct the: storage; reflective interpretation; and use of knowledge. If this
argument is a cce p te d , it could be argued that if all learning occurs
through this process, how is constructivism different? As noted above, this
study argues that there is no difference in the process of learning
between constructivism and other learning theories. Instead, the
difference lies in the degree to which constructivism provides the learner
the opportunity to interact, cooperate and negotiate with others, thereby
allowing for a larger number of interactions with the learner's mind and
the world. This process is further developed when used collaboratively by
members in a culture in a social atmosphere as the knowledge
constructed by many minds is used to negotiate and dynam ically evolve
meanings for our interpretation of reality (Fosnot, 1996, p. 28).
CHAPTER THREE
Cognitive Psychology
The preceding chapter discussed the components of pe dagogy
based on constructivist theory. In the introduction the question of why a
teacher would w ant to implement pedagogy based on constructivist
theory as opposed to another learning theory was asked. This chapter will
discuss three theories of cognitive psychology: ecological psychology,
activity theory and cognitive information processing. This discussion will
outline the processes these three theories propose the human mind
proceeds through in order to learn. In Chapter 5 these processes will be
connected to the five components of constructivist pe dagogy discussed
in the previous chapter. This connection will be m ade to show the
alignment between constructivist pedagogy and the processes proposed
by the cognitive psychological theory listed above. This will be done to
support the idea that the quality of the learning experience, defined by
the quantity of mental schematic connections, the ease of recall, the
ability for transference, and the endurance of the learned experience, is
greater when pedagogies based on constructivist learning theories are
used.
45
46
Using the constructivist framework of knowledge, it can be argued
learning is the result of a reduction in cognitive dissonance caused by a
problem encountered by the learner, (Jonassen & Jonassen and Land,
2004, p.36, 2000, p.vi) by the interaction between the learner’s mind and
world. If the learner encounters only expected results, there is no
dissonance, no need to interact with the world pertaining to the
encounter, and, therefore, no changes in mental structures to
acco m m o d a te the new input. However, if the actual result differs from
the expected result, a problem, a perturbation, or some other cognitive
dissonance occurs within the learner. The process of resolving this
dissonance can lead to meaningful learning because the learner’s mind
interacts with the world as it tries to understand the phenom enon of this
difference between the actual and expected. This is done to resolve the
cognitive dissonance, and may produce changes in the mind of the
learner.
This view of the learning process is supported by the cognitive
theories of ecological psychology (Jonassen, 2004, p. 136) and activity
theory (Jonassen and Land, 2000, p. v). Both of these cognitive theories
claim that learning is the result of a com binafion of the learner’s
perceptions of the world and the learner's subsequent action upon the
47
world. More specifically, activity theory, "...claims that the human mind
emerges and exists as a special com ponent of interactions with the
environment, so activity [sensory, mental, and physical] and conscious
processing [learning] cannot be separated. Individuals cannot
understand something without acting on it” (Jonassen and Land, p. v).
This activity, through which humans com e to understand, is m ediated
through the use of tools [symbol systems], and these tools alter the nature
of human activities and cognitive developm ent. (Jonassen and Land, p.
vi) In other words, both ecological psychology and activity theory support
the belief that learning is an interaction between the learner and the
learner’s world using cognitive tools to aid with the interaction.
As discussed above, constructivist theory, ecological psychology
and activity theory all support the idea that learning is a com bination of
action and thought that are com pletely interactive and interdependent
(Jonassen & Jonassen and Land, 2004, p. 136, 2000, p. v). If learning is an
interaction between action and thought, how the interaction occurs to
allow learners to com e to know their world should be understood.
It can be argued, this notion that thought and action cannot be
separated by the learner creates the a d d e d affect that w hat the learner
has com e to know cannot be separated from the context in which it
48
becam e known. To illustrate this point Chomsky uses the phrase, “ Flying
planes can be dangerous” (Phye and Andre, 1986, p. 7). In this single
sentence there are at least two meanings that are evident. Which
meaning is perceived the sentence to be relating is entirely dependent
on the reader and not the writer of the sentence. If the reader is a pilot
flying a plane, the sentence may be interpreted as the a ct of flying a
plane can be dangerous. At the same time a reader, possibly the same
pilot, standing on the ground w atching a plane fly low overhead may
interpret the sentence as a plane that is flying can be dangerous, as the
plane may crash into something. In this manner it is the reader’s focus of
interest, prior knowledge and experience that will determ ine how the
reader interprets the sentence. In other words, the learner does not
receive the meaning of the message; the learner interprets the meaning
of the message through the framework present in the learner’s memory
(Phye and Andre, p. 87).
If the theory discussed above, that the human mind com ing to an
understanding of reality is the result of an interaction between
perceptions and cognitive structures, is a cce p te d , it could then be
argued that a pe da go gy that allows for more interactions betw een the
49
learner's reality and cognitive structures provides the opportunity for a
higher quality of learning experience.
Schemata
As will be discussed below, it is proposed by the cognitive
psychological theories being discussed that knowledge and experience
for understanding are not free floating in the mind of the learner. Instead,
it is proposed that they are set in a framework, known as a schema, within
the mind for easy access and retrieval. According to Phye and Andre,
"...concepts are generally viewed as rules for classifying...In knowing a
concept, a person is assumed to have knowledge of the rule that defines
the critical features of the co n ce p t and to be able to use these critical
features to recognize unfamiliar instances of the c o n c e p t” (1986, p. 187).
In other words, it is believed those com monly referred to as concepts are
not ideas by themselves, but instead are, "...often called schemata
(frames, scripts, patterns, gestalts). A schema is an organizational form for
the knowledge learners have about a particular concept. A schema
usually has default values for the parts of the concepts. The totality of the
default values would represent the prototype for the schem a" (Phye and
Andre, p. 187). So, it is thought these concepts or schem ata are a way
the mind organizes information into a network of related concepts for
50
more efficient access and retrieval. In the same w ay that knowledge and
concepts are not free-floating, neither are the schema. These frameworks
for understanding are believed to, “ ...also relate[d] to other concepts
[and schema] by means of superordinate, coordinate, and subordinate
relationships...Acquiring knowledge of such relationships is necessary to
gaining an understanding of the c o n c e p t” (Phye and Andre, p. 188). In
this way, "...individual ideas are organized into schema and schemata
are arranged in networks of interconnected and interrelated ideas known
a semantic network. Understanding any idea, therefore, depends on how
it is related to other ideas in memory" (Jonassen, 2004, p. 63). As will be
discussed below, the greater the interconnectivity of this information, the
greater the understanding of that information or of problems encountered
from a conceptual standpoint.
The schema or mental representation of the problem is also known
as the, "problem space” (Jonassen, 2004, p. 7). The learner creates this
mental representation or im age of the problem itself to more fully
understand the problem from a conceptual standpoint because the
learner understands that, “ [c]ontent, the coin of the educational realm, is
relatively meaningless outside of the context of a problem ” (Jonassen, p.
2). This is because it is believed, as discussed above, the context of the
51
content affects the meaning of fhe content as the learner understands it.
This mental im age or m ap can include identifying im portant features of
the problem in its initial state and putting those features into working
memory. The representation can include concepts and knowledge from
long-term memory determined to be related to those concepts and
placed into working memory. This im age can contain the structural
elements of the problem, the concepts involved in the problem and the
relationship betw een the elements and the concepts. This process of
representation may even include drawing a simple schem atic diagram of
w hat is happening in the problem so the learner can fully understand the
problem (Bransford, Brown and Cocking, 1999, p. 26). To this the learner
can a d d the content knowledge, processing operations required to
solving the problem and content and processes already present in the
long-term memory of the learner. Phye and Andre propose that the
process of using prior knowledge to expand upon the problem at hand
facilitates the transfer of the new information into long-term memory
(1986, p. 11). By integrating this new information into the student’s existing
knowledge schemata, it is believed understanding of this information can
be enhanced by the increased likelihood that the student will be able to
access and retrieve the appropriate information when necessary (Phye
52
and Andre, p. 11). In other words, it has been proposed the more
interconnected the information becomes; the easier it is to store and
access it.
In addition to the new knowledge a d d e d to the representation to
increase understanding, so to can the problem ’s end or goal state and
any processes or knowledge deem ed appropriate to moving the problem
from the initial state to the goal state (Hacker, Dunlosky and Graesser &
Jonassen, 1998, p. 50, 2004, p. 63). Together these aspects of the mental
im age are generally referred to as the schema or schem atic network of
the problem (Jonassen, p. 63).
O nce the current problem has been solved, it is thought the
schema(ta) created during the process of solving the problem can be
m oved to long-term memory for use in solving future problems. According
to Jonassen (2004, p. 87) if schemata are well constructed, it will allow the
learner to bring them from long-term memory to working memory as a
whole chunk during future problem solving efforts, thereby reducing the
cognitive load required for working memory to process the problem.
Additionally, the developm ent of a good problem schema assists a
problem solver because,
53
...internal representations often reduce the memory

demands found in many problems...mental representations
allow the solver to organize the conditions and rules of a
problem and decide whether certain steps are legal and
productive ones...internal representations allow the solver to
keep track of where he or she is in terms of reaching a
solution and foresee potential obstacles that might im pede
progress...good mental representations help generalization to
new problems that might contain different surface features
(Hacker, Dunlosky and Graesser, 1998, p. 51).
It is proposed that this is how experts becom e such good problem
solvers in their domain. When given a problem, they can quickly create a
mental representation of the problem, classify the problem -type based on
the general concepts involved, retrieve the appropriate prior schema
from memory for the solution and then execute the processing of the
solution while monitoring their progress towards the solution (Jonassen, p.
Information Processing
In cognitive information processing (CIP) theory schemata are
described as information-based structures which determ ine how the
learner will view, approach and interpret content, (Phye and Andre, 1986,
p. 3). As discussed above, cognitive schema are thought to be created
by the individual learner based on their prior knowledge and help the
learner determine w hat content knowledge is im portant and are used as
54
a w ay of interpreting information as it is placed into long-term memory for
later retrieval.
As noted above, the mental representation that the learner creates
is tied to their previous knowledge and schema in relation to the world
represented by sensory input. A theory of how this connection between
sensory input and cognition is believed to function can be found in the
theory of cognitive information processing. The CIP view of learning
requires a basic understanding of the components of the human mind
and how they interact during the process of thinking. CIP theory proposes
that there are five basic components to the mental system of the human
brain: input buffers, a short-term memory, a long-term memory, an
executive routine and output buffers. When a learner encounters new
information it is brought in through the sensory system to the input buffer
(Phye and Andre, 1986, p. 116). Not all sensory input makes it through the
input buffer as a learner cannot pay attention to all input at the same
time. Some of the input is pruned, as discussed in the last chapter, and
because of this, based on many factors such as interest and attention, a
selection of sensory input goes through the input buffer to the short-term
or working memory. CIP theory supports the idea that short-term memory
is able to handle two to seven chunks of information at any given time
55
(Phye and Andre, p. 5). This small number of chunks that short-term
memory is able to handle illustrates why well-formed schem ata that can
be used as a single chunk are vital to an efficient problem-solving
strategy. O nce in short-term memory, the executive routine begins to
make connections betw een those concepts in the short-term memory
and concepts or schema in long-term memory that the executive routines
deems related and appropriate (Phye and Andre, p. 9). It is believed that
the long-term memory is both randomly accessible, meaning any bit of
information can be accessed independently of all other information, and
content addressable, meaning that bits of information that are similar in
content are stored in relative proximity (Phye and Andre, p. 6). Because
of this the executive routine can access the area of memory that is
temporally or spatially related to the concepts currently in working
memory and retrieve only the content that is thought to be directly
related to forming a solution strategy for the problem, while leaving other
memories in storage. From long-term memory the executive routine can
either access information from episodic or semantic memory that is
determ ined to be related or necessary for the solution strategy of the
problem at hand. Episodic memory contains memories from events in our
lives and is thought to be stored in a spatial-temporal basis (Phye and
56
Andre, p. 6). An example of episodic memory would be a memory of
where a person left their keys. A person may remember where they left
them in relation to the last time they had them (temporal) or m aybe w hat
clothes they were wearing the last time they had them (spatial).
Semantic memories, on the other hand, contain memories that are not
necessarily connected to any particular event in their lives (Phye and
Andre, p. 7). These memories are used to give meaning to events in their
lives. Some examples of semantic memories would be the memory of the
vocabulary and gram m ar of a language and other symbol systems, such
as mathematics. Depending on the focus of the executive routine and
the contents of both the episodic and semantic memories, each learner
will have a different internal representation of reality and therefore, a
different approach to resolving an instance of dissonance. The Kintsch
Theory provides a detailed explanation of how the process works to
construct a mental representation for an external reality by interacting
with memory:
...at the start of reading, a limited number of propositions are

drawn into working memory. Long-term memory is then
searched for relevant material, and one or more propositions
are transferred to working memory to serve as an anchor
point for the construction of a memory representation. When
a representation is constructed, highly im portant propositions
are selected to remain in working memory to serve as anchor
57
points for the next cycle of incoming propositions, and then

