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 PLATO'S ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE:

A GUIDING METAPHOR IN TEACHER EDUCATION

BY

MICHELLE RENEE PIERCZYNSKI-WARD

B. S., University of Illinois at Chicago, 1981
M. Ed., University of Illinois at Chicago, 1986

THESIS

Submitted as partial fulfillment of the r^irements

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Education
in the Graduate Colle^^ of the
University of Illinois at Chicago, 2002

Chicago, Illinois
 UMI Number; 3074164

Copyright 2003 by
Pierczynski-Ward, Michelle Renee

All rights reserved.

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 THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO
Graduate College
CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL
/jtL. ?ra A/^03--

I hereby recommend that the thesis prepared under my supervision by

MICHELLE RENEE PIERCZYNSKI-WARD
PLATO'S ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE: A GUIDING METAPHOR IN
entitled.
TEACHER EDUCATION

be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCT^SROI

Adviser (Chair^rson orOefense Committee)

/ concur with this recommendation

Department Head/Chair

Recommendation concurred in:

Membcfsof
Thesis or
Dissenation
Defense
Committee

• University of Illinois
at Chicago
 ' This dissertation is dedicated to my parents Frances and Jerome Pierczynski.

Their faith in God, devotion to family and untiring woric ethic provide me with a never-

ending source of inspiration.

ill
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply Indebted to my chair, Dr. David T. Hansen, whose patience,

guidance, and understanding helped see me through to the completion of this

dissertation, and in helping me to develop a better understanding of and appreciation for

education and teaching. I would also like to thank the members of my committee for

their time, commitment, and assistance.

I am gratbful to Susan McDonough and Dr. Janice Ozga. They read earlier

drafts and provided critical commentary. I would not have finished this project if not for

the frequent and meaningful conversations we have had over the years.

I have also called upon many friends and colleagues for help. I must thank Drs.

Marietta Giovanelli and Maureen Meehan for their support and encouragement, and

Eileen Collison and Dr. Peggy Tormay for their marvelous ability to listen and their words

of advice and encouragement.

Having a large family - seven brothers, one sister, and their spouses - has been

challenging at times, given the steady stream of questions such as, When are you going

to finish your dissertation? or How long have you been working on this? Yet, Iknow I

would not have been in the Ph.D. program without the time and commitment they

devoted to our family. I need to thank Jerry and Janet, Ed and Jackie (who deserves a

special hug - she has been a constant source of comfort, faith, and love throughout my

life). Arthur and Joni. Prank and Joyce, Norbert and Lorelei, Daniel and Betty, Greg and

Carol, and Steve and Joan.

Finally, I thank my husband, Dick, who believed in me and who waited patiently

until the end to read and comment on this dissertation.

MPW

iv
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION 1
Background 1
Background to the Question 6
Teaching Experiences 7
Primary School 9
Teacher Education 13
Philosophidal Experience 19
Philosophy and the Classroom 20
Use of the Allegory 26
Allegory of the Cave 29
Rousseau, Dewey, Plato and Socrates 33
Summary 39
II. EMILE: ROUSSEAU'S PROFESSION OF FAITH 41
introduction 41
Allegory of the Cave References 44
Releasing and Compelling 45
Emiie, the Govemor and the Vicar 53
Amour de Soi and Amour-Propre 54
Emiie, Books l-lll 57
Emile, Book IV -Innocence and imagination 62
The Entrance of tiie Vicar 67
The Govemor and Emiie 79
Summary 80
III. JOHN DEWEY'S DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 83
introduction 83
Objects and Agents 88
Growth and Objects 94
Educative Experiences 95
Democracy 98
Growth, Sodety and Knowledge 100
Plants as an Example - Revisited 102
Growtti 105
Conversation 111
Teacher Growth 118
Summary 119
IV. SOCRATES 123
IntitxJucti'on 123
What is Known About Socrates? 126
Socrates as a Teacher" 133
What Does Socrates Know? 136
What Socrates Does Not Know. 140

v
 Uviilg Life as If There Were Nothing To Lose; Is Socrates as Arrogant as He Seems?... 147
Summary 149
V. THE ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHER
EDUCATION 152
Introduction 152
Philosophy Emerges From Practical Daily Life 153
Reflections on the Cave 156
The Magnet of the Good 158
Wonder 161
What Keeps the Soul From Wonder? 163
Teacher Education 171
CITED LITERATURE 183

VITA 189

vi
 SUMMARY

The primary question raised in this dissertation is "How can the mindful reading

of philosophical texts be useful in teacher education?" Plato's Allegory of the Cave is

examined and utilized to understand the role of traditions and methods play in guiding

teachers, but also to examine how a moral source, such as the Goodness that exists

outside of the cave, can continually provide teachers with strength and faith as they face

their daily predicaments. Philosophical texts by Plato, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and

John Dewey are approached from a hermeneutic perspective to help interpret the stages

of the cave allegory. The cave allegory proves to be a useful metaphor through which to

examine teacher education because it highlights the practical role that philosophy plays

in helping student teachers think about the temns of their work.

Through the examination of the texts by Plato, Rousseau and Dewey, it is

concluded that utilizing philosophical texts in teacher education classrooms can be

useful in a number of ways. Students leam that that they hold strong opinions and

conceptions about the work of a teacher. They leam that these opinions influence the

perception they have of themselves, their subject matter and their students because they

hinge on some conception of goodness. By leaming to read texts carefully, in the

company of others interested irh education, students can leam how to read themselves,

their students and their colleagues more carefully and attentively.

vii
 I. INTRODUCTION

"Man is the measure of all things, of those that are that they are, and of those that are not that they
are not. "(Remarkattributed to Protagoras).

"Perhaps someone may say, 'But surely, Socrates, after you have left us you can spend the rest of
your life in quietly minding your own business. This is the hardest thing of all to make you
understand. If I say that this would be disobedience to God, and that is why I cannot 'mind my own
business', you will not believe me - youll think I'm pulling your leg. If on the other hand I tell you
that to let no day pass without discussing goodness and all the other subjects about which you hear
me talking and examining both myself and others is really the very best thing that man can do, and
that life without this sort of examination is not worth living, you will be even less inclined to believe
me. Nevertheless that is how it is, gentlemen, as I maintain; though it is not easy to convince you of
it.(Socrates, in Plato's Apology, 37e-38b).

Background

The primary question I examine in this dissertation is, "How can the mindful

reading, pondering, and discussion of philosophical works be useful in teacher

education?" By reading. I mean the systematic and thorough reading of the actual

works, not merely the readings of summaries of philosophical writings or ideas. As to the

pondering and discussion of the ideas, I suggest they take place in a classroom in which

the teacher educator is well-versed in the wori<s. Although I suggest the teacher

educator be familiar with the books' content and ideas, it is also important that s/he

remain curious about the author's ideas and how further reading and discussion with

teacher candidates can further illuminate the terms of teaching. This suggests that the

teacher educator remain curious regarding the beliefs and conceptions about teaching

and education that each new teacher candidate brings to the reading and discussion.

Finally, by teacher education. I am refem'ng primarily to teacher preparation programs.

The working, or provisional response to this guiding question, is that these texts

are useful in helping teachers and teacher educators to orient themselves in the light of

some regulariy examined moral source.^ I do not intend "useful" to mean only in a

crudely instrumental sort of way. as a means to a specific measurable end. Rather. I see

^1 use the term moral source, as I understand Taylor's (1989) definition and will develop it in the body of the
dissertation.

1
reading and interpreting these texts useful in helping to orient oneself in the world, or

helping one to see events, people, and him or herself in a brighter or more revealing

light. How philosophical works can be useful in helping persons to understand their

orientation towards teaching as a whole will be addressed in this dissertation. This

tentative or provisional answer is based on my own experiences as a teacher, my

experiences with the original, philosophical works that I will utilize and the secondary

sources that have helped to shape my understanding of these original philosophical

*
worits.

Regarding moral sources, Charies Taylor (1989) begins his book. Sources of the

Self, by suggesting that people should focus on more than just the "right" thing to do

when they encounter problematic situations. Rather, they should conduct themselves in

light of "questions about what it is good to be or what it is good to love" (p. 3). For

example, imagine a teacher educator who is observing a student teacher. For that

teacher educator to ask himself, "What is the right thing to say to this student teacher

about this lesson she just taught?" is not sufficient because both the question and the

possible answers may not allow the student teacher to see and describe the full reality of

the situation. In trying to solve a problem by doing the "right" thing, one is focusing on

acting according to a procedure or rule. That focus may neglect the situation's vital

particulars in favor of a straightfbnA/ard solution. Taylor believes that one of the problems

in modem society and in some current moral philosophy is this focus on merely trying to

do the right thing. This approach converts the moral life into a set of more or less human

engineering problems. The significance of what we can do fell by the wayside. Taylor

contends that there must be something, "the contemplation of which commands our

respect, which in turn empowers. Whatever fills this role is playing the part of a moral

source" (p. 94). This can then change the focus to how one should be rather than merely

on how one should act. This source is the "good" around which we judge other goods in

2
our lives. I maintain that careful and thoughtful readings and discussions of philosophical

works can expose students and teacher educators to philosophers who have worked

with great passion and enthusiasm in the light of some moral source. This process in

turn can help prepare teachers to contemplate the source that guides them in their

teaching.

Teacher educators aspire to help their students prepare as best as possible for

the challenges that await them in the classroom, and there are many schools of thought
4

focusing on how best to do this (Bullough & Gitlin, 1994; Lucas, 1999). Some centers

on extending the length of teacher preparation programs. Others focus on raising

teacher education program admission standards. There is research suggesting that a

teacher educator's focus should be on training students to leam and develop the latest

and most promising instructional methods. Still others discount methods and focus more

on cum'cular content and evaluation.

This study takes a different tack by focusing on building one's philosophy of

education, or helping a teacher to understand how he or she stands in moral relation to

the students, to teaching, and to research. This stance is concerned with how teachers

develop their conceptions of better or worse, of good or bad and of what it means to be a

flourishing human being. For in deciding matters such as changing teacher education

program's requirements to determining the best worksheet to teach three^iigit

subtraction to a classroom of third-grade children, a person relies, however unknowingly,

upon his or her vision or assumptions of good or bad, and better or worse. If these acts

are not infomned by considering one's moral vision, this too reveals assumptions, that

teaching, for example, is purely a technical or behavioral activity.

If teachers claim their assumptions do not matter, in effect they surrender their

moral impact on students to policy makers who are far removed from the everyday

particulars of each teacher's classroom. They have thus begun to accept another's

3
judgment about what is right or wrong, and good or bad for their students. This, in effect,

reduces teaching into a type of technical or behavioral activity in which teachers are

irrelevant other than to the degree that they can follow directions. If teaching is not

informed by moral vision, by contemplation of one's moral source or thought beyond

what is the "righf thing to do, then it becomes easy to define teaching as a merely

technical or behavioral activity.

The use of philosophical texts is not new to teacher education, in many

4

programs, students are required to take courses such as Educational Foundations or

Educational Philosophy. While introducing students to the pedagogical ideas of

educational philosophers such as Plato, Socrates, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John

Dewey is certainly worthwhile, I maintain it is not enough to merely introduce their ideas

in summary, or simply have the students memorize facts about these authors and

philosophers. Although summaries or interpretations do serve as excellent secondary

sources in helping to interpret and understand an author's writing. However, I will

illustrate that wrestling with the meaning of a philosopher's own ideas, firsthand, is a

much richer experience than reading a summary.

In this study, I will come to grips with some of the most influential worths ever

written on education. I will raise and respond to questions that Ibelieve will reveal the

educational insight that can be gained from the process. As I come to close quarters

with the texts, I will attempt to make plain how this interpretive work can significantly

shape a teacher's educational philosophy.

As Rorty (1997) notes, 'Virtually all we do involves reading" (p. 85). She

maintains that as we read, we interpret, and that "Ve are changed by what we read."

She offers suggestions on how to read a text, and concludes "teaming to read well is on

the way to leaming to live well" (p. 89). Yet, not only do we read texts, we read others.

Teachers read students, for example, in the work they submit, their mannerisms in the

4
classroom, or the frequency by which they wish to participate. In order to "live well" as a

teacher, teacher candidates must leam to begin to read texts carefully.

I approach the philosophical texts in my dissertation according to Gadamer's

hermeneutic perspective (1995). Accordingly, a reader should approach a text not only

to "know what is said," by an author, but to "know what it was said in response to." This

means that the reader must "give priority to the question being addressed over the

answer to it contained in the text" (Smith, 1986, pp. xi-xii). Gadamer (1975) further
4

suggests that the reader have an interest in or familiarity with the subject matter of the

text, while still appreciating the "strangeness" of the text (p. 295). Further, according to

Gadamer, one cannot help but approach a text without "prejudices and fore-meanings"

(p. 295) and he urges that readers be aware of these. For example, in the philosophical

texts I have used, I am not looking solely for answers to my own questions about

education and teaching. I have approached each text with an interest in education, but

also with a willingness to understand the questions that prompt the writing of each

author. Understanding each text meant that I approached it with some prior knowledge

and opinions about the thoughts of each author as well conceptions about the work done

by a teacher and education's role in society. Yet, I approached each with the willingness

to be transformed as I sought to appreciate the questions underiying the "answers" in

each of the texts. This means notidng when some of my "prejudices and fore-

meanings" are challenged or provoked. As such, henmeneutic text interpretation

suggests the reader will be transformed by the reading. For teacher candidates.

learning to read in such a manner means they could be on their way to living well.

If teacher educators use only summaries of philosophical writing, they do a great

disservice to both the writing and thinking of these philosophers, to themselves, and to

their classroom students. The effort one brings to bear in reading and interpreting and

5
original texts, and discussing the ideas Is essential and rewarding for both teacher

educator as well as the students.

In this chapter, first I will briefly discuss some experiences that led me to this

research. Some occurred while I was a primary school teacher and others occurred

while a student teaching field supervisor. Key experiences also took place when I read

philosophical works as a graduate student. In different ways, these experiences forced

me to wrestle with my own assumptions of goodness and to develop my own

4

conceptions of teaching. I will address some of the themes mentioned eariier (i.e., the

need for conversation in teacher education, the responsibilities of teacher educators in

helping their student teachers explore and the need for student teachers to expand the

conceptions they bring to their classes, etc.). Finally, I introduce Plato's allegory of the

cave as the framework through which I begin to answer my questions.

Background to the Question

Based on experience in two areas my conviction is that reading and interpreting

philosophical works is worthwhile. The first relates to my work as a primary school

teacher and as a teacher educator and the second stems from my own philosophical

readings. To illustrate my work as a primary school teacher I will present scenarios

throughout the study that reflect actual events. My work as a teacher educator is

presented in a more straightfonMard manner. Both illustrate the predicaments many

teachers and teacher educators face. I raise questions that suggest teaching is more

than following cum'culum guides and checklists, or doing the "right thing." These

questions certainly open the door for some to then say that because curriculum guides

and checklists lack certainty, teachers should be able to do whatever they want in their

classrooms. Others might ask, instead, "How can we prevent teachers from doing

whatever they want in their classrooms?" This, however, is not my point in raising the

6
questions. Certainly, a teacher's own thoughts and opinions are essential in classrooms

and schools, but neither extreme seems fitting for teacher or student. Checklists and

guides are often too confining while the second leaves open the opportunity for

irresponsible or careless teaching. The focus, instead, is to reconceptualize the

predicaments that classroom teachers face.

Being a graduate student while conducting my work as a teacher educator, I

began to read more philosophical works in my classes. The classes often were

comprised of teachers facing similar situations as those I experienced as a teacher.

From unresolved questions and answers emerging from my empirical work, this

philosophical approach seemed appropriate because these works proved to be rich

sources of fruitful discussions about education. These philosophical works seemed to

oblige and invite teachers to question the moral dimensions of their wori<, to reconsider

their attentiveness (or lack thereof) as teachers; and to appreciate the impact that one

life can have upon another. I do not intend to prove that the ideas of any of the

philosophers are supreme. Further. I do not set out to prove that my own interpretation

of these texts is final. Instead. I hope to illustrate how rich these sources can be and that

the continual searching for meaning, though difficult, is a better way to approach

teaching.

Teaching Experiences

In the following scenarios, and in the remainder of the dissertation, the tenm

"predicament",^ will be used as I understand it. from Burbules and Hansen (1997). In

their introduction, the editors define a predicament as "a problematic state of affairs that

^ If I were to follow a strict chronological order of events, I would not bring up the difference between
predicaments and problems here, because early in my teaching career, I was not able to characterize the
situation using such language. However, it is fitting to illustrate this difference now, rather than later, to help
the reader understand the predicaments I faced without actually dragging them through the entire process.

7
admits of no easy resolution" (p. 1). Throughout the book, contributing researchers

conclude that predicaments and uncertainty have been and always will be inherent in the

work that teachers do. To recall Taylor (1989), one focus highlight the importance of

"being" a teacher rather than "doing" things one thinks a teacher should do. For

example, Boostrom (in Burbules & Hansen, 1997) writes that "[c]onfidence and certainty

are the colors of those who teach by the numbers" (p. 6). In contrast to Boostrom's

statement, when a teacher sees his or her work as encompassing more than simply
*
forcing children to memorize facts, meaning if a teacher tries to teach in the richest

sense of the word, predicaments will ensue. In their introduction, Burbules and Hansen

agree that, "Teaching at all levels of the educational system is alternately surprising,

frustrating, delightful, and dispiriting"(p. 2). Yet, such work "gives life fonm and direction

and, in so doing, creates the possibility of growth, accomplishment, and joy" (p. 1).

In other words, problems are generally susceptible to diagnosis and solution. A

student has a problem if her disposable pen runs out of ink. She can throw the pen away

and pick up a new one. A woman has a problem if she finds a run in the only pair of

nylons left in her dresser drawer. Applying a bit of nail polish on the run usually solves

the problem and renders the nylons useful again. Each problem presents a limited

number of solutions, is solvable, and for the most part each person gets through the day

never reconsidering the choice made in solving the problem.

On the other hand, predicaments are multifaceted. A solution is not so apparent

because the nature of the situation or trouble at hand is not so distinct. In teaching, there

is never one best solution since every teacher sees each situation differently. Further,

teachers never face the exact same predicament twice. To be sure, teachers run into

and solve problems all day. For instance, a classroom is warm on a bree^ day and so

the teacher opens up the windows. Or, an alarm signaling a fire drill rings in the middle

of a lesson. The teacher instructs her students to line up, she grabs the attendance

8
book and they file out as they have practiced nnany times before. Certainly,

predicaments could ensue in either of these situations. This alarm bell may well be

signaling a real fire, and while filing out of the school, the teacher decides to switch exit

routes. While making that decisions, the teacher has probably considered other

classrooms using alternative exits, the distance each exit is from her and the children,

how long her first-grade children can follow her amidst all the confusion and noise, and

how she might respond when they ask about the safety of the fish in the classroom
4

aquarium. On the other hand, sometimes opening a window is just opening a window.

Predicaments are not so easily resolved, nor should they be. Certainly solving a

problem can give one a sense of achievement or satisfaction. However, the often difficult

unraveling and sorting through all that a predicament carries with it is the potential to

become a better person - the possibility of 'growth, accomplishment and joy'. This

distinction between problems and predicaments underscores the importance for

teachers to become aware of not only how they perceive but that they perceive, and that

their perceptions have consequences. I believe that one of the responsibilities of teacher

educators is to help student teachers understand and appreciate the difference between

problems and predicaments.

Primary School

Here, Ipresent three composite situations of my experiences as a primary school

teacher. Each example illustrates not only how difficult it can be to reach clear-cut

decisions, but also how the same situation might be viewed by one teacher as a problem

to be solved or by another as a predicament to be faced. Further, they illustrate that

there is no way to prepare students in a teacher education program for all the

predicaments they will face in their classrooms; teacher educators cannot give them a

list of all the 'right' things to 'do'. Instead, teacher educators can help students to leam

9
how to 'be.' As I maintain, one place for this practice to begin is reading and discussing

philosophical texts.

One might imagine listening to teachers in the lunchroom, or walking to the

parking lot after school, discussing the decisions they made that day or witnessedother

teachers making. For example, should a third-grade teacher place an eager student into

the higher level reading group even though her test scores prescribe placement Into the

lower level reading group? Would it be fair to a shy first-grade boy that his teacher
*
seated a boisterous child next to him, hoping that the move might calm down that

second child? What might be the best way for an eighth-grade teacher to deal with a

child who purposely stomps on a full milk carton in a crowded lunchroom? Of interest in

each of these three cases, there is not necessarily any agreed-upon outcome, although

decisions and outcomes are important, otherwise nothing would get accomplished at

school. Rather, consider how any teacher, or homeroom teacher, observing the three

situations, would have a different response or opinion to offer. Each illustrates the need

for teachers to consider their moral vision. How are they assessing each situation? What

is informing or guiding their sensing? Do they see these situations as problems or

predicaments?

Consider first the variety of ways teachers place children into reading groups. A

new teacher might ignore all the remedial woric the giri did over the summer and place

her in the lower reading group. She placed every student into three reading groups

according to their spring test scores because the principal instructed the teachers to do

so. A more experienced colleague might believe the new teacher is too concemed about

potential criticism from the principal instead of considering what is best for the student. In

view of the child's remedial wori<, he would place her in the lower group for the first

quarter since he believes it would be easier to move her up rather than down a group.

He would want the child to feel successful, or at the top of the lower reading group and

10
then reward her by placement in the higher reading group after the first quarter. If one

were 'teaching by the numbers', a teacher certainly should place the child in the lower

reading group. To be sure, both new and experienced teachers, need rules, regulations,

methods and routines to follow. However, student teachers must understand how to

handle question such as, "To what degree should rules be followed?" "Is it okay to break

the rules or change the routines?" "If so, how often or under what conditions?"

In the second case, the first-grade teacher was not sure if it was fair to the quiet
4

boy to seat a talkative student next to him. One colleague might consider the decision

fine, but another may feel it put undeserved pressure on the quiet child. The homeroom

teacher felt it best to move the talkative child because he was too tempted to

mischievous behavior. Moving a child is one of many options open when faced with a

disruptive child, and the homeroom teacher may even wonder if this is fair to the quiet

boy. Yet, in this situation, many teachers will agree that although the disruptive child

might need extra time and consideration, there are 29 other children in the classroom.

In the third case, there are also a number of options open. One teacher might

punish the child who stomped on the carton of milk in by sending her to the principal and

then calling her parents. Another might consider that particulariy harsh since no one was

physically hurt. Instead, she would take the child aside, tell her she did something

wrong, make certain she understands this, and then explain consequences of her action.

In other words, the child is to clean up the mess and apologize to the nearby students

who got splashed.

Obviously, it is difficult to make decisions, as teachers must often make them

quickly and without the luxury of time. Often, the time for more careful reflection is after

events have happened. Further, there are many constraints or considerations that

influence teachers' perceptions of the problems and predicaments they encounter, which

in tum influence the decisions they make. In the first example, there are intervening

11
issues to be considered such as parental involvennent, student motivation, and following

school procedures. The second scenario serves as a reminder that teachers face

decisions daily regarding classroom management and discipline. They must consider

actual classroom size, the number of children in the class, and an assessment of their

own management style and ability. The third scenario is a reminder that teachers must

think about the severity of any student transgression, the appropriate punishment or

consequence, and public or private reprimands of students.

4

After considering situations like those mentioned, I found common

Interdependent themes in the questions I asked myself about teaching and education.

One theme centered around the words "good" and "right." For example, was I a good

teacher? Which of my colleagues did I consider good and to whom would I go for

advice? Which teachers did the principal consider good? Which teachers did the parents

consider good? How can a teacher know she is doing the best thing in certain

situations? Ultimately, is there some definitive measure of the goodness of a teacher?

Looking back, I suspect I was hoping to find a large manual spelling out all the correct

answers for any situation a teacher must face; a list of the 'right' things to do.

The second theme was related to ose thoughts or opinions teachers might have

about each situation. Certainly, teachers cannot help but have opinions and visceral

reactions about events in a school or classroom events. To me, some just seemed more

appropriate or sound. Recall the reading group example. One teacher did not think it

was appropriate to separate third-grade children into reading groups, prefem'ng instead,

whole-classroom reading. His immediate reaction was to disagree with the new

teacher's decision. However, after reconsidering the situation, he could understand a

new teacher being unable to handle 30 children in a reading group all at one time. What

he might find less understandable is a teacher who consistently wastes valuable

teaching time by using half a reading period to grade papers. Even more objectionable

12
might-be a teacher who often praises Hitler's ideas in front of his eighth-grade social

studies students. Although a person can have an opinion about Hitler, if one is a teacher,

it is seemingly irresponsible to voice these opinions in front of children. So, he was able

to change his opinion about the new teacher and might believe that at least she is

teaching reading and is trying to do it well. Yet, he could not reconsider changing his

opinion or supporting the social studies teacher. Those actions did not agree with his

conceptions of a teacher's role and responsibilities. So, how far should one bend in
4

considering other's reasoning and in allowing it to influence one's own teaching?

This brought me to the third theme having to do with sources that underpin

opinions, thoughts, and actions. This is not only a question of why some teacher's

actions just seem wrong, but on what do they ground their perceptions, opinions and

actions. A new teacher might display the same welcoming bulletin board that her mentor

used. In this case, the source or inspiration was another person's action or idea. In the

case of the child who splashed the milk in the lunchroom, one teacher believed that by

punishing the girl for misbehaving was the right decision. Another teacher who might to

tum the incident into a lesson about good and bad behavior would be acting from a

different kind of source. What allows one teacher, but not others, to reconsider certain

factors - to work in a broader, more uncertain horizon? Apparently, this suggests that a

large answer book would definitely be inadequate.

Teacher Education

Similar questions and themes began to emerge in my work as a teacher

educator. My understanding, or working definitions of terms such as teacher, cum'culum,

or discipline took on a different significance. I was no longer a primary school teacher

hoping to be doing a good job. As a teacher educator. I was in a position where my

views would influence a new generation of teachers. It was my responsibility to help

13
student teachers to begin thinking about their decisions regarding classroom discipline,

assessment, planning, and motivating their students.

Student teachers rely on their teacher educator or field instructors for help and

advice. Aoki, (1992) reflecting on his years of teaching, poses the question, "A/Vhat

authorizes me to speak to educators of teaching?"^ This is the type of question I ask

myself when working with a new group of students. Aoki's question captures not only

what it means to comprehend and appreciate the grandness of teaching but also the
4

awe one feels in the face of that grandness. Aoki wonders aloud if he has forgotten over

the years to question his own understandings of what teaching means. He believes that

while teaching can be understood in tenms of lists and identifiable skills, "the essence ...

still eludes our grasp" (p. 20). He suggests we should reflect good teachers whom we

have known and consider the impact they have had on our lives. He believes that when

looking at teachers we need to "be attuned to a teacher's presence with children" (p. 21).

If we simply look at the visible and measurable, we might "deny the humanness that lies

at the core of what education is." (p. 18). The "truth" of a good teacher "is in the measure

of the immeasurable" (p. 27). This notion of the "immeasurable" speaks to the moral

source that guides a teacher.

Consider a teacher's classroom as if viewing a huge three-dimensional painting.

Should we try, as knowledgeable teacher educators, to describe to the student teachers

some of the particulars of that grandness? Yet, in doing so. we might miss telling them

about certain other particulars. Perhaps the fact that I must ask myself these questions

suggests it would be best to quietly step aside and let the student teachers look at and

speak about the particulars they see. But in doing so. it seems unfair to not offer them

^ Aoki begins his chapter by admitting that over the years he has been "preoccupied with so many answers
to the question, "What is teaching?' that perhaps he has neglected to question his own understanding of that
question. IHe posits that in education, we are surrounded by layers of voices claiming to know what teaching
is. Unlbrtunately, those voices often silence the others who do want to question what teaching is.

14
help. There must be something that authorizes a teacher educator to speak to student

teachers about teaching. They must present information and their interpretation of

current research and classroom practice, but somehow must refrain from telling the

student teachers what is "righf or that there is one conrect view.

Teacher educators, like primary school teachers, take on a number of roles and

have a variety of responsibilities as they usher in each new generation of teachers. In

the college classroom, they must choose books and course materials about relevant
4

topics (i.e., classroom management or teaching methods of subjects such as math,

science, reading, or social studies). They also assign activities to their students such as

interviewing the principal to leam about school-wide objectives or conducting a case

study on a child in their classroom, and so on. In making these decisions, a teacher

educator might ask, "Which of these three books seems to best explain classroom

management?" or "Which book did the instructor use for this course last semester?"

When acting as field supervisor, the teacher educator must visit the student

teachers in their placements. There, they observe the student teaching a lesson, and

might occasionally offer to help a student teacher plan a lesson. While observing the

student teaching a math lesson, what should one focus on first? How might a field

instructor handle a situation in which the student teacher forgot to explain a worksheet

that she distributed, resulting irt^five minutes of disruption? What if the student teacher

totally disregards the suggestions given by the mentor? Often, after observation, the

teacher educator must discuss the lesson with the student teacher. They also act as a

buffer between the classroom teacher's desires and those of the student teacher. How

does a teacher educator know that he is really doing his best to understand the situation,

instead of interpreting it by perhaps his unexamined beliefs about what is right and

good?

15
 • Referring back to the painting I mentioned earlier, neither the student teacher nor

I can deny that there is a large three-dimensional painting in front of us both. If the

student teacher wants help in describing it, do I let her fumble around for words and then

respond, '^ell...no. I know a little bit more about education than you - let me tell you

how / see things." That certainly does not allow the student teacher to leam how to read

and describe the events in the classroom.

Being a step removed from actions in a primary school classroom and trying to
4

understand them through the senses of the student teacher reminded me, in a different

manner, of the profound importance of teaching and of the responsibilities of a primary

school teacher. Questions remained as to what a good teacher is, the relativity of

opinions, and the sources of goodness that underpins one's vision.

In my initial work with prospective teachers, I found past teaching experiences

constantly influencing my vision. Although I tried not to tell my students how I might have

conducted a particular lesson or activity, my own beliefs about good teaching were

always before me in the individual conferences I held with them about their work. While I

wanted to offer specific methods of teaching mathematics, science, or reading, it

seemed risky to offer these tools unless the teacher candidate understood my grounds

for using them, or how I saw the situation. I wondered what made my suggestions and

methods not only technically useful but actually in service of education. Further, while a

field instructor must be concerned about the learning taking place for the children, the

field instructor's student is the student teacher. The immediate focus is not to criticize the

student teacher for unsuccessfully teaching the day's lesson plan objective, but to create

a dialogue that will help him or her become a better teacher.

In support, Johnston's (1994) woric focuses on a student teacher's "developing

personal practical knowledge and how the dialogue which does or does not take place

during the practice teaching may influence this practical knowledge" (p. 74). Johnston

16
contrasts one particular student teacher's experience with another who had a more

positive student teaching experience. 'Roger* describes his student teaching experience

as 'isolated,' with minimal feedback from his mentor, and little freedom to develop and

teach some lessons he wanted to try. Johnston observed that his image of teaching

upon entering student teaching was the "need to get through to each child and ensure

each child was teaming" (p. 72). According to Johnston, whether or not this is an

appropriate image of a teacher is not so much the issue. Instead, she develops a

convincing argument that what appears to be critical is "there should be much dialogue

between student teachers and others responsible for the practicum experience -

supervising faculty and co-operating teachers" (p. 81). This dialogue should not focus

on merely passing along technical skills, but should locus on the student teacher's

images of teaching and re-constructing those images as the problematic nature of

teaching brings inconsistencies and contradictions to light. Student teaching should be a

process of re-constructing visions of practice" (p. 81). To do this implies that the

responsible adult understands the transformative nature of such dialogue. Being able to

acknowledge the images the students hold and to further encourage them to "take an

active part in developing and clarifying that knowledge" (p. 80) implies that the

responsible adult has reflected on his or her own conceptions of teaching.

In an effort to see my student teachers' activities more objectively, I used the

recommended checklists as guides to my observations and conferences. After some

time, however, this method seemed unfulfilling and inadequate. While I was holding back

in offering specific advice as to what I might do in their situation, I was not learning much

about my student teachers' thoughts, perspectives or images. Using my checklists, I

was dominating the conferences. I found that often in effect, I was saying. "No, this is

how / see the situation."

17
 . With more time and Interaction with student teachers and with research into

studies in teacher education, I was better able to block out my own personal feelings and

reactions. I was also better able to bracket personal biases or opinions about "good"

teaching and not allow the checklists to drive our conversations. I listened more

attentively to the prospective teachers' experiences, hopes, and images.

It could be relatively easy to convince a student teacher to adapt to a teacher

educator's image of teaching. Thus, teacher educators can apparently shortchange

4

Student teachers if they see and judge only through their own current beliefs and

conceptions of teaching. Yet, teacher educator's only have their own lens through which

to view the world. This implies that the work of teacher educators does not consist solely

of training and educating student teachers - helping them with new methods and ways

of perceiving their classrooms. They must continue to question their own perceptions as

a crucial constituent of the work. They must remain open to new methods of teaching,

and how these new methods help them to perceive and understand their student

teachers' positions and conceptions of the woric they are about to embark on. They

must be willing to ask themselves the questions Aoki (1992) posed, "^hat authorizes me

to speak to educators of teaching?" and "What is teaching?"

Still, I felt genuinely unsure as to what should fomn the grounds for both my

observations and counsel — both of which should serve prospective teachers in taking

on obligations built into the endeavor. There needed to be a way to honor the

experience, information, and research the teacher educator brings to the classroom, as

well as the dynamic and developing conceptions student teachers have about their

future work. Should not the experience and lessons leamed as a teacher and field

instructor count as some grounds by which to watch, evaluate, or judge the teaching of

student teachers? Were my thoughts on teaching merely personal opinion, or did they

constitute grounded knowledge of the work? Should not my own inquiry into good
teaching infomn work with prospective teachers? How can teacher educators share their

knowledge and insights about teaching without appearing to be preaching to the pre-

service and student teachers? How can teacher educators observe pre-service and

student teachers without simply affirming whatever beliefs or practices they each

maintain? As stated earlier, the questions all appeared to revolve around beliefs of what

is good or right, the varying opinions of teachers and student teachers, and the source

that underpins or supports their vision and action in the classrooms.

4

Teachers at all levels are constantly making decisions about curriculum

materials, classroom management, parental involvement, faculty collaboration, and how

to be more attentive to the needs and teaming styles of all the students in the classroom,

to mention a few. Teachers make these decisions under a variety of budgetary,

environmental, and administrative constraints and support systems. Teaching though,

can be more than making cumcular choices, instructional decisions, grading judgments,

and so forth. Instead, all of those actions and scenarios can become possibilities or

opportunities for teachers to take the students, as well as themselves, to higher ground

in the best moral and intellectual sense of those tenms.

Philosophical Experience

In addition to my woric as a teacher and teacher educator, another experience

that underpins my view that reading and interpreting these philosophical works is

worthwhile in teacher education is my actual encounter with them. While reading

philosophical works related to education I was better able to contextualize questions that

had emerged for me while working as a teacher and teacher educator. However,

contextualizing questions does not mean they are answered. My own personal

experience or the experience of other teachers, while certainly invaluable, does not

seem sufficient to serve as my moral source; something around which I can judge other

19
goods in my life. While empirical research continues to be indispensable, philosophical

research is necessary to explore ways to help teachers, both new and experienced,

understand how they perceive every new classroom situation. Before making decisions,

they perceive their classroom in different degrees. They are "reading" their classrooms.

Philosophy, the love of wisdom, suggests a willingness to examine the obvious. It

can provide other tools that can either render the knowledge, facts, and opinions we hold

about education as much more precious or render some of insignificance, enabling us to

toss the unwieldy baggage. Murdoch (1970/1991) states that philosophy must, "keep

trying to return to the beginning; a thing which is not at all easy to do" (p. 1). This means

that philosophy suggests new ways of approaching or an openness to new ideas about

those things familiar. It suggests trying to "read" ones sun'oundings more carefully.

Surely, teachers use their senses to observe the goings-on in classrooms. Research

confirms the complexities inherent In teaching. However, relying on this type of research

does not always provide help in exploring our moral vision, or asking the questions Aoki

(1992) posed. Philosophy is not about solving problems once and for all. It is not about

taking up another cause or pursuing research to prove a point. Philosophy is about

questioning how one perceives and understands a situation, a classroom, or each child

in one's classroom. This love of knowledge obliges^ each teacher and student teacher to

question heretofore-unexamined conceptions of the terms of their ^Nork.

Philosophy and the Classroom

Teachers, often without having fully articulated it, have some conception of a

society that they wish to live in and they have some conception of "good." They have a

conception about the type of person they hope each child grows to become, along with a

* I do not mean obligate in the sense that a teacher must stop and ask questions before and after lessons
merely as an end to a mean. I mean in the rich sense of oblige that implies freedom as well.

20
conception of the society in which each student can make a contribution and feel

contentment and rewarded in retum. These assumptions and feelings influence the way

teachers at all educational levels interpret, understand, present the cum'culum, and

observe their students. Even when a teacher closes the classroom door, none operate in

a sociological, temporal, or moral vacuum or void. And, to deny that their values and

beliefs play a significant part in their teaching is to ignore their ability to make decisions

about their own work and the way they teach. Teacher educators need to help their
4

students understand the seer or perceiver that they become in their classrooms.

Eariier, I wrote about.my personal feelings of first being a new teacher. The

questions and thoughts I raised are consistent with research on feelings and perceptions

common to student and novice teachers. Questions and reflections are usually focused

on one's teaching perfonmance in front of the children, the mentor teacher, or field

supervisor. Concerns are "self-oriented" and appear to be characterized as "less mature

than the later pupil-oriented concems" (Veenman 1984, p. 161). Among other attributes,

more experienced teachers tend to plan their instruction or handle predicaments better

because they know how to pick up cues from their students, and they are better able to

take individual differences of students into account (c. f. Dariing-Hammond, 1995, Good,

1987). Yet, Veenman's survey of research indicates that the eariy stages of self-oriented

concem are necessary and must be resolved as one moves onto becoming a better,

more experienced teacher. This is consistent with the work mentioned eariier by

Johnston (1990), which further suggests the importance of meaningful conversation

between students and new teachers with more experienced faculty. So, not only is

conversation and thought necessary for the intellectual and moral growth of new

teachers, but I have suggested that it is also necessary for the continued growth of

experienced teachers.
 . Parker and Gehrke (1986), in referring to the classroom environment, agree that

classrooms can be "described as complex, fluid systems in which there is no one best

way for teachers to behave" (p. 229). Teaching represents more than a set of daily

responsibilities that must be met and problems to be solved. Certainly, teachers must

send the attendance sheet to the office, submit weekly lesson plans to the principal, and

distribute lunch tickets in the morning. However, if observing deadlines and solving

recum'ng problems is ail there is to teaching, any person, without graduating from a
4

teacher preparation program, can do the wori<.

