Cruz, Mario

THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE CAUSE OF EVIL

Within the Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas, many aspects of Catholic dogma were

stated and affirmed. The struggle for man to understand good versus evil is a dogmatic practice that has

always intrigued this author. Saint Aquinas has put together three points, questions that were asked to

understand the cause of evil.

The three questions that Saint Aquinas asked were as follows. The first, whether good can be

the cause of evil? The second, whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil? And third, whether

there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of all evils. Saint Aquinas breaks each question down

into numerous objections and then a statement of contrary. He then writes an answer that he will use

as evidence to prove his replies to each objection for his three questions. In doing so, he makes his

theory known and then states evidence, thus providing rebuttal to the objection, hence providing a

theological backbone to Catholic dogmatic practice.

In the first question on “The Cause of Evil,” Saint Aquinas provides the first objection to the

question; whether good can be the cause of evil? The first objections is, “It would seem that good

cannot be the cause of evil. For it is said, ‘a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit.’” 1 Saint Aquinas

refutes this objection by stating that the “rational creature” causes the “evil will,” but the “rational

creature” is good, so good is the cause of evil. Saint Aquinas cites Augustine, “there is no possible

source of evil except good,”2 in his contrary to the objections to the first question. Within the answer

that Saint Aquinas has stated, he talks about the privation of form. Where he says that good is the

subject of evil, and “evil is a privation of form.” He says, “for it was shown that good is the subject of

evil. But evil has no formal cause, rather is it a privation of form; likewise, neither has it a final cause,

but rather is it a privation of order to the proper end; since not only the end has the nature of good, but

1
Mat. 7:18
2
Augustine of Hippo, Contra Julian. I, 9
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THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE CAUSE OF EVIL

also the useful, which is ordered to the end. Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent, not directly,

but accidentally.” Saint Aquinas proves this by stating that evil is caused by the action, not the effect.

In the second objection, Aquinas talks about contrary where he says, “one contrary cannot be

the cause of another. Evil is the contrary to good, therefore good cannot be the cause of evil.” This

objection is the notion of good versus evil and the division that one would see. Aquinas does not see it

this way. He does admit that a contrary does, indeed, cause another; however, it is done so by accident.

Aquinas uses the example of shivering to explain that the contrary is done by accident. He says, “the

exterior surrounding cold heats (the body) through the concentration of the inward heat.” Aquinas

explains that evil is the cause of the contrary to itself, not good. Thus the “goodness of fire” causes

“evil” to water. For example, the heat causes the water to boil, but it is still in liquid form, but as the

water evaporated, it dissipates into steam. This breaks apart what makes water good, naturally good;

however, fire is naturally good as well. Aquinas says that the “goodness of fire” causes an “act morally

evil” to water. Making water dissipate into steam is not what makes it naturally good.

Aquinas states, in regards to the third objection on whether good can be the cause of evil, that a

“deficient effect” can only come from a “deficient cause.” Objection three continues to say that “evil is

a deficient effect.” Evil’s cause is deficient, and everything “deficient is an evil,” therefore, the cause of

evil is evil. Aquinas then responds to this objection that “evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things

otherwise than in natural things.” Natural things produce the effects that it is intended to unless it is

“impeded by some exterior thing.” This is a “defect.” “Evil never follows in the effect” unless there is a

“pre-existing” evil in that natural thing. When it comes to voluntary things, the “will,” and its actions are

deficient in the “defect of the actions” of the “will.” Aquinas continues to say the “defect is not a fault.”

The fact that the action willfully takes place with this defect in the “fault” itself. In the fourth objection,
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THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE CAUSE OF EVIL

Aquinas quotes Dionysius to say that “evil has no cause.” His response to this is a clarification in syntax,

where he says that “evil has no direct cause” but only an “accidental one.”

At this point, Aquinas moves on to the second of the three questions. He asks, “whether the

supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?” In the first objection, Aquinas writes that some would say that

the “supreme good, God, is the cause of evil.” He then uses two quotes from the Bible to corroborate

this objectional notion. He first says, “I am the Lord, and there is no other God, forming the light, and

creating darkness, making peace, and creating evil.” 3 And then goes onto the second quote from the

Bible is saying, “Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath not done?” Within Aquinas’ answer, he

clarifies by saying, “the order of justice belongs to the order of the universe, and this requires that

penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but not the

evil which is fault.” In the story of the great deluge, God washes away, man, because of the wickedness

that he saw in their hearts. This is an evil correct, but it is an evil through penalty. God was not at fault

for the wickedness in their hearts. This holds true with Aquinas’ reply to the first objection in saying that

the evil that is stated above refers to the “evil of penalty,” not the “evil of fault.”

The second objection of the second question, it states that “good is the cause of evil,” and since

God is the “cause of every good,” it means that from God comes evil. This objection is relying on the

first premise that good is the cause of evil. Where Aquinas responded to this premise within the

answers to the first question, he goes on to elaborate more on the rebuttal of the premise. He says,

whereas God is the “motive power” in his example of a limp, the defect is not the movement of the leg,

given to us by God, but in the “curvature of the leg.” So, whatever the defect may be, it does not come

from God, but from the “secondary cause.” In the third objection, Aquinas states another quote and

this time from whom he refers to as the “Philosopher.” This is Aristotle who he is using and quotes him

to say, “the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same.” God is the “safety in all things”
3
Isiah 45: 5,7
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THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE CAUSE OF EVIL

and thus is the “cause of all perdition and of all evil.” 4 Aquinas dismisses this objection as uncomparable

because the ship’s safety is up to the sailor, so if the ship sinks because it is unsafe, then that is the fault

of the sailor. He goes on to say that “God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all.”

