Leonardo

Lukács's Views on Artistic Freedom

Author(s): Bela Kiralyfalvi
Source: Leonardo, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring, 1983), pp. 124-126
Published by: The MIT Press
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Leonardo, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 124-126, 1983
Printed in Great Britain
LUKACS'SVIEWSON ARTISTICFREEDOM*
Bela Kiralyfalvi**
Since Plato banished the poet from his utopian republic,
questions of art's autonomy, artistic freedom and the artist's
role in society have been subjects of much philosophical and
political debate in the western world. Today, when there is a
sharp ideological split between the dominant socio-political
systems of our world, the debate is particularly lively and
certainly more than theoretical. Daily manifestations of
peaceful competition, co-existence, cold war, call it what you
will, bring constantly into our consciousness-whichever
system we are a part of-the fact that there is a living alternative
to our present situation. Some artists in democratic capitalism
look with envy upon the lavish subsidization of the arts in the
socialist countries, while some evidently outstanding artists of
the socialist democracies go to prison or seek political asylum in
the western democracies. In our increasingly global human
community, questions of personal liberty, artistic freedom and
economic necessity become convoluted in our minds. A recent
cartoon by Mike Petersin the Dayton Daily News touches simply
yet poignantly upon some of the fundamental issues. The
drawing is of five or six ragged-looking men, women and
children carryingtiny bundles on their backs as they climb to the
shore of a river they have just crossed. They are Mexican
'wetbacks'. With smiles on their faces as big as any ever flashed
by President Carter, they address a stern-faced and decidedly
unfriendly looking U.S. border guard who faces them clutching
his gun: 'Buenos dias. We are defectors from the Mexico City
Ballet Company'. The cartoon is a splendid summary of the
extreme complexity of the issues concerning human freedom
today. Some of the questions raised by it are pertinent to our
discussion here. How deep is the inter-relatedness of personal
freedom and artistic freedom? How basic are economic
conditions, economic necessities to the realization of any kind of
human freedom? Is the freedom or autonomy of art an issue
separable from the concept of the freedom of the artists?
Faced with such vexing questions, but possessing a global
view of the situation, we are tempted to rise above it all and
declare that artists of all times and places are endowed with a set
of universal and inalienable rights and freedoms. These rights
and freedoms, we are likely to maintain, are not alterable and
not determined by social and political circumstances. But, is
such a position supportable by historical and empirical
evidence? Gy6rgy Lukacs, an important Marxistphilosopher of
this century, believes that such thinking is the sterile fruit of a
subjective idealistic world-view, in contradiction with historical
reality. It is my intention here to explore Lukacs's ideas on the
subject of artistic freedom, with emphasis upon his analysis of
the conditions for artistic freedom in modern capitalistic
democracies and in the socialist democracies.
True to Marxist methodology in the investigation of any
question, Lukacs holds the view that in order for us to know
'where we stand' and 'where we are going', we must have a clear
historical perspective; we must know 'where we have come
*Originally published in TheBritishJournalof Aesthetics, 21, 151-158
(Spring 1981).
**Professor of Theater and Drama, Department of Speech
Communication, Wichita State University, Wichita, KS 67208, U.S.A.
124
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0024-094X/83$ 3.00+0.00
Pergamon Press Ltd.
from', what road we have travelled. A prerequisite of any
fruitful, direct comparison of the conditions of artistic freedom
in the socialistic and capitalistic systems of today must be a brief
look at the birth and development of artistic freedom, which in
turn can only be seen through at least a sketchy review of the
origin and development of art [1].
In the earliest primitive society, Lukaicsbelieves, there are no
separate modes of human reflection. What later separate into
scientific, religious and artistic modes of reflection, distinctly
different from one another, are, at this stage of development,
indistinguishable. The primitive ritual contains scientific
(utilitarian), religious (magical), as well as artistic (formal)
elements. The creator is scientist, priest (magician) and artist all
in one, doing what he does for the welfare of the community, for
survival. Going from here, the first developmental stage of art
consists of the separation of anthropomorphic reflection (art
and religion), from disanthropomorphic (scientific) reflection.