In addition, it is clear.that teaching cannot be dictated from the top down.

Cum'culum materials cannot be teacher-proofed; any attempts to make them so have

failed. Cuban's research (1993) clearly shows how various large-sized projects and

education reform movements, even with the soundest of intentions, failed to control the

actions of most teachers.

Further, while lists are available to help grade and evaluate student teachers,

none contain all the criteria of a good teacher (Liebennan & Miller, 1992). These socially

constructed tools, while helpful, cannot be the final arbiters of good teaching. Lists serve

to remind teachers and teacher educators what an ideal teacher might do or say in a

classroom, but they are simply ideals that can illuminate present situations. Most

teachers would balk at the thought of having to strictly follow such a list. Doing so would

stifle any creativity or distinctiveness in tenms of how the teachers set up the classroom

environment, choose the materials to bring into the classroom, or handle classroom

disdpline problems.

Because of this complexity, the uncertainty and the predicaments that teacher

educators know their student teachers will eventually face, it would be wrong to deprive

them of currently accepted approaches of teaching math, science, reading and other

subjects. No doubt, teachers at all levels must make dedsions that will help students

22
understand the basic or accepted tenets of each subject matter. Because of the

unpredictability of classroom occurrences, it would be unfair to let them begin their

teaching without being aware of the current classroom management techniques, ways to

interact with parents, or the implications of multicultural issues in education. Teacher

educators should provide these tools to help their students handle the complexity of

classroom teaching.

Darling-Hammond (1995) notes that contemporary research suggests that the

"educational environment is complex and viable and that generalized rules for teacher

behavior cannot replace the need for sophisticated teacher knowledge and professional

judgment" (p. 28). She maintains that a large body of research "supports the conception

of teaching that is" first of all, "based on the integration of many areas of knowledge," is

"characterized by the use of multiple skills, appropriately applied to particular situations,

rather than by unvarying exhibition of uniform teaching behaviors in all teaching

circumstances," and that it is "context-dependent" (p. 30). Good teachers are able to

take the focus off their own performance and focus it on the particulars of the classroom,

the subject matter, and the children.

Therefore, while teachers should not have to follow strict guidelines, neither

should they have to reinvent the wheel. They have many predecessors, and their

collective wisdom can and should inform today's practice. While teacher educators pass

on methods and discrete skills, and then tell student teachers to learn to adapt them as

they see fit, it is not feasible or permissible to allow classroom teachers to do as they

please in their classrooms - as if operating in a social void. This move sidesteps

philosophy and holds for both primary school and teacher preparation classrooms.

OthenMise, what would stop a teacher from Indoctrinating students to her own set of

beliefs?

23
 • Along with the responsibility that comes with the ability to influence others comes

the potential to misuse this influence. A responsible teacher educator would not allow a

student teacher to act in any manner he so chooses in the classroom placement. If

teacher educators let their student teachers teach according to their feelings, are they

really 'teaching' them anything at all? l-low are teacher educators inviting them into an

ongoing discussion of changing meaning and methods of teaching, as well as the

established requirements of teaching? Of course, in some instances, student teachers

need to try out their own ideas. Here again, I believe the Idea of a moral source is

needed to help us clarify and respond to these complicated issues.

It is clear that we are dealing with some tension or discord between the beliefs

that teachers and teacher educators have, and how they are necessary but sometimes

inadequate. They have to be adequate because one's beliefs and values make up the

lens through which one views or senses situations. Put another way, everyone is bom

with a lens that continues to be shaped throughout one's life. A child does not always

have control over the shaping events, but adults can have some control over these

events. If one were to stop and consider the events of life, one would probably see that

beliefs or perceptions change over time. Births, deaths, friendships, and the like shape

or alter the focus of the lens through which a person views and reads the world because

these events change what one considers important or relevant. They can become

inadequate if they do not allow the present situations to be seen for what they really

contain.

Philosophical works are not to be regarded as one person's ideal that we must

accept or deny as a viable option for our own situations. Philosophical works, while they

may seem to urge us to adhere to some ideal, may actually serve as a tool to practice

"seeing", and to explore various options. Philosophy serves the inquiry into pedagogical

questions. While we are all in the business of teaching and learning, the teacher
education classroom could serve as a safe or neutral place in which to discuss the

meanings of teaching through the writings of others and to learn about the "seir we bring

to situations.

This brings me to again ask what source teachers draw upon when deciding

which methods and tools to use. Will new teachers use what their mentors suggested in

similar situations? In meeting critical and necessary deadlines, and in examining what is

good, teacher educators must help student teachers to see themselves as they see their
*
classrooms. This means helping them to think about the lens or the vision they not only

have in the classroom, but the one that shapes their moral vision of their role.

Unfortunately, the perception that brief introductions to the writings of great philosophers

will provide sufficient information to help teacher candidates fashion dynamic, informing

philosophies of education appears to be widespread. But, here we run the risk of this

storehouse of compelling writing becoming only more infomriation in a teacher's "bag of

tricks".

Teacher educators are concerned with the qualities a good teacher should have.

While teachers, in general, are involved in changing people for the better (Hansen 1998;

Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen, 1993). Most teachers, at any level, hope that in the

semester or year that they are with their students, there is not merely change, but growth

in a student's ability to learn something new (i.e.. adding, subtracting or appreciating

cultural differences). How can teacher educators make student teachers better? Does

better mean making sure they meet the requirements in a list of criteria? If so. which list?

As new teachers enter the field, what source will guide them as they choose materials

and cum'culum for their own students? What source will they draw upon when deciding

what materials should go into their personal portfolio? How can a teacher educator

change student teachers yet still appreciate that they each choose teaching for different

reasons and with different intentions and conceptions of the terms of the work? Further.

25
how can a teacher educator appreciate and understand students' beliefs and help them

grow into good teachers without compromising what they already know about teaching?

How can a teacher educator prepare student teachers to better judge their own

classroom performance? Clearly, teacher educators make moral judgments, as will their

student teachers. Their conception of what is good and right, whether it be for

themselves, their students, or society, will influence the direction of their attention and

what they each say and do as teachers. Understanding the meaning of philosophy and
4

exploring the writings of the great philosophers offer a means by which the student

teacher can explore his or her own vision of what is good.

Use of the Allegory

To reiterate, the focus of this study is to strongly suggest that philosophical texts

can be useful and meaningful to teacher educators and their candidates. To illustrate

and provide an example, I will explore and utilize Plato's Allegory of the Cave from Book

VII of Plato's Republic (Bloom, 1991).

This allegory will be helpful in three ways. First, the stages in the allegory

represent the stages of a person's movement from a life of "shadows" and "artifacts" to

one of living in the light of the "Good." My initial interpretation was that we humans live

in this cave and are the prisoners that Socrates describes as sitting chained to a bench,

facing a wall upon which shadows are cast. Puppethandlers stand behind the prisoners

holding up artifacts that create the shadows. The fire behind the puppethandlers

provides the light that casts the shadows that the prisoners believe to be their reality.

Readers of the Republic are told that the chains inexplicably fall off one prisoner and he

begins his ascent out of the cave. I feel that this allegory serves as the best illustration of

any persons journey - be it a teacher, teacher educator, or student - from ignorance at

the cave wall to wisdom that helps one to ascend out of the cave. The allegory of the

26
cave will provide me with a framework to answer some of the questions I previously

raised about moral sources, the influence one person has on another's growth, the

responsibility that comes with that power, and how education is linked to society. The

allegory can help teachers to better understand what it means to have a source, a base,

or a standpoint - one that allows for a non-arbitrary way of viewing a situation and then

concluding, "In this particular instance, this is good to do, but this is not."

Movement from a life of ignorance to living by a different source of illumination is

4

a person's philosophy and the journey is his life. That all philosophy is a footnote to Plato

is true to some extent. Whether one agrees, disagrees, or struggles to understand his

theory of Ideals and Forms, knowledge, truth, or beauty, practically no philosopher can

ignore the influence Plato's ideas have had on their own thinking. It is, however.

important to note that any thought of an individual or philosopher is not simply a footnote

to Plato's or any other person's thinking.

Most individuals today wrestle with notions of knowledge, truth, God, and other

ideas, just as Plato did ages ago. Questions about goodness, happiness, justice and

education, for example, arise today just as they recur in every generation. Current

thinking, problem solving and posing questions are set in the context of today's worid.

Any philosopher's inquiry into the meaning of the term knowledge, for example, will

emerge from very genuine experiences of his or her own worid and social milieu. One

might read Plato, Kant. Hume. Locke. Rousseau. Dewey. Murdoch and other

philosophers and educators to leam not only about their ideas, but also to understand

and make sense of their own questions, journey, predicaments, and experiences. Of

course, one may. and some would suggest, should, use the ideas of other thinkers and

teachers as footnotes to their own journey.

In that spirit. I hope to make clear my own inquiry and its broader context, without

becoming a footnote to Plato or any other philosopher. Through examining the thoughts

27
and writings of various philosophers and educators, I hope to show that such an

endeavor can illuminate the worid of teaching. If we believe that every person is a

unique individual with talents and imperfections trying to live his or her life in a

meaningful way, then each individual life and story is not a footnote to another.

Collectively, thinkers of the past and present, give each new journey a starting place that

is unique and full of possibility. Teachers play an essential role in each person's journey.

I consider it challenging to understand, describe, and discover the context within which I

can examine teaching.

Secondly, it is necessary to use allegory and metaphors when the technical and

prescriptive language of checklists cannot capture the complex work teachers do. There

is no agreed-upon exhaustive list of characteristics that can be passed along to student

teachers. So, we tum to metaphors because that is often the manner in which teachers

can describe their work. Many teachers are aware but do not know how to describe their

moral impact except through the stories they tell. Gotz (1997) claims. "It is as if we felt

that, at bottom, the definitions (of teaching) do not suffice to give us the nature of

teaching" (p. 67). Additionally, Kittay (1987) agrees that, "metaphor thereby provides us

with a way of learning something new about the worid. or about how the worid may be

perceived and understood" (pp. 2-3). Plato's exciting cave allegory is full of metaphors

that can continually help readei^s to describe the woric and responsibilities of teaching. It

provides the materials to begin questioning one's conception of teaching.

The third reason for using the cave allegory is somewhat layered. While reading

Plato's Republic. Rousseau's Emile and John Dewey's Democracy and Education, one

finds that they each deal with crucial foundations or themes necessary to consider if they

seriously consider teaching and its responsibilities. Moreover. Rousseau and Dewey

wrote in direct response to ideas in Plato's Republic. Dewey read Plato throughout his

life and did so more enthusiastically than any other writer (Ryan, 1998).

28
 Allegory of the Cave

The allegory of the cave speaks to the vision we are bom with, or the picture of

the human condition that we hold. It is a picture that highlights the enlivening

responsibility that accompanies the freedom we are given. The cave imagery is

representative of the bounded system humans inhabit, and, in that sense, it continually

infomns my vision and helps me to better shape my questions. It is an allegory that can

serve to remind a person to step away from the present demands. Therefore, one can
4
ask, "How am I understanding this subject matter, situation, person, or student?"

In this section, I will introduce quotations from the allegory, exploring various

stages and explaining how it can be influential in helping student teachers to understand

their orientation in teacher education. I needed to find a picture that would illuminate

each pedagogical situation in its fullness. The allegory, though not meant to give

answers, can help shape the pedagogical questions so that we, as teachers, can better

use infomiation from lists, methods, and guidelines and consider our own needs and

growth. The allegory takes into account the customs, conventions, and traditions we

must follow and serves to remind us that we are each bom with a lens that it is shaped

as we grow and are influenced our experiences. The cave allegory accounts for the

current social, political, and educative milieu within each person's life and considers that

each person can have an influence on another. We are bound to others firom the past,

the present and the future. A teacher, if acting in the light of a moral source, is a conduit

between the past, the present and future. The allegory further considers that we each

have a responsibility to ourselves and to others. Most importantly, is the fact that each of

individual has a guiding source, even if not always articulated. These assertions will

become more clear throughout the dissertation.

29
 . The catalyst for the dissertation is Book VII of the Reoublic in which the cave

allegory appears. This book begins with Socrates and Glaucon engaged in conversation.

Socrates says,

"See human beings as though they were in an underground cave-like dwelling

with its entrance, a long one, open to light across the whole width of the cave.
They are in it from childhood with their legs and necks in bonds so that they are
fixed, seeing only in front of them, unable because of the bond to turn their heads
all the way around. Their light is from a fire burning far above and behind them.
Between the fire and the prisoners there is a road above, along which we see a
wall, built like the partitions puppet-handlers set in front of the human beings and
over which they show the puppets" (514a-514b).

"I see," [Glaucon] said.

"Then also see along this wall human beings carrying all sorts of artifacts, which
project above the wail, and statues of men and other animals wrought from
stone, wood, and every other kind of material; as is to be expected, some of the
carriers utter sounds while others are silent" (515a).

The prisoners, as the chained cave-dwellers are referred to by Socrates, have

spent their lives staring at shadows of artifacts; shadows of man-made objects. These

prisoners believe that, "truth is nothing other than shadows of artificial things" (515c).

During this life at the wall of the cave, the prisoners have seen nothing of

themselves or of each other. Their life is built around these shadows and talking about

these shadows; predicting what shadow might come next, winning 'prizes' for the most

accurate prediction. Socrates tells Glaucon, "They're like us." (515a). I interpret this to

mean that while people are not.bom with actual iron shackles around their necks and

legs, they are bom into customs, traditions and conventions, or expected ways of

behaving. In a sense, as' one matures and grows accustomed to habits and ways of

seeing, it is easy to stay at this wall where life has become somewhat predictable. To

push the metaphor a bit further, it can be easier to live an unexamined life, a point that

will be addressed later. A prisoner, for example, might say, "I'm doing fine here. Life is

predictable and I have become good at predicting." However, can one assume that this

individual will never think about how he might do a job differently, or how his work may
or may not be appreciated by someone, or the meaning of his work? Further, as soon as

a person (a teacher) claims that he wants to help another (a student) to become better,

he has entered the moral realm. Life is no longer predictable. A teacher must work at

moving away from the wall of the cave.

The movement away from and the subsequent unpredictability away fi'om the

cave wall does not imply an 'anything goes' attitude. Plato makes it clear that we are not

to reject our customs that give us vision, or an initial, working standpoint. Still, it is
*
necessary to examine how customs influence who we are and what we do; othen/vise,

we live according to unexamined customs and beliefs. Essentially, how does one begin

the movement away from the cave wall. Further, does not questioning traditions,

customs, and methods imply one is disagreeing with them?

Socrates continues in lines 515c-e:

"Take a man who is released and suddenly compelled to stand up, to turn his
neck around, to walk and look up toward the light; and who moreover, in doing all
this is in pain and, because he is dazzled, is unable to make out those things
whose shadows he saw before. What do you supposed he'd say if someone
were to tell him that before he saw silly nothings, while now. because he is
somewhat nearer to what is and more turned toward beings, he sees more
con^ctly; and. in particular, showing him each of the things that pass by. were to
compel the man to answer his questions about what they are? Don't you
suppose he'd be at a loss and believe that what was seen before is truer than
what is now shown?"

Glaucon replies, "Yes, by far."

Socrates continues to describe the stages the prisoner goes through as he

moves toward the exitjof the cave, as he adjusts to the light outside of the cave and his

eventual return to the wall of the cave.

Volumes have been written about the imagery of the cave. I will not examine

each point to its fullest, but will examine enough to help me understand what it means to

be a teacher. As I look into life at the wall of the cave, I will examine other points of the

imagery, to discover the role teachers play in compelling a person to turn from the wall.

31
My preliminary understanding is that one does not turn from this cave wall, or from

expected behaviors, as if he or she has access to perfectibility that others do not I do

not believe one is compelled once in a lifetime and remains forever after a good person.

Somehow, it is easier to understand If the chains were seen not as one or two large,

heavy chains around the neck, legs, and anms, but instead, as many chains that keep

the prisoners bound to their unreflected-upon behavior.

Apparently, every time one pays attention to something compelling, or that sets a
4

person into a state of wonder, a chain comes off and that person can see the situation

for what it really is. Ideas in a book can compel a teacher, a statement overheard at a

party can compel someone, and a math problem written on the board can compel a

student, perhaps only one out of 30 to question what he previously understood. I hope to

leam from examining Socrates. Rousseau, and Dewey how a teacher can help a student

understand this "compelling" and discern it from what might be desire or passing fancy.

How does one attain the discipline necessary to understand the compelling? How can a

teacher guide his students to understand the nature of what compels them? What

qualities of character does a teacher need in order to 'lead' the student through the

brightness of the unknown? How might a teacher discern the difference between

something that truly compels and something that might be shallow desire that could

keep the student from growing? The assumption here is that a teacher acts as the guide.

However, teachers may unwittingly act as puppethandlers in their students' lives, which

periiaps is inevitable.

The puppethandlers in the cave hold up the artifacts that cast the shadows on

the wall of the cave. In other words, the prisoners do not experience a real tree, but

instead a shadow of a tree. Essentially, anyone a person encounters can act as a

puppethandler, who passes on unfounded or unexamined information or opinions, or

who does not understand the nature of the responsibility one person has for another. Is

32
a teacher who forces children to memorize multiplication facts a guide or puppet-

handler? in teaching about the customs and governments of other countries, is the sixth-

grade social studies teacher a puppet-handler? Are teacher educators acting as puppet-

handlers when they allow student teachers to teach whatever they feel is best?

A fluidity here is of interest to me in that all teachers walk a fine line. As

responsible adults in the classroom, they are in the position to "be kind or cruel, fair or

unfair, considerate or inconsiderate, domineering or cooperative, as their fancy or their

*
moral temperament suits them" (Jackson, 1993, p. 173). They represent the subject

matter, for example, by choosing a book to use for a literature class, deciding on the

materials to teach multiplication, or selecting a method book for student teachers. With

its references to convention, wonder, and the soul seeking the true nature of things, can

the allegory help a teacher educator understand how a teacher can best represent

subject matter and engage students with it?

Rousseau. Dewey. Plato and Socrates

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was a philosopher, who envisioned himself as working

within the light of the Good, or at least as shedding light on good practice in the

comprehensive moral sense of "good." He appears in the guise of the "governor." or

teacher, in his Emile (Bloom, 1979). While he does not directly employ Socrates' or

Plato's tenms cr imagery, according to some critics such as Bloom, and my own

assessment, he wrote in direct response to the arguments in the Reoublic. Thus in

examining Emile. we leam more about the allegory of the cave and its relevance to

teaching.

Like the Republic. Emile offers a vision of a completely new human worid. a

worid painted in words alone, yet deeply evocative of educational possibilities and

hopes. In the efforts of the govemor. Rousseau provides an extraordinarily subtle.

33
intricate, detailed example of a teacher's role and responsibilities. Each example forces

the reader to question his own purposes for choosing activities in favor of or considering

what Rousseau believes to be the true purposes for doing any and every pedagogic

activity. Rousseau's teacher takes a child. Emile, and raises him from a newborn until he

is ready for mam'age. The narrative and Emile's education, concludes with Emile saying

that educating a child is "so holy and so sweet a duty" (p. 480), that he is grateful to his

teacher for all his guidance, and that he wishes the govemor to continue his guidance for
4

Emile and his family. It is quite clever of Rousseau to want to educate this child from

infancy. It triggers questions like, "Does this child avoid the chains that the puppet-

handlers of society can place on him, or does Rousseau merely replace those with

opinions and artifacts of his own making?" "Can one escape the chains of convention if

one is never placed in them?"

Whether one agrees or not with Rousseau's ideas, reading Emile can undeniably

uncover one's own beliefs about teaching, subject matter, growth, and sodety. As the

reader tries to understand what Rousseau is arguing for. he asks the reader to

temporarily put on hold his or her own thoughts or beliefs on education. But, because the

reader is forced to do this, when time comes to reconsider one's own thoughts on

textbooks, bulletin boards, or science-class materials, there is a sudden or pressing

need to reexamine them in light of where Rousseau's thinking has taken the reader.

Bloom (1979) writes that the educational system proposed by Rousseau, if taken

literally, is indeed ridiculous and an impossibility. "But this is to misunderstand the book.

It is not an educational manual, any more than Plato's Reoublic is advice to rulers. Each

adopts a convention - founding a city or the rearing of a boy - in order to sun/ey the

entire human condition (in Rousseau, 1979)." One might imagine a teacher thinking, "If I

did have to choose one book to teach reading, what would it be and why? Is the purpose

34
of teaching my children reading to get good scores on the state tests or is it something

grander?"

Rousseau fills the five books that comprise Emile with scenes of the governor

planning lessons, creating educational environments, interacting with the growing Emile

~ but all the while admitting that "childhood is unknown" (p. 33). I want to explore this

twin relation: working energetically as a teacher, or teacher educator, while also

remaining uncertain about fundamental questions of education, such as how a person

4

"really" teams and "really" grows and "really" thinks about the educational efforts of his

or her teachers. Like Socrates, who also felt the weight of these uncertainties (Hansen,

1988; Vlastos, 1980a), Rousseau's governor is not deterred by his own doubts, although

they sometimes deeply trouble and worry him. His uncertainties seem to accompany the

practice, as recent critics of teaching have suggested (Floden & Clark, 1988; Jackson,

1986). For, again like Socrates, Rousseau did not make use of "methods" of teaching

prevalent in his time. He did not face the wall; he sought to turn from it. He was charting

new tem'tory, a joumey that can scarcely go fonward without uncertainty and risk. I

believe his source for that method was an image of the Good not unlike what one hears

about in the pages of the Reoublic.

Another philosopher and educator whose writing 1 will examine is John Dewey.

Dewey was certainly influenced by the ideas of Rousseau and Plato and refers to them

in Democracy and Education (1916/1997), the main text of his that I plan to use. Dewey

does not always agree with their arguments, but does agree that one must examine

one's beliefs in order to grow. Of interest to me is how Dewey's ideas were

misunderstood or implemented and utilized with little thought as to the questions Dewey

was addressing. Like Rousseau, Dewey asks the reader to focus attention on the

interests of the child, but not to such an extreme that the teacher should forego his or

35
her teaching responsibilities. Dewey too, makes suggestions, but is in pursuit of how

teachers can help children get in tune with their own dispositions.

Democracy and Education is a book that challenges every teacher, no matter

experienced, to confront their own beliefs. Similar to Rousseau, but in a totally different

manner, Dewey explores some core issues of education that one has conceptions

about, but probably has never spoken about. What does it mean to have an idea? What

does it mean to think? What constitutes knowledge? What is motivation? What role does
4

habit play in the work of teachers and in the lives of students? What does a subject

matter demand of a teacher? What does all of this that is involved in teaching and

education have to do with the growth of an individual?

Finally, there is rich literature on the topic of Socrates work as a teacher (Nelson,

1965; Vlastos, 1980b). However, I want to examine his interaction with various

Interiocuters, keeping the rich metaphor of woriting in the light of the Good in view. That

light can help point the way to qualities of courage, genuine curiosity, and steadfast

pursuit of the truth that, in my view, characterizes Socrates' efforts in these

conversations. I like to think that my analysis can help better understand Socrates'

grounding: literally, where he "stood" while conducting inquiries on the meaning and

purpose of life. Rousseau and Dewey speak more directly to working with children, and

because educating new primary school teachers is of importance to me, I place Socrates

after them. Additionally, because Socrates refuses to be called a teacher, it will be more

fruitful to examine him after examining what Rousseau and Dewey say about teaching.

In sum, Socrates, Rousseau and Dewey orient themselves as educators toward

the Good; they seek to work in its "light." They each sought. In their own way, to tum

from the cave wall and help others examine their own situations more carefully. They

each demand that the teacher be a leamer, and they highlight the special relationship

between a teacher, a student, and the society in which that relationship exists.

36
Significantly, their orientation does not eliminate uncertainty and doubt. It may even

deepen it. Nevertheless, this orientation, as I hope to show, provides them a ground, a

source, and a standpoint that gives them an enabling voice with which to try to turn

others from the wall of the cave, or help them in their movement out. It gives them a

voice that is based on more than personal opinion or established practice alone. By

using texts such as these in teacher education classrooms, they might elicit or 'put on

the table for discussion' 'practical' topics such as rewards and punishments, knowledge,
4

opinion, teaching, leaming, and freedom. But moreover, in my opinion, such books can

help teacher educators and their students better understand a source that they might

use to further guide their own understandings. Throughout this dissertation, as I examine

these three main authors, I will comment on the predicaments that teachers and teacher

educators sometimes face.

Socrates, along with Rousseau's and Dewey's teachers, make many moral

judgments about others (Midgley, 1993), or at least are steeped in or predicated upon a

conception of some Good. They draw upon some source. This is another aspect of what

it means to orient oneself in the light of the Good, to seek and pursue the Good in one's

work with other people. This orientation provides a ground for moral judgment, i.e. for

the evaluations teachers and teacher educators alike must constantly make of their

students. If evaluations are truly to serve students, rather than merely to socialize

students, or fulfill institutional imperatives, they must be grounded in more than just

current beliefs and values. I think teachers need a broader horizon. Teachers and

teacher educators must make moral judgments and I believe they need to guide these

decisions with some conception of 'Good.'

To help in this analysis. I plan to turn to the works of contemporary moral

philosophers who are themselves experienced in thinking about the Good (Gadamer,

1975; Maclntyre, 1984; Midgley 1993; Murdoch, 1970/1991, Taylor, 1989). By

37
suggesting that one allow himself to turn from the wall of the cave to live and see in the

light of the Good, what is this Good? These authors investigate the "background" to

moral judgment as well as its impact and enactment in human life. They make plain how

moral judgment is unavoidable, despite occasional protests to the contrary. A teacher

educator can reject this position by asking "Who am I to tell prospective classroom

teachers what texts they should use?" or "Who am I to tell candidates their style of

discipline is wrong?" But, those claims harbor moral judgments in their own right,
*

namely that I, or others in my place, have no grounds for offering such counsel. That is a

moral judgment, even if cast more in negative than positive tenms. It compares with the

familiar words, "You have your values, I have mine, and we have to live and let live."

Those words may appear to sidestep moral judgment; but, as Midgley (1993) and others

show, they embody a very strong moral judgment. In analyzing Socrates, Rousseau,

Dewey and contemporary arguments about the nature of moral judgment, one of my

aims is to provide an argument that can assist teacher educators in making judgments

that are so much a part of their work — judgments that are moral because they involve

the development of prospective teachers, who will in turn, be responsible for the

development of so many others.

Gadamer's (1975) inquiries focus on how one thinks about how one understands

the events of the worid. As he vyrites about understanding texts, The important thing is

to be aware of one's own bias, so that the text can present itself in all Its othemess and

thus assert its own against one's own fore-meanings" (p. 269). Murdoch (1970/1991,

1977) has examined many of Plato's metaphors and refers in some of her works to the

phases the prisoner goes through after a being released from the chains and how his

conception of the Good acts as a source for the movement. Taylor (1989), traces the

historical influences that people have used to judge right from wrong or good from bad.

Each of these three contemporary moral philosophers, as well as others, seem to

38
understand the weight and importance that "an unexamined life is not worth living". Each

in their own way tackle the 'problem' of inherited customs and prejudices, look into how

people can become better, what grounds their definition of good or better, or maybe

more specifically, what grounds the seeking and inquiry.

Summary

This project is a study of the place of philosophy in assisting a person as they

continually consider what it means to be a "good" teacher, with the latter understood in

moral rather than merely technical terms. The works I will address may help one to

develop a ground or standpoint for evaluating - in the strongest sense of that term - the

process of becoming a teacher. My dissertation is an investigation of how reading

philosophy can help teachers and teacher educators to orient themselves in the light of

the Good, to orient their work in the light of a moral source.

I will utilize of several bodies of literature, the primary being the works of Plato

and Rousseau, and Dewey. These three form the center of my inquiry. A supplementary

body of literature examines questions about the sources of the Good, the nature of

becoming good, the dynamic of seeing another person justly, and so forth; here, I use

Midgley (1993), Murdoch (1970/1991,1977), Taylor (1989), and others. A third literature

provides critical commentary on the works of Plato. Rousseau and Dewey (c. f.

Gadamer, 1980; Vlastos, 1980). Finally, I make use of a growing body of research by

educators and philosophers who have focused on the moral dimensions of teaching

(Goodlad et al, 1990, Hansen, 1995).

It is vital for teacher educators to develop awareness of the larger moral

"background" to their work. This background provides the ultimate reason for doing all

the otherwise familiar tasks that comprise teacher preparation. Further, new teachers

should learn to welcome the judgments that they will have to face as teachers. At first

39
glance moral philosophy may appear an unlikely candidate to help teacher educators in

today's hectic world of school reform. However, like others (Arcilla, 1995; Proefriedt,

1994) who argue for the importance of philosophical study and reflection in learning how

to teach, I have found this line of inquiry to serve as a developing lens through which I

might view the world. The clarity and conviction of the arguments in Plato, Rousseau,

Dewey, and others, has been most inviting and challenging. They have provided mirrors

for me to see how I view the worid and the moral sources that ground my perception and
*
views. They also help me to continually reassess my understanding of teacher

educators' roles and responsibilities. I trust that this study might help reorient and

deepen the conversation in teacher education by helping others to challenge and

understand their sources and orientation.

40
 II. EMILE: ROUSSEAU'S PROFESSION OF FAITH

"Everything Is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the
hands of man (Opening lines ofEmile).

Introduction

The guiding question for this chapter is, '"hat does it mean to be released from

the wall of opinion and compelled to live in the light of the Good?" I examine this
4

question with an appreciation for the influence one person, a teacher, can have over

another, a student. The nature of the relationship where one has the responsibility of

shaping someone into a better person is most fascinating and underpins all I write about

in this dissertation. Certainly, a teacher's influence can be either negative or positive. I

hope to develop a teacher's awareness for the potential positive influence over the

development of another person. If, as I suggest, Plato's allegory serves as a

provocatively rich portrait of the human condition, what role does a teacher play in

helping someone to "turn from the wall" of the cave and to be better? I believe this

question cuts to the heart of teaching, including teacher education programs.

In answering this question, I will examine aspects of Rousseau's Emile. one of

the most influential wori(s on education ever written. Emile is not a real child, and the

education Rousseau describes is a worid of ideas or an ideal, which one would never

encounter in reality. My focus is to show how Rousseau's Emile can help to characterize

the notions of being released from the cave wall and compelled to turn toward what

tradition calls the Good.^

In Bloom's (1979) introduction to his translation of Emile. he writes of Rousseau.

"But he denies that the cave is natural. The right kind of education, one independent of

^ Rousseau refers to Plato often throughout Emile. Later in this chapter, I refer to Bloom's (1979)
introduction to his translation of Emile in which he examines it as a reply to Plato's Republic.

41
socie^, can put a child into direct contact with nature without the intermixture of opinion"

(p. 9). Apparently, Rousseau considers the possibility of a child never being in chains. If

Bloonn's interpretation is correct, Emile's vision never needs redirecting as do Plato's

prisoners. Yet, Rousseau still must deal with what moral source will guide Emile in his

interactions with others during his lifetime. Rousseau still must contend with some

themes that trouble every philosopher - for example, what counts as knowledge or

opinion; how should a person resolve strong passions and desires; how can one balance

the needs of self with those of one's society.

By denying the cave,'as Bloom (1979) suggests, Rousseau merely deals with

these timeless themes in different ways. If, as I suggested eariier, that being released

happens every time someone stops for a moment to break from routine or even question

routine, I still must account for the moral source that guides a person in his or her

interactions with others. Precisely because Rousseau denies the existence of the cave

makes Emile a perfect book by which to examine the concepts of releasing and

compelling and their relation to education. If a release implies a prisoner having been

chained, then it would seem that to be compelled might relate to what guides one's

movement as a moral being. Rousseau's interest in bypassing the cave only serves to

highlight the gravity and importance of being compelled. It would appear then that being

compelled is related to one's moral source or an awareness of something grander than

this physical, sensible worid. In terms of teaching, there must be something more

encompassing or rewarding than following checklists and performing well for an

observer. For Plato and Socrates, their moral source is the idea of the Good. For

Rousseau, the moral source is Nature.^

'As we will see later, Oewey did have something grander in mind as well - growth. However, his notion of
growth did not imply some transcendental order we must search for. For Omey, truth did not refer to
uncovering some transcendental truth, but truth created in light of growth through disdplined inquiry. It is a
truth very grounded in humanity and each individual's ability.

42
 In expanding key themes that emerge from Plato's allegory of the cave. I will

review some of the main points of Emile's first fifteen years which make up Books l-lll of

Emile. I then examine, in Book IV, the relationship between the Vicar of Savoyard and

young Rousseau. Baker (2001) maintains that for Rousseau, "the most significant part

of the text was the Profession of Faith by the Savoyard Priest" (p. 5). It represents

Rousseau's "best known discourse on conscience" (Cooper 1999), which Rousseau

describes as a "universal, active, inner force for good" (p. 84). This speaks directly to

what it might mean to be compelled. Another reason to examine this relationship is

young Rousseau's response-to the Vicar's Profession of Faith. This response seems to

be an example of someone being released and compelled from Plato's wall. Examining

this relationship could lead to further characterizations of the two. Because one of my

interests is in the moral sources we use to guide our vision, this section Emile most

cteariy addresses that theme. Next, I return to resolve the notions of releasing and

compelling. Finally, I conclude with some implications for teacher education.

The main findings of this chapter suggest that there are assumptions one

chooses to live by in order to be compelled and to live in the light of the Good. For

teaching, it suggests how to "be" rather than give suggestions as to what to "do." These

assumptions seem to take the form an inexhaustible resolve that one chooses to live by.

They relate to an individual's understanding of the possibilities and the limitations human

beings have as they go about their business of living. In other words, one must live by a

profession of faith if one hopes to be the sort of person that might release and compel

another person.

This profession of faith, a concept I examine as this chapter continues, has

certain guiding principles or assumptions one knows or realizes he must live by to

continue living in the light of the Good. The first assumption is that each human being is

a soul in a sentient body; that is the soul knows and can feel the magnetic pull of the

43
Good while the body prefers to move from one unfulfilled desire to the next. Second, as

humans living among others, we are firee to make comparisons and judgments about our

own wants and needs as well as the wants and needs of others. If humans admit to

being bound by some moral source, they are obliged to see situations in all their

particulars, are free to gather evidence, to make thoughtful assessments and to compare

and make judgments. With practice, they can get better at these activities. The third

assumption is that we accept being bound by a moral source, which in tum keeps us

bound to each other in "seeking the truth and doing the good." One might say that to

live with a profession of faith; "simply" means one must love the truth. Certainly this not

an easy task for cave dwellers, yet, I hope to show how Rousseau's Emile might help

readers to understand how one can learn to live this way.

Allegory of the Cave References

In this section, I differentiate between what it means to be released and

compelled. Further, I introduce the notion that Rousseau's Emile is written in response

to the cave allegory and through Emile. he considers the possibility of raising someone

without chains. To recall the cave allegory. Plato's prisoners are sitting chained to the

cave wall. While they are in chains and their sight is limited to what is directly in front of

them, they can see and they can think. They can hear the other prisoners as they each

try to predict the next shadow that will appear on the wall. Their sensory perceptions,

which allow them to see shadows and reflections and to hear their fellow prisoners

speaking, are parallel to the customary beliefs one lives by. The prisoners are not

making examined and rational judgments about the shadows of artifacts they see.

Though they are making dedsions. they are based on clouded or on second-hand

information filtered by the puppethandlers.

44
Releasing and Compelling

In Bloom's translation of Plato's Republic, it is not so immediately clear that the

release and compelling are two distinct steps, but I maintain that they are. I offer two

additional translations, following Bloom's, that reaffirm the distinctness. Here once again

is Socrates speaking to Glaucon:

Take a man who is released and suddenly compelled to stand up, to turn his
neck around, to walk and look up toward the light; and who, moreover, in doing
all this is in pain and, because he is dazzled, is unable to make out those things
whose shadows he saw before (515c-d).

Jowett (1894/2000) translates the passage in which Socrates is speaking to Glaucon as

follows:

And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are
released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and
compelled suddenly to stand up, and turn his neck round and walk and look
towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains, the glare will distress him, and he will
be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the
shadows; (515c-d).

Lee (1955/1987) translates Plato's passage in this manner:

Then think what would naturally happen to them if they were released from their
bonds and cured of their delusions. Suppose one of them were let loose, and
suddenly compelled to stand up and turn his head and look and walk towards the
fire; all these actions would be painful and he would be too dazzled to see
properly the objects of which he used to see the shadows (515 c-d).

Being released and being compelled are indeed two distinct activities for a

prisoner to undergo. A release begins the prisoner's movement away from the wall of

unexamined routines, unreflected-upon behaviors, and habits. It seems to refer to that

moment in time when someone thinks, "I am tired of this convention that requires me to

say Thank You' all of the time." However, when compelled, one thinks, "I am aware of

the fact that I am tired of this convention that requires me to say "Thank You" all the

time'. It implies the pull that one then feels to know more. The release seems to be

when one becomes aware of repetitive motions or behaviors, habits, and customs.

45
 ' On the other hand, to be compelled is to stand, to turn and to actually look at the

other prisoners and see the puppethandlers who hold up the various artifacts that create

the shadows on the wall. Here is where one begins to admit there is more to understand

about the convention, the opinion, or the habit. It opens up a space enabling one to ask,

"So, what can I do about this?" When compelled, there is an opportunity to ask oneself,

"How has this convention or habit shaped me and how does it influence my thinking?" It

seems to be a sort of uninstrumental space. If we do not examine the difference

4

between being released and compelled, one could assume that being released from

habits, traditions, or conventbns were enough to live a good life.

