Developing Reflective Thinking in The Process of Learning Activity

Journal of Russian & East European Psychology
ISSN: 1061-0405 (Print) 1558-0415 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mrpo20
Developing Reflective Thinking in the Process of

Learning Activity
V.V. Davydov & V.V. Rubtsov
To cite this article: V.V. Davydov & V.V. Rubtsov (2018) Developing Reflective Thinking in the
Process of Learning Activity, Journal of Russian & East European Psychology, 55:4-6, 287-571,
DOI: 10.1080/10610405.2018.1536008
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10610405.2018.1536008
Published online: 12 Dec 2018.
Submit your article to this journal
Article views: 13
View Crossmark data
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=mrpo20
Journal of Russian & East European Psychology, vol. 55, nos. 4–6,
2018, pp. 287–571.
© Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1061-0405 (print)/ISSN 1558-0415 (online)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10610405.2018.1536008
V.V. DAVYDOV AND V.V. RUBTSOV
Developing Reflective Thinking in the

Process of Learning Activity
Introduction
The idea that activity is the source of human mental development is
one of Soviet and Russian psychology’s central tenets. Activity’s
main structural components are needs, motives, problems, actions,
and operations. Within the psychology of ontogenetic development,
the following genetically successive types of activity can be identi-
fied: emotional communication, object manipulation, play, learning,
and socially useful occupations (work).
These types of activities, in that order, are the leading activities
for the corresponding periods of human mental development
(which, according to D.B. Elkonin, are object-manipulation for
ages 1–3 and play for 3–6). Learning activity is the leading
activity for young schoolchildren (6–10). This is the age during
which it determines the nature of other types of activity, as
corresponding psychological neoformations emerge as part of
English translation © 2018 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, from the Russian
text © 1995 “Prikhologicheskii institut imeni L.G. Shchukinoi, Rossiiskaia
Akademiia obrazovaniia.” Razvitie osnov refleksivnogo myshleniia shkol’nikov
v protsesse uchebnoi deiatel’nosti (Moscow: Prikhologicheskii institut imeni
L.G. Shchukinoi, Rossiiskaia Akademiia obrazovaniia, 1995).
Translated by Nora SeligmanFavorov.
287
288 JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN & EAST EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGY
learning activity. During the adolescent years that follow, socially

useful activity takes the lead through its main forms (social-
organizational, artistic, athletic, scholarly, and labor). Learning
at that age differs from the learning activity of younger ages,
since it is no longer the leading activity.
A reflective-theoretical relationship to reality and correspond-
ing means of orientation are learning activity’s specific need and
motive. This relationship centers on the contentful analysis of the
conditions under which a given system of objects occurs, analysis
that involves the objects’ actual or imagined transformation. This
analysis uncovers the genetic connection (universal relationship)
that determines the particular manifestations of a given system.
Schoolchildren’s correctly organized learning activity is the foun-
dation on which the development of reflective-theoretical think-
ing is built. For its part, the development of reflective-theoretical
thinking is the essential precondition for bringing a person into
the spiritual-practical sphere of consciousness and the basis
enabling intelligent encounters with the riches of culture and
history.
This understanding forces us to take a fresh look at the rela-
tionship between learning activity as a particular period in the life
of a growing person and the development of the foundations of
reflective-theoretical thinking. This relationship is far from
straightforward and demands special theoretical conceptualization
and theoretical and experimental investigation. First of all, the
question of how developing thought is studied has to be con-
fronted, the content and form of reflective thinking have to be
examined, and reflective thinking’s psychological structure and
the conditions under which it emerges during the process of
learning activity have to be studied.
The need to investigate these questions and the importance of
learning activity in the shaping of contemporary humans united
the authors of this book in an effort to solve a central problem:
how can the foundations of children’s reflective thinking be
developed during the process of learning activity? The book
contains theoretical and experimental analysis of important ques-
tions in the investigation of developing thought and the functions
JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN & EAST EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGY 289
and structure of its components: analysis, planning, and reflection

(Part I), and the psychological features and functions of sign/
symbol tools in the emergence and development of thought
activity (Part II). The psychological essence of cooperative activ-
ity between adults and children, as well as among children
themselves, is examined as a source of developing conscious
thought: types of interaction during the solving of cognitive
learning problems, the optimal ways of organizing cooperative
actions, and psychological factors governing the effectiveness of
learning actions (Part III). The book offers scientifically grounded
original ways of studying the development of reflective thinking
and shows how to apply them to the educational process as
teaching and diagnostic tools.
Part I (Chapter 1) addresses the problem of how to objectively
diagnose the development of reflective thinking. The activity
theory of mental development and the theory of learning activity
offer a method for doing this. Central to this method is the idea of
reflective thinking as a generalized method of action. This idea
guides the approach to and specific design of research and diag-
nostic methods for investigating the main components of content-
reflective thinking. This chapter also examines an experimental
and diagnostic methodology for studying thinking’s planning
function. A logical and object-related analysis of this methodol-
ogy’s problems and a logical and psychological analysis of the
main ways to solve them are also presented. Such indicators as
searching, intentionality, object-relatedness, systematicity, and
generalization are among the contentful characteristics of thought
actions introduced.1
Chapter 2 examines a method for investigating contentful
analysis and experimental techniques for studying this compo-
nent of reflective thinking. The method is based on the idea
that the thought act is structured as connected (mediated by one
another) acts of analysis, planning, and reflection. A central
assumption is the hypothesis that reflection plays a content-
constructing role in the act of analysis. One product of this sort
of reflection is the creation of ideal object-related understand-
ings that reflect the law that the studied object is always
transformed (moved, changed) as a single, integral whole. The

specific demands placed on techniques for researching and
diagnosing analysis as a thought act are determined within
the framework of this assumption. The results of this study
are discussed in the context of the contentful characteristics of
the act of thought introduced in Chapter 1.
Chapter 3 explores ways of identifying criteria for diagnosing
learners’ knowledge formation. Among the criteria that can be
used are the features of the theoretical concept: object-
relatedness, generalization, and systematicity. These features can
be determined by studying the method of action schoolchildren
use with the relationship reflecting the content of a given concept.
An experimental study was undertaken to see how well formed
a theoretical concept was in young schoolchildren using the
mathematical concept of magnitude. To that end, the chapter
features a logical and object-related analysis of the concept of
size, and the essential relationship underlying the concept of size
is identified, as well as the action representing this relationship in
the learner’s consciousness.
Chapter 4 includes an analysis and discussion of experiments
investigating the cognitive learning actions of 6–10-year-olds.
This study shows that systematicity—the ability to analyze and
construct a systematic object—is a criterion for measuring the
development of cognitive learning actions. The chapter describes
research into the relationship between children’s ability to focus
on the connection between essential features of a systemized
object (means of orientation) and their ability to construct
a new object in accordance with the principle of the system’s
construction. Construction and orientation are viewed as a unified
mental process that underlies the cognitive learning action. The
chapter identifies four levels of systematicity in cognitive learn-
ing actions and describes the levels’ differing development
dynamic at different ages. The link between the cognitive learn-
ing actions’ level of systematicity and academic success is
demonstrated, attesting to the need to specially develop this
mental phenomenon in the process of learning activity.
Chapter 1 of Part II subjects the function of signs and symbols that

are used during the early stages of object analysis to theoretical and
experimental examination and then explores natural-descriptive,
operational, and content-constructing ways of modeling. It is demon-
strated that when modeling is contentful, analysis occurs through the
mediation of objects’ properties by means of the very form of the
action being constructed. Such mediation is specific to the genesis of
sign/symbol activity and requires the subject to create appropriate
schemata and models of the action being constructed. Using these
schemata and models enables the content-reflective study of the
action’s bases and the consolidation of possible ways of carrying it out.
Chapter 2 examines how schoolchildren assimilate scientific-
theoretical knowledge within the three unified planes on which it
is presented: the object-related plane, the model-image plane, and
the sign plane. The extent to which the system of cognitive learning
actions enabling connection and movement among these three
planes is formed offers a way to characterize how knowledge is
assimilated. What distinguishes the identified means of constructing
knowledge (natural-descriptive, empirical, formal-schematicizing,
theoretical, or content-reflective) is the way that conceptual images
function in the process of solving a system of problems. The chapter
includes a description of such images as “image-copy (natural sub-
stitute),” “image-code,” “image-schema,” and “image-model.”
Chapter 3 of this part investigates the issues surrounding the
functional and psychological development of the speech action
system, which presumes that this action’s sign/symbol function
has emerged. Experiments involving the formation of reading and
writing in young schoolchildren were used to demonstrate the
laws governing the transitions between various vehicles of the
learning model of speech action, from bodily-material and object-
graphic to sign/symbol forms, in reproducing an object’s content.
Special emphasis is placed on the role of cooperative learning-
activity situations, which are communicatively significant and
natural for children. These situations create the conditions for
speech ontogenesis as children assimilate their native language.
Chapter 1 of Part III uses the cooperative solving of a class of
problems designed to teach grammatical constructions expressing
verb tense in English to analyze the functions and qualitative fea-

tures of modeling action. Levels of modeling, the features of model
transformation in solving this class of concrete-practical problem,
and the factors that determine them are identified. The choice of how
to organize cooperative learning activity was determined by the
participants’ relationship to the original material (common, divided,
or individual) and the means, goals, and results of the activity, as
well as the ways in which individual actions were broken down.
Chapter 2 of this part is devoted to studying various ways of
organizing cooperative learning activity as compared with indi-
vidual learning, as well as assessing how these different
approaches influence the development of systematicity of cogni-
tive learning actions in young schoolchildren. Research included
experiments using specially designed methodologies that differed
in terms of how adults and the children or groups of children
interacted. Two main ways of organizing interaction were exam-
ined: 1) positional and 2) object-related and contentful. The
factors involved in the effective organization of activity specific
to the object-related and contentful approach were also studied:
the distribution and object-related and contentful exchange of
actions among participants; the use of graphic models as
a means of organizing group work; and conflict. It was shown
that the genesis and development of cognitive learning actions
during young school age depends on how cooperative activity is
organized. The most effective approach to organizing this activity
was found to be the object-related and contentful approach, with
a complex of factors governing effectiveness. Using the object-
related and contentful approach, the systematicity of cognitive
learning actions was formed in more than half (56 percent) of the
children being taught.
Chapter 3 examines the psychological features of the interaction
formed by participants of a group using various strategies for the
cooperative solving of combinatorial geometry problems. There
were three main types of strategies for realizing cognitive learning
actions. These strategies differed in terms of how reflection was
oriented and how strongly it was expressed in the process of corre-
lating the transformation of operational and object-related
components of cooperative action. Each type of strategy was asso-

ciated with a particular way of organizing interaction that partici-
pants in cooperative problem-solving constructed as they
coordinated the sequence of the operations divided between them.
It was shown that the level of interaction (and the type of strategy
that corresponded to it) improved as the cooperative means of
problem solving became more developed and as problem-solving
became more attuned to the object-related transformation of the
operational-organizational structures of activities as they became
more complex.
This book was written by the following authors: Part I, Chapter
I – V.Kh. Magkaev; Chapter 2 – A.M. Medvedev and P.G.
Nezhnov; Chapter 3 – M.A. Semenova; Chapter 4 – I.V. Rivina
and V.V. Rubtsov; Part II, Chapter 1 – V.K. Mul’darov and V.V.
Rubtsov; Chapter 2 – V.A. L’vovskii; Chapter 3 – A.A.
Zubchenko and L.Iu. Nevueva; Part III, Chapter 1 – I.M.
Ulanovskaia and O.V. Iarkina; Chapter 2 – I.V. Rivina; Chapter
3 – N.I. Polivanova. The introduction and conclusion were writ-
ten by V.V. Davydov and V.V. Rubtsov.
Part I: Content, Functional Structure, and Dynamic of the

Development of Thinking
Chapter 1: Theoretical Premises Underlying the Study and Diagnosis
of the Development of Reflective Thinking
Object-Related Measurement of Children’s Mental Development
The idea of creating an informative psychological diagnostic (as

a counterbalance to testology) was proposed in the 1930s by the
Soviet psychologist L.S. Vygotsky (Vygotsky 1960; 1982 –
1984). On the basis of the great contributions made by the
activity theory of mental development, this idea was later devel-
oped in the works of prominent Soviet psychologists: A.N.
Leontiev, A.R. Luria, D.B. Elkonin, P.Ia. Galperin, and V.V.
Davydov, among others (Galperin 1966; Davydov 1960, 1972,
and 1986; Davydov and Vardanian 1981; A.N. Leontiev 1983;
Luria and Tsvetkova 1966; Elkonin 1974, 1980).
Relying on the basic ideas regarding the laws of mental devel-

opment spelled out in these works, we have arrived at a number
of suppositions regarding the scientific essence and socio-
pedagogical aims of object-related psychodiagnosis. First, object-
related normative diagnosis is the diagnosis of children’s mental
development — not just a measure of the actual level of isolated
mental functions. As such, it should fulfill two key scientific
tasks: 1) developing criteria for a substantive assessment of
children’s mental development and creating objective “norms”
(qualitative assessment “units”) for determining and observing
the patterns of a system of core psychological abilities’ genetic
and functional development and 2) creating the scientific princi-
ples for designing psychodiagnostic methods that can be used in
creating a system of methodologies capable of uncovering the
ways in which children reproduce the main forms of human
activity. Second, as an effective way of meeting the practical
needs of public education, object-related psychodiagnosis should
achieve the following goals: 1) determining the real level of
mental development of a specific person and making
a substantive assessment of how well the form and degree of
that individual’s mental development correspond to an objective
age-based “norm” for the purposes of socio-pedagogical correc-
tion; 2) creating objective diagnostic tools for distinguishing
contentful ways of assimilating scientific knowledge from formal
ones, that is, creating clear criteria for defining the depth and
durability of a system of knowledge, skills, and abilities; 3)
creating tools for the analytical assessment of the developmental
effectiveness of a given system of instruction and education that
show how the system can be improved; 4) creating scientific
criteria to identify mental disorders, delays, and deviations from
normal development; developing reliable psychophysiological
and pedagogical methods for correcting disorders in children’s
mental development; and 5) measuring the formation of mental
functions and abilities that play a decisive role in mastering
common types of professional activity and ensuring that school-
children choose a suitable profession. In short, the socio-
pedagogical purpose of object-related psychodiagnosis is to
serve as an objective means of managing (observing, assessing,

and psycho-pedagogically correcting) the mental development of
schoolchildren as people and to serve as an effective instrument
for analyzing the quality of instruction and education.
The creation of an object-related psychodiagnostic is not just
a complicated undertaking from a scientific standpoint, but it is
also exceptionally labor-intensive and painstaking in terms of
practical realization and entails a weighty social responsibility.
Its creation has therefore been preceded by a comprehensive and
logically coherent analysis of a body of work on children’s
mental development where theoretical and experimental results
can be confidently relied on as a solid foundation. The effective-
ness of object-related psychodiagnosis depends entirely on the
scientific rigor, systematicness, and purposefulness of the psy-
chological research on which it is based. Diagnostics, in turn,
provide an invaluable way of assessing the viability of scientific
research and serve to verify its practical value.
We are convinced that Soviet psychology’s activity theory of
mental development can serve as the theoretical and experimental
foundation on which to build object-related psychodiagnosis.
This theory rests on systematic and far-reaching investigation
into the laws governing the origin, emergence, and development
of the specifically human forms of activity through which the
socially determined person is formed.
The conscious form of the mind emerges and develops as part
of historically evolving means of material activity and material
forms of human communication. The conscious mind is itself the
objective process of society’s object-transforming activity.
Society is the true subject of sensory object-related activity and
therefore also the subject of consciousness and thought.
Consciousness and thought become individual psychological
acts in the process of the individual person’s reproduction of
society’s generalized means of activity.
The individual’s reproduction of socially intrinsic models of
action takes the form of collaboration and mutual communication
during socially significant activity. This suggests that the mental
development of an individual person (and each new generation) is
determined by the way in which cooperative activity and com-

munication are organized, by the form and means of the intrinsi-
calness of contents that objectively exist in society, and by the
constructiveness of means of reproduction of intrinsic models of
action. The content and nature of an individual’s mental devel-
opment is immediately determined by the form and means by
which the instruction and education that are realized in a given
society are organized. On this basis, normative psychodiagnosis
is designed to determine the degree to which a particular type of
instruction and education is developmentally effective.
The developmental role played by holistic methods of repro-
ducing activity is thoroughly and incisively described in the
theory of learning activity developed in the works of D.B.
Elkonin and V.V. Davydov (Davydov 1960, 1972, 1986;
Davydov and Vardanian 1981; Elkonin 1974) and in specific
experimental studies conducted under their leadership (Zak
1984; Zakharova 1978; Isaev 1984; Magkaev 1974b; Maksimov
1979; Rubtsov 1975).
In scientifically substantiating our approach to the problem of
object-related psychodiagnosis we relied largely on the theoreti-
cal and experimental results of studies guided by this theory.
According to its main propositions, “child-rearing and education
(instruction) serve as a universal and essential form of children’s
mental development, specifically as a form of organization of this
process, and not an independent process occurring in parallel with
development” (Davydov and Vardanian 1981). Developmental
instruction is organized based on the following principles: 1)
learners’ activity is ensured by objectively existing and socially
significant content that is “projected” (transformed by logical-
psychological and psychological-didactic tools, and then trans-
mitted) onto an academic object in the form of a system of
learning tasks; 2) learning tasks objectively demand that the
learner perform a strictly defined system of learning actions that
take shape in particular situations; 3) learners are brought into an
original learning situation of the sort in which they can discover
the conditions under which a certain genetically original concept
occurs and learn to seek out and analyze the basis for its
emergence; and 4) learners’ activity is organized to be explora-

tory (quasi-investigative) in terms of method: it should move
from contentful and abstract knowledge to mental and specific
knowledge, to an understanding of the diverse specific forms and
interconnections of the reality being studied.
The developmental role of learning activity is clearly evident,
since, in learners, it forms the very processes by which the main
means of reproducing activity emerge and develop: “the ability to
learn” and think independently. Schoolchildren thereby form the
foundations of a theoretical approach to reality: a need to search
out and assimilate conceptual knowledge.
We view learners’ mastery of generalized method of action,
and the transformation of these means into individual “organs”
and self-developmental abilities, as the foundations underlying
the formation of individuals’ active relationship with surrounding
reality, other people, and themselves. A generalized method of
action is the main form of the theoretical subjective activity that
gives rise to essential psychological neoformations in the form of
specific needs and abilities, knowledge and interests, relation-
ships and interrelationships. This suggests that the laws govern-
ing the development of a generalized method of action and the
features of the content that is reproduced in this process, together,
form the concept of “psychological age” and create a generalized
psychological portrait of a particular age. To be clear, what we are
describing is not a complete, fully fleshed out “psychological
portrait” but rather its basis. It expresses a given age’s form,
content, and degree of rationality. In other words, it reproduces
the real level at which society’s socio-cultural experience is being
assimilated, the real means of relating to the surrounding world.
In the psychological development of personality, the general-
ized method of action plays the role of the primary generating
“mechanism”: as it develops, it simultaneously forms and devel-
ops the entire diverse range of mental functions and synthesizes
them into a dynamic whole.
Our hypothesis consists of two interrelated assumptions. First,
we posit that the generalized method of action serves as the basis
for the “psychological portrait” of a given age and as a universal
criterion of the level of mental development, its “norm” and

“yardstick.” This creates a need to analyze the components of
the objective structure of the generalized method of action and
provide evidence for their usefulness as contentful “units” defin-
ing how well-formed the generalized method of action is. Second,
the power, the rationality of the generalized method of action, in
our view, is defined, on the one hand, by what objective content it
is reproducing and, on the other, by the form (object-related and
practical, sensory and object-related, or ideal) in which the pro-
cess of reproduction is taking place. It is therefore understandable
that it is not the method of action “in general” that is subject to
investigation and diagnosis, but the laws of its genetic and func-
tional development: its specific forms and types.
Main definitions of reflective thinking
In dialectical logic theory and in psychological research, thinking

is defined as the ideal component of aggregate social activity. It
produces and reproduces the laws of development of socially
essential objects and the logic of their objective existence. In
this process, it also simultaneously changes and develops its
own definitions, its creative possibilities. Because of its bidirec-
tionality, not only external objects, but also the mental processes,
the internal abilities and states of the thinking subject, are the
object and immediate target of thinking activity. They move
“outside” (become objectified) and are expressed in the form of
special objects that can change in the same way that sensorially
given things can change.
In terms of its origin and functional essence, thinking is not the
result of an action, but the action itself at the moment of its
performance, a process of “doing a deed.” And, in its developed
form it functions as a reflective method of action that, as it
transforms surrounding reality, subjects the foundations and
laws governing the measurement of this reality to critical exam-
ination and systematically reviews the schemata of transforma-
tions as circumstances change. At the same time,
a “transformation of transformations” is taking place: individuals’
reject their own schemata and methods of action. In the course of

their functional development, reflective methods of action turn
into a universal and constructive mechanism for shaping the
primary ways in which people relate to reality. By building
internal connections between various forms of human relations
and reconciling and joining them to one another, reflective think-
ing creates an internal harmony between them. In other words, it
creates a personality’s unity and integrity.
Out of the many existing definitions of thinking, psychology
distinguishes those that are functional, the definitions that imme-
diately characterize the laws governing the development of indi-
viduals’ existing psychological formations. In our opinion, the
following are the most indicative and best correspond to their
scientific object.
A. Thinking is humans’ vital activity, their universal method of

action. It is a process that unfolds in space and time to reproduce
the laws and principles of the objective existence of objects, the
search for and discovery of the conditions under which they
originate. The process of reproduction is based on the practical
and ideal transformations of the existent state of objects and
realizes their transition into the state needed by the society and
the person. The goals and results that are achieved in this process
(concepts, knowledge) are real (and therefore understood) only in
conjunction with the means of their emergence, with the content
of the act of reproduction of “the essence of the matter.”
Therefore, analysis of the generalized method of action uncovers
what and how humans truly think.
B. Thinking is the condition under which and the means by which
people master new forms of activity and new areas of knowledge.
“Readymade” concepts and knowledge fulfill the function of
developed sign/symbol tools for the human acquisition of new
knowledge under changing circumstances and new means of pro-
blem solving. They reveal the creative possibilities of already
formed knowledge and the laws of their actual functioning. It is
important that humans’ reliance on already acquired knowledge, as
well as skills and abilities, serves as a kind of mechanism enabling
the uninterrupted functional development of thinking overall. In
turn, the formation of more substantive levels of thought function-

ing leads various kinds of knowledge to synthesize into systems
and to scientific generalization: the formation of individuals’ con-
victions and worldviews. The analysis of thinking based on its
results (“readymade” knowledge, skills, and abilities) is the foun-
dation on which science-based criteria for defining the depth,
durability, and validity (practical applicability) of acquired knowl-
edge, skills, and abilities can be developed.
C. Thinking is a means of understanding and mutual understanding,
a mechanism for people to recognize one another, a means of
communication. As such, the thinking of an individual relies on
“readymade” concepts. Exchanging them with others, humans
grasp the generalized social consequences they entail. In dialogic
and collective forms of discussion and analysis of “readymade”
content there occurs a further concretization of original concepts
(knowledge) that reveals the path and means by which they can
penetrate the most diverse spheres of human life. Thinking as
a means of communication fulfills the function of the foundation
and concrete mechanism for development of consciousness and
personality overall. The main point is that in the process of
communication (especially when it takes the form of substantive
dialog, cooperative mental activity) there is a mutual reflection of
positions, of participants’ perspectives, of their real attitudes
toward a particular aspect of reality. The way one person under-
stands an object of cooperative activity and communication can
be, for others, a stepping stone and way to grasp the essence of
their common subject, a way to assess and correct their own
actions, a signpost showing the way forward in their search. The
investigation and diagnosis of thinking in this regard is of vital
importance in that it uncovers the psychological “mechanisms”
for cooperation as an effective form of communication and
a specific person’s real possibilities under conditions of a search
for collective ways of solving universally significant problems.
Within humans’ holistic thinking activity, these definitions exist

simultaneously both as the activity’s internally essential separate
entities and as a dynamic unity of discrete moments. However, the
original and, in essence, decisive definition is the definition of
thinking as a generalized method of action. The point is that the
essence of objectively existing things — the laws of their internal

connections and relationships — is revealed in the very act of their
creation. Thinking as a method of action includes acts of discovery
of the preconditions and conditions of an object’s occurrence, ana-
lysis of the basis of its unfolding emergence and development, the
search for the principles governing its construction. The various
methods for carrying out actions that are described in developmental
psychology — “manual thinking” and sensory-motor schemata,
“schemata” of the imagination, general ideas and “sensory” con-
cepts, scientific concepts — represent various stages in the devel-
opment of the generalized method of action, qualitatively different
levels of the assimilation of changing reality. The internal conceptual
connection between these methods of action is as yet insufficiently
clear, but nobody doubts that they form a “nodal line” in the devel-
opment of thinking.
The appearance of ideal conceptions in children’s thinking fun-
damentally changes their attitude toward the surrounding world.
Idealized objects begin to fulfill the function of knowledge of real
objects. Equipped with this tool for knowing reality, individual
thinking becomes genuinely reflective. The creative meaning and
“technology” of this kind of knowledge (thinking) is illuminated in
a work by V.S. Bibler: “Separating out the ‘essence of things’ (their
potential) from their being means building within the mind an
‘idealized object’ as a ‘tool’ for understanding a real object existing
within my consciousness and activity … to see two objects simulta-
neously: within me and outside — is impossible: I will stop seeing
and begin understanding” (Bibler 1975). Consequently, it is the
contradictory human act of the reproduction of a thing — specifi-
cally the necessity and impossibility of an object of idealization and
an idealized object being the same thing — that constitutes the basis
on which thought emerges. The connection between two objects —
external and internal — unfolds as the process of understanding. In
this genuinely ideal method of action, on one hand, the object is
grasped in its objectivity, in other words “as it is, why it exists as it
does and not some other way” (ibid.), while on the other, how and
for what purpose it is created, how the subject him- or herself acts.
With the help of a system of sign/symbol tools, humans express in
a generally accessible and meaningful form this focus on their

method of action. In this process, humans “discover” themselves
as creators who create not only socially necessary things, but also
their own abilities. This fundamentally human ability — to produce
and reproduce things whatever the parameters — is impossible to
imitate either through lengthy observation or painstaking copying or
verbal explanation (even if these explanations use visual aids and
modern technical tools). Why? Because, E.V. Ilyenkov replies, “it is
that which is not and at the same time is, that which does not exist in
the external appearance of the sensorially perceived thing but at the
same time exists as an active human ability” (Ilyenkov 1984, 192 –
193). For people to acquire this active ability in the form that society
demands, they must perform activity congruent to the activity repre-
sented in the given social “standard.” Consequently, the essence of
the problem is how this activity should be organized and deployed in
schoolchildren and what objective content should be offered as the
object, conditions, and tools of their reproducing activity and in
what form. The quality of the knowledge formed and the type of
learners’ thinking depends on how this problem is solved.
Structure of reflective thinking and the problem-solving process
Experimental research into the development of thinking has almost

unanimously found that the experimental model that best expresses
the active reproducing essence of the thinking process is the one that
uses situations where a variety of concrete-practical and cognitive
problems are solved. These studies define thinking as a problem-
solving process. However, there are significantly divergent under-
standings of the objective foundation of problems, their scientific
classification, and the very process by which they are solved. Our
approach was determined by a means of solving these problems that
has been scientifically demonstrated within the theory of learning
activity, primarily in a series of works by V.V. Davydov (Davydov
1960, 1972, 1986; Davydov, Elkonin, and Markova 1978; Davydov
and Vardanian 1981).
According to the theory of learning activity, the structure of
a thinking action (as a theoretical method of action) consists of
three interconnected components: analysis, an internal plan of

action, and reflection. The theory of learning activity defines the
content of the act of analysis as the search for and identification of
a genetically original relationship within a particular object area.
As it pertains to the problem-solving process as a model for the
experimental study of thinking, analysis is characterized as an
action aimed at identifying the main relationship, or the principle
underlying the solution, that is objectively inherent in the condi-
tions, means, and goal (that is, in a problem). Identification of the
problem’s main relationship occurs through exploratory-testing
transformations of given conditions and their juxtaposition with
the means and goal. In carrying out this process of analysis, the
subject designates the conditions and means for “lever” for switch-
ing the problem elements’ present relationships into new forms of
relationships. Furthermore, this act leads to the creation of
a “functional field” (“field of possibilities”) for carrying out sub-
sequent transformations.
While generally sharing this understanding of the action of ana-
lysis, we nevertheless believe it appropriate to make a few com-
ments regarding the experimental practice applied in researching it.
First of all, in works devoted to studying analysis (Amud 1973; Zak
1984; Maksimov 1979; Nosatov 1976), the theoretical content of
this concept is insufficiently clearly reflected in experimental meth-
odologies and problems. The logical and object-related basis for the
content of the problems used in the methodologies is clearly insuffi-
cient, and there is no explicit characterization of the principles
governing their design, which inevitably undermines the logical
and psychological interpretation of experimental results. Second,
the specific function of analysis is not sufficiently explained (to
distinguish it from other components): the very process of the search
for and identification of the problem’s main relationship. The con-
tent and meaning of this process are not fully demonstrated. Why is
this? In all likelihood, this has to do with the fact that certain aspects
of the concept “analysis” were not clearly formulated and were not
sufficiently specified as they pertained to the process of problem
solving.
A critical review of these works by P.G. Nezhnov and A.M.

Medvedev (1988) found that the definition of the concept “ana-
lysis” did not distinguish between the ideas of its objective and
logical content and its subjective and psychological function. On
the objective and logical side, the content (theoretical) analysis
was defined as a means of distinguishing the genetically original
relationship underlying a particular object system — in other
words, as a starting point for the movement (ascent) of theoretical
knowledge from the abstract to the concrete. On the subjective
and psychological side, as it appears in a problem-solving situa-
tion, analysis functions as the search for the problem’s main
relationship and the principle of its solution. The deficiencies
that these authors point out relating to how the original theoretical
understandings of contentful analysis were realized in the experi-
mental methodology stem from a failure to clearly spell out ideas
about: a) the genetically original relationship of an object system
(as a logical and object-related category); b) the problem’s main
relationship built on this object content, and, finally; and c) the
principle for solving the problem that is the immediate (closest)
objective basis for the generalized means of solving all problems
of a given class.
We believe that in elaborating on the concept of the analysis’s
content, it should be noted that the subject’s search for and con-
struction of the problem-solving principle involves a linking of all
elements of the given situation into a mental whole — into
a conceptual image of the situation. The system of interconnections
that form a conceptual image of the situation consists of: 1)
connections between the elements of the given conditions (between
elements of the intrinsic structure) and the goal; 2) connections
between the conditions under which a problem is being solved and
the means of solving it (their mutual designation); 3) connections
between the mutually designated conditions and means on the one
hand and the goal on the other; 4) connections among subjects’
actual transformations (their logical interconnections); and 5) con-
nections between the subjects’ actual transformations, their results
and consequences, and the conditions, means, requirements, and
goals of the problem. Naturally, the number of established
connections and relationships and their qualitative uniqueness

depend on the problem’s specific content and the form in which
it is presented. However, the creation of a conceptual image of the
situation always demands completeness, the connection of all of
the problem’s relationships. Therefore, as a result of subjects’
searching, testing, and transformative activity, an integral concep-
tual image of the situation is constructed and the problem’s main
relationship is brought out. That is from the objective side (this is
done with the given object). But for subjects, this result of their
own activity takes the form of ideas about the possible realization
of the goal in the form of an “intention-hypothesis” or an array of
possibilities.
We believe that this addition to the definition of analysis as
a concept enables the construction of intentional (in the logical
and psychological sense) experimental methodologies for
researching and diagnosing this main component of reflective
thinking. The theoretical significance of the stated proposition
has to do with the view of analysis as “the foundation of founda-
tions,” as the basis for the emergence of a reflective method of
action in principle. The functional purpose of exploratory trans-
formations of present circumstances consists of discovering the
preconditions and conditions that brought about the goal as
a certain idea “of a possible object,” an assumption of
a principle and its construction, an “intention-hypothesis” about
the possible ways the goal can emerge in the form of an idealized
object of activity. It is, therefore, analysis (“analysis through
synthesis” and the process of becoming oriented) that is the
basis and principle of human goal-oriented activity.
Another component of the theoretical method of action that is
traditionally included in its structure is the internal plan of action,
which research into the development of thinking’s planning func-
tion has shown not to be essentially connected with the main
components of the theory of learning activity (Isaev 1984;
Magkaev 1974a, 1974b). We therefore propose treating planning
as a special function of thinking and including it as a second
component of the theoretical method of action. Its object is the
construction of systems of potential actions, an idealized schema
as a plan for future practical actions, and the construction of

various versions of these actions and the choice of the one
among them most appropriate to the problem’s conditions,
goals, and requirements. The content of planning consists in
moving the defined (assigned by the situation) quantitative and
spatial relationships of a complex object into a temporal sequence
of subjective actions, into a logically complete system of actions
or operations. The ability to plan implies mastery of the principle
governing construction of a temporal sequence of one’s own
thought acts and turning one’s own means of constructing plans
into a special object of cognition. Planning, both as the process of
understanding the objective basis of an action itself and as under-
standing of one’s own method of action (defined by the objective
basis and the subjective intention), relies on such qualities as
foresight and intention. We use these qualities as criteria for
determining the level of development not only of the planning
function, but also of the theoretical method of action overall.
These same criteria characterize the psychological features of
the exploratory transformations and the content and sense of
“tries,” “seeings how,” and “guesses.”
However, like other components of the generalized method of
action, the preconditions and conditions leading to the origin and
emergence of intrinsic content-based forms of planning have
clearly yet to be sufficiently studied. We believe that solving
the problem of the emergence of intrinsic forms of planning is
internally connected with the means of solving something that
might seem to be a different problem: the emergence of imagina-
tion and sign/symbol means of thinking.
The original content and meaning of planning activity consists
in subjects moving beyond the bounds of actual space and time
(“here and now”), in the moving of perceived objects and actions
performed in the present onto the future plane. Through this act
(which has yet to be sufficiently studied), the subject essentially
creates the “idea” of a unified time of action by connecting the
past, present, and future. Multiple repetitions of these acts bring
about mastery of the space-time relationship of objects while, at
the same time, their common functional and conceptual
relationships and connections are being assimilated. The emer-

gence of these connections and relationships represents the emer-
gence of thinking. Once they have emerged, there occurs
a fundamental change in the nature of subjects’ activity: they
begin to act in accordance with a schema going from thinking to
situation rather than the other way around, as in the past.
A fundamental ability to change the present situation in accor-
dance with the content and requirements of one’s own thought
has appeared. Action, having become thought, begins to fulfill
the function of “projecting” the possible “thens” of an object’s
changes presumed in the future and the results that can be
achieved.
A third internally essential moment of the generalized method
of action is reflection. Reflection is understood as subjects’
reorientation toward their own method of action. The content
and sense of this reorientation consists in the following: a) sub-
jects’ critical examination of the reasons for changes in objective
circumstances as reasons for changing their own actions (“the
transformation of transformations”), the reconsideration (or con-
firmation) of their “viewpoint” and “subjective positions”; b)
changes or adjustments to devised plans and intentions in accor-
dance with changing conditions of action; c) the critical examina-
tion “from the side” of how well their actions correspond to all of
a problem’s objective demands, their immediate results and future
consequences: monitoring of the logical unfolding of their
actions; and d) a critical assessment of the integral content of
their method of action as a method for solving a particular class
of problems and a determination of their reproductive capacity.
The fact that reflection differs from the actual process of pro-
blem solving, being a contentful assessment of how that process is
unfolding and its results, makes it difficult to study experimentally
as a relatively independent component of the theoretical method of
action. Attempts to incorporate its content and functional purpose
into an experimental model to make it the immediate object of
study have thus far been unsuccessful. This is why manifestations
of reflection have been studied through the actions of analysis,
planning, control, and assessment. The attempts to experimentally
study the specific nature of reflection undertaken by A.Z. Zak