recently constructed memory representation is transferred to
long-term memory. New propositions are then drawn into
working memory, and the process is repeated without a
search of long-term memory. A search of long-term memory
(called a reinstatement search) is initiated on subsequent
cycles only if the propositions retained in working memory are
irrelevant to the propositions com ing in on any given cycle
(Phye and Andre, p. 90).
As can be seen through CIP and Kintsch theories, the learner
creates an internal representation of their external reality based on a
com bination of sensory input and content and schemata in memory. It is
this interaction between the internal and external realities of the learner
that create the schem ata that the learner uses to construct knowledge
and understand. In this w ay a learner in a particular dom ain can apply
schemata or knowledge retained in memory from previous problems or
similar concepts or knowledge to the problem at hand. It can be argued
this ability to create, and subsequently apply, schem ata or knowledge
from memory is possible only if there is a conceptual understanding of the
problem that can be connected to the prior schemata and time given to
create and apply the schemata. According to Phye and Andre,
“ [s]omething is understood when it has been integrated in a meaningful
way into the learner’s existing knowledge structure. When the learner
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does not have any relevant knowledge that can be used to construct an
interpretation of a message, memorization may occur, but understanding
will not” (1986, p. 87). Therefore, it is possible that this process of
understanding takes time to develop and needs to be explicitly taught to
learners, because the learner may attem pt to create and use knowledge
or schemata related to something more superficial to solve the problem
or simply that which first pops into working memory. For example, if the
current problem involves pulleys, a learner may attem pt to use a solution
strategy from a prior problem involving pulleys, without regard to any
other factors such as are the pulleys an integral part of the problem and
solution. This may be for lack of time to create or use a schema or may
be for lack of an understanding how to do the same.
The experienced learner has not only content knowledge, and
procedural knowledge of how to apply the content, but, more
importantly, the experienced learner has conditional knowledge of when
and why to apply the content and procedural knowledge. Having this
conditional knowledge allows the experienced learner to make a
connection between the schem ata of the problem at hand and assess
whether or not the previous schematic solution is appropriate for solving
59
this novel problem prior to the com m encem ent of the solution and in
monitoring the progress of the solution.
Metacognition
Instead of simply being able to repeat certain bits of information, to
assess understanding, “ ...people must learn to recognize when they
understand and when they need more information" (Bransford, Brown
and Cocking, 1999, p. 12). This recognition is part of determining
conditions and evaluating appropriateness of solution strategies. Students
also need to, “ ...understand the current state of their knowledge and to
build on it, improve it, and make decisions in the fa ce of uncertainty"
(Bransford, et al., p. 120). Therefore, a different set of skills is needed to
determine the current state of knowledge and the presence of
understanding of the material learned. This different set of skills is known
as m etacognition. M etacognition allows the student to (a) en cod e the
problem and form a mental representation of the parts, (b) select an
appropriate solution strategy, and (c) identify and overcom e obstacles to
the solution resolution (Hacker, Dunlosky and Graesser, 1998, p. 48). These
three aspects of m etacognition allow a learner to determ ine the correct
solution strategy and to make changes as needed during the solution
process.
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According to Hartman (2001, p. 4), there are tw o aspects to
m etacognition, those being knowledge and regulation, both of which are
vital to assessing the perform ance of a task. In turn, m etacognitive
knowledge is further broken down into three types: "...declarative,
procedural, and conditional knowledge...Declarative knowledge refers fo
knowing "a bo uf" things. Procedural knowledge refers to knowing “ how"
to do things. Conditional knowledge refers to knowing the “why" and
"w hen" aspects of cognition" (2001, p. 4). The uses of each of these will
be discussed below.
M etacognition is not something derived from input of a learner’s
external reality, but instead is a uniquely individual process tied to the
learner’s own internal representations of that reality. It is this internal
representation that m etacognition acts upon. As Hacker, et al. stated,
"...m etacognitive thoughts are deliberate, planful, intentional, goal-
directed, and future-oriented mental behaviors that can be used to
accomplish cognitive tasks (1998, p. 3). M etacognition is an awareness of
oneself as “ an acto r in his environment, that is, a heightened sense of fhe
ego as on active, deliberate storer and retriever of information" (1998, p.
3). Because the processes of m etacognition are based on individual
representations of the world it can be argued each student will have a
61
unique internal representation of the given problem. Additionally, each
student will have a unique understanding of how to go about solving the
problem based on w hat input they received and w hat content and
schema they possess in memory.
As mentioned above the third type of m etacognitive knowledge is
conditional knowledge. This is the knowledge of when and why to use the
declarative and procedural knowledge. As argued for by Jonassen,
“ ...when w e learn only the procedure for accomplishing the

task, w e do not construct any conceptual understanding for
the system in which the problem occurs, the strategic
knowledge about when and why to follow the procedure,
and many other intellectual perspectives on the task.
Procedures may be ad eq ua te for solving simple, well-
structured problems, but if the procedure fails to work,
learners are lost” (2004, p. 85).
It can be argued that this is why learners fail to generalize content
and procedures to novel situations. They lack the conditional knowledge
of when and why the content and procedures are appropriate. This
conditional knowledge can be developed through the m etacognitive
regulation of solution strategies. Problems that are solved without any
process regulation or corrections needed because of errors in the solution
strategy (Bransford, Brown and Cocking, 1999, p. 163). Therefore, the
learners have no modeling of the processes of regulation, evaluation, or
62
corrections of the solution strategy. Modeling m etacognitive regulation
would involve learners, "...to see the full range of instructors' false starts,
self-questions, experimentations, and insights, so that students get a more
realistic picture of w hat the problem-solving process is about" (Hartman,
2001, p. 25) instead of presenting problems in their finalized, polished
forms. If teachers are modeling only their successes, they allow learners to
believe that there is no need for self-regulafion of solution strategies and
that a person either are successful or not in solving problems (Hartman, p.
25).
This regulation does not mean that a solution strategy cannot be
started until the perfect strategy is choose, instead it requires that the
learner is able to determine problems, recover from false starts, realize a
strategy is not working and look for viable alternatives (Hartman, 2001, p.
23). It can be argued, they have difficulty in regulating their progress by
virtue of the fa ct that they have little idea of where they should be in
relation to where they are. In order to overcom e this problem of a lack of
self-regulation during problem solving learners can explain their
procedures and to make predictions of w hat will occur based on their
strategy, and their reasons for the predictions (Bransford, Brown and
Cocking, 1999, p. 122).
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According to CIP theory, this monitoring, regulation and
orchestration consists of the executive control of the brain constantly
com paring the schemata that is in working memory to the schema that
are in long-term memory to alleviate this perturbation. This,
“ [p]erturbation is a glitch in the smooth functioning of our cognitive
processes that must be neutralized somehow" (Hacker, Dunlosky and
Graesser, 1998, p. 75). Should a perturbation be d e te cte d between
incoming information and prior knowledge, an assessment needs to be
m ade. This may lead to a discarding of incoming input, a search for more
information either internally or externally, or a change in one or more
schema in either working or long-term memory. This constant regulation
of the solution strategy is necessary to identify problems along the way.
This constant monitoring and possible identification of perturbations can
be understood as, "...m etacognitive, executive control processes, which
guide the flow of information through the mind and regulate cognition,
[and can] explain why some students learn and remember more than
others" (Woodfolk, 1998, p. 33). “ High achieving [learners] have been
found to possess more m etacognitive awareness and engage in more
self-regulatory behavior than low achieving [learners]" (Hartman, 2001, p.
33). It can be argued that this higher achievem ent comes from those
64
students possessing more m etacognitive awareness and, therefore,
greater ability to generalize content and schemata to novel situations. A
learner possessing the m etacognitive knowledge and skill is not enough
for effective problem solving; its use must also be regulated (Hartman, p.
5). This m etacognitive regulation is broken down into three types:
planning, monitoring, and evaluating (Hartman, p. 5). Planning is the
selection of an appropriate solution strategy and allocating resources
toward the solution (Hartman, p. 5). Monitoring is the awareness of
comprehension and performance, and evaluation is the appraisal of the
solution product and efficiency of the processes (Hartman). As discussed
above, experienced learners use all three aspects of regulation to a
greater extent than novice learners. Experienced learners plan before
initiating a solution strategy; they monitor the processes; and they
evaluate the solution once the strategy is com plete.
As m entioned before, this is often w hat separates higher-achieving
learners as they generally, “ ...generate self-explanations by expanding
their solutions to other problems and monitoring their own understanding
and misunderstandings" (Jonassen, 2004, p. 89). An im portant aspect of
this monitoring process is reciprocal regulatory fee db ack between
thinking and the activity. It has been determined that by asking for
65
reasons and justifications for the solution strategy chosen, the learner is
more likely to make a more deliberate to the solution (Hacker, Dunlosky
and Graesser, 1998, p. 87). In turn, learners who are required to give
reasons and justifications for their solution strategy perform better, in that
they require fewer steps to reach the solution (Hacker, et al., p. 85).
This self-evaluation and regulation can cause changes in the
schema present in either or both working and long-term memory and
m etacognitive knowledge used for present and future problem solving
(Jonassen and Land, 2000, p. 7). This understanding may affect changes
in the schemata being used, which may, in turn, affect further
understanding of the processes and knowledge, and so on. As noted
above, the creation of problem schema and a solution strategy are both
done through the interaction between the internal and external realities
of the learner. O nce the learner has begun monitoring the progress of the
solution strategy further problems or perturbations may be encountered.
This could require the learner to com plete one or several, smaller sub
solution strategies along the way. In doing so the learner may need to
make changes in overall solution strategy, the problem schema or the
schemata stored in long-term memory based on this new information
obtained along the path to a solution. Again, as ecological psychology
66
theory proposes, learning is the result of this com bination of the
perceptions of the environment of the learner and the subsequent action
upon the environment. Each acts upon the other and are inseparable
from each other in the creation of knowledge.
Summary
The com m on thread am ong the research discussed in this section is
that changes m ade in the cognitive structures in the mind of a learner
[learning] are the results of the interaction between the learner’s mind
and the learner's world.
Several key ideas have been discussed, in this chapter, which will
be connected, in Chapter 5, to ideas from the constructivist and
philosophical chapters. In this chapter, it was discussed that ecological
psychology, the theory that learning is the result of this com bination of the
perceptions of the environment of the learner and the subsequent action
upon the environment, activity theory, the theory that claims that the
human mind emerges and exists as a special com ponent of interactions
with the environment (Jonassen, 2004, p. 136), and CIP (Phye and Andre,
1986, p. 3), share the belief that thinking and learning are the result of
interactions between the mind of the learner and the world of the learner.
As discussed above, these theories propose that thought cannot be
67
separated from action during the process of learning, nor can the
information a cte d upon be separated from the structure of the
information. Additionally, this information is organized within cognitive
structures called schemata and these schem ata are, in turn, organized
within cognitive networks. These schemata are created as a result of the
mind seeking to diminish cognitive dissonance encountered from the
world and are a com bination of sensory input and prior knowledge
schemata. It was also discussed that information is processed through a
series of cognitive functions and that this processing is regulated by
m etacognition and that m etacognition entails the encoding of
information and the regulation of the processing of information. As
schemata are changed in response to accom m odation and the
reduction of cognitive dissonance, these changes can affect future
cognitive processes are can be considered to be ‘learning’ .
As will be argued in detail in Chapter 5, the ideas of how the human
mind learns discussed in this chapter are in close alignment of the theories
discussed in Chapter 2 on constructivist theory and will be discussed in
Chapter 4 on the epistemological project of Immanuel Kant.
CHAPTER FOUR
Immanuel Kant
In writing The Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant was
attem pting to answer w hat could be considered to be a major problem
with western philosophy, the foundation of epistemology. In the
introduction to the Critique he stated, "there always remains this scandal
for philosophy and human reason in general [if idealism is a cce p te d ]: that
w e have to a c c e p t merely on faith the existence of things outside us
(even though they provide us with all the material humans have for
cognitions, even those of human inner sense); and that, if it occurs to
someone to doubt their existence, w e have no satisfactory proof with
which to oppose him” (Kant, 1996, Bxl). The reason this ‘scandal’ existed
was because of the Pyrrohonian skeptics. The ancient Greek philosopher
Pyrrho taught that since there are plausible arguments for both sides of
any issue, he argued, the only rational practice is to suspend all judgm ent,
abandon worries of every kind and live com fortably in an appreciation of
the appearances (Bett, 2000, p. 3-4). These skeptics believed that unless
knowledge is dogm atically or arbitrarily adopted, the criterion of the truth
of that knowledge must be based on circular reasoning or infinite logical
68
69
regress, and could, therefore, always be questioned. The Critique was an
attem pt to overcom e this problem that had face d western philosophy
and to give a philosophical basis for epistemology of which humans could
be certain and, in doing so, giving certainty to their knowledge and
understanding of the outside world.
Kant’s epistemological project of the Critique was intended to
develop a metaphysical system that could be depended on as a
foundation for epistemology, and, therefore, a foundation of the external
world. To accomplish this task this foundation of epistemology would not
succumb to the arguments of: skepticism, the argum ent that humans can
never be certain of their beliefs because their senses or mind could be
deceiving them, such as happens with an optical illusion; dogmatism, the
argument that something simply must be believed without cause or basis,
such as a belief in an Intelligent Designer; circular reasoning, that it is not
logically based on an argument which implicitly employs its own
conclusion as a premise; infinite regress, which is a definitional,
explanatory, or justificatory procedure that entails its own reapplication
without any limit. Kant set out to accomplish this task, and, in doing so,
created an epistemological system that is supported by several
contem porary cognitive psychological theories and philosophically
70
supports constructivist pedagogy. Kant does this by developing the
theory that knowledge is created through an interaction betw een the
knower and the external reality and humans have no other w ay to know
their reality other than the w ay they do. The reality that they com e to
know may or may not be the objective reality of the realists, however,
because the human mind has no other w ay of perceiving or conceiving a
reality other than the one they do, they may never know if their reality is
the same or different than the objective reality that the realists believe is
out there.
The basis of Kant's argument is the notion of pure intuitions and pure
concepts, and that these intuitions and concepts are synthetic-a priori in
nature. There are several types of concepts in two divisions that are
considered possible in philosophy and are com bined to form the
philosophical categories of concepts. The first division is how the co n ce p t
is com e to be known, those concepts would be either a priori or a
posteriori. An a priori co n ce p t can be known outside of experience, such
as the statement ‘There are no square circles’, by the definition of a circle,
it is logically impossible for a circle to be square, and it is not required to
experience this to understand this; while an a posteriori co n ce p t can only
be known through experience, such as the color blue. The second
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division is w hat makes the concepts true or false. In this division those
concepts are either analytic or synthetic. An analytic co n ce p t is one that
is known solely by virtue of the terms of its definition. A bachelor is an
example of this case because a bachelor is defined as an unmarried
man. The entire definition of the co n ce p t of a bachelor can be known
only by its definition. A synthetic concept, on the other hand, is not true or
false solely by virtue of its definition. As an example, a chair is a piece of
furniture to sit on. While this definition provides a general understanding of
the co n ce p t of ‘chair’, the definition does not com pletely encompass the
co n ce p t of a chair. Does the chair have three or four legs, plastic or
w ood, etc? Each of the concepts from both of these tw o divisions of
concepts can be com bined to form different types of concepts. Kant
agreed with other philosophers of the time that analytic-a priori, such as
‘There are no square circles.’, and synthetic-a posteriori, such as ‘My c a t is
w hite.’ concepts are possible. He also agreed that analytic-a posteriori
concepts are logically impossible, because if a person can fully com e to
know the truth of a co n ce p t by virtue of the definition, a person would
have no need to experience the co n ce p t to com e to know it. However,
Kant wrote, ‘‘...on such synthesis, i.e., expansive, principles depends the
whole final aim of our speculative a priori cognition. For analytic
72
principles are indeed exceedingly im portant and needed, but only for
attaining that distinctness in concepts which is required for a secure and
extensive synthesis that, as such, will actually be a new acquisition of
cognition” (1996, p. A10/B14). In this Kant is discussing the need for
synthetic-a priori concepts to acquire new knowledge that is knowledge
beyond that of the analytic. In this w ay Kant believed that synthetic-a
priori concepts are also possible, when other philosophers of the time, the
empiricists, believed them to be impossible to be knowable (Dicker, p. 15-
6). At the same time the rationalists did believe in synthetic-a priori
concepts (Dicker, p. 16), however these concepts must be dogm atically
a c c e p te d or proven through circular reasoning and, therefore, not an
unshakeable foundation for an epistemology. The crux of Kant's
argument in the Critique was to prove the existence of a con cep t, p, that:
“ a) p cannot be known just by understanding the meanings of its
constituent terms, yet; b) p can be known independently of experience,"
(Dicker, 17). A synthetic-a priori co n ce p t must apply to a co n ce p t of
possible experience, though not necessarily experienced; that it cannot
be known solely by the definitions of its constituent terms and can be
known independent of experience. An example of this type of co n ce p t
would be that of an Intelligent Designer (I.D.). Humans cannot
73
experience an I.D., therefore this co n ce p t would be a priori, and at the
same time the definition of an I.D. does not fully encompass the concept.
Kant (1996) believed it is possible to validly prove the existence for
synthetic-a priori concepts and that the contents of all empirical
concepts, those that com e to us through our senses, are created through
the synthesis (p. B103) of perceptions and the pure intuitions (p. B103)
(synthetic-a priori concepts) by w ay of certain rules (p. B134-5). As such,
these synthetic-a priori concepts would not be subject to the Pyrrohonian
argument or dogm atic a cce p ta n ce .
As discussed above, Kant believed in the notion of synthetic-a priori
concepts, through which the human mind can apprehend their reality.
The term Kant used for this underlying framework or coordinate system of
apprehension is form (Cicovacki, 1997, p. 43). These forms are not entities
that exist by themselves, but instead exist only through their application
(Cicovacki, p. 43), and it is through this application that the sensible
perceptions of the external world can be turned into objectively valid
judgments that the mind can apprehend (Cicovacki, p. 44). The forms do
not justify or validate the truth of our perceptions; they only structure them
properly for our apprehension (Cicovacki, p. 43). In this way, Cicovacki
claims that Kant believed, “ [i]n every cognitive representation of an
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object there is an element which belongs to sensibility (perception), an
element which belongs to pure form of sensibility (extension) as well as an
elem ent which belongs to the intellect (substance, divisibility, etc.)” (p.
87). In other words, there are parts of our representations of the external
world that com e from the external world through the senses; parts that
com e from our pure intuitions; and parts that com e from the intellect or
understanding. The pure intuition, as will be discussed shortly, consists of
space and time as pure forms or intuition, and the parts that com e from
the intellect or understanding consists of concepts which Kant calls
categories (Cicovacki, p. 87).
Kant proposed, "[tjim e is a necessary presentation that underlies all
intuitions” (1996, p. A31). In addition Kant proposed that,
“ [b]y means of outer sense (a property of our mind) w e