Accordingly, if one is to become a teacher - a person who by definition plans to

make another person better in one way or another -1claim that this release and the

initial standing and tuming, or the beginning of the questioning of one's perception of life

at the wall of shadows, is not enough. If this were the case, we could question why

people who have been released continue to make mistakes? How do we account for

those who continually retum to their old habits and routines? Conversely, how can we

account for people who seem to move through situations in a better manner? We have

all experienced teachers who have been released, yet are not good teachers whom

seem satisfied in their work.

The release and eariy tum from conventions and traditions and unexamined

ways of behaving might be a shift in vision, but it certainly is not necessarily a tum

towards life in the light of the Good; a life in which one tries to see people and objects in

the best light possible. For some prisoners who have made this tum and realized the

falseness of their eariier surroundings. Murdoch (1970/1991) writes of their current state.

"They do not yet dream that there is anything else to see. What is more likely tiian that

they should settie down beside the fire, which though its form is flickering and unclear is

quite easy to look at and cosy to sit by" (p. 101). She considers the fire in the back of
the cave to be "the self, the old renegade psyche, that great source of energy and

warmth" (p. 100). For these released prisoners, the fire "may be mistaken for the sun,

and self-scrutiny taken for goodness" (p. 101). Murdoch (1977) writes, "The bright

flickering light of the fire suggests the disturbed and semi-enlightened ego which is

pleased and consoled by its discoveries, but still essentially self-absorbed, not realizing

the real worid is still somewhere else" (p. 43). The Good - the Sun - exists outside of

the cave.
4

This is powerful imagery she offers to readers of Plato's cave allegory. Surely to

be released, or for example, to confront parents or teachers about their beliefs or raise

questions to the principal about her style of teaching and management, can be

considered a bold move. It is not easy to move from difficult situations, and try to take

care of the self after having lived in an unexamined manner. Certainly, a prisoner

released and turned, with his new semi-enlightened ego, aware that he was looking

merely at shadows, has every right to be angry, or hurt or sad about the falseness or

limitations of his prior life at the wall. Nevertheless, for Plato, one needs to move past

this stage because one's vision or perception is still veiled by these emotions.^ It is from

these emotions, it seems, that Rousseau's governor will keep Emile.

It is easy to then surmise, as did the Sophists, that if obeying convention and

tradition were all one needed inr order to be good or to do the right thing, there is no

inherent reason for turning from the wall or no reason to consider some transcendent

Good. Perhaps Thrasymachus was conrect; justice is the power of the strong over the

weak. It is one's power of persuasion that counts. Yet in Plato's dialogues, Socrates is

able to show that the definitions the Sophists live by do not hold for every instance.

Socrates is always "finding counterinstances" (Danto, 1989, p. 99) to their rules and

^ Rousseau might say that they might need a proper restoration of amour-propre, which becomes more
obvious later in the chapter when we see how the Vicar treats young Rousseau.

47
definitions. He continually challenges them to continue in their search for knowledge

and truth, especially since they regard themselves as teachers. Not moving past the

anger and emotions mentioned earlier keeps one from allowing the power of the Good to

guide thought and judgments.

Continuing in their discussion of the allegory, Socrates says to Glaucon,

"education is not what the professions of certain men [Sophists] assert it to be. They

presumably assert that they put into the soul knowledge that isn't in it, as though they

were putting sight into blind eyes" (518b-c). Instead, the soul has the ability to "endure

looking at that which is and the brightest part of that which is" (518c-d). The soul has the

ability to recognize that the body knows objects and people in a more pure manner than

simply seeing them for the earthly ends they can serve. "Education, therefore, is in the

service of the soul and the divine, and not, as for the Sophists, of the secular and human

alone" (Tamas, 1991, p. 43).

By this release and compelling, Plato is not refem'ng simply to the visible act of

one's corporeal body turning to see something better or simply to seeing how others

behave. It is more than "just a matter of one set of goals taking over the priority from

another" (Taylor, 1989, p. 115). Plato is refem'ng to the soul's perception needing to be

tumed in the correct direction. The human soul cannot look directly at the Good, just like

a human's eyes cannot look directly at the sun, but Plato believes our soul can see

better in the light of the Good. We can be better "when we are no longer run by our

desires" (p. 115). The release and initial turn is the soul beginning to question prior

understandings. One could ask, "How does one get released from the wall in the first

place? How is one compelled living in this worid of shadows? What holds the soul back

from perceiving well? How does the soul know it is in the correct direction?"

"l maintain that the soul never knows it is in the correct direction. Strangely enough, it is the acceptance of
this ignorance that leaves room for foith.

48
 If we accept Plato's theory of anamnesis, we could say that the soul of a

released prisoner, before turning from the wall, noticed something true or beautiful in

one of the shadows. "Our souls were before birth in a place where they [the Forms] were

clearly seen" (Murdoch, 1977, p. 3) For that particular prisoner, a certain shadow at a

particular time partook in some degree to an Ideal or Forni. If one stops to think about

potential implications of this ancient allegory, it is apparent that many, if not all people

begin to question their lives at the wall of opinions. They are released, even if briefly,

from acting in an unexamined manner. They do begin to question the qualifications of

those from whom infonmation comes. They wonder if they are leading a good life and

think about how to live a more meaningful life.

Though Plato's "picture of the parts of the soul is not in fact coherent" (Maclntyre,

1966/1998, p. 37), it seems that most scholars agree that his notion of a tripartite soul is

the most developed. Plato divides the soul into desire or appetite, spirit (thymos), and

reason. Murdoch (1970/1991) writes, "The lowest part [desire]...is egoistic, in'ational and

deluded, the central part is aggressive and ambitious [thymos], the highest part is

rational and good and know the truth which lies beyond all images and hypotheses" (p.

5). The third part of the soul "desire" is "thought of as manifold and often chaotic

because desire can fix on objects of just about any kind; there is nothing that unifies all

cases of desiring except that some particular thing is sought for" (Annas, 1981, p. 129).

This sounds similar to what student and new teachers experience. It is as if desire is

ruling their behavior. Their focus is often self-oriented.

Maclntyre (1966/98) notes that in the Republic the spirited part of the soul,

thymos, is "concemed neither with rational standards of behavior nor with bodily desires,

but with standards of honorable behavior, and with anger and indignation" (p. 39). For

Plato, the reasoning part is supreme. In order to act justly, the soul's parts need to be

guided by reason. In a just person, the three parts need to work together.

49
 ' "According to Plato, the beginning of philosophy, the desire for knowledge, is

wonder {thaumazein). It always intervenes at a point where something strikes us as alien

because it runs counter to habitual expectations" (Gadamer, 1992, p. 143). Philosophy

refers to the "incessant though constantly unfulfilled striving after truth" (p. 141). This

striving after truth is never ending; yet, philosophy continually is present - inviting us to

continue the search. Philosophy can keep the three parts of the soul working together.

To be compelled implies that one is striving after the truth in the artifacts, people, objects

and customs of this earth. For example, the rewards come not merely from perfomning

well when the principal comes to observe. The teacher finds rewards in being more

attentive to her students and the subject matter. So. in part, the task of education must

be to help students leam how to strive for truth.^

Educators then must continually look for knowledge and facts about the worid

around them if they are to remain teachers. Yet, philosophy demands that each teacher

accept that his or her current body of knowledge or some newly found facts are never

sufficient.^" The facts alone do not represent truth. As a teacher, one never reaches a

stage in which he is "finished" or has found the best methods that will work for all

students. Because the demands of that sort of life sound exhausting, the wall almost

seems necessary in order to leam behaviors until we are reasonable enough to make up

our own minds. If Murdoch is correct, then some people get distracted by the flame in

the cave; it certainly is ego-building to believe that one has certain knowledge. Perhaps

warming oneself by the fire is a necessary step on the road of philosophy and truth. It

can be reassuring to talk to others around that fire before continuing. However, how long

should a person stay at this fire? The fire seems to be necessary as a place to warm

^ For Dewey, philosophy was not about universals but how to Iteep moving, though not to the point of
utilitarianism. His teachers still have more power and intelligence than utilitarianism would allow.
Whenever we are in that gathering-knowledge mode, it is in pursuit of some end in mind. We are pursuing
an answer to some question. In my book about reptiles, I look up facts about the strange frog I saw in my
yard. Someone might memorize facts about the states, the presidents, and classical opera hoping to win big
on a TV game show. The spirit that precedes and accompanies that questtoning is what I am tooking at

50
oneself with others who have been released. Dissatisfied teachers who grumble too

much around 'the fire' in the teachers' lounge come to mind. Must one move on? What's

wrong with grumbling in the teachers' lounge about how students misbehave? Can a

prisoner bypass the fire and move directly on to a more pure path of being compelled?^ ^

Is it really possible to never be enchained in the first place and be able to directly be

compelled by the Good, or in Emile's case, by Nature? So, are the wall and the fire so

bad? It seems to mean that we must pass through stages from ignorance to wisdom.

Conversely, is Rousseau onto something here in denying the cave? If so, should we

raise and teach our children in order to begin a new social order? Rousseau's Emile

begs to not be summarized in a Foundations of Education course, but to be treated as

the integrated, artful whole that it is.

Bloom (1979), in interpreting Plato's cave, writes that "[Lliberation from the cave

requires the discovery of nature under the many layers of convention, the separating out

of what is natural from what is man-made" (p. 8). For Rousseau, according to Bloom, an

education independent of society and its conventions "can put a child into direct contact

with nature without the intermixture of opinion" (p. 9). Is Emile never meant to be

released? It seems so, but how is this possible? How can a child be raised without

chains?^^ if there are no chains and habits to be released from, how can Emile

participate in philosophy? Why would he need education? What sort of knowledge or

awareness does he need to seek the truth? It seems certain that the knowledge he

Murdoch's whole book, The Sovareiantv of Good (1970/1991), is an attempt to give acceptance and to
further understand those who live simply and who do not live according to the Socratic call that the
unexamined life is not worth living.
Emile forces me to think about what might be chains - even those unknowingly put on by well-meaning
parents and teachers. Parents-to-be consider their baby's name before it is even bom. Th^ want to name it
after a parent, another relative or a good friend. The name has a history or has a spedal meaning to ttie
parents. Is this name a chain, or is it the parents' sense of traditton that is the chain? Can a parent not sing
their favorite lullaby to their crying child or read them popular children's stories at bedtime? Are these songs
and books inherently chains or does it depend on how and when they are used? Should parents at a
restaurant with their fidgety child never say, "Stop banging the utensils. Good tx)ys don't do that in
restaurants because it bothers the other customers.' Would Rousseau call these words chains? And if all
these are chains, what are the altematives?

51
seeks is not in service of keeping others at the wall (a la the Sophists) or knowledge that

he uses to pacify himself at the fire. Will Emile never make any mistakes in his dealings

with other people? If he were a teacher, would he always gather the proper evidence

and always make sound decisions? If so, it would make sense to copy any methods one

can take from Emile, but why does Rousseau caution readers against this?

Certainly, there are no fonmulas to follow in becoming just or in being just or

good. Once one^is released, there are many avenues for the soul. How to be virtuous or

courageous or pious could not be taught as directly as the Sophists might have

suggested. Socrates never seemed to be able to get an adequate definition from them.

If one cannot define a temri, how can one teach, or live by it?

Plato never suggested there was such a method or even that it would be easy to

characterize being good or just since it seems to depend on the situation. Yet, he does

not leave morality up for grabs. How does Rousseau deal with man's desires and

interest in himself and his need to be a part of society? Are all passions and desires self-

serving -keeping a person at the wall, at the fire, or in the role of a puppethandler? Is

there a way to teach the soul to perceive better or to be ruled by reason and to take

advantage of a compelling moment?

As did Plato. Rousseau also believed that passions or desires are natural and

should not be necessarily thought of as the source of all bad behavior, but we can be

better when reason "rules." Bloom (1979) believes that the core of the difference

between Plato and Rousseau lies in their beliefs about the spirited part of the soul

{thymos). Plato sees it as inevitable that we are living in a cave that is "designed to

support human hopes and fears" (p. 10) and that knowing how to die is equivalent to

leaving the cave - a theme I will retum to later in the dissertation. Since Rousseau does

not believe the cave is natural, he also concludes that men naturally know how to die.

For Plato, since the cave is inevitable, thymos is necessary as a step between desires

52
and reason. For Rousseau, since a ciiild l<nows and understands his desires without the

intennixture of wills of others (i.e., the cave wall, the fire), reason will naturally rule more

often.

Emile, the Governor and the Vicar

In Book IV, Ennile and the governor are still the main characters, but Rousseau

introduces a third, the Savoyard Vicar.^^ His relationship with the teenage Rousseau

takes up over one-third of Book IV and is crucial in Emile. Further, in Emile. Rousseau

deals with many important concepts such as faith, truth, self-love, compassion. Nature.

God. reason, ignorance, and doubt, to name a few.^^ My primary focus here is to

understand the allegory of the cave as an apt metaphor for the human condition and

how it can inform our conceptions of education. For example, when I examine

Rousseau's concept of amour-propre, I do not examine it to better understand his

development of it over time. Instead. I try to understand the concept as it appears in

Emile.

There are a number of reasons for Rousseau to introduce this third important

character. First, it enables him to tum his writing from his account of Emile as a student,

to a consideration of the govemor as a fit guide for Emile. This is important because

even the most sympathetic reader of Emile would begin to wonder about the moral

character of the govemor. In Books l-lll, Rousseau makes all sorts of demands on the

character of the govemor, but it is in Book IV where we see some confinmation that he

has been fit and will continue to be fit to raise and guide Emile. Now that Emile's

passions are beginning to emerge, there is renewed pressure on the govemor to explain

The Vicar was not actually any one person Rousseau encountered in his life. He appears to be a blending
of two religious figures that Rousseau encountered in his youth. See, for example, Dent (1992, p. 6) and
Ourant & Durant (1967, p. 55).
It is impossible for me in such short space to give each the respect that Rousseau's thinking deserves,
since even Rousseau retumed to and developed these themes over his lifetime.

53
to Errrile that he is a fit governor. Further, with the focus shifted to Rousseau and the

Vicar, we discover they are two ordinary people - not raised like Emile. "They are like

us," to bonrow a phrase from Socrates - they were raised at the wall of the cave. They

were released and compelled; the Vicar to compel Rousseau, Rousseau to be the

inspired governor who then compels Emile. Readers can relate to them. It is

Rousseau's admission that we do live in the cave. In addition, in writing Emile.

Rousseau cannot continue describing Emile's education until he addresses what moral
4

source will guide Emile in his relationship with others. Finally, Rousseau, having

introduced and written about the Vicar, can retum to writing about the dynamic

relationship between the governor and Emile.

Amour de Soi and Amour-Propre

Book IV begins with Rousseau writing that Emile, about 15 years old, is

beginning to change. He is leaving childhood and entering adolescence.^^ Rousseau

describes this age as one of moral deterioration and drastic physical changes. "A

change in humor, frequent anger, a mind in constant agitation, makes the child almost

unmanageable. He disregards his guide; he no longer wishes to be governed" (p. 211).

One can imagine any stereotypical 15-year old teenager who begins to question and

rebel against his or her parents; teachers, or other adults and who begins to consider

how he or she appears to members of the opposite sex. Nature has moved Emile into a

new physical state and thus into the moral realm.

As Rousseau explains, people are bom twice, "once to exist and once to live" (p.

211). It is time for Emile's second birth. No longer can the governor keep Emile away

from the wills of others, which was the govemor's goal in Books l-lll. Emile is meant to

See the introductory pages to both Book III (p. 165) and Book IV (pp. 211-212) of Emile.

54
be with others; thus the suitable study for Emile is that of his relations with others/^

Rousseau says, "As soon as man has need of a companion, he Is no longer an isolated

being. His heart Is no longer alone. All his relations with his species, all the affections of

his soul are bom with this one" (p. 214).

Rousseau, however, does not believe that these emerging passions should be

extinguished or controlled. The governor needs to guide them correctly because these

passions are the "principal instruments of our preservation," and the "instruments of our

freedom" (p. 212). Further, Rousseau believes that the source of our passions is natural

(and therefore good), but the manner in which passions manifest themselves in people is

not always natural. For example, if the nature in a child has not been nurtured as

Emile's has been, the passions emerge in ways that to most adults do seem

uncontrollable.

Passions are key for Rousseau. One natural source of passions for Rousseau is

self-love, or amour-de-soi. Another natural source of passions is another type of self-

love, which he labels amour-propre. Rousseau writes that while amour-propre is natural,

it is "...naturally neutral. It becomes good or bad only by the application made of it and

the relations given to it" (p. 92). Introducing children to the wills of others along with an

improper education instills amour-propre before it is to emerge naturally from Emile in

Book IV. Rousseau writes, "Dominion awakens and flatters amour-propre, and habit

strengthens it. Thus...prejudices and opinion take their first roots" (p. 68). The

governor's task in Books l-lll is to foster the development of amour-de-soi from which

"gentle and affectionate passions are bom" (p. 214) and delay the development of

amour-propre from which "hateful and irascible passions are bom" (p. 214).

Cooper (1999) helps to distinguish Rousseau's writing on the noble savage and Emile. Rousseau's noble
savage is meant to live apart from sodety. Emile is not

55
 ' Amour de soi is a healthy self-love and self-esteem. Amour-propre is a self-love

relative to other men's opinions. Imagine a person so very dependent on the love or

approval of others. Unfortunately, he would never receive such approval, because others

are living In the exact same manner (i.e., looking for approval of others). Rousseau

believes that raised according to society's conventions, children and adults never trust

what their instincts or nature is telling them, but instead continually seek approval

through convention and opinion - which certainly sounds like life at the cave wall. It

becomes clearer to see why delaying development of amour-propre is so important to

Rousseau. The hateful and irascible passions he speaks of sound very similar to the

emotions that keep a person at the fire as Murdoch (1970/1991) describes (see p. 47).

Because of these negative emotions, they cannot attend to what could be a fruitful moral

source. If people were more able to read or interpret nature's intent as it acts through

them and had a healthy self-love and esteem they could live happier and more just lives.

They would be willing to seek the truth.

To help Emile at this stage, it is time for the govemor to change his methods. A

well-directed amour-propre becomes the goal. These positive emotions, along with his

sentiment of existence, bind Emile to others through pity and compassion. Dent (1992)

writes that for Rousseau, "to extend compassionate concern is a way of becoming aware

of and sensitive to another's state of mind, and hence of being drawn into a relationship

of mutual awareness and response" (p. 52). Onwin (1997) claims that for Rousseau,

"compassion seizes center stage as the morally fruitful sentimenf (p. 297). They both

continue their discussion of compassion by adding that seeing others in need stimulates

Emile's awareness of his strength and faculties. He does enjoy being the preferred, but

his strength and faculties are in the service of helping others. Emile will not use them

doing whatever pleases himself in the name of self-preservation or self-love (acting from

desire or from thymos). But this does not mean completely surrendering one's self to the

56
needs of others. Instead, it means being even more in touch with one's own needs and

how nature acts through the self, an awareness that enables one to better understand

when others are in need. Through tending to this compassion for others in need, Emile is

taking care of his needs. How did Emile get to this point? How did the govemor foster

amour-de-soi and delay amour-propre? Further, this sounds very much like enabling a

student teacher to get the focus off of performing in front of the students or a supervisor

and moving it toward examination of their moral source. This, in turn, helps them to
4

move their focus onto the students and subject matter.

Emile, Books l-lll

Rousseau suggests that for the govemor to raise Emile with more love than he

could possibly get from his natural family and with hopes of an education that respects

his natural dispositions, he will raise Emile in the country. He will take him away from the

conventions of the city. It certainly seems ridiculous for a person to think he can change

society or begin a new one by whisking a child away from the current sodety. However,

precisely because humans live in this world of disparate demands, most people at some

point In time think about doing this - to live more simply or in a way where problems are

more clear.

It is a courageous move on Rousseau's part to work so deliberately in examining

the complexity and intricacies of raising and educating this one imaginary boy.

Rousseau certainly appears to be wearied by and angry about the unnatural behaviors

of society, but still passionate and enthusiastic with humanity's potential. What

Rousseau wants is for readers to consider their purposes for doing anything, especially

when they are in a position to influence the development of other human beings. In later

chapters, I will demonstrate that this is a goal of Dewey and Socrates as well.

Rousseau's passion, enthusiasm and hope for humanity, through each individual's good

57
conscience, drives him to experiment with an ideal that might serve to influence the

direction of educational practice. Bloom (1979), in his introduction, writes "Emilc is the

canvas on which Rousseau tried to paint all of the soul's acquired passions and leaming

in such a way as to cohere with man's natural wholeness" (p. 3). Eariier I stated that

through this experiment, Rousseau examines the necessity of the cave. It now seems

that Rousseau knows very well that we all live in the cave. If he did not believe so, he

would not have written Emile. He wants readers, teachers for example, to examine the
4

conventions they follow to see if they are indeed missing the important particulars of a

student sitting right in front of them.

So far, what is highlighted are the negative emotions brought on by stimulating

amour-propre too eariy. Developed properiy, as in Emile, it can help bind us more readily

and appropriately to others in society. When developed improperiy, like at the wall, it

evokes the passions that can divert the soul from seeking the truth. It would certainly be

difficult then to stay on the path illuminated by the Good. It seems easier to jump from

one method to the next or from one belief to the next than it would to pay attention to

what compels. It is easier to go along with the group consensus.

In Books l-lll, the govemor's method of educating Emile has been through what

Rousseau calls the "inactive method" (p. 117). However, the governor is far fi'om

inactive. He does not sit back and allow Emile to follow every whim. Rousseau labels

this method inactive because while the governor takes great care to control the

environment Emile is in. Emile only interacts with Nature and not with the will of other

humans. Emile learns his lessons from Nature, and he never sees his govemor being

"active" in such a way that their wills are competing. For example, the govemor would

not punish children for having lied, but it certainly would be the responsibility of the

govemor or teacher to:

58
 ' arrange it so that all the bad effects of lying - such as not being believed when
one tells the truth, of being accused of the evil that one did not do although one
denies it - come in league against them when they have lied (p. 101).

As Rousseau saw the situation in his day, adults raised and educated children for

some specific office, function, or job the child would perform as an adult, as if the child

could not be raised to eventually make his or her own choices. A child's education was

prescribed toward this certain, adult-prescribed, end. Through this process. Rousseau

believed that each child's distinct personality, disposition and traits were lost, never

discovered, or dismissed.^^ This focus on an efficient education blinds teachers to what

nature bestows in each child-. Rousseau writes, "On leaving my hands, he will, I admit.

be neither magistrate nor soldier nor priest. He will, in the first place, be a man" (p. 41-

42).^®

What Rousseau tries to do with Emile in the first 15 years of his life, in working at

making him a man. is something quite drastic. He tries to raise Emile so that he has

what Rousseau calls the sentiment of his own existence. Meltzer (in Orwin & Tarcov,

1997) describes this "sentiment of existence" as "the sheer awareness that I am, that I

exist." He continues in his interpretation, and it is in this elemental self-consciousness

that Rousseau locates the true human self and the foundation of our being. Somehow a

human being exists not through his relation to God or to the essence of man, but through

a relation to himself. Our beingis our presence to ourself, our sentiment of existence (p.

287).

While reading Emile. one finds that Rousseau does not deny God or deny Emile

compassionate relations with others. Those come later in life. He is raising Emile to be

conscious of his own awareness, which is certainly not how prisoners chained at the

cave wall would act. I suspect Rousseau must have believed that those raised at the

See pages 37-42 of Emile.

See pages 41-79 of Emile.

59
cave wall are certainly responsive to objects and people in their world, but they are not

aware of their responsiveness. The prisoners see objects and people through the

opinions and prejudices of others. They are not truly awake to their own sensing of the

world.

In fact. Rousseau would probably claim that it is because they never really

interact with the natural worid. as Rousseau would define it. For Rousseau, "natural"

meant 'original' or pre-cultural" (Johnson, 1990, p. 4). The shadows on the cave wall are
4

not original or pre-cultural. They are steeped in the opinions of others. Plato's prisoners

interact with shadows and man-made artifacts, unlike EmIle who interacts with Nature's

objects. Rousseau's goal for the govemor is to keep Emile from "the accumulated vices

of civilization" (Durant & Durant, 1967, p. 179). Dent (1992) writes that Rousseau

believed "It is man's interference with the normal course of nature that makes people

conojpt, miserable and damaging to themselves and to others" (p. 107). Emile never has

to be released from his chains because Rousseau's governor, in following nature, made

sure he never placed them on Emile. Yet, Emile - Rousseau's natural man in a social

worid - still must learn how to seek the truth in his dealings with other people. To whom

will he be compassionate? To whom will he be attracted? By whom - by what sort of

person - will he wish to be preferred?

It is certainly brilliant and bold for Rousseau to try to tackle all of this. Really,

could someone ever raise a child to have such a healthy self-esteem? Is it even a

remote possibility that a parent or teacher raise a child without the yoke of convention? If

one answers, "Certainly not," Rousseau might respond with, "Well, why do you think it is

not possible? What are the methods, procedures, beliefs or opinions to which you hold

to so tightly? If you were to pick even one and ask yourself from where it came and if

you try to understand it, you would raise a child closer to the spirit with which I raised my

Emile!" One could also read Emile as an account of a real govemor and how he raised

60
one boy. These events just might have happened - but 'Emile' would never happen

again. Emile is an improbable occurrence, but the "existence" of him in a book such as

Emile has the potential to make one wonder if an adult could raise a child with as much

attention and care as the govemor gives to Emile. It would seem that this child, being

raised so carefully by the governor would never have to wrestle at the stage of the fire of

self-knowledge or agonizing self-scrutiny that bums in the back of Plato's cave. If Emile

were alive today, we would not find him needing a therapist, or psychotherapy to

overcome fears, delusions, or other coping strategies he learned while a child. He would

not have to spend time nurturing a wounded inner-child. Emile already loves himself

because In the first 15 years of his life he never had to deal with the competing wills of

others.

One reason for this was that the govemor did not introduce Emile to such words

as duty, obligation, or obedience. Rousseau believed those words come about only

because adults place their own convention-based parameters around a child's thoughts

and actions. He claims that before the age of reason, which begins around age 15, a

child should have no conception of what other people want for him. Instead, he raised

Emile to be familiar with words such as strength, necessity, impotence, and constraint.^^

The govemor took great pains to ensure that the environment surrounding Emile would

be one in which Emile could leam how he both sensed and responded to objects in this

environment. Bloom (1979) writes. "The tutor's responsibility is. in the first place, to let

the senses develop in relation to their proper objects; and. secondly, to encourage the

learning of the sciences as the almost natural outcome of the use of the senses" (p. 9).

Emiie became aware of his strengths and weaknesses. He learned to be aware of how

he responded to objects in his environment and what his strength would or would not

See page 89 of Emile,

61
allow him to have or do. He developed a healthy sense of amour-de-soi, or self-love, not

dependent on another person's opinion.

When reading Book III, which takes Emile from age 12 to age 15, it is natural to

ask what Emile and the govemor do together all day for these next three years. During

these years, the govemor will introduce Emile to the concepts of subjects such as

science. However, the govemor's ability to interpret Nature working through Emile will

not be clouded by a desire for Emile to obtain high test scores. Though his methods of

raising and educating Emile were unconventional for the time, most teachers today

would notice familiar themes-. He ends his lessons while Emile is still curious to leam

more. He is concemed about discipline, though his interpretation of it refers more to

Emile being disciplined in his inquiry, not disciplined as in sitting still and silent. Unlike

current practice, the govemor did not bring in representations of the objects of study. He

did not bring globes or maps into the classroom.^ In fact, there was no classroom. With

the help of the govemor, Emile drew his own maps and constructed his own machines,,

out of his own need to know and understand the forces of science and nature.

Emile, Book IV - Innocence and Imagination

But, once the passions are stirred, when Book IV begins, the govemor must

change his method hoping that he can compel Emile, considering how he can still be

Emile's guide through this difficult, but natural and therefore good, stage in his life.

Though these passions are stim'ng, Emile is still innocent. Rousseau describes other

children at this age who have been told too much or had too much expected of them in

their eariier years. The young people, exhausted eariy, remain small, weak, and ill-

I suspect Dewey might object to Rousseau's strictness. This point will become dearer through the next
chapter.

62
informed; they age instead of growing, as the vine that has been made to bear fruit in the

spring languishes and dies before autumn" (p. 216).

The govemor will keep Emile innocent by being careful in the way he answers

Emile's questions about the opposite sex as well as the intentions of other people, which

demands a governor who does not feel pressured in any way to compare Emile with

other children his age. The govemor's concern is, and has been, for Emile's growth, not

his own public adulation. Emile. up to this point, highlights the important role that a

teacher plays in developing a child's awareness and self-discipline. A teacher does play

a different role than any other adult in the life of a child. Rousseau seems to say that the

teacher is a link between the child, the world and the Good. Certainly this would mean

that a teacher's focus cannot remain on him or her self. It suggests that a teacher must

work within a more encompassing range of vision.

Rousseau continues to describe Emile's emergence into the moral worid. He

claims that Emile's first sentiment is not love, but friendship. He begins to take an

interest in those surrounding him and begins to understand that man is not to live alone.

"It is thus that the heart is opened to the human affections and becomes capable of

attachmenf (p. 220). He is not falsely attached to others based on opinion, but of

course as a social being, it implies he will want to be preferred. As he had learned early

in life to assess his environment relative to his own developing strength, he must now

leam to gather evidence, compare, to judge, and to reason. With this interest. Emile will

have to develop an understanding of the "notions of good and evil," and this will "truly

constitute him as a man and as an integral part of his species" (p. 220). Nevertheless,

how is the govemor to help him develop this sensitive or discerning eye?^^ Since Emile

From pages 223-226 in Emile. Rousseau writes his three maxims, which in a faw pages sum up the
reflections firom pages 211 to 222.

63
has not been attached to nor driven by the wills of others, what is he to make of them

now?

Again, much depends on the proper development of Emile's amour-propre.

Cooper (1999) writes.

When amour-proper is gentle and humane, it is because it has aligned itself with
and even supports natural pity, which is an expression of amour de soL When
amour-propre is cruel and malignant, it is because it has effectively overcome
natural pity. Everything depends upon the results of that first comparison of self-
to others^ (p. 162).

Bloom (1979) writes of this stage in which amour-propre is emerging, "Judiciously

chosen comparisons presented at the right stage of life will cause Emile to be satisfied

with himself and be concerned with others, making him a gentle and beneficent man on

the basis of his natural selfishness" (p. 17-18). Amour de soi will guide amour-propre.

For Rousseau, imagination now becomes key in developing a good amour-

propre. Before this age, imagination would have increased Emile's natural desires to

want things unattainable by his strength and abilities. The governor stalled the

development of Emile's imagination, but now it becomes necessary in order for the

govemor to introduce Emile to the concepts of pity and compassion. Amour-propre is

inevitably developing at this point, and one road the govemor should not take is to "put

the seeds of pride, vanity, and envy in him" (p. 221) by showing him the splendor of

wealth.^ A misguided amour-propre is what lies "at the root of competition and the quest

for power over others" (Masters. 1997, p. 114), which seems to parallel the role of the

puppethandlers in the cave. Emile's need to compare himself with others is natural and

good - amour-propre serves a purpose. Since Emile is yeaming to compare, it is vital

that from his first comparisons, the relative sentiment of pity or compassion is bom. If, as

^ Cooper (1999) writes that in Rousseau's later works, he saw pride and vanity as the two branches of
amour-pmpie" (p. 162). Pride is at woric *when one's sense of self-worth depends upon achieving
something whose value is real and not merely the product of opinion. When the standard is rooted in
appearance or opinion, one is ruled by vanity" (p. 163).

64
Rousseau writes, "every attachment is a sign of insufficiency," (p. 221) it would be better

to feel compassion towards others instead of feeling the need to take advantage of

others and their insufficiency. So, how will the governor property guide amour-propre'?^

Rousseau explains, as he presents for readers of Emile. his three maxims of

compassion. These maxims are a summary of his understanding of humanity and nature

and how both will continue to emerge through Emile. These maxims "stress not only the

power but the limits of compassion" (On^in, 1997, p. 303). His education "will concern

itself foremost with his ethical relations to human beings." As Burch (2000) notes,

"Emile's must be arranged in such a way that feeling and compassion rather than vanity

and domination become the organizing principles of identity fonmation" (p. 128).

Rousseau is presenting the groundwortc and the spirit through which the governor will

introduce Emile to others. The first maxim is that it is natural for the human heart to have

compassion for those "more pitiable" than those who are happier than oneself. It is not

wrong that Emile sees that others are happy, but the governor must also show him "the

sad sides of that lot," in order for Emile to fear unhappiness. This will enable him to

begin to "cut his own road to happiness, following in no one else's tracks" (p. 223).

Through his second maxim, Rousseau claims that it is not good enough for Emile to

simply pity those who are poor or sad. but that he needs to assist them as well. "Unsettle

and frighten his imagination with the perils by which every man is constantly surrounded"

(p. 224). In his third maxim, Rousseau writes about memory and imagination. Memory

and imagination keep a person linked to other people. He believes that the govemor

^ Orwin (1997) writes of Rousseau's concept of compassion (which furnishes one of the great themes of
Emite" p. 301). He compares Hobbes and Rousseau. "Where Hobbes had sought to reform human lifs
through appealing to rational self-interest, Rousseau seeks to do so through evoking fellow feeling.' 'He
[Rousseau] agrees with Hobbes that what unites human beings is not (as earlier thinkers had claimed) a
natural common good, but merely a common frailty. Hobbes, however, had sought to build on our fear of
incurring suffering ourselves, and on an alleged rational self-interest grounded in fear thus we would refrain
from harming others simply out of concern for ourselves. Rousseau, by contrast - convinced of the
infeasibility of this scheme — solidts a response to suffiarings of others founded on our experience of our
own. He appeals not to selfish interest but to genuine mutual concern' (pp. 302-303).

65
should teach Emile to love all people. He says, "Speak before him of humankind with

tenderness, even with pity, but never with contempt. Man, do not dishonor man!" (p.

226). Those who do not live by this, those wealthy or in power (i.e., the puppethandlers)

can inhumanely treat others. They act as if people have no memory or no understanding

of their lot in life, and that they have no imagination of a better life or of their fate. It

becomes easy to mistreat people, or to underestimate the power that the Good can have

in the lives of others.

4

Rousseau then speaks to possible critics who might wonder how this sort of

education - living according to these maxims - could possibly help Emile become a

happy or well-balanced individual. Rousseau would claim that a child raised any other

way would never be happy because their happiness is based too much on appearances,

in other words, how others judge him. Their child would always be looking inward

wondering if his doing or acting is In accordance with the whim or will of another. Emile,

by contrast, does not have to appeal to another person's opinion of him in order to judge

his own happiness. Emile, having been raised these past few years according to the

govemor's three maxims, can see deeper into the heart of himself and of others.

Through his need to help others, in needing them and trying to act justly, he finds

happiness. Yet, for Rousseau, it seems that happiness is not a goal he sets up for Emile

to reach - once and for all. Rousseau's conception of happiness seems to include the

struggle that one must undergo in living a life of trying to match one's desires and

faculties with one's environment - something Emile is better able to do than those raised

at the cave wall.^^

For more about Rousseau's conception of happiness, see for example Cooper (1999). He writes,
'Rousseau's discussions of happiness seem nearly schizophrenic" (p. 21). Dent (Dent, 1992) writes that
Rousseau never offers a dear definition of happiness (pp. 132-133). At least, in Emile. this seems correct to
me. Rousseau (in Emilet himself writes that we can never know what absolute happiness or unhappiness is.
He never offers a specific definition of the word. Instead, he speaks more of the niad to happiness (p. 80).
He writes that we too often judge it on app^rances (p. 229). The Vicar wishes for Rousseau that he live *a
long time in the happy state in which its voice (nature's) is that of innocence" (p. 267). It seems after reading

66
 ' Emile is learning to judge the acts of others, both in present experiences and in

reading history. In these next few years then, the governor brings Emile out into the

worid to see others in need. The governor's job is to notice "in his manner, his eyes, and

his gestures the impression it makes on him. One reads in his face all the movements of

his soul. By dint of spying them out, one gets to be able to foresee them and finally to

direct them" (p. 226). After these experiences, the govemor then introduces Emile to

biographical history to leam how others lived given their various circumstances and

environments.

Interestingly enough,'Rousseau writes "if...he just once prefers to be someone

other than himself - were this other Socrates, were it Cato - everything has failed. He

who begins to become alien to himself does not take long to forget himself entirely" (p.

243). Emile's properiy developed amour-propre keeps him from emotions that would

force his imagination to want to be any other person - wanting to sense life through this

other person or historical figure. Emile's imagination will allow him to gather evidence

and facts and to judge, but it will not allow him to want to be anyone else other than who

he is. Emile is very aware of every present moment. It is somewhat strange to imagine a

person so honoring of his perceptions in such a manner.

The Entrance of the Vicar

When Emile will start to ask the "great questions" - questions about God, for

example. Rousseau brings in the character of the Vicar.

To what sect shall we join the man of nature? The answer is quite simple, it
seems to me. We shall join him to neither this one nor that one. but we shall put
him in a position to choose the one to which the best use of his reason ought to
lead him (p. 260).

Emile. Rousseau's goal is to create a happy individual - this meaning, not one who is always lighthearted
and enjoying the finer things in life.

67
 ' The plot thickens. What Rousseau does once again is most clever. How can he,

a human, possibly give any concrete answer to the question of God's identity and

existence? If Rousseau were to claim any one human-organized religion were the best,

he would, in effect, claim that he knew more than or as much as God. And he would

thereby be claiming that he knows what is Good. Rousseau cannot possibly claim that

and still have hope for humanity. His experiment with Emile would come to a screeching

halt and might have become a fantastic novel or a methods book. Emile must make his

own choice of religion. How does Rousseau handle this dilemma? What does he have to

say to the reader, to the governor, to Emile? How does he put Emile in the position to

choose a religion or a moral source that in tum will illuminate the worid and help him to

make informed judgments?

Instead of directly answering the question for the reader about the best religion

for Emile, Rousseau writes about himself as a troubled youth who comes upon an

ecclesiastic, the Vicar of Savoyard. It is in this section of Book IV that Rousseau tells

about his own life. Rousseau's preface (quoted below) to his story as a youth is yet

another example of Rousseau telling his readers that he does not expect them to believe

as he does. He avoids the role of the puppethandler. Instead, he appeals to the reason

of the readers of Emile.