(1976, 1984) were, in our view, actually aimed at analyzing the
actions of classification and seriation, in which, as is well known,
comprehended content does not demand a conceptual method of
action. These methodologies therefore “capture” important features
of reflection that rationally classifies and formally assesses, but not
reflection that makes contentful determinations and critical assess-
ments. Of course, the classification and description of things is also
an essential moment in the process of cognition, but, as Hegel
wittily remarked, the description of things is not the same as
a subject’s motion in objects; the motion is still undergoing refine-
ment (Hegel 1913). A subject’s attainment of the essential content
of objects demands reflection that falls in the category of creative,
object-related, and transformative activity.
Under the conditions of problem solving, reflection is
involved in generating the interconnected actions of analysis
and planning and in reproducing the “logic” of a situation’s
motion, as an important property of the exploratory-
transformative process. But the specific object that reflection
controls, assesses, and regulates is the “logic” of subjects’
motion, how well this logic corresponds to the ‘logic” of the
situation. Reflection is, therefore, characterized as individuals’
ability to turn an image of action into a special object of
transformation, to examine its various possibilities and to
make a discrete choice of the appropriate means, that is,
achieve an effective understanding of the sense and goal of
their activity. It is specifically this central moment in the con-
tent of reflection that is, in our view, the immediate object of
experimental study, since the object-related content has already
been “sublated” in it, is “had in mind” in the development and
adjustment of subjective positions.
Logical and psychological analysis of action and its generalized

properties
The universal logical definition of an action, as mentioned pre-

viously, is the transformation of objectively existing things, the
change, reworking, and movement of the present state of an

object into “its other” state, into the “sublation” of its immediacy.
Action also performs this fundamental function in relation to the
object, as the real basis of its changes, and in relation to the
conditions out of whose transformation the object must occur. As
the process of change of an object’s original state, the negation of
its present form of existence, it is as if transformation “destroys”
and “annihilates” it. Nevertheless, this same process is simulta-
neously the construction of another object or its state as a goal of
action. In this process, it is important that not only the actual
content of the original object is preserved, but its “potentials” are
also developed, its new definitions are discovered. The single act
of transformation comprises the functions of analysis and synth-
esis, thereby demonstrating the illegitimacy of the question:
which of the two processes came first? They emerge and develop
simultaneously as two moments of a single act of object trans-
formation that mutually determine one another. Clearly, the dia-
lectic nature of action reproduces the dialectic of objective
processes in nature and society.
What makes designing experimental methodologies for study-
ing and diagnosing the development of thinking so difficult is the
need to model the genetically original law governing the objec-
tive existence of a particular sphere of activity and to reflect the
logic governing an object’s internal content development in the
means of solving a certain class of problems. When subjects
appropriately reproduce this content’s logic of development, this
shows that their method of action corresponds to the given
objective norm. And, since this norm presumes that particular
people change and assimilate objective objects and circumstances
from the position of the entire species, which has practically and
theoretically established various systems of content-based mea-
sures for determining reality, rather than from the position of their
own individual needs and interests, experimental problems must
provide for various forms, types, and levels of conceptual content
as the objects and goals of actions. In short, the experimental
problem must be built on scientific and theoretical content, and
not on everyday information and ideas about “natural” objects

and phenomena.
An action’s main content characteristic, the content-related prop-
erty that also defines its other qualities, is object-relatedness.
Practical action is aimed at gaining knowledge of “natural” things
and phenomena, at determining the similarities and differences
between separate material bodies. The global images of these
bodies are based on their sensorially perceived properties and
everyday functional purposes fixed in verbal meanings.
Identification of the similarities and differences of bodies occurs
based on such external properties as color, form, and size.
In parallel with the extensive formation of sensory images of
things there occurs a “breaking away” of individual external
properties from the “face” of their vehicle, the object as
a global formation and these property’s isolation as primary
abstractions or idealizations. As a result of this process, external
properties and relationships — color, form, size, placement in
space, everyday function — become relatively independent
objects of action. However, first of all, these ideas, as objects,
again become fixed and “materialize” in other natural objects,
replacing the original ones. It is as if the primary idealizations
serve as a means of building images of similar, heterogeneous
objects, whereby the original idea of the object becomes broader,
but not deeper. In other words, this process for now does not
provide for the qualitatively new penetration into the content of
the object, and, consequently, the development of the action
itself. Second, the primary idealizations continue to realize exter-
nal relationships and connections between objects, essentially
limiting themselves to the affirmation of their presence. These
formal ties and relationships in no way change the subject’s
general position in relation to objects: for the subject, they con-
tinue to be autonomous, isolated from one another, separate
realities that can be acted with to regulate many external features,
properties, relationships, and everyday functions.
The act of comparison is the primary source of vast amounts of
abstract information about the surrounding world. The practically
realized comparison of things and their numerous relationships is
based on assimilated “readymade” information about the external

properties, relationships, and functions of things, which is why
children do not see anything new in their own transformations,
although they are essentially the ones producing this newness.
Objects of sensory-practical actions include: “natural” things,
their externally observed properties, sensorially perceived general
space-time relationships, everyday functions of objects and their
totalities fixed in verbal meanings, and the external characteristics
of human relations. As a result, these actions remain utterly
dependent on the sensorially assigned diversity of things and
phenomena and are essentially “shackled” by their present state
and reproduce that which is given in immediate observation. For
this reason, they also remain separate — not internally connected
to one another; they do not generalize themselves. However,
these very same objects of action are involved in a constructive
form of sensory and object-related activity and uncover their own
content in a fundamentally new way. This occurs when, for one
reason or another, subjects encounter conditions where it is
necessary to change objects’ existing properties and relationships
and move them to another state, but the information and means
offered by the action of comparison are insufficient. The demands
of these conditions change the functional purpose of the action: it
takes on a cognitive orientation. If the goal cannot be immedi-
ately realized, first the properties and relationships that can be
used to achieve the goal must be found in the existing conditions
(new knowledge must be “discovered”). This means that the
subject has to perform an active exploratory transformation of
the object, not a passive comparison of objects. In other words,
the subject must analyze it. Within sensory and object-oriented
cognitive transformations, an object’s properties, relationships,
and connections that were not identified through the action of
comparison are uncovered. The process of searching for and
identifying them is viewed as the process by which the idealized
(conceived, internal) object emerges as an “idea” and “initial
sketch” of the real object. Such is the general schema for the
emergence of primary “idealizations” that within thinking activity
become the immediate objects and goals of cognitive activity.
Uncovering the laws governing the emergence and development

of the original idealization means gaining knowledge of the law
governing the development of the act of thinking overall. What is
crucial here is the fact that the original “idealizations” (abstrac-
tions) contain, not formal knowledge about externalities, but
contentful knowledge about the object, knowledge of the internal
essence that shapes the form of human activity. As the “embryos”
from which concepts about real things and phenomena develop,
as the basis of the development of scientific and theoretical
knowledge, these contentful objects of action simultaneously
serve as logical “units” for assessing a method of action’s level
of development. The original “idealizations” follow a path of
development from vague ideas and supposition to the status of
scientific concepts and theories, forming an interconnected sys-
tem of stages in the genetic and functional development of
thought and human consciousness.
Among the multitudes of contentful “units” that become the
immediate objects and goals of an individual’s activity, the most
essential in terms of their developmental function, and difficult in
terms of the search for and discovery of them as genetically
original idealized objects, are contentful and universal idealiza-
tions belonging to the defining spheres of human activity. Such
genetically original contentful “units” objectively exist both in
the many spheres of physical reality and in the sphere of social
relations and social consciousness. It should be noted that in the
research of experimental psychology, it is the mastering of intrin-
sic natural-science contents (mathematics, physics, chemistry,
biology, etc.) that have been most studied, along with the corre-
sponding development of natural-scientific thinking in learners.
In problem-solving experiments, the greatest challenge for
experimental subjects is searching for, discovering, and creating
this genetically original idealization, a process that involves
understanding the assigned conditions (including the experimen-
ter’s instructions) while at the same time understanding their own
ability to change these conditions. The contradictory essence of
this object stems from the fact that the object of activity is the
search for this very object, an object that is just coming into
being, in other words, a future object that is being built in the

present time. Holding in consciousness a constantly moving and
developing original content that furthermore becomes segmented
in the course of development into internally isolated moments
and seems to want to break out of the bounds of the given
circumstances, exposing and reproducing new connections and
relations over the course of this content’s development; this is
what makes contentful and object-related thinking activity so
difficult in our view. This is also what makes it difficult to
understand the very concept of “the object-relatedness of action.”
The contentful and functional properties of an action as a thinking
act depend on the nature of an object’s abstraction or concrete-
ness. This is what makes systematicity and generalization impor-
tant complementary properties of a contentful action.
Systematicity refers to the process by which subjects separate
out from a single generating basis (from a genetically original
“cell”) the most diverse definitions of an original object as
a “representative” of a given sphere of reality, the separating
out of a system of interconnected concretizations of original
content. In an extreme case, systematicity means (in contrast
with insularity and isolatedness) moving beyond the bounds of
a given class of objects into new spheres of objective reality. The
generalization of an action — the opposite of systematicity — is
a process that reduces diverse concretizations of content to their
original basis and brings them together into a dialectical unity
based on the identification of the law governing the existence and
development of entire classes of objects and spheres of activity.
Object-relatedness, systematicity, and generalization are, first
and foremost, characteristics of the objective content of reality.
Therefore, knowledge — concepts as “readymade” content — are
defined by these logical “units.” These units are then used to
assess the means of attaining this conceptual knowledge. In other
words, an action’s level of development as thought is evaluated.
Systematicity and generalization, as contentful criteria of an
action’s development, express its continuous-discrete logic of
full-fledged becoming. To put it differently, this logic consists
in the simultaneous development of a thought “in breadth” and
“in depth” based on the appropriate reproduction of the objective

process of a thing’s development.
One of the main psychological qualities of an action is inten-
tionality, which expresses various forms and dimensions of the
action’s consciousness. As a criterion of how well formed an
action is, intention is contrasted with such features as impulsivity,
spontaneity, a propensity for manipulation, and situationality.
A general sense of these features can be discovered as the
absence of a certain object and goal, an intention thought through
in advance, and a plan of action in problem-solving situations.
The solution in these situations is determined by sensorially
perceived features of a given situation and a desire to attain
a practical result through a direct path. When using this method
of action, individuals do not relate to their own transformations:
they are unable to appreciate the significance and role of the
results of their own transformations, to say nothing of connecting
them among themselves. It is impossible to discover even
a glimmer of an idea, so to speak, in actions (manipulations) of
this sort. Previously developed and learned action schemata do
not correspond to the content of the new conditions, to the
“logic” of the problem, so individuals do not know what they
have to do. In new situations, action schemata that have been
transformed into templates are no longer internal means of con-
structing transformations, and individuals’ entire previous experi-
ence proves useless in a creative situation.
Intentionality is the quality that signifies a cardinal change in
the overall attitude of consciousness (a change in the general
method of the active relationship toward developing circum-
stances), specifically: the emergence of a need first to “think
through” the features of given conditions and ponder what actions
and operations are possible under these conditions, and only then
to perform transformations realizing and verifying the hypotheses
and intentions worked out in advance. We believe that, when
confronted with an abstract intention to act, the ability to carry
out this intention, to bring about the unity of the intention and its
realization, is the original definition of intentionality.
Consequently, the approach (stance, attitude) to the solution of
a problem expressed in very indicative acts of “thinking through”

or “pondering,” in the typical phrases and pauses individuals use
is, however, indirect, a telling symptom of the level of develop-
ment of an action’s intentionality. Intentionality is a general prop-
erty of all types of contentful actions, including those such as
analysis, planning, and reflection.
Intentionality begins to develop on the basis of the act of fore-
sight — individuals’ ability to foresee the possibility of their future
actions, their results, and consequences. Highly developed foresight
is reflected in the ability to make an internal logical connection
between presumed actions, their results and consequences, in juxta-
position with the features of the given situation overall. This comes
with individuals’ mastery of their own ability to foresee as an
action’s internal property under changing circumstances. The stable
function of foresight as an inner “mechanism” for mastering new
content provides for the development of intentionality, but now in
the form of forethought. Forethought is a quality not only of think-
ing, but of a conscious personality overall. The functional develop-
ment of forethought, in turn, forms independence in actions and
deeds, in taking creative decisions and in working out strategic and
tactical plans for realizing them. Forethought, when developed to
a level where it is free from the rigid dictates of the present circum-
stances of an individual’s independence, becomes a contentful and
constructive basis for choosing life goals and interests.
Important indicators of foresightful action are sign/symbol
mediacy (Elkonin 1982), or, to be more precise, that it has sign/
symbol “equipment,” and a conditional-hypothetical orientation.
These two qualities represent unique “internal” means signifying
the content and meaning of individuals’ actions and serve to
organize and manage their own activity. Using these means,
individuals transform their own thought acts (actions) into
a special object of examination. They are what provide for the
unity of the objective content and the subjective action (the
external and the internal), which is expressed in subjects’ ability
to understand themselves and their method of action. In the end,
it turns out that the external object and the subjective action both
have the same content.
Of course, intentionality is also characterized by a number of

specific indicators, but analyzing them, it seems to us, is a task
for the future. For now, we point out important indicators that
become clearly evident in problem-solving situations. They are:
goal-setting, goal-orientation, and goal-drivenness. Their
absence from the make-up of an action in psychological research
is treated as a symptom of the “loss” of a goal and the descent
into unproductive methods for solving problems. On the other
hand, their presence is primarily reflected in two ways: a) an
action fulfills the function of searching out a goal in given
conditions relying on a certain general idea; and b) an action
fully reproduces (reconstructs) a method for achieving a goal
specified as the required result. We see the first as the process
of goal-setting and the second as the processes of goal-orientation
and goal-drivenness.
In psychological research, an action’s searching and cognitive
orientation is rightly considered to be a fundamental criterion
indicating how well-formed an action and its creative transforma-
tive capabilities are. The content of this property in an action is
revealed through the use of such terms and expressions as “giving
a try,” “orienting,” “approximating,” “thought experimenting,”
“searching,” “investigating,” and “gaining knowledge of,”
among others. An action’s searching function is externally con-
trasted with the executive and pragmatic orientation of an action
toward the immediate achievement of a result (“success”). This
does not mean that practical action is devoid of any searching
quality. It is always looking for the necessary result, but this
search is limited in nature and is based on the means at hand
and the immediate evidence from sensory organs, as well as
knowledge stored in the mind. However, these means and rational
knowledge are not enough to get results in problem-solving
situations. We refer to the fact that in practical actions, the
impulsivity and situationality of transformations predominate
over instances of searching for the objective bases for attaining
a result; they “swallow up” elements of intentionality. In new
situations, rigidity and stereotypicality in actions predominate
over a creative attitude. A contradiction arises between the
continually developing objective content of reality and a rigidly

fixed transformation method, between a subjective stance fixed as
an attitude of consciousness and dialectic of the objective pro-
cesses. The need to resolve this contradiction demands critical
analysis and a rethinking of the method of action, a rejection of
understandings and knowledge that formed under other circum-
stances, as well as of “invariant ideas” and “eternal truths.” In
other words, the person faced with this contradiction must under-
stand that these ideas do not correspond to the changing circum-
stances. This contradiction can be resolved by changing the
functional orientation of action, switching from practical and
result-oriented transformations of the situation to searching and
cognitive ones, to analysis of existing connections and relation-
ships between the problem’s structural elements. Searching and
identifying them unfolds as a process of constructing hypotheses
regarding the possible attainment of a result.
No search for a particular form of connection and relationship
within the given situation or specific object and goal enter into
the “intention to act” and “acting by making attempts.” The task
takes on a general form: to find out how the given situation will
change if there are various transformations and try to understand
and assess what has been learned. Despite the abstractness of this
way of framing the problem, it introduces an important element
that means the search is no longer “blind”: it is the idea of
drawing a connection between the nature of changes to the
situation on one hand and the features of possible actions on
the other. In the process of solving problems, this original idea
grows into thinking about (intended action) a preliminary inves-
tigation into the nature of connections and the relationships
among the main elements of the given conditions, into thinking
about the need to analyze the existing conditions of action. In
other words, intentionality becomes searching and searching
becomes intentional. Thinking, therefore, is defined as an inten-
tional searching and transforming action. The action’s intention-
ality and its searching and investigative orientation constitute
a dialectically interconnected pair of properties that complement
one another.
What is demanded of problem-solvers is that they change the

method for organizing and managing their actions by transform-
ing the given conditions. This means making changes to the
situation’s existing connections and relationships that they decide
in advance. But if they know the object, goal, and nature of the
transformations in advance, the situation is no longer a problem,
no longer a creative situation. And if they do not know all this,
the transformations will prove to be “blind” and “objectless” and
the problem solvers will be acting spontaneously, counting on
chance or a lucky break. This contradiction is resolved when
individuals’ intention to change the circumstances is joined with
the “idea” of finding out these circumstances’ features before
undertaking practical transformations. This means that the
“idea” of conducting “orienting,” “trying,” and searching-
investigative transformations of the given conditions forms in
the mind in order to find out something new about the connec-
tions and relationships among the situation’s elements. When
individuals do this, it is as if they relieve themselves of the
obligation of attaining a result and give themselves permission
to be wrong in the process of exploring the situation. In this case
“trial and error” constitute a sort of mechanism to search for
a special object existing in abstract form in the “idea”: the new
connections and relationships that can emerge as a result of
possible “trial” transformations of the given object. There can
be no “mistakes,” in the traditional sense of the word, in the
process of searching for this sort of “object.” “Trial” not only
allows for “error” — it anticipates them. The two play the role of
guideposts and means for assessing the transformations that have
been performed.
In developed form, intentionality characterizes the conscious
and volitional aspect of personality, while the processes of
searching and cognition underlie the development of its rational-
creative orientation. Taken together, they are the components of
human rational creative activity — the foundation of the self-
development of personality.
In summary, our theoretical analysis of the foundations of
reflective thinking lead to the following conclusions:
1. A human action reproduces the didactic “nature” of its object, its

discrete-continuous development, so it is defined as an act of transfor-
mation of the object’s present state, which becomes the construction of
a “new” object. At the same time, it signifies both “destruction” and
creation, since it consists of two complementary moments that presume
one another’s existence: analysis and synthesis. This process brings
about original idealizations that “capture” the moment that the state of
an object changes, the transition from one of its states to another, and
that establish connections between its various states. The emergence of
original idealizations signifies the emergence of action as a genuinely
thinking act. The thinking action, in the process of its emergence, takes
on a functional differentiation that can be reflected in the concepts
“analysis,” “reflection,” and “planning.”
2. The following properties are the main criteria for determining the level
of the genetic and functional development of a generalized method of
action (reflective thinking) and its components: object-relatedness,
systematicity and generalization, intentionality, and searching.
3. In juxtaposition with indicators that are their superficial opposites —
“natural” (obvious) object-relatedness, insularity and isolatedness,
spontaneity and a propensity toward manipulation, impulsivity and
a propensity toward execution, among others — these characteristics
of action are the criteria for assessing various types and forms of the
method of an individual’s action.
Chapter 2: Studying Contentful Analysis as a Component of

Reflective Thinking: Methods and Results
Starting assumptions and research method
From the standpoint of the activity approach to the study of the human
mind developed by Soviet psychology, mental development occurs as
a process whereby an individual assimilates the historically developed
means and methods of thinking. This approach’s central idea is that
thinking is an ability of the human species and as such is an object of
the study of logic. It is the task of psychology to uncover the
subjective methods by which individuals appropriate and realize the
forms of thinking that have evolved over the course of history, relying
on the findings of logic concerning these forms’ objective structure.
Dialectical logic distinguishes two main forms of thought:

empirical (common sense) and theoretical (reasoning intelli-
gence), which are treated as two stages of rational cognition. It
is specifically theoretical thinking, as the higher of the two and
corresponding to the contemporary level of scientific learning and
social practice, that is, of unquestionable interest for psychologi-
cal and pedagogical research.
Psychological research conducted by D.B. Elkonin and V.V.
Davydov on the theory of learning activity have focused on the
laws governing the emergence of the foundations of reflective-
theoretical thinking, as well as on solving the problem of how it
forms in young schoolchildren (Davydov 1972, 1986; Elkonin
1960a, 1966). This area of science has developed a system of
ideas about the content and structure of theoretical thinking and
criteria for assessing how well-formed it is. Methodologies for
studying and diagnosing it have also been devised. A cycle of
experimental studies has now been completed and their results
have been described in a series of works (Zak 1976, 1984;
Zakharova and Andrushchenko 1980; Isaev 1984; Maksimov
1979; Nosatov 1976). However, in our view, certain central
theoretical propositions have yet to be experimentally demon-
strated and have not been reflected in studies and diagnostic
methods.2 First and foremost among them are ideas about the
interconnections among the main components of theoretical
thinking — analysis, planning, and reflection — within the struc-
ture of an integral thinking act, and the content of the central
component — analysis — along with the method by which
analysis is realized. We believe that these shortcomings cannot
be rectified using current experimental methods, and new
approaches must be developed.
Designing the method for experimentally studying analysis
that we are proposing should begin by more precisely expressing
and concretizing the starting theoretical assumptions underlying
the idea of content generalization (Davydov 1972, 1986) that are
contained in a number of philosophical works by authors who
have significantly influenced this idea’s development (Arsen’ev,
Bibler, and Kedrov 1967; Bibler 1969, 1975; Ilyenkov 1984).

These works have led to the following propositions.
On the level of logic, the specific nature of theoretical thinking
is defined by its content and method, in other words, by the ways
cognitive problems are solved and new knowledge is formed that
are intrinsic to it. The realm of objectively interconnected phe-
nomena, phenomena linked by processes of mutual transforma-
tion, serves as the content of theoretical thinking, its object.
Dialectical logic usually places this interconnected diversity of
phenomena into the category of the concrete. In the process of
theoretical thinking, the concrete makes two appearances: first as
the starting point of knowledge (thinking) it is transmitted imme-
diately into contemplation, and, second, it ends as the result of
unification, synthesis, and abstractions.
Motion within this content is realized through the method,
specific to theoretical thinking, of reducing the diversity of
a certain area of reality’s phenomena to their universal generating
basis, to the essence that is fixed within an original abstraction,
with a subsequent ascent from the abstract to the concrete. The
central mediating link in this process is the theoretical (content-
ful) abstraction: “the historically simple, contradictory, and essen-
tial relationship of the reproduced concrete” (Davydov 1986,
120). The theoretical abstraction contains the fundamental —
genetically original — relationship of a studied object reflecting
the content of the potentials of its motion, its self-modification,
and its unfolding into concrete multiplicity.
Receiving original abstractions is the immediate problem of
theoretical analysis. Analyzing activity goes through several stages
as it solves this problem: 1) identification of the genetically origi-
nal relationship; 2) analysis of its internal contradiction; and 3) the
discovery of a way to resolve this contradiction (Davydov 1986,
118 – 126). Within the method found for resolving the contra-
diction there occurs a synthesis of opposite definitions of the
object, which creates the preconditions for unfolding the original
relationship into a system of relationships — the capacity for
logical movement from the abstract to the concrete.
An essential aspect of theoretical analysis is the modeling of

studied reality, its representation in ideal object-related understand-
ings and subsequent examination “through the prism” of these
idealizations. Modeling takes place in the course of a thought
experiment, a specific way of realizing theoretical cognition. In
the process of a thought experiment, the ideal (idealized) object is
transformed, and in this transformation, new properties of the
object’s realm are found. “In the course of such
a transformation,” writes V.S. Bibler, “idealized objects discover
(acquire) qualities that they did not have before the transformation”
(Arsen’ev, Bibler, and Kedrov 1967, 191). He identifies the fol-
lowing primary features of the thought experiment: 1) the object of
cognition is mentally placed in conditions in which its essence can
be discovered with a special definiteness; 2) the object of cognition
becomes an object of mental transformations; and 3) in the experi-
ment itself a system of connections forms the “ideal environment”
into which the object “fits” (Bibler 1969, 200).
Theoretical thinking that takes the form of a thought experi-
ment deals with an object’s change, its movement. Using analy-
sis, the elementary form of change is identified (the most
commonly seen change, a typical transformation): the logical
unit of an object’s transformation, which finds its expression in
the original concept of the studied object. This concept has the
characteristics of a dialectical contradiction and appears to be the
equivalence of opposites: the object is and is not in a given state.
Neither state of the object is fixed in the original concept (either
before or after the transformation), while the very moment of the
change of states is a transition, an elementary act of the object’s
change, its movement. Bibler comments in one of his works that
“any scientific concept looks like a dialectical contradiction, as
the equivalence of opposites, specifically because and inasmuch
as any scientific concept, in reproducing the essence of an object,
reproduces the specific form of movement of this object…. The
essence always winds up being that same principle of movement
in its special, concrete, specific form” (Arsen’ev, Bibler, and
Kedrov 1967, 103).
In his Philosophical Notebooks, in discussing Hegel’s proposi-

tion about the fundamental difference between the contents of
rational and intelligent thinking, V.I. Lenin wrote: “(1) Ordinary
understanding grasps difference and contradiction, but not the
transition from one to the other, and this is what is most impor-
tant… (3) Thinking reason (wit) sharpens the dulled difference of
the different, the simple diversity of understandings, down to the
essential difference, down to oppositeness. Only when raised to
the peak of contradiction do differences become mobile (regsam)
and alive toward one another — they take on the negativity that is
the inner pulsation of self-motion and vitality” (Ageev, Davydov,
and Rubtsov 1985, 128).
The specific form of an object’s motion is manifested in
the course of its sensory, object-related, and mental transfor-
mation by a person. The mediateness of an object’s change
(its “self-motion”) through human activity turns into the
internal contradictoriness of the very process of cognition.
On one hand, cognition presumes the need to envisage reality
in its own objective course and development, in other words
as something with which the subject is confronted, but on the
other, the internal laws of the object of cognition, the
mechanisms by which it is transformed, cannot be discovered
outside of subjective transforming activity. In other words,
the contradiction consists in the fact that the subject must act,
changing the object, while at the same “withdrawing,” letting
the object develop in accordance with its own — “objec-
tive” — law.
Subjects of theoretical thinking find a way around this contra-
diction by viewing their actions transforming the studied object
as “conditions” under which the law governing its existence is
reproduced. An object’s “objective” content, taken together with
the method for transforming it (the only way it can be discovered)
and expressed in ideal form, makes up the content of a theoretical
concept (including the original abstraction): the ideal object car-
ries within it not just the characteristics of a thing, but also the
convoluted, encoded method for dealing with it.
This focus on the method of action (intentional or uncon-

scious) is characteristic not only of scientific cognition, but also
of other areas of human spiritual and practical activity. As E.V.
Ilyenkov writes:
People deal with nature only to the extent that it is involved in the
process of social labor, transformed into material, into a means,
a condition of active human activity…. The universal forms and
laws of natural material truly show through, and therefore people
are aware of them specifically to the extent that this material is
already truly transformed into building material “of the inorganic
body of man,” the “objective body” of civilization, and therefore
the universal forms of “things in themselves” appear to man
immediately as active forms of the functioning of his “inorganic
body.” (Ilyenkov 1984, 167 – 168)
From this standpoint, the specific nature of scientific cognition

(theoretical thinking) consists in the fact that the methods of
human activity in their most generalized forms appear as its content.
The psychological characterization of theoretical thinking as
a generalized method of action presumes the discovery of its
inner structure and dynamic, as well as the identification of the
subjective means for realizing it.3
As previously discussed, theoretical thinking can be seen as
consisting of three components: the actions of analysis, planning,
and reflection. While sharing a single content (ideal object-
relatedness serves as their content), they perform different func-
tions. Analysis functions as a way of uncovering the genetically
original basis of a certain whole (an object-related system). As
a result of reflection, humans can examine the basis of their own
actions and thereby mediate one action using others, discovering
in the process their internal interrelations. Planning is realized as
the construction of a field of possible actions, an array of possible
transformations within the framework of a given object-related
system, and as the choice, on this basis, of the way of acting that
best fits the particular conditions.
Insofar as in the real process of functioning theoretical thinking
appears as the unity of its components (analysis, reflection, and
planning), studying each of these in isolation, in separation from
the others, is, in our opinion, impossible. Therefore, dealing with

any of these components as an object of psychological study
requires consideration of the thinking act as a whole, but each
time focusing on one of its functional projections. When the
action of analysis is chosen as the object of study, situations
must be designed in which this component of theoretical thinking
serves as the leading one, while reflection and planning would
perform an “auxiliary” function and serve as internal tools for
attaining the main goal.
Insofar as the immediate goal of contentful analysis — seeking
out and identifying an object system’s genetically original rela-
tionships — is, in the final analysis, subordinate to the task of
devising a general method of action (designing an effective way
of planning actions within the framework of a given object
system), we conjecture that planning serves as a sort of way of
orienting the action of analysis that can also serve as a way of
verifying its results. An appropriate context for studying analysis
is, therefore, a problem situation in which the necessary solution
of a series of problems of a single class is part of the conceptual
background, and the subject’s immediate goal is identifying and
representing the principle (law) governing the object system’s
development: constructing a conceptual image of this system
that enables the planning of actions within its framework.
We further conjecture that as theoretical analysis is being
performed, it is mediated by content-constructing reflection that
takes on the function of constructing the necessary idealizations
reflecting the interconnection of the subject’s transforming
actions and the corresponding transformations of the object.
Through reflection, both operation and transformation (an influ-
ence and the effect it produces), place themselves in
a relationship of mutual determination, and the results of preced-
ing actions are viewed as conditions for carrying out subsequent
ones, which enables the continuousness and logical interconnect-
edness of transformations under constantly changing conditions.
We believe that, in the act of contentful analysis, reflection is
manifested in the function of imagination and, as a result, leads to
constructive synthesis and the creation of a conceptual image of
the situation that brings together: 1) the object’s numerous pos-

sible states; 2) the type (set) of effective operations (the sorts of
influences on the object that lead to its transformation); and 3) the
system’s genetically original relationship (the simplest connection
of its separate states as an elementary basis for its change). In the
course of reflection, the states of the object before and after each
transformation are compared, the differences are recorded, the
role particular operations play in particular changes are uncov-
ered, the object system’s main contradiction is identified, and
a hypothesis as to how to resolve it is devised. In other words,
a universal passageway mentally connecting the object’s various
states is constructed. It is specifically this mental act of building
a passageway that serves as the main characteristic of contentful
conceptual analysis.
The specific way in which analysis is mediated by planning
and reflection is expressed in such properties of the method
of action as searching, intentionality, object-relatedness, sys-
tematicity, and generalization. In aggregate, these properties
make it possible to assess how well thinking (the method of
action) corresponds to the normative method of action that
reproduces the objective logic by which the object system has
developed.
The mediation of analysis by planning makes this action (ana-
lysis) searching and intentional. The quality of searching is man-
ifested in people’s ability to abstract themselves from concrete-
practical goals and concentrate on identifying internal relation-
ships that give an object the type of changes appropriate to it.
Because of the nature of searching, the initial attempts can differ
fundamentally: in one case they might be actions aimed at
achieving a concrete result and having as their only basis the
particular given conditions determining the “technical aspect” of
action; in another, they might be actions oriented toward the
construction of generalized means of managing the object that
enable all the states that are possible for it and, in so doing, solve
all concrete-practical problems of a given class. The searching
nature of actions in essence signifies a subject’s acceptance of the
learning task.
As a characteristic of analysis, intentionality is a sign that

a subject has a hypothesis that anticipates the next stage of the
search and is manifested in the predictive nature of the subject’s
thinking. The system of consequences stemming from the
hypothesis is like a spectrum of predicted changes in the object
that will later be correlated with the results of practical transfor-
mations. Intentional actions have their own internal logic corre-
sponding to the intention/hypothesis.
Reflection’s mediation of analysis provides for the object-
relatedness of this action and, as a result, its systematicity and
generalization. Object-relatedness, as a characteristic of any thinking
action (and thinking overall), is first and foremost relatedness to
a specific object area (field of knowledge), its reproducing ability
within the framework of the given object system. Thinking is object-
related if it relies on universal forms of human activity fixed in
corresponding ideal object-related understandings.4 Therefore,
object-relatedness is directly tied to the wealth of idealizations
present in the individual thinking of those performing the action
through the representation of universal (categorical) definitions of
reality in their consciousness. The object-relatedness of an action
unfolds and manifests itself (is actualized) in the process of active
interaction between the ideal object (an image that carries within
itself individuals’ assimilated ideal means and methods of human
activity) and the real field of knowledge (the object). Generalized
ideal understandings are furthermore transformed and concretized
with regard to the objectively given form of the object. There occurs
a simultaneous objectification of the ideal (of the image, the plan for
the subject’s intended method of action) and the effective deobjecti-
fication of the object. In the process of this interaction (mutual
reflection and mutual determination), the ideal object and the real
object are qualitatively transformed and take on new properties: the
ideal object becomes “objectified,” starts to be equated with the
object and be present in the process and results of the actions and
transformations performed with it — the actual object begins to be
equated with the ideal object. Now the change to its natural-external
properties appears as mediated by the ideal object-related under-
standings in which the inner “mechanism” of these changes
(transformations) is reflected. The operations that were initially

determined externally by the given conditions of the situation and
that reproduced only the “technical” aspect of transformations are
thereby filled with object-related content and become truly object-
related (and simultaneously ideal) thinking actions.
If this mutual determination does not occur, the ideal object acts
as a formal schema fixed in the subject’s consciousness, and a sort
of rupture forms between activity on the conceptual level and
sensory-object activity. In this case, the object’s transformation is
produced in accordance with this a priori formal schema, and
experientially received facts are “squeezed” into it to the extent
that they can find a place in it. Everything that cannot be covered
by these petrified object-related understandings, which does not fit
with them, remains outside the subject’s field of vision.
E.V. Ilyenkov describes this sort of “object-relatedness” of rational
thinking, with its characteristic insularity and inertness in regard to the
changing objective conditions of action, in rather great detail:
When individuals assimilate an ideal image only formally, as
a rigid schema and sequence of operations and without
understanding its origin and connections with real (non-
idealized) reality, they are incapable of adopting a critical
attitude toward the image as a separate object that is different
from them. It is as if they merge with it and cannot look at it
from the outside as an object that can be compared with
reality or altered in accordance with reality. In this case,
strictly speaking, it is not the individual who is acting with
the ideal image but rather a dogmatized image that is acting
inside and by means of the individual. Here it is not the ideal
image that is a function of the individual, but the individual
that is a function of the image, which holds sway over the
individual’s consciousness as an externally assigned formal
schema … as a system of indisputable rules of unknown
origin. (Ilyenkov 1984, 184)
We associate the mobility and flexibility of object-related understand-

ings, their ability to develop, with such properties of thinking as
systematicity and generalization. Systematicity and generalization
are, in our view, different aspects of the main characteristic (object-
relatedness) and determine the multidirectional, in the logical sense,

aspects of the dynamic of this property of contentful thinking.
Furthermore, systematicity, as the ability to derive from the universal
relationship assumptions (hypotheses) about the possible special ways
in which that relationship can manifest itself, serves as a leading
characteristic of object-relatedness, as compared to generalization,
insofar as systematicity allows theoretical thinking to move from the
abstract to the concrete. In the general tendency of contentful thinking
to move from original abstractions to increasingly concrete manifesta-
tions of the studied object, generalization is manifested as a moment
(of no small importance) of focus on original understandings, of
preserving the succession of used idealizations. To put it another
way, systematicity is manifested in a subject’s orientation toward
constructing a developed (concrete) understanding of the studied
object, toward identifying the system-forming relationship and taking
a holistic accounting of the special forms through which it is realized;
generalization, on the other hand, is manifested in the succession of
object-related understandings used by the subject in constructing
actions in a changing situation, in retaining the universal relationship
that constitutes the given object system overall. A subject’s determi-
nation of the boundaries of the object system beyond which pre-
viously devised original idealizations are totally inapplicable or
demand radical revision is also a sign of generalized thinking action.
Our starting theoretical understandings can be summarized as
follows:
1. An appropriate context for studying contentful analysis is the situa-

tion of searching for and identifying the law governing the changes
to and transformations of a particular object.
2. The process of analysis as a holistic thinking act cannot be realized
without the internal means of planning and reflection.
3. The mediation of analysis by planning and reflection is expressed in
such characteristics (properties) as searching, intentionality, object-
relatedness, systematicity, and generalization. The aggregate of these
characteristics enables evaluation of the level of analysis’s functional
development and thereby serves as the criterion for measuring its
formation.
4. The main constitutive characteristic of contentful analysis is object-

relatedness, which is expressed in the mediation of searching and
transforming actions by ideal object-related understandings that
reflect the law governing the changes of the objectively given object
with which the subject is acting. The analysis dynamic, which
consists in the search for (construction of) the sort of object-related
understandings (both original [abstract] and more concrete) can be
reflected in such characteristics as systematicity and generalization.
The aggregate of all three properties determines analysis to be
a genuinely constructive thinking act.
The understandings previously described concerning the structure

and dynamic of contentful analysis and the criteria for assessing
its formation formed the contours for our investigative method.
Hypothesis and the methodological requirements shaping out

experimental study of analysis
The understandings outlined above concerning the object of

theoretical thinking, the specific function of contentful analysis,
and the internal structure and dynamic of this thinking action,
enable us to formulate a number of assumptions that, taken
together, constitute our study’s hypothesis.
1. Analysis, in its original form, is performed within the context of

sensory object-related cognitive activity, meaning that it presumes
the full-fledged practical transformation of the object, real experi-
mentation with it.
2. The direct goal of contentful analysis is to identify the original
relationship that underlies an object’s changes and carries within it
the potential for and mechanism of these changes.
3. Analysis is internally connected with planning, which provides
analysis its conceptual orientation toward creating a universal
“tool” for transforming the studied object, something that enables
the object’s motion from any given state into any other state
required. Therefore, the effectiveness of analysis can be tested
using planning problems: concrete-practical problems that involve
moving an object from a given state to a required one and presume
finding the optimal trajectory of such a transformation.
4. Analysis is internally connected with reflection, which subjects use

to separate out their own actions as special objects of examination,
specifically treating these actions as conditions under which the
object’s transformation occurs and outside of which (“on its own”)
it cannot occur. The main function of reflection in the act of analysis,
a function that defines analysis as genuinely contentful, is figuring
out the mechanism by which the object can be transformed. This
kind of reflection relies on the activity of constructive imagination
and is manifested in the building of an ideal object that serves as the
conceptual center that “coordinates” the subject’s action and the
corresponding transformation of the object through the internal sub-
jective means of understanding, which we will refer to as “the
conceptual image of a situation.”
5. The conceptual image of a situation incorporates an understanding
of the genetically original relationship and of the concrete forms in
which it is realized and unites the conditions and means by which
the object is transformed into a system. This conceptual image
constitutes the basis (“the orienting basis”) of the generalized
method of action within the framework of the given object system.
6. By identifying the mechanism by which an object is transformed in
its simplest form, the form of the relationship, contentful analysis
creates the preconditions for concretizing this relationship and con-
structing the transforming mechanism in regard to the object’s most
complex, more developed forms. When a problem’s solution suc-
cessfully identifies the special forms in which the original relation-
ship was realized, this can be seen as confirmation that contentful
analysis was performed in the original situation. This view is con-
sistent with that of A.Z. Zak, who believes that the identification of
the special forms in which the original relationship was realized is
one of the manifestations of reflective thinking (Zak, 1984).
The concretization of these assumptions enables us to spell out

a number of methodological requirements involved in the experi-
mental study of analysis.
1. The experimental situation must be built around a quasi-

investigative (learning) problem that involves finding the principle
(law) governing the object’s transformation. The search for this law
must be the direct goal of the experimental subject’s action. This
goal is assigned because of the need to later solve a problem of the

given class and carry out the planning of the action-transformation
within the framework of the given object system.
2. To study reflection in the act of analysis (in the function we hypothe-
size) it is useful to arrange an external division between and comparison
of the operational and object-related planes of action. Furthermore, the
object’s change in states should be presented discretely, in the form of
the initial and final states (“before” and “after” transformation), which
makes immediate observation of the act of change itself, the object’s
motion, inaccessible. The object, as a result, will be represented by the
multitude of its states, with the method of motion from one state to the
other hidden from the experimental subject.
3. The experimental situation should require experimental subjects to
perform externally complex object-practical actions to transform the
object, and that these actions be recorded by the experimenter. The
experiment should be designed to enable the objectivization of the
hypotheses advanced by subjects and provide them an opportunity to
test them in practice.
4. The methodology should include a sufficient number of problems of
the main class and several sub-classes of problems where the geneti-
cally original relationship is concretized and the law governing the
object change takes more developed forms.
Methods
Logical object-related analysis of the content of

spatial-temporal relationships. In designing our method, we
chose a class of problems that could be described as “spatial-
combinatorial.” These problems are based on an object’s ability to
occupy a particular position in space in relation to other objects. The
choice of this particular type of problem was determined by our
assumption that the object of analysis was the reality of movement, of
change. Any change in the general case would show up in spatial- and
temporal-like characteristics. Therefore, in the search for material best
suited to our investigative purpose, we decided on spatial-temporal
relationships. We then conducted a logical and object-related analysis
of the content of our chosen problem type in accordance with the
principles for designing research and diagnostic methods described in

the preceding chapter.
Our logical and object-oriented analysis was based on the
concepts of space and time as used in philosophy and in certain
specific sciences where space and time are objects of examination
(geometry, mechanics).
Modern dialectical-materialist philosophy views space and
time as the universal forms of matter’s existence. Space
“expresses the order in which simultaneously existing objects
are arranged” (Elkonin 1981, 75), while time is the “sequence
of existence of phenomena replacing one another (Elkonin 1981).
Space can be defined as being contentful, and not as an “empty
abstraction,” only in unity with the object “immersed” in it: an
object in space and space that contains an object mutually define
one another. Hegel wrote on this account: “Nowhere can a space
which is space per se be demonstrated; it is always a filled space
and never distinct from what fills it” (Miller 2004, 30). However,
object and environment, point and space, serve as opposite defi-
nitions of one and the same thing: the actual properties of objects,
such as extent, derive their determinateness only in relation to
space (to its metrics), and space, in turn, is indeterminate except
through the property of extent. This inseparability of opposite
definitions can be seen in the characterization of the property of
extent offered by N.I. Lobachevskii: “Extent is a property of
bodies that, while spread out, come into contact with one
another” (Lobachevskii 1946, 4). This is what makes it possible
to “imagine all the bodies in nature as parts of a single whole that
exist in space” (Lobachevskii 1946, 168).
But the “space-point” relationship, as Hegel points out, is
merely a “dead” contradiction, a superficial opposition lacking
“vitality” — the transition of opposites into one another. The
“vitality” of this contradiction, its sublation, is time. The inter-
connection between space and time is presented in Hegel’s dia-
lectic in the following way:
Space is this contradiction, to be infected with negation, but in
such wise that this negation falls apart into indifferent
subsistence. Since space, therefore, is only this inner negation