present objects as outside us, and present them one and all
in space...[sjpace is not an empirical co n cep t...it must
similarly already lie at the basis in order for me to be able to
present [the objects of] these sensations as outside and
alongside one another" (p. B38, italics in original).
In these comments Kant is saying that the primary of these pure
intuitions are time and space. These are two concepts that are built-in to
the human mind, cannot be experienced, and are meaningless outside of
the human mind. They also, however, allow the human mind to
75
apprehend their reality, and humans cannot apprehend their reality
without them, at least not in the same w ay do so with them.
The first pure intuition for Kant is time, because all cognitive
representation, whether they are representations of internal or external
objects, are determinations of the mind, of our inner state. As such, they
are understood through the a priori condition of time. As Kant put it,
“ [tjim e is the formal a priori condition of all appearances generally.
Space is the pure form of all outer appearances; as such it is limited, as a
priori condition, to just outer appearances. But all presentations, whether
or not they have outer things as their objects, do yet in themselves, as
determinations of the mind, belong to our inner state; and this inner state
is subject to the formal condition of inner intuition, and hence to the
condition of tim e" (1996, p. A34/B50). Kant believed that regardless of the
origin of a cognitive representation, that representation was subject to the
condition of time, as time is “ ...the formal condition of inner sense...[i]n
time they must one and all be ordered, connected, and brought into
relations. This is a general com m ent that must be presupposed
throughout w hat follows” (1996, p. A99). Kant believed that time is the
fundam ental framework through which all cognitive function occurs
because it is the only framework that cognitive representations can occur.
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In my mind I can conceive of representations in a different order than
which I apprehended them, and no m atter w hat other frameworks I apply
to those representations, I still conceive of them in a time order. The
notion that I can conceive of representations in a time order that is
different than in which I apprehended them will then, “ipso facto provide
a meaning for the claim that they are of items whose existence is not
conceived solely as their being perceived - items that, unlike an after
im age or a pain, are conceived as existing independently of being
perceived and in that sense as being ‘ob je ctive’, or qualifying as
‘objects” ’ (Dicker, 2004, p. 115). If I walk around a chair, looking at the
views of all the different angles and at some later time conceive of the
views of the chair, but in an order possibly other than the order I
apprehended them, this gives a basis for the notion that the
representations are of something objective and apart from my mind. In
other words,
"...representations, being the epistemological vehicles for all

our thought and knowledge, cannot be said to have a time-
order of which w e could have no knowledge; there can be
no content in assigning to representations any order other
than the one in which they are apprehended unless there is
some w ay to determine or establish w hat that other order is”
(Dicker, p. 122).
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In order for me to conceive of this possibility, I must also conceive of
the chair being different than my representations of the chair. Therefore,
if I understand that there is a time order to my cognitive representations
that I can alter, and that time order is different than the order I
apprehended them, there must be an objective world outside of my
cognition. Humans could not establish any order to their thoughts other
than the order in which they apprehended their thoughts unless they
could establish w hat that other order is. In other words, they can not think
about the previously read sentence without apprehending those thoughts
in time order and having knowledge of time to understand the time order.
In order to be able to conceive of this objective world a human
must be able to understand that the time order of their cognitive
representations is different than the time order in which they
apprehended them. However, “ [tjime, however, cannot itself be
perceived" (Kant, 1996, p. B219), therefore, time must be, “ ...perceived
through the appearances...in the objects of perception...” (1996, p.
B225). In other words, these perceptual stand-ins for time are enduring
objects located in space. The human mind cannot apprehend time itself;
they only understand time by virtue of the change in the spatial relations
of objects outside of themselves. For instance, if a human look at the
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second hand on their w atch and w a tch it click several times, they have
no objective proof if one second or one year passed between each click.
In this example the only m ethod the human mind has for apprehending
time is through the fa ct that the spatial relation between the second
hand of a w atch has changed in relation to the face of the w atch. The
w atch or the movements of the Earth on its axis and around the Sun are
perceptual stand-ins for time. However, "...w e can only do it [determine
tim e/tem poral relations] by relating representations to perceptual objects
that are stable and enduring - that can, so to speak, serve as perceptual
‘stand-ins’ for time itself" (Dicker, 2004, p. 123). So, I can only establish a
time order for the things I did today if I can relate them to a perpetually
existing stand-in for time, such as the Sun passing overhead or the hands
on my w a tch spinning around. If there were no stand-ins for time that
endure perpetually and which I could perceive, I could only apprehend
the activities of my day, with no relation to the order in which they
occurred. These perceptual stand-ins must, however, be enduring in order
for them to qualify as a perceptual stand-in for time. If they are not
enduring through time, they could merely be objects that com e into and
go out of existence each passing moment; therefore, there is no w ay to
measure the continuous passing of time by them. Though Kant does not
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seem to believe it is necessary for these object to exist through all time, no
specific length of the endurance seems necessary to qualify as a stand-in
for time.
Now, because time itself cannot be perceived there must be,
“ ...the substrate which presents time as such, and in which all variation or
simultaneity can in apprehension be perceived through the
appearances’ relation to it, must be found in the objects of perception,
i.e., in the appearances” (Kant, 1996, p. B225). That is, because time itself
cannot be perceived, there must be something within the external world,
that allows for the perception of time by the human mind, thereby
allowing tem poral relations to be apprehended.
Theorem
The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my
own existence proves the existence of objects in space
outside me
Proof
I am conscious of my existence as determ ined in time. All
time determination presupposes something perm anent in
perception. But this permanent something cannot be
something within me, precisely because my existence can be
determ ined in time only by this perm anent something.
Therefore perception of this permanent something is possible
only through a thing outside me and not through mere
presentation of a thing outside me. Hence determination of
my existence in time is possible only through the existence of
actual things that I perceive outside me. Now consciousness
of my existence in time is necessarily linked with consciousness
of the possibility of this time determination; therefore it is
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necessarily linked also with the existence of things outside me,

as condition of the time determination. I.e., the
consciousness of my own existence is simultaneously a direct
consciousness of the existence of other things outside me
(Kant, 1996, p. B275-6, italics in original).
Here Kant begins with the cogito argument of Descartes, in that he
is aware of his own conscious existence. However, Kant does not attem pt
to overcom e the possibility of skepticism through the dogm atic argument
as Descartes did. Instead, Kant uses his temporal argum ent by stating
that he is aware of his conscious existence because he is also aware of his
temporal existence which presupposes something perm anent outside of
himself. It must be permanent because, as discussed above, without
something perpetual in existence, tem poral relations would be impossible
to determine. In addition, this perm anence is not something from within
him, but rather, a part of things outside of himself. Because of this
temporal awareness, as he is able to be conscious of his own existence, so
is he able to be consciously aware of things outside of his consciousness.
The notion that I am conscious of my own existence in time assumes
something perm anent outside of my consciousness by which I can
apprehend tem poral relations. The permanent thing through which I
apprehend tem poral relations cannot be inside me because it is through
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this perm anent thing that I am conscious of my own existence in time,
ergo it must exist outside of my consciousness. This argum ent could be
stated as, ‘I think I am, therefore there must be an outside world, and
otherwise I could not think I a m .’
At this point Kant has shown the existence of fime as a pure intuition
of the human mind, through which all our cognitive representations are
conceived. However, the existence and determination of time was
achieved through the apprehension of enduring objects in the external
world. These objects of the external world are perceived differently than
those of the internal cognition. In order, “ ...in order for certain sensations
to be referred to something outside me (i.e., referred to something in a
location of space other than the location in which I am). And it must
similarly already lie at the basis in order for me to be able to present [the
objects of] these sensations as outside and alongside one another, and
hence to present them not only as different but as being in different
locations. Accordingly, the presentation of space cannot be one that we
take from the relations of outer ap pearance by means of experience;
rather, only through the presentation of space is that outer experience
possible in the first p la ce ” (Kant, 1996, p. A23/B38). In order for me to
understand something is outside of my mind I must apprehend it in some
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sort of spatial relation to my mind; that relation being in a space other
than my mind is in. Because I can apprehend something outside my mind
and the only w ay to do that is through spatial relationships, the intuition of
space must exist.
Space is the other pure intuition that Kant believes exists in the
human mind. Kant explains,
[s]pace represents no property w hatever of any things in

themselves, nor does it represent things in themselves in their
relation to one another...space represents no determination
of such things, no determination that adheres to objects
themselves and would remain even if w e abstracted from all
subjective conditions of intuition...[sjpace is nothing but the
mere form of all appearances of outer senses; i.e., it is the
subjective condition of sensibility under which alone outer
intuition is possible for us...the subject's receptivity for being
affected by objects precedes necessarily all intuitions of
these objects...if w e depart from the subjective condition
under which alone w e can - viz, as far as we may be
a ffected by objects - acquire outer intuition, then the
presentation of space means nothing whatsoever (1996, p.
A26/B42).
By this Kant means that the intuition of space is not an intrinsic
property of an object. Instead, space is a condition of the human mind
understanding objects and other conditions outside of the mind, but
outside the mind space looses its meaning. Whereas time is the basic
intuition of our inner sense, space, for Kant was the basic intuition of outer
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sense. Everything outside of our mind is interpreted through the intuition of
space. However, thoughts, being inside our minds, including space, are
interpreted through time. Kant believed that much in the same w ay that
humans apprehend time, they apprehend space. The limits and
m ovem ent of various objects outside of our minds are bounded by their
relations with other objects. They live on planet Earth, and it is possible that
the reason everyone used to think that the Earth was stationary was
because they could not apprehend the movem ent of the Earth relative to
other objects. So, it was assumed that the Earth was standing still. Also,
humans apprehend the limits of their own bodies by the relation of it to
other spatial objects. If there were suddenly nothing around them, they
could no longer apprehend the m ovement or limits of their own body. For
all they could know they could be several thousand feet tall, or
microscopic, moving, or standing still.
Whereas space simply exists as a w ay for the human mind to
apprehend outer reality, in order for the human mind to understand
space, they divide it into parts. In an ontological sense, space is not
com posed of parts, however in an epistemological sense, space must be
divided into parts to allow the mind to separate and apprehend objects
in space (Dicker, 2004, p. 64). In other words, in order for the human mind
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to apprehend space, they must mentally break it up into com prehendible
parts. They separate space much the same w ay w e do with time. The
time division of a ‘y©cir’ is only that particular division of time in which it
takes the Earth to revolve around the Sun as a perceptual stand-in for
time. Smaller divisions such as days are based on the spatial relation of
the Earth rotating once on its axis, and hours, minutes, and seconds are
simply arbitrary divisions. In the same w ay space is divided up for their
understanding, but they are arbitrary divisions. In other words, there is
nothing intrinsically necessary about the length of a meter. It could just
have easily been shorter or longer than the length that is now agreed
upon as a meter. If time and space were not divided into parts our minds
could not understand different temporal or spatial orders, because there
could be no time or space order. It would all just be one expanse of time
or space. In other words, it would be like trying to fully apprehend the
co n ce p t of infinity. Our mind can superficially understand the co n ce p t of
infinity, but not in a com plete sense.
Again, just as the tem poral framework used by humans to
apprehend their reality is a perpetual one that exists in the enduring
objects outside of the human mind, so is space. As Dicker said, “ ...it also
requires a persisting framework that can only be conceived as a spatial
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one. But since this spatial framework itself cannot be perceived, it can
enter into our experience only in the form of persisting or enduring objects
in space" (2004, p. 117). So, in essence, “ ...space is ‘in us' means only
that w e humans cannot conceive of perceived or perceivable objects
distinct from ourselves and our own mental states except as being in
space, and that Kant's ‘empirically real’ objects are just the ones we must
conceive as being distinct from ourselves and therefore also as being
outside us in space" (Dicker, p. 208). As mentioned above, the pure
intuition of space is something that is in the mind of the knower and has
no meaning outside of the mind. The human mind cannot apprehend
the external world outside of the framework of space, and that
framework, when divided up into segments, allows our mind to separate
ourselves and our mind from the outside world in spatial terms.
This notion of not being able to conceive of something distinct from
either time or space may be difficult to com prehend, but as quoted in
Dicker, H.J. Paton explains,
‘‘[sjuppose that a man has a pair of blue-tinted glasses