The second stage is a split within the category of
anthropomorphic reflection, that is, the separation of art from
religion. Although art had achieved complete autonomy from
both science and religion and reached full formal development
in ancient Greece-owing to later regressions and the demands
made upon it by institutions, dogmas and social classes-to
some extent it is still carrying on its 'freedom fight'. We need
only be reminded of the demands of the mediaeval Church on
the one hand and the scientific expectations of nineteenth-
century naturalism on the other, to have unmistakably vivid
impressions of serious past encroachments, both in theory and
practice, on art's independence from other reflective modes.
Briefly stated, the difference between art and science is that
'art creates the world of man, always and exclusively.... In
every facet of reflection (contrary to scientific reflection) man is
present as a determinant: in art the world outside of man only
occurs as a mediating element of human concerns, actions and
feelings' [2]. The essential difference between art and religion is
that in art 'the reflected image of reality is conceived of as
reflection, while magic and religion attribute the status of
objective reality to their systems of reflection and requirebelief
in them'. Art, as a fully developed, autonomous mode of
reflection, in Lukacs's definition, is the anthropocentric and
anthropomorphic reflection of the objective world. While
science, as a mode of reflection, is mankind's awareness of the
world, art is mankind's self-awareness, but in context of the
world (especially the social world) around it. The two modes of
reflection together team up in the human quest to conquer the
world [3].
Clearly the issue of the freedom of the artist could not have
arisen until art itself had reached a high level of autonomy. It is
also quite evident in the history of the centuries between the fifth
century B.C. and the Enlightenment, that art's autonomy was
not always regarded as sacred either in theory or in practice.
How did the existing social conditions during these centuries
define individual and artistic freedom? In ancient Greece the
concept of freedom was first, and most importantly, a social
concept. Man was seen as a social animal; his freedom was
defined in the context of his society. Secondly, his freedom had
external and internal components. The internal component
consisted in the individual having control over those of his
 Lukacs's Views on Artistic Freedom
instincts which went against morally justified needs, and the
external component was in seeking independence from the
constraints of tyrannical society, recognizing that a person can
be truly free only in a free society. Freedom here was the
freedom of the citizen of a class society, slaves and women were
not included: the notion of inherent human equality was not the
foundation of this concept of freedom. Later, in feudalist
society, freedom either in the classical or the modern sense was
unknown. The individual's role was defined for him narrowly,
not only as a member of a class (e.g. nobility, peasantry), but
also as a member of an order or guild or similar sub-group which
determined his restrictions, rights and responsibilities. Moral
freedom tended to be limited to the choice between good and
evil by standards of external dogma, made in the interest of
achieving freedom for the soul in other-worldly salvation.
How did these conditions in the past affect the freedom of the
individual artist? Lukaics maintains that in all pre-modern
societies the artist was more restricted by ties to his society or
immediate community than is the modern artist, because art
itself was a part of community life and artists functioned
without hesitation, in full knowledge of the necessary
consequence of this fact [4]. Artists appear to have had a tacit
understanding of their social mission and art was almost never
merely subjective self-expression.
The foundation of the modern concept of freedom is the
assumption of the inherent equality of all human beings. The
major problem of individual freedom in modern capitalistic
society is two-fold: one, the failure of society to eliminate the
fundamental economic obstacles to actual equality, and, two, a
distinct tendency of the system to alienate the individual human
being from his social context. Bourgeois society, according to
Lukaics, attempts in fact to define individual freedom
completely outside of the social context, except to the extent that
the social context is an obstacle, or a limitation, in the path
towards individual freedom. In other words, the relationship
between individual and society is essentially a negative one,
hence, government and laws are often seen as nothing more than
necessary evils. Twentieth-century existentialism goes to the
extreme by defining individual freedom in complete alienation
from society. This, in Lukaics's view, makes the concept of
freedom empty: 'If freedom means only what an individual
relegated merely to his own resources considers to be freedom in
a given moment or situation, then this very abstract
generalization destroys freedom: because if everything is free,
there is no freedom' [5].