of itself, the self-sublating of its moments is its truth…. Now
time is precisely the existence of this perpetual self-sublation
; … the transition to time is not made subjectively by us, but
made by space itself. In pictorial thought, space and time are
taken to be quite separate: we have space and also time;
philosophy fights against this “also.” (Miller 2004, 34)
Time is “fluidity,” “negativity,” the very becoming of spatial

relations. “But it is not in time that everything comes to be and
passes away, rather time itself is the becoming…” (Miller 2004,
35). Furthermore, “The differences of time have not this indiffer-
ence of self-externality which constitutes the immediate determi-
nateness of space (Miller 2004, 37).
The object-point immersed in space-time is no longer indiffer-
ent in its opposition to space but becomes a “living” point of the
space-time continuum that Hegel defines as “place” and contem-
porary physics calls “event.” Place is the unity of Here and Now.
The transition from a geometric (“spatial”) point to seeing a point
in unified space-time — to seeing what Hegel calls “place” —
makes it possible to “grasp” (determine logically) the process of
motion.
The point … is a whole space as a totality of dimensions. This
Here is now equally time, a Present which immediately sub-
lates itself, a Now which has been. The Here is at the same time
a Now, for it is the point of duration. Place is spatial, and
therefore indifferent, singularity; and it is this only as a spatial
Now, as time, as that place is immediately indifferent towards
itself as this place…. This vanishing and self-regeneration of
space in time and of time in space, a process in which time
posits itself spatially as place, but in which place, too, as
indifferent spatiality, is immediately posited as temporal: this
is Motion. (40 – 41)
These universal contradictions of motion are embodied in the

objects of concrete sciences through the qualitatively unique
ways in which these sciences treat specific types of matter, and
therefore also in the specific forms of motion characteristic of
them. Furthermore, the positive sciences use a particular “trick”:
they sublate motion’s contradictory nature in their concepts. (Any

scientific law retains the “calm” in a phenomenon, to put it in
Hegelian terms.) In this regard, a sufficient arsenal of tools for the
“freezing” of motion has been assembled (all the geometrized
images of motion used in physics can be included here: trajectory,
movement, the world line, etc.). The “freezing” of motion is
present everywhere that there is a need for measurement, calcula-
tion, and the establishment of quantitative laws. This way of
representing movement could be called “universal” (in the sense
of “common to all”) in the positive sciences. It has also taken root
in practical human activity, where various sorts of motion are
represented in the forms of the tools of labor and in the design of
mechanisms.
The need to sublate the motion contradiction in scientific
concepts requires the design of ideal “constructions” capable of
capturing already completed motion and predetermining its pos-
sibilities (potentials). Such “constructions” and ways of building
them (idealization methods) have been devised first and foremost
in the process of developing mechanics. The influence of these
idealizations can be detected in other areas of the natural sciences
as well, insofar as it was conventional until recently to treat the
building of models of any object, process, or phenomenon as if
they were mechanical models.
Mechanical models are always based on the idea of
a kinematic (dynamic, energetic) connection. These ideas are
best objectified in such simple mechanisms as the lever, the
winch, the pulley, and the wedge. Here, the rigid kinematic
connection (the rigidity of the lever, the inextensibility of the
thread, etc.) determines the entire range of possible movement
and static states of a mechanical system and is the mechanical
“image” of the cause-effect connection, the “mechanism” of
movement.
A logical and historical analysis of concepts typical of the
mechanics of idealization was conducted by V.S. Bibler, who
points to the logical and historical need to formulate the
concept of movement through the concept of connection:
“Only reflected through the concept of connection does
a theory of movement not limited to the separate case of

a given one-time actualization of movement become possible..
Movement that is reflected in the concept of connection opens
up as possibility, as a system of possibilities — it becomes an
object of theoretical cognition” (Arsen’ev, Bibler, and Kedrov
1967, 169). The concept of connection underlies what in
mechanics is called the principle of possible displacements:
“All of the displacements within a given system that are
consistent with the nature of that system’s connection, that
realize potential possibilities inherent in that system’s connec-
tions, are possible (and can be determined)” (Arsen’ev, Bibler,
and Kedrov, 1967, 168).
Method. We undertook to design object-related situations
whose content reflected with sufficient definition the dynamic of
time-space relationships. In our view, V.Kh. Magkaev’s methodol-
ogy, “The Combination of Digits” (Magkaev 1974b), successfully
realizes the principles and requirements previously described using
space-time relationships. Magkaev also conducted the logical and
object-related analysis that we largely rely on here. His methodology
was initially intended for research into the thinking function of
planning. In our study, this methodology was altered so that it
could be used to study analysis. We used it in our first series of
exercises.
Our study method consisted of three series of exercises, each
representing a particular level of concretization of the main
relationship that defines the entire class of problems. We used
a personal computer to represent the object’s states and its
changes.
Series 1. The object was a series of four elements (numerals)
placed in the space of five cells arranged in a line.
The computer program could be used to transform the original
composition of elements by pressing any keys marked with the
numbers 1 – 4 (pressing the keys 5 – 9 did nothing to change the
original composition). Pressing a key moved the corresponding
number to an empty cell, freeing up the cell that it had occupied.
This new state immediately came about in place of the previous
state, and the previous state was depicted a line above.

Simultaneously with the change of state, a symbol appeared on
the screen showing the key pressed (to the right of the composi-
tion). This form of presentation, leaving the actual movement
hidden (the movement of the element was not depicted on the
screen) enabled study subjects to compare the state of the object
and determine the condition governing its change — the number
that had been affected by the action. It was possible to program
any original and target combinations of elements and vary their
number from two to nine. We chose to use four numbers.
Series 2. In this series, the object and law governing its trans-
formation were replaced. An additional element, the number 5, was
added to the numbers used in the previous series of problems so that
now all the cells were filled.
The transformation consisted in the switching of places of any
two elements of the composition. The two keys that correspond to
the chosen elements had to be pressed in order to produce this
transformation. As in the previous series, compositions contain-
ing from two to nine elements were possible.
Series 3. In this series, the transformation was significantly
more complex. The action remained the same: subjects had to
press two keys corresponding to any numbers from the set shown
on the screen. Every time keys were pressed the sequence of num-
bers was reversed so that the elements were in the opposite order.
Furthermore, when the elements arranged asymmetrically in relation
to the center of the sequence were acted on, the entire sequence
moved relative to the screen’s border. We based the transformation
on a 180° turn. The axis of the turn lay on the screen’s plane and
passed exactly halfway between the elements that were acted on. As
a result of this rotation, the entire sequence could shift a distance
strictly tied to the placement of these elements in a row. The
transformation itself (the rotational movement), as in the previous
series, was not visually displayed on the screen; the change of state
was instantaneous.
On the lower part of the screen, beneath the number sequence,
there was a scale line that could be used to determine the object’s
displacement. Immediately below the scale line was a cursor

symbol that could be moved by the experimenter to occupy any
chosen position. The cursor symbol was used to assign specific
requirements for the result of transformations in the practical
problems. The symbol could be placed under a particular posi-
tion, meaning that the subject had to change the position of the
object on the screen in such a way so that a particular number
wound up in that position, for example, 2.
Such was the content and method used in our problems. Let us
pause to explain how and to what extent the results of our logical
and object-related analysis of space-time relationships were
embodied in the material used by our method.
The primary object-related situation was the problem with the
empty cell. Here, the object of transformation was presented as
a sequence, a series of elements, the order of which was repre-
sented by the numbers. It was explained to subjects that these
were not numbers, but a totality of elements or “markers.”
Furthermore, the spatial border where the object was localized
was clearly designated; a frame in which cells were marked. The
empty cell was like an unoccupied interval between elements the
size of which was equal to the size of the element. Thus, the
elements’ main property was the extent that made it possible to
occupy a particular place within the limited area of space in
regard to the other elements.
At the moment the state changed, an element’s localization lost
its definiteness; it was no longer in one position (“place”), but it
was not yet in a new one. The same could be said of the empty
cell: its position also lost its spatial definiteness. Looking at the
elementary step of change, an element’s move into an empty cell,
the spatial position of the element appeared to be “three different
places: the present place, the place about to be occupied, and the
place which has just been vacated” (Miller 2004, 43).
From our perspective, this relationship between an element and
its place can be characterized as the essential relationship under-
lying the mechanism by which the object’s state changes. The
external expression of this relationship consists in the antithetical
nature of the element and the empty cell: the empty cell is the
absence of the element. The element’s movement is tied to the

coming into being of an empty cell in the place from which the
element departed and the disappearance of an empty cell in the
place to which it relocated. The movement of the element of the
object is accompanied by the counter movement of “the element
of the environment.” This relationship, the interconnection
between two displacements, is inter-reflective in nature: one
movement is reflected in the other. An element’s spatial definite-
ness (extent) winds up being the spatial definiteness of its
“place,” and “place,” being the absence of the element (its nega-
tion) is like a special “element.” This relationship, the connection
between the element and the empty cell, is reproduced every time
under new specific conditions: for different elements located at
different points in the sequence.
In the static state in which this appeared to subjects on the
computer screen, the original and achieved composition could be
correlated, and their similarity and difference could be deter-
mined: all the elements except one stayed in their places, one
element moved to an empty cell, and an empty cell appeared in
a different place. But determining the similarity and difference
offered a limited understanding of the transformation mechanism,
confining it to a single step — the movement of an element into
an empty cell. Magkaev saw this limitation, which is character-
istic of rational thinking, in “step-by-step” planning strategies
(Magkaev 1974b). Delineating a trajectory (and in the planning
problems it would be an extremely short one) for the transforma-
tion of the object from its original state to the required one
involved taking into account the “functional purpose of the
empty cell” (Magkaev 1974b). One of these problems’ specific
features was that each transformation changed the field of possi-
bilities of the object’s transformation. In its static state, every
element could potentially occupy an empty cell: there were four
possibilities, four possible states, and at the moment of transition,
the array of possibilities was reduced to a single realized possi-
bility, an actually occurring transformation, and again it turned
around, but now from a different point. The very change gener-
ated the conditions for further movement, for their potential. This
relationship between the potential and the actual that was made
concrete in this experiment’s exercises was the universal relation-
ship for this entire class of problems.
Our assumption was that a thorough analysis identifying the
genuine contradiction underlying the object’s movement was
a necessary precondition for designing an overall method. Using
analysis to identify the mutually determining movement of an ele-
ment and the empty cell, the structure of the corresponding connec-
tion, made it possible to see the trajectory of the empty cell’s
movement as a set of possible “places.” The field of possibilities,
naturally limited by the extent of the empty cell, became a developed
system of the object’s states linked by mutual movements.
In the Series 2 problems, where there was no empty cell and
any two elements could exchange places, the original relationship
we identified was concretized and took more developed form.
Here, it was as if the elementary step of transformation involved
a duplication of this relationship: every element moved along
a trajectory that was “freed up” for it by the other element. This
place-trading can be thought of as manifesting a sort of “kine-
matic connection” between the elements. Identifying this connec-
tion and using it to construct the units of transformation —
elements’ paired exchange of places — made it possible to plan
the action of transforming the object from the starting state to the
required one.
The Series 3 problems more fully realized the idea of
a mechanical connection. Here, the object was a “rigid” structure:
the sequence of elements, their placement in relation to one
another, was preserved in any transformation. The transforma-
tions themselves, as described above, consisted in rotating the
entire sequence as a whole by 180° in relation to a particular axis.
Changing the axis of the turn, moving it each time to a different
point in space, moved the entire sequence as a whole. The
possible states and ways of achieving them were determined by
the specific nature of the connection. Therefore, designing the
general method for transforming the object required the identifi-
cation (formation) of this connection, which in turn required the
active involvement of imagination.
Since this series of problems followed the problems involving

the paired exchange of places, we assumed that the first attempts
by experimental subjects to identify the law governing transfor-
mations would be tied to their existing understanding of the
elements’ place trading. Furthermore, subjects had the objective
ability to see the transformation as the totality of paired place
tradings. This would make the object’s transformation look like
a complex combination: all elements’ exchange of places within
a composition and the composition’s simultaneous shift as
a whole by a particular number of positions. This understanding
required a rather complicated algorithm for calculating each sub-
sequent state and, therefore, should have made planning actions
to solve the concrete-practical problems much harder or even
impossible.
Reducing this complicated combination of transformations
down to one simple transformation would require the constructive
(associated with the activity of imagination) act of designing the
“ideal lever,” action on two particular points of which would
“turn” it and in so doing change the position of all its points in
space. Determining the contribution of their own action in produ-
cing the effect, searching for the “place of effect,” and construct-
ing the connection between the effect and the observed
transformation would require subjects to engage in content-
constructing reflection. We therefore assumed that including this
series of problems in our research method would enable us to best
objectify analysis’s internal connection with reflection and
uncover reflection’s function in the act of analysis.
A common, unified methodological principle was realized
throughout this series of problems: the nature of the transforma-
tion, the object’s transition from one state to another, contradicted
the external form in which its static states were presented. For
example, in Series 1 and 2, the object was a linear matrix of
elements, and the type of change presumed (if these changes were
produced naturally) a “going out onto the plane.” In Series 3, the
linear forward movement into the screen field externally contra-
dicted the image of rotation. Realizing this principle allowed us to
see all of the exercises in these experiments as passageway-
building problems, which fit our hypothesis about the specific

nature of the experimental situation for studying contentful
analysis.
Experimental procedure. The experimental procedure con-
sisted of three stages that were repeated as the subject went through
each series: 1) instructions that included the necessary explanations
and the posing of the searching (learning) problem; 2) the problem-
solving process; and 3) the solution of several concrete-practical
planning problems.
The most detailed instructions were given before Series 1. The
instructions given to subjects reflected two goals: 1) introducing
the field of spatial-combinatorial problems and 2) posing pro-
blems based on searching for the law governing an object’s
change and on devising a general method for solving the
problems.
To introduce subjects into the object field (subject area) in
which they would be working (the field of spatial-combinatorial
relationships), we demonstrated a number of possible object
states that could be achieved through various arrangements of
elements. Various combinations of cards with images of numbers
on them were shown. The cards, of which there were four, were
arranged within a frame containing five cells. The frame and
numbered cards were externally similar to the way in which the
object was represented on the display screen.
Such object-related (subject area) understandings had to be
introduced in order to prevent subjects from perceiving the
combinations of numbers as quantities, since this would have
made their search too confused and interpretation of their
actions much more difficult, since they might have focused
on the number’s quantitative relationships. It was therefore
explained to subjects that they would be dealing with cards,
numbered markers, and that the numbers were needed to keep
track of the order in which these markers would be arranged.
This allowed subjects to attain a certain initial understanding
of the possible states of the composition of numbers and the
composition’s possible changes.
Attention then shifted to the display and the similarity between

the combination of numbers on the cards and the images on the
screen. Subjects were shown how to use the keyboard to produce
changes of state on the screen.
The second important aspect of subjects’ introduction into the
situation was the formulation of the searching problem. To orient
subjects toward the search, the experimenter pointed to the multi-
plicity and variability of problem conditions and explained that
problems had to be solved using the fewest possible moves
(keystrokes). The problem was then explained: “Determine the
law, the principle, governing changes in the sequence of num-
bers”; “Determine the means by which the arrangement of num-
bers in the frame changes”; “Determine what happens on the
screen when a key is pressed”; “Find how it is possible to get
various other sequences out of one sequence.” The experimenter
used this entire set of formulations. After the instructions were
given, subjects were asked to give, after completing their search,
an oral accounting of how well the law governing the object’s
change had been clarified and to formulate this law.
Subjects then proceeded to start solving the searching problem.
The computer automatically recorded every keystroke and the
resulting state of the object, and subjects’ utterances were recorded
by the experimenter. As the searching problem was being solved,
the experimenter periodically asked questions, such as: “Have you
figured out what to do?”; “Have you understood something?”;
“What is happening here?”; “What are you doing now?” These
questions were asked to established the interim results of the search
and to objectify the hypotheses subjects were coming up with and
identify the moment they concluded the search and moved on to
solving the practical problem.
However, we avoided questions that might prompt children to
change or add to their proposed formulation. In other words, we
tried as much as possible not to disrupt the spontaneous logic of
their searching and transforming activity.
Children from grades 3 and 6 – 7 of Moscow’s School No. 9
(57 and 12 children respectively) took part in the experiment.
The experiment’s results were analyzed in accordance with our

original assumptions. We examined: the features of the object’s
searching transformations, the content of the reflection that
mediated these transformations and the connection between the
searching activity and the subsequent taking on and solution of
planning problems. We also tried to trace how the concretization
of the conceptual image of the situation was realized as subjects
moved from simple forms of spatial-combinatorial relations to
more developed ones.
Results
Series 1 Results. We identified three moments of children’s

searching and transforming activity: 1) discovery of the boundaries
of the working operational field — of the keys that initiated the
object’s transformation; 2) identification and retention of the features
of the object’s transformation; and 3) the attempt to independently
carry out a trial solution of the problem: to adjust the existing
composition (as a “provocation,” the numbers on the screen were
out of order at the start).
It was also discovered that each of these moments played out
differently for different children. Furthermore, sometimes the
moments were realized one after the other, and sometimes they
were intertwined with one another. Subsequent examination of
the searching and transforming activity taking these features into
account enabled us to break down approaches to this activity into
three main types.
Type 1. The main content of subjects’ searching and transform-
ing actions consisted in determining the boundaries of the working
operational field. After they achieved this goal, children felt that the
“understanding problem” had been solved and that they could start
solving the practical problem.
For example, Oleg Z. pressed keys 1 – 9 one after another and
stated: “I get it. It seems that you have do it like this: one, two,
three, four.” Experimenter: “What did you get?” Oleg Z.:
“These are the ones you need: one, two, three, four. And now
I’ll try from the other end. [Presses keys 1 – 4 several times in
ascending and descending order.] So that’s what you have to

do.” Vanya R., after trying all the number keys several times,
reported: “These ones [pointing to keys 5 – 9] don’t work, but
here [1 – 4] something happens, it changes somehow.”
Typical features of the process of identifying the operational field
included: a) trying all the number keys, sometimes repeatedly; b)
an absence of any predictions or hypotheses whatsoever; and c)
a lack of attention to the nature of the object’s transformations.
This was followed by an independent “test of strength”: an
attempt to put the present composition in order before the experi-
menter presented the problems. The following variations on these
tries were observed.
First, there was a sort of “syncopation”: children would quickly
press the keys for numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 in order and then compare
the result with the target composition, clearly expecting complete
success. Then they would try the reverse order (4, 3, 2, 1). These
attempts were repeated. It was as if the children were trying to type
the result, to immediately “force” the object into the necessary
state. No attention was paid to the actual logic of the thing. Given
their lack of success, children would begin to change the composi-
tion of the syncope and then move on to attempts to solve the
problem by sequentially putting separate elements in place.
However, the “willfulness” (attitude of compulsion) in regard to
the object was manifested in this case as well.
For example, third grader Vasya Ya., having the composition “4 –
312” on the screen, 29 times pressed the 4 key in unsuccessful
attempts to “force” the four to the end of the series.
The ineffectiveness of this sort of attempt at an element-by-
element transformation led subjects to switch to a probability-
based strategy for solving the problem. They settled for some-
thing that, in principle, might change the object (influence the
object-related situation) and counted on the certain likelihood that
they would achieve the target state.
For example, third grader Dima A., after making approxi-
mately 30 keystroke attempts, reported: “You have to keep
pressing the keys in a jumble; if you press them in order it
doesn’t work at all. Here you have to press in different ways

for a very long time; then something will work.” Random
successes reinforced this attitude. For example, third grader
Pasha K., after identifying the operational field, began to
chaotically manipulate keys 1 – 4, and at one point he
achieved the target composition. The following dialog
ensued: Pasha: “That’s it!” Experimenter: “What did you
figured out?” “Pasha: “I put them in order; that means
I got it!” Experimenter: “So now you can solve the pro-
blem?” Pasha: “Yes, of course, I already solved one!”
It should be noted that during all of these trials, there was

essentially no intentional reflection of the transformations per-
formed, something that is clearly evident from what subjects were
saying during relatively fast paced manipulations (as many as 1 –
2 operations per second) and from the lack of long pauses. If this
was a search, it was a search for a result, and not for a method for
achieving it: repeated efforts to solve a single problem could
prove to be unsuccessful or require many more operations. It is
these features that qualify this way of carrying out the assignment
as manipulative.
Over the course of problem solving, certain isolated aspects of
the connection between operations and the object’s transforma-
tions did, after all, begin to be noticed by subjects. However, they
were not pursued in a purposeful way and did not have a marked
influence on the problem-solving method.
For example, Anton A. accompanied his actions with the
following commentaries: “One, one … it goes. If I press two,
then a one appears here … no. But if I press four, then either
the second will be a four or the first. If I press the four, then
there will be two, one, three at the end … a two went into the
first cell, the one skips over the three …” and so forth. Other
“manipulators” also offered such descriptions.
It was typical for particular aspects of the composition’s change

to be described in terms of various “coordinate systems”: the
movement of numbers was related either to the frame (“in front
of,” “at the end of”) or to other numbers (“skipped over,” “went
between”). Interconnecting all these observations would have
been difficult, and indeed there was no attempt to do so. As

a result, understandings of the object-related situation were extre-
mely fuzzy. The one thing that was clearly established was that
every key initiated the movement of the specific element of the
composition to which it corresponded.
For example, at the end of an experiment, Ksenia S. reported
the following: “I understood that the number you press changes
its position.” Experimenter: “How does it change it?” Ksenia:
“Well, if you press the three, then the three goes to its place.
Although that’s not quite right: you press the one — it will go to
a different place, the three — it also goes to a different place, and
that’s how I type in the numbers, change them and get what I’m
supposed to.”
Throughout the experiments, the “manipulators” ignored the
requirement that they make the fewest possible moves and
showed that solving the problem “in their head” was beyond
their ability. For example, when asked to solve the problem “in
his head,” Dima A. responded: “I can’t do that.” This suggests
that the planning function was not being used to guide cognitive
activity. The manipulative method was observed in twelve third
graders and one sixth grader.
Type 2. In contrast with the first type, here identification of the
working operational field was faster and more intelligent in nature.
Some subjects did not even treat this task as a problem and pro-
ceeded immediately to act within the 1 – 4 range, having connected
the purpose of the symbol on the key with the movement of the
corresponding element after the very first attempt. In these cases,
only one or two of the 5 – 9 keys were tried before subjects, seeming
to have confirmed a starting hypothesis, began operating only within
the working zone of the keyboard.
Next, as in the first type, there followed an independent
attempt to put the composition in order. However, the search for
a solution was now accompanied by systematic attempts to reflect
on this process. Evidence for this could be found in subjects’
statements, as well as prolonged pauses and the slower pace of
their keyboard operations as compared with the “manipulators.”
In terms of subjects’ orientation, this type was on a higher

level than the manipulator type, since it exhibited determination
to devise a method for solving the problem that took into account
the object’s actual logic: the nature of its transformations and
their connection with the operations performed. Nevertheless, the
devising of a method occurred within the framework of the
process of solving practical problems, and, furthermore, the
immediate practical orientation appeared to be constant and
dominant, while the cognitive orientation appeared to be sporadic
and subordinate. For subjects exhibiting this type of searching,
mastering problems meant first and foremost solving them. This
priority was manifested in various ways: a) to the question “What
are you doing now?” subjects offered responses such as: “I’m
putting them in order” or “I want to put the three in its place”; b)
in the course of problem solving, subjects sometimes formulated
generalized hypotheses; however, rather than getting right down
to work testing them using targeted trials, they tested them only
whenever corresponding practical situations were encountered in
the course of further problem-solving; and c) subjects avoided
trying things that might change the placement of elements that
had already been properly arranged, meaning that as the compo-
sition came closer to the proper order, the search became nar-
rower, and once the target composition was achieved it stopped
completely, even when the solution was achieved randomly and
the orientation was clearly insufficient; searching continued only
with the solution of the following problem.
In light of the observed features of this type, we labeled
this way of carrying out the assignment “empirical.” Thirty
third graders and five sixth or seventh graders used this
approach.
In the course of problem solving, subjects displayed various
types of reflection, various ways of taking mental pictures of,
making sense of, and organizing their own actions. For example,
first of all, we noted purposeful attempts to figure out and
immediately memorize the specific sequence of operations that
solved a particular problem. In the course of this sort of search,
subjects would periodically go back to the original composition
in order to repeat and reinforce the mastered part of the path

toward a solution. For example, Tanya V., on her fourth return to
the beginning of the problem, reported: “You have to return to the
original position in order to see the last action.” As subsequent
problem was formulated, these subjects tried to “recall” and apply
how the previous ones were solved, which, of course, did not lead
to success.
Second, attention to the object’s transformations as such was
observed (at first in the form of chaotic descriptions of what
was happening that resembled behavior by the “manipulators”),
followed by a focus on identifying these transformations’
repeating features. For example, some subjects first discovered
that the object’s change that had been caused by the pressing of
a particular key could be canceled by repeating this keystroke.
Using this ability to reverse operations, subjects were able to
more purposefully seek out a path to the result: they were now
able to devise a rather imperfect “method” for solving the
problems. Other subjects began with a more detailed break-
down reflecting the two main aspects of element transforma-
tions: 1) when they pressed a particular key, the corresponding
number “disappeared” and the place where it had been became
empty (subjects did not notice where the number had moved);
and 2) when a key was pressed, the corresponding number
“appeared” in the place of the empty cell (where the empty
cell went remained unknown). Masha N.’s behavior offers an
illustrative example.
Like most “empiricists,” she began with chaotic descriptions: “I
pressed the three and at first a three appeared right away.
I pressed the two, and it appeared next to last. I pressed the
three again and it went empty here. The four — it appeared in
first place.” Then Masha began to identify the invariants: “I get it!
I pressed two and it became empty. And that’s how it is in every
case. And when I pressed the four, it appeared in the empty spot,
and the empty spot went somewhere (!). I also noticed that when
I pressed the one it went to the empty spot, and when you press
the one again, it becomes empty there too.”
Crucially, in this description, the movement of numbers seems to

be disjointed, occurring in two ways: 1) the number goes away,
freeing up a cell; and 2) the number arrives in the unoccupied cell
and occupies it. Both moments are taken in isolation, as if two
different empty cells exist. It can be assumed that “empiricists”
typically notice an object’s change as it immediately appears to
perception (a number “disappeared” or “appeared”), with insuffi-
cient reliance on thinking through the implications. In other
words, reflection obediently follows perception rather than taking
the lead. This is evidently what causes the initial atomism seen in
the understandings of the process, since while one of its aspects is
being observed, the second is not. The connection between them,
to say nothing of their unity, can only be thought.
The bifurcated understanding of the elements’ transformations
causes and corresponds to the method of action in the practical
situation: operations were divided between preparatory ones,
which vacated a cell by removing a number from it (the number
went “somewhere,” to “some other cell”) and concluding ones,
which placed the necessary figure into the cell, with no regard for
where it came from. Thus, the single act of a number’s move —
its vacating of one cell and occupation of another —was repre-
sented by two fragments whose isolation was underscored by the
fact that they belonged to two separate operations.
It should be noted that, in a number of cases, a systematic error
accompanied the solving of practical problems using this method
of action, yielding the sequence “1234–“ (the empty cell at the
end rather than the beginning). After this error was pointed out,
children transferred the empty cell to the beginning by pressing
keys 4 – 1 and went on to consciously use this general problem-
solving schema, in blatant violation of the requirement to use the
least number of moves.
Let us take a closer look at this phenomenon. Having separately
identified both aspects of the transformation, yet seeing them as
taking place one after the other rather than simultaneously, subjects
gained the objective ability to place numbers in the necessary
order. However, in an effort to keep the parts of the composition
that already corresponded to the correct order in place, they had to
put them at the start of the frame. This allowed them to move the
empty cell to the necessary position without disrupting the already
ordered segment. For example, by putting a 1 in the first cell it was
possible to transfer the empty cell into one of the remaining four
cells; by putting the 2 into the second cell the empty cell was
moved into one of the three remaining ones, and so forth. The
numbers, meanwhile, were arranged in order, and the empty cell,
having fulfilled its function, was squeezed into the final place of
the composition. The final step in of this problem-solving method
was transferring the empty cell (or shifting the entire composition
one cell to the right, which amounted to the same thing). The
operation to move the empty cell was usually accompanied by
comments of the following sort: “And now we have to move the
blank”; “Let’s move the blank to the front”; “Now let’s shift
everything back”; “And presto–it’s done!” and so forth. The press-
ing of the keys 4 – 1 was done at a faster pace compared with the
previous operations (syncopation) and was accompanied by heigh-
tened animation. This, in our opinion, could be evidence of the fact
that the result of this operation — in contrast with the others — had
been exactly predetermined by the subjects and was the final
contribution to the overall result of the solution, bringing the
composition into the state corresponding to the problem’s require-
ments. Evaluating this method of acting overall, it could be said
that, rather than being based on an understanding of the law
governing the object’s change, it was guided by a certain super-
ficial (in relation to the object) formal conformity to the rules.
Analyzing our findings, we noticed several other facts. First,
there was a large number of “aha!” reactions among some chil-
dren. Specifically, the process of mastering the problem was
made up of several “discoveries,” after each of which the child
would say: “Aha, I get it now!” In our view, this could be
associated with children’s lack of a clear criterion for “under-
standing.” Furthermore, there were repeated instances where
a child who was rather successfully solving a problem had trouble
explaining what the solution was based on. In other words,
problems were mastered in a practical sense before they were
understood.
Overall, the children using this approach experienced difficulty

in solving problems that demanded the shortest solution; success
was achieved only after several tries that gradually improved the
results. Solving problems “in the head” also involved numerous
errors and was successful only after a number of failures, and
some subjects proved utterly incapable of this sort of problem
solving. In essence, problem-solving was a step-by-step process.
This attests to the fact that, in both empirical and manipulative
problem-solving, planning did not serve to internally orient the
function of analysis.
It is important to note that 11 of the 35 children who clearly
demonstrated the empirical method of action were able to men-
tally correlate both aspects of the object’s transformation and
appropriately formulate the object-related system’s primary rela-
tionship after solving a number of practical problems: “The
number moves to the empty cell, and where it was becomes
empty” or “The number changes places with the empty cell,”
and so forth. Sometimes the formulation was abbreviated (“The
number moves to the empty cell”), but it subsequently became
evident that the child was taking into account the displacement of
the empty cell. Based on the results of their cognitive activity,
these subjects in essence came close to the theoretical level.
Furthermore, 14 schoolchildren (12 third graders, 1 sixth gra-
der, and 1 seventh grader), upon encountering the strict require-
ments of the planning problems, especially those where the
problem had to be solved “in the head,” continued to study the
situation and as a result appropriately identified the problem’s
main relationship. For these subjects, planning was obviously
a factor mediating the transition to the contentful form of analy-
sis. However, there was one unexpected finding: 10 of the 25
“empiricists” who had somehow managed to connect both
aspects of the object’s transformation, nevertheless continued to
make mistakes while solving the planning problem.
Type 3. This type identified the working operational field just
as quickly and intelligently as the empiricists. However, unlike the
empiricists, the subsequent searching and testing activity of the Type
3 approach was purely cognitive. After the first of several keystrokes

(and often after the first) there was a long pause, during which
subjects compared the object’s successive states, sometimes putting
a finger to the screen, before purposefully identifying how these
states differed and the nature of the change that had just occurred.
Subjects paid no attention to the random order of the composition.
Usually, the search included no more than ten tries. It should be
noted that for three subjects, one trial keystroke was enough, and in
one case the problem’s main relationship was formulated before the
child had even touched a key. In other words, in a number of cases,
reflection was anticipatory in nature. Subjects would announce with
exclamations such as “Aha!” “I get it!” “That’s it!” that the pro-
blem’s essence had been grasped. They would then quickly put the
present composition in order (as a rule, in the shortest way possible),
and only then, as if they had put their hypotheses to the test, provide
the correct formulation of the problem’s main relationship. Some of
these formulations were quite involved.
Olya R.: “I understood how they move around. There was a 3
here, and here, an empty cell. And if you press the 3, it will go
into the empty spot, and where the number was, the spot is left
empty.” Misha K.: “The number moves here, where there’s
a blank spot, and the blank spot will now be where the number
was.” But often the original relationship is described in abbre-
viated form. Oleg Sh.: “The numbers change place through the
empty spot, you type the number and it will be in the spot that’s
empty.”
We identified the following additional features of the theoretical

method of action under the experimental conditions described:
A class of problem’s main relationship is identified before even
problem has been solved;
Identification of the main relationship is sometimes accompa-
nied by an explanation (Misha D.: “I figured it out! This
number moves into the empty space. After all, there are only
four numbers here and there are five cells — so the 1 moves
here”).
There were no false “Aha!” reactions.