permanently and irremovably affixed to his head. On the
one hand, it is obvious that the man does not create or even
alter the things he sees through the glasses. On the other
hand, it is obvious that he can never see anything except as
blue. But finally, just to the extent that the w ay he sees things
(i.e., as blue) is determ ined by the glasses rather than by the
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object seen, it is necessary for him to see them that way, and
he can know in ad vance of experience that he will see things
as blue (Paton, 1970, p. 166).
Additionally, the man cannot step aw ay from the glasses to see
things the w ay they exist other than through the blue glasses. In the same
way humans cannot step out of our spatio-temporal understanding of our
reality, therefore they apprehend their reality through that framework,
and have no w ay of knowing if an objective reality exists apart from the
reality they apprehend, or how their reality relates to that objective reality.
The basis of all knowledge, for Kant, is, therefore, this spatio-temporal
framework. For Kant, “ ...both the forms of intuition and the pure concepts
of the understanding are permanent, built-in features of human knowers"
(Dicker, 2004, p. 34). These ‘pure concepts' Kant mentions are substance
and causality and will be discussed below. From this it follows that, “ 1) all
intuitions must be given to us in a spatio-temporal framework, that is, at
least in time or else in both time and space, and that 2) all intuitions must
be conceptualized in certain basic ways, such as substance and cause"
(Dicker, 2004, p. 34).
This framework is w hat allows the human mind to apprehend and
construct a representation of the external world. It is, “ ...what makes it
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possible for us to differentiate between, say, two otherwise identical coins
is that they exist in different places or at different times" (Dicker, 2004, p.
66). However, both space and time must be divisible into parts, as
m entioned above, which requires that, to use the Kantian term, “ pure
schema of m agnitude (quantitas)" be applied to time and space (Kant,
1996, p. B182). The requirements for things like these extensive magnitudes
of time and space are w hat connect other concepts, such as quantity, to
the pure intuitions. As an example, the reason I can understand that there
are three pennies on the table in front of me is precisely because I can
separate time and space into divisions. Certain divisions of space are
occupied at this mom ent in time by three objects that are known to me
as pennies. If I could not apprehend the separation of time and space
into divisions I would not be able to identify the occupation of that
particular space by the pennies in this mom ent from that space being
occupied by a book several minutes ago. Additionally, I could not
identify the pennies as being separate from each other, and, in turn,
could not arrive at a quantity of three.
The significance of there being the synthetic-a priori intuitions of
time and space can be found in w hat Kant called his ‘Copernican
Revolution’ (1996, p. Bxvi-xviii) of Transcendental Idealism (Tl). Up until
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Kant’s time, it had been believed, by the philosophy of Idealism, all a
knower knew about objects in the external world cam e from the object
itself (Dicker, p. 32). This would leave it impossible for the existence of
synthetic-a priori concepts. This is because a priori concepts are, by
necessity, linguistic in nature and exclusively of the mind, while objects
outside of the mind are, necessarily, synthetic. Therefore, if the only
manner in which they can com e to know objects in reality must com e
from the object itself, they must experience the object; ergo synthetic-a
priori concepts are logically impossible. By introducing Tl, Kant is not
saying that the knower changes the object in any way, but instead, he is
proposing that the knower contributes a framework in which the object
can be apprehended by the knower. In this way the extent and manner
in which the knower comes to know the object is determined, not by the
object, but by the knower, and is therefore, necessarily, a priori (Dicker,
2004, p. 126).
Kant's critics have found several weaknesses internal to the
argument found in the Critique's espousal of a Transcendental Idealism.
Dicker (2004) discusses the difficulty of “ things-in-themselves" (p. 43) and
how some Kant scholars interpret this as meaning there are tw o worlds,
one of things-in-themselves and one of appearances or phenomenon.
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Other scholars interpret this as being only one world. However, whichever
view is taken, Dicker points out that Kant proposes that thing-in-
themselves a cco un t for the appearances or phenomenon, i.e., that
things-in-themselves cause appearances (p. 44). The difficulty comes with
intelligibly understanding a cause-effect relationship outside of space and
time. Both Kant and Paton, as discussed above, pointed out that an
understanding of the world outside of our spatio-temporal framework in
not possible for the human mind. Because of weaknesses in Tl, Kant’s
successors have not been able to defend the Tl argument as Kant
intended (Dicker, p. 44). Instead, they have retained certain claims m ade
by this argument. This form of the argument has com e to be known as the
Weak Transcendental Idealism (WTI) and consists of the following three
theses:
1) w e must perceive all things in time and all things
distinct from ourselves and our own mental states as being in
space
2) w e must think of some of the things w e perceive
as being distinct from ourselves and of every event we
perceive as having a cause
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3) we can have no knowledge about, nor even any
conception of, w hat things are like apart from the ways in
which w e must perceive and think of them; nor can we
intelligibly suppose that things might be different from the
ways w e must perceive and conceptualize them (Dicker,
2004, p. 47).
In his argument, Kant is basically saying that there are pure
intuitions, time and space, along with other pure concepts, such as
substance and causality, that are based on the pure intuitions, and that
are meaningless outside of the human mind, and yet are built-in cognitive
properties of the knower. In other words, humans are born with certain
intuitions, and other pure concepts, that w e use to apply to our external
reality to construct and understand other, empirically derived, concepts,
but are meaningless outside of the human mind.
Through WTI, and as discussed in the above sections, Kant has
shown that the pure intuitions of time and space are built-in cognitive
aspects of the human mind. Kant has based his arguments, for time and
space, on the presupposition of objects in the external world. Without
them he does not have the enduring objects needed for the
determination of time, nor anything to apply space to. In this way, "...for
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experience to be possible, the category of substance - in the sense of the
term ‘substance’ on which it just means ‘a thing,' ‘a body,' or ‘a material
o bject' - must be applicable to it” (Dicker, 2004, p. 123). This, according
to Kant is the “substrate of everything real, i.e., of everything belonging to
existence of things, is substance" (1996, p. B225, italics in original). It is not
an individual object, but rather it is the stuff that all objects are m ade from
and it is permanent, or at least enduring (Dicker, p. 123). This, however,
does not actually explain w hat substance is because w hat Kant has
done, in the discussion above pertaining to time, is to say that substance is
permanent, and now that the perm anent is substance. To alleviate this
problem of circularify Jonathan Bennett’s argum ent will,
“ ...call substance defined in the traditional w ay ‘substanceT;

in other words, let us define a substancei as something that
bears properties but cannot itself be borne by anything
...And let us call substance as Kant ultimately defines it in the
First Analogy ‘substance 2 ’; in other words, let us define a
substance 2 simply as a sempiternal entity. Then the
permanence-of-substance thesis means that every
substancei is also a substance 2 . This is by no means a trivial
thesis because the notions of substancei and substance 2
seem to be entirely different, for it certainly seems as if,
contrary to the permanence-of-substance thesis, a thing
could be a bearer of properties yet com e into being or go
out of existence" (1966, p. 182).
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For the com plete logical outline of this argument, see appendix A. So, a
substancei is a ‘bearer of properties’ or w hat most people would call a
substance. However, this type of substance could bear properties; any
yet still go into and out of existence. At the same time a substance 2 is
probably w hat most physicists would call a substance; m atter in general,
which cannot be created or destroyed under normal circumstances, and
is, therefore, permanent, or at least enduring. Based on this argument a
substance can be said to follow the Aristotelian notion of substance which
can exist as a subject, but never as a predicate. In other words a
substancei can bear properties, but is not a property that can be borne
by anything else. In a more practical sense, a substancei is also a
collection of coexisting properties all taken together. A substancei is also,
however, com posed of a substance 2 , also called a substratum by Kant,
that is distinct from all its properties, but bearing all of them (Dicker, 2004,
p. 73). It is this substance 2 that is the perm anent or enduring needed for
the basis of the perceptual stand-in for time and to which space is
applied by human cognition. However, they cannot apprehend
substance 2 in an everyday sense. Instead they apprehend substancei
which are m ade of substance 2 . If the Sun were to be used as an example
for a stand-in for time, it can be said that the Sun undergoes changes
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from moment to moment, and is, therefore, not the same Sun each
successive moment. According to Kant these changes are merely
changes in the properties of the Sun and are, therefore, “ accidents”
(Dicker, p. 74). The substancei of the Sun may change, but the
substance 2 remains the same no m atter how many accide ntal changes
the Sun itself may go through because the substance 2 of which the Sun is
m ade, "cannot vary in its existence, its quantum in nature can also be
neither increased nor decreased” (Kant, 1996, p. B225). To walk through
Dicker’s outline of the First Analogy of the Critique, please see appendix B.
The second pure con cep t for Kant is that of causality. According to
Dicker (2004), Kant believed humans must have some sense of causality,
"...to show against Hume’s skeptical empiricism that w e must
conceptualize our experience as being of substances causally interacting
in space and tim e" (p. 50). Without causality, their reality would simply be
a series of events occurring one after the other in their perception with no
relation between those events, and their reality would not be the manifold
of experience that they actually have. As an example, the statement "If it
is raining, then the street is wet," (Dicker, p. 77) is a synthetic judgm ent. It
combines two individual judgments, “ If it is raining...” and “ ...then the
street is w e t.” The statement does not imply that either statement is true
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because it, in fact, may not be raining. What it does do, however, is link
the two statements through causation. The truth of the second statement
is based in the truth of the first. Without the notion of causality the human
mind could only conceive of events in the world as a series of temporally
linked events, (Dicker, p. 77) and not a manifold of experience.
Additionally, Kant believed that the actuality of the external world was a
necessary result of the notion of causality, or could have been predicted
by the laws of causality. To explain this argument Kant wrote,
1. What agrees (in terms of intuition and concepts) with the
formal conditions of experience is possible.
2. What coheres with the material conditions of experience
(with sensation) is actual.
3. That whose coherence with the actual is determ ined
according to universal conditions of experience is
necessary (exists necessarily) (1996, p. A218/B266, italics in
original)
In this statement Kant is saying that if it actually exists, it must have been
necessary by some cause, because if it was not the necessity result of
some cause, it would not have becom e an actuality. In other words,
“ ...the difference between the actual and the necessary is [merely]
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epistemological - it is a distinction with respect to our knowledge of the
existing thing” (Dicker, p. 80). For Dicker’s com plete analysis of Kant’s
argument of causality please see appendix C.
At this point Kant has provided the arguments for the existence of
two pure intuitions, time and space and the existence tw o pure concepts
of substances and cause. Beyond these four basic frameworks of human
cognition Kant argued for the existence of twelve categories of cognitive
framework that are based on the four frameworks above. These,
“ ...categories are those conceptual rules by means of which it is possible
to synthesize and unite a manifold of representations given in intuition so
that they represent an object of cognition” (Cicovacki, 1997, p. 110).
These categories also, “ ...have w hat [Kant] calls ‘objective validity’ ...that
a certain principle associated with the category has a special status...is
synthetic a priori" (Dicker, 2004, p. 49), “ ...or it is unobviously analytic, or its
truth is a necessary condition of having a kind of experience that we
unquestionably have" (Dicker, p. 126). These categories function as
meta-rules for the formation and understanding of other, empirically
derived, concepts. These categories function as normative rules in so far
as they prescribe laws a priori to appearances. It is through the
application of these categories that the human mind can apprehend
96
perceptions of reality and create cognizable, internal representations of
reality by synthesizing perceptions of the outside world with internal
frameworks of cognition (Cicovacki, 1997, p. 117).
It is only through the application of these categories that
perceptions can becom e objects of cognition. It is also through these
categories that Dicker claims Kant can make the argum ent that, “ ...the
truth of these principles is a necessary condition of our having the kind of
experience w e unquestionably have" (p. 49). In other words, the reason
they have the experiences they have is because of the conditions
created by the rules of the categories. To have this kind of experience
Kant discusses the twelve categories divided am ong four types: quantity,
quality, relation and modality (Dicker, p. 50).
Each of these categories is abstract and possesses no intrinsic
meaning outside of the mind, and does not exist in isolation. Instead,
these categories are interconnected in a network with other categories
and concepts (Cicovacki, 1997, p. 37). Therefore, in order for these
concepts to be related to reality, "they must each have a ‘schem a’ or be
‘schematized’ (Dicker, 2004, p. 66). This schema makes the application of
the co n ce p t easier to understand and to use and is similar to the
schemata discussed in the last chapter. An example would be Kant’s
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category of quantity. The notion of quantity has no meaning until it is
applied to something. To illustrate this, the notion of twelve has no
meaning unless it is applied to another concept. That co n ce p t could be
tangible, such as twelve doughnuts, or intangible, such as the number
twelve. Each of the four main categories listed above has three
categories that are contained within them, making a total of twelve
categories. For example, a quantity could be universal, particular or
singular. In other words, the judgm ent of quantity could apply universally
to ‘all’, particularly to ‘some’, or singularly to ‘something or someone
specific’ .
The next difficulty with Kant's argument is to show that these
categories are objectively valid. If they are not objective valid, then the
categories, such as quality, could be different for each person, and
therefore, Kant's project would succumb to the argum ent of skepticism.
To defend against this argument Kant used the Deduction Principle in
which, “ ...one can de du ce the objective validity of the categories from
the mere fa ct of consciousness" (Dicker, 2004, p. 89). In the
Transcendental Deduction of the Critique Kant is seeking to prove the
objective validity of his categories (Dicker, p. 84). To do so he needs to
98
show how the categories are the synthetic a priori concepts discussed
earlier in this chapter.
Much in the same manner in which the forms of pure intuition have
been shown to give a priori knowledge of external reality, categories are
supposed to give further a priori knowledge about that reality (Dicker,
2004, p. 84). In this way, the experience humans have of fheir external
reality must be understood through these categories as applying to
substances and governed by causal laws. The existence of these
categories is a truth that, "is a necessary condition of the kind of
experience w e unquestionably have..." (Dicker, p. 85). Therefore, "if we
have the kind of experience w e unquestionably have, that is, by showing
that if w e have the kind of experience w e unquestionably do, then we
must conceptualize our experience as being of substances whose
changes are governed by causal laws" (Dicker, p. 85) and thereby
proving the existence of these categories. Essentially, this means that if
humans have the kind of experience that they do, and there is no
possibility of any other kind of experience that they could have, that
experience must be m ediated by something that forces our experience
to be the w ay it is, and no other way. That which mediates their
experience must be the categories. To deny the existence of these
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categories would be to say that their experience is the result of a random
occurrence and that each of them can never be sure of anything about
their experience of reality. But because their reality has regularity and
order, categories must exist.
To show that the kind experience that they have is the kind of
experience that they unquestionably have they must have experiences of
some objects enduring through time while other objects changing with a
certain am ount of regularity and order. Kant writes that the,
“ ...com bination (nexus) is the synthesis of manifold [elements] insofar as
they belong to one another necessarily - as, e.g., the a ccid e n t belongs
necessarily to some substance, or the effect to the cause. Hence the
manifold, even if heterogeneous, is yet presented as com bined a priori"
(1996, p. B201, italics in original). In other words, it is through this order and
regularity that characterizes cognitive experience as a manifold of
experience and it is determ ined by the necessity of interconnections
between concepts of cognition. This necessity and regularity of
interconnections and, therefore, cognitive experience is introduced by
the cognitive subject, not the objects of cognition as noted by Kant when
he wrote, "...the order and regularity in the appearances that w e call
nature are brought into them by ourselves..." (p. A125, italics in original).
100
The ability to com prehend a regularity of order and change in order,
humans must be able to recognize patterns of stability or instability. This
recognition involves the ability to, "...classify, identify and re-identify an
item of perceptual encounter or thought..." and, "...presupposes some
stability and pattern, and this is precisely w hat is missing in sensations"
(Cicovacki, 1997, p. 55). And yet, the recognition of an object is possible
only if there is something that remains the same in our perceptions of the
world in one w ay or another (p. 60). Therefore, in order to recognize a
sensation, it must be that a sensation has two, "distinguishable, separable,
and mutually irreducible com ponents...,” the physical sensation and the
cognitive (p. 61). It is only when these two com ponents are correctly
aligned that humans can apprehend a recognizable sensation, and the
alignment is provided for them by the categories. This regularity and order
can be understood in the context of ‘seeing as’ and ‘seeing th a t’. The
notion of ‘seeing as’ reflects expectation, interests, cognitive structures,
background knowledge, and a person's whole point of reference (p. 67).
As Cicovacki explained, "I can see the here and now given in front of me
as a red object only because I already understand w hat it is for something
to be an object, that is, a perm anent bearer of properties and relations. I
can see this as a red object because I can see that this is something
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which will not disappear in the next moment of which I still have no
perceptual experience” (p. 68).
"Conceiving them in these ways is a necessary condition of
something that is unquestionably true, namely, that w e have experience
in the narrow sense of consciousness of a manifold of successive
representations” (Dicker, 2004, p. 126). In other words, if it can be shown
that our experience is a com pilation of representations of our reality that
flows smoothly and contains some enduring objects and some objects
that change in an orderly manner, and that this is the experience humans
must have, it can be de du ced that the synthetic-a priori categories do, in
fact, exist.
To this point Kant has demonstrated the existence of the pure
intuitions of time and space; the pure concepts of substance and
causality; and the categories within the mind of the knower. These,
together with perceptions the knower receives from the external world,
allow the knower to apprehend the external world. But because an a
priori elem ent is required for the cognitive apprehension of empirical
concepts, these empirical concepts cannot be understood merely from
experience. Instead these empirical concepts must be constructed in
some manner (Cicovacki, 1997, p. 105). The process of the human mind
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creating these empirical concepts was discussed in the previous chapter
from the view of cognitive psychology.
If Kant’s argument can be a c c e p te d to this point, he has shown
how the human mind can apprehend individual, empirical concepts.
However, this leaves the question of a unified flow of experience as
opposed to the existence of many consciousnesses. In other words, how
can humans be sure that their experience of these individual empirical
concepts of the external reality belongs to a single reality and is not an
assemblage of many worlds of consciousness? Kant accomplishes this
task with his notion of, "...‘the manifold of representations'... [which]
covers both intuitions and conceptual contents, whether these be a priori
or em pirical" (Dicker, 2004, p. 91). The difference betw een a manifold of
representations and that of many worlds can be seen as an example of
taking a sentence of a dozen words, and telling each of a dozen people
one word. If the people would stand next to each other and asked to
think of their word, this is still not a consciousness of the entire sentence.
Instead, this would be twelve separate consciousnesses of twelve different
words and this is not the same as one consciousness of the entire
sentence (Dicker, p. 92). The conditions necessary for this manifold of
representations, the consciousness of the entire sentence, is possible
103
because of, “ ...the application of categories grounds in an objective
manner, or provides an objective ground for, the cognitive synthesis of
some given m anifold" (Cicovacki, 1997, p. 117).
This notion of a unity of consciousness is only possible in an
objective, orderly world in which the pure concepts of substance and
causality, and the categories contained within these pure concepts, have
an objective validity (Dicker, 2004, p. 95). This objective validity is
im portant to the unity of consciousness because, as seen above, the
contents of consciousness are representations of objects in external reality
as well as objects of the knower's consciousness. In being so,
representations and objects of consciousness, the objects of the knower’s
consciousness have a relationship with each other in being
representations linked to an object in the external world. This connection
through the external object serves to unify the objects of consciousness,
but only if the categories by which they were apprehended have
objective validity (Dicker, p. 95). In Kant’s words, “ ...an object is that in
whose co n ce p t the manifold of a given intuition is united” (Kant, 1996, p.
B137, italics in original) [therefore] a set of representations can refer to an
object only if they are all contained in one consciousness (Dicker, p. 98).
The reverse of the notion that a unity of consciousness is possible through
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a connection to an external object is also true. A unity of consciousness
cannot com e solely from objects of cognition. These connections to
representations of external objects are necessary for a unity of
consciousness (Dicker, p. 98). The representations of a chair contained
within my mind are linked together by their connection with the chair in
the external world, but only if the rule that connects the internal and
external worlds has objective reality and all representations are contained
within one consciousness. In this w ay the sensations of the chair are not,
by themselves, insufficient for cognition because they may be subjective
or relative, and, therefore, cannot represent reality (Cicovacki, 1997, p.
58). However, in every sensation, “ ...there must be something that
remains constant or that repeats itself” (Cicovacki, p. 59).
At this point Kant has established a unity of thought for a single
object, but consciousness is a rich menagerie of experiences, with many
interconnections. For this phenomenon Kant explains,
...we must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of