Although Kant, whose philosophy is in large measure the
theoretical foundation of the modern concept of freedom,
provided a safeguard against the aimlessness arising out of this
situation by referring the individual to his conscience-the
backbone of the categorical imperative-the concept of
individual freedom in the twentieth century has become
increasingly that of the moment, the mood and of the
uncontrolled instincts. Lukaics cites Hitlerism as the most
extreme manifestation of the unbridled expression of the basest
human instincts.
If the pre-modern artist was not free in the modern sense of
the term, what is the nature of the freedom of the artist in
modern capitalistic democracy? As we turn to examine the
relationship between the modern artist and his society, we find,
according to Lukacs, that in contrast with the pre-modern artist
who was in direct and fertile contact with his audience, the
modern artist, owing to the necessary evolution of the
capitalistic economy, is in a substantially different position [6].
For him, the vital contact between artist and community has
been severely loosened and sometimes completely eliminated.
There is a new sense of freedom never before experienced by the
artist, but it is directionless, aimless, without a sense of social
mission. The laws of capitalistic economy, capitalistic
marketplace,have an unavoidably negative (even dehumanizing)
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125
effect upon all individuals, including all artists, living within
capitalistic society. Whereas the pre-modern artist knew his
audience directly, the modern artist faces his audience very
much as any creator of a commodity (merchandise) faces his
consumers. His freedom is as unlimited as that of any producer
of any product, but in reality he is ruled by the laws of the
marketplace. Sometimes fully, other times to a small extent,
sometimes the fact is obvious, other times it is hidden beneath
deceptive surface factors, but the artist-even despite
himself-is always engaged in merchandising. There is no need
to belabour this point; the capitalistic, profit-making nature of
the enterprises of publishing, film making, the music industry,
the television industry, theatre, with their agents, publicity,
marketing systems and surveys, are all well known. That
amorphous entity, capital, has wedged its way between the artist
and the audience to create a distancing and ultimately
detrimental barrier.
What is important is to see clearly how these conditions have
affected the work of the artist. The answer in brief is: adversely.
If these determinants characterize the nature of the modern
artist's freedom, then that freedom may be more illusory than
real. Recognizing the intolerable adversity of their circum-
stances, artists in numerous capitalist countries at the turn of the
century undertook a variety of efforts-not-for-profit experi-
mental theatres, literary journals, literary presses, art exhibits,
etc.-to create non-capitalist islands in the powerful sea of
capitalism [7]. Soon, however, it became quite obvious that with
the proper packaging, merchandising, indoctrination of
consumers, every kind of art work-even the most radical in
form and content-is capable of being sold, of fetching a good
price in the marketplace. With this development not only junk-
art, gush, trash, camp, sentimentalism, but also experimental
art, the avant-garde, the masterpiece, the classic, all came under
at least a strong influence of the laws of the marketplace. Given
the help of appropriate capital, new trends and fashions in
artistic products could be created in approximately the same
manner as fashions in clothing, shoes or motor cars.
Nevertheless, it would be an oversimplification to say that this
situation has destroyed artistic individuality. In a sense the
contrary appears to be true: originality, individual taste,
idiosyncratic qualities, peculiarity, stylishness, inventiveness
(especially once they are attached to names), have themselves
become very marketable commodities.