In our experiment, the theoretical method was exhibited by

fifteen third graders and six sixth – seventh graders. Almost all of
them (with the exception of three third graders) easily and cor-
rectly solved all the planning problems they were given.
In summarizing our description of the main types of actions,
we should add that different methods were seen in the actions of
one and the same child rather often, although, as a rule, it was not
difficult to determine the leading method. For example, two
“theoreticians” (out of 21) deviated into the empirical method in
minor ways. Out of 35 empiricists, 25 came close to the level of
the theoreticians in terms of their results, and in five cases it was
the other way around: these empiricists relapsed into manipula-
tion. Finally, 7 out of 13 “manipulators” demonstrated the rudi-
ments of the empirical method.
The results of the Series 1 experiments generally corresponded
to understandings about the structure of the action of analysis
and, in particular, about its internal connection to planning. It was
also found that the mental construction of the image that “cap-
tures” the object’s change was part of the content of reflection
that mediates the act of analysis. In this case, the presence of such
an image was manifested in verbal form: “The number switches
places with the empty cell”; “The number moves into the empty
cell.” The active nature of reflection was confirmed by the fact
that the process itself, as previously noted, was not naturally
represented on the display screen.
At the same time, the fact that 13 out of the 46 children who
appropriately formulated the problem’s main relationship contin-
ued to make mistakes in planning was unexpected and is note-
worthy. In seeking an explanation for this, we assumed that the
differences found in the effectiveness of planning were associated
with differences in the subjective ways in which various aspects
of the object’s transformation were correlated (linked). And
synthesizing them so that they would be represented as a single
whole, and therefore occurring simultaneously, is exactly what is
needed for success.
According to our starting understanding, the image of the
sort of simultaneous change whereby all aspects of the
transformation are compactly represented comes out in the

function of the idealized (mental) action that intelligently
reflects the principle governing the object’s change. This idea-
lized action, once constructed, automatically provides for reten-
tion of the transformation’s multidimensionality, reproducing it
holistically, as a single change, not successively, in the form of
a sequence of changes. The idealized image of the transforma-
tions’ mechanism, uniting within itself various moments in the
object’s movement, absorbs the operations that initiated these
changes and becomes a means of transformation. This idealized
(notional) construction is the main generalized way of acting
with an object.
The further objectivation and experimental study of the process
by which a holistic idealized action is constructed became our
primary objective.
Since Exercise 1 did not create the conditions for a fully
detailed unfolding of the process of interest to us, this process
became our focus in Exercises 2 and 3, in which the object-
related system’s original relationship became concretized and
the multidimensionality of changes increased. Making it neces-
sary to coordinate the changes’ separate moments in order to
successfully solve the problems created conditions in which the
act of generating the holistic (compact) thinking act of interest to
us would manifest itself more distinctly. The same subjects as in
Series 1 participated in this experiment.
Series 2 Results. As before, the children who had exhibited
a manipulative way of acting in Exercise 1 became bogged down
studying the boundaries of the working operational field. Most of them
(10 out of 13) did not figure out that two keys had to be pressed to
change the composition. None of the children from this category man-
aged to solve the problems involving putting the composition in order.
Twelve children (ten third graders and two sixth-seventh graders)
exhibited the empirical method. As in Series 1, typical character-
istics associated with this method included the predominance of
a pragmatic mindset over a cognitive one and a tendency to
formally generalize immediately perceived information. The fol-

lowing generalization is a good illustration of the latter
characteristic.
Andrei A.: “When I press the number and then want to press it
a second time, it doesn’t work. Probably you can’t repeat
something two times, only after the next move.”
An orientation toward that which is empirically given and form-

alism in generalization were also manifested in the concrete
groundedness of identified invariants.
For example, at the beginning of an experiment, seventh grader
Sasha G. identified the following principle: “You have to type
the number that you want to place, and the next one.” In this
case, Sasha detailed the results of utterly concrete attempts (he
tried the combinations “1,2”; “2,3”; “3,4”; “4,5” and left other
possibilities unconsidered).
As in Series 1, some of the empiricists (6 out of 12) did finally

manage to complete the exercise: they came up with a content-
based generalization and effective way to solve the problems.
Four of them did this while still in the orienting stage, while two
solved the problem after unsuccessful attempts to solve planning
problems assigned by the experimenter. The other six did not
complete the assignment.
Of greatest interest for us was the developed — in other words,
theoretical — method of action observed in 32 schoolchildren (25
third graders and 9 sixth–seventh graders). During Series 1, nine
of them had already demonstrated this method and 15 had
demonstrated the empirical method, although with contentful
generalization (five of them exhibited only minor features typical
of the empirical method).
In this series of experiments, the leading nature of reflection
and an orientation toward content were more clearly evident than
in Series 1. All subjects classified as theoreticians tried to make
sense of the situation before making attempts, and 5 children
immediately figured out the principle governing the object’s
change without making a single attempt.
For example, Lena I., after taking a careful look at the object of
Exercise 2, stated: “Here there are no blanks. (Using two hands,
she pressed two keys at once: 1 and 2.) I pressed two buttons to
switch the places of two numbers.” For 8 people, one or two tries
(paired keystrokes) was enough. For example, Misha D., seeing the
new composition, reacted in the following way: “Hey, where to
stick it, where to put it? [He was referring to the lack of an empty
cell.] I have to figure this out. I press on the 2 — it doesn’t do
anything. [He presses the 4 and the two and four change places.]
I’ve got it! You have to press two numbers to switch their places!”
The planning problems posed no difficulty for the theoreticians.
The other subjects (21) required five to eight tries to identify the
principle governing changes.
The data shedding light on the very act of folding together
understandings of the object’s change were an important outcome
of this series of experiments.
For example, Oleg M. at first described the object’s change in
terms of a sequential movement of two numbers. His descrip-
tion obviously rested on idealizations relating to a simpler form
of transformation familiar from Exercise 1: “Here, a spot is
vacated and occupied. For example, the 3 goes away from here,
and here it becomes empty, and you can put another number
here, such as a 5, and then it becomes empty there, and you can
put a 3 there.” After solving the planning problem, the trans-
formation in his description became more compact and simul-
taneous in nature: “So here they simply change places — the
ones you press are the ones that trade places!”
It is important that this description is related by the subject as
something new, as something he only just understood. At the
same time, both descriptions are objectively more or less identical
in content and differ only in the level of detail. This points to,
first of all, the subjective importance of the difference between
a successive (detailed) description on one hand and
a simultaneous (compacted) description on the other
and, second, the fact that the move from one form of description
to the other is mediated by the need to plan the transformation.
Another interesting phenomenon was the spontaneous use of
a technique some subjects (four third graders and one sixth
grader) used to help them visualize the movement of two

numbers as simultaneous and mutually determined. The tech-
nique in question — essentially a sign tool — was a particular
gesture: subjects used their middle and index fingers to point to
the original position of a particular pair of numbers within the
composition and then, by flipping their wrist, showed what the
arrangement of the numbers would be after the keys were
pressed. Both numbers involved in the act of trading places
wound up being connected, as if attached to the same compass.
The movement of either of them automatically signified the
simultaneous movement of the other. This same image of
simultaneous change was used later during planning: using
this gesture, subjects counted the number of moves needed to
achieve the right order of the composition and thereby arrive at
their solution.
This, in our view, can be taken as an example of the construct-
ing (imagining) of an idealized object-related action. This action
represents more than an abbreviated version of a successive pro-
cedure of “freeing up one cell, moving a number into it, freeing
up another cell”; it is a fundamentally different action (a turn,
a rotation) that holistically embodies the essence of the transfor-
mation occurring. Another aspect is also reflected here: the con-
struction of an idealized mechanism of a given action (“a
compass”) that will subsequently serve as a subjective means
for registering and realizing the action and that, in the final
analysis, is like a planning tool.
A clearer objectivation of this constructive moment in the act
of analysis was undertaken in Series 3 of our experiments.
Series 3. Thirty subjects from grades 3 and 6 – 7 (21 and 9
children, respectively) who had experience with the first two exer-
cises took part in the experiment.
The main result from this series was that 15 subjects, after identi-
fying the principle governing the object’s change, used (in other
words, constructed) an image of the composition’s rotation (Oleg
Sh.: “Whichever ones you press, they change, and it [the composi-
tion] turns”; Kolya E.: “Here, when you type a number, it just tips
over”). It should be noted that all 15 subjects had consistently

demonstrated a theoretical way of acting in the previous two series.
Some of the findings from this series offered evidence that
a holistic image was constructed before individual aspects of the
transformation and the connections between them were identified.
For example, Grisha M., like most subjects, first identified the fact
that two numbers corresponding to the keys pressed traded places.
Furthermore, he was clearly using an idealization for this (and
a corresponding gesture with his fingers), the idealization that
served as the problem-solving principle in Exercise 2. (Grisha M.:
“If you press 4 and 5, it reverses: they were one way and now
they’re the other [gesture showing the exchange of places by two
numbers].”) After several tries, an addendum was added.
(Grisha M.: “Also, if there are two numbers between the ones I’m
changing, then these numbers also trade places, turn in the same
way, and the ones at the end around them do the same.”) Grisha
subsequently switched to using the image of the composition’s
rotation and the finger gesture to signify the exchange of places
of two elements was replaced by a different gesture, the rotation of
the entire hand, in which the hand signified the composition as
a whole.
There was also a case (only one) where a subject in essence

immediately arrived at an understanding of the composition’s
rotational axis that enabled him to mentally foresee the composi-
tion’s shift along the line.
For example, sixth grader Fedya K. achieved this by reviewing
mental images of all the object’s previous states. (Fedya K.:
“Here it rotates around a column.” Experimenter: “Around
what column?” Fedya K.: “Well, I press 1 – 3, and underneath
where 1 – 3 was you get 3 – 1, a sort of column. And if, let’s
say, you press 4 – 1, then underneath them in the column you
get 1 – 4”.)
It is important to note that in these examples the object begins to

take on new characteristics in subjects’ minds in the course of
exploratory transformations. Some numbers change places, others
are “dragged along” behind them, pairs of numbers form col-
umns, and the composition as a whole “spins” around them. This
is indeed the very process of constructing idealized object-

relatedness that makes it possible to mentally reproduce the
object’s actual change. In the course of this process, operations
with the keyboard take on this object-related content and the
status of an actual sensory and object-related action. Now when
the children press on keys they are actually rotating the composi-
tion, shifting it, turning it.
Not a single subject performed a total synthesis: the construc-
tion of an idealized object-related action in which the object took
the form of a rigid structure rotating around an arbitrarily
assigned axis. As a result, the transformation performed by the
majority of them was reproduced as something with two compo-
nents: the composition turned and it shifted along the line.
Furthermore, they related the direction and extent of the shift to
the pressing of particular keys purely empirically (in other words,
without a fully conceived holistic interpretation) and without
a detailed understanding.
Artem K.: “To move it to the left, I press the number that’s
closest to the left side — that’s 1 — and a neutral number — 3;
and to move it to the right, we press 2 and a neutral one.”
Maksim D.: “It always turns and also creeps over. It happens
different ways: you press 2 and 5 or 4 and 1 — the end ones —
and it moves three spaces; if you press 3 and 1, it creeps over
one space; 3 and the end one, it moves two.”
In addition to the image of the composition’s rotation we

recorded six instances of a “non-object-related” way of looking
at the movement of individual numbers. For example, Sasha
G. concluded that “the numbers get rearranged in the opposite
order,” while Misha B. stated that the numbers “always get
written backwards.” The difference between “getting rewritten”
and a “rotation” consisted in the fact that “rewriting”: 1) is not an
actual transformation in that it does not involve a change to
something old but rather the creation of a new object, which
ignores the successive nature of the states; 2) is a multiple pro-
cedure unlike the holistic act of the “rotation.” In our view, what
we are encountering here are manifestations of an empirical
method of action, specifically an inability to look beyond the

object’s present form of existence and identify the essence of the
situation. The invariant is identified only formally and without
reliance on an object-related model.
It should be noted that in the preceding assignments, these six
subjects also exhibited an empirical method of action. Another
six subjects who had previously shown themselves to be theore-
ticians (four third graders and two sixth-seventh graders) were
able to identify the relationship underlying the movement of
numbers but failed to construct a holistic image of the transfor-
mation. For example, Anton G. determined that a pair of numbers
corresponding to the keys pressed exchanged places, that the
numbers on either side of this pair also changed placed, and
that those that lacked a pair simply moved to the other side. On
the basis of this knowledge, he constructed an algorithm (rule)
that allowed him to intentionally change the object.
A conversation with Anton afterwards confirmed that he really
had failed to notice the holistic nature of the composition’s
changes. In our view, this is partly explained by the fact that
this subject had experience programming. In other words, he had
experience working with more complex algorithms. Evidently, in
the other cases as well these subjects did not search for a holistic
image because the algorithm they had developed fully satisfied
them and they felt no need to search for a more compact and
efficient approach.
These subjects (like the others) used idealizations that they
devised to separate out simpler transformations (an element’s
movement to a free space, the paired exchange of places).
However, unlike the theoreticians, they did not advance beyond
the level of an “atomistic” understanding. In the end, three
children (after concluding the previous assignments as empiri-
cists) were unable to cope with the situation and switched to
manipulating the keyboard.
All subjects except for the manipulators solved the practical
problems but, as a rule, they did not use the optimal number of
moves. Solving problems “in their heads” proved to be beyond
their capabilities, something that is fully explained by the fact that

they were imperfectly oriented in the situation.
Experimental results
Our study’s first assumption was that contentful analysis aimed at

identifying the object’s genetically original relationship was asso-
ciated with the action of planning. The experimental findings
confirmed this proposition and allowed us to elaborate on it.
Planning acts as a way of orienting toward the goal that directs
analysis toward identifying the relationship that holistically repro-
duces the elementary step of the movement: the object’s transition
from one of its characteristic states to another. We were able to
evaluate the early stages of analysis, which took the form of
searching-testing actions, based on how goal-oriented it was.
We used searching, a characteristic of the action of analysis, as
an indicator of goal orientation.
According to our findings, searching actions — actions that
transform an object with the goal of identifying the internal
relationships that enable the changes characteristic of its type —
can be contrasted with practical actions aimed at the immediate
solution of a concrete-practical problem. The tendency to search
can be used as a criterion clearly distinguishing between object-
related and contentful methods of action and manipulative ones.
The latter is characterized by a total absence of searching
throughout contact with the object.
As previously discussed, intentionality, the second criterion
characterizing goal-setting in the process of searching, is present
when subjects’ have a hypothesis that anticipates the next step of
their search. Subjects enter the early stage of the search with
a particular understanding of the nature of the object’s behavior:
for example, they rely on the most common understandings of
spatial-combinatorial relations and do not bring into their descrip-
tion of the object quantitative relations or ideas about the posi-
tional calculation system of no relevance here.
Theoretical and empirical methods of action can be rather
clearly distinguished based on the nature of intentionality. In the
first case, subjects devised a hypothesis or prediction and by the

early stages of analysis were already including actual and poten-
tial states of the object in their considerations. At a certain stage
in the search they were able to make conjectures about how the
object would change and “guess” its future states. In the second
case, subjects were primarily operating at the level of retrospec-
tive description of changes, gathering empirical evidence, and
formulating it in the form of familiar schemata. Their under-
standing of how their descriptions should conform to a certain
set of rules stood in for intention. This sort of intentionality is
oriented toward a search for particular problem-solving
techniques.
Typically, manipulators did not exhibit intentionality as such:
they did not expect any particular result from each separate
operation, and operations were not separated out and proceded
at a rapid pace, merging into a single flow.
Our study’s second assumption was that analysis was mediated by
reflection. In the context of our experimental situation, reflection was
expected to be manifested in the act of analysis by the identification
of differences in the object’s states and their merging into a content-
constructing image of the movement that established a connection
between the object’s change of state and the operation causing this
change. This placed the operation and transformation into
a relationship of mutual determination. This sort of mutual determi-
nation could be seen in the construction of images of “rotation,”
“turning,” and “toppling” of the object that subjects whom we
categorized as theoreticians demonstrated. We assumed that there
was a connection between content-constructing reflection and imagi-
nation in the process of building an ideal object-related image (a
conceptual image of the situation) that brings together the object’s
states into a certain whole, a passageway between them and the
operation. This connection was experimentally demonstrated (objec-
tified) in moments of constructive synthesis. The main aspect here
was idealization: the construction of an ideal object-relatedness that
enabled reconstruction of the mechanism by which the object moved.
The emergence of object-related action occurred through the
reflection of differences and the creation of a connection that
coordinated different aspects of the change. The emergence was

complete once an image of simultaneous change that absorbed all
the moments of transformation and unified them into a single
whole had formed.
We should point out that the simultaneous action-
transformation we observed meets the criteria developed by P.
Ia. Galperin for abbreviated thinking actions in his theory of the
stages through which mental actions form:
The abbreviation of an action to account for separate elements
of a set rests on the formation of a schema that expresses
a certain function of this set, and the characterization of the
function itself constitutes a new object of mental action…. Of
course, such an object appears only as a mental action because
in sensory cognition a set is discovered as the joining of
singularities above which it cannot rise. However, if it does
rise above them, a mental action gains the ability to operate
a set as a simple object, opening up limitless possibilities for
conceptual thought. (Galperin 1966, 267)
This assumption, which was incorporated into our study’s

hypothesis, relates to the need to learn more about the original
idealizations developed in the process of analyzing the simple
form of the object’s transformation when transitioning toward
more developed forms of the object’s change. This transition
took the form of increasing the number of elements moving in
the composition. Our experimental data enabled us to trace the
action of analysis as subjects moved from one series of problems
to another.
In characterizing this dynamic, we relied on criteria we have
established for measuring the generalization and systematicity of
an action. Generalization was manifested in the successive nature
of object-related understandings used by subjects when they were
constructing actions in a changing situation and in their retention
of the main relationships characteristic of the subject area to
which all the sub-classes of the problems they solved belonged.
In this regard, we have experimental data reflecting methods of
action already developed in the course of analysis being used to
construct new means appropriate to the changing conditions.
Systematicity, the ability to make assumptions (hypotheses) based

on the universal relationship concerning the possible special
forms in which this relationship could be manifested, was exhib-
ited in the mobility and plasticity of object-related understandings
when subjects encountered types of transformations that were
new to them.
Since generalization and systematicity are, from our perspective,
different aspects of one and the same property of action, its object-
relatedness, and they characterize aspects of the dynamic of the
object-relatedness of action that differ only in terms of their logic
direction, it is practically impossible to view them in isolation from
one another. This is why we evaluated subjects’ methods of action
based on these criteria simultaneously for both these directions.
A contentful-theoretical method of analysis is characterized by
a high level of flexibility in object-related visualizations. The
restructuring of actions (for example, the merging of elements
into pairs after moving from Series 1 to Series 2) in some cases
occurred before practical tests or after one or two tries. This
change of transformation method was based simultaneously on
already developed means and on identification of the features of
the new situation: subjects attributed the need to construct a new
method of action — the paired exchange of places — to the lack
of an empty cell in the composition. The subsequent concretiza-
tion of the method of action, which was linked to the need to
solve different concrete-practical problems, led to the emergence
of qualitatively new object-related understandings embodied in
the image of rotation. This is why contentful analysis can be
characterized as a generalized-systematic thinking action.
After the move from Series 2 to Series 3, subjects’ actions
were dominated by a succession of object-related understandings;
they now used a found image of the rotation, while the shift was
viewed primarily as a second part of the movement. We did not
see a total “simultanization” of the transformation and are, there-
fore, inclined to view the methods of action demonstrated by the
subjects as insufficiently systematized.
Empirical analysis aimed at achieving particular transformative
techniques and devising them based on the conditions of particular
problems yielded methods of action that do not lend themselves to

development. This is why actions’ generalization and systematicity
were reduced to a formal transfer. Among subjects demonstrating
an empirical method of action, some resorted to manipulation when
the nature of the transformation changed. In other cases, the trans-
formation continued to be disjointed: after moving from Series 1 to
Series 2, children reconstructed the composition’s change by ima-
gining spots that had been vacated and then filled.
Based on the criteria of generalization and systematicity, the
manipulative method, featuring action that lacked object-
relatedness, was characterized just as negatively.
The characteristics used in evaluating methods of action
described here relate to the types of problem solving used for
searching and practical problems. Regarding our experimental find-
ings as a whole, this evaluation is not yet clear-cut. Individual
tendencies in methods of action, both within each series and
when moving from one series to another, show a change in the
nature of subjects’ actions involving both a reduction and an
increase in the characteristics under study. There are two possible
causes explaining fluctuations in the level at which methods of
action are devised: first, as the laws governing an object’s change
grow more complicated, means of transformation that had already
formed begin to “fall apart,” and second, encountering the need to
plan stimulated in some cases the framing of searching problems
using a more appropriate method.
Chapter 3: Criteria for Assessing the Formation of Scientific

Concepts in Primary Schoolchildren
Whether or not the principle of scientific rigor is achieved in the
classroom depends on the level of psychological and pedagogical
understandings of the nature of scientific concepts and the laws
governing their assimilation by children. An important contribu-
tion in the development of these understandings has been made
by V.V. Davydov. As a result of his research, a dialectical materi-
alistic distinction between theoretical (contentful) and empirical
(formal) generalization has been established within Soviet
pedagogical psychology, along with the two corresponding types

of concepts (Davydov 1972). Davydov’s works also clearly show
that children’s mastery of theoretical and contentful concepts is
the primary precondition for developing their scientific thinking.
This has essentially established the principle for organizing a new
type of education that is of practical interest for contemporary
schools. A significant number of studies have already been con-
ducted in this vein that have enabled a greater understanding of
how children assimilate theoretical concepts at different ages and
the main psychological conditions and outcomes of this assimila-
tion, as well as the organization of successful experimental prac-
tices for studying this learning (Davydov 1966, 1972, 1986;
Davydov and Vardanian 1981). However, further development
in this area is being impeded to some extent by the lack of
methodologies allowing for the clear and unambiguous determi-
nation of how well children have learned a particular scientific
concept and for diagnosing how well-formed these concepts are.
This work endeavors to investigate ways of designing such
a diagnostic method using the mathematical concept of size.
In exploring this problem, we relied on the main propositions
of the idea of contentful generalization and the associated
approach to theoretical concepts. Describing the theoretical con-
cept, Davydov writes: “The objective connection between the
universal and the particular is the specific content of the theore-
tical concept.. This sort of concept, unlike an empirical concept,
does not find something the same in each individual object of
a class; instead, it traces the interconnections between separate
objects within a whole, within the system that brought it about”
(Davydov 1972, 275). It is specifically the fact that theoretical
concepts reproduce a system’s development, its emergence,
which distinguishes them from general understandings. The the-
oretical concept emerges as the result of two interconnected
processes: contentful abstraction and contentful generalization.
These processes enable identification of the real and special
relationship of things that serves as the genetic foundation of all
other manifestations of a system. Revealing itself through these
particular manifestations, this relationship serves as a universal
form or essence of a certain whole. In dialectical logic it is

generally believed that the essence of a thing can be discovered
only by analyzing its development, that it is revealed only in the
transition to phenomena. From this perspective, the essential is
characterized as the foundation of phenomena, while phenomena
are characterized as the external expression of essence. To under-
stand a phenomenon is to be able to separate out the genetic
foundation of a system from the entire diversity of its particular
manifestations — to master the method of constructing the
essence of an object (Ilyenkov 1984). “This method is a special
thinking action by human beings that itself forms as the deriva-
tive of an object-related action, reproducing the object of cogni-
tion” (Davydov 1972, 322). There is a specific action
corresponding to every concept that makes it possible to identify
and generalize the relationship underlying the system, and also to
use this relationship in the process of form-making. In other
words, behind every concept is hidden a special object-related
action or system of actions. Mastering a particular theoretical
concept means first and foremost mastering the action appropriate
to this concept.
Based on the specific content of a theoretical concept, we
propose using object-relatedness, generalization, and systemati-
city as its main characteristics. When we approach an object with
our senses, we can act either in keeping with its external logic or
with the logic of a concept. It can be determined which logic
forms the foundation of an action based on the action itself: if the
action is specific to the studied concept, then conceptual logic is
being applied. What the object-relatedness of knowledge refers to
is the ability to extract the genetically original and contentful
abstraction or the essence of an object [predmet] from a worldly
object of cognition [ob”ekt]. Thus, object-relatedness as
a conceptual action performed on something being studied
[ob”ekt] can serve as one of the diagnostic criteria for judging
a concept’s formation.
In dialectical logic, generalization is interpreted as discovery of
the connection and relationship between the general and the
singular. While the primary function of contentful abstraction
consists in separating out a certain relationship of things that

defines a system’s wholeness, generalization involves
a determination of the connection between this relationship and
singular phenomena. Only through this process does the identi-
fied relationship reveal its universal nature and become the
genetic foundation of the system being examined. A concept’s
generalization reveals itself in the reduction of the particular
forms in which it manifests itself to the basis that generates
them. The ability to transform a given set of conditions, reducing
them to a universal basis, is an indicator that knowledge has
become generalized. The moment at which original conditions
are transformed is, in this case, diagnostic. Depending on the
form (as an object, as a sign or symbol) in which conditions are
presented, the transforming action can be sensory and object-
related or purely mental. If an action is carried out “in the
head,” then the only evidence that it has taken place is the result.
From this perspective the most diagnostic object-related and
sensory situation is one in which it is possible to observe the
externally object-related form of the object’s transformation. This
situation makes it possible to simultaneously diagnose both the
object-relatedness of knowledge and its generalization.
However, the manifestations of theoretical knowledge — and
therefore the possibilities for diagnosing it — extend beyond the
ability to reduce a particular case to its universal basis. While, in
terms of content, a theoretical concept is characterized as a reflection
of the connection between the universal and the singular, in terms of
form it is a method for inferring the singular from the universal
(Davydov 1972, 320). The ability to infer from a universal basis
a particular form of its manifestation is referred to as a concept’s
systematicity. It provides for the construction of an entire system as
a whole, the recreation of the concrete. A concept’s systematicity is
revealed in the ability to transform an original abstraction with the
goal of constructing its particular form.
The concrete development of criteria for how well-formed
a theoretical concept is presumes a logical and object-related
analysis of the concept’s origin and the identification of its
object-related sources. In the present work we investigated
object-relatedness, generalization, and systematicity using the

mathematical concept of magnitude. We chose this concept for
a reason. V.V. Davydov has developed a system of scientific-
theoretical concepts than can be used in a mathematics course
(Davydov 1966). He demonstrated that all types of numbers
studied in the mathematics classroom are unambiguously linked
to the concept of magnitude. This is a basic concept of experi-
mental instruction, and various types of numbers are introduced
on the basis of the properties of magnitude, as particular mani-
festations of magnitude. In the process of mastering this material,
children’s thoughts move from the abstract to the concrete, which
corresponds to the logic of the theoretical study of the subject.
There are several approaches to defining the concept of mag-
nitude in mathematics. The most common is the axiomatic
approach, in which the concept is defined through a particular
system of axioms. In designing his experimental mathematics
course, Davydov relied on the theory of the concept of magnitude
described in a book by the Soviet mathematician V.F. Kagan,
Essays on Geometry [Ocherki po geometrii] (Kagan 1963). In this
book, Kagan demonstrates that there are other mathematical con-
cepts underlying the concept of magnitude that express the nature
of relations between objects (“equal,” “greater,” “less”). Through
these concepts and their properties, Kagan uncovers the content
of the concept of magnitude. The applicability of the terms
“equal,” “greater,” and “less” is determined by several factors.
First is the presence of a feature common to compared objects.
Kagan writes of the concept of magnitude: “We have in mind
a certain defined totality or a set of objects placed in a separate
category based on a particular set of features; comparing them to
one another, we apply the terms ‘greater,’ ‘equal,’ or ‘less’ to
individual elements of this totality” (Kagan 1963, 50). Such
a feature for a number of objects could be solidity, in regard to
particular values for which it could be said that “the first object is
more solid than the second” (“greater than” in terms of solidity)
or that “the first object is the same as the second in terms of
solidity” (“equal to”). Another factor in the applicability of the
concept of “equal,” “greater,” or “less” is having a criterion for
comparison, something that makes it possible to determine what

specific correlation is being made. A person’s actions with given
objects in accordance with certain rules could be one such criter-
ion. For example, in defining the relationship between two
straight segments, mathematics describes the criteria for compar-
ison in the following way:
Let AB and A’B’ be two segments. We place the first segment
over the second in such a way that point A falls on point A’ and
point B and B’ fall on the same side of Point A’, and if point
B falls on point B’, then segment AB is equal to segment A’B’; if
point B falls within the A’B’ segment, then segment AB is less
than segment A’B’; if point B falls beyond segment A’B’, then
segment AB is greater than segment A’B’. (Kagan 1963, 104)
Every type of magnitude has its own criteria for comparison. For
mathematical magnitudes (such as volume, weight, and length,
among others) the system of criteria is clearly defined. In daily
life people encounter correlations for which the system of criteria
seems rather vague and often is reduced to an intuitive assessment.
For example, there are no clear-cut criteria for defining intelligence,
beauty, and other human qualities. Usually a system of criteria is
closely linked to a term signifying the feature used to carry out
a comparison. This term is the name of a specific type of magni-
tude. “Length,” “volume,” “weight” — these are all names of
magnitudes. When we ask objects to be compared by length, we
call the feature being used to conduct the comparison of objects
“length.” Furthermore, the system of criteria is not specially stipu-
lated; it is simply taken for granted. If a comparison based on length
is required, one system of criteria is used; if the comparison is based
on volume, another system is used, but clearly defined. Different
systems of criteria can be applied to one and the same objects, and
then one and the same set of objects can be “converted” into
a different type of magnitude. “For the mathematician,” Kagan
writes, “magnitude is fully defined when the number of elements
and the criteria for comparison are indicated” (Kagan 1963, 107).
Thus, criteria for comparison play a definitive role in identifying
magnitude while the word signifying the type of magnitude may be
absent. At the same time, the terms “equal,” “greater,” and “less”
merely represent the result of the action performed on objects.
Defining the concept of magnitude using these terms, Kagan essen-
tially links it to certain actions underlying these terms.
Characterizing the concept of magnitude using the concepts of
“equal,” “greater,” and “less” presumes that the conditions that
these concepts must fulfill have been satisfied. According to
Kagan, these conditions are based on the following properties:
The relationship of “equal,” “greater,” and “less” forms a total
disjunction. If A and B are any elements of a given set (i.e., of the
magnitude being considered), then this property can be expressed
through a system of the following conditions:
1. At least one of the following relationships is true: A=B,
A>B, A<B.
2. If the relationship A=B is true, then the relationship A<B is not.
3. If the relationship A=B is true, then the relationship A>B is not.
The relationships “equal,” “greater,” and “less” are transitive.

Transitive relationships are those in which anytime element A is
in relationship α with element B, and element B is in the same
relationship α with element C, element A is in that same relation-
ship α with element C (A, B, C are elements in a set). For a given
relationship, this property could be expressed in the following way:
4. If A=B and B=C, then A=C.
5. If A>B and B>C, then A>C.
6. If A<B and B<C, then A<C.
Only equality is characterized by the following two properties:

7. Equality is an inverse relation: from the relationship A=B the
relationship B=A follows.
8. Equality is a reflexive relationship: whatever element A might
be within a given set, A=A.
Kagan calls these eight conditions comparison postulates. They

represent the main properties of the concepts “equal,” “greater,”
and “less.” Kagan gives the other properties in the form of eight
theorems following from these postulates.
I. The relationship A>B precludes the relationship B>A (A<B

precludes B<A).
II. If A>B, then B<A (if A<B, then B>A).
III. If A>B, then it cannot be that A<B.
IV. If A1=A2, A2=A3, …, An-1=An, then A1=An.
V. If A1>A2, A2>A3, …, An-1>An, then A1>An.
VI. If A1<A2, A2<A3, …, An-1<An, then A1<An.
VII. If A=C and B=C, then A=B; in other words, if two
elements of a set (two values of a magnitude) are equal to
a third element, then they themselves are equal.
VIII. If there exists the equality or inequality A=B or A>B or
A<B, then they will not be violated when we exchange one of
their elements for an equal element. This means that if A=B
and A=C, then C=B; if A>B and A=C, then C>B, and so forth.
Kagan believes that “the comparison postulates (1 – 8), along
with assumptions I–VIII following from them, cover all the
properties of the concepts ‘equal,’ ‘greater,’ and ‘less’ that are
associated with them in mathematics and are applicable indepen-
dent of the individual properties of the set to whose elements we
apply them in various particular cases” (Kagan 1963, 95). This
defines the content of the concept of magnitude in mathematics.
The psychological approach to analyzing the concept of mag-
nitude calls for an answer to the question of what essential
relationships underlie the concept of magnitude and what object-
related actions enable subjects to discover these relationships. We
have proposed that the genetic basis of the concept of magnitude
is a special form of connection among elements that is discovered
in a seriated (ordered in terms of magnitude) sequence. Mastering
the concept of magnitude means being able to identify or recreate
this connection by performing the action of ordering. Let us
assume that we have a certain set consisting of n elements. The
elements in this set are comparable among themselves: compar-
ison criteria have been established for them. Comparison results
in certain relations (“equal,” “greater,” “less”) that satisfy com-
parison postulates 1 – 8 (see Kagan’s axiomatics above). This
means that the relationships form a full disjunction, they are
transitive; furthermore, the relationship of equality is inverse
and reflexive.
In this set, consisting of n elements, it is possible to identify

nðn 1Þ
2
binary relations.5 Analysis has shown that these binary relations
differ in terms of their origin. Some of them can be derived only
by directly comparing objects while others can be derived either
directly or indirectly. For example, (n–1) binary relations can be
derived through direct comparison. These correlations are origi-
nal in the sense that the remaining
ðn 1Þðn 2Þ
2
correlations can be derived from them. The minimal number of
elements in this set must equal three. The number of original correla-
tions increases in proportion to the number n, and the number of
derived correlations increases in proportion to the square of the
number n. For example, if n = 3, there will be two original correla-
tions, and one derived correlation; if n = 10, there will be 9 original
correlations and 36 derived correlations. Analysis showed that not just
any correlation can be original, only fully defined ones that character-
ize the order of elements in the seriated sequence. For example, if we
have a set consisting of three elements, it has three possible binary
relations. Let us assume that it is the following correlation: a1≥a2, a2
≥a3, and a1≥a3. It has to be determined which of these three correla-
tions can be derived, and which are original relative to them. Let us
look at the relationship between a1 and a2. Can it be derived from the
two others, specifically from the correlations a1≥a3 and a2≥a3? If a1
≥a3, a2≥a3, then nothing certain can be concluded about the relation-
ship between a1 and a2. Consequently, the relationship between a1 and
a2 from the formula a1≥a3, a2≥a3 is not derived.
Let us examine the relationship between a1 and a3. We will use
the relationships a1≥a2, a1≥a3. From these relationships, accord-
ing to Axiom V, it follows that a1≥a3.
Let us examine the relationship between a2 and a3. Presumably
in this case, the original relationship will be a1≥a2, a1≥a3. As in
the first case, no definitive conclusion follows from these
relationships.
Thus, in this set the relationships a1 to a2 and a2 to a3 are

original, and the relationship a1 to a3 is derived.
Let us examine the original relations (a1≥a2, a2≥a3). All three
elements of the set (a1, a2, a3) are involved in these relationships,
and the relationships themselves characterize the order of the
elements in terms of the decreasing values of the considered
magnitudes (from the formula a1≥a2, a2≥a3 we deduce that a3
has the least value, since it is less than a2, which, in turn, is less
than a1; a2 has the middle value, since it is more than a3 and less
than a1; a1 has the greatest value, since it is more than a2 and a3).
For a set of equal elements, these deductions are trivial. In this
case, any relations in the quantity (n–1) can be original, and the
rest that are possible in this set are derived from them. If the set is
characterized by a relationship of inequality or by a combination
of relationships, the original relationships for it will be those
characterizing the order of the elements in the seriated sequence.
Analogous deductions can be made for a set consisting of any
number of elements. For example, if a set consists of five ele-
ments, ten binary relations can be established for it:
a1 a 2 ; a 1 a 3 ; a 1 a4 ; a1 a5 ;
a2 a 3 ; a 2 a 4 ; a 2 a5
a3 a4 ; a3 a5
a4 a5
Furthermore, only four relationships will be original for such
a set (a1≥a2, a2≥a3, a3≥a4, a4≥a5), and the other six of them are
derived. This is not difficult to demonstrate:
From a1≥a2, a2≥a3 it follows that a1≥a3.

From a1≥a2, a2≥a3, a3≥a4 it follows that a1≥a4.
From a1≥a2, a2≥a3, a3≥a4, a4≥a5 it follows that a1≥a5.
From a2≥a2, a3≥a4, a4≥a5 it follows that a2≥a5.
Insofar as it turns out to be the relationships that characterize

the order of elements in a seriated sequence that are original, it
is the action of systematizing elements of a set based on their
differences that is the specific action aimed at identifying these

relationships — this is the action of putting the values of
a given magnitude in order. The sequence of magnitude values
itself represents a special type of relationship form that is
derived as a result of seriation, of ordering. This special con-
nection among elements of a set (the relationship of relation-
ships) is the contentful real abstraction that reveals itself in all
individual cases where magnitude is manifested and is geneti-
cally original for the concept of magnitude. Analysis has shown
that Kagan’s postulates, which constitute the main content of
the theory of magnitude, are a mathematical way of describing
this relationship. All other properties represented in the eight
theorems (see the aforementioned) are derived directly from
this relationship.
Thus, the genetically original relationship for the concept of
magnitude is the relationship in the seriated sequence. The action
that is appropriate to the concept of magnitude is ordering, which
a subject can use to identify and build this relationship. Mastering
the concept of magnitude means being able to separate out an
object’s genetically original relationship, to reduce to this rela-
tionship and derive from it particular forms of the manifestations
of the relationship that are new to the subject.
According to findings by J. Piaget (1969), the action of order-
ing (seriation) goes through three developmental stages: 1) the
stage of putting objects in order; 2) ordering with reliance on
objects or concrete understandings; and 3) actual ordering in its
conceptual form. Piaget connects these stages in the development
of the action of ordering with the stages of children’s intellectual
development.
If 4- and 5-year-olds are offered a set of sticks of different
lengths and the differences are such that pairs of objects have to
be compared to determine their relative lengths, they will not yet
be capable of putting the ten sticks in order. They would only be
able to match pairs, not coordinating them with other pairs. With
age, children gain the ability to arrange short series consisting of
no more than three elements. By seven, they are able to put ten
elements in order, but only by comparing each element with those
already in order one at a time. So, to put three containers (A, B,

C) in order based on volume, a child would need to perform three
comparisons: A to B, B to C, and A to C.
At the stage of concrete operations, this same task is handled
differently, because from seven to twelve children are capable of
deduction: if A is greater than B, and B is greater than C, then
A is greater than C (Piaget 1969). Subjects will only need to
make two comparisons, and if they discover that the volume of
A is greater than the volume of B, and B’s is greater than C’s,
they can conclude that the volume of A is greater than the volume
of C without comparing the two. This is when children begin to
understand the fundamental property of relationships: each ele-
ment in a series can be simultaneously greater than one element
and less than another. For example, in the series A>B>C, B is
simultaneously greater than C and less than A, and if that series
were continued either to the right or the left, the elements A and
C would continue to have this same property. Therefore, in
putting 10 sticks in order based on length, children can use
a particular strategy leading to success, such as selecting the
smallest object and then the smallest from among those left,
and so forth. When the capacity for simple deduction appears, it
expands the limits of children’s actions. While at the previous
stage of development they could only see relationships between
pairs, at this stage they can work “three at a time,” simultaneously
keeping in mind the middle element’s relationship with the first
and the third. But because they still have trouble constructing
complex lines of reasoning, they lack understanding of an integral
series consisting of n elements. Children’s mental operations at
this stage are still tied to object-related actions and in essence are
“concrete operations.” They structure this action logically, but do
not yet have the ability to make deductions independent of action.
This is why the task of seriation assigned in verbal form presents
great difficulty for children at this concrete-operations stage. An
analogous problem presented on a physical plane is accessible to
children by age seven (Piaget 1969).
According to Piaget’s findings, reflective thinking emerges at age
twelve. It is hypothetical and deductive in nature, and the ability for
combinatorial analysis appears. Piaget characterized operations at

this level as second-stage operations, or operations of operations.
Adolescents put the results of concrete operations into the form of
propositions and use them in designing further operations. They
think in terms of propositions and are capable of putting together
lengthy lines of reasoning. In making deductions, the adolescent is
acting in the realm of hypotheses. They no longer have trouble
solving seriation problems in which the conditions are given in
verbal form. For example, the problem: “Edith has darker hair than
Lily; Edith is fairer than Suzanne; who of the three has the darkest
hair?” would pose no problem at all for them. Furthermore, they
are now able to operate more than three side-by-side elements.
What is happening here is the ordering of members of a series
relying on relationships rather than the objects themselves. This is
why adolescents are able to handle problems such as C<B, A>B,
D>E, D<C, where they are asked to determine A’s relationship to
E. To solve this problem, the relationships have to be put in order,
leading to A>B>C>D>E. Understanding a series as an integral
whole to be operated on enables conclusions about the relationships
between members of the series. Therefore, in this last problem, an
adolescent is able to not only draw a conclusion about the relation-
ship between the elements at either end of the series, but also to
derive relationships between any interim elements.
Can the tasks that Piaget used to study the natural process of
intellectual development be used for testing purposes in the
purposeful formation of intellectual thinking? Our research has
shown that mathematical symbols can be operated formally (in
other words, independent of content). For example, in assigning
a task where A’s relationship to E had to be determined based on
C<B, A>B, D>E, D<C, we found that in the majority of cases
(93 percent), subjects provided a formally correct solution: A>E.
We then asked subjects to explain their response. The majority
(68 percent) explained their response in the following way.
Subject Seryozha P.: “A is greater than E. Here, I had to jump from
the second formula to the first, from the first to the last, and then to
the second-to-last. It turned out that A is greater than B, B is
greater than C, C is greater than D, and D in turn is greater than E.”
Subject Alla L.: “Here the formulas are all out of order. But
you can still say that E is less than A. Here A is the largest
value, B is less, C is even less, D is less than C, and E is the
smallest.”
In these examples, subjects used all four formulas to get the
answer by transforming the conditions and putting the values in
order, arriving at a well-grounded conclusion.
Another group of children (25 percent) offered explanations of
the following type.
Subject Kirill F.: “A is greater than E because here (pointing to
the second formula) there is a greater-than symbol, and here
(third formula) there is a less-than symbol by E.”
Subject Seryozha Kh.: “A is greater than B, and E is less than
D, so it means that E is less than A.”
The orientation of the symbol by the letter led this schoolchild
to a thoroughly ridiculous solution.
Experimenter asks him: “In the first formula we get B’s mag-
nitude, and in the second; what can you say about them?”
Subject: “B is greater than E.”
Experimenter: “What do we have here? Different Bs?”
Subject: “No, but one B is big and the other is little.”
In these examples, almost all subjects eliminated the first and
fourth formulas from their thinking. Many of them felt these for-
mulas to be superfluous. Styopa Kh.’s response provided an oppor-
tunity for a test that allowed us to get, along with a formal and
correct solution, an incorrect one. This sort of contradiction in the
performance of one and the same task allowed us to gather more
objective data about the mechanism of formal problem-solving. We
gave these same subjects a task in which all magnitudes were
already in order (K<G, G<U, U<L, L<S) and written in a column.
The task was to determine the relationship between the elements at
either end of the series (S and K). All subjects thought that this task
was easier, since they did not have to transform the conditions in
order to solve it. All subjects gave a correct response: S>K. Then the
experimenter picked two magnitudes from a particular column (left
or right) and asked the subject for the relationship between them.
For example:
K<G
G<U
U<L
L≤C
G⸱L
For most children, this task proved extremely easy, and they gave
correct and well-grounded solutions (G<L).
All the children who demonstrated a divergence between their
formal and correct solution and its poorly grounded explanation
in the previous assignment gave incorrect answers.
Subject Kirill F.: “I think they are equal because both have
a greater-than sign next to them.”
Subject Seryozha B.: “G is equal to L, G and L are in the same

column.”
Subject Styopa Kh.: “G is equal to L because L is greater than U,

and G is greater than K. They are both greater and they are equal.”
Subject Nastya Z.: “They are equal. G was greater and L was
greater.”
Subject Vova K.: “G is equal to L because these are all smaller