imagination that itself underlies the possibility of all
experience (inasmuch as this possibility presupposes
necessarily that appearances can be reproduced). Now,
obviously, if I w ant to draw a line of thought, or to think the
time from one noon to the next, or even just to present a
certain number, then I must, first of all, necessarily apprehend
in thought one of these manifold presentations after the
other. But if I always lost from my thoughts the preceding
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presentations (the first parts of the line, the preceding parts of

the time, or sequentially presented units) and did not
reproduce them as I proceeded to the following ones, then
there could never arise a whole presentation; nor could there
arise any of the mentioned thoughts - indeed, not even the
purest and most basic presentations of space and time (1996,
p. A101-102).
Here Kant is explaining how it is must be that his theory of
transcendental synthesis must be correct because, otherwise, he could
not experience a manifold of experience, but instead reality in a manner
other than that which he does. In this way this manifold of consciousness
is not merely pertaining to a single external object, but it also involves
internal representations of cognitive processes connected in a tem poral
succession. In this way, our perceptions of the external world are a
network of perceptions, intimately connected to our other concepts,
perceptions and beliefs (Cicovacki, 1997, p. 37). In this manner humans
can create a continuous unity of consciousness (Dicker, 2004, p. 108). As
an example, “ ...in order to hear the third stroke of the bell as the third, for
example, I must not merely reproduce the first and second strokes, but
also be aware that w hat I am reproducing is the first and second strokes
(Dicker, p. 108). In this manner our perceptions and representations of our
external world and internal consciousness form an interconnected
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network (Cicovacki, p. 42). These interconnected perceptions and
representations are w hat form the schemata m entioned above. This
interconnection does, however, require an object from the external world,
as discussed above. As Dicker points out, “ ...the only w ay to unify a
manifold of representations is to refer them to an object...representations
refer to an object by being related to each other in a non-arbitrary, rule-
governed w ay" (Dicker, 2004, p. 103). It is therefore, a necessary
condition of cognition to have a connection to the external world. The
portion provided by the external world is necessary, but not sufficient for
an apprehension. To apprehend the world, the sensation provided by the
object must be organized within the cognitive structures of the subject
apprehending the object (Cicovacki, p. 109).
To reverse the order Kant writes,
[...the unity that the object makes necessary can be nothing

