People v.

Dalisay
GR NO. 188106; NOBEMBER 25, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent Antonio Dalisay was charged and convicted with the crime of rape perpetrated
against the 16 years old daughter of his live in partner. It was alleged that even prior to the
commission of rape, the accused was already repeatedly molesting the victim.
Then, an information charging the accused of the crime of rape in relation to Republic Act 7610
was then instituted before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. The RTC convicted
the accused for the crime of qualified rape. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) only found the
accused guilty of the crime of simple rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the special qualifying circumstance of minority, though not alleged in the
information, may be appreciated in the case at bar. And whether an exemplary gamage may be
awarded

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that the special qualifying circumstance of minority may not be
appreciated as it is not alleged in the information charging the accused of the crime. The Court
cannot convict appellant of qualified rape because the special qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship were not sufficiently alleged in the information. It should be noted that
pursuant to sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
With regards to the exemplary damage, the courts generally awarded exemplary damages in
criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been
proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same was not alleged in the
information, but that was Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
.However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the
aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the
award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not
alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. following sections 8,9 of rule 110

However,according to the SC, taking into account simply the attendance of an aggravating
circumstance in the commission of a crime, will yield to lost sight of the very reason why
exemplary damages are awarded. Thus, the Catubig case is enlightening on this point, Where
Catubig reasoned that the retroactive application of the Revised Rules should not
adversely affect the vested rights of the private offended party.

Hence, the court affirmed the decision of CA finding the accused guilty of simple rape and as
regards to the exemplary damages, the SC sustains the award of exemplary damages to
discourage and deter such aberrant behavior.

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Sec. 8. Designation of the offense.—The complaint or information shall state the designation
of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

Sec. 9. Cause of accusation.—The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the

offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient
to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

Nevertheless, People v. Catubig31 laid down the principle that courts may still award
exemplary damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating
circumstance has not been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted
before the effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter. Catubig
reasoned that the retroactive application of the Revised Rules should not adversely
affect the vested rights of the private offended party.

(1) their grandfather Gregorio could not have appeared before the notary public on July 22,
1996 at Santiago City because he was then confined at the Veterans Memorial Hospital in
Quezon City; (2) at the time of the alleged execution of the deed of sale, Gregorio was seriously
ill, in fact dying at that time, which vitiated his consent to the disposal of the property; and (3)
Catalino manipulated the execution of the deed and prevailed upon the dying Gregorio to sign
his name on a paper

(1) the deed of sale was actually executed by Gregorio on July 19 (or 18), 1996
and not July 22, 1996;
(2) the Notary Public personally went to the Hospital in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya on July 18, 1996 to notarize the deed of sale already subject of a
previously concluded covenant between Gregorio and the Spouses Paragas;
(3) at the time Gregorio signed the deed, he was strong and of sound and
disposing mind;
(4) Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were Gregorio’s separate capital and the inscription of
Lorenza’s name in the titles was just a description of Gregorio’s marital status;
(5) the entire area of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were sold to the Spouses Paragas.
They interposed a counterclaim for damages.