It is up to you to see if useful reflections can be drawn from it about the subject
with which it deals. I am not propounding to you the sentiment of another or my
own as a rule. I am offering it to you for examination (p. 260).

Rousseau writes that when he was an adolescent, he moved to a foreign

country, hastily changing religion (he was bom a Calvinist) simply to get food and

shelter. While at the almshouse for the poor, he heard dogmas preached that did not

parallel his religion. For his complaints and questions, he was imprisoned. The youth

that Rousseau describes is one whose amour-propre was developed too soon. In

describing himself, he uses terms such as anger and bitterness. To him, witnessing

68
men's injustice served as proof of the viciousness of their nature. Then he met the Vicar

who had come to do business at the almshouse. The Vicar subsequently arranged for

young Rousseau to escape and then found him lodging.

It impresses young Rousseau that the Vicar would even be interested in

spending time with him. He notices how the Vicar can see that his spirit and belief in the

goodness of humanity was near non-existent, yet the Vicar believed it was not too late

for the young Rousseau to turn his life around. Young Rousseau lacked courage and
4

pride. He no longer was sure about the assumed goodness of organized religion. To him

it seemed that those who claimed to have the truth about God only seemed to make a

mockery of the Supreme Being. While he did have some education, he was on the road

to having the "morals of a tramp and the morality of an atheist" (p. 263). However,

young Rousseau still had an innocence and curiosity that the Vicar notices. He still

needed others and was willing to admit this.

It seems through this innocence, young Rousseau, or anyone who tums to

ponder and tries to utter a question, is willing to be in the state of wonder I wrote of

eariier (see p. 49). It seems that when we come upon young Rousseau's story, he has

tumed from the wall, but is not sure which way to go. He seems somewhere between

moving to the near and warm light of the fire or life in the light of the Good. His meeting

the Vicar highlights just how important a guide is in helping the soul to move in a better

direction. Rousseau is not a child, but because he does not trust his instincts - he does

not have Emile's sentiment of existence - it is difficult to discern the fire from the light of

the Good. Yet, because he does not ding to the hardened beliefs of those in the

almshouse, he is still willing to pay attention to some strong pull his soul is feeling.

Something compelled him further to seek a better way of life, a better way of gathering

evidence and making judgments as he moved in the moral worid. He still needed others

but did not know in what capacity. This Vicar took time with the young Rousseau to

69
develop the positive emotions of amour-propre. After the Vicar "studied the boy's

sentiments and his character well" (p. 264), he gave him specific books to read and give

accounts of. He brought young Rousseau along as he tended to the poor and to those

who were "the victims of their own and other's vices" (p. 265).

It is helpful to note how differently amour-propre is nurtured in young Rousseau

and in Emile. For example, the Vicar sometimes would appear "feigning to need" (p.

264) excerpts from or interpretations of books that the Vicar gave young Rousseau to
4

read. In contrast with the governor's strategy, predicated on the luxury of time, the Vicar

told young Rousseau about the good and noble deeds of others. Emile, at this stage in

his life, has a good sense of amour-de-soi and the "sentiment of his existence" that

young Rousseau does not have. The Vicar had to do such things in order to "reanimate

a generous ardor in his heart" (p. 264) and to "regain a good enough opinion of himself

(p. 264). The methods of the governor and the Vicar had to be different. Cooper (1999)

writes that the difference between the Vicar's methods and the govemor's methods is

the "difference between treating a virus and preventing one" (p. 126). Yet, both Emile

and the young Rousseau have innocence and curiosity about them. Moreover, both the

Vicar and the governor spend much of their time observing their charges.

I believe that Rousseau had faith in those who would read Emile - that they still

have this innocence and further would note that they have the responsibility to foster it in

those they teach. The govemor raised Emile nurturing this natural innocence and

curiosity. The Vicar comes upon young Rousseau when it seems his is waning. What

Rousseau is cleariy not saying is that If children are not raised like Emile, there is no

hope for them. If so. he did not need to write Emile. instead, Emile stands to highlight the

key role a teacher has in both compelling students - setting up an environment in which

something can release and compel them - but also being available and able to interpret

this pull in students. We hope to get student teachers to this point of wanting to learn

70
more,'of questioning their assumptions and emerging images of teaching - a point I will

come back to at the end of this chapter. Though they are young adults, and perhaps we

often see some of their curiosity hardened, opportunities always present themselves to

notice their questions. When one is compelled, one is not living a life hardened at the

wall or fire.

Later in Book IV, this innocence becomes clearer. On page 287, for example, the

Vicar says that there are some whose "vile passions" have stifled the sentiments that

keep people drawn to each other. Such persons have an "icy hearf and find "no more

joy in anything." On page 291of Emile. Rousseau he speaks of those whose conscience

was not given a chance to make itself heard. "It gives up as a result of being dismissed."

Young Rousseau was not yet at that point.

I want to spend a bit more time with the Vicar because the way he lives and the

words he speaks seem to speak directly to the work of a teacher educator. The students,

the young adults in teacher education classrooms, are similar to young Rousseau. They

have been "raised at the cave wall," but that does not at all imply they have no capability

for independent thought. Further, it is important to briefly examine the Vicar's profession

of faith in order to learn what Rousseau's governor says to Emile about God.

The Vicar, who seemed to be trying to live in the light of the Good, took pity on

Rousseau and helped him. The Vicar wanted to be there, not to help the young man with

hopes of getting payment or some other form of public recognition. The Vicar only

wished to be good. Rousseau writes.

The ecclesiastic saw the danger and the resources. The difficulties did not
dishearten him. He took pleasure in his worit. He resolved to complete it and to
render to virtue the victim he had snatched from infamy. He made long-range
plans for the execution of his project. The beauty of the motive aninfiated his
courage and inspired him with means worthy of his zeal. Whatever the success,
he was sure of not wasting his time. One always succeeds when one only wishes
to do good (p. 263).

71
 ' As the relationship between the Vicar and Rousseau develops, Rousseau trusts

him more. He notices how the Vicar is interested in what Rousseau wants to discuss.

The Vicar never seems to want to convert Rousseau into his own ways of behaving or

believing. Rousseau believed it a "touching spectacle" (p. 263) that this Vicar seemed to

take pleasure in being with Rousseau and listening to him. In fact, throughout Book IV,

young Rousseau notices not only what the Vicar says, but also the manner in which he

speaks, the tone of his voice, and his humbleness in the sense that he does not worry
4

about his appearance or what others think of him. He notes that the Vicar risked much

in helping Rousseau to escape (as do all guides?). Rousseau also watched the Vicar in

his work with others, and these observations encouraged Rousseau. He writes.

What struck me the most was seeing in my worthy master's private life virtue
without hypocrisy, humanity without weakness, speech that was always straight
and simple, and conduct always in confomnity with this speech (p. 264).

Young Rousseau could not wait to leam "the principle on which he founded the

uniformity of so singular a life" (p. 265) and why the Vicar claimed he knew how to be

happy - quite a claim. The Vicar does not give Rousseau any one specific method to

copy. The Vicar does not say, "Well, I do yoga everyday," "I get 8 hours of sleep a night."

or "I eat a good breakfast every moming." Even /f he did these things, they have nothing

to do with his profession of faith, which speaks more to how one approaches his

awareness of living rather than specific observable practices he performs. The Vicar

says to Rousseau,

When you have received my whole profession of faith, when you know well the
state of my heart, you will know why I esteem myself happy and, if you think as I
do, what you have to do to be so (p 266).

The following sunny summer moming, with the Vicar and Rousseau sitting on a

hilltop from which they can see mountains, trees, vineyards, houses and fields, the Vicar

begins to speak to Rousseau. Here we think once again of any teacher and a student.

The teacher, or the one with influence over the other, does not speak to a student as if

72
the principal is listening, and therefore, he must say certain things agreeable to the

principal. He does not speak as if parents are listening and he must appease their

wishes. He speaks as if God, or the Good, or Nature, was listening, and in that regard,

he speaks to the goodness that appeals to the souls of all of humanity. Also, the phrase

"what you have to do to be sp" is worthy of note and I will return to it at the closing of this

section.

Moreover, upon reading the Vicar's profession, one notices that he speaks in a

tone similar to Socrates in Plato's dialogues, revealing once again how powerfully

Plato's thinking remained in Rousseau's consciousness. Before he delivers the content

of his talk, and even while the Vicar delivers infomnation about himself, he pauses to

remind Rousseau that he, Rousseau, must make up his own mind about the content.

While Rousseau, the author of Emile. respects the role that passions play in the life of

each individual he also respects the power of reasoning in every individual.

As mentioned eariier, this section highlights the fact that the work of teacher

educators is similar to that of the Vicar. Teacher educators do not get classrooms full of

students like Emile. The amour-propre of student teachers and pre-service teachers has

been promoted too eariy. They have often been subjected to the wills and whims of

others. I suspect that as Rousseau was writing Emile. he knew this about his potential

readers. He knows we are all cave-dwellers and Emile does not stand as the curriculum

guide for raising just and good humans. The Vicar sees the young Rousseau is troubled

and offers help. Rousseau knows that the serious readers of Emile have genuine

questions about the role of education in the life of an individual and offers the ideal of

Emile as one way to further understand one's own conception of the themes of

education. How can teacher educators act more in the spirit of the Vicar? It would be

admitting to the existence of the cave. Yet acting with the Vicar's spirit implies

acknowledging the place of faith and thought that exists outside the cave or as one
begins to turn from the wall. Emile serves as an Ideal to help readers ask. "In this

situation, how can I pay closer attention to the child - to Nature acting in this particular

child. Similarly, how can I avoid chaining them to the cave wall?" To answer such a

question, teachers need to have made clear to themselves that they also have

conceptions of key temns of teaching that do influence how they see and interpret the

world.

However, to summarize the actual content of the Vicar's thoughts in order to help

teachers and teacher educators would be similar to trying to summarize a recipe or

blueprint for goodness. Rousseau runs into the same problem when Emile will confront

him about God and about how to compare and judge, to seek the truth, and to do good.

Through his profession of faith, the Vicar embraces young Rousseau's soul into the

human story with his own life story, which I do feel justified in summarizing as the Vicar's

admission of the humility and the awe he has in the presence of all he cannot know.

Rousseau must go to a story about how someone compelled him. and further,

about how this person was compelled. There Is no blueprint, and the requisites listed in

the introduction seem to be only a part of the list of suggestions on how to "be" a good

teacher. To merely summarize the content of the Vicar's speech, and leave it at that,

would be to claim that reading philosophy, such as Emile. is of no service to teachers or

teacher educators; that a summary of key points would suffice in helping to make one

better. It might help one "do" the "righf thing in the short run. but not necessarily to "be"

better in the long run. Reading through the Vicar's words and joumey is awe-inspiring

and difficult. It seems that what the Vicar has found in his life, or what he observes daily,

is knowledge that there are extremes in human possibilities and limitations, not a reope

that one can use in any situation. To read his profession, one cannot simply adopt his

words because it would mean having to be the Vicar and go through the experience with

him. which is impossible. In trying to understand the Vicar or to summarize his thoughts
one niust examine his or her own position on God, the soul, or what moves people to be

good. There is no shortcut, but there are certain signposts.

This once again brings us back to the cave. According to the allegory, one can

never look directly at the sun. One can never really know the Good. A person can never

be absolutely sure that what he or she is doing is Good. Instead, one ponders the good

alone, via one's thought and conscience. The prisoner in Plato's allegory exits the cave

alone. The guide is not with him - and yet the guide, the teacher, has been

indispensable in getting the released prisoner to this point. Emile seems to be

representative of the fact that humans do need each other in order to become better. It

is a never-ending cycle of an appeal to the Good, but we can only do this with help from

another. We are continually presented with opportunities to give voice to the Good as it

appears in each situation. Faith in this possibility feeds the cycle.

After the Vicar delivers much of his profession of faith, he pauses. Rousseau

thinks to himself, "The good priest had spoken with vehemence. He was moved and so

was 1." He continues. "Nevertheless I saw a multitude of objections to make to him. I did

not make any of them, because they were less solid than disconcerting, and

persuasiveness was on his side (p. 294).

He then says to the Vicar,

The sentiments you have just expounded to me. I said to him, appear more novel
in what you admit you do not know than in what you say you believe...But in the
present condition of my faith I have to ascend rather than descend in order to
adopt your opinions, and I find it difficult to remain precisely at the point where
you are without being as wise as you. I want to take counsel with myself...I carry
your discourse with me in my heart. Imust meditate on it (p. 294).

In reading the Vicar's words, Rousseau's assessment seems true. The Vicar

does indeed know something. He knows what he does not know and is willing to admit

this. Living with this knowledge gives one tremendous freedom to focus on what really

matters. Living with this knowledge opens up a space for faith that the negative emotions

75
of amour-propre continually close off. Living with this l<nowledge, one discovers he

genuinely needs others. Living this way makes the Vicar happy. His life is simple. There

is no need to impress others with his opinions or beliefs as would a puppethandler. He

needs others simply to help them out of the love he has for himself, others and God.

Further, notice Rousseau's response to the Vicar. He appears puzzled by the

Vicar's profession. It is evident that the Vicar did not, out of some abuse of power that he

might have over^Rousseau, mesmerize him into converting to his own religion. What this

also is indicative of is that Rousseau felt comfortable enough with the Vicar to admit he

could not understand everything. It seems that because of their eariier lessons,

Rousseau learned how to speak his opinions and teamed to have more confidence in his

beliefs. The Vicar, as opposed to the clerics young Rousseau came upon eariy in his

story, is someone trustworthy.

There is a similarity in the conviction with which Rousseau writes and the

conviction of the Vicar he writes of in Book IV. As Rousseau was compelled to listen and

ponder as the Vicar speaks, one is also further compelled while reading Rousseau. He

claims that the conviction with which the Vicar speaks will make him think. Rousseau is

not swept up in a frenzy to join to Vicar, like one might do at a propagandizing rally.

Rousseau was not blinded by an emotional plea of the Vicar, but instead compelled to

consider his previous beliefs while trying to understand the Vicar's conviction. It seems

that one who speaks with "conviction" is appealing to the humanity in himself and in

others, not some current, personal end that needs finality. Rousseau, in writing Emile. is

doing just what the Vicar did in professing his faith.

There is something here that is reminiscent of the "chicken and egg" riddle. What

comes first, being compelled or not'dng someone who acts and speaks as if moving

from a different source than others? Up to now, it seems to confirm that we cannot

create Emile's even if we tried. It would be difficult to find govemors like Rousseau's. We

76
cannot take children as infants and raise them in semi-seclusion for the first 15 years of

their lives. It confirms that the stages in the cave do exist. We move from ignorance at

the wall, to the release, to the fire, and out of the cave. It further suggests that teachers,

as the adults in the classroom, have the responsibility to sincerely strive to be aware of

the impact their words and actions might have on students. Teachers must have faith

that acting in this light will certainly have a positive impact on their students. Again, the

notion of rewards comes up again. Teaching is so difficult and the demands are so
4

varied. The Vicar is a reminder that the students are a primary source of reward and

renewal. "Seeking the truth and doing good" is the reward in itself. This might seem a bit

Pollyannaish, but knowing that acting and speaking in a certain way has the potential to

move one into a path illuminated by the Good can be more rewarding than knowing all

the students passed their latest state-wide math test. Of course since we are living in the

cave, worrying about the state-wide math test is important, but the Vicar serves as a

source of inspiration that teachers can and should think beyond those conventions.

Young Rousseau says to the Vicar he wants to hear more, at which point the

Vicar responds to Rousseau.

Yes, my child, he said, embracing me, I shall finish telling you what I think. I do
not want to open my heart to you halfway. But the desire you give evidence of
was necessary to authorize my having no reserve with you. I have told you
nothing up to now which I did not believe could be useful to you and of which I
was not profoundly persuaded. The examination which remains to be made is
very different. I see in it only perplexity, mystery, and obscurity. I bring to it only
uncertainty and distrust. I dedde only in trembling, and I tell you my doubts
rather than my opinions. If your sentiments were more stable, I would hesitate to
expound mine to you. But in your present condition you will profit from thinking as
1 do. Moreover, attribute to my discourse only the authority of reason. I do not
know whether I am in error. It is difficult in discussion not to adopt an assertive
tone sometimes. But remember that all my assertions here are only reasons for
doubt. Seek the truth yourself. As for me, I promise you only good faith (p. 295).

In the few remaining pages, the Vicar finishes his profession of faith. He

continues to speak about God. The Vicar, in all this time he has spent with young

Rousseau, has been paying attention to the state of Rousseau's soul. He finds it is not

77
"stable" or hardened. The Vicar finds Rousseau's soul wants to learn about living life in

the light of the Good, or living in a compelled manner. Yet, the faith that the Vicar speaks

of is not just a set of rules to live by, because that would be chaining Rousseau to the

wall once again. They are suggestions that will help Rousseau to keep his conscience in

a condition where it wishes to be enlightened. When the Vicar tells him to "seek the truth

yourself," it is as if he were telling him that he must exit the cave alone through thought

and reason.
4

In the end, the Vicar tells Rousseau to go back home to his own religion since he

has found that all religions have the potential to serve as a source for goodness.

My young friend. Ihave just recited to you with my own mouth my profession of
faith such as God reads it in my heart. You are the first to whom I have told it.
You are perhaps the only one to whom I shall ever tell it. So long as there
remains some sound belief among men, one must not disturb peaceful souls or
alarm the faith of simple people with difficulties which they cannot resolve and
which upset them without enlightening them. But once everything is shaken, one
ought to preserve the trunk at the expense of the branches. Consciences which
are agitated, uncertain, almost extinguished, and in the condition which I have
seen yours need to be reinforced and awakened; and in order to put them back
on the foundation of eternal truths, it is necessary to complete the job of ripping
out the shaky pillars to which they think they are still attached (p. 310).

What this suggests is an invitation to read philosophical texts, not to make a

person jump from one belief to some other random belief. It suggests that the process

of moving from the cave wall begins in wonder, but that to woric in the light of the Good

requires one to move slowly. It requires working with others who can help them to think

about their existence and the perceptions and beliefs that influence their lives -that they

can make changes, that they can be different. Jumping from belief to belief is just as

dangerous as staying at the cave wall because those new beliefs are actually someone

else's - not borne of one's own sense of wonder.

78
 The Governor and Emile

When Rousseau turns his attention and writing again to the governor and Emile,

he realizes that Emile has been raised according to a religion - the religion of nature. It

is according to the rules of that religion that the governor will continue to raise Emile.

The governor decides, in a manner similar to that of the Vicar, that it is time to

speak his profession of faith to Emile. Also, Emile is now 20 years old. The governor has

kept him away from women long enough. How can he keep him from submitting to
4

passions for a bit longer as he teaches him about the moral source that will guide his

movement with others? He still needs to help Emile develop his ability to judge. The

governor will take Emile to a place, like the Vicar did, to where they can look out over all

of nature. Nature can be a witness to their conversation. The governor speaks, not of

'cold maxims' he will give to Emile, but of how he will speak to the boy. "I shall put in my

eyes, my accent, and my gestures the enthusiasm and the ardor that I want to inspire in

him." Here, the govemor says to Emile, "You are my property, my child, my work. It is

from your happiness that I expect my own. If you frustrate my hopes, you are robbing me

of twenty years of my life, and you are causing the unhappiness of my old age." No

longer does the govemor follow nature in Emile, but he tells Emile of his own needs. He

waits then for Emile's response.

Of course, Emile, recognizing that his govemor has been compelled decides that

he wants the govemor to continue to be his guide. I suspect that what happens is a

person ready to work in the light of the Good notices with much more ease those who

have been compelled. It is easy for Emile to admit that he does not know everything. He

need not put on false airs in order to impress anyone. He admits that he needs his

govemor. Only when Emile begins to need others does he understand that they need

him and love him as well. He will admit, I suspect, later in life that he will need other

guides along the way. The govemor and these other guides will help Emile to develop

79
the language that he needs to describe all that he is seeing. If a person, such as Emile

or any teacher, can find the language to better describe situations they are in, or to seek

the truth, certainly they are more apt to be good rather than simply what is right.

Summary

Emile confirms that Rousseau, in an abstract way, must have believed that we

are indeed cave dwellers. The fact that while "raising" Emile he had to deal with religion,

power struggles, competing wills, reason and emotion, highlights the stages of the cave.

It highlights the importance of the relationship between a teacher and a student and

serves to remind teachers of the responsibilities inherent in this relationship.

I began this chapter thinking that the chains in the cave are the conventions and

the traditions that we inherited or the chains of habit we assume as we grow. The first

assumption is difficult to state publicly because it can appear disrespectful of familial

traditions, duties, and obligations, or disrespectful of religious practices, symbols, and

observances. How could these practices and habits be both chains and enabling? If they

are both, what does that imply for teaching?

Initially, it seemed to me that for Rousseau, the chains were these practices.

After reading Emile. it seems the chains exist at a level deeper than these observable

practices and habits could account for. Instead, the chains seem to be our unawareness

of going through the motions. When a student innocently asks, "^hy must we do these

long division problems on paper when I have a calculator?" or "Why do I have to go to

school?," the teacher's response depends on the state of his or her soul at that time.

Does the teacher quickly interpret the question as criticism of the convention - taking the

question too personally? Alternatively, is the teacher one who is comfortable enough to

seize that moment as an opportunity to consider the state of the soul of that child?

Because the child is asking these questions does not necessarily mean he is critidzing
math or school. Instead, a teacher working in the light of the Good can recognize this as

a potential release from the cave wall. By attending to the questions, the teacher is

encouraging curiosity. The teacher is allowing a child to admit ignorance, and by doing

so, reinforces this ability in the child.

A comment that is usually raised discussions of these texts goes something like,

"Yes, but I'm only one teacher. Do I make that much of a difference?" Would not life be

easier if, in the name of living chain-free, we abandon all traditions and start from some
*
ground zero? Of course, doing so would require acute retraining or brainwashing, but my

question is /fit were possible, should we? Is this what Rousseau had in mind for the

readers of Emile? If he really believed following specific methods in Emile should be our

course of action, he would not have written Emile as he did. Rousseau does not deny

the cave, but experiments with how adults might raise children to have a "sentiment of

existence." I believe Rousseau was very aware that he was living in the cave of the

human condition wondering how to live a good and just life. Emile is not Rousseau's

treatise on how we could escape the cave. It is his own attempt to come to grips with

what it might mean to be good and just in a worid of "prisoners" who often take the

opposite course, and the role of education in such a life. We are reminded of the pivotal

and profound role a teacher plays in this process.

In Chapter V. I will return to Emile to further consider implications for teacher

education. The relationship between the Vicar and young Rousseau is very similar to

that of teacher educator and student. As for primary school classrooms, the relationship

the governor has with Emile is certainly thought-provoking and leaves me with further

questions about how to structure an actual classroom environment. Rousseau does not

want us to copy the methods he used in raising Emile, but does want us to think about

the spirit with which he wrote and the spirit which guided the govemor.

81
 - The action of pici<ing up and reading Emile can certainly signify that the reader

has made a turn from the cave wall and is curious about how to teach children better.

Emile stands as Rousseau's profession of faith and signifies his hope that some

released readers will take it as evidence of one other person who has been compelled to

work in the light of the Good. In that spirit, I move on to John Dewey. If Rousseau

prompts us to further seek the truth about such things as the purposes of education,

Dewey can serve as a source to use when solving actual classroom problems. Since we
4

do have laws about mandatory public education for all, it is a bit unrealistic to hope for

the one-on-one relationship that Emile has with the govemor. But is it possible to set up

a classroom environment with man-made objects and still be working in the light of the

Good?

82
 III. JOHN DEWEY'S DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION

"Whenever philosophy has been taken seriously, it has always been assumed that it signifiecS
achieving wisdom which would influence the conduct of life "
Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 324

'Charming child, absorbed in play,

we smile at your precarious efforts.
But, just between ourselves, which is more solid -
Our project or your house of cards?
Quoted in (Blake, Smeyers, Smith, & Standish, 1998, p. ii)

Introduction

In Chapter III, I examine aspects of John Dewey's Democracy and Education that

help me further develop a portrait of the power of philosophic texts in helping candidates

develop their philosophy of education. I will examine how Dewey addresses the themes

of being released and compelled, what it might mean to turn from the wall of shadows

and, crucially, what role a teacher plays in this learning and growth. In Democracy and

Education there is something compelling about the manner in which Dewey writes and in

the attention and seriousness he demands from his readers. He writes with a conviction

similar to Rousseau's and similar to the conviction with which the Vicar acts and speaks.

Dewey's focus, like that of Rousseau and Plato, is not on prescribing specific methods in

order to be good, but to explore a certain spirit^^ that one must live by if one hopes to do

good. Dewey does not promote specific methods of teaching, but instead examines

conceptions of knowledge and morals in order to understand the concepts of teaching

and education so that teaching does not become merely telling or training. If one

seriously attempts to interpret his writing, the worid of teaching can become much richer.

In this attempt lies the essence of my questions, for example, "How can Democracy and

Education help one to understand the role and responsibility of the teacher in helping

someone to turn from the wall and to work in the light of the Good?"

^ See the beginning of Chapter 7 of Democracy and Education.

83
 This is not a comparison between Rousseau and Dewey in terms of their

philosophical rigor. Nor do I try to prove that one is better than the other in their

interpretation of the metaphor of the cave metaphor. I am not examining how each of the

philosophers' ideas on education compare to those of Plato. Rather, I am examining

Democracy and Education to further an understanding that the cave metaphor

implicates. Comparisons between the two will arise, however, while clarifying Dewey's

writing in order to further develop an understanding of the cave allegory and its
4

usefulness for capturing what lies at the heart of teacher education. It would be difficult

not to compare Dewey and Rousseau because Dewey himself uses Rousseau's ideas in

clarifying his own.^ Further, as Ryan (1998) claims, Dewey wrote Democracy and

Education in direct response to the educational ideas in Rousseau's Emile and Plato's

Reoublic.^^

One similarity is that Dewey, like Rousseau, is writing this book first for himself -

to answer pressing questions that he has on the role education plays in the growth of an

individual and the significance of the relationship between an individual and society. In

many respects, the ideas or "life goods"^" which Dewey's moral source illuminates -

those that he examines and interprets - are similar to those of Rousseau. For example,

Dewey begins his book on a note very similar to Rousseau. Both begin by stating their

position on the necessity or role education plays in the proper growth of an individual. In

^ See Democracy and Education, pages 60,91,93-94,112-118

^ I am not recommending only ttiese philosophical texts for teacher education classrooms. Instead, what
will become clearer as the dissertation progresses is the nature of the texts that I am recommending. As it
happens, the texts I focus on are considered part of the 'canon* and as such are often thought of as having
nothing relevant for the multicultural nature of today's classrooms. I agree with Arcilla (199) who suggests
that "what we should ultimately respect in them are not their possessive claims to truth but the questions
they broach twyond themselves, the intertextual, uncentered field of questions they lead us into' (p. 153).
Any other philosophical texts or novels that can provoke the sort of questions Arcilla suggests or continually
remind their readers to respect the individuality and inherent dispositions of others, as do the texts I
examine, can be utilized in teacher education classrooms.
^ Taylor (1989) describes lifia goods as those goods in our life defined by our "actions, feelings, or modes of
life' (p. 93). Our moral source is the constitutive good around which our life goods are centered. Life goods
he mentions - or goods important in living a good life might t)e, for example, family, universal benevolence,
or universal justice.

84
other words, a child's proper intellectual and moral growth does not happen by an adult

allowing a child to follow his or her whims. Rousseau follows Nature to guide him, while

Dewey allows for the notion of growth to be the source for goodness, a concept

addressed later in this chapter. If we refer to Emile. it can appear at first glance that

Rousseau drags Emile away from society. Dewey, on the other hand, if he were raising

and teaching Emile, would immerse him in society. However, //Dewey were writing

Emile. I suspect he too would spend quite some time, as does Rousseau, in describing
4

the sort of society in which Emile's proper growth would take place. While Rousseau

does not speak as directly as does Dewey about the concurrent reciprocal relationship

between a child and the existing society, he does need people - those of the countryside

- to raise Emile property. Similariy, while Dewey claims that groups such as gangs can

constitute a society, they are not the sort of society which promote proper growth, and

therefore do not partake of the educative experiences and democratic life he builds

upon.^ Further, like Rousseau, Dewey believes that certain adults play a critical role in

the intellectual and moral development and growth of children. Both writers consider the

meaning of knowledge, and how teaming can take place in which the child is interested

and involved in problem solving within subject areas. Finally, they both place

tremendous faith and accountability in the teacher.

A quote from Democracv and Education applicable to this faith and accountability

placed in the teacher and is relevant to my questions is, "[hjence one of the weightiest

problems with which the philosophy of education has to cope is the method of keeping a

proper balance between the infomrial and the fomnal, the incidental and the intentional

modes of education" (p. 9). In one respect, this quote summarizes the problems that all

^See page 36 of Democracv and Education. Also see Dewey (1963) in wtiich he writes about gangsters and
burglars (p. 36) and Dewey (1954) in which he writes atwut a "robber bands' (p. 148). Both comprise
groups, but each does not interact with other groups nor set up the condita'ons for further growth of the
members, as Dewey believes they should.

85
teachers face. This brief statement serves as a reminder that teaching is not easy. A

second-grade teacher must decide if it is more beneficial for his children to drill once

again for upcoming state-wide tests or let them have free time to color, paint, and draw.

A fifth-grade teacher must decide if she should reprimand or keep silent when she sees

two children talking to each other while completing their language arts lesson. Both of

these teachers must also decide on materials to use and those that are irrelevant to the

subject matter. Some decisions are made quickly, while others require more time and
4

reflection.

Implicit is the fact that a teacher can never avoid, nor solve once and for all, this

problem of balance. It must be coped with continually. Inherent in this grander problem

are the daily predicaments that teachers face with each different student, class, grade

level, or subject matter. The cave allegory, and interpretations of it presented in the

previous chapters, help remind us that problems of balance are to be endured,

experienced, and welcomed and through this, the participants grow. Teachers must live

with predicaments if society is to continue to place faith in them and the role they play in

society. Balance is an ever-evolving problem that will take different shapes for every

teacher with each new student, classroom and generation. A teacher must admit that

this lack of certainty in the process of making someone better highlights the moral nature

of teaching.

The poem that heads this chapter speaks directly to Dewey's notion of balance.

While reading the verse, one might imagine a teacher saying these words smugly to a

student. Of course, the teacher certainly expects the child to respond with non-delayed

fervor. "Your project, of course, teacher." But really, where does teaching lie? In having

projects that suggest to the teacher methods to be followed, in allowing children to build

-whenever, wherever and however they choose - houses of cards, or do enactments of

teaching lie somewhere in-between these either/or options set by the poem.

86
 ' Whatever a teacher believes to be relevant or irrelevant, or notices or does not

notice In a classroom, is tied to his or her appreciation and understanding of the

compelling power of philosophy. In essence, this refers to what each teacher believes to

be good or right for the self, the children, and society, and further, it highlights how

aware he or she is of those beliefs. It is right that the public should have faith in

teachers, but it is also right that the public hold them accountable for how they perceive

and handle classroom situations and for the decisions they make. Therefore, another
4

aspect of the problem of balance that Oewey speaks of is for teacher educators to help

teachers, both new and experienced, to cope with keeping a proper balance between

the modes of education while shaping and rearing children. This means helping teachers

to understand and develop their philosophy of education. How might reading Dewey's

Democracv and Education help?

As with Rousseau, it is not feasible within one chapter to study and then

comment on all the concepts Dewey examines and refines In Democracv and Education.

Therefore, to further understand the allegory, I will direct the main inquiry to a concept

he writes about in Chapter 10 of his book entitled "Interest and Discipline". Here Dewey

presents the importance of an "object." Dewey uses words such as materials, apparatus,

equipment, etc., throughout the book and often interchangeably. However, he

seemingly uses "object" when speaking of the item that compels. While the distinction is

not clear-cut for Dewey, I reserve the term, "object" to refer to materials that can serve to

compel. Thus, in this chapter, I develop the idea that an "object" captures something so

crucial to a genuine education. Also, through a discussion of "objects", I can speak more

directly of the growth that teachers go through when thinking about them for their

classroom and from discussions with their students.

To restate some basic questions, how might Dewey's inform teachers as to how

they can turn cum'cular things into "objects" more often, or to bring fewer things and

87
more objects into the classroom? Is it only possible for a teacher to bring things into a

classroom, hoping that some will turn into "objects" for students? Further, how do

teachers notice that something has become an "object" for a student? In other words,

can a teacher deliberately bring "objects" into a classroom, or are things tumed into

"objects" when a teacher notices a student's interest and pursues it with them?

To reframe the main question in the context of the allegory, is it possible for

teachers to compel a student with what is brought into a classroom? Through examining

Dewey's notion of object, I hope to further my understanding of how teachers can help to

compel students and how Dewey's philosophy can help them to understand and develop

their own appreciation for this process. I believe Dewey speaks directly to a teacher's

work regarding classroom "objects" that will interest the students and will invite

conversation between teacher and student as well as between students. It speaks to the

development of students' continuous power or progressive attention towards objects in

the environment as well as the teacher's continual renewal.

Objects and Agents

When Dewey writes about an object, he speaks not merely of some material

object that one has in hand, but of an agent's inquiry, reflection, and motives regarding

the object. He considers the agent's attitudes of affection and concem for possible

outcomes in a given situation that the object provokes. An agent understands that he or

she has some control over events in the environment and of the variety of means and

ends present in that environment in which he or she is situated. An agent is someone

involved in his or her own problem forming and solving. In terms of the cave allegory

then, if an "object" can keep an agent moving in the light of the Good as opposed to

things, shadows or another person's force that keep a person at the cave wall acting,

from impulse or fear. Is it possible for teachers to help children become agents in their

88
own learning? Rousseau's govennor did it with Emile. The Vicar, more realistically, did it

with young Rousseau. How can teachers do this?

Dewey explored the concept of objects in other writings, for example. How We

Think (Dewey, 1910/1991). Here, he describes objects in terms of what thought confers

on them. He does not define "object" but instead characterizes it through different

examples. As such, he writes, "a stone is different to one who knows something of its

past history andjts future use from what it is to one who only feels it directly through his

senses" (p. 17). So, we might say that a chair is different for a person who sees it as

merely something to kick when angry than it is for one who sees it in temns of the

properties that make it something upon which to sit, thus giving an opportunity to rest or

converse with others. In imagining modem-day classroom activities, one student might

see a math book as something she likes to doodle in while another student might open it

and begin to form questions about the numbers and mathematical signs. What is

relevant here is the teacher's role in helping each student see the math book as

representative of the wonder of mathematics - as an embodiment of the history of

mathematics, the potential It has for solving or forming new problems and the

relationship it has for future possibilities? This simple math book might represent

repeated and dreaded. 50-minute math sessions to one student, but to another, it can be

an object that represents a wortd of important mathematical questions.

To further clarify my questions about objects. I turn to two other philosophers.

Gadamer and Murdoch, who emphasize core ideas similar to those of as Dewey, such

as growth and teaming in the company of others. Gadamer (1975) writes about our use

of language as we share ideas with others and how we become transfonmed through

such dialogue: "[sjomething is placed in the center, as the Greeks say, which the

partners in dialogue both share, and concerning which they can exchange ideas with

one another" (p. 378). In such a dialogue, one partner is not out to convince the other of

89
what he believes the object to be about. Instead, they are both willing to 'come under the

influence of the truth of the object" (p. 379). In this "communion," the partners develop a

new vocabulary, a new way of looking at things and as a result they grow.

The partners might be talking about, for example, a poem, a math problem, or a

scene from a movie.®' One asks the other, "Well, what did you think of the movie?" By

conversing about the truth of an object, Gadamer means something more than a mere, "I

liked the movie," to which the first responds, "Well, I didn't care for it too much," and then

go on, never to discuss it again. Instead, the movie, or a certain scene, becomes the

object when they both find that questions arise about the motivation of a character,

timeless themes such as happiness, beauty, love, death or life, or the meaning of a

scene's relevance to one's own life. The movie becomes an object in that it stopped

them both short and, further drew them to admit to their puzzlement and wonder. The

partners each watched the same movie, read the same poem, or worked on the same

math problem, but each saw from a different perspective. Therefore, they step away

from the movie, the poem or the math problem with different thoughts and questions that

need tending to. Yet, it is not that the object contains some prior "truth" that must be

found. Instead, the truth in the object is present because the two interlocutors approach

it with genuine questions, to which they do not yet know the answers. "[Elvery true

question requires this openness" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 363). It seems possible then that

anything has the potential to be an object, but it depends on those present - their

disposition or willingness to admit that some object provoked questions and a

willingness to move from their initial perceptions. The truth is in their actions and words

as they come together to grow within a certain situation.^^

^ Sometimes the object of discussion is deciding what the obj^ for further discussion will be.
See the section on The Hermeneut'c Priority of the Question" (pp. 362-379) in Truth and Method. Here
Gadamer describes fully the necessary dispositions of those who are in a dialogue, and the requirements for
the questions asked in a dialogue.

90
 Murdoch (1970/1991) examines how our attention to an object helps us to grow.

She writes, "We learn through attending to contexts, vocabulary develops through close

attention to objects, and we can only understand others if we can to some extent share

their contexts" (p. 36). In trying to describe the properties or meaning of an object, in

trying to find words to describe how something looks and feels or what it might mean, we

develop shared language. She claims, "uses of words by persons grouped round a

common object is a central and vital human activity" (p. 36).

A

Dewey might call Gadamer's and Murdoch's participants active agents in their

own growth. Each is a participant out of his or her free will and a need to leam and grow.

It is relatively easy to Imagine two adults having a conversation about a topic, subject or

object in which they both are interested. However, it is a bit more difficult to imagine

such a conversation happening in a classroom between a teacher and a primary school

student or between two primary school children. Is it not feigned interest or curiosity if

the teacher already knows the answer to the student's question? Can a teacher, certified

in math for example, enter into such a conversation with a student about the plus or

minus sign? The same would hold for a science teacher with a student asking why

leaves tum color in the fall. How might Dewey help a teacher tum that plus or minus sign

or a leaf from a tree, into an obiect through which both teacher and student can develop

a new vocabulary and develop new ways of looking? Rousseau's Vicar, in trying to

restore amour-propre for young Rousseau, has helped me to let go of the ideal that

every question a teacher asks a student needs to be genuine, in the sense of being a

question that one does not know the answer. Nonetheless, the questions asked should,

in some way, be benefidal to the growth of both the teacher and the student.