other than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of
the manifold of the presentations. When we have brought
about synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition - this is when
w e say that w e cognize the object. This unity is impossible,
however, unless the intuition can be produced according to
a rule through a [certain] function of synthesis, viz., a function
of synthesis that makes the reproduction of the manifold
necessary a priori and makes possible a co n ce p t in which the
manifold is united (1996, p. A105-106).
107
What Kant means is that this manifold of consciousness requires that
representations be reproduced and recognized according to a rule, such
as his categories. Dicker concurs by writing that it is only through this use
of a rule that it is possible to apply the representation to a co n ce p t (p.
1 1 0 ).
Kant’s belief of the contribution of the subject to understanding
reality is that the subject: 1) understands reality through the framework
brought to cognition of the world; 2) are different based on the different
structures and concepts of the subject; and 3) altered by the situation
that changes the cognitive experience (Cicovacki, 1997, p. 72). It is
because of these various factors that each knower understands their
reality through their own conceptual framework based on their individual
previous knowledge, expectations, and interests. Therefore, there can be
more than one correct understanding of reality (Cicovacki, p. 83) within
two separate minds, but not within the same mind. Because there can be
more than one correct understanding of reality, two people cannot have
the same understanding unless they each share the same perceptions,
relevant prior knowledge and conceptual frameworks (Cicovacki, p. 83).
This viewpoint was illustrated by Kuhn in his notion of incommensurability,
whereby tw o individuals can arrive at mutually exclusive conclusions from
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the same d a ta set. Each conclusion being valid and defendable based
on the data set (1970, p. 102-4).
Summary
In this chapter, through Kant's epistemological project, this study
has discussed the notion that the external reality that humans com e to
know must be known to them in the w ay that it is known because it is the
only possible w ay for them to com e to know it. Because the pure
intuitions of time and space and the other pure concepts that were
discussed earlier have shown that the human mind can com e to know
the external world only in the w ay it does, humans can know the external
world only in the w ay that we do because they are human. Additionally,
the way humans com e to know our external reality is through an
interaction between their mind and that external reality and this
interaction between our mind and reality is m ediated by schema created
from pure intuitions and concepts that exist in the human mind as part of
being a human mind.
Kant’s original purpose of writing The Critique of Pure Reason was to
answer the 'scandal' of western philosophy and to give human reason a
metaphysical system as the basis for the existence of an external reality
that is not de fea te d by the Pyrrohonian skeptics or dogmatism.
109
In examining if Kant was successful in his attem pt it can be stated
that Kant’s metaphysical system is not dogm atic, as there is a logical basis
for the system. It is also not subject to skepticism because: 1) not arbitrary
because it is not assigned to cognition but is built into the structure of our
cognitive experience; 2) cannot be circular because it is not wholly
internal, but a com bination of formal and material elements; and 3) not
infinite regress because cognitive structure is not based on a chain of
logical inferential justification, but on a system of related rules. Therefore,
it can be argued that Kant is successful in his attem pt to create a
metaphysical system on which humans can base our knowledge of an
external reality.
The success of Kant in his endeavor has implication for both
constructivist theory and the cognitive theories discussed above.
According to Kant, the external reality is not imposed on nor collected by
a knower. Instead, each knower has com e to know of external reality
differently. This is because their com ing to know is through an interaction
between the knower and their external reality. This com ing to know the
external reality is m ediated through the pure intuitions of time and space,
the pure concepts of substance and causality, and the twelve categories
discussed above. With the occurrence of this interaction betw een the
110
internal and external, the mind creates a mental representation of the
external world that can be called a schema. These schemas are not
static once created, but instead are fluid as new information and
experiences occur to the knower. This fluidity is because the, "...cognitive
experience not only involves an em ploym ent of empirical concepts but
also leads to their formation (B118)...experience as a process in which our
sensible representations are transformed into concepts. (B102)” 101 In this
way, humans are constantly creating and recreating their understanding
of theirr reality by constantly reflectively thinking about new perceptions
and their relation to existing schemata. In addition, Kant showed that the
knowledge that is com e to be known by the knower cannot be
separated from the context in which it was created because it is
connected, via the schem ata that hold it in the mind, to that action.
CHAPTER FIVE
Alignment of the Theories
As discussed in Chapter 1, the purpose of this study was to examine
the processes of learning through constructivist learning theory, the
cognitive psychological theories of ecological psychology, activity theory
and cognitive information processing theory, and the epistemological
project of Immanuel Kant. The first hypothesis of this study was that the
only manner by which the human mind can com e to know the world is by
constructing knowledge through the interaction of the learner’s cognitive
structures and the learner's reality. The second hypothesis of this study is
that the first hypothesis is supported by the cognitive psychological
theories discussed in Chapter 3 and the epistemological project of
Immanuel Kant. In addition, pe da go gy based on the constructivist theory
is the application of the first hypothesis. The third hypothesis of this study is
that pe dagogy based on constructivist theory is more closely aligned with
the processes by which certain cognitive psychological theories and the
epistemology of Kant explain the w ay the human mind learns. This
hypothesis is the focus of the discussion in this chapter.
Ill
112
First and Second Hypotheses
Constructivist Theory
In Chapter 2 it was proposed that, though there are variations within
the genre of constructivist theory, there are five com ponents that are
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for a theory to be considered a
variation of constructivist theory. As shown in Chapter 2 these
com ponents are: learners use contextual symbol systems to represent their
unique reality; learners interact, cooperate and negotiate meanings using
symbol systems; learners are cognitively active participants in the learning
process; learners reflect on internalized and acco m m o d a te d structures
and information from their world; and learners determine the viability of
their knowledge within the social context in which it is created. These
components, in com bination, were shown to support the idea that a
learner is an active participant in the learning process and not simply a
passive recipient of knowledge. This activity takes the form of the
learner’s perceptions of reality being encoded into signifiers of symbol
systems, meanings of the perceptions being negotiated, being reflected,
acco m m o d a te d and validated through existing cognitive structures.
113
Cognitive Psychological Theory
In C hapter 3 it was discussed how the cognitive psychological
theories of ecological psychology, activity theory and cognitive
information processing all support the idea that learning occurs by the
mind obtaining input, either from the external reality of the learner through
the senses or from internal sources, either internal to the body or the mind
of the learner. Following the input of information, an interaction occurs in
the mind of the learner between the input and the cognitive structures of
the learner’s mind. Learning occurs when changes occur in those
structures, either through integration of the new input to the existing
structures or through changes in the existing structures. For these three
cognitive psychological theories the learner’s knowledge of reality is a
result of the learner understanding the input through the mediation of the
cognitive structures.
Epistemological Theory
In Chapter 4 it was shown that Immanuel Kant supported the idea
that learning occurs by the mind first obtaining input, either from the
external reality of the learner through the senses or from internal sources,
either internal to the body or the mind of the learner (Cicovacki, 1997, p.
117). This input is interpreted through the cognitive structures of the
114
learner's mind, known to Kant as synthetic-a priori concepts. Learning
occurs when changes occur in those structures, either through integration
of the new input to the existing structures or through changes in the
existing structures. For Kant (1996) the learner's knowledge of reality is a
result of the learner understanding the input through the mediation of the
cognitive structures (p. B103, B134).
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4 it was proposed that learning occurs through
the interaction of the input from the learner's reality and the cognitive
structures of the learner. If the arguments discussed above are a cce p te d ,
the first hypothesis, that learners com e to know reality by the construction
of knowledge through the interaction of cognitive structures and inputs
from reality, has been shown to be supported by both certain cognitive
psychological and epistemological theories. In addition, the second
hypothesis, that the first hypothesis is supported by constructivist theory,
specific cognitive psychological theories and the epistemological theory
of Kant, has been shown to be supported by the evidence. The
implication of these two hypotheses being shown to be supported by the
evidence would be that all learning is equivalent, in terms of the process.
The process by which learning that occurs through rote memorization of a
list of spelling words would be the same process as learning through a
115
lecture or a students-centered, constructivist lab. This would mean that
there is no difference between pedagogies, in terms of the processes the
mind of the learner goes through in order to learn something.
The implication of this conclusion would be that no m atter w hat
m ethod a teacher uses in the classroom, the results, in terms of student
learning, would be the same. However, the third hypothesis of this study is
that even though there is no difference in the processes by which the
human mind can com e to know reality, there is a difference in the quality
of learning experiences created by different pedagogical methods.
Specifically, this study proposes that pedagogies based on constructivist
learning theory provide the opportunity for learners to have a higher
quality of learning experience. This study proposes that this difference
occurs because of the alignment between the com ponents of
constructivist pe da go gy and the cognitive psychological theories
discussed in C hapter 3 and the epistemology of Kant. In other words, the
reason constructivist pe dagogy can create the opportunity for a higher
quality of learning experience is because the classroom activities the
learner engages in during a lesson are in alignment with the processes in
which it is believed that the human mind learns.
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Third Hypothesis
This study has argued that a higher quality of learning is
experienced when constructivist pe dagogy is used to teach students. This
study has also argued that pe da go gy can be considered part of the
constructivist genre if the pedagogy employs the five com ponents that
were argued above to be necessary and sufficient for inclusion to the
constructivist genre. This section will argue that the reason for the higher
quality learning experience when constructivist pe da go gy is sued is
because of the alignment between the five com ponents of constructivism
and the cognitive psychological theories and the epistemology of Kant.
In C hapter 2 it was argued that there are five com ponents that are
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for a learning theory to be
considered part of the constructivist genre. In support of the third
hypothesis, this study will now show these proposed com ponents of
constructivism to be supported by, and aligned with, the cognitive
psychological theories discussed in Chapter 3 and the epistemological
theory discussed in Chapter 4.
117
First Com ponent
Constructivism and Cognitive Psychology
The first com ponent discussed in C hapter 2 was that learners use
contextual symbol systems to represent their unique reality. As the
example used in Chapter 2 discussed, most people have encountered a
furry, four-legged creature that barks. In com ing to understand this
perception, Jonassen and Land (2000) wrote that humans m ediate this
perception through the use of tools (symbol systems), and it is these tools
that alter the nature of human activities and cognitive processes (p. vi).
These tools m ediate the perception and allow humans to construct a
mental representation of that perception using the symbol systems known
to the learner. As discussed in Chapter 3 this internal representation of
reality is based on a com bination of sensory input and content and the
structure of the cognitive framework in memory. As Phye and Andre
(1986) wrote, in this manner the learner does not receive the meaning or
representation of the perception from the object being perceived;
instead the learner interprets the meaning or representation of the
perception by mediation of the perception through the framework
present in the learner’s memory (p. 87). Each learner possesses a unique
framework based on past experiences and unique perceptions of reality,
118
therefore a unique representation of the perception. As shown in Chapter
3 symbol systems have a structural system unique to that system, such as
the gram m ar of the English language, and that learners construct
cognitive representations, called a schema, of their reality using those
symbol systems. This schema is constructed using a com bination of
sensory perceptions and prior schemata. Because learners have a unique
set of perceptions based on such things as the point of view and the
processes discussed in C hapter 3, such as neural pruning. In addition,
each learner possesses a unique set of schemata based upon their past
experiences. In addition, because learners have a unique set of
perceptions and set of schem ata with which to build a new schema,
each learner will create a unique representation of fheir realify. In the
example discussed above, the learner would create a schema of the
visual perception of the furry animal, the signifier ‘d o g ’ and possibly other
perceptions, cognitive structures or prior existing schemata con ne cted to
this encounter. In other words, working the discussion backwards, a
learner creates a unique representation of reality by m ediating
perceptions of that reality using the cognitive tools of symbol systems.
The belief that perceptions of reality are m ediated through the use
of symbol systems is supported by ecological psychology and activity
119
theory support. It was shown in C hapter 3 that these theories support the
belief that learning is an interaction between the learner and the learner's
world using cognitive tools to aid with the interaction. Teachers, or others,
such as parents, can assist children in building those representations of the
world by connecting the representations to symbols that have been
agreed upon and that are generally a cc e p te d by the wider society, but
they cannot give the learners their representation or build it for them. For
example, at some point someone around the learner explained to the
learner that the representation a learner created is called ‘d o g ’ in the
spoken English language, and in written English language it is represented
by the symbols ‘d ’, ‘o ’, and ‘g ’, in that order.
Constructivism and Epistemology
At this point both constructivist theory and the cognitive
psychological theories discussed above support the theory that the
understanding of reality by the human mind is the result of an interaction
between reality and the cognitive structures of the mind. As discussed in
Chapter 4, it was shown that Kant also supported this theory. Kant (1996)
was not saying that the knower changes the object in any w ay during this
interaction, but instead, he proposed that the knower contributes a
framework within which the object can be apprehended by the knower
120
(Dicker, 2004, p. 126). In this w ay Kant proposed the extent and manner in
which the knower comes to know the object is determined, not by the
object, but by the knower (Dicker, p. 126). As discussed above, a
learner’s reality is represented within the framework of synthetic-a priori
concepts, such as time, space and Kant’s categories (Dicker, p. 34). The
only w ay things perceived by the learner can be m ade sense of is through
the structures provided by these concepts. Building on the prior example,
the learner perceives the dog through, at a minimum, the cognitive
frameworks of both time and space. As shown in Chapter 4, because the
learner would be able to establish an order of thoughts of the dog other
than the order in which the learner apprehended the thoughts, the
learner must be able to establish w hat that other time order is. In this way,
be it conscious or not, the learner understands the framework of time in
which the learner perceived the dog. In addition, again, consciously or
not, the learner can understand the dog as being separated in space
from the learner. As shown in Chapter 4, Kant argued that in order for a
learner to understand something is outside of the mind the learner must
apprehend it in some sort of spatial relation to the learner's mind; that
relation being in a space other than the learner’s mind is in. Because the
learner can apprehend something outside the mind and the only w ay to
121
do that is through spatial relationships, the intuition of space must exist.
Otherwise the learner would not have an understanding of the dog being
separate from the mind of the learner. O nce the learner has an
understanding of the perception, as it has com e to be known through the
synthetic-a priori concepts of the mind, the learner's mind will need some
way to integrate the perception into the cognitive structures, the
schemata, of the mind. As Cicovacki (1997, p. 68) wrote, I can see the
dog in front of me now only because I already understand w hat it is to be
an object and w hat it is to be a dog. In other words, there must be an
existing cognitive structure, including the symbol system to signify the
representation of the perceptions, to con ne ct the perception to in order
for the mind to com e to an understanding of the perception, not to only
have the perception. In addition, the categories of Kant contain
synthetic-a priori concepts such as quantity and quality. The social system
of learners has created various symbol systems to a ct as signifiers for these
categories (e.g., number to signify quantity and language to signify
quality). The signifiers of these symbol systems are, in turn, used to
construct cognitive representations of perceptions of the learner.
As was shown in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 and subsequently discussed
above, constructivist theory, the cognitive psychological theories used in
122
this study and the epistemological theory of Kant all support the idea that
the understanding of reality by the human mind is accom plished through
the m ediation of perceptions through the use of cognitive tools, such as
symbol systems.
Second Com ponent
The second com ponent discussed above was that learners interact,
cooperate and negotiate meanings using symbol systems. In C hapter 3 it
was shown how it is through symbol systems that one learner can
com m unicate with other learners and how the structures and how
information is interpreted within those structures is based on the social
structures within which the learner exists a n d /o r the symbol system was
created. As new concepts com e into existence, learners or groups of
learners negotiate and agree upon the meanings of concepts and the
symbols used to signify the concept. An example of this would be the
co n ce p t of ‘b it’ or ‘b yte ’. In the last century computers and
microprocessors have com e into existence. A group of com puter
scientists, who worked on the developm ent of these devices, determ ined
that a certain number of switches entailed a ‘b it’ and a certain multiple of
123
bits would entail a ‘byte ’. Then they coined the signifiers ‘bit’ and ‘b y te ’
to represent those concepts in the English language.
As shown in Chapter 3, Phye and Andre (1986) discussed the idea
that the learner does not receive the meaning of the message, but rather
that the learner interprets the meaning of the message through the
framework present in the learner's memory (p. 87). If the learner has no
framework for a concept, either because the con cep t is new or simply
new to the learner, the learner must work with others to determine the
meaning of the concept. Again, there is nothing intrinsically necessary
that these concepts possess the signifiers they do. It was simply agreed
upon by a group of learners and a cc e p te d in com m on usage. A
different group of learners, socially isolated from the first may apply a
different signifier to the cam e co n ce p t and it would be equally valid as
the first group’s signifier. Though these symbol systems are not intrinsically
meaningful they are also cannot be randomly applied. Although different
learners, or groups of learners, may have different schem ata from prior
experiences, therefore possibly different representations, interpretations or
signifiers of a concept, to avoid relativism meanings must be negotiated
between or am ong learners.
124
In Chapter 4 it was discussed how categories, such as quantity, exist
as synthetic-a priori concepts. As discussed above, these concepts are
meaningless outside of the application of the co n ce p t to an object of
cognition. In other words, concepts, such as the number three, do not
exist outside of the human mind, and are useless until they are applied to
an object in the learner's reality. In this case the co n ce p t of three has no
meaning until it is applied, as in a m athem atical calculation or to count
something. This also applies to qualitative concepts, such as ‘re d ’. It is a
meaningless co n ce p t outside of human cognition and until it is applied to
an object of reality. In other words, there is no objective sense of the
concepts of ‘three’ or ‘re d ’. Instead, these concepts have been
negotiated and agreed upon by learners and there is nothing intrinsically
necessary for the co n ce p t of three to fall between the quantities of two
and four. It is simply something that was agreed upon by a group of
learners. The same applies to the co n ce p t of red. It was simply agreed
upon by a group of learners that a certain wavelength of visible light that