What has this situation done to the artist? For the marginal
artist, whose main concern (like a businessman's) is to find a
market for his product, this set of conditions dictates quite
naturally that he should create what sells. There is literally no
limit here from fads, fashions, novelties and idiosyncrasies to
gimmicks and pornography. (Particular individuals, of course,
often set their personal boundaries.) Entire industries of
gigantic size, as we have noted earlier-the film industry, the
television industry, the publishing industry, the music industry,
etc.-have grown up around the various forms of art. But, more
importantly, what has the situation done to the genuine artist?
Lukacs believes that there has never been a social system in
history to which the artist has related as poorly as to capitalism
[8]. The only constant and clearly communicated expectation
capitalist society has of the artist is the expectation to produce a
saleable commodity that will satisfy an essentially escapist need
in the consumer; that will give pleasure similar to that of alcohol
or drugs. Lukacs asserts that it is not by accident that bourgeois
aesthetics places the aesthetic effect in the realm of the human
unconscious and compares it by analogy to the experiences of
dream and even intoxication.
As the genuine artist realizes that the kind of artistic portrayal
of the world which intrudes significantly into the individual's
self-consciousness and social consciousness is not expected of
him, he becomes increasingly alienated from his society.
Alienation, despair, turning inward lead more and more
126 Bela Kiralyfalvi
towards the portrayal of the almost purely subjective experience
of the artist. It is in this direction, Lukacs believes, that the artist
of modern capitalism has nearly unlimited freedom, but as a
consequence of his preoccupation with this freedom, he
becomes more and more separated from his objective, social
environment.
Paradoxically, then, even though he is freer from external
constraints, laws, censorship than the pre-modern artist, the
artist of the modern capitalist democracy is less free to reflect
objective, social reality, the anthropocentric portrayal of which,
according to Lukacs, is the chief mission of art. His freedom is
the subjective freedom of the forlorn individual who alternately
cries out in existentialist anguish, protesting at his having been
condemned to live in freedom, or declares in manifestos that art
is pure 'psychic automatism'; or attempts to return art to the
fold of religion-perhaps instinctively recognizing the necessity
for direct, communal contact-and turn the artist into a high
priest once again.
How is the situation of art different in the socialist countries?
One would think that with the elimination of the uniquely
capitalistic constraints and with at least the start of the creation
of a classless society, the situation for art, for the relationship of
the artist and the people, would be immediately ideal. Writing
about it in the late 1940s and again in the 1960s, Lukacs believes
that this is only potentially true [9]. For the present, there are
many serious problems. First of all, there is no empirical
evidence for him to analyse art in socialism. The existing
socialist countries are in fact dictatorships of the proletariat,
transitional stages between capitalism and socialism. Citizens
and artists of these societies are making an adjustment(in many
cases coerced adjustment), which may require several
generations to complete, from life in capitalism (sometimes
democratic, other times non-democratic, capitalism) to life in
socialism. In the process, the individual loses some of his
personal freedoms, such as the freedom of capitalistic
enterprising, and the artist loses, in addition to his enterprising
freedom, much of his purely subjective freedom of expression.
The artist, instead of being responsible to the laws of the
marketplace on the one hand and the guidance of his alienated
subjectivity on the other, is now responsible to the guiding
philosophy of the Party.
The guiding philosophy of the Party in essence is to bring art
and artists once again into direct contact with the people. There
is no significant disagreement among Marxists on this basic
premise of the guiding philosophy but, as the brief history of the
socialist democracies amply demonstrates, there are some basic
differences and serious problems when it comes to interpreta-
tion and especially to implementation. Recognizing the negative
effects of the extremes of Stalinism and similar (so-called 'vulgar
Marxist') positions which perceive the role of the Party
bureaucratically as the authority which should prescriptively
guide artists to deal propagandistically with the immediate
social problems of building socialism, turning artists into what
Zhdanov called 'engineers of the soul', Lukacs warns against (in
fact rejects) externally guided art achieved by means of
dogmatic prescription and censorship.
Lukacs postulates the basic problem of art in the socialist
democracies in the form of a dialectical conflict between two
dominant positions, both of which contain extreme demands as
well as core elements capable of eventual dialectical synthesis.