If we reconsider Rousseau's Emile. the objects that the governor introduces to

Emile are closer to a natural state than, for example, a math book. It seems safe to say

that Emile certainly becomes an agent in his own learning. Of course, his development

91
into an agent would not have been possible without the governor. With the governor's

help, Emile became aware of his own motives and questions as he manipulated objects

in his environment. However, as stated in Chapter II, teachers do not have the luxury of

teaching only one child, let alone bringing them out into a natural environment for

extended periods of time.

In the previous chapter on Rousseau, it would not have been appropriate to

speak, for example, of a teacher showing a movie in class. In terms of the cave, a movie
4

might be considered an artifact held up by powerful puppethandlers trying to get others

to see their view of somethir^. Would Rousseau, the author of Emile. allow Emile to

watch movies? I highly doubt it - at least not until Emile has a more developed

"sentiment of existence." Would Rousseau, the person, if he were here today, allow

students to see movies in a classroom? I suspect he would not make an immediate or

blanket objection. Rousseau's philosophy, as depicted in Emile. prompts us to ask,

"What purpose am I serving in showing these children a movie?" "Is there a more natural

object than a movie to provoke questions and discussion?" Dewey's philosophy, as

presented in Democracy and Education, seems to help teachers decide which film to

choose so it might serve as a meaningful object of discussion and not a thing that merely

provokes "blind and capricious impulses" [i.e., keeping students chained to the wall] (p.

140).

Teachers do have the responsibility of choosing important materials for

classroom use. The teacher needs to see students as thinking agents, capable of

seeking the truth (with the help of the teacher). Still, how can there be a genuine

dialogue, as Gadamer and Murdoch suggest if the dialogue is between teacher and

student? It appears to be the case that the teacher, that person with more subject matter

knowledge, must set up the environment around certain objects so that the students can

dialogue (with the teacher's help) about it. However, what about the teacher's growth
that is supposed to come from classroom predicaments and the dialogue between

students? Is the potential for growth in each particular classroom assumed to be only for

the students, while the teacher's growth is limited to seminars and in-service days? On

the other hand, one might argue that the question a student asks is, in and of itself, a

learning object for the teacher because it enlightens him or her to areas where more

knowledge may be required in the lesson plan. Moreover, a student's questions reveals

who that student is, or is becoming - and this for Rousseau and Dewey, constitutes an
4

"objecT of pemianent, compelling interest to the teacher. And certainly this points to the

responsibility teacher education programs have in helping student teachers understand

their role in this development.

The following example serves to refine my understanding of "object." Consider a

third-grade science classroom in which the upcoming three-week unit is on plants.

Among other objectives listed in the school's long-range plans and in the curriculum

guide, the children will learn the basic properties of photosynthesis, and the basic parts

of a plant. Just before the unit begins, the teacher plans to bring into the classroom a

variety of small houseplants. She might also ask the children to draw a picture of their

favorite plant or flower to tack on a bulletin board during the three-week unit. She might

ask the librarian to put on hold some books about plants so the children can use them

during their free reading time. She might also arrange for a guest speaker from the local

garden center to come speak to the children about topics such as why certain plants

grow best in their region of the United States.

Most teacher educators have seen this sort of activity and planning with mentor

teachers and with their student teachers. These plans certainly are not excessive, but

we still do not know why a teacher is arranging for these activities. Is it enough that a

teacher brings plants into the room, yet never allows the students near them or never

finds the time to answer questions that students might have about them? If the teacher

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brought them in to spark student interest, it seems too vague to simply bring plants into

the classroom but allow no time for discussion. In contrast, suppose the teacher allows

the students to go to the plants, touch them and water them whenever Vt\ey choose. She

is allowing them near the plants, but are they learning anything other than that they can

get leave their desks whenever they desire? Perhaps the teacher arranged for all these

materials in hopes of appeasing the principal or colleagues. Some teachers and student

teachers believe that the more materials they can bring in, the more impressive it will be
«
to the principal, mentor, and the university supervisor. Yet. these third-grade children

might never even look at the-books about plants or they might roll their eyes and flop

their heads on their desks as the guest speaker lectures.

Then, there are classrooms, even with limited resources and materials, where an

observer would find the children sharing library books during free time and children who

are eager to write new vocabulary words onto their plant drawings. Somehow, the

teachers in those classrooms helped the students to grasp the meaning of the

importance of plants. The materials in these classroom environments seem to have

meaning and relevance to the students and teachers because they became objects.

Growth and Objects

A quick scan through Democracy and Education will show that Dewey offers no

list of "Dewey-approved objects" from which teachers must pick. He respects the work of

teachers too much to shortchange them in this manner. Instead, leaming about objects

must take place in a roundabout manner. The questions I have raised revolve around a

number of themes that Dewey addresses. These include, for example, teachers' beliefs

about children, their belief in the importance of the subject matter, how one conceives of

knowledge, and what is good for sodety. They allude to someone's philosophy of

education. They constitute a section of the web of questions that occur as a function of

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being humans who are continual problem solvers. What is important to know, how to go

about teaching, or the potential one sees in children are all based on some conceptions

of good. As with Rousseau's work, there Is a thoughtful and deep network of

assumptions and ideas in Dewey's Democracy and Education that can help answer

these sorts of questions, point to their moral source, and illustrate how their moral

source is a guide.

In considering Dewey's writing about "objects", it is necessary to understand his

underlying assumptions. Three tenms are noticeably important - education, experience,

and democracy. Bremer (1992) writes that these terms "^orm a complete and all-

encompassing circle. No matter which term we begin with, we are led inexorably on to

the other two" (p. 544). Together these three are necessary components for growth,

which, as I claimed eariier, is his moral source. Ganison (1997) writes, "Growth, for

Dewey, is the all-inclusive ideal, the greatest good" (p. 29). Egan (1992) comments,

"Dewey transformed some of Rousseau's central ideas into a form appropriate for an

industrializing, urbanizing, democratic state. The dynamic of the educational process for

Dewey is what he calls 'growth,' a version of Rousseau's intemal, natural development"

(p. 649). Attention to and love for growth, as I interpret Dewey, is what can lead people

to be good. In this case, how can a teacher foster growth of students as well as self-

growth?

Educative Experiences

In the first six chapters of Democracy and Education. Dewey writes about the

basics of what he believes constitutes a good education. In the first chapter, Dewey

makes some assumptions about the human condition. Similar to Rousseau, he begins

his writing by stating that living things grow and maintain by renewal in their

environment. He then differentiates between living and inanimate things and uses a

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stone to illustrate the difference. A stone certainly exists within an environment, as do

living things. However, when kicked, depending on its properties and the force of the

kick, the stone will either resist the kick or shatter into smaller bits. The stone - an

inanimate object - cannot react on its own accord. On the other hand, a person or living

thing, when struck, "...tries to turn the energies that act upon it into means of its own

further existence. If it cannot do so, it does not just split into smaller pieces...but loses its

identity as a living thing" (p. 1). As a living thing "endures," it uses the light, air, moisture,
4

and soil within its environment, and it has the potential to grow.

To consider the cave-allegory, Dewey might say that those at the cave wall are

on their way to losing their identity as living things as contrasted with being merely

existing things. Or, perhaps their identity is not yet lost. They still might possess the

innocence or curiosity I wrote about in Chapter II. However, at the cave wall there is

merely physical growth and observable, customary, role-driven behaviors. But for

Dewey, human beings, especially the young, need education and specific experiences if

they are genuinely to grow - turn from the wall and work in the light of the Good.

Life, as Dewey intends in Democracv and Education, denotes "the whole range

of experience, individual and racial" (p. 3). It refers to more than physical adaptation to

the environment, as with animals other than humans. It covers "customs, institutions,

beliefs, victories and defeats, recreations and occupations" (p. 3). He asserts that

"[e]very one of the constituent elements of a social group, in a modem city as in a

savage tribe, is bom immature, helpless, without language, beliefs, ideas, or social

standards" (p. 2). If left alone, without the benefits of the knowledge and skills of the

group, the child will not develop fully nor will the "sodal fabric" of the group (p. 3). The

education Dewey speaks of is dependent on a certain society that leaves room for

teachers to shape the experiences individuals will have, but it must begin within one's

society.

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 Of course, once again, Rousseau comes to mind. IHe and Dewey might very well

come to an impasse over society's role in educating the young. One wants to ask

Rousseau if it really is the case that Nature would not want the governor to work with

society. Yet. it is understandable once we read Emile how Rousseau believed Nature

would not approve of behavior based on unexamined layers of convention. His

experiment forced him to take Emile to a place where people are more in touch with true

purposes for living, where the factors in decision-making are not as muddled. He thought

carefully and publicly about what it might mean if one did remove a child from

convention. Indeed, something did compel him to truly exhaust his imagination and

reason on certain points. It would be easy at this point to say that in creating this "ideal,"

Rousseau is creating a dualism that can only serve to confuse our present moments

even more. Yet, what is becoming clearer are the distinct purposes for reading each

book. By this "ideal," Emile compels us to consider our purposes in doing anything.

Dewey does not create an ideal - a telos toward which one must grow. His questions

are located within humanity. One must dig deep to see that Rousseau does not

absolutely object to all of society just as one must dig deep to understand that Dewey

does not absolutely embrace all aspects of society.

Nevertheless, for Dewey, survival and proper growth is contingent on reciprocal

relationships within societies. Individuals and society each need the other if there is to be

survival and proper growth. "Education, in its broadest sense, is the means of this social

continuity of life" (p. 2). This renewal happens through the experiences that humans

have and the communication that occurs with others. This communication has the

potential to modify "the disposition of both parties who partake in if (p. 9) and is a

concept I return to at the end of this chapter. Through education, humans must be

rendered cognizant of and leam to be actively interested in the aims and habits of the

social group of which they are a part. Through formal education, the younger members

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of the group should be enabled to share in the common life. The older members -

teachers, for example - need to consider whether they are "forming the powers which will

secure this ability" (p. 7) of sharing in this common life.

When a person is in control of or can freely interact with objects in the

environment - instead of having to look at things placed there by others in control

(puppethandlers, for example) - that person has the potential to grow. According to

Dewey, education is not preparation for some unknown distant future predetenmined by
4

a government, school or teacher. Like Rousseau, Dewey believes adults should not train

children for a specific job. Nor is education a means by which teachers should inculcate

children to passively accept the status quo. This is not what he means by 'common life.'

For Dewey, it is through a formal education that a complex society can transmit its

resources and achievements, but the educative experiences he speaks of are more than

memorizing facts about these resources and achievements. The problem then remains

as to what end education can be directed. If he suggests no telos, then what is the aim

of growth? What sort of society, common life or community is the best one in which

these educative experiences can take place? What are the powers a teacher should

focus on?

Democracy

For Dewey, truly educative experiences can only take place in a democracy - a

word that Dewey spends much time characterizing, not defining. It is a clever tactic on

Dewey's part because to define democracy would mean he is giving us some static ideal

that we must yeam for but one that we can never reach. If democracy were some

attainable list of objectives, what would Dewey suggest we do after we have attained

those objectives? Moreover, what does one call that lifestyle of striving to attain the

Utopia of a defined democracy? So, if he dares define it, he leaves the door open for

98
those with a certain power to believe they are better at interpreting it and then decide to

take on a dictatorial role over others.

What Dewey does instead is characterize this democratic way of life. He tries to

explain what it is not, and then sets the parameters within which possibilities for its

manifestations can take shape and flourish. Again, he does not set it up as an ideal

toward which we must strive. I do not believe Dewey thinks we are so perfect or

infallible. He does not say that we should strive to live in a worid in which gangs or

corrupt leaders should not or will not exist. Those will occur as a function of our being

fallible humans. By living a democratic life, strange as this may sound, he means we

should be striving to live, in a very real sense, a democratic life. It is a dynamic way of

life that asks from us to ask ourselves if we are living in a society in which interests are

numerous and varied, and in which we are free to associate with other groups. It

requires awareness similar to Emile's "sentiment of existence." What democracy

actually is - what it looks like and feels like - is different for every individual in every

different circumstance. It represents an infinite set of experiences to which humans can

aspire to take part. It is not infinite in that "anything goes" and that morality is up for

grabs in the name of democracy. That sort of behavior would signify a different moral

source than Dewey's notion of growth. The infiniteness represents any possible outcome

for every individual, but the individuals who strive to live in this manner are bound

together in the spirit of the aspiration his democracy allows for. He writes of a very

disciplined freedom, bounded by democratic educative experiences of the past, present

and future, along with disciplined inquiry. Robertson (1992) notes, "[F]or Dewey.

freedom was the power to take part in a democratic community in which one could

participate with others in determining the conditions of life" (p. 365).

Dewey is very specific when speaking of the common interest that binds the

people of a society together. For example, in any kind of oppressive sodety, one cannot

99
say there is a common bond between the njlers and those ruled. In such cases, fear of

those in power reduces the ruled to people who cannot operate on their own. Their lives

become simply one of avoiding pain and seeking pleasure. Like those prisoners at the

cave wall, this mundane life leaves each with untapped capacities. There is merely

physical adaptation to the environment. The prisoners are not free to interact with and

manipulate the objects in their environment in the company of others with those same

freedoms. Ther^ is physical growth, but not moral and intellectual growth.

Growth, Society and Knowledge

As a moral source, growth does not provide an inaccessible ideal or suggest a

life based on contemplation of and in accordance with God's law, Nature or some divine

cosmic order as the way to a good life. Further, by growth Dewey is not refening simply

to physical growth or adaptation to an environment like an animal. Instead, he is

referring to an individual's proper physical, moral and intellectual growth. Proper growth

is a function of and a requirement for social beings. Where Rousseau relies on Nature to

guide the governor, Dewey relies on growth to guide teachers. For Dewey, it is the

responsibility of schools to provide educative experiences within a democratic

environment if they hope to "influence the mental and moral dispositions of their

members." He "believed that schools, operating with the right goals and vision, could

offer a setting in which teaming would be possible for every child" (Karget-Bone, 1997, p.

54)

It is not clear if Rousseau would categorically object to all classrooms if he were

to appear today, since he might consider them too culturally laden. To deeply ponder

what Nature is asking of humans, he had to use a single child placed in the countryside

as a way to investigate and study what a proper education can mean. The scenario was

necessary for the questions he had. On the other hand, in order to understand what

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growth is demanding of humans, Dewey must situate his investigation in temporal and

very real situations. In not wanting to write of an ideal, Dewey keeps focused on what is

currently happening. It therefore becomes right for him to allow teachers to use books, to

be in the classroom, and to do all the pedagogical things so familiar to us. In the name of

goodness through growth, Dewey wants both teachers and students to take advantage

of organized knowledge that has developed through the ages. In Emile. Rousseau

represents bodies of knowledge and subject matter materials as being too tainted by

individual interpretations. He would rather Emile feel the need to learn about such

subjects as language arts, astronomy, and geography rather than be obliged to. Yet,

Rousseau does not let Emile run from desire to desire. The govemor does not dismiss

bodies of knowledge; otherwise, how would he himself have learned about geometry,

astronomy, science, math and so on? Rousseau hopes that we will push away

superfluous materials or those too influenced by curent convention. He wants the

govemor and his readers to truly ponder such questions as, 1/Vhy read? What is its true

purpose? What is the true or natural intended purpose of writing or doing mathematics?"

Dewey's questions for his readers seem to focus on, "Of the available materials,

what is best to read?" or "What materials best represent current conceptions of scientific

or mathematical properties? What materials represent individuals driven by disciplined

curiosity? How might the prospect of growth suggest I use these materials?" These

questions focus on his. attempt to help an individual and society grow together.

Dewey did not write Democracy and Education to help us reach some Utopia, but

rather to help each individual push away stagnant beliefs held in the false conception of

the word "knowledge". The questions represent an attempt to keep knowledge moving.

For Dewey, in a certain sense, any knowledge we claim to have represents a veri}-like

entity. Bremer (1992) tries to capture the problem Dewey had with language by noting,

"But Dewey saw that processes - not things - were what human life was about, and so.

101
for him, the focus of the sentence should be a verb, the name of an action, an activity or

process" (p. 539).

Dewey considers knowledge more than a stagnant collection of facts. No

knowledge or fact is forever off limits to questioning. Knowledge is amenable to its own

scrutiny and dissection. Knowledge represents action on the part of those people in the

past whose questions, attention, discipline and dispositions drove them to their research.

Dewey's interpretation of the word knowledge represents a person's acceptance and

participation of that very history of action. If one pays attention to growth, it is assumed

that his knowledge about the concepts within and about subject matter wilt change. Love

of growth keeps one aware of the knowledge and opinions brought to new situations,

and it is a love that teachers must foster.

Plants as an Example - Revisited

As I have suggested, Dewey makes a helpful distinction between "objects" and

things. He cannot offer a convenient checklist of items that he considers objects from

which a teacher must choose, or he would be violating his own beliefs about teacher

responsibility and evolving subject matter knowledge. It is becoming clearer that what

determines the difference is how teachers conceive the subject matter and the materials

they wish to use. Democracy and Education provokes questions that can enable

teachers to make better judgments about various materials by fordng them to consider

their educational philosophy. To further understand Dewey and see how his thoughts

illuminate, or take their point of departure from the word compel and other stages of the

allegory, metaphorically speaking, let us tum once again to the plant example.

The appropriateness of my utilizing a concrete classroom example is necessary

to consider. By presenting an example about a teacher using long-range lesson plans

and a cum'culum guide, one might assume that Dewey believed teachers must adhere to

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the school's or district's plans and suggestions. That is not entirely the case. As stated

earlier, Dewey accepts classrooms as places where the potential for formal education

lies. Growth demands we honor accomplishments of those who have come before.

Critics could argue that Dewey would object to pre-packaged units or subject matter

being divided up neatly between grade levels; therefore my analysis would become

debatable. They could ask, "How could a classroom be 'Deweyan' if the teacher is using

the school's lonf range plans?" or "Would Dewey approve of pre-planned cum'culum

units on plants based on ages and grade level?" I maintain that these objections come in

part from misconceptions of what a 'progressive' or 'Deweyan' classroom might look like.

It is common for many to think that Dewey advocates letting children do as they please,

and the teacher must work within the parameters set by the children's needs. Some of

what I have already written in this chapter begins to refute those misconceptions.^

Secondly, Dewey writes that schools "cannot immediately escape from the ideas

set by prior social conditions" (p. 136). His tripartite notion of growth through democracy,

education, and experience leaves a place for each person to begin acting more

responsibly no matter what existing situation he or she is in. Therefore, it is appropriate

to continue with this concrete example. Further, Dewey would vehemently object to a

teacher trying to make his or her classroom 'Deweyan.' There is no such thing. This

misconception, then, serves as an ideal for those who misinterpret his wori(. He would

say that the classroom "simply" should be one in which growth can take place and each

individual teacher is free to fashion the environment into one in which the children "...act,

and hence think and feel" (p. ).

Perceptions and thoughts about common subject matter serve to bind the

students during the school day. A teacher's responsibility is to introduce materials on an

^ Dewey's Exnerienca and Education [1938/1963 #211] is dedicated to explaining that he is not a
progressive in that loose sense of the tenn.

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organized body of l<nowledge, for example, plants. The teacher's and the school's

responsibility is to assess whether the curriculum builds from simple to more complex,

does not hold that only one viewpoint Is correct, and finally be rich enough to inspire

questions from students. Introducing plans and guidelines that have evolved in the

school and district over time is certainly acceptable. This does not imply one is

accepting and perpetuating the status quo. It simply means an experienced teacher is

beginning a science unit. However, as an active agent in his or her own development,

and that of the students, a teacher must be aware of the material's appropriateness for

each particular group and that it represents the subject matter.

Dewey writes that society, as a whole,^ is much too complex for any student to

grasp as a totality. Thus, the cum'culum must first be simplified and then progressively

build on the "factors first acquired" (p. 20). Further, it is not the school's responsibility to

"transmit the whole of the existing society," because every society becomes,

"encumbered with what is trivial, with dead wood from the past, and with what is

positively perverse" (p. 20). This sounds very much like Rousseau. Teachers and

administrators must constantly know the materials and information they use as

resources. Third, the school's job is to provide a broad environment in which the

students can temporarily escape from any limitations that their home life might foster.

Most teachers notice those students who come from abusive households, dangerous

neighborhoods, situatipns in which there is little academic support and so on. This

certainly does not mean that parents in these situations do not care for their children, but

the school environment should provide the child with a place in which strengths and

dispositions can be developed. The intermingling of students firom different and smaller

sodeties provides the broad and rich environment in a classroom. What serves to bind

^ As opposed to smaller sodeties which can t)e made up of households, neighborhoods, church groups,
business groups or dubs. See page 21 of Democracy and Education.

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them together during the school day is the common subject matter, and the subgroup of

society of which they are a part.

The teacher should think of the classroom environment as more than the

immediate surroundings. As Dewey notes, "The things with which a man varies are his

genuine environment" (p. 11). Things in an environment have the potential to "promote

or hinder, stimulate or inhibit, the characteristic activities of a living being" (p. 11). The

teacher's responsibility is to bring in or arrange for materials that will shape the

environment into one in which the students can share experiences.^

Can a teacher's cum'culum and materials always meet these criteria? They must

proceed from the simple to the complex and be built on the student's existing

knowledge. They must represent the best available information, and the classroom must

be a rich environment. A teacher cannot possibly meet these criteria before stepping into

a classroom with some cum'culum or material in mind. Dewey would expect that level of

perfection from any school or teacher. Situations are always evolving. A teacher cannot

be sure, before teaching a lesson, that certain objects or curricula meet these

requirements. This predicament brings us back to questions of balance and forces us to

continue reading Dewey for further questions about objects. Again, he provides a set of

questions that can go into the reflection before, during and after a lesson. A school

lesson must begin at some point, with planning and preparation in mind on the part of

the teacher. The subs^uent lessons and objectives evolve as the teacher learns more

about his or her students' abilities, capabilities and interests.

Growth

^ I need to reiterate here that during my initial research, I noticed the word "object* in Dewey's writing. At
the same time, I came across Murdoch's and Gadamer's use of the word and all three seemed to be
speaking of a similar theme — that communication can take place around some meaningful object and that
an object emerges via interactnn with others. In Dewey's case, I extended the use of the word beyond his
original intent in order to exptore the relevance for teacher education.

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 The materials a teacher decides to bring into the classroom is important because

they can serve as a common object. Part of a teacher's responsibility is to try and tum

plants, pictures, or books, for example, into objects. Then the teacher should notice if

these things or objects appeal to a student's "present needs and capacities" (p. 183).

What is the direction that growth should take? The guidance a teacher offers refers to

assisting each student's natural capacities. However, this does not mean the assistance

should take the [orm of overt control over a student's actions in order to meet some

"public or common ends" (p. 23). Instead, the teacher must consider the direction of this

guidance to mean that "the active tendencies of those directed are led in a certain

continuous course, instead of dispersing aimlessly" (p. 23).

Dewey, in a different manner, considers the desiring part of the soul. Though he

does not mention this tri-partite notion in Democracv and Education, he must come to

terms with it. This suggests that, indeed, people do have desires, but not all of them

should be acted upon. Teachers should help children develop this discipline and decide

whether a child is asking a question about the plants just to stall for time before the lunch

bell rings or if the questions imply the beginning of another horizon of questions.

Dewey, unfortunately, finds that too much of education relies on the physical

results of activities.^ Weil (1951) speaks of something very similar as she works at

unpacking the notion of attention.^

Most often attention is confused with a kind of muscular effort. If one says to
one's pupils: 'Now you must pay attention,' one sees them contracting their
brows, holding their breath, stiffening their muscles. If after two minutes they are
asked what they have been paying attention to, they cannot reply, they have
been concentrating on nothing. They have not been paying attention. They have
been contracting their muscles" (p. 109-110).

^ See Democracy and Education, pages 39<40. Disdpline and control should develop as a result of the
materials used.
^ I must thank Susan McOonough for introduang me to this article and for her continuing interest in the
notion of*attention.*

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Adults often mistake physical control for guidance which makes it difficult for a teacher to

focus his or her attention on students' "present needs and capabilities." For example, a

teacher can order her students to memorize the parts of a plant, check out one book

from the library on plants, and name two of the five different plants sitting in the

classroom. Depending on how the children perform, the teacher might then assign letter

grades.

This perfprmance grade, though, is based simply on the physical aspects of the

subject matter, or an observable muscular effort put forth on the child's part. Some

students might demonstrate that they have memorized some new words and can check

out a library book. Moreover, if many students do well on these evaluative measures, a

teacher might assume that the materials and cum'culum used were good. Possibly,

however, a student who performed well might be speechless or simply repeat one or two

memorized phrases if asked the next day to put into his or her own words what was

learned about plants. In contrast, a student who perfooned poorly on the evaluative

measures might appear at the outset to have no interest in science or in plants. Yet, if

asked to speak about plants she might be excited to share with the class the types of

vegetables in her home garden or be able to summarize the library book she checked

out. This student might want to share the results of an experiment done at home with

parents in which they varied the amount of light and water each plant received. Based

on the test scoress, some of the students would receive an A for this unit while the

second student might get a C. However, Dewey would probably say that for the second

student, the materials had more meaning, but the teacher was unable to work with that

student's natural interests in the plants. I do not think Dewey would say that the teacher

was totally wrong in using her teacher's guide for this unit, but in a sense, nothing really

became a "shared object." The teacher was much too interested in the "common ends"

that the guidelines provided for her. She misinterpreted growth.

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 Dewey might also say that the "moral results" were not taken into account (p. 26).

Put another way, this teacher's methods and assumptions ignore Dewey's assumption

that humans are social beings; teachers must keep this in mind when considering

growth. Certainly, since individual dispositions and capacities vary from one student to

the next, it makes sense to say it would be difficult for a teacher to keep all students

interested at every turn. However, Dewey believes that overall, individuals need to be a

part of the comrpunity and be involved in "conjoint and cooperative doings" (p. 24).

Consider the point raised eariier, where the teacher allowed students to look at or

water the plants whenever they wanted. One might assume that the students just want

to be social by meeting with their friends in the back of the room and are following a

genuine human impulse. This is not what Dewey means. The teacher, as the

responsible adult, is in charge of guidance, direction, and control of the "natural

capacities of the individuals" in the classroom (p. 23). A child running up to the plants

represents a physical, not a "mental act." In this situation, the plant has no meaning for

the student. The student is not learning about the colors, shapes, sizes, smell or other

impressions these plants can convey. He is not teaming about potential uses the plant

might have. Running up to the plant does not take into account the direction of the

child's growth and the direction or relevance of subsequent activities. There are no

"conjoint and cooperative doings."

According to Dewey, it is not possible for any one person to plant ideas into the

mind of another person. Though facts and "ready-made 'ideas'" can be passed on,

genuine ideas cannot (pp. 159, 160). Here he refers to "suggestions, inferences,

conjectured meanings, suppositions and. tentative explanations" (p. 158). Formulating

ideas requires thinking. While this does not make memorization obsolete, true thinking

requires hands-on experience with and communication with others about familiar

materials. To have an idea means that there must be an object about which a student

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can form "perceived meanings and connections" (p. 160). Apparently, teachers must

bring materials and apparatus into the classroom in order for communication to begin.

Dewey writes that there is no such thing as one person having direct influence

over another person except, of course, having influence over another's physical action.

Such influence is only through superior force or power (p. 19), or it is a case of one will

forcing another's will. What Dewey means by moral and intellectual influence constitutes

an indirect procqss. Once again, this sounds very much like Rousseau. The teacher

needs to use the objects in such a way that the students feel there are genuine problems

to be solved, questions to be asked, and original ideas to be had. This parallels what

Gadamer (1975) means when refem'ng to a willingness to come under the influence of

the truth of an object. It is not that the "Truth" is in the object and that we grow in looking

for this Truth. Instead, it simply refers to truth - moving from one stage of awareness

and knowledge to a richer, broader one, in the spirit that the truth of growth resides in

this direction, rather than in the direction of narrowing or in impoverishing human

horizons.

Dewey notes that children ask questions outside of school, but that inside school

there is "the conspicuous absence of display of curiosity about the subject matter of

school lessons" (p. 155). This suggests that something is lacking in the school

environment. It would seem, unfortunately, that from a young age children leam that

their questions are secondary to the educational or social aims set by parents and

teachers. However, Dewey writes that the ideal aim of education "is to enable

individuals to continue their education ~ or that the object and reward of leaming is

continued capacity for growth" (p. 100). I do not think that Dewey is suggesting we

abandon objective or measurable aims. Instead.

[ajny aim is of value so far as it assists observation, choice, and planning in

carrying on activity from moment to moment and hour to hour; if it gets in the way

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 of the individual's own common sense (as it will surely do if imposed from without
or accepted on authority) it does harm (p. 107).

For Dewey, educational aims set by teachers or the public should not serve as

objectives that must be ultimately met, but instead should serve as "suggestions to

educators as to how to observe, how to look ahead, and how to choose in liberating and

directing the energies of the concrete situations in which they find themselves" (p. 107).

Dewey suggests that when starting with a new subject matter, teachers should

give the children something to do - not something to leam or memorize. There is a call

here for objects in the classroom. As a way to build toward their emergence, teachers

can bring things into the classroom with which the students are familiar - things about

which they might already have opinions, questions, familiarity and knowledge. Thus, the

communication between teacher and student and between the students tums these

things into objects of deeper, more compelling discussion. Here, it would seem logical to

let the children thumb through books about trees or plants and draw pictures of their

favorite plants, or touch the leaves and the soil. A certain amount of instinct is involved in

this initial stage of curiosity; this is where children begin to form their own questions,

problems and ideas. These observations speak to Dewey's idea that "[tlhe most

important attitude that can be formed is that of the desire to go on learning" (p. 48).

This requires that an individual leam to become aware of a lack of knowledge in certain

circumstances. It requires that students begin to leam to be aware of their

understanding of what'lies before them. The teacher is a guide in the sense that he

helps the students to understand that they have opinions and knowledge and that in

problem-solving, these opinions and knowledge are subject to change.

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 Conversation

Involvement leads to conversation or communication that should take place in

the classroom. What might this sort of conversation consist of and what are its

requirements? An important requirement is that the teacher be well versed in the subject

matter. For Dewey, this means that knowledge of "subject matter is extensive, accurately

defined and logically interrelated." He writes that "[ojrganized subject matter represents

the ripe fruitageiof experiences...It does not represent perfection or infallible wisdom, but

it is the best at command to further new experiences which may, in some respects at

least, surpass the achievements embodied in existing knowledge and works of art" (p.

182).

Noddings (1998) writes that "Dewey's recommendations require teachers who

are superbly well educated, people who know the basic fields of study so well that they

can spot naive interests that hold promise for rigorous intellectual activity" (p. 221). It

does not, then, seem wrong, inappropriate, or unfair for a teacher to introduce her

conceptions of or understandings of the subject matter. Otherwise, why claim to be a

teacher? Nevertheless, the teacher must, or at the very least try, to present materials

and the latest set of facts and opinions - about math for example - without stepping into

the role of a puppethandler. This task requires, at best, serious vigilance on the

teacher's part.

Another way to. think about this is that Rousseau might, for example, not let Emile

have a watch until Emile himself felt the need to know what time of day it was. Dewey,

however, would not object so quickly to a teacher bringing a watch into the classroom.

For Dewey, a watch represents knowledge about time that has transformed through the

years. He might call the watch or clock "available capital" (p. 182). Similariy, he might

call the teacher's infonmation about plants "available capital." By definition, a teacher

must have more knowledge about a subject matter, but must accept the fact that this

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knowledge Is not perfect or infallible. What knowledge can do is provide the teacher with

a base that can inform the choice of materials brought into the classroom, hoping some

will provoke questions and conversation as they metamorphosize into objects.

Having command of subject matter suggests a number of thoughts to consider.

Using the plant example, it is very possible that a student in the classroom has extensive

knowledge of plants because his parents work as researchers or groundskeepers at a

botanic garden. Jhis child might be able to name more plants than the teacher can or

know more about how a certain plant thrives under varying conditions. Most teachers

have had students who seerh wise beyond their years and whose knowledge base is

phenomenal. However, Dewey would surmise that this youngster's knowledge is still

centered on or around him or herself. There is more to subject matter than a child

thinking, "I know this or that about plants." Obviously, this child is more familiar with

plants than most of the other children in the classroom - a fact that the teacher must

take into account when deciding on each activity. However, this knowledge should not

suggest a benchmark for the teacher toward which all the other students must move.

Instead, the teacher's responsibility is to set the environment so lhat every individual

shall have opportunities to employ his own powers in activities that have meaning" (p.

172). A teacher is the person who should know about the broader context of the subject

matter. His job is to keep the students' education moving in the direction from merely

absorbing knowledge or facts, to acquiring an understanding about those concepts and

knowledge.^^ The teacher's attention should not be focused, per se, on making the

children leam more about any one particular plant, but should focus on the "the attitude

and response of the pupil" (p. 183). This helps students to form their own questions

about the object and to pursue their questions in a disciplined manner.

^ See pages 183-184 of Democfacv and Education.

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 How might this work in a classroom of 30 students? The teacher cannot simply

distribute books, plants, crayons and paper and tell the students to do whatever they

want while she sits back and watches their "attitudes and responses." There would be

too many impulses at work and not many would be focused on the plants. Growth

requires a teacher to introduce the unit and to tell the students a little about the

introductory activities they will be working on (i.e., drawing and coloring, touching the

plants, reading books). This also allows the teacher to tell the students that during and

after the activities, they will be sharing their experiences with her and the other

classmates.

If the teacher allows the students to continue talking among themselves -

following their whims and desires - the teacher is no longer in charge of the direction of

their knowledge. The children might be following some of their natural curiosities, but the

inquiry is not disciplined inquiry. Dewey reminds us that humans are curious by nature. It

seems, then, at any moment in time there are objects in every person's environment that

can release and compel. The teacher or guide is there to help a learner to understand

how he or she is interacting with the objects. The teacher is there to help the student to

understand how he or she understands the object. Part of teaming and disciplined

inquiry is not jumping from one interest to the next, but consists of a series of connected

activities around this object. The idea of disciplined inquiry mirrors the idea of being

compelled.

So, we can imagine a good teacher, in Dewey's sense of the term, having a

conversation and observing a child as he or she interacts with the classroom objects.

There is communication here between the teacher and student, but what about the other

29 children? This is another problem of balance for teachers to deal with. It would be up

to the teacher, for example, to decide when a child's questions are ready to be

redirected, and when a question seems to be irrelevant to the objects. But, this does not

113
mean that others in the classroom cannot learn from obsen/ing the conversation

between teacher and student. Dewey wntes that "modes of purposeful doing include

dealings with persons as well as things" (p. 185). The teacher, as best as he or she can,

must be reassured that the time spent with one child's questions fuel the spirit of the

others in the classroom. Through this conversation "a large fund of social knowledge

accrues" (p. 186). He continues;

As part qf this communication one learns much from others. They tell of their
experiences and of the experiences which, in tum, they have been told them. In
so far as one is interested or concerned in these communications, their matter
becomes a part of one's own experience. Active connections with others are
such an intimate and vital part of our own concems that it is impossible to draw
sharp lines, such as would enable us to say, "Here my experience ends; there
yours begins." In so far as we are partners in common undertakings, the things
which others communicate to us as the consequences of their particular share in
the enterprise blend at one into the experience resulting from our own spedal
doings. The ear is as much an organ of experience as the eye or hand; the eye is
available for reading reports of what happens beyond its horizon. Things remote
in space and time affect the issue of our actions quite as much as things which
we can smell and handle. They really concem us, and, consequently, any
account of them which assists us in dealing with things at hand falls within
personal experience (p. 186).

This quote refers to the dispositions noted eariier of the children and the teacher. They

have all come under the influence of the object, but it affects them in different, yet

positive, ways.

Hansen (1992) describes the emergence of a shared morality in a classroom,

that addresses the moment-by-moment enactment of the spirit that Dewey describes. He

portrays a teacher who is concerned that she does not always "get it right," and that she

"is unsure of how to describe what it means to be 'a positive influence rather than a

negative influence."* Yet, in Hansen's observations he notes certain actions and words.

During the first meetings with her students, she explains the course themes, "outlines

her policies regarding quizzes, grades and behavior," "emphasizes the value of content

reading and completion of homework" (p. 349). If we examine her from a misguided

'Deweyan' perspective, one might wonder why she is teaching in a school where she

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has course themes to follow and 24 students to teach. One could certainly criticize her

for not, upon the first day of school, demanding that the principal lower her class size so

she can teach in the 'Deweyan' spirit. However, my interpretation of Democracv and

Education suggests that we should not criticize teachers for what they are doing

"incorrectly" or in a manner we think Dewey would not approve of. In fact, Hansen notes

that this teacher has played a significant role In shaping the cum'culum themes and in

class size during the time she has taught at this particular school. What he notes about

her actions suggests that she understands her responsibilities as a teacher, understands

the nature of balancing various demands, and has in mind a type of teaching that goes

beyond following strict procedures; "she launches into instruction promptly." "She

channels their energy into cooperative activity." Her "unhesitant admonishments invite

students to become more self-disciplined and more self-possessed." Her "conduct also

encourages respect for subject matter." "Kathy habitually attempts to keep her class

focused on a single topic (at least when they are involved in whole-group activities). In

so doing, she publicizes the value of concentration, of consistency, of persistence in

thinking collectively" (p. 350). In sum, he writes that this teacher's everyday conduct can

be seen

in her acts of attentiveness, of respectfulness, and of patience. These acts

invited students themselves to contribute to an environment in which individual
growth and flourishing could occur. Kathy helped students put themselves in a
position where they could experience, as a consequence of their own efforts,
some of the possibilities built into classroom practice: a sense of fulfillment, of
accomplishmeht.-of leaming. Furthermore, as a participant herself in the morality
they shared. Kathy also realized concrete opportunities for personal growth (p.
355).