is perceived by the human eye be called ‘red’ . It could have easily been
called ‘zippy’ or any other signifier.
125
As shown in Chapter 4, in order for the mind to have a manifold of
consciousness, the representations of reality must be reproduced and
recognized according to a rule. However, Kant believed there was a
system to the application of these rules and that system was his categories
(Dicker, 2000, p. 110). As shown in Chapter 4, Kant believed these
categories function as meta-rules for the formation and understanding of
other, empirically derived, concepts, such as ‘3’ or ‘re d ’ (Dicker, 110). It is
through the application of these categories that the mind is able to
understand reality through the perceptions of reality. As indicated above,
Cicovacki (1997) states that there must be two com ponents that are
necessary and sufficient to the understanding of a perception: the
physical sensation and the cognitive (p. 117). Cicovacki also believes
that it is only when these two com ponents are correctly aligned that
humans can apprehend a recognizable sensation, and the alignment is
provided for them by the categories (p. 117). It is, however, possible for
two different subjects to contain tw o incommensurate representations of
reality. This is possible because of Kant’s belief in the contribution of the
subject to understanding reality (Dicker, 2004, p. 126). First, the subject
understands reality through the synthetic-a priori framework of cognition.
Second, each subject possesses a unique set of cognitive structures
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based on that subject’s past experiences. Third, each subject has a
unique situation within which to experience reality. Cicovacki (1997)
discussed that it is because of these factors that each subject
understands reality through their own conceptual framework based on
their individual previous knowledge, expectations and interests (p.83).
Therefore, there can be more than one correct understanding of reality.
In addition tw o subjects cannot have the same understanding of reality
unless they somehow share the same perceptions, prior knowledge of the
perception and cognitive framework.
the learners interact, cooperate and negotiate meanings using symbol
systems.
Third C om ponent
The third com ponent discussed was learners are cognitively active
participants in the learning process. As was shown in C hapter 3 the
cognitive psychological theories discussed above support the notion that
the human mind learns through interactions between the cognitive
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structures of the mind and the external world. In other words, these
theories do not subscribe to the idea that the mind is a passive receiver of
information imposed upon it from an objective reality. As discussed
above these cognitive theories claim that learning is a result of a
com bination of the learner’s perceptions of the world and the learner’s
subsequent cognitive action upon the world. In addition, ecological
psychology, activity, and cognitive information processing theories
support the belief that learning is an interaction between the learner and
the learner’s world using cognitive tools to aid with the interaction.
Jonassen and Land (2000) claim ed that the human mind emerges and
exists as a special com ponent of interactions with the environment, and is
not an objective entity apart from it (p. v). In addition, this activity, of
interaction between the mind and the environment, and conscious
processing cannot be separated. In other words, individuals cannot
understand something without acting on it. Through this process the
learner creates an internal representation of their external reality based
on a com bination of sensory input and content and schem ata in memory.
This cognitive d a nce of processes that occurs during these interactions is
controlled by executive processes, as was shown through CIP theory,
within the mind and cause structural changes within the mind. These
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structural changes occur because of connections that are m ade
between existing structures of the mind and new information and
structures. Because the mind undergoes these changes, not only is the
mind a ffected by the interactions, but reality is also a ffe cte d because the
changes cause the mind to now interact differently because of the
change when com pared to how the mind would have interacted prior to
the changes.
Kant (1996), as was shown in C hapter 4, unlike many of his
predecessors and contemporaries, believed that reality cam e to be
known to a learner not passively through perceptions given by an
objective reality, nor solely through rational, cognitive processes (p. B103).
Instead Kant believed that reality comes to be known to a learner through
an active interaction between the learner’s mind and reality (p. B103).
Each has a role to play, and the learner cannot com e to understand
reality without both parts interacting. As discussed above, Kant believed
that an understanding of reality was created through the active synthesis
of perceptions and the pure intuitions by w ay of certain rules. It is through
the application of these rules, called categories, that the human mind
can apprehend perceptions of reality and create cognizable, internal
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representations of reality by synthesizing perceptions of the outside world
with internal frameworks of cognition. So again, Kant is not saying that the
knower changes the object in any way, but instead, he is proposing that
the knower contributes a framework in which the object can be
apprehended by the knower (Dicker, 2004, p. 126). In this w ay the extent
and manner in which the knower comes to know the ob je ct is
determined, not by the object, but by the knower. It is in this manner
Cicovacki (1997) discussed that in order to recognize a sensation, it must
be that a sensation has two, distinguishable, separable, and mutually
irreducible components: the physical sensation and the cognitive (p. 109).
It is only when these tw o components are correctly aligned that humans
can apprehend a recognizable sensation, and the alignment is provided
by the categories. Therefore, in order to com e to an understanding of
reality Cicovacki wrote that it is a necessary condition of cognition to
have an active connection to the external world (p. 109). The portion
provided by the external world is necessary, but not sufficient for an
apprehension. To apprehend the world, the sensation provided by the
object must be organized within the cognitive structures of the subject
apprehending the object through the active interaction betw een the
cognitive structures and the sensations of the object.
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Therefore, constructivist theory and the cognitive psychological
theories used in this study and the epistemological theory of Kant all
support the idea that the learners are cognitively active participants in
the learning process.
Fourth C om ponent
The fourth com ponent discussed in Chapter 2 was learners reflect
on internalized and acco m m o d a te d structures and information from their
world. This was also discussed in Chapter 3 in that learners create
schemata to organize and understand their reality. When new
information or structures are encountered by a learner, the learner can
attem pt to integrate this information into existing schemata. As discussed
above, the process of first determining if novel information and structures
can be integrated into existing schemata and changing existing
schemata is performed through the process of reflective thought. In this
attem pt to integrate new information, the learner can reflect the new
information upon schem ata or knowledge retained in memory from
previous problems or similar concepts or knowledge. It is through this
interactive reflection between the internal cognitive structures and
external realities of the learner that compares new information to existing
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schemata. If the learner determines these information and structures
cannot be integrated within existing schemata, the schem ata must be
changed, thereby internalizing and accom m odating them. Phye and
Andre (1986) pointed out that by integrating this new information into the
student's existing knowledge schemata, understanding of this information
can be enhanced by the increased likelihood that the student will be
able to access and retrieve the appropriate information when necessary
(p. 11). In addition, they believed that something is understood when it
has been integrated in a meaningful w ay into the learner's existing
knowledge structure, not simply memorized in isolation. When the learner
does not have any relevant knowledge that can be used to construct an
interpretation of a message, memorization may occur, but understanding
will not. Also, the more interconnected the information becomes; the
easier it is to store and access it. Jonassen (2004) believed that if
schemata are well constructed and with many interconnections, it will
allow the learner to bring them from long-term memory to working
memory as a whole chunk during future problem solving efforts, thereby
reducing the cognitive load required for working memory to process the
problem (p. 87).
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In Chapter 4 it was discussed how all perceptions encountered by a
learner must be interpreted through existing synthetic-a priori structures in
order to have meaning. Cicovacki (1997) wrote that it is through the
application of these categories that the human mind can apprehend
perceptions of reality and create cognizable, internal representations of
reality by synthesizing perceptions of the outside world with internal
frameworks of cognition (p. 109). As discussed above, this interpretation is
done by the learner reflecting new perceptions onto existing structures,
including the framework of synthetic-a priori concepts. As in the example
used in C hapter 4, the reason a learner can understand that there are
three pennies on the table is because the learner possesses the
frameworks of time and space, and the framework of the divisions of the
extensive magnitudes of those frameworks. In other words, the learner
can reflect the perception upon existing frameworks and understand that
certain divisions of space are occupied at this moment in time by three
objects that are known to the learner as pennies. If the learner could not
apprehend the separation of time and space into divisions the learner
would not be able to identify the occupation of that particular space by
the pennies in this moment from that space being occu pied by a book
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several minutes ago. Additionally, the learner could not identify the
pennies as being separate from each other. Additionally, the learner
must possess a framework of the category of quantity to reflect the
perception upon in order to arrive at a quantity of three pennies. Again,
Kant is not saying that the knower changes the object in any way, but
instead, he is proposing that the knower contributes a framework upon
which perceptions of the object can be reflected and, subsequently,
apprehended by the knower (Dicker, 2004, p. 126). As also shown in
Chapter 4, in order for the mind to have a continuous unity of experience,
the mind must reflect new information upon existing structures and
information. Using the example from C hapter 4, in order for a learner to
hear the third stroke of a bell, the learner must not only reproduce the first
tw o strokes, but must also reflect the perception of the third stroke upon
the awareness of the first two strokes. Otherwise the learner would merely
have perceptions of three strokes of a bell, with no connection to each
other, no manifold of experience. It is through this process of reflecting
upon existing structures that the mind fulfills the requirement Kant referred
that in order to have this manifold of consciousness (Dicker, 2004, p. 110).
Again, this manifold of consciousness requires that perceptions are
formed into representations through the reproduction and recognition of
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those perceptions through reflection upon a framework of rules, such as
Kant's categories (Cicovacki, 1997, p. 109).
the learners reflect on internalized and a cco m m o d a te d structures and
information from their world.
Fifth C om ponent
The fifth and final com ponent discussed in Chapter 2 was learners
determine the viability of their knowledge within the social context in
which it is created. As discussed in Chapter 3 learners com pare new
information and structures to existing to determine if the new information
should be a cco m m od ated , discarded, or if more information should be
sought. As shown in Chapter 3, this process is controlled by the executive
routines and the conditional knowledge of when and why to apply the
content and procedural knowledge. This conditional knowledge allows
the learner to reflect this new information upon existing schemata and
determine the disposition of the new information (integration, elimination
or search for more information). Therefore, the conditional knowledge
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can determine the viability of new knowledge and schema by com paring
them to existing cognitive structures. This form of m etacognition is not
derived from a learner's input from their external reality, but instead is a
uniquely individual process tied to the learner’s own internal
representations of that reality. Because of this, each learner will
determine their own validity of new knowledge, as each learner will
possess a unique existing cognitive structure upon which to reflect new
knowledge for validity. Additionally, as shown in C hapter 3, Hacker,
Dunlosky and Graesser (1998) supported the idea of learner validation of
knowledge used to solve a problem by encoding the problem and
forming a mental representation of the parts, then selecting an
appropriate solution strategy, and finally identifying and overcoming
obstacles to the solution resolution (p. 50). If the knowledge being used as
a strategy is identified as being inappropriate for the solution, the learner
will deem it invalid and seek other means by which to solve the problem
at hand.
In C hapter 4 it was shown that Kant believed the process of the
mind interacting with reality was the only manner by which the mind can
com e to understand reality (Cicovacki, 1997, p. 67). It was discussed how
136
he believed that in order to have a manifold of representations of
experience, which humans do have, the experiences must be related to
each other in a rule-governed, non-arbitrary manner. Therefore, a learner
can be assured of the viability of the knowledge the learner has com e to
know as long as it is through the interaction between the learner’s mind
and reality. Again, Kant is not saying that the knower changes the object
in any way, but instead, he is proposing that the knower contributes a
framework in which the object can be apprehended by the knower
(Dicker, 2004, p. 126). In this w ay the extent and manner in which the
knower comes to know the object is determined, not by the object, but
by the knower. This framework, consisting, in part, of categories, allows
representations to be reproduced and recognized by the human mind. It
is through the application of these categories that the human mind can
apprehend perceptions of reality and create cognizable, internal
representations of reality by synthesizing perceptions of the outside world
with internal frameworks of cognition. This, in turn allows for a manifold of
consciousness for the knower. As shown in Chapter 4, the learner can be
assured of the validity of the representations within this manifold of
consciousness that is experience through the interaction of the learner's
cognitive structures and perceptions of reality, by virtue of the fa ct that
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this is the only manner by which the knower could com e to an
understanding of that reality. In other words, if a learner has a manifold of
consciousness, the learner’s experience of reality must be governed by
causal laws, or categories. This provides the learner’s experience of reality
a cognitive framework within which the learner experiences reality. This
framework comes from the cognition of the learner and not from the
object of perception. Because this framework of cognition is a built-in
and a unique aspect of the learner that the learner's mind will use to
understand reality, the learner has no other manner by which to
experience or understand the perceptions of reality. Therefore, the
learner can be assured of the validity of understanding of reality, as there
is no other understanding possible for the learner.
the learners determine the viability of their knowledge within the social
context in which it is created.
Summary
If the first hypothesis of this study is a cce p te d and the human mind
only learns by constructing knowledge through the interaction between
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the cognitive structures of the mind and inputs from the learner's reality;
and if, as discussed above, the increase in the number of interactions
could result in more connections am ong concepts and schema within a
schematic network; and if, as discussed above, the increase in
connections results in a higher quality of learning experience defined by
such things as the ease of recall, the ability for transference, and the
endurance of the learned experience; then a pedagogy that provides
opportunities for more interactions and the building of schematic
connections through activities such as: validating information;
accom m odating information through reflective thought; actively
participating in the learning process; negotiating meanings with other
learners; and building of representations of perceptions by using symbol
systems, will result in a higher quality of learning experience for the learner.
In this study it has been shown that each of the five com ponents
proposed by this study to be individually necessary and jointly sufficient to
be included within the constructivist genre of learning theory are aligned
with both the cognitive psychological theories discussed above and the
epistemological theory of Kant. The im plication of this alignm ent is that
constructivist pe dagogy allows the opportunity for a higher quality of
learning experience.
CONCLUSION
Explanation
The purpose of this study was to show that pe da go gy based on
constructivist learning theory is could more effectively support learners
com ing to know the world. As has been argued in Chapter 2, pedagogy
can be considered to be in the constructivist genre if it adheres to five
components. In Chapter 5 these five com ponents were then shown to be
aligned with the cognitive psychological theories discussed in Chapter 3
and the epistemology of Immanuel Kant discussed in Chapter 4. The
alignment between the components and the cognitive psychological
and epistemological theories could explain why constructivist pedagogy
would be a more powerful teaching and learning tool when com pared to
other pedagogies. If it is a cc e p te d that the cognitive psychological
theories from Chapter 3 do explain how the mind functions to learn and
the epistemological theory of Kant from Chapter 4 explains how the only
manner by which the mind learns, it could be considered reasonable to
follow that pe da go gy aligned with those cognitive psychological and
epistemological theories would also be aligned with how the mind does
139
140
and must learn, thereby making it a more effective m ethod to learn than
by using methods not aligned with how the mind does and must learn.
Implications
The implications of this study could be considered to be fairly
straight-forward: if the hypotheses of this study are correct and pe da go gy
that is more closely aligned with the specific cognitive psychological and
epistemological theories discussed above are more effective methods for
learning; this could be a basis for examining present and future
educational policies and practices. Specifically, policies and practices
that do not prom ote the use of pe dagogy that contain the five
com ponents first proposed in Chapter 2 may not be the most educational
sound policies and practices, and therefore, may need to be re
examined and possibly changed to prom ote pe da go gy that do contain
the five com ponents from Chapter 2.
In addition to examining general educational policies practices,
politicians and other educational policy makers at the federal level may
need to reconsider the policy of No Child Left Behind [NCLB]. With the
advent of NCLB and the financial and political pressures it places on
educators, those educators may be more inclined to focus on spending
time preparing students to pass standardized tests to appease the federal
141
regulators of NCLB. In doing so students will spend less time interacting
with the material presented to them in their classes, discussing and
negotiating meanings, and the other components of pe da go gy deem ed
earlier to be both necessary and sufficient for the mind to learn in a more
efficient manner, as supported by both cognitive psychological and
epistemological theories discussed above.
Limitations
This study has two significant limitations. The first limitation is that the
cognitive psychological section is based on three cognitive psychological
theories out of all that exist. It is possible that the three theories chosen for
this study are faulty or invalid, and will at some point in the future, be
superceded by other cognitive psychological theories. However, even if
this scenario comes to pass, it is still possible that the theory or theories that
supercede the three chosen for this study will continue to support and
validate the hypotheses proposed here...or not. The second limitation of
this study is that the epistemological aspect is based solely on the
epistemological theory of Immanuel Kant as discussed in the Critique of
Pure Reason. In the 200-plus years since Kant wrote his Critique, there
have been many supporters and critics of his theory and m ethodology.
As with the cognitive psychological theories used in this study, it may
142
com e to pass that Kant’s epistemology is shown to be faulty or invalid in
some manner; and again, it may be that an epistemology that is shown to
be more valid than Kant’s may also support the hypotheses proposed in
this study...or not.
Further Study
At the end of this study many questions remain for further study as a
result of this study. The foremost is of a somewhat practical m atter in the
form of the question as to how these five com ponents can be integrated
with a standard-based curriculum, still adhering to the five com ponents
and yet covering the standards set forth by policy makers. In addition, the
question of can a curriculum be constructed containing both the five
com ponents and the standards while continuing to m eet the
requirements given by NCLB also remains. In addition, a quest following
this study could be an empirical study to determine the veracity of the
hypothesis of pe da go gy adhering to the com ponents proposed here
being a more effective m ethod of learning.
APPENDIX A: KANT’S FIRST ANALOGY - SUBSTANCE
BY JONATHAN BENNETT
143
144
1) if S is a progressive series o f existence changes, then every
existence c h a n g e in S is m erely an alterations
2) if every existence c h a n g e in S is merely a n d alteration, then either