(draws a circle around the column of letters to the left), and
these are all bigger (column of letters to the right), and among
them, they’re all equal.”
Subject Alyosha D.: “They are equal. They are in the greater-
than column.”
We labeled this group of schoolchildren “formalists.” The results of
this and many other studies showed that when formalists solved test
assignments, they used a method inappropriate to the concept of
magnitude, but, in the process, often came up with the correct answer.
These subjects deduced a “rule” for themselves that they followed in
all experimental situations. This “rule” was basically that in analyzing
the formulas (for example, A>B), they had to relate the relationship
symbol (in this example, the > symbol) to the letter next to it,
interpreting it as an absolute characteristic of the magnitude, and not

a relative one (in this example, A is big and B is little, rather than
A being greater than B). Following this rule, most formalists success-
fully solved learning problems that were sometimes rather compli-
cated. This circumstance served to explain the fact that 71 percent of
the formalists were seen as excellent and good pupils. For example,
43 percent of the children from this group got “fives” on the final
quiz, and another 28 percent got “fours,” while only 29 percent got
“threes” and “twos.”6 Apparently, the use of such a formal way of
analyzing these educational tasks had internal causes. One of the
main causes was that for the formalists, the mathematical symbol had
not yet acquired its meaning in the learning process.
Piaget considered word problems to be particularly difficult for
children under 12. We gave our first graders two assignments in
verbal form.
Problem 1. Tanya has hair lighter in color than Olya, but darker
than Katya. Which of the girls has the darkest hair?
Problem 2. The rock is lighter than the stick; the brick is lighter
than the rock. Which is the heaviest?
The text of the first problem is taken from ones of Piaget’s

works (1969). Only the names have been changed. The second is
taken from a work by L.A. Levinova (1974).
In regard to the first problem, Piaget wrote:
Now this problem is rarely solved before the age of 12. Till then
we find reasoning such as the following: Edith and Susan are fair,
Edith and Lily are dark, therefore Lily is darkest, Susan is the
fairest and Edith in between. In other words, the child of 10
reasons formally as children of 4 – 5 years do when serializing
sticks, and it is not until the age of 12 that he can accomplish with
formal problems what he could do with concrete problems of size
at the age of 7, and the cause of this is simply that the premises
are given as pure verbal postulates and the conclusion is to be
drawn vi formae without recourse to concrete operations.
(Quoted from: Piaget 2003. The Psychology of Intelligence, tr.
Malcolm Piercy and D.E. Berlyne, New York: Routledge, 164.)
L.A. Levinova assigned the second problem, which conflicts with

children’s everyday experience, to children from 6 years, 7
months, to 7 years, 3 months. Only 20 percent of the children
gave the correct answer. Most looked to their own everyday
experience and assumed the brick or sometimes the rock would
be heavier. Here, instead of “greater than/less than” relationships
typical of word problems, these problems used the analogs
“lighter/darker” and “heavier/lighter.” According to Piaget, this
sort of problem begins to be accessible to most children at age 12.
However, we felt we could assign them to younger children (age
7 – 8), since the concept of magnitude had been specially formed
in our subjects in the process of experimental teaching.
The problems were assigned to the same first graders of
experimental school No. 91 who had been tested using the pre-
vious method. The majority of subjects (75 percent) solved both
problems correctly. It is interesting that some of these children
(12 percent) had been qualified by us as “formalists” based on the
results of the first study. Examples of correct solutions include the
following:
Problem 1. Tanya has hair lighter in color than Olya, but darker
than Katya. Which of the girls has the darkest hair?
Seryozha B.: “Olya has the darkest. Olya’s hair is darker than
Tanya’s, and Tanya’s hair is darker than Katya’s.”
Alisa S.: “Tanya has lighter hair than Olya, Katya’s is lighter
than Tanya’s, which means that Olya has the darkest.”
Olya T.: “Tanya’s is darker than Katya’s, and Olya’s hair is

darker than Tanya’s. Katya, then, has lighter hair than all of
them, and Olya has darker hair.”
Volodya G.: “Tanya has lighter hair than Olya, and Katya’s hair
is lighter than Tanya’s. That means Olya has the darkest hair.”
Lyusya A.: ““Olya has the darkest, because you say that Olya’s
hair is darker than Tanya’s, and
Tanya’s is darker than Katya’s, so that means Olya has the

darkest hair.”
Problem 2. The rock is lighter than the stick; the brick is lighter
than the rock. Which is the heaviest?
Zhenya Iu.: “The brick is lighter than the rock, and the rock is
lighter than the stick. The stick is the heaviest.”
Tolya P.: “The stick, because the stick is heavier than the rock,
and the rock is heavier than the brick.”
Natasha N.: “The rock is lighter than the stick, and the brick is
lighter than the rock. The brick is the lightest; the stick is the
heaviest.”
As these examples show, it was common for the problem to be
solved by “turning around” one of the relationships (for example:
“Tanya has darker hair than Katya” was transformed into “Katya
has lighter hair than Tanya”), and by rearranging some of the
information (for example: “The brick is lighter than the rock and
the rock is lighter than the stick”). This sort of transformation of
the conditions had one particular goal: the seriation of relation-
ships, which we see as an important diagnostic indicator.
The relatively high percentage of subjects who correctly solved
both problems may serve as a testament to experimental teaching,
but the fact that some of the subjects we had categorized as
formalists also successfully solved the problems requires expla-
nation. Although the problems were expressed in words and
analyzing them, according to Piaget, would therefore require
developed thinking, it strikes us that, in dealing specifically
with these problems (in contrast with mathematical formulas),
subjects would have been able to rely on concrete reasoning
(imagined girls with various shades of hair, for example) to
come up with the correct solution. Piaget saw the sort of problem
solving that relies on concrete reasoning as the second level in the
development of seriation. We therefore believe that some of the
subjects who successfully handled these problems were at
this second stage of the development of seriation. Furthermore,
the fact that these problems involve only three elements makes it
impossible to differentiate the third and second levels in the
development of seriation. Analogous problems with four or
more elements might have offered a clearer diagnostic picture.
In any event, it is obvious that the problems Piaget used to study
how well the action of seriation has developed given the natural
emergence of intellect are not appropriate to the goals and con-
ditions of experimental teaching. This type of teaching forms the
concept of magnitude and its underlying action of seriation in
children as young as 7 or 8.
Determining whether learners are operating with theoretical
concepts in their thinking or are still at the level of general
understandings requires a special investigation of their knowl-
edge to see whether it has attained object-relatedness, gener-
alization, and systematicity. It was the need for this sort of
investigation that shaped the design of our methodology.
Diagnosing the object-relatedness of children’s knowledge
requires presenting them with a set of real objects susceptible
to the appropriate object-related transformation. Subjects have
to be given problems that cannot be solved unless their condi-
tions undergo an object-related transformation. The very
moment of transformation is diagnostic, since it reveals the
logic subjects are applying. If the transforming action is appro-
priate to the concept under study (if it is realized with the goal
of identifying the genetically original relationship), this is
a sign of object-related knowledge. To the extent that
a sensory and object-related situation is one of the particular
forms of the concept’s reflection, this can serve as evidence of
an ability to reduce the particular to its universal basis, which
is an indicator of generalized knowledge. Next, subjects are
tested to see whether they can connect the identified relation-
ship with the particular form of the concept: can they use this
relationship to derive a new particular form of the concept’s
manifestation. If this sort of deduction is accessible to children,
their knowledge is systematic. The presence of all three char-
acteristics shows that theoretical concepts are functioning in
subjects’ thinking.
Our method took these requirements into account. It was

designed to diagnose whether or not the concept of magnitude
had formed in young schoolchildren based on the criteria of
content-relatedness, generalization, and systematicity.
The experiment used a set of segments of varying lengths. The
segments were either drawn or were in the form of paper strips.
We used sets of three, four, or five segments that were either
arranged in order of length or in no particularly order. Subjects
were asked to independently design a problem requiring that the
segments’ relative magnitudes be determined and express the
problem in terms of a formula. They themselves decided how
to express the given magnitudes.
The experiments began with subjects being asked to solve
several problems of a type they were familiar with, such as deter-
mining the relationship between A and C, where A>C, C<B. After
these problems were solved, the experimenter said: “You did a very
good job solving these problems; now try to think up a problem for
future first graders that will be about the length of these strips (the
experimenter places a set of strips before the child). You have to
write out these problems using formulas, the way mathematicians
do.” Framing the problem in this way was appropriate and the
instructions were sufficient, because in the process of forming the
concept of magnitude, the first graders had compared objects based
on particular features (volume, length, area, etc.), described binary
relations using algebraic formulas, studied the properties of rela-
tions of magnitude expressed in Kagan’s axioms, and solved
standard problems involving relations of magnitude. However,
they had never had to design a problem on their own. The test
situation required subjects to correlate the goal with the object-
related conditions and doing so required a sensory and object-
related transformation of the conditions corresponding to this
goal. The result was a problem to determine the relationships
among magnitudes designed by the subjects themselves. Subjects
were given the following different sets of conditions: 1) three
segments in order of length; 2) three segments not in order of
length; 3) four segments in order of length; and 4) five segments
not in order of length.
The task here was to find the relationships necessary and

sufficient for deriving all remaining relationships for the given
set of elements. The optimal solution to the problem required
transforming the original object-related situation so that all rela-
tions within the set were “visually presented” — the set’s ele-
ments had to be put in order. The basis for constructing such
a series was the relationships between the particular values for
each magnitude, and the action for creating the series was an
action of seriation.
According to our experimental method, the strips were to be in
a fixed position, but in a number of cases we varied this method
by giving subjects strips of paper that were not in fixed position
and could be moved as needed. Having the strips in a fixed
position was harder for subjects, since the transformation of the
situation needed to identify the original relationships had to be
performed mentally. The original relationships chosen served as
evidence of this action. This was possible because the order in
which the problem’s conditions were given to subjects in sign/
symbol form expressed the action of identifying original relation-
ships in the given set of lengths. However, when the strips were
not in a fixed position, we were able to observe the action of
seriation in its object-related form and thereby immediately see
that it had taken place and was primary.
We conducted our investigation into the formation of the con-
cept of magnitude using 8- and 9-year-olds from Moscow’s
School No. 91 in whom the experimental mathematics program
had formed the concept of magnitude in first grade. We studied
89 pupils individually.
As previously stated, some children worked under a method
whereby the positions of strips were not fixed. In these cases, we
observed that some subjects put the strips in length order before
they wrote down the problem. Most often they performed this
action after moving to problems that were subjectively more
complex. For example, subjects might easily solve Problem 2,
where they were given three unordered strips, but when they
moved to solve Problem 3 they began to change the given
arrangement of strips into an ordered series. Other children
performed this action when they got to Problem 4, and some

never needed to perform it. It was important to us to see whether
or not this action had taken place and whether it always came
before subjects devised the problem.
Based on their performance, we divided the children into four
groups: children who refused to seriously attempt the exercises
were placed in Group I (30 percent of subjects); those who
correctly solved Problem 1, in which the strips were already in
order, but failed to solve Problem 2, in which the strips were out
of order, were placed in Group II (16 percent); those who cor-
rectly solved only the first two problems, in which the magnitude
was presented for sets of three elements, made up Group III
(13 percent); and children who successfully completed all exer-
cises, regardless of the number of elements and form of presenta-
tion, were placed in Group IV (41 percent).
The Group I subjects either refused to solve the problem (Anya
G.: “I can’t do that.”), or offered nonsensical solutions, such as
Pavel P., who labeled the strips with the letter A, B, C and wrote:
A>B=C. Another boy, Yegor K., also wrote down a solution that
did not correspond to the exercise: he labeled the shortest strip
with the letter A, the next longest, D, and the longest, K, and
wrote: K>D+A. Their behavior showed that they had not grasped
the assignment. This result was not surprising, since preceding
tests had shown that almost all children in Group I had not
mastered the program.
Group II subjects correctly wrote Problem 1 but were not able
to solve Problem 2. In the first case, the segments were presented
in order and there was no seriation required. Children described
the given situation without transforming it and came up with
a correctly designed problem. However, their method for solving
the problem by describing the relationships in the order in which
the segments were arranged in the drawing was not applicable to
the second case, where the segments were not in order. Using
their own “method” for solving the problem, subjects came up
with a problem in which relationships that were not original in
the given system served as conditions. For example, Petya
K. wrote a problem: M<T, T>I, M ? I. M’s relationship to
I cannot be derived here. Usually the experimenter would ask in

such cases (covering up the drawing, requiring an answer based
on the formula rather than the drawing, from which it was easy to
derive the relationship): “And are you able to solve this pro-
blem?” Children would often reply that M was equal to I, enter-
ing into a contradiction with the situation presented in the
drawing, where M was less than I. The experimenter pointed
out this fact: “How can it be? In the drawing, M is less than I,
and you have them as equal?” As a rule, subjects were not
troubled by this: “Well, what of it? That’s how it worked out
for me.” In other words, they did not perceive the contradiction,
even when it was directly pointed out. Some children described
the relationship between segments by beginning with the longest
(which was in the middle) and compared it with the first in order
(the shortest), and as a result the condition consisted of the only
relationship that could be deduced in this system. Subjects wound
up designing an unsolvable problem of the same type as pre-
viously shown.
The subjects were not able to draw a connection between
symbol and object. These same children were unable to produce
a drawing to match a system of formulas, to show the content of
a formula using objects, or to solve a problem requiring that the
relationship among magnitudes be determined when the problem
was presented in the form of objects. They were not able to
arrange a given set of segments in order of length and conse-
quently could not identify the relationship essential to the concept
of magnitude. It can be confidently stated that the concept of
magnitude had not yet formed in Group II children.
Group III consisted of children who had solved Problems 1
and 2 but were not able to solve Problem 3. As we see it, the
main difficulty for these children was advancing to sets consisting
of more than three elements. As our previous studies showed, in
assignments based on revising conditions, as a rule these children
reduced conditions to the relationships of three magnitudes, rather
than four, as the assignment required. For example, they were
given the following problem:
B>C
A=N
B⸱N
Subjects correctly noted that the problem could not be solved,

since the formula’s conditions did not relate to one another. They
were then asked to revise the conditions. As a rule, they did this
in the following way:
B>C
C=N
B>N
In this case, one magnitude has been removed and replaced with
another that fulfilled the function of an “intermediary” and
a “yardstick” between the members at either end of the series.
Another fairly common version was:
B>C
B>A
A=N
B>N
B>A was a formula that subjects inserted when they were revis-
ing the conditions, however it did not reflect, as one might have
expected, a connecting relationship such as C>A. Instead it
represented a new relationship that rendered one of the given
formulas superfluous, B>C in this case. The problem, as in the
first case, was reduced to the relationships between three magni-
tudes. These same children had difficulty solving a problem using
physical objects when the assignment involved four magnitudes,
despite having easily solved an analogous problem with three
elements. These children had a hard time solving problems
where, according to the conditions, two magnitudes were larger
than a third and they had to determine the relationship between
these magnitudes. This was an unsolvable problem, but many
children claimed that the magnitudes were equal.
In our view, the principle connecting elements in an ordered

series had yet to be universalized in these subjects. They had
mastered it as a general principle for a number of particular
situations, specifically for sets with a minimal number of ele-
ments (n = 3). We believe that these children exhibited a general
understanding of magnitude, but the concept of magnitude has
yet to form in them.
Subjects in Group IV, for whom the form in which the task was
presented and number of elements made no difference, moved on
to Problem 4 after Problem 3 and solved it just as easily as the
previous problems. We did not assign problems with large num-
bers of elements, as such problems are very unwieldy. Analysis of
records of the experiments showed that these subjects used the
seriation of elements to identify the relationships that were origi-
nal for a given set and to construct the universal relationship
underlying the concept of magnitude. The fact that they created
a new problem, wrote it down using formulas, and put the
problem in question form is evidence of an ability to deduce
a particular form of a universal relationship. These children’s
knowledge of magnitude is therefore systematic, generalized,
object-related, and represents a concept.
This research leads to the following main conclusions. Such
characteristics as object-relatedness, generalization, and systema-
ticity are the basis for diagnosing the formation of theoretical
concepts in schoolchildren. These characteristics are specific to
the theoretical form of mastery of reality, the foundation of which
is a manner of thinking that moves from a certain general (uni-
versal) relationship to the diversity of its particular aspects and
properties.
The object-relatedness, generalization, and systematicity that
signal the formation of theoretical concepts can be identified by
studying schoolchildren’s method of acting with the relationship
that reflects the content of the corresponding concept. An action
appropriate to the concept makes it possible to identify and
generalize the essential relationship underlying a concept and to
use this relationship to create any particular form of a concept.
Designing a diagnostic method requires logical and psycholo-

gical analysis of the studied concept in order to identify its object-
related sources and the transforming action that constitutes the
basis of the corresponding concept.
Our logical and psychological analysis of the mathematical
concept of magnitude has shown that the essential relationship
underlying the concept of magnitude is the relationship character-
izing the connection among elements in a seriated sequence, and
the action that reveals this relationship to the subject is the action
of seriating the elements in a sequence.
How well formed the concept of magnitude is in schoolchil-
dren can be determined by having them put elements into
a seriated sequence in order to identify the corresponding rela-
tionship and to deduce from this relationship its particular forms.
The approach to diagnosing theoretical concepts in schoolchil-
dren that we propose in this work can be used in cases where
there is a need to establish how well-formed a concept or system
of concepts is in learners and, in turn, assess how effectively
instruction is organized.
Chapter 4: Systematicity of Cognitive Learning Actions in 6- to

10-Year-Olds
The specific motive of learning activity is a subject’s contentful
and reflective theoretical relationship toward a systematic object.
This relationship is formed through special cognitive learning
actions designed so that schoolchildren can analyze the conditions
under which a certain system of objects originates and identify the
genetically original relationship (connection) governing concrete
and particular manifestations of the given system. Cognitive learn-
ing actions are the foundation of schoolchildren’s learning activity
and serve as the means by which creative scientific theoretical
thinking develops in children (Aidarova 1978; Davydov 1986;
Zakharova 1978; Mikulina 1982; Minskaia 1966; Repkin 1976).
We used systematicity as the criterion for children’s cognitive
learning actions. There are two indicators of systematicity: a) the
ability to analyze an object as a system of connected elements
and identify the general principle governing the system’s struc-

ture, and b) the ability to construct a new system based on the
identified principle (Rubtsov and Rivina 1985). The development
of an action’s systematicity was studied using a method enabling
us to examine both of these indicators either separately or in
conjunction with one another (Rubtsov 1984; Rubtsov and
Rivina 1985).
Our experiments investigating the systematicity of cognitive
learning actions (Rivina 1988) were designed to answer the
following questions:
1. To what extent had primary school children, especially 6-year-olds,

formed the ability to see an object as a system of elements based on
connections between essential features?
2. How does this ability influence the construction of new systems
based on previously identified connections between features?
3. What were the levels of cognitive learning actions’ systematicity?
4. What was the overall dynamic of systematicity’s development at
different ages?
5. Is there a correlation between how well formed the systematicity of
learning actions is and academic success among primary school
children?
These questions are of crucial importance in light of reforms that

will bring 6-year-olds into primary schools on a large scale.
Orientation toward a system’s features
To study children’s ability to analyze an object as a system of

connected elements, we used the “Series of Rings” method. The
rings served as elements in this system, and each of them
obviously differed in the size of their inner and outer diameters.
In each exercise, the diameters were an essential feature of each
ring and the system overall.
Method. Subjects were presented with a system consisting of
four rings. Moving from left to right, the inner diameter of the rings
gradually increased in size, while the outer diameter decreased. As
a control task, children were given a new element to incorporate into
the series — a “conflicting” ring. In terms of its outer diameter, this

ring was smaller than the third ring but larger than the fourth ring,
and in terms of its inner diameter it was larger than the first ring but
smaller than the second ring. Taken together, these parameters vio-
lated the series’ overall pattern.
Children were given the following instructions: “Here you
have a series of four rings. And here is a fifth ring. What do
you think? Does it fit in this series?” When children said that it
did fit, they were asked: “Where would you put it?” If they
replied that the ring did not fit, they were asked to explain why
they felt that way.
A total of 333 subjects participated in this study, children from
the preparatory group of Kindergarten No. 729 and grade 0 of
School No. 57, as well as second and third graders from Schools
No. 637 and 91 in Moscow.
As a result of this study, subjects were divided into four groups
based on their ability to orient on a system’s features while
identifying its original relationship.
Orientation Method I: Orientation on the connection among
the object’s essential features. Subjects using this orientation
method said the ring did not fit in the series. One subject imme-
diately pointed out that the ring did not fit, showing that he had
solved the problem in his head. Third grader Andrei S.: “You can
see right away that this ring doesn’t fit!” Others drew this con-
clusion only after several attempts to find the answer using an
action. For example, third grader Natasha S. tried to put the
control ring between the series’ various rings, holding it next to
each ring and comparing the outer and inner diameters before
giving the correct response.
Many subjects were able to explain their decision. For
example, second grader Ira D. responded to the experimenter by
saying: “In this series, the outer circles get smaller and the inner
ones get bigger, so the ring doesn’t fit in the series based on its
outer and inner circles together.” Some of the children who could
not explain their answers were nevertheless confident that they
were right.
When first grader Galya G. was asked why she thought that,
she replied: “I don’t know why, but I’m sure that it doesn’t fit.”
But some of the children doubted their answers, such as second
grader Seryozha Kh.: “You can’t put the ring there, it doesn’t
look good, but maybe you can, based on the little hole. No,
I don’t think so, something’s not right here.”
Overall, only using this orientation method can the object’s
genetically original relationship be identified. All other methods
lack an orientation on the connection between essential features.
Orientation Method II: Orientation on each essential feature
separately without paying attention to their connection. In trying
to solve this problem, subjects identified two possible places for
this new ring: between the first and second rings in the series (the
correct placement in terms of the inner diameter) and between the
third and fourth rings (the correct placement in terms of the outer
diameter).
Fourth grader Andrei S. was typical in his attempt to solve the
problem: “The new ring can be put in two different places in the
series, depending on which circles you consider — the outer one
or the hole” (the ring’s inner diameter).
Like the subjects using Orientation Method I, some of the
children from this group responded only after trying to put the
ring in various places in the series. Some of them first put the ring
in one place, focusing on one diameter, but after the experimenter
asked another question tried to find a different place for the ring
based on its other diameter.
Third grader Igor V. put the ring between the third and fourth
rings in the series (meaning that he was focused on the outer
diameter). Experimenter: “Does it fit anywhere else?” Igor:
“Now let’s try. [Puts the ring between the first and second
rings in the series]. Yes, based on the hole it could also go
here, but nowhere else.”
Orientation Method III: Orientation on one essential feature.
Children exhibiting this orientation method thought that the con-
trol ring could occupy only one particular spot within the series.
One of them was focused only on the control ring’s inner dia-
meter. In his response, second grader Volodya P. pointed to the
space between the first and second rings in the series: “The new
ring can only go here.” However, most children gave responses
that only considered the ring’s outer diameter. Third grader Sasha
Sh.: “The new ring only fits here.”
Six- and 7-year-olds often explained their solutions using
imagery:
Second grader Kolya R.: “I put them this way–papa, mama,
older son, and the younger two.” Olya T., a kindergartener age
6 years, 4 months: “Here, it’s like a snowman — the balls get
smaller and smaller.”
Children who initially stated that the ring did not fit in the series but
after further explanations by the experimenter finally responded
with an answer reflecting orientation on one essential feature were
also categorized as exhibiting this orientation method.
Kolya B, a kindergartener age 6 years, 6 months: “You can’t
put the ring in the series; it’s not the same as the other rings,
and the color doesn’t match.” Experimenter: “But as you can
see, all of the rings here are different….” Kolya: “Ah…but then
you can put it here” (places the ring based on the size of its
outer diameter).
Orientation Method IV: No orientation on essential features. This

group included children who:
a. Refused to solve this problem. The response of kindergartener Dima

F. was typical:
Dima: “What do you mean, put the ring in the series?”
Experimenter: “You know, so that it fits with the series.” Dima:
“I don’t know where to put it; I’m just learning after all.”
b. Placed the ring without an orientation on the size of its diameters.

Some of these children had no explanation for their action.
When asked by the experimenter why he had placed the ring in
the middle of the series, second grader Sasha T. just shrugged:
“That’s just how I wanted it.” Others pointed to nonessential
features in justifying their solution: “You can put the ring last
so that it will be like the neck of an animal, or you could put it
in the middle — it looks good that way — or you could put it

wherever you want!” (6-year-old kindergartener Sasha S.).
The distribution of subjects based on orientation broken down by

age is shown in Table 1. These results suggest the following
conclusions. First, one important fact is of primary interest: the
vast majority of primary school children (94 percent of cases)
have an ability to orient on a problem’s essential features. This
ability grows more prevalent with age and time in school (from
65 percent of cases among 6-year-olds up to 100 percent among
third graders).
Second, subjects’ orientation method depended not just on
their level of development, but also on the nature of the object
itself, in particular how visually apparent and clearly identifi-
able its essential features were. For example, among the 59 per-
cent of subjects (71 percent of whom were first graders) who
oriented on one feature, 82 percent of them oriented on the
most “eye-catching” one (the ring’s outer diameter), while the
less obvious feature (the inner diameter) usually went
unnoticed.
Only 9 percent of subjects (including only one 6-year-old and
only 6 percent of first graders) were able to “see” two of the
Table 1
Distribution of subjects based on orientation method broken down

by age.
Orientation Methods, Percentage
Age I II III IV
Age 6 (grade 0, kindergarten) 4 – 61 35

7 – 8 year olds (first graders) 21 6 71 2
8 – 9 year olds (second graders) 31 13 54 2
9 – 10 year olds (third graders) 36 16 48 –
Percentage of subjects overall 26 9 59 6
system’s essential features, and only 26 percent of children could

discover the object’s more complex property: the connection
between these two features. The relationship between these num-
bers can evidently be explained by the fact that orientation on two
features separately is an intermediate state, since, if children can
“see” two features, it is easier for them to grasp the connection
between them. This ability makes it easier for subjects to advance
to seeing the connection between features.
It is important to point out that the vast majority of children
enter first grade lacking an ability to orient themselves on the
connection between two essential features (79 percent of first
graders). This ability is particularly rare in 6-year-olds: 96 percent
of 6-year-old subjects lacked this ability.
Only a minority of primary school children (between 4 and
36 percent of cases) demonstrated the ability to orient on the
connection between two essential features when examining
a studied object. This suggests that most pupils in the lower
grades will have trouble with those parts of the curriculum that
include such problems.
As they grow older and gain classroom experience, the number
of pupils with the ability to orient on the connection between
essential features increases; however, even in third grade more
than half of pupils (64 percent) have not developed this ability.
Between first and third grade, the number of such children
increases by only 15 percent.
This conclusion has been confirmed by the results of a special
study of the stability of young schoolchildren’s orientation method.
Using the same Series of Rings method, the same set of
children was studied a second time: the second set of experiments
was conducted six months after the first. A total of 62 first
through third graders participated. It turned out that in 68 percent
of cases subjects did not change their orientation method during
this interval, and out of the 32 percent who did change it, only
20 percent moved from Methods II and III to Method I — in
other words, were able to solve the problem by orienting on the
connection between essential features.
Levels of learning actions’ systematicity
A method called “Constructing New Series” was devised to study

how well formed systematicity was in the actions of young
schoolchildren. This method embodies the idea that an indicator
of systematicity is the ability to use the original relationship
identified in solving a problem to construct new systems based
on the same principle but with new specific design principles.
We chose to combine the Constructing New Series method
with the Series of Rings method to determine the relationship
between subjects’ orientation methods and their ability to con-
struct new systems.
Method. The study was conducted immediately after the
experiment using the Series of Rings method. The same subjects
were presented with only the control ring; the other rings from the
original series were removed. Instead, nine rings that differed in
terms of the sizes of both their outer and inner diameters were placed
before subjects in random order. The children were given an oppor-
tunity to select from the nine rings those that could be used with the
control ring to construct several series (consisting of a total of four
rings each). Some series could be designed based on a single fea-
ture” either the outer or inner diameter. However, if the connection
between the outer and inner diameters was taken into consideration,
there were only two possible series.
These series were as follows: Series X exactly corresponded to
the original series used in the Series of Rings experiments: the
rings’ inner diameters gradually increased while the outer ones
correspondingly decreased. Series Y had a different design prin-
ciple: both the outer and inner diameters gradually decreased.
Series X and Y were incorporated into the method both to
identify subjects in whom learning actions had already become
systematized and to find out whether subjects, in designing new
systems, would show a preference for an already familiar pattern
(in other words, whether they would reproduce the model offered
in Series X) or would realize this principle in a system with
a completely new form (Series Y). Constructing either of these
series required picking three specific rings from among the
randomly placed nine rings and arranging them in exactly the

right order. On the other hand, any of the nine rings could be used
in putting together one of the series based on just one diameter,
and there were multiple ways in which they could be combined.
Given this circumstance, it was highly unlikely that a system
reflecting the connection between two essential features would
be unintentionally constructed.
Subjects were given the following instructions: “Look at this
ring. There are also nine other rings. Can you choose three of
these nine rings that would make a series with this one lying
separately over here?” After the subject finished putting together
the series, the experimenter asked whether another series could be
constructed and how many series in total could be constructed.
The same 333 subjects took part in the Constructing New
Series experiment as participated in the Series of Rings
experiments.
Results. Using this method, we were able to divide subjects
into four groups depending on the level of their cognitive learning
actions’ systematicity over the course of our experiments. The divi-
sions were based on differences in children’s actions when they were
designing series of rings that included the control ring.
Level 1. Subjects belonged to this level if they were able to
design new series of rings based on the relationship reflected in the
pattern of relative sizes of the outer and inner diameters. This group
included 76 subjects: during the Series of Rings experiments, 70 of
them had used Orientation Method I; 3 had used Method II; and 3
had used Method III.
Analysis of the transcripts of these experiments showed that the
group of subjects that achieved this level of systematicity was
diverse and could be further subdivided into four subgroups
based on how systematic their learning actions were. How well
systematicity was formed was judged based on how subjects acted
and what specific new system they designed (X, Y or X + Y).
The study results are summarized in Table 2.
Children with well-formed systematicity of learning actions
confidently designed both possible new systems, X and Y. Not
Table 2
Distribution of subjects exhibiting Level I systematicity of learning

actions broken down by age and grade.
Number of subjects who designed series
Both systems One system Partially one

(series X (series X or system (series X or
Age +series Y) series Y) series Y) Total
Age 6 (grade 0, – 1 2 3
kindergarten)
7 – 8 year olds – 14 – 14
(first graders)
8 – 9 year olds 8 15 8 31
(second graders)
9 – 10 year olds 10 16 2 28
(third graders)
Total 18 46 12 76
only did they solve the problem correctly, they solved it thor-
oughly. These subjects saw the task of constructing a series that
included the control element as the task of realizing the corre-
sponding principle. Some children selected three of the nine rings
and used them to put together series X. They then used three
other rings to put together series Y.
Third grader Natasha S.: “Now I’ll make a series in which the
inner circles get bigger but the wheels themselves get smaller,
like the one you showed me, and then I’ll make another series
in which the circles and wheels both get smaller.”
These subjects immediately saw all the possibilities.

For example, second grader Ira D.: “I could make a completely
different series in which everything gets smaller, or I could
make one like the other, where the circles get smaller and the
holes get bigger.”
Another interesting detail was that some of the children, after

constructing both series (X and Y), confidently announced that
these were the only possible series. After constructing both X and
Y, third grader Vitya Sh. said: “These are the only two possible;
there aren’t any others.”
Overall, the experiments demonstrated that these children
could construct new series of rings intentionally and confidently.
They were able to provide clear, logical explanations when they
constructed series based on connections between features. Often
these explanations come before they constructed the series.
Children in whom the systematicity of learning actions was
not yet sufficiently formed were able to construct the new
system Y, but not series X. In other words, they did not use
every opportunity for constructing a system based on
a previously modeled principle. Nevertheless, many subjects
understood that one and the same principle could serve as the
basis for several systems. Here are two examples of subjects’
explanations that illustrate this:
Third grader Sasha G.: “I will build a series where both the
circles and the holes get smaller.” After the experimenter asked
him whether a ring fit in that series, he replied: “Of course it
fits, it’s only that here two features change together in one way,
not like in the first task, but that’s not important.” Second
grader Seryozha P. asked the experimenter: “Can I make one
so that both the hole and the ring get smaller?”
Some children only constructed series X. In other words, they

made an exact copy of the model system familiar to them from
the Series of Rings experiments. This attests to an ability to
identify a pattern (rule) for constructing a model system and use
it, but it says little of their ability to use the original relationship
on which this pattern is based in constructing an object. For
example, after the instructions were given, third grader Andrei
S. asked: “So what series should I make — one analogous to the
previous one?” He was using the word “analogous” in reference
to a series constructed based on the same rule as the series
presented in the previous set of experiments.
However, far from all subjects mentioned their experience

solving the original problem in explaining their actions.
Second grader Roma L.: “I make it this way: big ring — little
circle, smaller ring–bigger circle, and so on.” Some children
repeatedly tried to construct a series of rings, but they kept
turning out like the one they had already constructed. For
example, first grader Natasha V, after constructing series X,
against came up with the exact same series, but in reverse
order. After the experimenter pointed this out she exclaimed:
“Oh, yes, it’s exactly the same and I didn’t notice.”
Some children were able to identify the system’s original relation-

ship embodied in the connection between two features but were
not able to completely solve the problem on their own.
Some of them initially constructed series of rings solely on the
basis of one property (the outer or inner diameter) and only
arrived at the correct solution in the course of searching. For
example, after third grader Sasha R. constructed two series–one
based on the inner and another based on the outer diameter–he
was able to construct series Y only on the third attempt, after the
experimenter gave him a hint. A number of subjects (primarily
first graders) managed to construct a series based on the connec-
tion between features, but with great difficulty. These subjects
were not able to clearly explain their actions.
For example, second grader Zhenya T. arranged three rings from
series X and said: “I can’t find a fourth one.” He placed a ring that
did not fit. “No, this one doesn’t work, I don’t know why, it just
doesn’t work!” With great difficulty and after numerous attempts
he completed the series correctly. Second grader Denis Sh. tried
constructing series X several times: he put together three rings
from series X but could not find a fourth one. He placed a fourth
one based on the size of the outer diameter. Experimenter: “Is that
right?” Subject: “No, the fourth ring doesn’t fit right, the hole at
the end has to be bigger, but I can’t find a ring like that, I can’t
finish it.” Third grader Yasha Zh. behaved similarly. He correctly
arranged two rings but was not able to complete the series: “I
understand that in this series both the holes and the wheels should
get smaller, but I can’t make it work.”
Level II. Nine percent of all subjects were identified as being at

this level. This category was for children who constructed two
systems, both of which involved an original relationship based on
the change in one of the two features rather than being based on the
connection between two essential features. Some series of rings were
designed based on the change in the size of the outer diameter while
others were based on the inner diameter.
This group consisted of 29 subjects. During the Series of Rings
experiments, 22 of them had exhibited Orientation Method II and 3
had exhibited Method III. Here too, there was a clear relationship
between children’s level of systematicity and their orientation ability.
Children exhibiting this level of systematicity were able to
construct at least two series: one with an orientation on the
outer and another with an orientation on the inner diameter.
Furthermore, some of them solved the problem immediately,
without any hesitation. Third grader Kostya B. was typical:
Kostya: “Tell me, how should I make it–based on the holes or
based on the sizes?” Experimenter: “You have to make it so
that the ring fits in the series.” Kostya: “Then I’ll first make
a series based on one feature and then on a second feature–that
will be a different series.” Experimenter: “Can you construct
any other series?” Kostya: “No, only these ones.”
Other children from this group found the solution in the process
of a series of tries. Third grader Anya P. held the control ring up
to each other ring in turn, orienting on the inner diameters: “Let’s
try to make it based on the hole.” After constructing a series, she
again picked up the ring, now orienting on the outer diameter:
“And now I’ll make it based on the size!”
After becoming involved in the process of seeking a solution,
children kept putting together new series, but they were all
designed with an orientation on one diameter.
Third grader Natasha P., after constructing two series based on
the outer and inner diameters: “And can I make another one
based on the hole?” and after it was constructed “And now
based on the size?” She constructed four series: two based on
the outer and two on the inner diameter. Second grader Andrei
K.: “And what makes a series suitable, based on what feature?”
Experimenter: “You decide what would make it suitable!” Andrei

K.: “And can I stack them on top of one another?” (Stacks them.)
“I’ll construct one based on the hole and then on the size.” Third
grader Andrei S.: “So, one way of doing it is, we line up the holes
and build it based on the holes, and the other way is lining up the
sizes and building it based on the sizes–that’s all there is too it.”
Level III. Subjects in this group constructed a series of rings
orienting themselves on only one of the system’s essential feature:
either the outer or the inner diameter of the ring. Children exhibiting
Level III systematicity made up the largest group: 211 children or
63 percent of all subjects.
Comparing the results of the Series of Rings and Constructing New
Series experiments, summarized in Table 3, showed a clear relation-
ship between Orientation Method III and Level III systematicity.
The results show that the higher number of subjects with Level III
systematicity as compared with subjects exhibiting Orientation
Method III is due to a few subjects in whom these two measures
do not match up. Specifically, within the Orientation Method III
group, 3 subjects each exhibited Level I and Level II systematicity.
There were 12 subjects in the Level III systematicity group exhibit-
ing Orientation Method I and 5 exhibiting Orientation Method II.
Table 3
Distribution of subjects exhibiting Level III systematicity and

Orientation Method III broken down by age and grade.
Age and Grade
Age 8 – 9
Age 6 (gr. 0, Age 7 – 8 (second Age 9 – 10
Subjects kindergarten) (first grade) grade) (third grade) Total
Orientation 28 77 60 32 197
Method III
(number)
Level III 30 85 69 27 211
systematicity
(number)
The group with Level III systematicity can be divided into two
subgroups. Members of the first subgroup constructed series
based solely on the outer diameter (in 89 percent of cases). The
children in the second subgroup constructed series of rings based
solely on the inner diameters. As a rule, children exhibiting either
of these orientation methods (focusing on the outer or inner
diameter) had the same results during the Series of Rings experi-
ments as they did during the Constructing experiments (98 percent
overlap). The problem-solving of both subgroups can be seen in
the experimental transcripts.
Second grader Seryozha Kh.: “How many series do you want
me to build based on the holes?” He put together 3 series, all
focused on the inner diameter. First grader Natasha
A. confidently selected the first rings she happened to touch
and arranged them based on their inner diameters: “And can
I build more series like that?” She constructed four series, all
based on the outer diameters and then announced to the experi-
menter: “That’s it; very good series!”
The nature of attempts during the problem-solving process was

indicative. As a rule, these children had a hard time solving the
problem.
Third grader Natasha T.: “Can I measure them? Can I arrange
all the rings?” (First measures all the rings based on the outer
diameter.) “And how can I get it so it goes from the biggest to
littlest?” (Constructs a series of nine rings based on their outer
diameter.)
There was one subject who paid attention to the second essential
feature when constructing a series but did not have a precise
orientation (Orientation Method III based on the Series of Rings
experiments). He constructed four series based on the outer
diameter, but after constructing a series using rings that essen-
tially differed in terms of the size of their inner diameters,
announced: “The holes in all the rings have to be little so there
won’t be a big difference.”
Level IV. This was the level exhibited by children who either
refused to construct a series of rings or constructed one without any
focus on essential features. The following are examples of typical

responses. Ira F. (age 6 years, 6 months): “What do you mean–
construct a series?” Experimenter: “Think about it. Do you know
what a series is?” Ira: “I know. But what is it? I don’t know. I’m not
going to do anything.” When constructing a series, first grader Renat
S. placed the control ring in a random spot in the series without
consistency or a system and did not focus either on the outer or inner
diameter. He seemed to be arranging four rings randomly, without
any understanding of what the experimenter was asking him to do.
After familiarizing himself with all the rings, second grader