Hansen's account of Kathy illustrates that a classroom does not transform into

being "Deweyan" one bright morning during the school year, nor can one evolve into

one. A classroom does not become "Deweyan" at some point in the year and stay

'Deweyan' for the remainder of the year. Drawing upon and Dewey (1916/1997. and

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Gutmann (1987), Hansen writes, "while a classroom cannot be fully democratic, it can

foster a democratic disposition" (p. 357). Also, through their conversations and

interactions the children learned to appreciate their own opinions as well as those of

their classmates. It is also important to note that the teacher also had opportunities for

growth. Every time the teacher seizes a moment to focus on growth, she is working in

the spirit with which Dewey intended. By focusing on the growth, a teacher is welcoming

predicaments aod thus, inherent in her attention lies the possibility for the intrinsic

reward of self-growth. In order for a teacher to wori< in the spirit that Dewey intends, she

must continually respect the "attentiveness, respectfulness, and patience" required of a

teacher.

To an outsider, these conversations could look messy, with the teacher

sometimes having to interrupt to reprimand a student or two while in conversation with

others. Somehow, those quick reprimands and comments exist in a worid parallel to

actual conversation going on with the children about the subject matter. We can see a

conversation going on, but the teacher, as the adult, also has to keep a part of her soul

aware of all else happening in the classroom. If teaching were simply a matter of

chatting, then it may as well take place in a coffee shop. However, as the director and

guide for children's growth, the teacher must maintain vigilance over the course of the

conversation. This vigilance calls to mind a level of awareness and perception that

reminds us of Rousseau's notion of attaining the "sentiment of existence". It is this

"sentiment of existence" that teacher educators need to develop in student and pre-

service teachers. This image broadens our notions of what it means to be a teacher.

To reconsider the children teaming about plants, the teacher might notice that

one group seems to be particulariy interested in plants' roots. They are noticing the

differences and similarities in the roots and are forming questions about these. If the

children do not know the word root, but are using their own words to describe it, the

116
teacher does not have to disregard their description of it by not using their terms. In fact,

as she slowly introduces them to the vocabulary words, she is moving the students from

the point where their knowledge simply revolves around them, toward curiosity about

each other's point of view. Students in another group might be wondering why some of

their plants were wilted and others were not. The teacher can help turn these into

predicaments for students by asking, "What might be the cause of that?" or "Why does

that seem impoilant?" She does not come out and say that one plant has not had water

or sunlight for the past week.^ Instead, the children can wori< on suggestions or ideas

together based on their own experiences and can fomi more questions. "What if the

plant does not have water for one month?" "How many days can the plant go without

water before the leaves start to droop?" "What if the plant does not have soil?" The

teacher, along with the students, can decide which questions are the most important so

they all can work to answer them in the two weeks they have available for this unit. The

students are beginning to get in touch with the social and historical aspect of plants -

that people have studied plants before.

While this conversation is occum'ng, the children are forced to try and form their

own thoughts into words that others in the classroom can understand. The teacher asks

the children to listen as others speak, which extends their current conceptions and

understandings of the classroom objects. By being partners in conversation, each

student can leam that there is more than his or her own point of view about subject

matter. The teacher is inviting them to inquire into their shared truth about the object.

The teacher is also helping the students to develop discipline. Dewey

(1916/1997) writes that

a person who is trained to consider his actions, to undertake them deliberately, is

in so far forth disciplined. Add to this ability a power to endure in an intelligently

^ Certainly in the interest of time, teachers often must cut conversation short There is not always enough
time to delve further into questions from each student Another predicament of teaching.

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 - chosen course in face of distraction, confusion, and difficulty, and you have the
essence of discipline. Discipline means power at command; master of the
resources available for carrying through the action undertaken (p. 129).

The teacher, through conversation, is helping to develop each student's "power of

continuous attention" which is necessary to convert things into objects. Through

conversation, the teacher is teaming about how every individual child is responding to

the stimuli. She is not only learning more about each child's dispositions, but also how to

help them to develop these dispositions or natural capacities through subsequent

*
classroom activities. Though this teacher might be certified in science, it should not be

her hope that all the children^ will grow up to be botanists. She is moving them toward the

appreciation that not only do plants exist and we can name their parts, but that ideas and

questions about plants are important, have existed, and will exist for others.

Teacher Growth

Thus, a teacher can and should take things, artifacts, and materials and consider

them as objects which can further growth. Neimen (1995) writes that for Dewey,

Knowledge is understood as advancing awareness of the antecedents and

consequences of experienced, useful tor coping, for problem solving. The
meaning thereby grasped of objects and events contrasts sharply with a more
traditional understanding of knowledge as copying, or adequate representation,
of a reality that is said to exist prior to human activity (p. 60).

In this context, the plants were an object for the teacher as well. The teacher, if

interested in his or her own growth, is noting how children react. In other words, as she

gains knowledge about the children and how they are learning, she is getting better at

coping and problem solving. The information is useful in helping the teacher to make

better judgments about objects that can compel students. Did the introductory activities

provoke their curiosity and move them to interesting questions and problems to solve?

Did the teacher's guide give useful tips on questions that can keep the conversation

moving between teacher and student? The teacher might dedde to note that tomorrow

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she rfiight bring in a few different plants. Based on their conversation, she might put their

pictures on the hallway bulletin board instead of only in the classroom. She might want

to make a note that next year she will tell the principal that two weeks on plants is not

long enough. By grappling with these questions, a teacher grows both morally and

intellectually. She leams more about how to be in front of children. She leams the sort of

questions students ask and can carry that knowledge with her into the next unit with that

group. The responsibility inherent in Dewey's conception of teaching keeps a teacher

very focused on the classroom, the children, the conversation, and the objects. As the

teacher, the guide, one assumes she is a disciplined person and that her predicaments

and question occur, if she is paying attention, when the students ask questions. She

grows - her current conceptions teaching, education, motivation, or discipline are

challenged because of their questions. Problems of balance are never completely

solved, nor should they be. Growth expects that they will not be.

Summary

The manner in which Dewey describes life seems congruent with and extends

my assumptions about the cave. He does note, as does Rousseau, that the nature of

some human relationships are built upon power struggles, or the unequal balance of

power.

Individuals use one another so as to get desired results, without reference to the
emotional and intellectual disposition, and consent of those used. Such uses
express physical superiority, or superiority of position, skill, technical ability, and
command of tools, mechanical or fiscal. So far as the relations between...teacher
and pupil...remain upon this level, they form no true social group, no matter how
closely their respective activities tough one another (Dewey, 1916/1997, p. 5).

Therefore, the nature of the relationship between the teacher and each student is key.

As the adult, the teacher must leam to be aware of not only her philosophy - as it

influences her perception of the classroom, her thoughts and subsequent actions (or

119
inaction) - but of her responsibility to attend to the potential for growth in each student

and herself.

After examing Emile. I refined my thoughts on the chains that keep us at the wall.

The chains are not necessarily the traditions and conventions we are bom into or the

habits we develop along the way, but our lack of awareness about how they influence

our perception and actions. It is difficult to say exactly what can cause a person to turn

from the wall. What we do know is that they will tum- humans are curious by nature.

One obvious answer as to what causes a prisoner to tum is a shadow, because

shadows is what the cave dwellers' worid consists of. However, it seems more layered

than that now. Obviously, the shadows exist as a physical entity cast from some artifact,

that, in tum is representative of something even more real or natural. The shadow exists

as a sociological phenomenon as well, because the will of another places it there. One

can see once again why Rousseau exposed Emile to more natural objects that did not

directly pit Emile's will against the will of another person. Still, to expect or blindly hope

these shadows can be a force for goodness is difficult. Nevertheless, if shadows

represent our corporeal worid, then there must be some qualities in them that a prisoner

happens to notice based on his or her natural dispositions. Are objects shadows or are

they something else? The answer, seemingly, lies in part in the will of or philosophy of

the teacher as she sets up and chooses materials for the classroom environment.

Further, as we learned from Emile. it depends on the state of the soul of the teacher as

questions arise about the classroom objects.

Rousseau bypasses the questions about what might be adequate man-made

objects and materials for Emile. He is well aware that readers (cave-dwellers), be they

teachers or parents, will no doubt have decisions to make. His search, his sub-questions

revolve around a larger one and if one is aware of education in Rousseau's time and his

opinion of it, one could understand why his question became, "^hat is the source of all

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that we see around us?" The answer is Nature: thus, his next question becomes, "How

can we honor and love Nature and let it guide us?"

Dewey (Dewey. 1916/1997) was certainly understanding of Rousseau's need to

write Emile.^° However, he disagreed with Rousseau's need to extract Ennile from

society. He writes.

That evil institutions and customs work almost automatically to give wrong
education which the most careful schooling cannot offset is true enough; but the
conclusion is not education apart from the environment, but to provide an
environment in which native powers will be put to better uses (p. 118).

Dewey, in surveying all that was being done (pooriy) in the name of education thought

about humanity's potential for growth. His questions then become, "^here are we each

going as individuals and what can we do with all that we have around us? How can we

honor past accomplishments (and stay in society), honor past work done through

reflective thinking, and use these objects for our own development?" His answer was to

love growth.

If Dewey and Rousseau could sit together and talk, I suspect Dewey might be

more sympathetic to Rousseau than he lets on. He might be better able to understand

that it was not Rousseau's intention that his experiment be mistaken for a new method of

education. If I were to sit with both of them, I wonder if they might agree with me in

saying it was inevitable that some of their readers tried to distill out of their books some

quick methods. What drives us cave dwellers to such behavior? One of Rousseau's

answers might be, "Our too-eariy-stimulated amour-propre. The negative emotions often

cause people to want to look good in front of others, that is, to have quick answers and

clever quips." Most teachers are concerned, at one time or another, about looking good

in front of the principal, the mentor teacher or the university supervisor, espedally when

See, for example. Democracy and Education. "Rousseau's passionate assertion of ttie intrinsic goodness
of all natural tendendes was a reaction against the prevalent notion of the total depravity of innate human
nature, and has had a powerful influence in modifying the attitude towards children's interests' (pp. 114>
115).

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a grade or an evaluation is pending. Often, we want to appear to have planned and

executed the perfect lesson and to have things under control. We want to win the prize

for predicting when the next shadow will appear. Dewey's answer might be more

intricate but it would probably suggest an adult not knowing how to use each moment as

one in which to begin again. Their questions and research imply following the guidance

of a moral source rather than relying on merely convention.

Emile and Democracv and Education remind me of the richness of using

metaphors to think about education. As cave-dwellers we do not all wear the same

chains; therefore, what compels each of us will be different. Briefly, by a reading of

Emile. we can assume that people can compel us by what they do and how they act. If

one is curious and innocent, one is not afraid to ask questions that mark the release

from the wall and movement into the light of the Good. From examining Democracv and

Education through the notion of objects, we can say that objects in our corporeal worid

can compel us. However, both works signify the importance of the guide. Teachers are

key to supporting and nurturing this curiosity in their students. Through this, they renew

their faith in teaching, they grow, and they help society develop instead of remaining

chained, unquestioning, to the wall of received opinion and custom.

In these past two chapters, as I tried to further understand the allegory of the

cave, I expanded my conception of the role and responsibilities of teachers and teacher

educators. Socrates is someone who claims not to be a teacher. Yet, 2000 years later,

we look to him for guidance on how to be a good teacher. Is he compelling? Does he

help others to be released from the wall of the cave? Is he concerned about his own

growth? In the next chapter, I examine how Socrates can further help me to understand

the metaphor of the cave and its relevance to teacher education.

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 IV. SOCRATES

Knowledge lies not in the effects of the sense upon us,

but in our reasoning about them. For it is. it seems,
possible in the case of the latter to lay hold on reality and truth,
but not in the case of the former (Theaetetus I86d).

Introduction

Among the many questions that present themselves while reading the Platonic

dialogues are thpse that center on Socrates as a teacher.'*" For example, "What sort of

a person must I, or any teacher educator for that matter, be like in order to teach well?'

In a broader sense, "What does it mean to be a teacher like Socrates? What about him

should be emulated?" He seems to be a bit impractical as a role model. By reading the

Platonic dialogues, would an analysis of Socrates' conduct help teachers to fi^me their

problems differently, with an eye toward doing not only what is right, but moreover what

is good? More specifically, "how does Socrates's conduct inform my evolving

conceptions of the stages of the cave as a metaphor for the task of teaching and teacher

education?"

Because Socrates did not write anything outlining his own philosophy. I cannot

focus this chapter around any single work. Instead, we know of Soaates and his

reputation mainly through the writings of Plato, Xenephon, Aristophanes, and Aristotle.^^

There is a general consensus among writers that of these four, Plato best captures

Socrates as a person. Also, Socrates is best represented in Plato's eariier works while in

his later dialogues, Plato begins working through his own philosophy using Socrates, at

times, as his mouthpiece. In this chapter, I refer to the words and actions of Socrates

from a variety of dialogues. I will work with the character represented by Plato. I do not

center my questions around how Socrates "actually" lived, but how and why we could

*° An issue 1 address later is that Socrates himself never claimed to be a teacher.

See for example, chapters by Vlastos (Vlastos, 1980b), and A. R. Lacey. Also, see Guthrie (1971), Each
in some manner discuss how the various writers depict ^crates and why Plato's is generally the most
reliable.

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base discussions in teaclier education classrooms on the readings of Plato's dialogues.

Socrates seems to be someone who paid attention to what compelled him; that

consistency of vision is intriguing. How can reading about Socrates help one to become

a better teacher and/or teacher educator?

Part of the answer lies, I believe, in the fact that Socrates and Plato were

compelled by Goodness, a point that will become clearer as the chapter progresses.

Their search for*Goodness in the earthly worid is the same as our search today. What is

good? Is there a way to be sure that we are doing the best for ourselves, our students,

our school, and society given that there always exists a struggle between an individual

soul and the collective soul of the society. These texts do not provide Socrates' and

Plato's solutions to our pedagogical questions. Instead, these dialogues illustrate the

search for goodness, to live amore fulfilling and undiminished way of life.

In addition, the answer to why we should read Plato's dialogues is his

presentation of Socrates. McAvoy (1999) notes, "Plato must have thought long and hard

about the profession of ignorance, for he has placed it central to his portrait of Socrates,

and Socrates central to his portrait of the philosopher and philosophy to action" (p. 22).

One must acknowledge the magnificent timing of events. Plato, bom about 40 years

after Socrates, seemed destined to witness and record these events. Plato was drawn in

by Socrates' search and need to question. What can we learn from Socrates about a

teacher's role in helping someone to turn from the wall of opinion and live in the light of

the Good? While interpreting Rousseau and Dewey is difficult, it is a bit trickier

interpreting Socrates. Rousseau and Dewey each wrote specifically about education and

its role in society. Emile and Democracv and Education are singular documents around

which we could wrap our thought and deliberation. With Socrates, we have instead a

composite picture of a complex, living person and an approximate record of the

conversations that were so critical to his soul.

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 There are two main streams of thought in classroom discussions of Socrates.

There are those who believe Socrates is the best of teachers. It would make sense,

then, to ask, "If he is such a good teacher, can teacher educators help student teachers

to be just like him?" Others find him obnoxious, a bad influence, and manipulative; they

argue, for example that Socrates knew the answers to the questions he posed. They

doubt his sincerity. If he is such a troublemaker and nuisance to many of the citizens of

Athens, why bother trying to emulate him?

Both of the above are strong and extreme reactions to Socrates and to Plato's

dialogues. A superficial reading, or second-hand knowledge of the content of the

dialogues, might certainly leave a reader with either impression about Socrates. Yet, as

noted in the previous chapters, it is both necessary and rewarding to move beyond initial

reactions to truly engage the authors. Rather than attempting to learn methods and traits

to copy or to avoid while reading Dewey and Rousseau, one should pay close attention

to the spirit and intent of the authors' words. What then is the spirit and intent that

invigorated Socrates? If his name and the spirit of his questioning have stood the test of

time, there must be something tangible, something applicable to both teaching and to

teacher education as a mode of teaching.

In this next section, I present and consider some common assumptions and

some general information about Socrates. From these, I raise questions about Socrates

being a fit role model for teachers. Then I examine more carefully what Socrates claims

he claims to know and not know. His resilience in following his divine mission carved out

and further defined a certain way of life for him. To the casual reader, it could appear he

lived his life selfishly risking those relationships and possessions most people cannot

live without such as friends, a family, or a home. To those who believed him to be

boastful and anrogant, it might appear that he had a cavalier attitude to many Athenians.

It could seem he lived his life as if he cared for no other needs than his own and ignored

125
the needs and feelings of many Athenians. He seemed to live as if he had nothing to

lose. However, I make the claim that Socrates did not focus on the secular or material

gains that these relationships and possessions might afford. Instead, his life of

questioning others' claims to knowledge and his own admission of ignorance allowed

him to live as if his soul had everything to lose if he did not follow his divine mission, but

everything to gain if he did. The soul is key for Socrates as it is for Rousseau and

Dewey. I will suggest that what is often labeled as his knowledge or arrogance is actually

faith. It is a faith that, recast for our own time, can form the backbone of a teacher's

philosophy of education.

What is Known About Socrates?

Because he is such a strange character, we tend to be curious about Socrates'

life before we meet him in the dialogues. How did he become the character who attracts

the attention of Plato and the other Athenians? Perhaps by teaming about his youth,

teacher educators can leam how to teach students to be more like him. However,

Nehamas (1998) writes that while we know quite a bit about the life of his followers and

the development of their thought, little is known about Socrates' life.

We can follow them, more or less, in their efforts to create themselves. But when
Socrates appears in Plato's dialogues, he appears ready-made: he is already
one; he never makes an effort. His own unity is so extreme that he even believes
that the human soul, the self, is itself a principle indivisible and that it is therefore
impossible for us to do anything other than what we consider to be the good.
""[h]e always does only what he considers the right thing to do; he never wavers
in the slightest way from the course of action he has chosen as best, even in the
hour of his death (p. 6).

This is precisely what I find compelling about Socrates - that he just seems so

sure of himself, yet he professes to be ignorant. This is reminiscent of the argument that

good teachers are bom. not made. However, teacher educators cannot believe this.

Granted, there are prospective teachers who strike us as being naturally better at

126
teaching, but we do not ignore the others. Part of the challenge as a teacher educator is

to move each candidate further in his or her learning.

While it is difficult to know how Socrates came to this unity, we do know about

some of the facts of his life that can provide a glimpse into his thoughts. Socrates was

bom in Athens In 470 or 469 B.C. and died In 399 B.C. There is minimum information

about his youth. Socrates' father, Sophroniscus was a stonemason. Guthrie (1971)

suggests that Sgcrates' father, in another translation from Greek, could have been a

sculptor.'^^ His mother, Phaenarete, was a midwife. Tarrant notes that his education

would have been ordinary. Also, he notes that "during his youth, Presocratic philosophy

flourished and "[sltill in its infancy was the sophistic movement" (Tarrant, 1954/1993, p.

xxii). He grew up In the "powerful, prosperous, brilliant Athens that issued from the

Persian wars" (Jaspers, 1990, p. 5). Pericles, the ruler at the time, attracted intellectuals

and artists from all over Greece. As an adult, Socrates served In the Peloponnesian

War (431-404 B.C.), his duty as an Athenian. From those with him in war, the stories of

Socrates' strength and "powers of endurance" began to emerge (Guthrie, 1971).

Munn (2000) writes, "Athenian democracy encouraged habits of literacy, for both

the creation of public records and memorials and in the personal use of writing as one of

the tools to sharpen and amplify rhetoric" (p. 1). He maintains that this trend of

encouraging the habits of literacy had consequences that were "various and profound"

(p. 1).^ For example, the conditions were right for sophistry to flourish just as they were

right for Socratic philosophy to flourish. The Protagoras, for example, provides us with a

Guthrie writes that Socrates may have practiced sculpting in his eariy years, as it was customary for a
craft to be handed on from father to son (p. 58-59).
Munn (2000) writes that 'Political, judidal and military power were directed by means of public debates in
which skilled speakers tried to sway the majority against their rivals' efforts to do the same. Because power
was publicly constructed, contestants for political influence at Athens devetoped the means to appeal to
wide audiences, and to guide popular approval or condemnation not so much according to narrow, sedona
interests, but by casting their arguments in terms of transcendent principles. Over the course of the
Athenian experience with empire, the use of writing to hone the skills of debate and to express the prindples
that made arguments memorable gave rise fo new habits of discourse and standards of judgment These
habits in turn provided the foundations of rhetoric, political philosophy, constitutibnal law, and history.' (p.
1)

127
variety of Sophists who frequented Athens. Therefore, on one hand, there were the

Sophists whose avowed aim was to speak and write well in order to convince or sway

other's opinions during public debates, and to teach others to do the same. On the other

hand, there was Socrates who questioned the very foundations and beliefs on which

their positions rested and, ultimately, the foundations of the Athenian polity.

Consequently, it Is not difficult to appreciate why he was perceived to be a threat. It

becomes very egsy to understand the eiders charging him with corrupting the youth of

Athens. He was a threat to unexamined routines. Egan (1997) notes that, "the radical

skepticism that his kind of education engendered threatened the foundations of

society...His fellow citizens saw his behavior as a kind of treason" (p. 18). If Socrates

were alive today, one could almost imagine saying, "Oh, just stop asking me questions

Socrates. I am just trying to live my life here." Yet, that is exactly what he stood for; the

potential for each individual to live not only a life, but to continually better Vheir life by

considering the state of their soul, by questioning the assumptions they live by.

So it seems we must make room for both the strange, extreme character of

Socrates to exist along with those who do live more deeply within society and its

conventions. His philosophy makes room for all people of differing abilities and vision.

Socrates was good at questioning, but it was to an extreme that not all people living a

life have the time, luxury, faith, ability, or courage to do so.

According to Jackson (1986), while the Sophists seem to represent the "mimetic"

style of teaching, Socrates represents "transformative" teaching. Mimetic "is closer to

what most people today seem to think about education." "In short, it is knowledge

'presented' to a leamer, rather than 'discovered' by him or her" (p. 117). Successful

transformative education would mean "a transformation of one kind or another in the

person being taught" (p. 120). They both serve a purpose and taken independently from

one another, either can become extreme. They exist as extreme styles of teaching. As

128
Egan (1997) also maintains, "If people continually ask themselves (a la Socrates), 'Is this

really the best way to live?,' they simply can't get on with day-to-day business In a

single-minded, efficient manner" (p. 18). They must make decisions in order to live a

life, but there must be time built into their day for reflection about the Good, or moral

source. As i interpret this, Socrates never claims that society does not need

shoemakers, shipbuilders, or teachers. If we all walked around as Socrates, there would

no longer be much of a society.

4

Yet, Socrates does allow for "techne."** In fact, his conversations emerge from

considering mundane and everyday conventions, crafts and lifestyles. His question to

Athenians went something like, "How do you know you're a good shoemaker, ship

builder?" This figure of Socrates is compelling to modern day readers, just as he was to

the youth of Athens. The Sophists represent the fact that teachers must have some body

of knowledge if they claim to be teachers. Yet, as we have leamed from the previous

chapters, they must be willing to continually examine this body of knowledge. I picture

here a person with Socrates, the transformative teacher, on one shoulder and a sophist,

the mimetic, on the other. Should we knock the sophist off and only listen to Socrates?

Can Socrates help us to understand how we can become willing inquirers?

Reading Plato's dialogues, it is easy to get the impression that Socrates did not

have conventional attachments, as we know them. He did not hold a regular job.

Jaspers (1980) writes that he lived frugally and lived off a small inheritance as well as

state subsidies paid to all Athenians. If his family played any important role in the

** Of techne, Lee (1955/1987) writes that Socrates continues to draw from these "various human
occupations from cookery to horse-breeding. To describe all such occupations the Greeks had a single
word, techne, for which there is no equivalent in English that will bring out the variety of its meaning. It
includes both the fine arts (music) and the practical arts (cookery); all forms of skilled craftsmanship (ship­
building) and various professional activities (navigation and soldiering); besides activities calling for sdentific
skill (medicine). It may thus be sakl to cover any skilled activity with its rules of operation, the knowledge of
which is acquired by training. But it is a very elusive word to translate, varying between art. craft,
professtonal skill, and science according to the emphasis of the context" (pp. 73-74).

129
development of his philosophy, it was not represented in the dialogues.^ His reputation

is such that he wanders Athens, occasionally lapsing into what one might consider

trances or meditative states.^ He has the ability to be engaged in discussion all evening

and yet be ready to continue the next morning. One could make the claim that without

conventional attachments - for example, pressure from a job or a regular home life - it

would be easy to be like Socrates. Who couldn't be a transfonmative teacher if he only

worked with one student at a time? One could say that living the life of Socrates is the
*
lazy person's way out of working a regular 9-5 job. Therefore, why bother learning from

someone who is so unlike any person living a pressure-filled existence - like a teacher in

any school?

Yet, Socrates was not a sage-like philosopher who separated himself from

society in order to ponder eternal mysteries. Unlike Rousseau, he did not fabricate a life

or society. Socrates had no access to some vantage point from which he could

objectively view the worid, much less interact with Athenians. He did not reject all

convention. In order to be with other Athenians, he did live by certain shared beliefs and

in accordance with some convention. He spoke the native language. He was married

and had children. He participated in praying to the gods, as did other Athenians. He

"often appealed to the laws and customs of his state" (Taylor, 2000)

It is apparent that Socrates interacts with Athenians on a regular basis, simply

because of the number of Athenians who know of him. He has a reputation for the

manner in which he interrogates his interiocutors which others find compelling or at the

least, interesting to obsen/e. Vlastos (1980a) notes that Socrates'

^ His wife, Xanthippe, makes a brief appearance in Phaedo. Also, see Guthrie (1971) for a discussion of
those who wrote of Xanthippe. In reference to his sons, in the Apology, Socrates makes a plea to the jurors
that if they see his sons growing up 'putting money or anything else tMfbre goodness, take your revenge by
plaguing them as I plagued you; and if they fancy themselves for no reason, you must scoM them just as I
scolded you, for neglecting the important things and thinking that they are good for something when they are
Mod for nothing' (42e).
For example, see Symposium 175B, 220 C-D.

130
 day-in, day-out role was to know his fellow-citizens as that of a destnjctive critic,
whose behaviour looked from the outside like that of a man who saw nothing in
his interlocutors but balloons of pretended knowledge and was bent on nothing
else but to puncture them (p. 3).

In the Republic. Polemarchus, at the request of his father, Cephalus,^^ asks

Socrates to come to his home for discussion with the young gathered there. The

Symposium begins with Socrates getting ready to attend dinner at Agathon's house. In

that dialogue, Appolodorus says to those already gathered at Agathon's house that he

makes it his daily habit to try to learn what Socrates says (p. 34). In Protagoras, the

young Hippocrates desperately wants Socrates to come with him to speak to the famous

sophist, Protagoras.

As these Athenians, young and old, know of Socrates and his reputation,

Socrates knows the Athenians and is well aware of the reputation of the Sophists. For

example, in Phaedrus, Socrates asks young Phaednjs to recount Lysias's speech on

love. Socrates says to Phaedrus, "Don't you realize that to me an account of what

passed between you and Lysias is, to use Pindar's phrase, 'a matter of which takes

precedence even over business'?" (p. 21). In Gorgias, Socrates expresses his wish to

speak with and question Gorgias about the nature of his art, rhetoric.^ It becomes

clearer with each reading of the dialogues that Socrates is concemed with the

development of others and the detrimental effect that the Sophists can have on their

students. In Plato's Apology, Socrates says that those who enjoy spending time with him

do so because they enjoy "hearing me examine those who think that they are wise when

they are not; an experience which has its amusing side." {Apology 33b).

Regarding the students he attracted, they seemed to be older, adolescent boys

as opposed to young children (Comford, 1993). Still, he never calls anyone his student.

Cepahlus was not an Athenian, per se. He was a metic from Syracuse but seems to have tmen settled
and had a buisiness in Athens long enough to know Socrates.
^ See Hamilton's introduction to Gorgias (Hamilton, 1960/1971, p. 8).

131
He speaks of them as "[tlhose who frequent my company," or "those who seek my

company." {Theaetetus. 150d-151b). These young men seek out Socrates and while I

would venture to guess that he casually spoke with many Athenians, he is quite choosy

when it comes to those with whom he will have a deep conversation. He says about

those who return to him for a renewal of their discourse, "sometimes the divine warning

that comes to me forbids it; with others it is permitted, and these begin again to make

progress." {Theaetetus 151a).

4

Socrates was certainly not a lazy or aloof citizen of Athens, but he does not live a

normal life that one would commonly expect from teachers, or any other citizens for that

matter. Socrates was not an ideal to be emulated. He was an earthly man, but he

moved differently than others. It might not be fair to Socrates then, to compare present

day teachers to him. One could ask questions such as. What kind of primary or

secondary school teacher acts like this? How many students invite their teachers to

accompany them to question guest speakers? How many teachers wander around their

city questioning the knowledge and assumptions of supposed wise men. politicians,

poets, and skilled craftsmen? Yet, the fascination seems to have something to do with

how he cared for the soul of both himself and those with whom he spoke, whether

sophist, citizen, or adolescent. Vlastos (1980a) summarizes some Socratic thoughts on

the soul.

The soul is as worth caring for if it were to last just.twenty-four more hours, as if it
were to outlast eternity. If you have just one more day to live, and can expect
nothing but a blank after that. Socrates feels that you would still have all the
reason you need for improving your soul; you have yourself to live with that one
day, so why live with a worse self, if you could live with a better one instead? (pp.
5-6).

The life of Socrates highlights that life continually presents us with moments of

choice ~ to live with a worse self or a better self. So, might I be setting the bar too low for

teachers by saying that I do not think they can all be or should strive to be like Socrates?

132
Am I selling humanity short? Not necessarily. It is misconceived, I believe, to think of

Socrates as some ideal that we must strive to be like, as I stated eariier. From the

previous two chapters I proposed that as cave dwellers we should not think of ideals as

a goal that we must continually progress towards. Rather, it makes sense for teachers to

think of Socrates' determination, spirit, and the Goodness he strove towards, when

reflecting on their own lives. This reflection can serve to illuminate the present situation

that one is in, or*has been in.

Socrates as a "Teacher"

In the Apology Socrates says in his defense at his trial, "...and if you have heard

anyone say that I try to educate people and charge a fee, there is no truth in that

either..." {Apology. 19e). Later in the dialogue, he says,

I have never set up as any man's teacher; but if anyone, young or old, is eager to
hear me conversing and carrying out my private mission, I never grudge him the
opportunity; nor do I charge a fee for talking to him, and refuse to talk without
one; I am ready to answer questions for rich and poor alike, and I am equally
ready if anyone prefers to listen to what I have to say and answer my questions.
(33a).

Scott (2000) uses the Greek forms of didaskalos (teacher) in interpreting this

passage from the Apology. He writes that Socrates denies

being a didaskalos, thatJs, one who is a master or instructor or others. Socrates

has no didaskaleion, or school, and he claims no expertise or mastery of any
particular art or sdence, as would have been conventionally thought to be a
prerequisite for one to instruct {didasko) others. A didaskalos should be able to
instruct others on the various subjects he has mastered; hence Socrates is
denying having ever purported to be anyone's master or instructor (p. 16).

Woodruff (1998) writes that when Socrates denies he is a teacher, he is

"distinguishing Socratic education from practical training, from the liberal education

promised by the Sophists, and from the wisdom traditional of the sages" (p. 24).

Why do we expect to leam about teaching from someone who did not want to be

known as a teacher? To call him a teacher is to say that he willingly put himself in the

133
position to influence others who might not be ready for the information and

transformation. Certainly, Socrates is not a puppethandler. Really, Socrates does not

teach, in the traditional sense of the word. Basically, he spoke, listened, and asked

questions in carrying out his divine mission.

Most teachers do talk, listen and ask questions in their classrooms. However,

there are not many teachers with Socrates' ability to compel others or with the reputation

that Socrates h^s for questioning others about the assumptions they hold to be true and

live their life by. It is not that he disliked the Sophists so much that he would not speak

to them. That he questioned their assumptions and opinions is common knowledge, but

he would not waste his time if he did not think he might leam something, they might

leam something, or the witnesses to those conversations might leam something. Of

more importance, the Sophists put themselves in the position of claiming to make others

better. Socrates saw it as part of his divine mission, on behalf of their students, to

uncover what they meant by better. What they believed to be knowledge or truth,

Socrates asserted were inadequate and relativistic opinions. Socrates is saying at his

defense that he denies claims that others have learned from him. By denying this,

Socrates reminds us that the ultimate responsibility to leam is in the hands (or soul) of

the student. It is in the hands of each individual. This is what teachers must help young

children to understand (and to nurture this love of questioning and problem forming and

solving) and is what teacher educators should convey to prospective teachers.

Socrates did not work in a typical classroom filled with an assigned student body.

Instead, he spoke with individuals in places such as the palaestra, in the marketplace, or

in the homes of others, again, not typical of teachers. While there was often a crowd of

onlookers, Socrates most often spoke with one individual at a time. In the Apology he

consistently refers to speaking to individuals as opposed to lecturing to groups.

However, he does not take up serious conversation with just anyone he meets on the

134
street: If someone believes he has knowledge of goodness and of virtuousness {ar§te),

then he becomes Socrates' concem. Nehamas (1998) writes that Socrates %vas

ordered not to approach 'all and sundry,' but to examine those who believe they are

wise, but in fact are not, and to expose their arrogance" (pp. 74-75).

Socrates works with only one person at a time - similar to what we saw in Emile.

Yet, corresponding to Dewey's ideas, Socrates is firmly situated in his place. "He knew

beyond a question that his existence was inseparable from Athens." (Jaspers, 1990, p.
4

9). Similar to the ideas about teaching in Emile and Democracy and Education.

Socrates does not lecture. On the other hand, teachers must lecture sometimes. Yet,

much of the day a teacher is talking or conversing with one student at a time.

A social studies teacher might, along with the students, read aloud from the first

section of the week's chapter. After 10-15 minutes, there is often a question and answer

session. Socrates' example highlights the fragility of each interaction and how potent

with possibilities each is. Dewey said that the uniting of students from different

backgrounds, conversing about some common object, provides a rich environment. Co­

existing with that group, communion is the nature of the special relationship between the

teacher and student. Socrates perseveres with one person for as long as they are

willing. How many teachers can do the same? For those brief moments, a teacher must

almost forget that four walls of the schoolroom sun'ound this interaction or, for example,

that test scores will be published in the local newspaper. Yet, a teacher cannot forget

that other students are watching this interaction, a fact that deepens the moral

significance of the moment.

Nehamas (1998) believes that Socrates is not so much a character of complex

irony as Vlastos maintains, but is instead an enigma. He writes.

If Socrates believes sincerely that he does not know what ar6te is and that he
cannot teach it to others, he constitutes a real enigma. He held that knowledge of
arite is necessary for the good and happy human life. He disavowed that

135
 knowledge and the ability to communicate it. And yet he succeeded in living as
good a life as anyone has ever done so far, in Plato's eyes as well in the eyes of
the tradition the two of them initiated. And he never let us know how that was
possible (p. 67).

Nehames notes that some suggest "irony can always be deciphered, or that

ironists are themselves always in dear possession of the truth they are holding back" (p.

97). How can someone claim ignorance, yet seem to act as if he had knowledge that

others did not have? Socrates must have known something important or had some

strong beliefs about something that allowed him to live such a driven sort of life. If he

believed he knew nothing, or really was ignorant of all knowledge, he would most

certainly be a despondent individual wandering Athens. He certainly appeared to know

something about a better way to live. Nehamas notes that Kierkegaard said in reference

to Socrates, "Even if I were to imagine myself his contemporary he would still always be

difficult to comprehend" (p. 66). "That difficulty," Nehamas believes, "is what we must

capture" (p. 66). In trying to understand the spirit that moved Socrates, readers of the

dialogues can learn to question their own moral source.

What Does Socrates Know?

Socrates certainly knew of the 'Pre-Socratic' philosophers and their theories.

There seems to be agreement as to Socrates' dissatisfaction with them. Olafson (1995)

writes that Socrates was disillusioned with the Pre-Socratics because they were

primarily interested in "the explanation of natural processes and were, in his view,

indifferent to the reasons why people live and act as they do" (p. 2). Jaspers (1990)

writes that Socrates saw that "[N]atural philosophy was of no help to a man's soul," and

"had no bearing on man's serious problems" (p. 6). Comford (1993) writes that while

Pre-Socratic philosophy began with the discovery of Nature, "Socratic philosophy begins

with the discovery of man's soul" (p. 4). Gadamer (1992) maintains:

136
 As tradition has it, he brought philosophy down from heaven - that is, from the
Inquiry into the structure of the cosmos and of the events of nature down among
men. Inquiring In restless and tireless conversation about the good. He became
the prototype and exemplar for all who see in the philosopher a person
concerned about self-knowledge and helped by his thinking to rise above the
hard experiences, misfortune, injustice, and suffering of life, indeed above the
bitterness of death, (p. 142)

While this certainly does not explain, in whole, Socrates interest with the soul, it

helps us begin to understand some of the forces that might have influenced his interests

and the manner4n which he lived. He was not as interested as those were before him in

trying to explain Nature's forces. Instead, he became interested in disceming right from

wrong, knowledge from ignorance and In the practical matters of how to live a good life.

Further, at his trial, Socrates begins his defense, "Very well, then; I must begin

my defense, gentlemen, and I must try, in the short time I have, to rid your minds of a

false impression which is the woric of many years." He reads aloud to the jurors the

charges listed on the affidavit.

Socrates is committing an injustice, in that he inquires into things below the earth
and in the sky, and makes the weaker argument defeat the stronger, and teaches
others to follow his example. {Apology 19b-c).

To this accusation, Socrates says,

I have gained this reputation, gentlemen, from nothing more or less than a kind of
wisdom. What kind of wisdom do I mean? Human wisdom, I suppose. It seems
that I really am wise in this limited sense. Presumably the geniuses whom I
mention just now are wise in a wisdom that is more than human -1do not know
how else to account for it, because I certainly do not have this knowledge (20d).

Socrates did have 'human wisdom." He studied early philosophy and the

teachings of contemporary Sophists. He did not wander around Athens without opinions

or a lack of familiarity with Greek history. In the ADOIOQV. he speaks of the heroes that

died at Troy. In the Svmposium. Socrates makes a speech about love that illustrates his

knowledge of history and traditional stories. In such dialogues as Republic, etc.. we find

Socrates either making offerings to gods or being at festivals in honor of the gods. In

Protagoras, he refers to poets whose woric he studied.