S is an infinite series o f alterations or S is a finite series o f alterations term in a ting in
an existence c h a n g e th a t is m erely an alteration
3) if S is a progressive series of existence changes, then S is n ot an

infinite series of alterations
4) if S is a progressive series of existence changes, then S is a finite

series o f alterations term inating in an existence ch a n g e th a t is m erely an
alteration
5) every existence c h a n g e th a t ever occurs is either a m e m b e r o f a

progressive series of existence chan g es or an alteration th a t is not a m e m b e r o f a
progressive series of existence changes
6) if (4) a n d (5) are b oth true, then every substancei is the subject of
the term inal alteration in a progressive series o f existence changes
7) if (4) is true, then every su bject o f the term inal a lteration o f a

progressive series of existence chan g es is a substance 2
8) every substancei is the subject of the term inal a lteratio n o f a

progressive series of existence changes
9) every subject of the term inal a lteratio n o f a progressive series of

existence changes is a substance 2
10) every substancei is a substance 2 (Dicker, 2004, p. 159)
APPENDIX B: KANT’S CENTRAL ARGUMENT OF THE ANALYTIC
BY GEORGES DICKER
145
146
1) Consciousness of a m anifold o f successive representafions (=experience) is
possible for m e only beca u se o f I c a n ascribe all the representations in the
m anifold to myself
2) I c a n ascribe representations to myself only if I have a c o n c e p t of myself
3) I c a n have a c o n c e p t o f myself only if som ething in my expe rie n ce answers to

th a t c o n c e p t
4) No p articu la r item(s) of expe rie n ce answer(s) to the c o n c e p t o f myself
5) If no p articu la r item(s) o f e xperience answer(s) to the c o n c e p t of myself, then the

only thing in my e xperience th a t c a n answer to the c o n c e p t of myself is a
tem po ra l order a m o n g my representations
6) The only thing in my e xpe rie n ce th a t c a n answer to the c o n c e p t o f myself is a

tem po ra l order a m o n g my representations
7) If the only thing in my expe rie n ce th a t ca n answer to the c o n c e p t o f myself is a

tem po ra l order a m o n g my representations, then som ething in my e xpe rie n ce
answers to the c o n c e p t o f myself only is a tem po ra l order a m o n g my
representations answers to the c o n c e p t o f myself
8) A te m p o ra l order a m o n g my representations c a n answer to the c o n c e p t of

myself only if a t least som e o f m y representations have a n o th e r tem po ra l order as
well
9) O ne tem po ra l order a m o n g my representations is the order in w h ich the y are

a p p re h e n d e d
147
10) If a tem po ra l order a m o n g my representations c a n answer to the c o n c e p t of
myself only if a t least some o f my representations have a n o th e r te m p o ra l order as
well, a n d one tem po ra l order a m o n g my representations is the order in w h ich
they are a p p re h e n d e d , then a tem po ra l order a m o n g my representations c a n
answer to the c o n c e p t o f myself only if some o f m y representations have
tem po ra l order different from the order in w h ich they are a p p re h e n d e d
11) A te m p o ra l order a m o n g my representations c a n answer to the c o n c e p t of

myself only if some o f my representations have a tem po ra l order d ifferent from
the order in w h ich the y are a p p re h e n d e d
12) Representations c a n have a tem po ra l order diffe re n t from the order in w h ich they
are a p p re h e n d e d only if there is a w a y to dete rm ine tem po ra l relations b e tw e e n
representations o th e r than the order in w h ich they are a p p re h e n d e d
13) Time itself is n ot p e rceive d
14) If tim e itself is not p erceive d , then there is a w a y to dete rm ine tem po ra l relations
b e tw e e n representations oth e r than the order in w h ich the y are a p p re h e n d e d
only if some experiences are c o n ce p tu a lize d as being of enduring objects, by
re feren ce to w h ich tem po ra l relations c a n be d ete rm in e d
15) Experience is possible for m e only if some experiences are co n ce p tu a lize d as

being o f enduring objects
16) Some experiences c a n b e c o n ce p tu a lize d as being o f enduring objects th a t c a n

b e re e n co u n te re d a n d re-identified
17) Some experiences c a n b e co n ce p tu a lize as being o f objects th a t c a n be

re e nco u n te re d a n d re identified only if some experiences are c o n ce p tu a lize d as
being o f objects whose ch a n g es have significant a m o u n t of order a n d regularity
148
18) Experience is possible for m e only if some experiences are co n ce p tu a lize d as
being o f objects whose chan g es have significant a m o u n t o f order a n d regularity
19) Experience is possible for m e
20) Some experiences are c o n ce p tu a lize d as being o f enduring objects
21) Some experiences are co n ce p tu a lize d as being o f o bjects whose ch a n g es have

a significant a m o u n t o f order a n d regularity (Dicker, 2004, p. 143)
APPENDIX C: KANT’S SECOND ANALOGY - CAUSALITY
BY GEORGES DICKER
149
150
1) Consciousness o f a m anifold o f successive represenfations (=
experience) is possible only if one c a n ascribe all fhe represenfafions in the
m anifold to oneself
2) O ne ca n ascribe representations o f oneself only if som ething in

one's expe rie n ce answers to th a t c o n c e p t
3) O ne c a n have a c o n c e p t of oneself only if som ething in one's

expe rie n ce answers to th a t c o n c e p t
4) No p articula r item(s) of expe rie n ce answer(s) to the c o n c e p t of

oneself
5) If no p articula r item(s) o f e xperience answer to the c o n c e p t of

oneself, then the only thing in o n e ’s expe rie n ce th a t c a n answ er to the c o n c e p t
o f oneself is a tem po ra l order a m o n g one's representations
6) The only thing in o n e ’s expe rie n ce th a t c a n answer to the c o n c e p t

of oneself is a tem po ra l order a m o n g one's representations [from (4) a n d (5)]
7) If the only thing in o n e ’s e xperience th a t c a n answ er to the

c o n c e p t of oneself is a te m p o ra l order a m o n g one's representations, then
som ething in o n e ’s expe rie n ce answers to the c o n c e p t o f oneself only if a
tem po ra l order a m o n g one's representations answers to the c o n c e p t of oneself
8) A te m p o ra l order a m o n g one's representations c a n answer to the

c o n c e p t of oneself only if a t least some of one's representations have a no the r
tem po ra l order as well
9) O ne tem po ra l order a m o n g one's representations is the order in

w h ich they are a p p re h e n d e d
10) If a tem po ra l order a m o n g one's representations c a n answer to

the c o n c e p t o f oneself only if a t least some of one's representations have
a n o th e r tem po ra l order as well, a n d one te m p o ra l order a m o n g one's
representations is the order in w h ich they are a p p re h e n d e d , then a tem po ra l
order a m o n g one's representations c a n answer to the c o n c e p t of oneself only if
some o f one's representations have a te m p o ra l order d iffe re n t fro the o rd er in
w h ich they are a p p re h e n d e d
11) A te m p o ra l order a m o n g o n e ’s representations c a n answer to the

c o n c e p t o f oneself only if some o f one's representations have a tem po ra l order
different from the order in w h ich they are a p p re h e n d e d [from (8), (9) a n d (10)]
12) Representations c a n have a tem po ra l order d iffe re n t from the

order in w h ich they are a p p re h e n d e d only if there is a w a y to determ ine
tem po ra l relations b e tw e e n representations oth e r than the order in w h ich they
are a p p re h e n d e d
151
13) Time itself is n ot p e rce ive d
14) If tim e itself is not perceive d , then there is a w a y to determ ine

tem po ra l relations b e tw e e n representations oth e r than the order in w h ich they
are a p p re h e n d e d only if some experiences are co n ce p tu a lize d as being of
enduring objects, by reference to w h ich te m p o ra l relations c a n b e d ete rm in e d
15) Experience is possible only if som e experiences are

c o n ce p tu a lize d as being of enduring objects [from (1), (2), (3), (6), (7), (11), (12),
(13), a n d (14)]
16) Some experiences c a n b e co n ce p tu a lize d as being of enduring

objects only if some experiences are co n ce p tu a lize d as b e in g o f objects th a t c a n
b e re e n co u n te re d a n d reidentified
17) Some experiences c a n b e co n ce p tu a lize d as being of objects

th a t c a n b e re e nco u nte re d a n d reidentified only if experiences th a t are
c o n ce p tu a lize d as being o f objects th a t c a n be re e n co u n te re d a n d reidentified
c a n be distinguished from experiences o f events
18) Experiences th a t are co n ce p tu a lize d as being of objects th a t c a n

b e re e n co u n te re d a n d re identified c a n b e distinguished from experiences of
events only if one c a n know by observation w h e th e r one is perceiving o f an
o b je c t or an e ven t
19) O ne c a n n o t know by observation w h e th e r o ne is p erceiving an

o b je c t or an e ve n t by one's p e rce p tio n s’ being successive, irreversible, or of
things-in-themselves, or by reference to absolute time
20) If (19), then one c a n know by observation w h e th e r o ne is

p erceiving an e ve n t or an o b je c t only if every e ve n t such th a t one c a n know by
observation th a t it is occurring has some cause
21) O ne c a n know by observation w h e th e r one is p erceiving an even t

or an o b je c t only if every e ve n t such th a t one c a n know by observation th a t it is
occurring has some cause [from (19) a n d (20)]
22) Experience is possible only if every e ve n t such th a t one c a n know

by observation th a t it is occurring has some cause [from (15), (16), (17), (18), a n d
( 2 1 )]
23) Experience is possible
24) Some expe rie n ce are co n ce p tu a lize d as being o f enduring

objects [from (15) a n d (23)]
25) Every e ve n t such th a t one c a n know by observation th a t it is

occurring has some cause [(22) a n d (23)] (Dicker, 2004, p .176)
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Vita
I began my aca de m ic career with a very different end in mind.
Having attended SUNY @ Cobleskill for both my A.A.S. and B.T. degrees in
Animal Husbandry and Animal Science, respectively, I had planned on
attending veterinary school. However, a series of events pointed me in a
different direction and I ended up working in the business field for a few
years. I continued to attend various colleges and universities while
working, taking a class or tw o at each, until I began a program to work on
a certificate at Trinity College of Vermont to teach secondary science.
Once I began teaching full-time, I began a master's degree at program
at The University of Vermont (UVM). It was at UVM that a class taught by
Dr. Robert Nash turned me on to philosophy, in general, and specifically
philosophy of education. Shortly after beginning the program at UVM I
moved to Ann Arbor, Michigan where I continued my master's degree at
Eastern Michigan University. By the time I finished my master’s degree I
had m oved to Chicago, whereupon I began my present program to
obtain my doctorate at Loyola University of Chicago.
155
DISSERTATION APPROVAL SHEET
The dissertation submitted by James-Patrick O'Shaughnessy has been

read and approved by the following com m ittee:
Robert E. Roemer, Ph.D.

Professor of Education and Director of Cultural and Educational Policy
Studies
Loyola University C hicago
Judith Hayn, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor in Secondary Education
Ken Kaufman, Ed.D.

Professor in Education
The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation
and the signature which appears below verifies the fa ct that any
necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is
now given final approval by the com m ittee with reference to content
and form.
The dissertation is therefore a c c e p te d in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Date Director’s Signature

Constructivism, Cognitive Psychology and The Epistemology of Immanuel Kant

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CONSTRUCTIVISM, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF IM M AN U EL KANT

THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF

PROGRAM IN CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL POLICY STUDIES

Copyright 2007 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.

All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against

unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company

CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 1

CHAPTER TWO: Constructivist Theory 13

CHAPTER THREE: Cognitive Psychology 45

CHAPTER FOUR: Immanuel Kant 68

CHAPTER FIVE: Alignment of Theories 111

Figure 1 - Axes of Constructivist Theory

In the past several years it would appe ar that interest in

constructivist pedagogies has increased. This increase can been seen

with the publishing of several textbooks based on the constructivist

(Biological, 2004), Chem com (American, 2000), EarfhComm (Smith, 2000),

and IMP (Rubenstein, 1994). It could be that this interest in the

constructivist theory of learning, and pedagogies based on this theory,

com bining or constructing knowledge through the interaction between

cognitive structures present in the mind of the individual, has risen

than other learning theories and pedagogies. Often, constructivist theory

know by such things as rote memorization or repeated behavior.

However, in order to make a claim that one theory of learning or

understood: 1) the differences that separate constructivist learning theory

and pe da go gy from other learning theories or pedagogies; 2) w hat is it

about constructivist learning theory and pedagogy that could make it

better than other theories or pedagogies.

In this study the philosophical, cognitive psychological and

mind learns by an interaction between either the external, internal (i.e.

mental or physical) world of the learner and the learner's internal

cognitive structures, subsequently making changes in the internal

cognitive structures (learning) about the world. Therefore, based on the

and there is no difference in the learning processes when using different

pedagogies. Put another way, all pedagogies, regardless of the learning

which the human mind comes to know the world.

construction of knowledge, the question can then be asked w hat

separates constructivist learning theory and pedagogies from other

teachers use to teach students (pedagogy), in terms of the learning

experience they provide the learner.

To answer this question this study will examine constructivist learning

theory to more fully understand the process by which learning theorists

believe humans construct knowledge. This study will show, through a

com bination of learning theorists, such as Dewey, and constructivist

construction of knowledge. This study will argue that no m atter how

learners are taught, regardless of the pedagogy, they will learn

something. However, as will be argued below, the difference between

pedagogies based on different learning theories lies not in the cognitive

processes of learning, but rather in the opportunities for broader variety,

experience, defined by the quantity of mental schematic connections,

learned experience, is greater when pedagogies based on constructivist

between a learning theory or pe dagogy and the process by which the

human mind constructs knowledge affects the quality of the learning

Specifically this study will examine: w hat is m eant by constructivist

methods; the variations within the pantheon of constructivist theories; and

inclusion of a theory within this constructivist pantheon. Constructivist

theory will also be examined from a cognitive psychological standpoint to

understand the processes posited by ecological psychology, action