Kostya T. concluded: “Here, it doesn’t matter what rings you
put, you can use any.” He chose the first ring he happened upon
and put it next to the control ring. Vova S. offered the following
explanation for why he chose the rings he chose for his series:
“I liked these ones.”
Our findings involving subjects exhibiting Level IV systematicity

of learning actions indicate that, although there were very few
such children (17 out of 333 subjects), it is important that they
undergo a special propaedeutic course of instruction. The devel-
opment of such a course will require special research.
The results of our Constructing New Series experiments are
summarized in Table 4. These experiments offer evidence that the
systematicity of learning actions has formed to some extent in all
but a few subjects. However, 72 percent of our subjects had
attained only Level II or III systematicity. Consequently, most
subjects were only able to solve problems requiring seriation
based on one or two unassociated features. This suggests that
for most of the children in the early grades of primary school who
took part in this study, solving learning problems involving con-
nections between two features is, at best, extremely difficult.
Relationship between the level of systematicity and orientation

method in young schoolchildren
Comparing the results of the Series of Rings and Constructing

New Series experiments revealed a relationship between
Table 4
Distribution of subjects across four levels of systematicity broken

down by age.
Level of Systematicity, %
Age Number of people I II III IV
Age 6 (grade 0, kindergarten) 46 7 – 65 28

7 – 8 year olds (first graders) 109 13 7 78 2
8 – 9 year olds (second graders) 111 28 8 62 2
9 – 10 year olds (third graders) 67 42 18 40 –
Total 333 23 9 63 5
children’s orientation method (how they focus on a system’s

essential features) and the level of their learning actions’
systematicity.
Children who lack the ability to identify a system’s essential
features (Orientation Method IV) also lack systematicity of learn-
ing actions. This would suggest that systems can only be built out
of essential features. In the process of solving a learning problem,
subjects start by determining how a system’s elements are con-
nected based on the nature of the essential features and identify-
ing the contentful relationship that reflects this connection —
only then are they are able to construct new systems based on
this relationship.
It therefore turns out that, without exception, all subjects able
to orient themselves on a problem’s essential features have
attained a certain level of systematicity of learning actions. In
essence, three levels of systematicity of learning actions are
characterized by one and the same operational algorithm: orienta-
tion on an object’s essential features; identification of the princi-
ple governing its structure based on this orientation; use of this
identified original relationship in learning actions with other
objects of the same class (whether in the solving of existing
problems or the devising of new ones). All of these actions are

carried out in sequence, whether or not subjects are oriented on
individual features or their interconnection or whether or not they
use the identified original relationship in their actions with other
problems of the same class. However, the level of systematicity
of learning actions is directly related to how well formed each of
these components of systematicity are formed.
Our experimental results have revealed a deep internal corre-
spondence between the analytical components and building
blocks of the systematicity of cognitive learning actions. These
results are summarized in Table 5.
Table 5 shows that 92 percent of children who had previously been
able to orient themselves on the connection between two essential
features were then able to construct new series based on the connec-
tion between two features. A total of 75 percent of subjects who had
exhibited Orientation Method II were able to construct series based on
each feature separately, while 91 percent of the children who con-
structed series based on just one feature had previously exhibited
Orientation Method III in regard to systems’ essential features. This
means that orientation method in most cases predetermines the level
of learning actions’ systematicity in young schoolchildren and plays
a decisive role in the formation of Level I systematicity.
Table 5
Distribution of subjects across four levels of systematicity in rela-

tion to Orientation Method, %.
Orientation Method
Level of Systematicity I II III IV
I 92 4 4 –
II 14 75 11 –
III 6 2 91 1
IV – – – 100
It should, however, be noted that a given orientation method

does not guarantee the corresponding level of systematicity of
learning actions. For example, in 19 percent of cases, children
able to see the connection between features in the Series of Rings
experiments were nevertheless unable to construct a series based
on this original relationship.
This incongruity can be partially explained by the fact that
some children happened on the correct solution by chance during
the Series of Rings experiments. However, there may be more
important reasons for these incongruities. Understanding them
requires a close look at the inner structure of each group of
subjects based on age. The following table shows this structure
within the group exhibiting Level I systematicity of learning
actions and Orientation Method I (Table 6).
As Table 6 shows, such a low percentage of 6-year-olds
exhibited Orientation Method I and Level I systematicity that
further study would be needed before drawing any conclusions
regarding a relationship between these two indicators of
systematicity.
Comparing results for first graders shows that, while 21 percent
of subjects exhibited Orientation Method I, only 13 percent
Table 6
Distribution of subjects with Level I systematicity and Orientation

Method I broken down by age, %.
Age
Age 6 (grade Age 7 – 8 Age 8 – 9 Age 9 – 10

0, (first (second (third
Subjects kindergarten) grade) grade) grade)
Orientation Method 4 21 31 36
I (Series of Rings) _
Level I systematicity 7 13 28 42
(Constructing New
Series)
exhibited Level I systematicity of learning actions. This suggests

that, at this age, while the ability to see a connection between two
features is a clear precondition for the development of learning
actions, it is not enough.
In 8- and 9-year-olds, having Orientation Method I evidently
determines children’s membership in the high level of systemati-
city group (31 and 28 percent).
By third grade, another trend becomes evident: the number of
pupils able to correctly construct a system is greater than the
number of pupils capable of seeing the connection between two
features (42 and 36 percent respectively). This phenomenon can
be explained by the fact that, at ages 9 and 10, children begin to
develop a mental picture in the process of a corresponding activ-
ity and therefore some of them achieve an orientation toward the
connection between features only in the process of trying to
construct a new system.
Systematicity of cognitive learning actions as an indicator of

effective education
To determine whether or not the levels of systematicity of learn-

ing actions identified in our experiments could be correlated with
children’s success in the classroom, we compared the results of
our Constructing New Series experiments with the results of
a special study. This study involved the entire third grade class
(32 children age 8 to 10) at Moscow’s School No. 637.
The study was designed as follows. After explaining a new
section of the program, “The Area and Perimeters of Rectangles,”
the teacher asked the entire class to solve the following problem
from their textbook: “A soccer field is shaped like a square with
a perimeter of 360 meters. What is the soccer field’s area?” The
next day, the teacher gave these same pupils another problem
from the same section: “Two rectangles each have the same area.
The first rectangle is 15 centimeters long and 14 centimeters
wide. What is the length of the second rectangle if its width is
10 centimeters?”
Correctly solving both these problems required an ability to

compare (connect) the problem’s features (conditions). The first
problem required connecting such conditions as a square’s area
and perimeter, and the second required connecting a rectangle’s
length and width.
After the entire class worked on solving these problems, the
Series of Rings and Constructing New Series experiments were
conducted on the entire class. The relationship between the chil-
dren’s problem-solving results and the level of their learning
actions’ systematicity is presented in Table 7.
As Table 7 shows, children who exhibited Level
I systematicity of learning actions in the experiment were more
than twice as likely to solve the problems that were based on
a connection between conditions.
Meanwhile, children exhibiting a lower level of systematicity
of learning actions (II and III) had difficulty with this type of
problem (71 percent with Level III systematicity failed to solve
Problem 2).
The difference in children’s results in solving the two problems
confirms what we determined in our experiments: the successful
solution of a problem depends not only on the level of systema-
ticity but also a number of other factors, especially the difficulty
of the problem, how comprehensible it is for learners, and
whether or not they have developed the skill required for solving
the particular type of problem. All this undoubtedly affected the
Table 7
Distribution of subjects successfully solving arithmetic problems

broken down by systematicity level, %.
Systematicity Solved Problem Solved Problem Solved Both

Level 1 2 Problems
I 64 82 73
II 33 33 33
III 43 29 36
results. However, Table 7 shows a clear connection between the

level of systematicity and the ability to effectively solve arith-
metic problems involving a connection between two conditions
(features), in other words, problems involving multiplicative
relationships.
In order to gather further evidence related to this question, which
is of great practical importance, we conducted a study to compare
the level of subjects’ systematicity and their classroom success as
expressed in the marks teachers recorded in their class ledgers.
When we compared the level of actions’ systematicity with
grades earned for mathematics by 131 first through third graders,
it turned out that the marks earned by pupils with Level
I systematicity averaged at least one grade higher than those
earned by pupils exhibiting lower levels. For example,
among second graders, the level of systematicity corresponded
to the following average grades: Level I – 4.4; Level II – 3.4;
Level III – 3.0; Level IV – 2.5. Similar results were obtained
when we compared the level of systematicity and grades for
Russian language. The relationship between classroom success
among children in the earliest grades and their level of systema-
ticity was confirmed by a study conducted on these same subjects
using a “subjective assessment” method.
Diagnosing the level of systematicity of learning actions
The findings outlined in this chapter offer evidence that the

results obtained using other methods correlate highly with the
results obtained with the primary method used to investigate the
systematicity of cognitive learning actions (Constructing New
Series). This suggests that this method can be used not only for
research purposes, but also for diagnosing schoolchildren and
determining the level of their individual learning actions’
systematicity.
As previously described, it is also extremely productive to use
the Constructing New Series method immediately after the Series
of Rings method, combining the two into a single method. The
combination of these two methods has certain advantages. One is
that familiarization with the Series of Rings method seems to

prepare subjects for the Constructing New Series exercises, teach-
ing them a set of rules and thereby eliminating the need to
provide instructions pointing to the presence of the system’s
different features, which could serve as a sort of clue.
Furthermore, comparing results obtained using the two methods
offers a clearer diagnosis.
It is also worth bearing in mind that using two methods in
combination takes under ten minutes and does not tire the chil-
dren. All this leads us to recommend combining the Series of
Rings and Constructing New Series methods into a single diag-
nostic tool.
Studying the structure, origins, and developmental dynamics of
cognitive learning actions is an important area of psychological
research into the learning activity of young schoolchildren. The
particular ways in which these actions are performed are defined
by the search for an object’s content and identification of the
generalized principle governing its (the object’s) structure.
The full complement of indicators used to assess the develop-
ment of cognitive learning actions should reflect the way in
which children search for an object’s object-oriented and content-
ful basis. Such indicators include: a) analysis of an object as
a system of connected elements (conditions); b) the transforma-
tion of elements’ initial structure and the building of a new
structure with the goal of identifying the principle governing its
design; and c) the identification of changes to the structure of the
studied object when a new element is incorporated (or removed)
and the derivation of the new element’s properties on the basis of
the identified principle. In conjunction, these indicators can be
used to assess the systematicity of a cognitive action.
There is evidence for at least four main levels of the systema-
ticity of cognitive learning actions that can be used to assess the
development of these actions in children.
In children, Level I systematicity is the ability to identify the
connection between an object’s system-forming features and
construct a new system on the basis of the identified connec-
tion. Level II systematicity is the ability to identify each of an
object’s features separately without taking their connection into

account. Level III systematicity is the ability to identify only
one of an object’s system-forming features. Level IV systema-
ticity is the lack of an ability to identify an object’s system-
forming features.
Part II: Function of Sign and Symbol in the Development of

Thinking
Chapter 1: Sign Mediation as the Psychological Mechanism by
Which an Action is Constructed
When studying the functional structure and developmental
dynamic of thinking, modeling is of great importance as
a component of the contentful analysis of an object. The psycho-
logical features of such modeling have been primarily discussed
from two perspectives: either in terms of the modeling of an
object’s properties and relationships or of actions performed
with a created model. Meanwhile, the question of modeling as
a psychological mechanism used in searching for the grounds for
a performed action and its orienting basis has fallen almost
completely outside investigators’ purview. Such a search involves
subjects’ distinguishing between a method (or form) of action and
the conditions under which that action is performed (the object’s
properties). As demonstrated above (see Part I, Chapters 1 and 2),
this search is based in this instance on the multifaceted movement
from the actual to a possible way of performing an action. The
possible and the actual serve here as binary forms of the action
being constructed, and the action’s design is based on testing of
what is essential in the object, while the object’s properties
become an objective measure for the deployment of future actions
(see: Nezhnov and Medvedev 1988; Mul’darov and Rubtsov
1987; Repkin 1976; and Elkonin 1981, among other works).
There is evidence that the modeling process takes two main
forms. In one case, the way in which the action is constructed is
designed to mirror the way in which the object is constructed by
bringing its elements together into a structure (see Part I, Chapter
4). In the other, the opposite process occurs, a “splintering” of the

object and the method of action; this process incorporates the
building of a model of the object and the transition from the
model to the objective form of the performed action. Such mod-
eling represents an intentional planning of possible methods for
performing an action whereby the action is not immediately
aimed at objective material, but instead is represented only as
a potential means of changing this objective material. Our
hypothesis about modeling as a means of constructing an action
involves two primary assumptions. First, modeling constitutes
a vital psychological precondition of constructive and contentful
analysis of an object: such modeling is how people search for the
possible forms of an object’s transformation. Second, in the
process of analysis, modeling serves as a special problem-
solving action. It is based on the mediation of object-related,
contentful, and operational characteristics of an action and
requires the subject to create special tools (sign/symbol schemata
of action) that will be used to enable the reflective and contentful
study of the action’s bases and to consolidate the corresponding
ways of carrying it out.
The logical and object-related analysis of a physical task that
demonstrates the specific nature of a person’s search for the
content of the problem’s object through the mediation of the
action’s object-related and operational characteristics can serve
to clarify the essence of the formulated hypothesis. Let us exam-
ine the transformation of physical structures made up of two (and
more) interacting annular magnets that form a complex system of
linked elements (the object). How the elements in this system are
connected results from the mutual orientation of the magnetic
fields: when magnetic fields face the same way the magnets repel
one another, and when they face in opposite directions, the
magnets attract one another. When the connection between
poles changes, specific properties of the entire system of inter-
acting magnets change: the attraction of poles turns to repulsion
and vice versa. If the annular magnets are oriented vertically
relative to their support, attraction will be replaced by repulsion
if one of the rings is flipped 180 degrees, but if the vertical
orientation of the magnetic fields is changed to a horizontal

orientation relative to the stand (shown by an arrow), the change
from attraction to repulsion of fields will occur when the magnet
is turned. In other words, the move from one structure to another
demands the transformation of the method of action.
This example shows why changing methods of action are not
an elementary operation: it represents the internal condition for
contentful analysis of the object. For example, the distinction
among properties of objects’ structures only becomes essential
to subjects when this distinction relates to the differentiation of
methods of actions. To put it another way, the relationship
represented in the way that elements are oriented toward one
another (the attraction versus the repulsion of poles) that is
general in our structures must be brought into accord with the
relationship of the actions themselves (flipping the magnets
versus turning them). The relationship between different actions
serves as a necessary component of the search for the sought-
after principle governing the construction of a given systematic
object (the direction of the arrow on the magnets represents the
way in which the fields are oriented toward one another), while
a particular property of the object itself (the placement of the
magnets) assigns significance to various methods of action.
Sign mediation of the object through action characterizes the
connection between methods of action and various types of
connections of elements. In this act, the action reaches the
sought-after object (it becomes “objectified”) and, reflecting
its meaning, it becomes object-related and reflective for the
subject. Two things are happening here: first, the subject is
viewing the change of the method of action as a way of
transforming the connections among elements in the given
object-related structure, and, second, the relationship among
the connections of elements that is general for the various
structures is discovered through the relationships among var-
ious methods of action.
The search for the organic connection between the transforma-
tion of a systematic object’s structure and the change of methods
of actions performed on elements of this structure is rather
complicated and involves a number of operations crucial to the

constructive and contentful analysis of this connection. The most
important among them are:
transformation of connections among the structure’s elements and

these elements’ systematization in order to identify the principle
governing its construction;
representation of the structure’s properties in object-related graphic
or sign models;
representation of the method of action and the changes to which the
actions will lead in graphic or sign models (the construction of
a schema of action); and
modeling of the connection between methods of action and changes
in the structure of the studied object.
This system of operations does more than define the mechanism

by which the object is mediated by the action. It serves as
evidence that, treating the object as a test particle for the con-
struction of the action, we incorporate it, now, not only as
a condition, but as a means of this change of method of action
(the method of action turns into a property of the object and vice
versa). In fact, the object turns into this sort of means every time
a newly constructed object-related structure fails to uncover the
sought-after relationship between elements and the changes repre-
sented in the object are insufficient for identifying its contentful
basis. In other words, the need to change the method of action
itself is already contained in the need to transform the object as
a precondition. This can only be achieved by “separating” the
method of action from the properties of the studied object, which
means that these methods have to be represented and modeled
using special sign tools.
A known criterion for measuring the development of children’s
cognitive activity is their ability to produce symbolic substitutes
for actions. J. Bruner has argued that a precondition for expres-
sing experience in language and for mental operations using this
experience with the help of language is children’s transformation
of their experience into a symbolic structure (Bruner 1973).
According to Bruner, children’s symbolization of experience

takes place through the classification (grouping) of objects
based on particular properties. For Jean Piaget, the formation of
symbolic constructions (symbolization associated with various
forms of imitation) depends on the particular dynamic governing
the development of the intellect’s operational structures for which
the criterion of development is the reversibility of operations.
Symbols are at work when a schema stands in for certain actions
and is then embodied in another action (Piazhe [Piaget] 1969). In
describing the various schemata of people’s manipulative move-
ments, Piaget demonstrated that in order to destroy such symbolic
constructions and for a symbol to be overcome by reality either
the position of another individual that is coordinated with the
person’s own perspective must be taken into consideration or
a special action immediately connected with a different situation
must occur.
In his definition of an action schema, Piaget did not relate it to
the constructive and contentful analysis of an object. In other
words, he did not view the search for a method through the
mediation of an object by an action. If a person’s search for the
relationship between the object-related and operational character-
istics of an action is identified as the main condition of contentful
analysis, it is important to consider the psychological features of
this process and understand that it is specifically this process that
defines the unique nature of the sign/symbol activity that emerges
in children, as well as of modeling as its central link.
Soviet psychology’s study of the role of signs and symbols in
human mental activity is closely associated with the works of L.S.
Vygotsky. It was Vygotsky who first addressed the sign’s function in
human mental development. He approached signs from the func-
tional perspective and believed they should be studied as a means of
mastering behavior. Vygotsky assigned symbolic activity “a specific
organizing function that penetrates the process of tool use and
produces fundamentally new forms of behavior” (Wertsch 1986,
75). Vygotsky defined a sign as follows: “We refer to the artificial
stimuli that people introduce into a psychological situation and that
perform the function of self-stimulation as signs…. According to
our definition, any artificially created conditional stimulus that is

a tool in mastering behavior — whether someone else’s or one’s
own — is a sign” (Vygotsky 1982–4, 78).
Vygotsky studied the role of sign mediation in the development
of memory, attention, and other higher mental functions within
the framework of cultural historical theory. He assigned a special
role to the study of meaning as the contentful aspect of speech
symbols: words. Vygotsky viewed meaning in the context of the
search for units for analyzing the mental; for him, meaning served
as the unity of communication and generalization, as a formation
relating both to speech and to thinking. The most interesting
findings relating to signs came from Vygotsky’s research into
the formation of scientific concepts in children. He conducted
this research in connection with criticism of N. Ach’s approach to
concept formation processes. Vygotsky expressed the opinion
that: “Even Ach, who made special studies of word meaning
and who first made the move toward overcoming associationism
in concept theory, was unable to go beyond a recognition that
determining tendencies were present alongside associative ten-
dencies in the process of concept formation” (Vygotsky 1987,
247). Vygotsky’s harsh criticism was provoked by the absence in
Ach’s works of objectivation of the process of concept formation.
These studies have done away with the mechanistic representa-
tion of concept formation once and for all. Nonetheless, they
have failed to reveal the actual genetic, functional, and structural
nature of this process. They have taken a common path in using
a purely teleological explanation of the higher functions. In
essence, they are reduced to the assertion that the goal itself
creates the corresponding goal-oriented activity through
a determining tendency. They are reduced to the assertion that
the solution is contained in the task itself. (Vygotsky 1987, 127)
Therefore, in developing a methodology for studying concept
formation in children (in collaboration with L.S. Sakharov),
Vygotsky attempted to overcome the approach he was criticizing.
Analysis, however, shows that Vygotsky associated the formation
of concepts with the use of the word as a symbol that merely
represents the features that characterized a concept. Furthermore,
the role of the sign was significantly limited, insofar as the use of
the word did not uncover the operational aspect of concept
formation, and he examined the sign only in its nominal function.
In studying the development of thinking, specifically the stages
over which children develop generalized actions, it is important
to remember that “the use of a system of verbal signs traces its
origin to the more generalized ‘symbolic’ function, whose
essence consists in the fact that representation of the real occurs
through various ‘signifiers’ that differ from the ‘signified’” (see
Losev 1968, 1982). As children become better socialized, their
“symbolic function” is replaced by mastery of signs and conse-
quently serves as a bridge to the mastery of speech.
Investigation into the genesis of symbolic function in children
is key factor to better understanding how the action of modeling
develops as the basis for the constructive and contentful analysis
of an object. As noted, such modeling is based on the mediation
of the object-related and operational characteristics of an action,
which ensures the connection between sensory and object-related
action and action with an object’s model. The task of the research
described here was to study types of modeling and the role of
sign/symbol tools in the process.
Types of modeling actions (Series 1 of experiments)
Magnetic Ring Method. Logical and object-related analysis

of problem solving using magnetic field interactions. The goal
of Series 1 of our experiments was to determine the means by which
children integrate conditions (elements) into pairs and construct
a system of connections between those conditions. We selected
rather well studied problems from the area of physical interactions
within a magnetic field. This specific type of problem was chosen
for our experimental situation because, for this class of phenomena,
linked pairs of opposing conditions and corresponding methods of
action can be simply identified. Furthermore, solving problems of
this type requires experimental subjects to form and then change
opposing conditions. For example, the nature of such opposite
phenomena as attraction and repulsion, insofar as they correspond
to opposite conditions for achieving them (a pair of identical poles
versus a pair of different poles), can be understood only by identify-

ing the relationships between the corresponding pairs of poles and
the type of phenomenon.
Our experiments used ceramic ring magnets. Each ring was
magnetized along an axis (the poles were on opposite parts of the
ring). The rings were black and had no markings. Turning over
any magnet ring changed their mutual orientation and, conse-
quently, the phenomenon of attraction versus repulsion.7
Analysis of the pairs of interconnected conditions offered
a path toward describing the laws governing the generalized
method for solving problems of this class. In our case, the method
subjects used to integrate the conditions into pairs allowed us to
identify three possible types of orientation under the conditions of
the problem’s content. Orientation Type 1 was characterized by
a failure to interconnect the conditions of action: both of the
object’s conditions were identified, but they were not integrated
with one another and remained isolated. Orientation Type 2 was
distinguished by the fact that, although subjects integrated the
object’s identified conditions, they did not explore the intercon-
nection in the relationship between them. For example, the fol-
lowing type of connections between conditions was possible: V1
→ V2 → V3 (in this series there was no mutual reversibility
between conditions). Orientation Type 3, which corresponded to
the content of the examined physical object, involved integration
of the conditions of action based on mutual opposition (for
example, V1 ↔ V2).
The research situation was built around the following four
groups of problems:
Group 1 (two rings)
Problem 1a. Two rings have been placed on the rod. What
happens if the upper ring is turned upside down?
Problem 1b. Two rings have been placed on the rod. What
happens if the lower ring is turned upside down?
Problem 1c. Two rings have been placed on the rod. What
happens if both rings are turned upside down?
Group 2 (three rings, flipping of the middle one)
Problem 2a (2b). Three rings have been placed on the rod.

What happens if the middle ring is turned upside down? (In
problems 2a and 2b, the three magnetic rings had a different
initial arrangement.)
Group 3 (three rings, removal of the middle one)
Problem 3a (3b, 3c). Three rings have been placed on the rod.
What happens if the middle ring is removed?
Group 4 (two rings, introduction of a middle one)
Problem 4a (4b). Two rings have been placed on the rod. What
happens if a middle ring is added?
Solving each group of problems required subjects to search for
the particular connection between the relative positions of rings
and the properties of the given phenomenon. In other words, the
solution involved a particular way of connecting the conditions/
elements into structures and then transforming them as an essen-
tial link in the process of constructing the action. Let us examine
the logical and object-related bases of the problem-solving
method for each group of problems from this perspective.
1. “A separate condition.” In order to solve Group 1 problems, subjects

had to discover at least one connection between the relatively posi-
tioned rings and the type of interaction (attraction or repulsion).
Identifying this simple condition enabled them to determine that
repulsion of the rings was associated with one type of ring position-
ing, while attraction required the opposite arrangement.
2. “A pair of ordered conditions.”To solve Group 2 problems, it was
sufficient to construct a series of connections between the relative
placement of rings and the properties of the phenomenon: to create
series of conditions. For example, in analyzing these situations, at
least one pair of conditions had to be identified. Depending on how
they were combined in relation to one another, there are four
possible corresponding series of phenomena, two in each series: a)
repulsion and repulsion, b) repulsion and attraction, c) attraction and
repulsion, and d) attraction and attraction. Each of the two phenom-
ena in a single series was inversely connected with the two other
phenomena through the operation of flipping the ring. For example,

by flipping the ring, the repulsion and repulsion sequence was
replaced by attraction and attraction.
It is exceptionally important that outwardly similar phenomena
occurred under opposite conditions. For example, in the “repulsion
and repulsion” pair of phenomena, there were two opposite condi-
tions (different directions of the magnetic field) that corresponded
to the outwardly identical relative placement of the rings (the rings
push apart). Therefore, unless the conditions under which corre-
sponding phenomena occur were given special consideration, the
properties of these phenomena acquired a purely superficial nature.
However, even a simple integration of the conditions into series
was sufficient to solve this group of problems.
3. “A pair of opposite conditions.” Group 3 and 4 problems were of
fundamental importance in studying the method of action common
to this class of phenomena. For example, by solving the “remove
a ring” and “add a ring” problems subjects were required to analyze
the entire system of connections among relatively placed rings and
the properties of phenomena, in other words, to create an integral
system of interconnected conditions. For example, when the third
ring was introduced, it was important to construct a system of
interconnected rings that enabled identification not only of the con-
nection between relatively placed rings, but also types of connec-
tions that the addition of a third ring could form. The systematization
of such connections by the children themselves provided a look at
how they solved the corresponding problems, in particular the fea-
tures of the process whereby two conditions were identified and the
basis for integrating them.
Results. First, third, fifth, seventh, and ninth graders were

tested individually using this method. One hundred children took
part in the study, 20 for each age group. Our evaluation of the
children’s actions in the experimental situation led to identification
of three main methods used to analyze the content of this class of
physical problem: natural-descriptive, operational, and content-
constructing. Each of these methods characterizes a particular type
of modeling action in the process of finding the object-related and
contentful basis for the given class of physical problem.
The natural-descriptive type of modeling consisted in deter-

mining that the relative arrangement of the rings corresponded to
the observed phenomenon. What made this type unique was the
way in which children performed separate isolated operations that
connected the given disposition of the rings with the observed
phenomenon (the identification of one condition). For example,
in solving Group 1 problems, children might flip one ring and
remark on the different disposition of the rings, compared with
how they had been. But the connection between the disposition of
the rings and the type of phenomenon remained beyond their
grasp. In solving Group 2 problems, these children did not see the
interaction of three rings as a whole and could not determine how
phenomena were interconnected. When they flipped the middle
ring, they pointed only to the change of one of the two phenom-
ena and “kept forgetting” about the other. They often described
phenomena with statements such as the following: “they’re hang-
ing here because those are the sides,” “because here the magnet
air moves the ring,” “this side is sticky, and that one isn’t.” The
work of these children thus consisted in describing observed
phenomena without discovering the connections between them.
Children using the operational type of modeling action estab-
lished the series of connections between the relative arrangements
of rings and the type of phenomenon without seeing the opposite
relationships of these connections. These children had little trou-
ble solving Group 1 and 2 problems. An important feature of this
way of working was the “flip the ring” operation, changing
a specific pair of a phenomenon to its opposite pair. This was
accompanied by comments such as: “here and here they pull
toward one another, and now, when you flip it, they push one
another away” or “the similar ones pull toward one another, and
the different ones push each other away, and now, the opposite.”
However, since these children did not see the oppositeness of
conditions when they provoked phenomena, they had difficulty
solving Group 3 and 4 problems. For example, they could not
construct the new connections between conditions needed to
integrate two possible types of solutions to the Group 4 problems.
This is why they often performed the corresponding procedure

before giving their answers, only then explaining their result.
It should be noted that children used specific utterances that
helped them interpret the unique nature of the phenomena they
were observing. Using, as a rule, two signs, usually “+” and “–,”
they constructed sequences such as (“+” and “–“), (“–“ and “+”),
(“+” and “–“) and so forth (the parentheses show that two signs
belong to the same ring). The combination of signs within a series
allowed the children to describe certain types of phenomena: for
example, the sequence of the pair of signs “–“ and “–“ meant that
the rings repel one another, and the signs “+” and “–“ meant that
the rings attracted one another. This interpretation was not fun-
damentally different from the analogous combinations of corre-
sponding pairs of words. Common to both sequences was the
bringing together of their components without noticing their
inherent oppositeness.
Children using the content-constructing type of modeling
action constructed pairs of conditions that were interconnected
by their oppositeness. In other words, the main feature of the
modeling was the systematization of pairs not based solely on the
fact that they were next to each other, but also because they were
one another’s opposites. This essentially changed the children’s
method of orientation and the experimental situation: instead of
isolated conditions, the children created an integral and closed
system of connections (such as “+” ↔ “–”/↔/“– ”↔ “+” ↔
“+”↔ “–”), where the bidirectional arrows represent the oppo-
siteness of conditions within a pair and between pairs. Within this
closed whole the entire multifacetedness of phenomena encoun-
tered by the children as they solved the problem became concrete.
For example, when solving Group 3 and 4 problems, these
children specially constructed a system of connections between
the relative disposition of rings and the type of phenomenon. In
other words, they created a system of interconnected conditions.
Children’s study of the connections between conditions within
a pair and among pairs essentially changed the content of the
“flip the ring” operation. While in the previous case performing
this operation reciprocally connected opposite properties of
physical phenomena, using content-constructing modeling and

the “flip the ring” operation, the very conditions for achieving
physical interactions were transformed. This was seen in chil-
dren’s performance of two simultaneously opposite operations
that were closed in nature. The closed “back and forth flip” trial
was typical. In Problem 1c, children did not turn the rings upside
down one after another but arrived at their answers either by
flipping the two rings simultaneously (usually using both hands),
or by turning the entire construction upside down.
Depending on age, the role of the natural-descriptive type of
modeling action in the process of solving this class of problems
tended to be reduced over the course of learning and the opera-
tional type emerged. A critical transition point from one type to
the other came during the third to fifth year of school.
Our results further suggest that only two types of modeling
actions underwent essential change over the learning process: the
natural-descriptive and operational types. Children’s content-
constructing type of modeling action was specific. As experi-
ments to study content-constructing analysis have shown, it has
not been sufficiently developed in the learning process, although
the signs of these actions have been seen as early as the first years
of school (2–3 percent). This fact, which has its roots in current
methods of classroom instruction, requires special validation. It is
evidence that fundamental reflective-theoretical thinking in the
area of physics is being poorly developed. Current methods
realize the rational-empirical type of thinking.
Our results paved the way toward further investigation of the
essential difference between operational and content-constructing
methods for analyzing an object. This difference was also con-
firmed by a special study comparing the ways in which children
performed Piaget’s famous class-inclusion task and tasks based
on connecting elements and transforming structures used in the
Magnetic Rings experiments. This comparison found that the
same children who exhibited Types 2 and 3 modeling were also
able to perform Piaget’s task. Children with Type 1 modeling
could not complete this task (the Piaget phenomenon). Piaget’s
description of the stages over which intellectual structures
develop was generally confirmed by our results. In particular, just

as the Piaget phenomenon disappeared with age, in much the
same way Types 2 and 3 modeling emerged — the very types that
do not coincide with the phenomenon.
We have also discovered the difference between the content-
constructing method of object analysis and the operational
method described by Piaget. For the operational method, coordi-
nation of actions is not determined by the object-related content
of the studied object; this coordination comes from the reversi-
bility of the operation within the limits of the corresponding
operational structure. The identification, retention, and modeling
of a certain relationship reflected in the content that essentially
determines how performed actions are coordinated makes
content-constructing object analysis unique. Furthermore, this
original contentful property of a given systematic object is estab-
lished through analysis of the general principle of the object’s
construction. In such analysis, people are guided not by the
relationship of properties of the part to the whole, but by the
relationship of properties of the whole to the whole. This con-
firmed the viewpoint that the described difference between opera-
tional (Piaget’s research) and object-related and contentful
methods of object analysis is fundamental. The object-related
and contentful analysis method is based on the transformation
of structures of connected elements (the passageways from struc-
ture to structure) and the derivation of the properties of these
elements depending on the identified content. The process of
transforming structures reveals the need to model the connection
of structures’ relationship and corresponding changes to the
method of action.
Psychological features of modeling action based on using sign/

symbol tools (Series 2 of experiments)
Our findings allow for a fresh look at the problem of how the
sign/symbol function emerges and develops in children. This
problem takes on new resonance in conjunction with investiga-
tion into the features of the modeling action that takes place as
part of the search for the content of a studied object. If we believe

that modeling constitutes an internal condition of content-
constructing analysis and consists in a person’s construction of
possible methods of action, it is reasonable to raise the question
of the tools used in the modeling of an action. Results suggest
that the action of modeling depends on the formation of special
signs representing operations and the construction, using these
signs as a basis, of holistic schemata of the action being con-
structed. In relation to action, a schema is nothing short of
a possible “plan” for the object’s future transformations. In rela-
tion to the object, it is a tool for describing the diversity of its
various aspects and properties. This supposition, which makes up
the second part of our hypothesis, was specially tested in Series 2
of our experiments.
Series 2 (carried out in collaboration with G.M. Markina)
studied the role of sign schemata in forming children’s object-
related and contentful methods of modeling. This series of experi-
ments demonstrated the functional role of children’s sign/symbol
activity in assimilating the content of the concept of magnetic
interaction.
Method. Our experiments included two stages. The goal of the
first stage was to introduce children to the content of the given
concept by having them solve certain physics problems. This was
the formative portion of the experiment. The second stage was the
research portion. On one hand, it integrated the results of the pre-
vious stage and, on the other, had a purpose of its own.
Children from first grade (age 7–8), third grade (age 9–10),
and seventh grade (age 13–14) took part in these experiments, 20
children from each age group.
This series also used ceramic ring magnets. Special signs were
marked to signify a full set of operations.
Stage 1. The first stage of the study consisted of an intro-
ductory series and two learning series. The goal of the introduc-
tory series was to familiarize children with the properties of
magnets and provide an understanding of how like and unlike
poles interact. Children were given a construction consisting of
four or five ring magnets (the object). In the first exercise, the
experimenter gave the object a certain initial state, arranging the
rings, for example, at a distance from one another (repulsion).
Children were asked to perform a series of transformations: to
turn one of the rings, to rearrange them or remove one, and so
forth. In the second exercise, the experimenter used drawings on
a sheet of paper to show a sequence of different states of an
object made up of magnets and asked the child to reproduce
these states, using drawings of magnets as if they were real
magnets. Children were then given a card on which the trans-
formations were marked using graphic signs.
Learning Series 1. The Series 1 schematic problems can be
represented as follows:
Figure 1. Children’s operation with two sets of ceramic ring magnets

(4–5 magnets in each).
Here, Object 1 and Object 2 are the states of the magnetic

structures connected by an operation. We introduced two opera-
tions into this learning series’ problems. The first series consisted
of two sub-series — A and B — which differed in terms of the
conditions of the problems used, specifically the unknown that
had to be found.
In Sub-Series A, the unknown (X) was Object 2. The general
schema of Sub-Series A problems took the following form:
Figure 2. Sub-Series A – Unknown object 2.

In the problems of Sub-Series B, the unknown that had to be

found was a certain operation. The general schema of Sub-Series
B therefore took the following form:
Figure 3. Sub-Series B – Unknown necessary operation with two

objects (set of magnets).
The experimenter gave all the problems to children on

cards, always formulating the problem orally as well. For
example, in Sub-Series A: “Draw the stack of magnets (an
object) that we would get if we perform the following opera-
tion”; or in Sub-Series B: “Figure out the operation that
connects two magnet stacks (objects). Mark it with a sign.”
Children were able to perform an assignment once they man-
aged to clarify its essence. When children were unable to
solve a problem, the exercise was explained a second time
and they were allowed to use real magnets to solve it.
Analysis showed the importance of distinguishing between the
following moments in the problem-solving process:
a) The type of operation (flipping, rearranging, removing, adding)

that either served as the unknown or that had to be performed in
order to find the unknown state of the object;
b) The element (magnet) with which the operation had to be per-
formed. For example, asking children to perform a flipping opera-
tion on the top magnet (1) transformed only one connection,
whereas flipping the middle magnet transformed two connections.
Let us take a closer look at the tasks involved in each operation.