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 Socrates also knows that he hears a voice, one that began appearing to him

when he was a child. He describes it as "a sort of voice which comes to me; and when it

comes it always dissuades me from what I am proposing to do, and never urges me on"

{Ap. 31d). Socrates also knows that God had given him a mission. In the APOIOQV.

Socrates relates to the jurors how his search for wisdom began. Socrates tells them that

he and Chaerephon were friends since childhood. One day, Chaerephon asked the

Oracle at Delph^f there was anyone wiser than Socrates. The oracle replied that there

was no one. Soaates says to the jurors,

When I heard about the answer, I said to myself, 'What is the god saying and
what is his hidden meaning? I am only too conscious that I have no claim to
wisdom, great or small; so what can he mean by asserting that I am the wisest
man in the worid? He cannot be telling a lie; that would not be right for him {Ap.
21b).

Socrates continues that at that point, he began to "check out the truth" (21b) of

the oracle's statement.^^ He claims he was "bound to interview everyone who had a

reputation for knowledge." (21e). He begins with a politician who others believe to be

wise. He continues with dramatic and lyric poets, and skilled craftsmen. He leaves these

conversations with the impression that these people do not know as much as they claim

to know, while he, in contrast, is still aware of his own ignorance.

It seems not that Socrates knew nothing, but was aware of (and willing to admit

as much) his own ignorance about moral terms. He was ignorant as to the meaning of

the Oracle's statement. However, based on his words and actions, and the fact that he

questions accepted beliefs about what is good, the Athenians are of the opinion that he

seems to claim to know more than the gods. It is easy to understand their position that if

he continually questioned their beliefs, then he must surely know a finite definition exists

and he is simply holding back in teaching or imparting it to them. Is it possible that he is

this arrogant?

Vlastos (1991) notes that this statement by the Oracle was a turning point in the life of Socrates (p. 252).

138
 Finally, Socrates knows that people in a position of authority have the potential to

influence the lives and beliefs of others. He questions parents about how they teach their

children. He questions Sophists about their influence on the students they meet.^

Socrates takes very seriously the potential that any one person has to influence another

person's developnfient, which is why he takes his own life so seriously. For example, in

Protagoras. Hippocrates comes knocking violently, just before dawn, at Socrates' door

requesting that Socrates speak to Protagoras on behalf of Hippocrates. Socrates

"recognized his detemnination and the state of his excitemenr (31Od). Socrates does not

just run off with Hippocrates to speak with Protagoras. Socrates insists Hippocrates talk

with him for a while so Socrates can learn more of why Hippocrates wants to see

Protagoras. Socrates, as the responsible adult, is trying to understand the position of

Hippocrates' soul. He wants to "try Hippocrates' mettle" and begins to "examine and

question him" (311b). Socrates asks Hippocrates, "Now whom do you think you are

going to, and what will he make of you?" (311b). Hippocrates says, "Last time he came

to Athens I was still a child. But you know Socrates, everyone is singing his praises and

saying he is the cleverest of speakers" (31Oe). Socrates does not want young

Hippocrates to pay Protagoras for knowledge as if he were buying food and drink. The

latter, as Socrates claims, come in a receptacle and with instructions so "there is not

much risk in the actual purchase" (314a). However, when it comes to knowledge, or

what others claim to consider knowledge, Socrates says, "When you have paid for it you

must receive it straight into the soul: you to away having learned it and are benefited or

hanmed accordingly" (314b). Socrates knows that one cannot buy knowledge of

goodness or virtue. One is only buying another's opinion of it and as such, it is another

shadow on the wall of the cave.

^Compare this to t)oth Rousseau who questioned the influence of sodefy and Dewey who worked at
understanding the necessary relationship between an individual and sodety.

139
 What Socrates Does Not Know

Tarrant (1954/1993) writes, "Socrates never sets himself up as any authority

upon any matter relating to morality, nor upon any matter traditionally taught by

Presocratic philosophers or by the Sophists (pp. xi-xix). In the Symposium, Socrates

claims that he "knows nothing and is ignorant of everything (216). Socrates also states

that,

real wisd9m is the property of the god, and this oracle is his way of telling us that
human wisdom has little or no value. It seems to me that he is not refem'ng
literally to Socrates, but has merely taken my name as an example, as if he
would say to us, 'The wisest of you men is he who has realized, like Socrates,
that in respect of wisdom he is really worthless (Apology 23b).

He knows that real wisdom is the property of God - that no man. including

himself has a final say on what is good. Yet, his claims to ignorance are compelling:

While the claim to know nothing could hardly be taken literally it nevertheless
captured some genuine feature of Socrates radical epistemic doubt that both
bewildered and attracted those young men [Egan, 1997, p. 141 #224].

That his words and actions seemed to bewilder and attract younger rather than

older citizens of Athens is worth noting. These young men sound like they are at the

stage young Rousseau was in.

They found in him exactly what youth needs in this phase of reaction - a man
whose proved courage they could respect and admire, and whose subtle intellect
was always at the service of the youthful passions for argument. He would never
silent their crude questionings with the superior tone of adult experience. He
always said with manifest candor, that he was himself an inquirer, who knew
nothing and had nothing to teach, but regarded every question as an open
question (Comford, 1993, p. 44).

The youth in Athens are filled with questions. In Socrates, they see someone

whose curious spirit is not hardened or crystallized. But does he release them from the

wall or compel them? it seems that because they come to him with questions, they have

been released. What does he do or say, then, to compel them? It could be the manner in

which he questions others - known as the elenchus.

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 ' Through the Socratic process known as the elenchus, Socrates "exposes the

inadequacies in the moral beliefs of the interlocutor, inconsistencies which are likely to

be reflected in their lives" (Tarrant, 1954/1993, p.xvii). In this process, there is "a

demand for accurate definitions, and clear thinking, and exact analysis" (Durant, 1961, p.

9). Nussbaum (1997) writes, "Vlastos defines it as 'a search for moral truth by question-

and-answer adversary argument in which a thesis is debated only if asserted as the

answerer's own belief and is regarded as refuted only if its negation is deduced from his

own beliefs." She continues that Vlastos distinguishes it from eristic argument, which Is

"aimed at point scoring or defeat of an opponent." Elenchus is "a search for truth" (p.

28).

An eristic argument is reminiscent of Rousseau's negative emotions of amour-

propre. One wants to look good in front of others - appear to have certain knowledge.

Of course, though, this is what the Sophists' life depended on. They had to appear to be

confident and to have knowledge. After all, they had a reputation to uphold and fees to

collect. "The victims of the Socratic elenchus were cheerfully confident that they knew

what they were talking about, and they would have ever remained so had they recited

their ignorant certainties to anyone but Socrates" (Vlastos, 1995b, p. 185).

In all these conversations, why does Socrates pursue some ultimate or absolute

definition of moral terms? He almost seems to believe that there exists some ultimate or

absolute definition of such words as courage, virtue, justice, etc. To be sure, if the

Sophists claimed they could live their life by their definitions, then who would not want

this information. Using elenchus, Socrates tried to get at the essence of what each

interiocutor really meant.^^ To his defense, if one builds his life around seeking ultimate

definitions as Socrates did, then one never feels any one definition is adequate enough

cf. Apology (26a). Socrates says to Meletus, "I can't make out what your point is." In Republic (338c), he
says to Thrasymachus, *You shall have it (praise] when I understand what you mean [as to his claim that
justice is in the interest of the stronger party], which at present 1 don't'

141
to pass on to some unsuspecting 'student.' Maybe he is not as anrogant as some

maintain. I take Socrates at face value - that he is a cun'ous individual.

Compare Socrates' refusal to pass on knowledge to Dewey, who states that if

one claims to be a teacher, one must stake one's claim and publicly admit to having

knowledge and opinions about some subject matter. However, along with that

admission, the teacher must admit to him or herself that he or she is never finished

learning and th^^ knowledge is to be expanded. Moreover, the teacher can always say, "I

may know many things, but I do not know my students well enough - what they know,

how they leam, how they respond to subject matter." In some sense. Socrates so loved

the world, he would not teach or pass on the latest opinion he heard about the virtues.

Guthrie (1971) claims that Socrates

was not a dogmatic moralist but an inquirer, who believed that an honest search
after the truth about the principles governing human behaviour was most likely,
simply because of the better understanding which it would ensure, to lead to an
improvement in behaviour itself (p. 119).

It is not that Socrates knew with certainty that there was one ultimate definition of

moral terms such as courage or justice and that his mission was to find these definitions.

Instead, his mission was to leam more about each of those virtues by learning from

others, but also to push them from their curent conception of these moral terms,

espedally of those who were in the position of influencing the souls of others. The soul

of both Socrates and his interiocutor stood to benefit. Guthrie (1971) continues.

We should not dismiss his profession of ignorance as altogether insincere. His

mission was not to impart any body of positive doctrine, but to bring home to men
their intellectual need, and then invite them to join with him in the search for truth
by the dialectical method of question and answer (p. 127).

The elenchus begins with Socrates asking his interiocutor to state his opinions.^^

It must begin with him stating what he believe to be true about some moral term.®® From

^ Cf. Republic 350e. Gofgias. 500, Meno. 83d,

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there, it depends on the interlocutor, as to the manner and tone which Socrates takes.

With the Sophists. Vlastos (Vlastos, 1995a) describes it as such:

You say A, and he shows you that A implies B, and B implies C, and then he
asks, 'But didn't you say D before? And doesn't C contradict D?' And there he
leaves you with your shipwrecked argument, without so much as telling you what
part of it. if any, might be salvaged. His tactics seem unfriendly from the start.
Instead of trying to pilot you around the rocks, he picks one under water a long
way ahead where you would never suspect it and then makes sure you get all
the wind you need to run full-sail into it and smash your keel upon it (p. 7-8).

I am not ^ure that I want to be such a teacher. This seems to be an unduly harsh

manner in which to treat one's students. Could it be that as a teacher. I am not as

concerned for the souls of my students as Socrates would expect me to be? And yet.

of elenchus, Robinson (1971) writes that it can change

ignorant men from the state of falsely supposing that they know to the state of
recognizing that they do not know; and this is an important step along the road to
knowledge, because the recognition that we do not know at once arouses the
desire to know, and thus supplies the motive that was lacking before. Philosophy
begins in wonder, and the assertion here made is that elenchus supplies the
wonder (p. 84).

Robinson also notes that in the Sophist (229e-230e). Socrates claims that the

elenchus is "the greatest and most sovereign of the purifications. "Socrates also states

"For just as the physidans of the body believe that the body cannot benefit from the

nourishment it receives until the internal hindrances are removed, so do those who

perform this purification believe about the soul." (p. 85). The elenchus is "subsumed

under the general notion of education" (p. 85). Robinson further maintains that the

elenchus "arose out of a divine oracle, and that Socrates continued it because he felt

divinely commanded to do so. It represents the ultimate aim of the elenchus not as

intellectual education but as moral improvement" (p. 86).

" Cf, Robinson in (Vlastos, 1995 pp. 78-93), and Woodruff (1998) who writes ttiat Socrates' 'most
important rule" is "to say only wtiat you believe when you are questioned (p. 18).
 ' Socrates himself, in the Theaetetus likens his work to the art of midwifery.^ As a

"midwife," Socrates claims that he could not conceive knowledge, but he did not deny

that certain others could. He could give birth to the knowledge in another but only where

there was already conception and where there was a desire to continue leaming. Those

who wanted to "be" better in their work or techne could conceive of knowledge, and

Socrates was there to help them - to guide them through the experience. The Greek

term aporia literally means without a path and I think here about those prisoners at the

wall who have been released.^ They have questions about some topic or moral term. It

is not just that they are without a path but are at the critical moment of realizing there are

many paths from which to choose. This sounds like young Rousseau might have been or

sounds like the youths who follow Socrates. They can turn back to their chains, run to

the fire or continue on in the light of the Good, but a guide is needed to help distinguish a

way and to say that the path is safe enough. This means the guide invites the released

prisoner to ask questions. This ability has not yet been hardened in those followers of

Socrates. He guides them through the darkness of aporia, if they are willing to go, if he

judges that their souls are ready.

Through this elenchus, Socrates could pave the way for further leaming. It

appears that the Sophists did not want to continue leaming. In terms of the cave, they

rather enjoyed their positions as puppethandlers. Still, it seems that even

puppethandlers can get released, but they most often are not ready for the demands of

philosophy. Socrates seemed to take a different tack with those interiocutors who

displayed a desire to continue leaming. Woodruff (1998) notes that "[w]ith young people

^ Cf.. Taylor (2000), Hansen (1988)

^ I drew on a number of sources to understand more about aporia. Cf. Burbules (1998) and Scott (2000)
who define it as perplexity or confusion.

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Socrates takes a different line than he does with companions his own age; he is kinder,

more encouraging, and less cutting in his use of irony (p. 16).^

For example, in the Phaedo, Socrates' main interlocutors are the young Simmias

and Cebes. Tarrant (1954/1993) describes them as:

people who very much want Socrates to be correct, yet are honest enough to
express their fears that he may not be. They are not woridly men, and are
themselves devoted to the pursuits of the mind rather than to those of the body
(pp. 95-96).

In this dialogue Socrates has already been condemned to death, and it begins with

Crito's servants leading away Socrates' wife and his youngest son. The topic of the

dialogue is about the immortality of the soul. Granted, in this dialogue Socrates is giving

his account of the soul, but his two interlocutors do stop him and ask him to explain

points (69e-70a, 77c), and he asks for their opinions throughout. About two-thirds into

the dialogue, Socrates says to them.

If you think that anything I say is true, you must agree with me; if not, oppose it
with every argument that you have. You must not allow me, in my enthusiasm, to
deceive both myself and you, and, like a bee, to leave my sting behind when I fly
away (91c).

Actually, in a sense. Socrates is "lecturing" but not in any sort of mimetic fashion. He is

saying, "This is what I have learned so far about the soul. If you have any questions,

stop me and ask them." His listeners do. They trust him. Toward the end of the

dialogue, Socrates goes off for a final bath and Crito tells the others to wait. Phaedo

says.

So, we waited, discussing and reviewing what had been said, or else dwelling
upon the greatness of the calamity which had befallen us; for we felt just as
though we were losing a father and should be orphans for the rest or our lives
(116b).

Socrates in certainly not acting as a puppethandler, or at least he seems to avoid

that role more than most people. By not setting up shop as a teacher, he avoids it. He

^ He cites talks with Cleinias in Euthydemus and the young men in Lysis.

145
must if he is to stay true to his divine mission. IHe could not write his philosophy; he lived

it. Arendt (1958) notes that Socrates alone among the great thinkers

never cared to write down his thoughts; for it is obvious that, no matter how
concemed a thinker may be with eternity, the moment he sits down to write his
thoughts he ceases to be primarily concemed with etemity and shifts his
attention to leaving some trace of them (p. 20).

It would be easy to avoid the role of puppethandler by never joining in or making

any commitment to others. Socrates did not teach any cf his opinions as facts. Instead,

he seemed to be an enactment of the very virtues to which he could give no verbal

definition. Nehamas (1998) writes that Socrates "actually drew no line between what he

believed and what he did" (p. 85). He challenged others to be the same in whatever role

they were in. Socrates reminds us once again that one needs others in order to live and

search in the light of the Good.

In accordance with his divine mission, Socrates must persuade others of their

ignorance. He must persuade each of them that they are never finished teaming about

the virtues and goodness if they are to live a full life. He says,

So instead of taking a course which would have done no good either to you or to
me, [refenring to the fact that he did not set out in a job which would make him
wealthy, or in a high ranking military or civil rank] I set myself to do you
individually in private what I hold to be the greatest possible service: I tried to
persuade each one of you not to think of more of practical advantages than of his
mental and moral well-being, or in general to think more of advantage than of
well-being, in the case of the state or anything else {Apology 36c).

Socrates had knowledge, but he was not the final arbiter of what constituted

knowledge, or more spedfically, what knowledge was of moral importance for another

person. It seems that when it comes to matters of human-made information, there is

knowledge. But as for the moral realm, there is something more encompassing than

knowledge. Here one must instead use words such as faith and spirit. The word

knowledge is not the best word to use in the moral realm. Considering all the

disapproval he encountered, what made Socrates continue on when he could have

146
stopped to live an ordinary life? Where were the rewards he found? As I suggested in

the introduction, in some sense, he seemed to live as if he had nothing to lose. And I

want to suggest, that in a dynamic sense, teachers might strive to teach as if they had

nothing to lose, but rather everything to gain.

Living Life as If There Were Nothing To Lose: Is Socrates as Arrogant as He Seems?

Socrates^claimed, This occupation has l(ept me too busy to do much either in

politics or in my own affairs; in fact, my service to God has reduced me to extreme

poverty" {Apology 23c). Considering that early on in his journey he did not understand

the message of the Oracle, what made him continue? He lived as if he had no choice in

the sort of life he had to live, and he seemed to feel rewarded that he was doing God's

work. As a human, he felt he needed the Athenians as much as he thought they needed

him.

Yet, something is still puzzling. Is his interest in the soul a belief he had? If so, it

might be false, or based on shadows. Is this knowledge that Socrates had about the

soul? If he claims to have knowledge, then would he be any different from the Sophists?

I think at some level that he did have knowledge, and with every new person he spoke

with (or got into an argument with), he walked away with his knowledge confirmed a bit

more. He did keep subjecting himself to public scrutiny. After years of this, the

knowledge (that caring for the soul is a good thing) becomes more concrete. Yet, in

order to continue to be Socrates, he could never really claim to be sure. What is possible

is that his faith became stronger with each new interiocutor. Socrates knew the gods

gave him a mission, but his faith rewarded him daily to continue to claim ignorance in the

moral realm. He seemed to have a sentiment of existence and certainly the ability for

disdplined inquiry. The Athenians who sentenced him to death apparently mistook his

faith for certain knowledge about the virtues.

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 ' If he were as arrogant as some might have assumed, why would Socrates then

even bother talking to others? I believe he had faith that they too could escape their

condition. He had faith that their soul's perception could work in the light of the Good.

They did not have to live with their chains all the time and they did not have to be

continually subjected to the manipulations of the others. Further, if Socrates lived by

faith, then is there such a paradox about him after all? Socrates does not deny others, or

himself, from having opinions or beliefs or ability in some techne. However, when it

comes to goodness, faith in some moral source is needed to guide us through situations.

This faith implies a faith in the power of philosophy to enlighten. I think he would say that

we can have opinions about the things of this world, but about the soul - which is drawn

to goodness - we can only speak in terms of ignorance and faith. The concepts of

knowledge and opinion are not directly relevant to matters of the soul. I am certainly not

trying to downplay knowledge and opinion, but it would seem that faith is what keeps our

search for knowledge and opinion (needed for life in the cave) moving in a better

direction instead of a worse direction.

Socrates challenged convention and beliefs so much that he lived life as if he

had nothing to lose, but it was his soul that had nothing to lose. He did have his earthly

body and many friendships and relations to lose. In that sense, he gave up his notion of

"self," to care for his soul and the souls of other Athenians. He was freed from him

chains when the god told him no one was wiser. He did not worry about conventional

things that have the potential to keep one at the wall in front of the cave or at the fire in

the back of the cave. His soul had nothing to lose by keeping turned constantly towards

life in the light of the Good.

What this suggests, or what this does to inform my interpretation of the cave, is

that we all have the potential to be philosophers. No. not all people can live and work as

professional philosophers; even professional philosophers do not always act in a

148
philosophic manner. As I stated earlier, society needs those who are good at some

techne. Some individuals have a nature more suited to mathematics, science, history,

geography, literature, parenting, gardening or teaching. But whatever sphere a person

works in, there is the potential to love wisdom, to be a philosopher, and to pursue the

truth about the content and authenticity of their life. The life of Socrates suggests that all

cave dwellers can be released and all have the capability to be compelled to become of

his cun'ent perceptions or state of awareness.

Summary

Eventually, Socrates was sentenced to death for corrupting the young and

praying to false gods. Tarrant's (1954/1993) phrasing of the charges is interesting in

that it helps make the charges a bit more graspabie to the contemporary reader. He

writes, "Meietus brought the notorious impiety charges, claiming that Socrates failed to

acknowledge the city's gods, substituting his own private ones and undermining the

moral fabric of the young" (p. xxviii). Stone (1989) translates the verb corrupting as

"[slubverting" or "alienating" (p. 28-29). Munn (2000) writes "[h]is trial thus pitted his

personal devotion to abstract ideals against a pragmatic, public consensus on the

appropriate forms of piety" (p. 6). "Socrates' vocation of serving as a gadfly to a

complacent state, of calling its dtizens to greater self-knowledge, and of incessantly

drawing their attention to the place of the right and the good above convention, law, and

the majority's will was a greater and noble one" (Flanagan, 1991, p. 1). Should Socrates

have escaped when he had the chance? He could not have since it seems his faith

would not allow this. He knew the people of Athens and needed them to continue in his

search for goodness.

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 Socrates pursued the exhortation, "Know Thyself," in the fullest sense of that

term. The phrase does not mean to know and accept thyself in light of convention,

honor, or praise. It means to know thyself in light of the Good.

In Socrates's view, any attempt to foster true success and excellence in human
life had to take account of the innermost reality of a human being, his soul or
psyche. He affirmed the Delphic motto, 'Know thyself,' for he believed that it was
only through self-knowledge, through an understanding of one's own psyche and
its proper condition, that one could find genuine happiness" (Tamas, 1991, pg.
33).

What this suggests is that we must continue to question what is good. Socrates

knew that any in any city, there are a multitude of jobs, professions, attachments, and

the like. Nonetheless, each person can seek self-knowledge. "Know thyself does not

mean to be like Socrates. If so, the exhoration would be "Be like Socrates." Socrates

was just one illustration of what it could mean to "know thyself."' In the light of the Good,

this means that one should use one's gifts or take care of one's soul in the best way

possible, whether one is a fifth-grade teacher, a college teacher, a shipbuilder or a

factory worker. The only way someone can 'be like' Socrates is to continue to question

whatever definitions they live by.

How does one "know oneself in light of the Good. With respect to "knowing

thyself as a teacher, or teacher candidate, one way is by questioning oneself through

the reading of Plato's dialogues. Teacher educators cannot force students to be like

Socrates; otheoMise reading the dialogues becomes an exercise in looking for methods

to copy. Sections of the dialogues would then become just pieces of infomnation that

students must remember in order to pass their Foundations course. Socrates was an

illustration that it is better, no matter what profession, practice, or techne one is involved

in, to question one's guiding assumptions.

What do teacher educators know? They know about subjects such as math,

science and sodal studies. They know methods of teaching those subjects that can help

150
teacher candidates. They know about philosophers and the questions they wrestled with.

Many teacher educators have taught in or observed in primary and secondary schools

and have much experience to share with student teachers. Rousseau might say that all

teacher educators have are their opinions, and he would be correct in reprimanding

them if these opinions are used to form teachers in specific limiting ways. Dewey would

say that teacher educators have the responsibility to share their knowledge. Socrates

helps us to understand that one must try to live one's philosophy. In so doing, one is

forced to realize that every individual has the potential to influence the development of

another human being - this certainly being the case for any teacher.

Teacher educators also know that some students in teacher education programs

act like Sophists. They claim to "know" teaching and all it entails. Others tend to be more

like Hippocrates, wanting to leam more, wanting to hear from experts and wanting to

hear other's opinions on these experts. We also know that as teachers, most of us

cannot simply walk barefoot around the campus waiting for students in order to shake up

their complacency. Can teacher educators just sit around waiting for a student to come

question them or invite them to hear a speaker? Well, yes and no. No, because teacher

educators do not have a lifetime with student teachers or preservice teachers. There is

usually one semester in which to 'teach' the Philosophy of Education or History of

Education course. On the other hand, in a sense teacher educators can simply 'wait' for

candidates questions and act as their guide, but the teacher must set up the

environment in a particular way to make this possible. This is one of the themes I

address in the final chapter.

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 V. THE ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHER
EDUCATION

Introduction

This dissertation has focused on the mindful reading of philosophical works and

how they can be useful in teacher education. The philosophers I have attended to, as

well as the metaphor for teaching of the cave allegory, do not point to any specific fool­

proof methods to use in classrooms. Instead, they suggest an outlook or direction one

might continually strive to take. For example, in Chapter II, I began the exploration of

what it might mean to be released and compelled. Rousseau reminds us that each

interaction between a child and a teacher is fragile in guiding a person onto an

illuminated path. Dewey reminds us that democratic educative environments, which

keep both teacher and student focused on certain objects, can lead to growth for both.

Socrates brings us back to that moment of wonder in which philosophy begins. His life Is

a reminder that while a guide is necessary to move someone's body through the cave, a

soul leaves the cave through its own primary agency. All point to the teacher's critical

role in both guiding a student out of the cave and setting up the environment so students

are released and compelled.

An examination of the allegory, and its usefulness as a rich resource for teacher

education, did provide answers.that kept the inquiry moving along, but it also summoned

more questions about certain themes. In this chapter, I will revisit those themes as a way

to sum up my interpretation of the power of the allegory of the cave, and with it the

power in reading philosophical texts. The themes include questions about faith, reason,

education, knowledge, doubt, ignorance, and wisdom, all of which, as I have sought to

show, form the substance of the allegory of the cave. I conclude with reflections on the

allegory's meaning for teacher education.

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 Philosophy Emerges From Practical Daily Life

While the allegory is useful, I am still puzzled by the notion of being compelled. I

am working with the assumption that our human condition is indeed this cave or our

world. We live in competition with the wills of others. We live surrounded by facts and

knowledge that have accumMlated throughout the ages. We make judgments about the

conditions and people in our lives, about the will of ourselves and others, and about the

facts and knowledge around us.

According to Bloom (Bloom, 1991), in Plato's cave the "needs, fears, hopes, and

indignations produce a network of opinions and myths which make communal life

possible and give it meaning" (p. 8). Solomon and Higgins (1997) suggest that the

shadows are real. "It is not that these are unreal - they are real shadows - but they are

shadows of things that are even more real" (p. 37). They go on to say that the cave

allegory represents a distinction between "reality and illusion," "the more and less real,"

"a superior and inferior worid" (p. 37). Life at the cave wall indeed is a certain kind of life,

but a life tumed from this wall could be richer.

The fact remains that humans, by nature, are curious. We ask questions - we

are released. Children ask questions we adults no longer ask: "Why is the sky blue?"

"Where do the stars come from?" "Where does the sun go at night?" These questions

hint at the raw courage of admitting to seeing more than is visible to the human eye.

Often the comnnon response to their questions in general is, "Stop asking such silly

questions. The sky is blue because it's blue."^ After enough of these responses, it is

easy to understand shy children leam to stop posing their questions to adults. Yet, given

the context and complexity of life in the cave, it is understandable that adults give these

responses. After all, they too were raised in such a manner. It appears to be a vidous

circle unless one leams, for example, to pay attention to one's own question and to

''Cf. (Havas, 1999)

153
interpret the pull of the Good. The cave explains the responses, but does not offer

excuses for them. Adults are pressed for time, given the fact that unlike Socrates, they

do have jobs, families, and other societal obligations and commitments - not to mention

the traffic. An amour-propre developed too early creates negative emotions that make us

crave approval and wield power over the wills of others. Educative experiences not

focused on growth, or not thought about in light of a moral source, can lead people to

focus on the physical rather than on the intellectual and moral results of interactions with

stimuli in the environment. Such physical results do not require thinking and having

ideas. Again, educative experiences, while they must emerge from a diverse

environment, from thinking, and from the ideas thought produces, are the creation and

possession of each individual agent. This highlights, with the three philosophers Ihave

examined, the pressing reed for teachers to be the guides when questions do arise. It

further highlights the need for teacher educators to help their students recognize the

agency they will have as teachers. Students ask questions and therefore need someone

to help interpret the nature of the questions.

It again becomes more clear why Rousseau felt the need to write Emile. By

taking Emile into nature, the objects about which he asked questions were, for the most

part, of Nature. Secondly. Emile had a governor who honored his questions and who

fueled Emile's courage to continue questioning. In Rousseau's preface to Emile. he

portrays himself as one who has been released and compelled. He claims that at first he

had "planned only a monograph of a few pages," but that, "[mly subject drew me on in

spite of myself (p. 33). There can be no release or compel without some objects and

stimuli from one's environment - the cave. For example, Rousseau was upset about

educational methods he saw practiced during his day. Emile represents his need to

understand and give voice to the complexity of a good education and the teacher's

154
critical role in a good education.^ Because Rousseau wrote from curiosity and without

much thought of public praise, he was wori<ing in the light of the Good. He took

advantage of the place that being compelled opened up for him. Rousseau seems to be

saying, "This book represents words that I have found thus far to be able to describe the

spirit of a good education. Y;et it also is a wori< that displays my humbleness before all

that is not knowable." It takes much strength to admit this - to admit ignorance and

doubt about one's own interpretations and thoughts. On Rousseau's part, it took faith in

others to remind them that they must not follow in whatever path they think he might be

drawing for them, but instead that they are to carve out their own.

From examining Socrates, it is easy to see he had an uphill battle living in

Athens. He lived among those raised at the cave wall. Plato's dialogues document this

life. The Athenians did not have the care and attention that Rousseau's governor or

Dewey's teachers would have given them as children. Not only do children need this

care, but teacher educators need to help new teachers to develop their instrumental and

moral perception. Childhood, as the writing of both Dewey and Rousseau attest to, is

critical for cultivating the powers to become a disciplined and courageous inquirer, an

agent - even in the face of adversity and even when it seems nobody wants to hear the

questions. As for Socrates. Hadot (1995) writes that he is "consciousness." This

certainly seems to be the case.To those who opposed Socrates, he represented a pure

ability to question. Naturally they found him threatening. While ail this suggests the

advantages in nurturing this ability from childhood on, it is not impossible to nurture this

in adults (like student teachers). In fact all three philosophers, each in his own way,

attest to the fact that our questions about what is good must arise out of the practical

situations we face every day. They each encourage us to become philosophers in the

^ An education stripped -as much as possible - of convention wtiich is the residue resulting from the wills of
others.

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rich sense of the word, to be people willing to wonder. Further, they make it clear that a

teacher is a guide unlike any other adult in a student's life. A teacher's unique role is to

dwell In this love of wisdom and to foster it in one's students. This is not knowledge of a

better way of life, but represents a faith that every person has the vision to continue to

carve out a better life at any and every moment.

^ Reflections on the Cave

The allegory and the discussion thus ifar present a paradox. In part, education

must take place in the cave. An agent's questions must emerge from the objects and

situations of this human condition. At the same time, however, education cannot be

whole or have the complete impact on one's capacity to be better if another part does

not happen outside of the cave. What must go on inside the cave? What goes on outside

the cave? Is the goal of a proper education - one that fosters the philosophic spirit -

simply to help prepare one for death as many philosophers from the worid over would

have it? This meaning, should we think of education as preparing the soul for the

aftertife?

In the cave, we live by certain unquestioned beliefs and habits and are unaware

how these beliefs and habits affect our living, perception, judgments, and conception of

what is good and right. At the wall, "Nve are unconcemed with what it is to perceive, to be

aware" (Taylor, 1995, p. 31). Life would be difficult to live if we did not have some

conventions and traditions. Without traditions and conventions, we would be living in a

kind of hyper-awareness. We would never be able to just sit in a chair, click on the

computer switch, or greet each other. Life would be difficult if we could not commiserate

with acquaintances "at the fire in the cave," that is, over a quick lunch in the teacher's

lounge. Sometimes the questions and answers are more about venting over a bad day

or week. "Is the prindpal crazy? Why wouldn't he let the kids out for recess today? It

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wasnl that cold outside!" The release from the wall refers to the daily questioning that

most people do. Sometimes the questions do not require further thought or prompting

from another person. "What am I doing here? Oh. yes, I came into the kitchen to get a

cup of coffee." Question asked and answered. Sometimes, the question about a

convention represents a simple desire to sit down and watch TV. For example, "Oh,

Mom, why do we have to go to grandma's house again? We go every Sunday." Getting

up off the cave bench to turn around requires a bit more strength and effort as does

moving through the darkness of the cave. It also requires a certain environment in which

the questions one asks partake of the Good.

Dewey might say that some questions emerge from one's current body of

knowledge which is still revolving around the self. "What am I doing teaching these fifth-

graders who don't want to learn long division?" Sometimes, selfish emotions produce a

question that Socrates might dismiss as a "false phantom" instead of one "instinct with

life and truth" {Theaetetus, 150c). The three philosophers all make it clear that desires

are part of being human, and we should not strive to crush or ignore them. Our sense

perceptions, though sometimes limited in scope, are all we have to experience the worid.

We are indeed bom with vision, thus with a capability to act in the light of the Good, but

how can we continue to make our lived experiences better or richer? How can we

recognize that some of our questions are rich beginnings or the source for more

questions about the conception we hold about an object or person in our environment?

The answer lies, partly, in the light of the Good or some moral source, in the moment of

wonder called philosophy and how an individual tends to that moment.

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 The Magnet of the Good

The pull of the Good seenns to exist as something that serves to compel the cave

dwellers as it acts through objects, events and people in our environment.^ Antonaccio

and Schweiker (1996) write that for Murdoch, whom I have commented on several times,

"Good is a necessarily real, magnetic force which draws the self beyond itself in moral

concern for concrete other individuals" (p. xiv). Summarizing Murdoch's thoughts on

Goodness, Antonacccio (in Antonaccio and Schweiker, 1996) notes that Goodness:
4

does not represent any particular being or value, but it rather the ground or
source of all being and value; it is not a thing we see directly, but rather that
which makes seeing possible; it is not an object of knowledge, but the condition
of the possibility for knowledge" (p. 132).

In addition, as Tracy (in Antonaccio and Schwieker, 1996) notes, for the

characters in Murdoch's novels, "our ordinary human interactions are often our best

opportunity for both self-delusion and for spotting those self-delusions as we feel,

through the very attractions and confusions of our interaction with others, the magnetic

pull of the Good" (p. 72). This notion of the Good seems to be something present

everywhere, but we must know how to look or how to tend to the pull that we instinctively

feel.

Silber (1999) argues that teachers of philosophy must try to consider the moral

principles they live by. He maintains that there are certain principles "without which no

society can function effectively and without which no individual can hope to live happily

with any chance of self fulfillmenr (p. 84). For example, he writes that when Confucius

was asked, "Is there one word that may serve as a rule of practice for all of one's life?'

He replied, 'Is not reciprocity such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do

not do unto others.'" He also notes that Buddha had said, "Hurt not others in ways that

^ Here it becomes clear again why Rousseau preferred Natural objects while Dewey preferred objects that
represent the "funded capital" of human growth. They each believe that their objects partake more directly
of the Good. Rousseau's objects only needed Emile's interpretation. Dewey's objects, in order for them to
have any meaning for another person must pass through very specific human touches.

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you would find hurtful." Aristotle, when asked how we should behave with our friends

said, "As we should wish them to behave to us." There is the Christian notion of "Do

unto others" and Kant's Categorical Imperative. The "enlargement in understanding"

resulting from putting ourselves in the place of the others or using "imagination" to

consider another's point of view of the other, is "the fundamental importance in the

fulfillment of one's moral responsibilities", even though to "think and act soundly, one

must think and act for oneself (Silber, 1999, p. 86). Reason moves us to the door; we

exit the cave alone through our own human agency. This suggests that there is some

place that thought, or reason, or the soul must look toward or be part of in order to make

better judgments about how to live. While they do not speak directly to the notion of the

Good that Plato or Murdoch mention, they seem to serve a similar purpose. There is

some place that our thought can be guided by and extended to, and from which it draws

light and inspiration.

This brings me back to Taylor's (1989) notion of moral sources. A moral source is

something that keeps our attention focused on some notion of Goodness. As I stated in

Chapter I, Taylor suggests that people should focus on more than just the "right" thing to

do when faced with problems or predicaments. Rather they should conduct themselves

in light of "questions about what it is good to be or what it is good to love" (p. 3). There

must be something more than following rules convention and physical outcomes that

guide our judgment.

For example, it is quite common for student teachers to change their lesson

presentation when they know their university supervisor will be observing. They bring in

lots of plants and hands-on materials. They want to do the right thing or what they think

will please the supervisor. Instead, being in touch with one's moral source highlights the

dignity of the uncertainty that accompanies serious attempts to teach. It is important to

recognize this uncertainty in order to appreciate the teacher as a human being who can,

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indeed, have a positive influence on the students placed in her care. It can restore her

sense of agency as a teacher in the classroom. She can hardly have this kind of

influence if she resolutely avoids areas of doubt, confusion, and uncertainty - in her own

practice as much as in her students' work. To suggest that she accept the uncertainties

actually frees the teacher to become the educator she hopes to be. Having a moral

source, articulating it, and understanding how it influences the choices, can help to guide

the teacher through the doubt, confusion and uncertainty.

Taylor notes that a moral source must be something, "the contemplation of which

commands our respect, which in turn empowers. Whatever fills this role is playing the

part of a moral source" (1989, p. 94). A moral source, simply, is some good through

which we can each attend to our world more carefully. Working in light of a moral source

allows us to be agents for goodness. Taylor also notes that in order to have a sense of

self, one must have a sense of the good and how one's life is situated in relation to this

good. To make sense of our life, we must think of it, "in narrative as somehow related to

the good" (p. 97). As I stated earlier in chapter 1, we order the life goods in our life

based on our conception of some moral source. Taylor argues that to make sense of

situations, to make sense of our lives, to lead better and more meaningful lives, we need

the means to be able to articulate what makes our rationale, or 'gut' reactions,

appropriate or inappropriate. This suggests a certain sort of reflection, being able to ask

oneself questions, and further being able to communicate with others.

Any teacher who asks. "Am I doing the right thing?" might actually be asking a

number of questions. "Am I seeing this situation correctly? Am I seeing it in the dark or

in the light of some examined moral source? If I move to a different position, might my

perception change?" Taylor might say that the teacher who asks. "Am I doing the right

thing?" may actually be trying to follow someone else's procedure in order to get to some

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prespecified or hoped-for end. What the teacher really should ask is, "Am I doing the

good thing?", a question that extends us beyond the merely conventional or predictable.

A moral source moves us through the cave. It is something the love, respect or

reverence of, empowers us to do and to be good. A moral source has to be something,

the search for words to descnbe it as it influences our perception, thoughts and actions,

is our lifelong quest. For example, I can describe the Good. I can use different

adjectives for Good, but I cannot actually see or touch the Good. I can describe trees

and rivers, but I cannot touch Nature. A teacher cannot touch Growth but, with help of

others can get better at describing growth in self and students. One can only see, hear,

or otherwise sense examples of a moral source in people, and events in the worid. A

moral source, it seems, must be something that has the feel of always having been,

something everiasting, something that exists outside of the cave.