Narrowly interpreted, the 'art for the people' notion of the Party
means that art should concern itself only with the immediate
daily problems of the people and advocate solutions from the
point of view of the present position of the Party's leadership.
The positive, though sometimes unstated, core of this pogition is
the desire to bring artists out of their subjective cocoons, off
their ivory towers, and back into contact with the reality of the
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people which is both their subject and audience. The equally
narrow-minded opposition to this position, states Lukacs,
argues: Yes, bring art to the people, but art is what it is and
artists are who they are; therefore, lift the people up to the level
of art, so that the people can receive it as it is. If the people prove
to be incapable of receiving it in this way, then we will have
learned that art is not for the people and should leave the matter
at that. The positive core of this position is the desire to preserve
the characteristic and indispensable right of art to reflect social
reality independently. The positive components of the two
opposing positions, Lukacs believes optimistically, will
ultimately merge in a union to create socialist art.
Meanwhile, the responsibility of the Party, says Lukacs, lies in
attempting to convince artists that it is equally to the benefit of
art and artists to understandthat a complete change in the social
foundations (infrastructure) must necessarily be followed by
change in the various components of the superstructure.During
the transitional state, that is the present, it is up to the artist to
work out what this means for art, what directions art may take
fully to realize its mission in a new social context. In this fresh,
fertile social environment, in this unploughed land, art's role
then will be avant-gardist and the role of the artist will be
determined not by external, bureaucraticPartyguidance, but by
self-guidance. At the same time art will be able to fulfil its
universal mission: to reflect the objective world anthropo-
centrically in every social context.
It appears then that Lukacs finds neither the ideal kind nor an
adequate amount of artistic freedom either in the capitalistic or
the socialistic democracies. Capitalistic society provides the
more freedom of the two systems, but the kind of freedom here is
almost exclusively subjective and, consequently, art is
predominantly self-expression. Modern capitalism, moreover,
is seen by Lukacs as a dying socio-economic system, whose
superstructuremust also necessarilydecay. If the situation of art
in such contemporary societies is less than ideal now, it can only
look forward to further deterioration. Socialist democracies, on
the other hand, constitute the beginning stage of the socio-
economic order of the future. There is not genuine artistic
freedom in these societies today either, according to Lukacs, but
the potential for it clearly exists. While presently the distinct
tendency of socialist governments is to imprison art in a
narrowly conceived utilitarian mould, to use it for the solution
of immediate social problems, and the tendency of many artists
is to prize their sense of subjective freedom higher than their
contact with society, the direction of the future points towards
an autonomous art with a self-imposed, deep sense of social
mission. As to how soon this synthesis will actually occur is not
easily predicted, for in Lukacs's view historical progress comes
in the form of two steps forward and one step back.
REFERENCES AND NOTES
1. G. Lukacs, Magyar irodalom, magyar ktltura (Budapest:Gondolat
Kiad6, 1968) p. 385.
2. G. Lukacs, A kulondsseg, mint esztetikai kategoria (Budapest:
Akademiai Kiad6, 1957) p. 235.
3. G. Lukacs, Die Eigenart des Aesthetischen (Berlin:Luchterhand,
1963). In chapter 16 of this, his major work, Lukacs presents a long
theoretical discourse on the historical 'Freedom fight of art'.
4. Magyar irodalom, magyar kultura, p. 387.
5. Ibid., p. 389.
6. Most of Lukacs' discussion on this is to be found in Chapter 16 of Die
Eigenart des Aesthetischen and in the essay 'Free or guided art?'
(translated title) in Magyar irodalom, magyar kulttra.
7. The work of foundations, governmental grants and the like today,
though in inadequate measure, have similar objectives.
8. Magyar irodalom, magyar kulttra, p. 396.
9. In Magyar irodalom, magyar ktltura and in Die Eigenart des
Aesthetischen.