Flip operation. In solving problems involving this operation, it
was important to take into account the fact that the properties of the
interacting magnets changed to their opposites; therefore, the spatial
structure of the object always changed. Furthermore, when the upper
or lower magnet was flipped, only one connection was transformed,

whereas flipping the middle magnet transformed two connections.
Rearrangement operation. When solving this class of pro-
blem, children had to take into account that it did not involve
a single change of poles (to their opposites). Solving these pro-
blems required determining the entire system of mutual orientation
in the construction of the depicted magnets. For example, if we
moved the top magnet (1), they had to take into account the pole of
the lower magnet (3), and, correspondingly, the pole of the top
magnet (1). If we moved the middle magnet (2), we had to take
into account the pole of the moved magnet and the orientation of
the other magnetic rings.
Removal operation. This problem consisted in reconstructing
the object’s structure by changing the number of elements. It
required taking into account (when the middle magnet was removed)
the orientation of the magnet rings within the construction.
Insertion operation. Since this problem consisted in incorpor-
ating an element into a connection formed by other elements of the
system, it was necessary to construct a hypothesis about the various
states of the object that would be achieved, which were dependent
which way the magnet incorporated into the object was facing.
Solving this problem required a hypothesis about the particular
orientation of the magnet rings relative to one another, but it was
also important not so much to determine the polarity of the con-
struction’s magnets as to correlate the elements’ possible orientations
within this construction and in the inserted magnet; furthermore, it
was those magnets that were going to form a connection in the
construction of the new object that had to be correlated.
The task in Sub-Series B generally amounted to determining
the unknown operation corresponding to the change of magnetic
interactions. Finding the unknown operation required correlating
two states of the object inherent in the problem’s conditions,
identifying the qualitative change in connections (the mutual
orientation of the magnetic rings), and determining what opera-
tion could achieve these changes. For some problems it was
permissible to give several possible series of operations.
Learning Series 2. Learning Series 2 differed from the first

series in terms of the conditions of the assigned tasks. While in the
first series children solved problems where there were only two
objects in the conditions and consequently one operation, the pro-
blems of Series 2 included more than two objects and consequently
more operations.
Learning Series 2 also consisted of two sub-series: A and B.
In Sub-Series A, the children’s task was to put in the operations
that would bring about the given changes to the objects’ states.
The general schema of the Sub-Series A problems can be
represented as follows:
Figure 4. Stage 2: Sub-Series A – Operations leading to corresponding

states of three objects.
In this series, there therefore appeared sequential chains of

objects and operations.
In Sub-Series B the children’s task was to reconstruct objects’
states based on the operations represented. The schema appeared
as follows:
Figure 5. Stage 2: Sub-Series B – Reconstructing state of objects

starting from demonstrated operations.
Solving these problems consisted in making the chain of the

objects states accord with the represented operations.
For example, a sequence of operations was presented in the
following form:
Figure 6. Child’s solution of task starting from selected initial state.
Since it was not indicated in the problem’s conditions on

which magnet the operations were to be performed, this was
determined by the child, and the problem solving began with
the selection of an initial state.
Analysis of Learning Series 1. Our experimental findings led
us to divide the children into three groups based on how they solved
these problems.
The first group of children relied on the actual magnets to
solve these problems and the magnets were oriented toward the
experimenter’s monitoring of their actions. The children in this
group introduced additional signifiers (markings) into the pro-
blem’s conditions. However, these markings did not serve as
tools to facilitate the problem-solving process. Instead, they
served to illustrate the problem’s solution.
The second group of children actively introduced additional
markings into the problem’s conditions. These markings were
used to denote the magnets’ various orientations. Relying on
these tools, they finished drawing out the problem’s conditions,
which helped them come up with a correct solution.
The third group of children solved the problems without using
additional markings to represent the magnets’ orientation.
Furthermore, they offered explanations for each problem solved.
A typical explanation was given by Sergei O., age 7: “In this
problem you have to flip the magnet. What happens when you
flip it? The magnet turns to the other side. That means that on the
drawing it will all be backward. While the magnets used to stick
together, now they become unstuck.” The children in this third
group illustrated their solutions with additional graphic signs, but
only after they had drawn out the answer. These illustrations were
probably intended as an explanation to the experimenter. The sign
tools the children used were not always suitable for all the
problems in this series. The children used additional markings for

some problems involving rearrangement of the magnets.
Sixty children from different age groups were tested using this
methodology. Our results show the following breakdown by age
for children’s assimilation of the concept of magnetic interaction.
Grade 1 (age 7–8). Children of this age were able to solve the
problems. First graders had significant trouble solving problems
where the middle magnet was inverted or where the magnets
were rearranged. A large proportion of first graders fell into our
first two categories.
Grade 3 (age 9–10). Third grades successfully solved these
problems. The problems involving the magnets’ rearrangement
presented them with some difficulty. Most third graders fell into
the third group.
Grade 7 (age 13–14). Seventh graders successfully solved the
problems. They made up the majority of the third category.
Stage 2. The second stage of the study comprised one third of
the learning series. As mentioned, this series integrated, on one
hand, the results of the two preceding learning series and, on the
other, had an independent significance. The following situation was
used in the first and second learning series: the sign-based form of
the problem presented to the children contained within it the condi-
tions and result of the problem’s solution; in the third series, how-
ever, the process by which a certain original relationship was
identified in the structure of the object was modeled. This was
made possible by introducing a special problem into the experiment
featuring a quadrangle whose sides consisted of transition arrows.
Every arrow pointed to a special unit — a “transformation.” It began
with an object (a construction made of magnets) and ended with an
object (the corners of the quadrangle), and the transition from one
object to another was realized through an operation that was given as
part of the problem’s conditions. The objects served as the
unknowns.
Subjects were given the following problem: “Design a system
of objects in accordance with the given diagram of operations.
The objects have to be put in the corners of the quadrangle.”
What made this problem special? Remember: the problems

from Learning Series 1 and 2 took the following form:
The unknown here was either an object (or objects) or an
operation (or operations). The characteristic feature of these pro-
blems was the linear method by which the objects and operations
were connected.
The Series 3 problem was constructed so that the operations
formed a closed cycle, rather than being connected linearly. Let
us assume that it is necessary to perform two operations — c and
d — in sequence (one after another) and that they are unknown,
and it is also necessary to construct Objects E and B. The initial
state has been arbitrarily selected (Object A) and Operation c has
been performed to result in Object E. Now Object E and
Operation d, which we known, have explicitly defined Object
B. But this would have been the case had Operation g, which
connects Object A and Object B, not been part of the original
conditions. In other words, the two sequential operations, c and d,
as a result of which it was possible to go from Object A to Object
B through the intermediate state E, could be substituted for by
a third operation, g. In carrying out this operation, children could
get from Object A to Object B while avoiding this intermediate
object. Taking this circumstance into consideration was of funda-
mental importance for solving this problem. Essentially,
Operation g was a diagonal across the quadrangle and the base
of the two triangles AEB and ACB that form this quadrangle.
It is also crucial that solving the problem required an under-
standing of the connection between objects (the construction of
magnets) and the performance of a pair (or three) operations (see
points A and B). For example, one and the same stack could be
the result of two different operations originating out of different
points on the quadrangle. There were “dual” operations, such as
“removal” and “insertion.”
Yet, another crucial point, one that was also relevant to the
previous learning series, was that the operation always related to
one magnet that, when changed, changed the connection in the
entire object, such as rearrangement, flipping, and inserting. But,
in this problem, operations were not rigidly fixed. This meant,
first and foremost, that operations and the operational units (the
magnets) were correlated with one another.
Results. The findings from Series 2 of our experiments also
identified three groups of children distinguished by different ways of
solving problems of this class. In characterizing these groups below,
we will pay special attention to children’s development of the ability
to identify and understand the sign relationship within a system of
operations and objects.
Group 1. It took the children in this group a long time to
understand the problem’s conditions. In some cases, children pro-
posed drawing constructions with an equal number of magnets in all
four corners of the quadrangle. They started solving the problem by
arbitrarily choosing an object in one of the corners of the quadrangle
and then performing separate operations to achieve certain states.
However, since the problem did not assign the direction of move-
ment (the arrows could come together at a single point), the solution
was an enumeration of possible operations with the magnets. This
problem-solving method could be diagrammed as a chain, with one
object represented and an operation performed on it, followed by
another object and another operation. In other words, the problem’s
conditions were gone through one after another.
The problem was solved on paper. Children added additional
markings into the problem’s conditions in an attempt to indicate
the sequence represented by the quadrangle.
The following are examples of statements from this group:
Filipp I. (age 7) picked up a pen and filled in the problem’s
conditions as follows: “From this point I’ll first go here, and
then to another point, and then to a third point. Oh! But here
two arrows come together.”
Experimenter: “But two arrows came together before too”

(points to a corner where a removal operation and an insertion
operation came together).
Filipp: “That doesn’t count. First, we’ll do one operation, to put

them in order, and then another.”
Experimenter: “How many magnet constructions will you have

in this corner?” (points to a corner where a removal operation
and an insertion operation converged and then diverged).
Filipp: “There will be two stacks. We’ll add to one and take
away magnets from the other.”
This exchange suggests that the child’s attempt to come up with

a sequence for the quadrangle’s sides was driven by a particular
understanding of the end result. For this group, with each opera-
tion, the children reconstructed a separate magnet construction.
Furthermore, these children’s problem solving largely relied on
feedback from the experimenter.
In summary, this group of children was focused on establishing
the order of operations. These children often put the result of an
individual operation on the diagram of actions without identifying
the connections between operations. This led to a situation where
the children focused on individual operations and failed to iden-
tify transformation as a unit of the problem. They attempted to
solve the problem by enumerating possible versions and repre-
senting conditions one after another.
Group 2. The children in this group substituted numbers for the
problems’ conditions. After the problem was presented, they would
identify the corner of the quadrangle where the object had the largest
number of elements (magnets). The following examples are
illustrative.
Maxim M. (age 14) exhibited the following reasoning in sol-
ving the problem: “Solving the problem means constructing
stacks of magnets. What operations do we have here? Flip,
rearrangement, removal, insertion. The operations are different
in that different things are changed in the stacks of magnets:
some change the number of magnets, others, their composition.
So, you have to find the corner of the quadrangle where the
number of magnets changes. Let’s looks at all the corners. Here
[Maxim points to a corner where the removal operation and the
insertion operation converge and diverge], we insert a magnet
at this point, and going back, we remove one. So, there are
more magnets at this point than at the others. Let’s say that the
stack consists of four magnets. We take away the magnet to the
left and below, so there will be three magnets in each spot. In

the last series there are also three magnets, since flipping
magnets doesn’t change the number.”
After going through this reasoning, he drew the corresponding

solution.
An analysis of this group of subjects’ actions showed that their
problem solving involved substituting the number of magnets for
the problems’ conditions. This number was arrived at by compar-
ing and analyzing operations and represented the operation’s
relationship to the object, which consisted in the fact that the
operation always somehow changed the object. If it was
a flipping operation, the spatial disposition of the object’s ele-
ments changed; if it was an insertion operation, there was always
a change in the number of the object’s magnets, and so forth. By
analyzing the problem’s conditions in this way, the children
determined the original transformation, which consisted in the
object’s state and the operation that could be used to achieve it.
Group 3. The children from this group solved the problem by
independently placing stacks of magnets on the end of the quad-
rangle’s diagonal. They then moved the magnets along the diagonal
and used them to lay out two structures. After moving the magnets in
this way, they had no trouble completing construction of the
quadrangle.
What was behind moving the magnets along the diagonal, and
what did this movement contribute to the problem solving?
Identifying the diagonal and placing the objects on it were
some of the most important steps in solving this problem. By
placing the magnets on the diagonal, these children were making
their way toward contentful analysis of the diagram’s principles.
Identifying the diagonal gave the children two planes of action:
on one hand, the plane of identifying the basis of the schema (the
diagonal), and on the other, by identifying this basis, the plane of
determining the properties of this whole.
These children identified the essential properties through
a special action: “the action of reading the diagram.” Our findings
indicate that this consisted in understanding that the objects were
placed along the diagonal and then moving them. They thereby
established that objects could be made the same by performing
operations on them. Through this action, the children identified
the unit of analysis of this diagram: a transformation consisting of
“the object’s state” plus “an operation.” What set the Group 3
children apart was a way of organizing their work that allowed
them to identify the whole in this problem.
The same 60 children belonging to different age groups took
part in this series of experiments. The overall development of the
sign relationship based on using a schema of action broke down
by age as follows.
Grade 1 (age 7–8). At this age, not all of the children were able
to solve this problem. Some of the children were unable to
understand the problem’s conditions. For example, they were
not able to construct a system of objects that included all the
necessary operations. For each operation, the children drew their
own constructions of magnets.
Other first graders did manage to solve this problem. This
portion of the first graders could be included in Group 1: they
typically determined the technique for transforming conditions
one at a time. In first graders, this method resembled trial and
error: they kept correcting the systems of objects they created
until they accorded with the problem’s conditions. Their opera-
tional schema was like a chain made up of a large number of
moves and attempts at solutions, as well as failed attempts to
arrange the objects.
Grade 3 (age 9–10). The third graders successfully managed to
solve this problem. This is the age at which the third type of
children’s ability to relate sign to action first appears. Some third
graders fell in Group 1. These children typically needed fewer
steps and fewer attempts at arranging the objects.
In discussing this age group, we would particularly like to
mention one method of problem solving that was encountered
only among third graders and only in two cases. It consisting in
identifying an object with three connections (these children identi-
fied and specially analyzed the number of connections). After
determining this object (the object was located either at the bottom
or the top of the quadrangle’s diagonal), these children carried out

all designated operations, and then just put the object together. In
this case, the problem was solved rather quickly. As a rule, the third
graders successfully managed to solve this problem.
Grade 7 (age 13–14). All children of this age successfully
solved this problem. Seventh graders typically exhibited
the second type of sign relationship to their action.
Furthermore, this group was made up of children who were
doing well in mathematics.
Overall, this study supports the conclusion that using special
sign tools (action schemata) provides for the construction of an
action during the early stages of object analysis. These schemata
were used to identify essential properties and relationships of the
studied object, and object-related and operational characteristics
of action were substituted for one another.
Chapter 2: Conceptual Image in Problem Solving

When analyzing thinking’s symbolic function, it is impossible to
sidestep the relationship between sign, significance, and the sig-
nified, a topic to which numerous works have been devoted at the
juncture between philosophy and psychology (Bruner 1973;
Brushlinskii 1970; Vygotsky 1982 –4; Galperin 1957; Gamezo
1977). This chapter addresses a problem that A.N. Leontiev has
called “a stumbling block for the psychological analysis of con-
sciousness” (Leontiev 2005, 19), one that is associated with the
development of meanings in the individual consciousness and
their relationship with the objective world. This relationship is
not trivial, since, as Leontiev has rightly remarked,
Although in their abstraction, in their “super-individualness,”
meanings are indifferent to the forms of sensibility through
which the world is revealed to a specific subject (one could
say that meanings in and of themselves are devoid of sensi-
bility), their function in the realization of its actual vital con-
nections by necessity presume their reference to sensory
input… Of course, the sensory-objective reference of meanings
in the consciousness of a subject is not necessarily direct; it can
take the shape of a chain of compressed cognitive operations of
any level of complexity — especially when meanings reflect

reality that appears only in its most distant, oblique forms.
(Leontiev 2005, 21–22)
The problem of the relationship between meaning and object is
the problem of a subject’s understanding of an object’s content.
Indeed, only when people separate themselves from nature to
some degree and have adopted a particular viewpoint and attitude
toward the object can we describe this as specifically human
understanding of an object. As A.F. Losev emphasizes:
Only then, [objects] will actually signify something real for
[people], only then will the living, vital relationship to objects
be added to the objective, indifferent, and dispassionate repro-
duction of objects in scientific thinking… . As a result of this
semantic act, a special analog of the understood object also
emerges, specifically a sememe that will prove to be not just
a sensory image, as a result of indifferent reproduction, and not
just a concept, as a result of an exceptionally reflective and
comprehensive generalization of the reproduced and under-
stood object. (Losev 1982, 15)
A similar position is held by M.S. Shekhter, who has analyzed the
figurative components of verbal thought. He warns against ignor-
ing the elements of knowledge that are crucial to explaining the
mechanism of actions with signs. This includes, first, non-sign
elements and, second, non-visual or sensorial images of objects.
Shekhter introduces such terms as “the image of the object” and,
especially as regards assimilation of the features of concepts, the
term “conceptual image” to signify such elements (Shekhter
1959). We will also use this term in discussing the thoughts
previoiusly outlined.8
In order to study the unique features of the conceptual images
that form in learners as they assimilate scientific knowledge, we
have developed a system of problems (drawing on the field of
physics) that reproduces the content of knowledge in an appro-
priate system of cognitive learning actions. The problems’ typol-
ogy was designed based on logical and object-related analysis of
the structure of scientific theory that was conducted in accordance
with ideas about the content of physical knowledge developed by
Soviet philosophy and psychology (Arsen’ev, Bibler, and Kedrov

1967; Kedrov et al. 1962; Kopnin and Popovich 1967; Tavanets
and Shvyrev 1962). In particular, we have relied on an analysis of
the structure of scientific theory conducted by I.V. Kuznetsov
(Kuznetsov 1967), which identified the foundation and core of
physics theory that constitute its primary elements. Kuznetsov
lists as belonging to the theory’s foundation:
The empirical basis incorporates the totality of the most essential

facts that make the creation of a theory not only possible but also
necessary. These facts are accordingly generalized and
systematized.
The idealized object is that “in specific form embodies within itself
the innermost features of the essence and the specific nature of the
studied area of phenomena and its way of functioning — its most
general law” (Kuznetsov 1967, 88). In terms of its significance, the
idealized object plays the role of the fundamental idea on which
the entire edifice of the theory rests; it becomes the mediating link
that joins the empirical basis to the totality of new concepts.
The system of fundamental concepts is each a characteristic of
a particular property of the idealized object. These characteristics
are the essence of physical magnitude. Both the rules for relating
physical magnitudes to experimental data (measurement proce-
dures) and the rules governing actions performed on physical
magnitudes (logical calculus) are brought into alignment with the
system of fundamental concepts.
Kuznetsov lists as belonging to physics theory’s core the system

of laws (equations) defining the connections among and change
of fundamental magnitudes, the totality of symmetry principles
(groups), the laws governing connections between new and old
theories, and world constants (characteristic parameters). He
believes the main structural element of the theory’s core to be
the system of equations that expresses “specific laws of motion,
ways of functioning, and the forms of activity of the idealized
object that constitute the foundation of a given theoretical sys-
tem” (Kuznetsov 1967, 90). Meanwhile, it is important to under-
score the interplay between object and law: equations lead to
a more detailed elaboration of the idealized object and can even

lead to its replacement. Building a theory up to its “top floors” —
the reproduction of the concrete in concepts, the link with objec-
tive reality — stimulates the re-examination of starting assump-
tions, the expansion of the empirical basis, and replacement of the
ideal object.
While researchers may differ in their approaches to discovering
the structure of scientific knowledge, there is a certain unity of
views in how they describe the so-called “macro-structure” of
theory. In our opinion, G.P. Dishkant, using the example of
mechanics, has best concentrated the original, basal, essential
components of theory (Dishkant 1965). Among them he includes
the natural phenomenon, the model of a phenomenon, and the
corresponding formal system proposition. Dishkant has also
examined the process of cognition as combining two primary
methods: abstraction and concretization. Abstraction is realized
in the process of analyzing the natural phenomenon, the building
of a model of a phenomenon (the action of schematization), and
the appropriate formal proposition (the action of conception). The
opposite process of concretization is associated with the model
interpretation of certain formal system propositions and the sub-
sequent representation of the derived model in a phenomenon
(the action of realization).
Within pedagogical-psychological research, a great deal of atten-
tion is paid to the relationship between what is taught in the
classroom and scientific knowledge: the problem of reflecting the
logic and structure of scientific-theoretical knowledge in the struc-
ture of learning activity. As V.V. Davydov has written: “Each
school subject is a unique projection of a given ‘higher’ form of
social consciousness (science, art, morality, law) onto the plane of
assimilation. The laws governing this projection are determined by
the goals of education, by the features of the assimilation process
itself, by the character and potentials of the school children’s
psychical activity, and by other factors” (Davydov 2008, 137).
In this projection process, it is essential that the “macro-
structure” of scientific theory be preserved and that the following
three main planes on which knowledge is represented should be
taken into account in teaching and testing: the object-related,

model-image, and sign planes.9
On the object-related plane, objects’ and phenomena’s external
aspects — their features, properties, and unique qualities — are
detected using the tools of science: reality is reflected, but
a special reality that has been culturally transformed and become
an object of science. The model-image plane is where the internal,
essential, and necessary laws governing objects and phenomena find
their reflection. It is important to bear in mind the two contradictory
aspects of this way of presenting knowledge in the learning process.
As it relates to science, it is the totality of models, laws, principles,
and so forth (all the components of theory that form its “core”). As it
relates to learning activity on the model-image plane, it is the
subjective characteristics of the knowledge taking shape in children
(conceptual images, ideal constructions, etc.) that develop and
become consolidated. These internal patterns, as they are refracted
through the concrete conditions in which objects and phenomena
exist, are formulated in various ways in “linguistic” constructions
and constitute a special sign plane.10
Teaching must deploy a detailed system of cognitive learning
actions that include:
1. Actions that translate an object-related form of description for

objects and phenomena into a model-based form (an R → M type
of movement);11
2. Actions that translate model-based conceptions onto the object-
related plane (an M → R type of movement);
3. Actions that translate an object-related form of description into
a sign- or graphic-based form (an R → (M) → S type of movement).
This movement is mediated by model conceptions, since there are no
normatively prescribed ways of connecting the object-related and
sign planes without treating them as scientific models;
4. Actions that move sign or graphic constructions onto the object-
related plane (an S → (M) → R type of movement). This movement
is also mediated by model conceptions.
The typology of object-related problems was informed by con-
ceptions of the structure of scientific knowledge and an
appropriate system of cognitive learning actions. The types of

problems varied depending on the particular components of the
structure of scientific knowledge and on the ways in which they
were to be correlated and transformed. The typology of problems
developed reflected the logic governing movement between the
elements of this structure, and the process of solving them was
provided for by the described cognitive learning actions. The
typology of the object-related problems described in the follow-
ing was realized using the content of a classroom physics course.
Problem Type 1 (corresponding to the R ↔ M type of move-
ment). The conditions of this type of problem involved the assignment
of reality or model conceptions, or a combined definition of both (the
formal apparatus of the theory was not used). This type included problems
requiring that a given phenomenon (the object) be related to a model;
requiring the classification of phenomena based on one or several justi-
fications; requiring the qualitative planning of a solution (without using
sign constructions); and requiring the construction of a reality appropriate
to given model conceptions (including under conditions where limitations
were placed on the tools and method of construction).
Problem Type 2 (corresponding to the R ← (M) → R type of

movement). This type required a transformation (correlation) of
reality where this transformation was mediated by clearly non-given
model conceptions.
Problem Type 3 (corresponding to the R ← (M) → S type of

movement). This type involved the assignment of reality, or of a sign
form for describing it, or both in combination. Included in this type of
problem were those requiring a sign (graphic) description of reality
(including requiring the symbolization of conditions, the planning of
a solution using sign constructions); requiring the construction of reality
appropriate to the given sign structures (including under conditions
where there were additional limitations on the tools and methods of
construction); requiring the correlation of reality and a sign form for
describing it (analysis of the answer, search for errors in the solution,
and so forth).
Problem Type 4 (corresponding to the R ← (S ↔ S’) → O’

type of movement). This type of problem required
a transformation (correlation) of reality appropriate to the given
transformation (correlation) of the sign structures.
Problem Type 5 (corresponding to the S ← (R ↔ R’) → S’
type of movement). This type involved the need for
a transformation (correlation) of sign structures appropriate to the
given transformation (correlation) of reality.
Method and Experimental Protocol. In the process of indi-
vidual testing, subjects, one by one, were given diagnostic pro-
blems of various types based on material from physics. The
problem-solving process was recorded, including the experimen-
ter’s questions clarifying the method being used to solve the
problem and whatever was said by the subjects. Thirty eighth
graders and 30 tenth graders from Moscow’s Schools No. 91 and
605 participated in the experiments, along with 5 students from
post-secondary institutions in Moscow. The experiments were
designed to uncover the strategy used to solve the described
types of problems. These strategies differed in terms of the make-
up and features of the actions performed by the subjects. This
information was used to draw a conclusion about the connection
between the quality of subjects’ knowledge and how well formed
their cognitive learning actions were, as well as the features of the
conceptual images that facilitated the problem-solving process.
Results. The evidence collected in the course of individual
testing led us to divide the subjects into five groups based on how
well formed their cognitive learning actions were and, consequently,
the way in which they acquired knowledge. A connection between
the way knowledge was acquired and the functional purpose of the
subjective conceptual image was also discovered.
Group 1 subjects were unable to solve the problems assigned
them and often refused to try. These subjects’ attempts to solve
individual problems were primarily manipulative in nature, as
manifested in their lack of consistency when working on pro-
blems of the same type. The necessary cognitive learning actions
turned out not to have formed in these students, and they lacked
appropriate conceptual images. For example, when working on

assignments requiring them to match situations to a model, they
selected as their starting point for analysis features that were
external in relation to the content of the objects or phenomena,
and they changed features arbitrarily. These students came up
with arbitrary relationships between a situation and a particular
type without any clearly identifiable grounds for this classifica-
tion. When these subjects were given analogous problems, they
changed their problem solving and were unable to explain their
actions. Solving construction problems, they worked on the pro-
blem in a manipulative manner, formally reflecting the conditions
in the drawing. When correlating (transforming) situations, they
worked with external features and thoughtlessly changed them as
they moved from one problem to another (even if the problems
could be solved in the exact same way). They were unable to
handle assignments based on symbolization of conditions and
planning of solutions.
Group 2 subjects were also unable to complete the assignment,
but the errors they made were consistent, which showed that their
actions were not manipulative. These students demonstrated
a low level of cognitive learning action formation, and the actions
connecting physical objects and sign structures were performed
without the use of model conceptions. They were unable to
identify the content of this studied reality or to reflect it using
the corresponding sign constructions, and when dealing with
conceptual images they equated a sign and the reality it repre-
sented. In other words, for these children, reality was reflected
naturally (“was copied”), and the conceptual image served the
function of a natural substitute. For example, when solving con-
struction problems, instead of constructing they reproduced situa-
tions familiar to them from past experience, and they were not
able to correlate the pictures they were given with the system’s
conditions. These subjects did not complete assignments invol-
ving a complex system of limitations, and they had trouble with
assignments requiring the symbolization of conditions and the
planning of the solution; only in cases where symbolization had
already been done by the experimenter were they able to “solve”
the problem (in the traditional classroom sense of this word). This
suggests that the solution was arrived at by formally transforming
sign structures without use of the model plane. Their attempts to
solve the problems attested to a natural-descriptive approach, for
which it is typical to ignore the model plane and to equate the
sign and object-related planes. In the constructed situation they
depicted integral sign structures, but in their natural representa-
tions. Their actions “bypassed” model conceptions. Strategies
were identified that involved attempts to use past experience or
to recall analogous elements of sign or object-related construc-
tions. We will offer some illustrative examples.
Eighth grader Ludmila B. was given an assignment requiring
a sign (graphic) description of reality that involved symbolizing
a condition, creating a plan for solving the problem, and writing
down her solution. The problem was: “A ball with a mass of 50
grams falls from a height of 1 meter onto a spring with the spring
constant 80 N/m. Assuming free fall acceleration to be 10 m/s,
find the spring compression and the height to which the ball will
ascend.” In solving the problem, the subject offhandedly depicted
the height h (without showing the zero-reference height), and
next to the spring wrote k, without depicting the dynamics of
the situation (the state of the compressed spring); she was unable
to draw out a plan for solving the problem. After making several
unsuccessful attempts to solve the problem, she immediately
wrote her answer:
mgh – k.
Experimenter: “Explain your answer.” Subject: “I don’t know;

I don’t think it’s right. Well, I don’t know, that’s what it seems to
me: the potential energy mgh minus the spring, since it stops.
Well, I know it’s not right.”
Ludmila B. demonstrated a natural-descriptive approach to
solving the problem. The corresponding cognitive learning
actions had not yet formed in her. She did not perform the action
of relating the problem to the model and equated the sign and
object-related planes: “minus the spring,” the spring is equated
with k in the formula. The subject demonstrated a “blend” of

scientific and everyday understandings.
Eighth grader Sasha L. was given a problem requiring the
construction of reality appropriate to given sign structures
(including under conditions where limitations were placed on
the tools and method of construction). In solving the problem,
the subject interpreted the graphic showing the velocity-time
relationship that was given to him in the following way:
There’s a cave at the foot of a mountain, and there’s a spiral
staircase inside the cave in the middle of the mountain.
One day a man decided to climb from the middle of the
mountain to the top. After he began climbing, he slipped and
fell to the foot of the mountain, and he didn’t go into the cave,
but instead again began to climb on an outside staircase. Three
times he climbed and three times he fell. Then he understood
that it was pointless. He climbed a little and went into the cave.
Here, Sasha L. was equating the sign and object-related planes

and in essence did not complete the learning actions that connect
these two planes.
Group 3 subjects on average completed approximately 25 per-
cent of the assignments, worked very slowly, and constantly
asked the experimenter for help. For these children, conceptual
images fulfilled the function of “indexing” or coding reality, and
as a result they designated objects’ (phenomena’s) separate fea-
tures and established “direct” connections between them and sign
constructions (bypassing model conceptions). The object-related
and sign planes were not equated by these students; instead they
were connected by particular rules reflecting past learning experi-
ence in conjunction with intuitive everyday understandings.
This enabled subjects to demonstrate better formation of
actions to concretize model conceptions and corresponding sign
structures when solving certain problems as compared to actions
requiring movement from physical objects to model and sign
structures. At times subjects demonstrated better formed actions
connecting the object-related and sign planes for representing the
content of knowledge as compared with actions connecting the
object-related and model planes. The results thus offered evi-

dence that these students assimilated knowledge empirically.
The students reflected individual elements of the sign construc-
tions in the situation without taking their connections into account:
they would sometimes recall analogous situations from past learn-
ing experience and bring up corresponding signs (construction was
replaced by reproduction). They attempted to reduce all elements
to a single situation, but purely superficially and formally. The
subjects often identified only separate elements characterizing the
situation’s content but failed to consider their connection and
relationship and sought an analog from their own experience sol-
ving past problems. In the process of working on the assignments,
they only took some of the conditions into account, constructed
individual elements of the situation without unifying them, did not
correlate their solution with the conditions, and did not uncover
errors. Some subjects, when working on assignments requiring the
qualitative planning of solutions, demonstrated better formation of
actions involving moving from the object-related to the model
plane as compared with actions moving in the other direction.
This was manifested in the way they worked: only some of the
stages of problem solving were identified and described, no clear-
cut plan for solving the problem was constructed, and individual
stages were not connected with one another.
Group 4 consisted of subjects whose actions moving from the
object-related plane of knowledge representation to the model and
sign planes were at a higher level of formation than the level
characterizing movement in the other direction. These children
often refused assignments of the constructive type, and those who
did take them on were not able to successfully complete them.
Although, these subjects exhibited a rather high level of knowledge
acquisition (they on average completed approximately 50 percent of
the assignments), this knowledge was formal in nature. Analysis of
the results found evidence of special model-image representations in
some of them through which particular features and properties of
objects were reflected in the totality of sign constructions. In this
case conceptual images fulfilled the function of schematizing prop-
erties, features, and relationships of reality.
In solving classification problems, these subjects developed

rules governing their search for the sought-after situation in the
form of a totality of requirements and used them as the basis for
their classifications (moving from the object-related to the model
plane). Despite the modest level of formation of these actions, the
subjects were able to consistently analyze situations based on
each rule separately and then unify the results. A higher level
of formation of actions involving movement from the model to
the object-related plane was demonstrated by those subjects who
immediately analyzed the totality of situations based on each rule
and then unified the results.
Analysis of the process these students used to solve construc-
tion problems showed that they used a step-by-step method.
During this process there was consecutive consideration of the
conditions and a corresponding transformation of interim results.
In solving classification problems, these subjects demonstrated
better formation of the action of moving from the object-related
plane to the model plane than the action of moving in the
opposite direction. After identifying separate elements of situa-
tions, subjects related them to the model but then did not unify
the results. Relying on previous experience, they constructed
particular rules that they used to complete the assignment.
These subjects demonstrated better formed actions translating
object-related descriptions into sign-based ones as compared with
actions moving from the sign to the object-related plane. This
was manifested in the fact that they rather successfully completed
assignments but had trouble interpreting their results and took
into consideration only some conditions without registering the
system of limitations on their actions. This group performed sign
construction one element at a time with more or less successful
attempts at then reducing them to a single situation. However,
when given the reverse problem, they attempted to reformulate it
so as to avoid the need to construct the object-related plane in
accordance with the given signs. Another approach was demon-
strated by subjects who objectively interpreted individual ele-
ments of the sign constructions but did not connect them
among themselves and exhibited insufficiently formed actions

connecting the object-related and sign planes.
Group 5 subjects solved more than 70 percent of the problems
and, on average, were equally successful performing all the types
of assignments. These students identified an object’s essential
properties and constructed a conceptual image-model that reflected
the object’s content using an appropriate system of scientific con-
cepts and sign constructions, thereby demonstrating a high level of
object-related knowledge. In solving classification problems, these
subjects uncovered the essence of the process described in the
situation and examined the contentful relationships of the elements
represented in it while taking into account the limitations given in
the problem–this characterized well-formed actions of moving
from the object-related to the model plane.
This group easily performed actions moving in both directions
between the object-related and model planes: they constructed
a new object-related model that took into account both the totality
of requirements and the material that was used in situations and
conducted analysis as if from a distinct “standpoint.” Sometimes
they formulated rather particular classification rules that they
easily and reliably transformed when moving from assignment
to assignment. This attested to the fact that these particular rules
were based on generalized models. The actions of these students
were characterized by a rather high level of formation, which
allowed them to quickly and correctly complete this type of
assignment.
In solving planning problems, they generally clearly deter-
mined both the stages themselves (while correctly translating
them into model form) and the points at which they connected,
the transitions from one stage to another. Some subjects, on their
own initiative, even determined the system of limitations under
which the problem was being solved in that way. Analysis of the
process by which construction problems were solved uncovered
the following features: subjects started from a rather abstract
model situation that permitted them to take into account all the
essential requirements. They constructed a holistic image of the
situation and then performed a concretization in accordance with
the problem’s conditions. The students in this group identified

essential properties, performed actions of moving from the
object-related to the model plane, and constructed concrete
dynamic models that permitted them to transform and correlate
situations. They demonstrated a high level of formation of actions
that connected the model and object-related planes. They also
correctly completed all assignments, uncovered superfluous and
missing information, and had no trouble planning, while keeping
in mind the various possible sets of conditions and solution
methods. They demonstrated a high level of formation of actions
connecting the object-related and sign planes.
In constructing a situation based on the assigned sign system,
students identified the essential connection between elements of
the sign construction and then constructed an appropriate situa-
tion. If the proposed construction was sufficiently complex, these
subjects performed a preliminary restructuring (or redesignation)
of assigned elements. They freely moved from an action translat-
ing object-related constructions into sign constructions to an
action moving in the opposite direction, which attested that
these actions were well formed in them. In solving problems
requiring that reality and sign constructions be correlated, these
subjects demonstrated that both of these types of actions were
well formed in them, and they freely moved from performing an
action translating the object-related plane to the sign plane and
the opposite action of constructing sign structures.
Our results suggest that the main contentful criterion of the
quality of knowledge acquisition in schoolchildren is the level of
formation of conceptual images that refract and reflect scientific
and theoretical knowledge on three unified planes: the object-
related, the model-image, and the sign planes. Our research has
identified different types of conceptual images used in problem
solving that characterize different methods of knowledge acquisi-
tion. The natural-descriptive method of knowledge acquisition
forms “image copies” (reality is naturally substituted); the empiri-
cal method forms “image-codes”; and schoolchildren using the
formal method create “image-schemata” (of an algorithmic type).
Finally, the contentful (theoretical) method forms conceptual

images with the virtue of generalizing a scientific model.
Chapter 3: Sign/Symbol Function in the Structure of the Speech