Unfortunately, I suspect that most people would be hard-pressed to say what

their moral source would be. We tend to not talk in those terms because as "cave-

dwellers" we follow convention so often. Reading works of Rousseau, Dewey and Plato,

for example, can put teacher candidates and teacher educators in touch with those who

considered some moral source and its implications for education. Discussions about

such philosophical texts can prompt readers then to consider what guides them in their

thinking about education.

Wonder

So, our questions arise from the worid around us. Some are phantoms, while

others hold the promise of more questions. We must leam to honor the latter questions

because they seem to draw their strength from the Good. What they hold is a chance for

us to become consdous of our own unawareness of the conceptions and beliefs we

hold. They hold a chance for us to become agents in our own living. They hold the

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chance to live life more welcoming to wonder. What is apparent, at least in the world of

the cave, is that in order to get to the state of wonder, one must begin at the cave wall.

Childhood, and how an adult prepares a child for expenencing these moments of wonder

certainly is key, but 1 will address that later in the chapter. In the abstract, we can say

that the prisoners are there, looking at shadows held up by puppethandlers, and so on.

Something releases us briefly as I discussed eariier. It has become an object or event

about which we have opinions. I interpret the moment of philosophy - the moment of
4

wonder - when for a split second - a person's thought is projected into the worid of

Ideals. There it basks in the light of wisdom and ideals. Durant (1926/1961) writes,

[B]ehind the surface phenomena and particulars which greet our senses, are
generalizations, regularities, and directions of development, unperceived by
sensation but conceived by reason and thought. These ideas, laws and ideals
are more permanent - and therefore more "real" - than the sense perceived
particular things through which we conceive and deduce them...There is...a
worid of things perceived by sense, and a worid of laws inferred by thought; we
do not see the law of inverse squares but it is there, and everywhere; it was
before anything began, and will survive when all the worid of things is a finished
tale (p. 26).

Plato's notion of the Good does not have to be normative and nor do notions

such as Nature or Growth. We do not have to strive to become part of the worid of

Ideals, for that would be impossible. Instead, the worid of Ideals - the place of the Good -

acts as a place for reason and thought to move toward as we face new predicaments.

The soul, when it exits the cave, is together with wisdom, in uninstrumental space. This

is the moment in which the bright light has dazzled the prisoner, and he is unable to

make out those things whose shadows he saw before. One's soul is forever changed,

and how a person takes advantage of and prepares for those moments is crucial. One

might think about the moment that leaves one speechless, or that moment just before

one says "Aha!" Teachers recognize those students who appear to be listening and

attentive, drift off for a second and then "return" more attentive, ready to try out another

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question. Thought must get back to the object in the cave that first propelled the soul

into the light of the Good.

Barrett (1986) writes, "philosophy is the effort of our human mind to know itself

and take stock of the universe and our place In it" (p. 55).^ A prisoner has been keeping

an account of certain shadows appearing when one day he becomes aware of himself

as an entity that can conceive of past, present and future. The prisoner on a given day in

the present becomes aware of the pattem of past shadows and can predict future

shadows. He notices a pattem and questions arise based on experience.

Berlin (1996) maintains that

philosophy is an attempt, and has always been an attempt, to find ways of

thinking and talking which, by revealing similarities hitherto unnoticed, and
differences hitherto unremarked...cause a transformation of outlook suffident to
alter radically attitudes and ways of thought and speech, and in this way solve or
dissolve problems, redistribute subjects, refomnulate and reclassify relationships
between objects, and transfonn our vision of the worid" (p. 65).

Philosophy addresses a need to not only to questions the shadows on the wall,

but to verbalize those questions. Verbalizing questions, admitting to others in the cave

that one has seen from a different perspective, however is not easy, as displayed in the

three last three chapters.

What Keeps the Soul From Wonder?

In writing about his admiration for the courage with which Socrates lived, de

Botton (2000) writes that he cannot help but comment on why he finds it difficult to live in

such a manner.

^ The theme that Barrett pursues is how certain theories of the mind and of consciousness tend to reduce
them to bits of discrete data. He claims instead "the reality of consciousness' is 'more total and engulfing,
and it can move backward and forward in time.' He writes as an example to suppose that he has a vision of
a particular project. The vision "comes to me now as an aggregate of ready-m^e items, tiut as a while of
which I have as yet only an intuitive grasp and which I must now proceed, with much sweat and toil, to
articulate in its details. If our consciousness could not be groping in this way, it would cease to be genuinely
creative, and it could not then t)e the powerful instrument that it has been in shaping human history" (pp.
165-166).

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 In conversations, my priority was to be liked, rather than to speak the truth. A
desire to please led me to laugh at modest jokes like a parent on the opening
night of a school play.... When passing through customs or driving alongside
police cars, I harboured a confused wish for the uniformed officials to think well of
me (p. 7).

Rousseau would say that yes, it is okay to want to be preferred or liked, but the

manner described here is not sufficient for a fully-realized life. We often turn away from

wonder to stay with a group, or to be liked. Yet, philosophy does not demand that we

continually abanjjon friends and family in order to pay such attention to wonder. The

Vicar tells young Rousseau to retum to his home and to seek the truth right there,

amongst those with whom he is familiar. The Vicar is telling him to continue to look for

the Good in everything already familiar to him; there is no need to travel to some strange

land or seek out practical know-how from some prophet. Goodness and truth reside in

the worid around us, in the shadows with which we think we are familiar. Yet. Dewey,

Rousseau and Socrates would also remind us that as agents we must continue to be

selective in the questions we tend to, and in the company we yeam to converse with.

McAvoy (1999) notes.

One astonishing thing about wonder is that, unlike terror or anxiety, we do not
nonnnally want to ignore it, yet here strangely we do. It is not surprising that terror
is not ignored, since we hardly can, but we can easily ignore wonder, for it is,
unlike awe, not quite so overwhelming. Yet despite its gentler silvery lining, there
is still enough a cloud of perplexity about it to make us recoil from risking
admission or entry into its depths. The sophist, the pseudo- or non-philosopher,
prefers to settle for pseudo-wonder, or 'impenetrability'(p. 23).°^

It certainly seems to be the human condition that it is difficult to admit questions. It is

easier to go along with group consensus. All three philosophers tackled this topic and all

suggest it is worth going on in our questioning. The question, "^hy am I teaching these

kids who don't want to learn long division?" may not be full of "life and truth." Instead.

the teacher posing the question might be frustrated that the class will fall behind the

Here his footnote is, "I meant by 'impenetrability' that we've had enough of that subject, and it would be
just as well if you'd mention what you mean to do next, as I suppose you don't intend to stop here all the rest
of your life.' Chap. 6, 'Humotv Dumotv' Alice Through the Looking Glass, Folk) Soo'ety, 1992, p. 75. *

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math Curriculum schedule. Students will not be ready for the statewide tests. Or, she

might be frustrated because the students are disruptive in class, and she has placed the

blame on the children. While I am not saying she should shift the blame to herself, she

might want to take her question and really try to answer it. What she might find is that

she does not like teaching long division herself, or is frustrated that the focus of her

district is on covering material (mimetic teaching) instead of helping children to

understand the material (transformative teaching). But these questions are difficult to ask

oneself and to verbalize around some colleagues.

The cave wall is predictable and it certainly being by the fire is warm and

comfortable. That adults often do have a more difficult time admitting these questions to

others because we have been conditioned to not ask questions is becoming clearer to

me. It would be risky for a teacher to genuinely ask aloud at a teacher meeting, "I've

been wondering, why are we teaching long division? I want to further explore the

meaning of this." She would get some strange looks from the other teachers along with a

comment, "Look, just follow the cum'culum guide. We teach long division because we

have to teach long division." By verbalizing her questions, she is admitting that she

needs the help of others to interpret her thoughts and confusion about long division. Her

thoughts and current conceptions of mathematics can only take her so far.

Throughout this dissertation, I have mentioned those things that keep us from

wonder, from getting to that moment of aporia. When the soul rejoins the body, one

appears speechless or fumbles for words. One can see this in a classroom seminar for

example. A student raises his hand thinking he has something profound to say but can

barely get out coherent words, "Well, I thought I wanted to add something. I think our

discussion of Dewey's notion of a 'problem' is making sense. I think I have a

question...well, maybe a few questions, I'm not sure. I can't put it all together yet. Let me

think about it for a while." And he listens to further discussion. Just like the teacher who

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asked the question about long division, this student has come back willing and needing

to converse with others about the object in front of them. But to other cave dwellers, the

lack of knowledge the teacher professes and the half-formed questions the student tries

to ask. can suggest that the teacher and student are not "on the bal." The cave allegory

suggests that there will be laughter at those who retum; thus it certainly Is easier to keep

quiet about one's ignorance. It is a very risky proposition to verbalize questions. Dewey,

Rousseau and Socrates highlight the fact that by not speaking up and asking questions,
4

one is still living by some conception of what is right and good, however conventional or

truncated it might be.

Camus (1991) addresses the notion of aporia, that moment when one has been

released and is not sure which path to take, or is not sure if there are any other paths to

take. He notes that we "get into the habit of living before acquiring the habit of thinking"

(p. 8); a "worid that can be explained even with bad reasons is a familiar worid" (p. 6).

This sounds like the worid of illusion at the cave wall. It is a safe and predictable place.

We have learned how to live in it without thinking about or being conscious about these

habits and behaviors. It is more 'rewarding' in the short term to not raise questions.

As Camus continues, an event happens to arouse our consciousness of

something in the worid. A person so agitated cannot reclaim his same seat at the wall

and is different having been exposed to the bright light of the Good. Camus' thinking

becomes similar to the thoughts of Rousseau. Dewey and Socrates. One must admit

Ignorance - "that all true knowledge is impossible" (p. 12). or, "I can never be sure of my

perception." In a way, one must relinquish a sense of control (of the life of predictability

at the wall, or of having to seize and conquer some ideal).

Instead, as Camus notes, consciousness of one's present is key;

"Consciousness suspends in experience the objects of its attention. Through its miracle

it isolates them. We can tend to something carefully and if in the company of others

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come'upon some truth in the situation" (p. 43). This runs counter to living according to

the rules of the wall in which it is expected we always have answers, where it feels good

to have knowledge that someone else does not have, where all thought is purely

instrumental.

This moment aporia is bound to happen to all individuals if we think of the Good

as a magnet, but our "tentacles of self often stop us. As Murdoch (1977) notes, the

defeat of illusion requires moral effort. She refers of Plato,

[throughout his work, including the more cheerful earlier writings, Plato
emphasizes the height of the objective and the difficult of the ascent. On the
other hand, even at his gloomiest he is never in essentials a sceptic. The Good
(truth, reality) is absent from us and hard of access, but it is there and only the
Good will satisfy (p. 69).

Recall also the words the Vicar says to Rousseau, 'one always does well when

one only wishes only to do good.' At the wall, we are prisoners of desire and ignorance

and rewards are extrinsic. Once one is willing to begin living philosophically, with

consciousness, the rewards are intrinsic to the work being done through the light of

some moral source.

I am led once again to the life of Socrates. He did not deny Athenians their right

to make dedsions about how to live their lives as teachers. Sophists, sculptors or ship

builders. However, he did not want the perception of what is right that they felt at the

time of some decision, to stagnate and canry over as some sort of rule into subsequent

experiences. He was a constant reminder to stay conscious and aware. To most

Athenians, this sort of examination was very threatening. As I alluded to in the previous

chapter, Socrates did not expect the Athenians to give up their day jobs to be like him.

He did not want them to be like him. He only wanted them to care for their own souls.

This curiosity and wonder is easier to avoid then to embrace, unless one has faith that

surrendering to the Good does not mean foregoing one's way of life once and for all.

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 It seems then, that all "cave-dwellers" all have the capability to be philosophers.

When we wish to do good, or try to live according to some moral source, we are living

philosophically. Rousseau, Dewey, and Socrates all place faith in this ability that lies in

all cave dwellers - no matter what profession or work or stage of life they are part of. It

seems that what is key is to start when questions still do come naturally. But some might

ask still, what are the payoffs for such a life? Two thoughts come to mind.

First, this ability for the soul to leave the cave suggests it will come back with a
4

need to be enlightened once again, but it can only happen with further attention to and

conversation about the particulars (people, meanings, events, and objects) in this cave.

Each return seems to lead to better perception, moral rather than instrumental

perception.

Philosophy does need practical contexts from which to emerge. This suggests

that as teachers, we "should always do morally is strive to perceive our students' best

possibilities. Assessing our students' best possibilities is difficult, however; it requires a

great deal of imagination" (Gam'son, 1997, p. 171) Practical contexts are often very

messy, but they need to be approached with an attitude of faith and imagination that

partakes of the sort Rousseau writes of if they can lead us to philosophy. However, we

must learn to let this occur. We "must let ourselves be changed in our point of view,

attitudes and convictions" (Hadot. p. 91).

Secondly, there is a notion of progress that must be addressed. Philosophy is

often taken to task for providing certainty in conclusions or not offering any assurances.

Nehamas (1998) asks, tongue in cheek, "What is the good of philosophy, after all, if it

does not tell people what to do?" (p. 103). Murdoch (Murdoch, 1970/1991) also

maintains that many look at philosophy and ask where it has progressed. Taylor (2000)

writes that "Socrates even sometime describe philosophy as the tendency of the soul,

thinking again of its analogy with medicine, which is the tendance of the body" (pp. 84-

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85). The body longs for facts while the soul longs for the truth. This would suggest that

philosophy and the sdences are complementary in living a good life, yet as Murdoch

notes, "science cannot contain morality" (p. ). As much as we would like certainty in our

lives, we cannot have It unless we are willing to give up our agency. Scientific methods

and studies can provide teachers series of checklists from which to choose, but science

cannot make the choice for the teacher. Science gives us the options, but people do the

choosing.

Exiting the cave is not a once in a lifetime occurrence that needs to be feared or

conquered. Being released and compelled, the soul exiting and retuming to the cave,

goes on much more than we are aware. But to become aware is key. With practice, as

noted earlier, it gets easier to 'let' faith, reason, imagination, thought 'take over* or

'illuminate' the present. It is a whole shift in focus and that is where wisdom lies.

Philosophy - the love of wisdom - suggests one wants to be in new situations to further

and more deeply be with the Good. This practice can first begin in discussions about

philosophical texts.

The return to the cave suggests a person needs and appredates those moments

of being dumbfounded. Therefore, there is no philosophical progress that can be

observed directly (i.e., look at how fast her soul exited and returned to her body). We do

not accumulate wisdom. Instead, it seems to suggest a refining of one's posture of

openness to the world. We let faith take over more often and we get better at interpreting

the pull of the Good when it does occur. We get better at thinking, with the Good as a

source and we get better at verbalizing our questions. As humans, we cannot label some

person, object or event 'Good. 'The best we can do is to return to the person, objects

and events that continually compel us and continue, along with others, to give names

and words to the temporary truths we seek together.

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 Murdoch has a wonderfully reassuring way of reminding readers that there

should be no pressure to keep looking for the good so that they can one day daim. "I'm

done. I have found the Good." Such a search would lead to very dismal days. Instead

she reminds us that life is muddled and difficult, yet in these difficulties is where

instances of the Good can be found (Murdoch, 1977). Gamwell (in Antonoccio and

Sshweiker 1996), notes that for Murdoch, "Life is a spiritual pilgrimage inspired by the

disturbing magnetism of truth, involving ipso facto a purification of energy and desire in
4

the light of a vision of what is good" (p. 14)." Moral advance is the movement toward

reality. The ability to see better, further, deeper is rewarding in itself. It is the reward that

makes one want to continue on the quest. The reward in seeing 'predicaments' instead

of problems, as I stated in Chapter I, presents teachers with opportunities for "growth,

accomplishment, and joy."

Finally, as Annas (1981) maintains:

The Cave is Plato's most optimistic and beautiful picture of the power of
philosophy to free and enlighten. Abstract thinking, which leads to philosophical
insight, is boldly portrayed as something liberating. The person who starts to
think is shown as someone who breaks the bonds of conformity to ordinary
experience and received opinion, and the progress of enlightenment is portrayed
as a journey from darkness into light. Unlike the passive majority, people who
start to use their minds are doing something for themselves; after the first
(admittedly mysterious) release from bonds it requires the person's own utmost
effort to toil upwards out of the Cave. Few thinkers in philosophy or fiction have
given a more striking, and moving, picture of philosophical thinking as a releasing
of the self from undifferentiated conformity to a developing and enriching struggle
for the attainment of (p. 251).

Beriin (in Hardy, .1999) notes that an "allegory is a representation in words or in

paint of something which has its own meaning but also stands for something other than

itself (pp. 101-102). That which it represents is not always stable in clear and predse

terms. For me, it has proven to be a worthwhile allegory through with to view education

and its terms.

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 Teacher Education

To relate the cave more directly to teaching and teacher education once again, a

quote by Montaigne is appropriate. He writes.

Many of the delusions of the worid, or to speak more boldly, all the delusions in
the worid, are begotten of our being taught to be afraid of professing our
ignorance, and thinking ourselves bound to accepting everything we cannot
refute. We speak of all things in an authoritative and dogmatic style.... I prefer
these words which tone down and modify the hastiness of our propositions:
'Perhaps, In some sort. Some, They say, I think,' and the like. And if I had had to
train children I should have so accustomed them to adopt this inquiring, doubting
mode of reply: 'What does that mean? I do not understand; It might be so; Is that
true?' that they would rather have kept up the appearance of learners at the age
of sixty than put on the airs of a leamed doctor a ten, as they do (in McAvoy,
1999, p. 27).

If one of the aims of teacher education is to invite and nurture students into being

curious leamers, then how can philosophical texts be of service? As Greene (1978)

notes.

If teachers are not critically conscious, if they are not awake to their own values
and commitments (and to the conditions working upon them), if they are not
personally engaged with their subject matter and with the worid around, I do not
see how they can initiate the young into critical questioning or the moral life (p.
48).

I maintain that these texts can help to make pre-service and student teachers "critically

conscious" at a time when they are, metaphorically speaking, in the childhood of their

professional careers as educators. Childhood is a critical time to prepare people to

question so that when they must make moral judgments, they are used to the

questioning way of life- when it becomes most important. As humans, as teachers, we

have more freedom and responsibility and capacity for agency than we realize. It seems

a teacher's unique work is to foster a love for this in students as well as renew this love

through one's work.

One way to help student teachers to become these critically conscious teachers

is through reading and discussing philosophical texts. Reading such texts is like bearing

witness to curiosity and innocence. Philosophical texts can serve as objects around

171
which conversation can take place. Teacher education classrooms should be the place

where honoring candidates own images and questions can occur, giving these

prospective teachers time to nurture and practice honoring the compelling nature of

wonder. Such texts and practice can put them on the road to becoming lifelong learners,

agents in their own leaming. This puts teachers In the position of, for example, wanting

to learn more about their subject matter, how to teach the subject matter or how to help

their students tend to and develop their own curiosity and questions. However, the point

I wish to reiterate is not for teacher educators to read the dialogues with their students

repeatedly in order to come up with, for example, a picture of the real Socrates.

Historians have not been able to do that in the last 2500 years. The usefulness lies in

the fact that his complexities can leave one perplexed, in awe or angry. Therein lies the

potential he has to compel those who come in contact with him, either in person as he

did 2500 years ago, or today in teacher education classrooms. His life, along with the

thoughts of philosophers such as Rousseau and Dewey, as part of the complex world of

the cave, can and do act as the font for emotional reactions. They provide many

opportunities for being released from the cave wall; this is where classroom conversation

and dialogue can begin.

Because teaching is not a simple skill that one leams, like how to tie a shoelace

or how to hold a tennis racquet; it is difficult to teach others how to teach well. Teaching,

is indeed, a moral activity and, as such, teacher candidates need to think about the

source that supports their opinions. Teaching lies in carefully maneuvering through the

predicaments with a developing moral perception. It means trying to perceive well,

thinking about how others solved similar problems in the past, and adjusting the

methods one has learned. Helping to put someone else on the road of being better

means becoming aware of the conceptions and opinions one holds about morally loaded

terms as better and good. If teacher educators believe teacher candidates can and

172
should be agents in their own learning, then we must accept that part of their job is to

help their own students become agents in their own leaming. This, of course, means that

we believe they can make rational judgments in and about their classrooms and likewise

for their students. They must become aware that habits, opinions, conventions, and the

like, have the potential to influence their perception and thought.

In addition to making teacher candidates aware of the opinions they hold, the

cave allegory suggests that if teachers want to avoid the role of puppethandler, then they
*
cannot adopt the 'moral' standpoint of "^hat I say goes in my classroom." Also, if

teachers want to stay away, as much as possible, from warming themselves by the fire,

then they too must avoid saying things like, 'Well, when I was in fourth grade, my

teacher was really unfair and I never want to be unfair to my students. I will let them say

or do whatever they want in class." Both of these positions sidestep the moral

perception that it takes to be a teacher tying to work in the light of some moral source.

Both positions avoid the rich predicaments that hold the potential for both teacher and

student to work in the light of the Good, the potential to think more clearly both alone and

with others, and the potential to get better at working in this light.

The ability to be aware of one's opinions must be fostered; one place to begin is

certainly in teacher education classrooms, or more specifically in the obligatory

philosophy of education classroom. My writing up to this point suggests that wrestling

with actual philosophical texts can be very worthwhile for both teacher and pre-service

teachers. But. there are two thoughts I want to make obvious that reinforce this

assumption, that these texts can become objects in Dewey's sense of the word and that

they can continually serve as objects because they are "profound."

Teacher educators do not have their own homerooms. They cannot bring in

plants or carefully decide what will go on the bulletin boards. It can sometimes be

173
difficult to decide on what nnaterials nnight become relevant objects in the classroom.

Philosophical texts can easily turn into objects around which they can seek the truth.

Unfortunately, more often the texts do not serve as objects. Freimiller (1997) found

many students in her Introduction to Philosophy class "very oriented toward utility.

'What's this going to do for me?'" (p. 271). Pre-service teachers often have the same

feeling. Profriedt (1994) notes that even some teacher educators "view teaching a

course in the philosophy of education as a less serious enterprise than running a field-

based program or teaching a 'practical' course (such as "Classroom Management)" (p.

49). Further, he maintains, -

In our anxiety to be responsive to the problems of teachers and schools, we have

accepted the narrowest definitions of those problems and encouraged the
teachers to do the same. In the process, we have forgotten the need to question
current definitions of the problems and to lead teachers to question them as well
(p. 50).

Indeed, it is important to give voice to the perception of the problems teachers, pre-

service students and student teachers have in their classrooms. An important step in

improving their situations is by giving them the space to talk about their problems and

allowing them to put into words the feelings they have. Yet, as Proefriedt (1994) notes,

our "dismissal of a philosophical approach in the education of teachers stems from a

focus on what many consider to be important - but what in fact tums out to be shadows

and images on the walls of the cave" (p. 50). Unfortunately, in our rush to help and honor

the thoughts and feelings of teachers and students, we forget that their thoughts and

feelings can have deeper significance. We use the terms we have come up with to

unknowingly categorize the thoughts of each new teacher or student we meet. Dewey

(1929) writes that "we are made for conversation with our kind" (p. 125) and that too

often, "we lose ourselves in the stream of events because we are afraid of conversation,

of thought, of art which should say something" (p. 127). Sinaiko (1998) also writes that

"dialogical necessity" - "that we cannot discover the truth about ourselves by ourselves;

174
we need to do it with someone else - "is built into the human situation" (p. 15). In a

sense, the problem is that we already know that candidates have conceptions of

teaching or else they would not be in a teacher education program. What is important is

that teacher educators help their teacher candidates begin to state their current opinions

on educational issues, and then help them to become aware of how these influence their

perception of the world.

In addition to Dewey's notion of an object supporting the idea that philosophical

texts are worth reading. Berlin (in Hardy, 1999) once again comes to mind. In describing

certain works, he uses the word "profound." By profound, he means the texts have a

depth which suggests an "inexhaustibility" or "unembraceability". He writes.

In the case of worits which are profound the more I say the more remains to be
said. There is no doubt that, although I attempt to describe what their profundity
consists in, as soon as I speak it becomes quite clear that, no matter how long I
speak, new chasms open. No matter what I say I always have to leave three dots
at the end. That being so, this is certainly one of the uses of 'profound' - to
invoked the notion of irreducibility, the notion that I am forced in my discussion,
forced in description, to use language which is in principle, not only today but for
ever, inadequate for its purpose (pp 102-103).

This was my experience while reading and rereading Dewey, Rousseau and

Plato. There is certainly always more to leam regarding what each author thought. But

more importantly, they continually serve to release and compel. In Chapter III, I

suggested that a plant can serve to invite children into the history of plants, that others

have studied them and that whatever knowledge they have is subject to change. Pre-

service teachers do come into programs with images, conceptions, and opinions that

teacher educators need to draw out. Often some candidates seem almost sophist-like in

the opinions they hold and some appear wounded from their own experiences as

students. Others simply love children and believe this love will see them through the

tough times. As Dewey would note, that they all seem to come from different

175
backgrounds, with different expectations of the course and different images of what

teaching entails.

As Dewey's teachers must decide on which materials can become objects, a

teacher educator needs to decide which philosophical texts or novels can become

objects in a teacher education classroom which consists of students from a variety of

backgrounds. The diverse background of the students can provide the material for rich

discussion. The teacher must take advantage of these differences because they hold
*
the promise for thoughtful and thought-provoking discussions. Questioning conventional

beliefs, expectations or suppositions does not necessarily mean one is rejecting them. In

fact, it could very well mean the opposite. It could mean one has been compelled to look

further into the convention or supposition. Once in the throws of everyday classroom

routines, problems, and predicaments, it is difficult to know that an event holds promise if

one has not practiced in this light. Further, through these discussions between students

or student and teacher, we are reminded of the fragility of each individual student's soul

and how the teacher must try to maintain this awareness.^^

To cite an example, Silber (1999) describes a student in one of his philosophy

classes who wrote a very thoughtful paper in which he defended Protagoras's position

that "Man is the measure of all things." Silber made the usual comments throughout the

student's paper, but gave the student's paper "a resounding F." When the student came

in to complain, Silber responded.

Why are you complaining, I was totally convinced of your argument. Since you
have shown that there are no objective criteria by which I can evaluate your
paper, because all such judgments are matters of whim, I dedded to follow my
whim and give you an F. What now is your objection?" (p. 86)

^ Again, I must make it dear that I certainly do not believe it is possible to be hyperaware. The cave implies
that that position and ability is impossible. But that does not mean despair. It means that every day is a new
day and presents new opportunities to see and looi(.

176
 ' He notes "The student was thunderstnjck, as he had to face for the first time the

practical consequences of his own frivolous argument. Thereafter, he became a much

more thoughtful student" (p. 87). This sounds like something Socrates might do. The

student was living with certain assumptions about what was right and good. Silber simply

helped him to think through all the Implications, which is what Socrates tried to do for the

Sophists. So, philosophical texts can compel, and one way to start is to have the

candidates summarize what the text is "saying." Silber does not go into detail about the
4

assignment or the discussions that preceded the paper, but we might assume either he

or the student asked, "What does Protagoras mean when he says that 'Man is the

Measure of all things'?"

What Silber's woric suggests is that we cannot merely let preservice teachers

voice their opinion about a text and how it relates (or does not) to some educational

issue and leave it at that. They need to team how to approach these profound texts and

how to use them to support and challenge their opinions. Rosner (1998) suggests that "a

purely emotional response stands as a bam'er to richer understanding and Insight, not

just for the individual but for the class as well" and that "emotions become self-

confining...because they prevent one from seeing beyond one's personal experience."

She uses "sympathetic bias," a term from The Moral Life of Schools (Jackson, Boostrom,

and Hansen, 1993), which means a "loosening up or a relaxing of the tendency to rush

to judgement" to descrit)e the "respectful orientation toward teachers and students."

Rosner uses the term to suggest a way to approach texts.

By students and teacher forming an agreement to approach the text with a

"sympathetic bias" the teacher has in effect, opened up a space that otherwise might not

have been realized by the students. While they will still have their emotional first

reactions, asking them to take a moment to consider, "Am I trying to understand what

the author is saying?" helps them to realize that they indeed have this reaction. It opens

177
up a space for them to begin to dialogue with themselves. It invites them to not only say,

for example, "I heard that this Rousseau would let kids do whatever they want," or

"Rousseau is wrong to suggest that women stay home to take care of the children."

Approaching a text with "sympathetic bias" invites them to think, "Well, maybe I should

actually read Rousseau more carefully before I believe what someone else has told me

about him," or "What do I think about gender roles that might have caused this reaction?"

It asks students to have faith that their classmates are trying to read the text in such a

manner as well which in turn, suggests that each have respect for the opinions of others.

While emotional reactions to these "profound" texts give us a place to begin

discussion, Rosner (1998) maintains that good classroom discourse requires

participants to feel "responsible to ourselves and to our fellow inquirers to buttress our

assertions with explanations." Here, she cites Midgely (1993) who writes:

What explanation does is to specify. It does not just make a claim and
emphasise it. It shows in detail what kind of recommendation that claim has. It
makes sense of the feeling rather than just expressing and defending it. And it
functions both ways between positions, so that each respondent, by listening,
finds out how to become more intelligible to the other (p. 149).

This suggests returning repeatedly to the text to listen as one student reads some lines

that support her position. In this process, not only are candidates learning, for example,

what Rousseau thought about the education methods of his day, the students are each

leanning that they each have certain positions on critical matters of education, and that

these positions will influence their practice. Further, the students are forced to give voice

to their opinions in the company of other souls sympathetic to the need to leam good

teaching.

Gadamer (1975) might say that realizing that one has these opinions, and by

trying to state them can make one "aware of one's own bias, so that the text can present

itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one's own fore-meanings"

(p. 269). In reading these texts carefully, one tries to understand what the author

178
means. Attempts to "listen" to the author and to listen to others is actually practice (in a

trusting environment set up by the teacher educator) for conversations and

communication to come once one becomes a teacher. Heslep (1998) writes that

"communication sustains and develops the freedom...and deliberativeness that are

features of agents, both as individuals and as members of society, communication is

something that students need to learn not just to succeed as students but to develop and

flourish as agents" (p. 32).

Hansen (2000) maintains also that these philosophical texts can be worthwhile

and suggests questions to begin interpreting the text. Interpreting Brann (1999) he

writes,

shared inquiry centered around meaningful texts can lead persons beyond
uncritical opinion includii.g the opinion that their outlooks possess automatic
validity or truth (p. 8).

This means that while reading and discussing philosophical works, we need to

help teacher candidates to move beyond simply trying to explain what they think the

authors are saying. Instead, in order to "ponder seriously the terms of the work" and

"provoke them to think about their motivation and their ability to teach and their

willingness to take the necessary steps to leam how to perform well" they should their

questions on how they interpret the author. Such questions would be, "Should I teach as

they do, or in the spirit which they advance? Is it possible, and desirable, that I follow

their example?" (p. 8).

In terms of the cave allegory, by asking these questions we are moving them

beyond simply stating their opinion about a text. As mentioned eariier, eliciting an

opinion is not necessarily improper, but is not enough to help them to think about

themselves as agents. Hansen suggests "three core questions" to help make the

discussion fruitful. "What does it [the text] say? What does it mean? And What

difference does it make?" It is exercises like this that turn the text into a common object

179
of study for the teacher and students. After coming to some common understand the

teacher should then ask the students to consider, "Am I willing to conduct myself in this

way? Do I believe this" (p. 9)?

Asking students to think a bit more about their opinions and those of others might

be a call to simply help our teachers to be more reflective. Being reflective is more than

sharing opinions of a text or sharing stories about one of the children they are wori<ing

with consistently misbehaves. For a teacher, it would mean more than sharing her
4

particular methods for keeping the quiet (i.e., writing her spelling words 20 times each,

having her sit alone in the back of the classroom, or sending her down to the principal's

office, and so on).°^ This once again brings up the notion of truth. Certainly it is

necessary to vent, but just talking to confirm their opinions that Janie is 'trouble,' does

not mean the teachers are being reflective, or are trying to discover the truth about

Janie. In fact, no person can discover "The Tnjth" about Janie. For her to become the

object around which they can have a meaningful discussion, two things would have to

happen. First, the teachers must state that they are aware of how their encrusted

opinions might be influendng their perception of her. It suggests approaching her with

"sympathetic bias" written of eariier. While I am not suggesting that one semester of

approaching texts with "sympathetic bias" has forever given teachers a way to approach

their students, but what I have written up to this point suggests that it might be helpful.

Stating that they each have some hardened perceptions about Janie suggests they are

willing to have their opinions changed by the other. Secondly, it suggests that they are

not just discovering the tnjth about Janie. They come under the truth when they each

have moved from their current conceptions of this particular student. They have changed

as a result of the conversation, not the child. They are not looking for the truth about her,

^ I am not saying that any of these are inappropriate forms of disdpline, but to use them regularly on any
one group of students or any one particular child, suggests something more is going on that needs tending
to.

180
per se. Instead, they are working at fonning a temporary working truth about her through

their conversation. They might still come to the conclusion that she misbehaves too

much, but they might see her with a slightly more enlightened eye.

Higgins (Higgins, 2001) subjects Schon's notion of reflective practice to a

sympathetic critique. What teaching calls for is a kind of reflection that goes beyond

instrumental rationality - beyond means-end reasoning. He believes the "Aristotelian

concept of phronesis or practical wisdom (as extended by Hans-Georg Gadamer) offers

4

us a richer vocabulary for talking about the very kind of reflectiveness Schon is after" (p.

3). By applying Aristotle's notion of techne (craft knowledge) with phronesis (moral

knowledge), he maintains that "[Tleachers must cultivate not only flexibility in application

of education methods, but practical wisdom about educational aims. "In applying a

certain solution to a problem, a teacher might be doing something well, but "without

necessarily acting for the good." In order to see what a situation demands", one "must

view the particulars of the situation in light of one's "general notions of good and right".

This means the focus shifts from oneself and a specific end in view to the particulars of

the situation. It means leaning to think about one's moral source.

Nozick (1990) asks, if the philosopher love wisdom or love the love of wisdom.

My answer is that the philosopher loves wisdom. This person loves wisdom because it

gives a person the freedom to live within the realm of faith here in the cave, in the realm

of questions, the unsure, the realm of willingness, wonder, curiosity and fallibility. In this

realm, there is not knowledge, but faith. Each time a teacher begins a new day or a new

lesson, they might think of it as a return to the cave. A teacher should need students in

order to be with the Good, or in order to think in some moral source. A person does not

return to the cave out of a selfish need to be close to the Good again. A person returns

for oneself but for others, so that they too can experience such moments.

181
 • If, as Rorty claims, that all we do involves reading and interpreting, the mindful

reading of philosophical texts in teacher education classrooms is one way to help

students leam to love the difficult movement out of the cave and the necessary return

into it.

182
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 VITA

NAME:
Michelle Renee Pierczynski-Ward

EDUCATION:

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO

September 1992 to September 2002 - Ph.D., Cum'culum and Instruction, Fail, 2002

December 1986 - M.Ed. - College of Education/Educational Studies-Elementary Education

December 1981 • B.S. - College of Business/Marketing: completed 30 hours in math
and computer related courses

September 1991 to 1995 - Audited classes in spoken and written Mandarin at UlC

HAROLD WASHINGTON JUNIOR COLLEGE

September 1989 to May 1991 - Studied Mandarin Chinese through Department of
Continuing Education.

EXPERIENCE:

SAM HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY

January, 2002-May, 2002 - Student Teaching Supervisor, EED 491/492, SED 496/497,

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO

January 1993 -May1997 - Research Assistant.

• May 1996-May 1997 - Assistant to author of chapter on Teaching as a Moral Activity.

Part of a sponsored project by AERA for 4"^ edition of Handbook of Research on
Teaching, ed. Dr. Virginia Richardson.

• January 1993 - May 1997 -Assistant to book review editor for The Journal of Curriculum
Studies.

• April 1994 - April 1995 - Assistant to Program Chair, Division B of American Educational
Research Association.

September, 1992-December, 1996, University Field instructor, ED 315/325

January-May, 1994 and 1995 - Teaching Assistant and Field instructor. ED 470/471

February -April, 1996 - Research Assistant - Sponsored project "Evaluation of the

Technology-Rich Educational Environment."

October-December, 1995 - Research Assistant - Sponsored project: "Classroom Effects

of Reform Study," for the Consortium on Chicago School Research based at University
of Chicago.

DE PAUL UNIVERSITY

189
 January-April, 1997 - Adjunct Lecturer, CU 380 - Philosophical Foundations of
Education-

EAST CHINA INSTITUTE OF POLITICS AND LAW (Shanghai. Peoples' Republic of

China)
July-August, 1994-Visiting Instructor

September 1990 - February 1991 - Visiting Instructor of English.

February - June 1987 - Visiting Instructor of English.

ANDREW JACKSON LANGUAGE ACADEMY fChicaao. Illinois)

September1991 - June 1992 - Substitute teacher - Substituted grades K-8.
4

September 1987 - June 1990 - Teacher, S"' Grade, self-contained classroom.

ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE:

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO (UlC)

March, 1983-September, 1986 - Coordinator for Student Employment

December 1981 - March 1983 - Administrative Assistant, Office of the Vice Chancellor
for Administration.

February-December, 1981 - Student Assistant, Office of the Vice Chancellor for

Administration.

HONORS AND AWARDS:

UlC Faculty of Education Teaching Incentive Award, 1996.

East China University of Politics and Law - Presidential Citation, 1995.

SCHOLARLY PRESENTATIONS AND ACTIVITIES:

December 2000-April 2001 - Book Display Co-Coordinator - Philosophy of Education

Society (PES).

April 2000 - Session Chair - Division B/Division K Symposium .

April 1998 - Paper presentation -Division B - Sources of Self-Examination in Teacher

Education, Annual meeting of American Educational Research Association (AERA).

Summer 1995 - Reviewer -Division G-for annual meeting of the AERA held in Division
G for annual meeting of the AERA.

April 1995 - Session Chair - Division B Paper presentation - Studies of Cum'culum

Enactment and Evaluation at annual meeting of the AERA.

190