Aquinas moves onto the last question, and it is a question that is often misconstrued with an

answer that is also misinterpreted. The question is whether there is one supreme evil, which is the

cause of every evil? One could simply say that the Fallen Angel, Satan, is the one supreme evil;

however, that would play into the misconceptions. The first objection is the one that allows the

misinterpretation of dogma, saying that there is “one supreme evil, which is the cause of every evil.”

Aquinas quotes, “good is set against evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner against a just man.” 5

He goes on the say that “there are many contrary principles, one of good, the other of evil.” The second

objection states that the supreme good is in nature and is the cause of good. So, if contraries exist in

nature, there would be a supreme evil to the supreme good. Again this makes sense; however, it does

not hold true to the previous proofs that Aquinas has set forth previously. The third objection states

that we find good and better things, so we must find evil and worse things. He goes on to say, “good

and better are considered in relation to what is best. Therefore, evil and worse are to considered in

relation to some supreme evil.” Again, this objection is put forth to put the supreme good, God, against

a being that is the supreme evil. Aquinas does not believe this to be. In the fourth objection, he says,

“everything participated is received to what is essential.” But, evil things that are participated are not

essentially evil, so we “must seek for some supreme essential evil, which is the cause of every evil.”

Aquinas does go on to correct these misconceptions of evil in his answer and replies to the six objections

to this question.

4
Aquinas refers to Aristotle as the Philosopher, Aristotle, Phys. Ii, text 30
5
Ecclus. 33: 15
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THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE CAUSE OF EVIL

He then moves to say in the fifth objection that the term “per se” is introduced to say “whatever

is accidental is reduced to that which is “per se.” He goes on to say that “good is the accidental cause of

evil.” So, a supreme evil must be the “per se” cause of evils. It cannot be said that evil has only an

accidental cause and no “per se” cause because evil would then only exist in the few and not the many.

The sixth and final objection to the third question is that “we must suppose one first evil as the cause of

every evil.” Aquinas goes on to write that we cannot prove for “infinity” that the evil of the effect is

reduced to the evil of the cause.

Aquinas states in his contrary to the objections for the third question that “the supreme good is

the cause of every being. Therefore there cannot be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evil.”

Aquinas then answers, “there is no first principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good.” He then

answers in three parts. The first, he says, is “the first principle of good is essentially good.” There is

nothing that “can be essentially bad.” Because “every being” is good and “that evil can exist only in

good as in its subject.” Secondly, he states, “the first principle of good is the highest and perfect good

which pre-contains in itself all goodness.” There cannot be a “supreme evil” because “although evil

always lessons good, it never wholly consumes it.” So while “good always remains,” there can never be

anything that is “wholly and perfectly bad.” Aquinas quotes the Philosopher once again to say that “if

the wholly evil could be, it would destroy itself.” 6 Since evil is the “subject of good,” if “good were to be

destroyed, evil itself would be taken away.” The third part, Aquinas writes that the very nature of evil is

against the idea of a first principle because every evil is caused by good and because evil can be only an

accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental cause is subsequent to the

direct cause.

Aquinas writes his replies to the six objections to the third question, as mentioned above. The

reply to the first objection is that contraries agree in the nature of being and that “we must come at last
6
Aristotle, Ethics iv, 5
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THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE CAUSE OF EVIL

to one first common cause.” His reply to the second objection is that “privation and habit belong

naturally to the same subject.” He then goes on to say that “since evil is privation of good, it is opposed

to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the supreme good, who is pure act.” It is said that

“evil and worse, by reason of access to the supreme evil, and good and better by reason of access to the

supreme good” are not the same thing as stated in reply to the third objection. In reply to the fourth

objection that everything can be reduced to what is essential, Aquinas answers, “no being is called evil

by participation but by privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to any essential

evil.” So evil is seen as through privation. Aquinas replies to the fifth and sixth objections in just a few

lines. He states that “evil can only have an accidental cause.” So since this is true, then we cannot

reduce evil to any “per se” cause. The sixth reply refers to the causes of evil are not “preceded to

infinity,” but we do reduce “all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows accidentally.

Within the Summa Theologica, Saint Thomas Aquinas brings forth the standard for Christian

theology, that foundation that all those that worship God and Christ should look at and abide by as well.

In another section of the Summa Theologica, the section of “The Natural Law,” Aquinas writes of seven

basic good. Those basic goods are listed as life, the notion of self-preservation; reproduction, the notion

of procreation; educate one’s offspring, within the sphere of morality, ethics, and education; to seek

God, this is said to be natural, we are born into this; to live in society, it is natural to be social and to live

with others; to avoid offense, in morality; and to shun ignorance, it is natural to be inquisitive, this goes

beyond our natural will to survive. This author can say that if these are basic goods, then everything

that was previously stated about evil is that of which is left ultimately up to man. We now know that

God is not the source of evil and that there is not one supreme evil. Evil is the privation of what is good.

These seven basic goods can become swayed by the privation of evil.

Bibliography
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THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE CAUSE OF EVIL

Aquinas, Saint Thomas. 1232. "The Cause of Evil (Three Articles)." In Summa Theologica, by Thomas
Aquinas, 338-342. NA: NA.