Action
The psychological and pedagogical study of what is referred to as
“grammatical thinking” shows that young schoolchildren have
great difficulty mastering programs in their native language
(Davydov 1972). These difficulties have two aspects: they
emerge both when children are being taught to read and write
and when theoretical concepts about language or linguistic con-
cepts are introduced into the classroom.12
In the past two decades, the problems involved in the
primary-school teaching of the native language have been
actively debated and analyzed by both psychologists and peda-
gogs (Ageev, Davydov, and Rubtsov 1985; Bogoiavlenskii
1966; Zhuikov 1986; Shuleshko 1964; Elkonin 1974). Efforts
have primarily been focused in the area of the general principles
governing the design and planning of instruction independent of
the goals informing research studies: to find evidence supporting
methods for teaching writing, reading, syntax, or morphology
(Aidarova and Tsukerman 1978; Amonashvili 1981; Markova
1969; Elkonin 1960b); to study the structure of learning activity
(Protopopov 1974); or to study the psychological features of the
development of linguistic abilities related to mastery of linguis-
tic concepts (Bogoiavlenskii 1966; A.A. Leontiev 1969;
Markova 1969).
The vast material yielded by experimental and theoretical
studies into the process of teaching and learning the native
language can primarily be viewed from the perspective of the
problem of organizing forms of instruction that take into account
the unique problems involved in teaching the native language.
This uniqueness goes beyond the simple ways in which native
language differs from mathematics or physics; it consists primar-
ily in the fact that children have essentially learned their language
long before they begin to study it in the classroom.
The clear continuity between previously emerging forms of

speech and the voluntary forms that develop through learning
activity is reflected and informatively expressed in the process by
which the sphere of dialog, which traces its roots to infancy and
early childhood, develops in parallel with the broadening of the
monologic utterance: the development of expository speech dur-
ing primary-school age. Writing and reading as sociocultural
purely sign-based “neoformations” in the speech activity of the
young schoolchild is formed under conditions of some sort of
organized collective instruction. The same could be said about the
formation of linguistic concepts, something that has been con-
firmed by special studies into the use of “dialogized” and collec-
tive forms of school work that take place during the assimilation
of the native language and mastery of linguistic concepts.
The problem of communication therefore has special signifi-
cance for the psychological analysis of the genesis of object-
related activity. The place of this problem has been “insufficiently
explicated,” since it cannot be solved solely within the framework
of the psychology of speech or any other expanded theory of the
“circulation of sign information in general” (Leontiev 1983, 247).
Furthermore, L.S. Vygotsky, who incorporated external symbolic
forms of activity into the system of psychological concepts
(Vygotsky 1982–4, 66), has written that: “sign operations are
not simply invented by children or acquired from adults, but
arise from something that is not at first a sign operation and
that becomes a sign operation only after a series of qualitative
transformations” (Vygotsky 1982–4 [quoted from Robert
W. Rieber and David K. Robinson, eds. 2004. Essential
Vygotsky, New York: Springer Science+Business Media, 562]).
It is obvious that, insofar as sign systems themselves emerge in
communication, their purpose in human activity is directly related
to the development of symbolization and reflection functions,
specifically: to processes of understanding and interpretation, of
representation and, especially, of modeling of the object-related
content of activity.
Examination of the role of language within a system of activity
and of the ontogenesis of speech activity itself in the process of
native language acquisition shows that the purposeful reconstruc-

tion of the course of development of any mental function or
activity generally comes with the need to reconstruct all geneti-
cally appropriate conditions for the formation of mental pro-
cesses. Communication, as the most important of these
conditions, can take place both through immediate practical
forms of interaction and through the mediated sign/symbol and
linguistic forms in which an object of activity can be presented.
However, a much more important circumstance is that, in fact,
these linguistic and sign forms do not assign the object of activ-
ity; rather, they themselves are generated in the process through
which the content of activity unfolds. Looking at this from
a developmental standpoint, this can be clearly traced by compar-
ing the structural-functional characteristics of communication
tools associated with the various periods of language develop-
ment during preschool age (Vygotsky 1982–4; Gvozdev 1948,
1949; Luria and Tsvetkova 1966; Markova 1969; Piaget 1932;
Psikholingvistika 1984; Shvachkin 1948; Shtern 1922; Elkonin
1960a, 1966).
By the end of the preschool period of childhood, as a result of
the development of thinking and speech, children’s activity in all
its manifestations is characterized by a rather flexible object-
related and sensory (in terms of its organization, conceptualiza-
tion, and generalization) regulation (Podd’iakov 1977). The
visual-acting and visual-image basis of this type of control is
exhaustively presented from the standpoint of its logical structure
in the “Piaget phenomena” (Piaget 1932, 1969).
The way in which the forms of thinking and speech that have
emerged subsequently change are not pre-determined by their
preceding development, but, as research has shown, the fate of
their inherent potential largely depends on the way in which their
learning activity is organized and the content of this activity
(Davydov 1972, 1986; Markova 1969; Rubtsov 1987; Elkonin
1960a, 1960b). The transition to theoretical thinking in primary-
school age children takes place in the course of their assimilation
of a classroom subject. In early learning situations, of central
importance is the process of designing the subject so that its
constructive characteristics are appropriate to the conceptual

method of reproducing this subject and that the conditions for
reproducing are provided by using a learning model in the form
of a “sensory concept” (Gvozdev 1949; Davydov 1986; Davydov
and Vardanian 1981).
The task of the specifically educational comprehension of a newly
assimilated conceptual method, together with the production of reflec-
tion of this method, includes, as necessary conditions, processes of
interpretation or understanding, of expressing and communicating of
the content of the object under construction. However, since the
specific nature of this content requires assimilation of the conceptual
logic underlying the object’s structure, this content can no longer be
expressed using existing means of communication enabled by the
diverse sensory arsenal of children’s understandings of the object-
related conditions of activity. When it comes to assimilating a subject
such as native language, new means of communication or “psycho-
logical tools” aimed at assimilating written and speech culture reflect
an understanding of a new object-related content and become
involved in the process of transforming children’s existing speech as
writing, reading, and voluntary speech actions form.
Findings from research into the psychological laws governing
these transformations have been consistent with Vygotsky’s
famous propositions about the role of the significative function
of the word in the development of concepts in children (Vygotsky
1956). Vygotsky’s analysis of the genesis of the “word–concept”
relationship, which compared lower and higher mental functions
and natural and socialized processes, has been substantially
reconceptualized from the positions of the activity approach to
the problems of mental development. As it relates to learning
activity, the “word–concept” relationship derives from the nature
and make-up of the object-related transformations (learning
actions) within which this relationship first arises. The necessary
object-related transformations that are conveyed through
a learning model, being conceptual in terms of their organization,
initially preserve their sensory-practical form. This is why the
formation of the “verbal-sign model/concept” (Davydov 1960)
can be seen as a process whereby new means of communication
based on those that already exist are developed. Meanwhile, the

process of semiosis itself — the emergence of the sign/symbol
function of the transformed speech action (like any other
action) — is always rooted in the non-sign object-related context
of educational interaction.
The interconnection between existing and newly emerging means
of communication, written speech in particular, constitutes the main
feature of the native language as a classroom subject. This intercon-
nection relates to the need for a subtler differentiation of the construc-
tive and communicative functions of the learning model,
a differentiation that makes it possible, first of all, to develop
a specific form of reflection during the learning process: children’s
reflection of their own speech. Second, it enables use of a learning
model as a sign/symbol vehicle and a single generalized basis for the
formation of the abilities to write and speak and of linguistic concepts.
The linguistic and semeiological aspects of native language
content as an object of learning enable a logical and object-
related connection between the communicative and constructive
functions of a model that appropriately conveys the linguistic
content and conceptual method of reproducing this content, initi-
ally in sensory (through physical and graphic matter) and later in
sign/symbol form. Meanwhile, the design of the object’s content
is subordinate to two opposing principles for organizing the sign
form, specifically: in a complete linguistic sign, the paradigmatics
are presented as the principle for grouping elements of the sign
form, while the syntagmatics are presented as a principle for the
semantic combinability or the linear compatibility of these ele-
ments. In this sense, the systematicity of the sign form brought
about by a speaker’s speech action and expressed through the
means of any possible bearer of this action consists in the identi-
calness of externally opposite principles. Indeed, “every linguistic
element, as it enters into opposition within a paradigmatics, cor-
responds not simply to a place within the speech chain within the
syntagmatics, but a place of a certain extent” (Stepanov 1975,
260). Nevertheless, the property of semantic compatibility that is
common to all these linguistic units “is the essence of the act of
utterance” in which it is first generated, and this property can be
independently seen only as the consequence of an utterance or, in

particular, as “an abstraction of a syntactic property in the sphere
of paradigmatics” (Stepanov 1981, 251).
This means that the formation of the speech action must begin with
assimilation of the rules for constructing a learning model of the
syntagmatic relationships between elements in a complete linguistic
sign. A model representing the sign/symbol function of a speech
action or (essentially amounting to the same thing) that simulta-
neously represents the constructive and communicative functions of
the linguistic sign, assigns the conditions under which object-related
content unfolds by concretizing and sublating the original contra-
diction of the assimilated content. The essence of this contradiction
consists in the fact that, in the learning model, the constructive,
material, and “sensory” givenness of the linguistic sign as the content
of a devised speech action can be realized only in conjunction with
a communicative function that precludes the independence of the
content of the sign’s material vehicle.13
Resolving the contradiction inherent in the process of replacing
a learning model’s sign/symbol vehicles involves not just the well-
known dynamic continuity of levels at which an acquired action is
performed that is typical of assimilation. First and foremost, this
resolution involves a series of specially organized learning situations
within which the communicative function of the learning model is
realized through the means of the vehicle out of whose material the
model is being built. Teaching the essence of a linguistic sign actually
consists in the fact that the totality of a learning model’s vehicles is
a spectrum of possible means that create the conditions for an inten-
tional and “active choice of what a person needs to communicate with
another person during a particular moment in time” — in other words,
for the “communicative use of reality” (Losev 1982, 13). Building
a model out of different material, in other words, its easily materi-
alized variability, at the same time enables the organization of
a conditional collective plane of learning actions and the movement
toward the voluntary mental plane of a forming speech action. The
essence of this process consists in the concretization of the original
content, which contains everything needed for the conceptual unfold-
ing and assimilation of the structure of the complete linguistic sign.
The synthetic structure of the linguistic sign is sufficiently

obvious and consists in the fact that, for example, the word as
a complete linguistic sign is a morphological and grammatical-
syntactic unit. In this sense, the problem of holistically reproducing
the systematic properties of sign relationships when reconstructing
the original “sensory” form of the speech action learning model’s
vehicle can be solved by keeping the following moments in mind.
First, construction of the vehicle’s — or, rather, the sign-vehicle
’s — form has to correspond to the level of the speech and object-
related actions of the young schoolchild (who was until recently
a preschooler). In other words, the learning model at the early stages
of schooling must maximally satisfy the conditions that object-
related and speech actions are accessible and can be performed
independently while promoting interaction among all participants
in the collaborative solving of a learning problem.
Second, the learning model must be constructed so as to preserve
the possibility of deepening and expanding reflection of the
constructive-linguistic features and the communicative purpose of
the word in its written-speech and oral forms. Third, an appropriate
generalized form of the sign-vehicle that conveys the synthetic struc-
ture of the linguistic sign obviously must also be in its original form
a model of the pronouncing object — the word — and not of rules for
describing, however precisely, the “behavior” of this object. How this
sign/symbol model is constructed could certainly be adjusted to fit the
present developmental level of independent speech actions, and the
transformation and concretization of the logical and object-related
content of the original relationship can be carried out based on the
degree to which the necessary means for reproducing the learning
model — writing and reading — have been assimilated. These
written-speech abilities constitute an extralogical: they are practical,
and therefore defined, independently regulated, and an important part
of the conceptual way of reproducing the linguistic sign in the learning
model. Furthermore, if the way of constructing a linguistic sign
demands pronunciation and the implementation of written-speech,
then the learning model has to be simultaneously both a means for
forming written speech and a means for the conceptual construction of
the linguistic sign.
In the linear-syntagmatic model of a word (a complete linguis-

tic sign), an invariant component is the syllable, which fulfills the
function of an elementary semeiological sign-vehicle within
a linguistic system (Stepanov 1981). The syllable is also the
minimally allowable unit into which pronunciation can be broken
down while still preserving the comprehensibility and indepen-
dence (“spontaneity”) of the speech action, as well as the reflec-
tion of this action when a learning model is constructed in
a sensory-practical way. Primary reflection of a speech action is
attained by putting in place a logical and object-related condition
that provides a way to construct a linguistic sign by developing
the ability to distinguish and equate the time and place of the
stressed and unstressed syllable and essentially constructs
a symbolic space-time model of a word.
An experimental teaching program that we designed to teach
the native language to young schoolchildren used an accent
schema (stress diagram) of a phonetic word containing, in gen-
eralized form, the essential properties of the linguistic sign-
vehicle, in other words, the properties of the elementary sign-
vehicle (Zubchenko 1987). It was this schema that was learned by
pupils as an accented written-speech model of the word, which in
this model was linear, discrete, spatial-temporal, seriated, and
conceptualized through the independent pronunciation of
a structure that was realized using sign/symbol, object-related
graphic, and speech materials.
The introduction of the accent schema was preceded by class-
room work consisting of word sound analysis (Elkonin 1960a,
1962, 1974). For the vast majority of our first graders (rural
schoolchildren), the result of learning throught the use of the
phonemic analysis method was expressed, first, in familiarization
with the printed and handwritten alphabet and, second, in the
emergence of more or less stable syllabic reading. The children
who knew the alphabet, or most of it, before entering school
significantly outpaced the others in their ability to read and write
by the end of the first quarter of the first year of instruction. The
phonemic analysis method yielded the same indicators of reading
and writing mastery in four experimental classes, since most of
the rural first graders were illiterate when they entered school,
some could confidently distinguish and name between five and
fifteen letters, and only a few — no more than one or two per
class — knew the entire alphabet and were able to sound out
a syllable at a time. By the end of the first half year, the gap was
reduced through focused development of the ability to indepen-
dently construct a sound-letter schema of a word, which brought
written speech abilities to the following levels during this period
of instruction: average writing speed (8–10 signs per minute) and
average reading speed (20–25 words per minute). This level of
ability fully exhausted the possibilities of extralinguistic and
purely quantitative understandings that usually form in school-
children as they learn the orderly relationships connecting the
sequence of material elements in the sound-letter schema of the
word. It also served as evidence that the speech action’s sign/
symbol function that enables the voluntary and appropriate con-
struction of this action, and — most importantly — its transfor-
mation, was not yet fully deployed.
Introducing accented word schemata for the purpose of moving all
work with “living” speech onto the sign/symbol plane and equipping
children with special psychological tools for analyzing and managing
their own speech involved the organization of a number of learning
situations allowing for the construction of an original physical-
material form of a model on the basis of sympractical interaction.
Furthermore, up to a certain moment, the process of mastering the
sign/symbol model unfolded within a context where tools for con-
structing and tools for communicating were only minimally and
purely functionally distinguished, with the communicative tools
being a complete imitation of the constructing tools and, as such,
replaced verbal-discursive expressions of understanding with
a physical-material demonstration. Based on the experience of experi-
mental instruction, the hand gesture was chosen as the vehicle of the
original model’s constructive-communicative functions. Within the
act of natural-speech communication, the hand gesture is an immedi-
ate linear component of the linguistic sign’s distributedness through
space and time. Within the framework of sympractical interaction, the
linear representation of a speech action’s accent and intonation
characteristics by means of a hand gesture offers at least three forms

for representing a word and communicating its linear properties in
these same forms. They are, first, a cyclical gesture that marks each
separate word synchronous to the pronunciation; second, a modified
cyclical gesture that indicates the point of stress in the word and, third,
a two-handed gesture model of the word’s syllabic structure that
requires reflection of the place of the stressed and unstressed syllables
in the child’s own speech action. This last form served as the basis for
a hand-written graphic model to be used in the next phase in devel-
oping the speech action’s sign/symbol function. The construction of
a two-handed gesture model was combined with elements of dis-
course that include the terms “word,” “syllable,” “stressed syllable,”
and “unstressed syllable.” “Meta-language” is thereby organically
incorporated into the context of children’s speech activity and enables
the development of lexical reflection that ultimately comes together in
linguistic concepts and so-called grammar rules in parallel with the
development of written-speech culture.
In an expanded object of assimilation whose content is in sign/
symbol form, the relationship between the learning model’s con-
structive and communicative functions acquires an essentially
different nature as compared with the model’s original sensory
form. Here, the representation of the object’s content is directly
dependent on the degree of voluntariness or “freedom” of the
speech action’s entire system, the communicative directedness of
which determines what tools are needed to construct the action’s
subject matter, whether a theoretical concept or types of produc-
tive and reproductive speech activity befitting a child’s given age.
As a first step in mastering accentuation and intonation, we,
working jointly with children, designed a manual analog of the
accent schema of a word and a situation to be played out in
conjunction with it referred to as “Call the word.” The simplest
form of the manual analog was a cyclical hand movement “out,
up, and down” produced in synchrony with pronunciation of the
word in a text being read so that each word was accompanied by
a single full hand movement. In the joint learning action, this
analog served as a mediating “mirror” by which children could
control their own synchronization of pronunciation and gesture:
Option 1
Option 2
"Re-bia-ta so-bi-ra-li gri-by..."
Option 3
"Children were gathering mushrooms."

Figure 7. Synchronization of pronunciation and gesture [Option 3].
But since listeners first and foremost (and ultimately readers as

well), as they perceive the text, are naturally motivated by the native-
language norms for accenting speech, any divergence among the
anticipated, pronounced, and heard word leads to a new contentful
aspect of mutual control: the need to precisely indicate
a systematically marked (stressed) part of the pronounced word. The

manual analog was restructured and refined to indicate the borders
between words by indicating where the stress falls in the simulta-
neously pronounced word, with the outward movement of the hand
corresponding to the beginning of the word, the upward movement
corresponding to the stress, and the downward movement corre-
sponding to the end of the word.
Option 1
Option 2
"Vtrav-e tre-shcha-li kuz-ne-chi-ki."
Option 3
Out-side crick-ets chir-rupped.
Figure 8. Indicating intonation with gesture [Option 3].
The ability to reliably indicate and name the stressed part

(syllable or vowel) of the pronounced word essentially indicated
that the manual analog had served its purpose; subsequently, it
was only used as one of the tools for learning a way to intona-
tionally break up text in teaching reading, or when children had
difficulty in mastering writing due to individual differences.
To achieve a hand-written representation of the word, the
manual analog was restructured to enable the ability to indicate
and construct, together with the marked part (the stress), the
unmarked part of the word’s accent schema. The word’s construc-
tion and indication were realized through a two-handed move-
ment whereby a right-handed upward gesture was used to
indicate the stressed part of the word, and a left-handed gesture
from right to left indicated the pretonic or posttonic parts of the
word. Obviously, the coordination of such a complex gesture
rested on children’s own reflection of the speech action constitut-
ing the conceptual characteristic of the gesture model.
As the schoolchildren learned this way of constructing
a model, a linear transcription was introduced as a transitional
object-related and graphic form for denoting the spatial sequence
of a word’s independent phonetic components and their tonal
relationships within the word’s accent schema. The transcription
used diacritics to mark stress and lack of stress and a line of text
signified by two horizontal parallel lines:
Option 1
Option 2
....malina (doroga, sobaka)
Option 3
...potato (tomato, gorilla)
Figure 9. Accentographic model of the word [Option 3].

Any word could be represented using this discrete notation in

the form of the disposition of diacritics that repeated the sequence
of syllables in the pronounced word. A stable ability to retain and
reproduce the order characteristics relating to the moment and
place of the corresponding independent elements of pronuncia-
tion made it possible to advance to an accentographic model of
the word. In this model, the hand gesture and transcriptional
notation that were previously separate were combined in such
a way that the unstressed syllables as pronounced and shown
were represented with the graphic sign ⁀, while the stressed
syllable was represented by the sign ˄.
In terms of its spatial characteristics, the accentographic model
of the word was the continuous contour of a discrete linear
transcriptional notation, while a unified, left-to-right continuous
handwritten movement, which replaced the previous two-handed
representation of the pronounced word, served to represent its
temporal characteristic.
Using this form of notation, the relative disposition of vowels
in the word can be precisely determined, and therefore the sub-
stitution (replacement) of diacritics marking stress and no stress
with the vowel graphemes that correspond to them in terms of
placement makes it possible to have a combined sign/symbol
model that can be read in accordance with the given accent
schema of words and notated series of vowels.
The appearance of numerous variations in the reading and
writing of words based on one and the same combined model
has to do with the fact that it contains within it necessary and
previously learned tools that attest to the fact that the speech
action is developing a “semiotic mechanism” and has enabled all
learners to conceptualize and interpret any such model through
their own pronunciation. Furthermore, the speakers themselves
can monitor how intelligent and independent the speech action is,
to the extent that they are able to retain simultaneously a series of
vowels as they apply to a specific word being pronounced and an
accent schema as a generalized systematic-linguistic model of the
syllable structure of a class of words. At this stage of develop-
ment of the speech action’s sign/symbol function, children
develop and begin to actively realize a whole series of reversible

actions associated with the “filling out” of models and the pro-
duction of new models, as well as these models’ refinement and
transformation.14
The ability to relate the meaning of a word generated in
individual pronunciation and its accent characteristics reflects
a substantial advance in the development of reflection and the
corresponding planning and predication of one’s own speech
action. Children’s development of this ability together with the
introduction of new sign/symbol tools opens the door to the
further unfolding and concretization of object-related content
when they move on to learning models of the Russian language’s
grammatical relationships. At the same time, the results of experi-
mental instruction have shown that, even at the attained level, the
appropriate sphere for applying the voluntary speech action based
on the emerging system of sign/symbol tools is the handwritten
form of the word. This is because children’s ability to work
independently with this form of the word promotes the preserva-
tion of a word’s stable appearance, both in the area of basic
spelling and in the area of writings established by orthography,
while at the same time writing at a rather fast-pace, distinctly
separating graphic units, and without spaces between letters.
The preservation of the written form of the word in reading and
writing is the primary condition for constructing a model of
grammatical relationships. A learning situation designed to pre-
pare children to construct a model of the paradigm for declining
a noun used a modified two-handed way of showing stress with
the following conditions: the raising or dropping of the left hand
signaled stress falling on the first part of the word, while raising
or dropping the right hand indicated that stress falls at the end of
the word. Furthermore, a raised hand indicated stress in the plural
form of a word, while a lowered hand indicated stress in the
singular form of the pronounced word. The additional condition
of a collaborative action was introduced: each child was able to
give only one form of the word — either plural or singular —
while showing the corresponding stress, and the following parti-
cipant in the collaborative action had to construct an “answer” to
the previous child by pronouncing and showing the other form

before offering his or her word and getting an “answer” from the
following participant.
After instituting the oral-speech form of the collaborative
action, a graphic model of the word form of a singular word in
the nominative case was constructed. The model’s design fea-
tured a horizontal line over which was written the accent schema
of the word in the plural. The ability to separate out the ending as
a variable part of the word form that had been developed in the
oral-speech form made it possible to add a sign for the stem to the
model that showed the morpheme boundary and, also, to intro-
duce a letter designation of the ending after the sign for the stem.
However, in order to obtain a complete declension paradigm, it
was necessary to go from the internal syntagma of the stem and
ending (parus + a = parusa; parus + 0 = parus, and so forth) to
the external syntagma of the noun and preposition, as well as to
the contextual meaning of the non-prepositional oblique form of
the noun (v + les + u = v lesu; … vizhu + parus + a = … vizhu
parusa, and so forth). Preparations for this transition were made
during the teaching of reading, which was based on separating
out units of language characterized by such communicative vehi-
cles as the system of prosody, or intonation.
In constructing a method for forming intelligent reading in
young schoolchildren, we started with the assumption that, for
the emerging speech mechanism of deobjectifying a sign/symbol
product as complex as a written text, reading is a productive type
of activity. This is because children who are beginning to read are
confronted with the need not simply to decipher the letter code
but to recreate in its entirety a system of communicative mean-
ings hidden behind a written-speech utterance. The point is that,
in the act of oral-speech communication, the speakers and listen-
ers mutually assign and affirm the accentuation, melodics, tone,
and pause pattern of speech — everything that makes it intelli-
gent and gives it modal coloration — without needing any special
effort to distinguish the participants in the conversation and
reproduce the speech of the other speaker. In a written text, the
relationship of involvement in communication is hidden and
veiled. Therefore, children’s most difficult task once they have

learned to read is equating another speaker and a text. Strictly
speaking, literate children do not see a letter as a weighty and
communicatively valuable sign. It is “silent” until, within readers’
circle of communication, they are able to reconstruct, whether
spontaneously or as a result of purposeful instruction, the sense of
what is written when it is actualized in spoken speech addressed
to a listener.
The formation of intelligent reading in the post-primer period
can be divided into several stages, each of which is characterized
by a certain level of development of the sign/symbol function that
enables the objectification of such features of a text as accentua-
tion, intonation, melody, and pauses. Developing children’s abil-
ity to equate a normative-graphic voluntary form of expression
that is new to them with heard speech of the same content
immediately spoken to them is the formation of intelligent read-
ing. This task involves being aware of, indexing, and mastering
the hidden spatial-time prosodic characteristics of the (printed)
text. It consists primarily in “finishing construction of” the sign-
ness that is inherent in the text and manifested with the help of
symbolic models of communicative essence. It is this commu-
nicative essence that makes it possible to “voice” the text just
right and to assure its correct, meaningful articulation without
destroying the holistic nature and addressivity that make it pos-
sible to precisely, simultaneously, and completely understand
what is being read.
It is specifically the lack of an ability to simultaneously sepa-
rate out meaning in the course of reading that shows an insuffi-
ciently high level of development of reading “technique,”
expressed in anormative pauses and violations of intonational
articulation of the text being read. This is particularly common
in the post-primer period, when most children are at the level of
syllable-by-syllable reading or are just advancing toward reading
entire words. Observations of this kind of reading shows that
recreating the sound aspect of what is being read is hindered by
the facts that: 1) auxiliary words (prepositions, particles, conjunc-
tions) break away from the phonetic groups to which they belong
and are given their own stress; and 2) every word is read indivi-
dually with an autonomous intonation and words are separated by
unjustifiably long pauses that destroy the text’s addressivity to
a real or imagined listener. When there is this level of predication
of an entire structural sound image (at the level of the word,
phrase, syntagma, or sentence fragment, etc.), comprehension of
what is being read occurs not at the moment of reading, but is
delayed until a subsequent rereading.
Deciphering and comprehension, which are indistinguishable
when the skill of reading is just emerging, appear as two separate
and non-simultaneous processes during the early stages of read-
ing’s formation. Furthermore (and this is extremely important),
when children reread something, they intuitively seek a way to
make what they are reading phonetically continuous, which helps
them understand its meaning. Based on our observations, the
smooth reading of an entire sentence or group of words during
a repeat reading appears in children after they have overcome two
types of difficulties: 1) the intuitive identification and reading of
a meaningful word joined with its associated auxiliary words and
particles; and 2) the smooth pronunciation of an entire sentence
based on the principle of the connection between words.
Ultimately, the smooth reading of a whole sentence or group of
words is attained as a result of the separating out of the so-called
“phonetic word” as the first step and a subsequent focus on the
phoneme of the juncture — all sorts of breaks encountered in
a text and heard as various pauses (the boundary of a word,
syntagma, sentence fragment, full sentence; and emphatic pauses,
and so forth) (Zubchenko 1972; Zubchenko and Nevueva 1974,
1978, 1979).
These two factors, or steps, which appear one after the other,
can be considered preliminary conditions for the formation of
speech actions associated with the semantic processing of what is
being read. They are what constitute the stage of phonetically
conjoined reading. This leads us to surmise that the mechanism
by which intelligent reading proceeds, in all likelihood, goes
through two main stages of formation: the stage of phonetically
conjoined reading (the attainment of a holistic sound image of
what is read) and the stage of truly intelligent reading, which is

characterized by voluntary and norm-observant interpretation
with a rhythmic intonation at an appropriate tempo and with
simultaneous comprehension and addressivity.
The content and object of actions during the first stage are
phonetic ways of fusing sound units (syllables, “phonetic words”)
into a linear sequence. Children’s spontaneous speech actions at
this stage have to be restructured through elaboration, objectifica-
tion by means of the sign/symbol function, prosodic characteris-
tics of the text that are hidden from them, and especially through
phrasal stress and insertion of breaks. The learning action “is
played out” as part of learning situations that are created by two
or more participants as a form of natural communicatively mean-
ingful interaction. For participants in such interaction, there can
be no functional-role positions (to say nothing of forms of
instructional introduction into the cooperative speech action), if
only because they automatically lead to the destruction of the
“sound whole” that results from interaction. In that case, the
construction of a “sound whole” (a word, syntagma, or sentence)
occurs due to the collective identification of the action’s preci-
sion, of the method for determining and reproducing the units of
content of the speech action; and being natural and intuitive in
terms of procedural properties, it turns out to be completely
voluntary and conscious after the interaction or the joint speech
action. In other words, it becomes a psychological tool in the
arsenal of each individual participant.
Intelligent reading at the stage of continuous phonetic reading
comes together as an action oriented toward the mastery of ways
of breaking down a sentence (or text) that enables the construc-
tion of an intonational model of the completely normative and
expressive sound of what is being read. A feature of this syntag-
matic articulation is the separating out of groups of connected
words based on the principle of establishing a linear semantic
connection. Three phases within continuous phonetic reading can
be identified. Each of these phases is aimed at mastering
a particular phonetic aspect of what is being read. The actions
of the first phase are focused on manifesting, registering, and the
cooperative clarification by participants’ in the interaction of the

precise stress in the word. The action of the second step involves
identifying the “phonetic word.” The action of the third step is
aimed at marking the phoneme of the juncture.
The “Stress” Phase is needed to form the foundational speech
action or a generalized method of working with linguistic mate-
rial. The limitations of this method are proportionally reduced as
the material becomes more complicated. The speech action asso-
ciated with identifying stress in each individual word is a macro-
action in relation to all subsequent actions, insofar as within it the
most important techniques for working with an object and meth-
ods for interaction are discovered; the paradigm for physical-
material and sign/symbol models and the mechanism by which
they transition into one another is manifested and constructed.
Two problems are solved during this phase: recurrences of
syllable-by-syllable reading are eliminated and the ability to
quickly figure out and place stress in individual word or words
within a sentence is formed.
A technique referred to as “call a word, pass a word” was used
to determine the stress in a word in a learning situation involving
two to six participants, each of whom had his or her own word on
a card. One at a time, the schoolchildren would read their word as
if they were relaying a communication. For perfect clarity, the
words were pronounced with an emphatic drawing out of the
stressed syllable, allowing all the listeners to identify it simulta-
neously. Any violation of the norms of individual pronunciation
and deviations from what was naturally expected by all listeners
was automatically eliminated by the regulating ability of the
linguistic socium: the collective linguistic consciousness of the
speakers/listeners. A symbolic hand gesture outward and down
toward the listener was used to mediate determination of the
stress placement. This gesture produced a primary indexing of
stress in an individual word or words in a sentence, thereby,
transforming the content of speakers’/listeners’ speech into an
object of investigation for all participants in this collaborative
effort. The content turned into an object of reflection and analysis
without being destroyed. The content, which was understood by
all participants in the speech action through the physical index,

was moved to the following form of representation: the diacritic
marking of stress. The children now knew the content of this
sign, since they literally built it on their own: they made it with
their own hands and it was not delivered into the context of their
consciousness from the outside in the form of a rule or model,
assigned by an authoritative adult. The found stress, the correct-
ness of which was confirmed by everyone, was represented
within the sentence first using the synchronous voicing and
rhythmic movement of the hand that marked each subsequent
stressed syllable in the word, and then graphically:
Option 1
Option 2
Tsvetý liúbiat svézhuiu vódu
Option 3
Flowers always enjoy water
Figure 10. Diacritic marking of stress.
All of the group’s participants monitor one another as they

exchange cards and correct the voicing and precision of the
sentence’s accentuation (throughout this process, as part of its
conditions, the children are presented with varied systematically
standardized and age-appropriate linguistic material).
The goal of Phase 2 in the formation of phonetically conjoined
reading (the “phonetic word”) is to create an orientation toward
the unstressed auxiliary particles and words that are phonetically
joined to meaningful words. Readers, moving from left to right as
they voice the sentence and indicate stress, have to identify the
“phonetic word,” that is, a whole consisting of stressed and
unstressed syllables. In this case as well, the normative precision

of the voicing is confirmed by all participants in the action
(during this stage, the children are mostly working in pairs).
Sentences identical in structure and containing prepositions, con-
junctions, and particles were used as material for this exercise.
Readers started out working on a sentence by finding and mark-
ing the stress using the action established during the first phase.
The auxiliary words were either given no diacritic sign or, most
often, were given an autonomous stress. This is how disagree-
ments arose, with divergent stress markings and actual sound
images of “phonetic words”: there were more words than accents
(a). The conflict between the method of action and the result was
eliminated by introducing a prosodic (intonational) sign () joining
together the component parts of the “phonetic word” and indicat-
ing a single stress for such word combinations (b).
Figure 11. Intonational sign of “phonetic word.”
Version 1
b
Version 2
a) Rebiáta bezháli po dorózhke
b) Rebiáta bezháli po dorózhke
Figure 12. Single stress for word combination.

During the phonetic word phase the speech action, which

changed in an unregulated manner based on the number of
participants, alternating between being individual and collabora-
tive, took the following form:
The consecutive identification of stress and phonetic words in
the sentence (from physical-material to sign-graphic
symbolization);
the repeated reading of the entire sentence in synchrony with

the hand movement; and
the exchange of marked sentences among participants in the

learning situations and reading using another child’s markings
(a collaborative monitoring action).
During Phase 3, the final phase in the formation of phoneti-

cally conjoined reading, the phase of the phoneme of the
juncture, children learn about breaks in the text: pauses
between words in a sentence and the sentence’s boundary.
The main feature of this phase is the introduction of
a “threading” operation that essentially consists in the sen-
tence being read from the final word to the first word: the
entire left part of the sentence is covered with the hand,
which gradually reveals one word at a time as it moves to
the left. An intonation marking indicating the “completeness”
of the utterance is introduced after the final stressed word
(marked by a hand movement out and down) to represent the
pause at the end of the sentence (and make sense of the
intonational significance of the period as a punctuation
mark): a sign representing a drop in tone (↓). The conjoined
pronunciation of words at their juncture (the phoneme of the
juncture, or a unifying pause) is marked with an arc (U).
Sentences were read in the following order, synchronous
with the hand movement:
Version 1
Version 2
v les.
poshlí v les.
Mál'chiki poshlí v les.
Figure 13. Phonetically conjoined reading of sentence [version 2].
The threading operation was intended to eliminate mistaken

guesses in reading and prevent rereading. This technique has
made it possible to orient readers toward true phonemes of the
juncture–toward the need to conjoin words in the process of
reading. It has also enabled the emergence of a mechanism for
simultaneous understanding during reading.
A typical feature of conjoined phonetic reading is a certain mono-
tonous intonation (recitativeness) and slow, albeit even-paced read-
ing. Furthermore, the reading of texts based on someone else’s
intonational model is often accompanied by an orchestral conductor-
like movement of the hand indexing and mediating the stress and
moments when words conjoin within a sentence in the process of
transforming the sound image into a whole. In this case, the hand
gesture plays the role of a high-level meaningful sign/symbol con-
trolling speech action that enables both the reader’s self-control and
reflection for the listener, the author of the intonational markings.
It turns out that throughout the entire stage of phonetically con-
joined reading there is a recreation and objectivation of the main and
original speech characteristics of the written text as communicatively
valuable content that speakers and listeners trade back and forth. Also
throughout this stage, these characteristics are represented in the

physical-material and rhythmic-intonational models that complete
the construction of the printed text.
At the stage of actual intelligent reading, actions of articulating the
constructed holistic sound image are formed by means of the identi-
fication of its linear semantic connections. The result of such reading is
expressed in the identification of groups of associated words in the
sentence (or syntagma). The search for syntagmatic connections is
carried out based on the principle of the linear semantic membership of
words in one and the same group. The “threading” operation is used to
identify a syntagma and syntagmatic connections. This operation, by
drawing lines between all discontacted connections, enables the reli-
able determination of immediate linear semantic connections. When
the entire group of participants agrees on the appropriateness of
a connection, it is marked with an arc, which now simultaneously
signifies both the connection of words in the syntagma based on
meaning and the phonetically conjoined voicing. The boundaries of
a syntagma are determined based on two characteristics: 1) the impos-
sibility of the further expansion of the syntagma using adjacent words
(the syntagma’s semantic exhaustion); and 2) the absence of any
words to the left (in this case, the boundary of the group of words
connected based on meaning coincides with the beginning of the
sentence). Found syntagmas are enclosed in parentheses, pauses
between groups of words are marked with a sign for the melodic
raising of tone (↑); and the end of the sentence is marked with a sign for
the lowering of tone (↓).
Version 1
Version 2
(Trúdnoe slóvo "izmerénie") (my proiznósim ne óchen' chásto.)
Figure 14. Identification of phonetic semantic connections in reading

[version 2].
After the phonetic and semantic rhythmic-intonational mark-

ing, the sentence is read in accordance with the entire system of
designated phonetic and semantic connections. Pairs of children
check whether or not each other’s action is fully formed, exchan-
ging cards with marked sentences and “sight-reading” the other
person’s text. This process uncovers possible reading variants and
actual errors.
As described, the teaching of reading that was carried out in
parallel with the teaching of writing and grammar enabled the
creation of natural conditions for advancing to the analysis and
construction of grammatical forms, since the schoolchildren had
mastered the external syntagma of the noun and preposition as
units of the intonational mark-up of a text, which had been
labeled with a sign of syntagmatic stress on the proclitic and
enclitic. This enabled the initial distinguishing of classes of
words. The development of the sign/symbol function of the
speech action at this stage signified the formation of special
tools for describing grammatical meanings as the basis for the
emergence of linguistic concepts.
Once a complete declension paradigm was constructed and
children were able to read a word form in an oblique case, they
were then able, working collaboratively, to expand the nominative
case graphic model arranged in a column with two levels: “above
the line” were endings showing how the noun changes in the plural
and “under the line” the case endings of the noun in the singular.
The totality of communicative and constructive elements that
has come together as classroom content has been assimilated and
that has been presented in a physical-material, graphic, and sign
form, and reflects the logical and object-related schema represent-
ing how the classroom subject unfolds. However, the practical
reproduction of this schema cannot be reduced to the reproduc-
tion of the logic of connections between elements of the content;
despite the fact that in constructing a learning model, this logic is
assigned as a way of acting with the object-related content. The
model in the learning action not only builds itself and serves as
a tool for identifying and representing the subject matter, it also is
an actual tool for transforming the actions themselves depending
on the features of the practical learning problems. In this sense,

the more “transparent” the structure of the learning tool becomes
over the course of learning (the better the model fulfills the
function of “being for the other”), the more appropriate the
method for constructing the model and the model itself is to the
content being assimilated.
An illustrative example of measuring how well formed the
speech action’s sign/symbol function was, along with the corre-
sponding level of reflection and the flexibility of the entire speech
action system, was the testing situation that we used as an integral
criterion for determining whether or not children were ready to
study a second language. At the end of second grade, a group of
pupils who had begun to study English was asked to perform
a grammatical analysis of the first line of Book 2 of Homer’s
Odyssey (Vstala iz mraka mladaia s perstami purpupnymi Eos
[Arose from the darkness the young and rosy-fingered Eos]). The
children were very familiar with this task: based on what they
heard, they were to write down the phrase using an accentogram
and under each word, after the sign of the root, they were to write
the ending; over the word they were to use abbreviations to
signify the part of speech and the necessary grammatical features
(gender, number, case, etc.).
In performing a task related to semantic analysis of the phrase,
the children had to construct a version of the sentence equivalent
in meaning to the original. They were able to ask any questions
regarding the meanings of words in the original phrase as they
figured out its overall meaning. The children each offered their
own version, such as:
a. “Early dawn arose.”

b. “In the night darkness arose the early dawn.”
c. “Scarlet sunrise took the place of night.”
After concluding the analysis, the teacher asked the children to

“jointly pronounce” the lines, but not in unison: the children were
each supposed to have their own part to pronounce. In distribut-
ing the lines and constructing pronunciation units, the participants
in the planned action could not operate on a word-by-word basis,

since there were only eight words in the line and fourteen of
them. After a discussion that organically incorporated the use of
such terms as “word,” “syllable,” “stressed,” “unstressed,”
“pause,” and “test speech actions of the pronunciation,” the
children arrived at the conclusion that the line had to be pro-
nounced one syllable at a time and that the final three syllables
should be distributed among the first three participants in the
cooperative action. The distribution can be represented in the
following way:
Vsta- la- iz- mraka- mla- da- ia- s- pers - ta- mi- pur- pur- ny- mi- E- os.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 2 3
Figure 15. Distribution of syllables among participants.
The children’s first attempt at distributed pronunciation while

maintaining a clear tonal delivery of stressed and unstressed
syllables with emphatic pleophony took 13 seconds. For compar-
ison, individual pleophonic pronunciation of this line took 7
seconds. The children, who were trying to achieve a “smooth”
sound, made a total of fourteen attempts at joint pronunciation so
that each of them could have a chance to play each role. The first
six attempts ranged between 12 and 14 seconds. After that, the
duration stabilized, and each cycle took no more than 10 or 11
seconds.
Analysis of this experimental situation indicate that, first, both
individually and as a group, the children were distinguished by
a highly developed sign/symbol means of speech action and were
able to use the entire set of sign models to retain a holistic image
both of the cooperative action and of the object that was con-
structed within the framework of this action. Second, the main
characteristic of the reflective processes that enabled the coopera-
tive action was the difference between how long the individual
voicing of the phrase took as compared with the distributed
pronunciation. This difference represented the total time each
participant in the cooperative action spent on predicting, plan-

ning, calculating, and restructuring their own speech action in
order to reflect the specific conditions of the pronunciation as it
unfolded in real time.
If we look solely at the process of word pronunciation, even here
the communicative properties of the speech action sign/symbol
mean that children assimilate determining expression in certain
spatial-temporal characteristics of the word, specifically in the pace
at which it is pronounced or written. In experimental teaching of
Russian, the transformation of the model, which occurs as the
replacement of its communicative-constructive vehicles (with
sign/symbol vehicles taking the place of physical-material and
graphic ones) enables the formation and functional-psychological
development of a speech action system, first and foremost its sign/
symbol function and the corresponding pace of writing and speak-
ing and the ability to “operate with abstract concepts.”
The qualitative and quantitative indicators of abilities formed
through the experimental teaching of rural schoolchildren confirm
that reading and writing, being special forms of productive activ-
ity for children of primary school age, have to form on the single
psychological basis of the speech action’s sign/symbol function
that emerges through cooperative actions.
The realization of the sign/symbol function on a model’s var-
ious vehicles creates the object-related and practical conditions
for communication, for the development of mutual understand-
ing, and for the organization of interactions during the joint
reproduction of object-related content.
A specific feature of this function is that it provides for the
retention and semantic continuity of object-related and practical
transformations, from the original sensory form of interaction
right up to sign-level interaction.
The development of the speech action’s sign/symbol function
(specifically its communicative function) results in movement
from the conditional collective plane of cooperative action to
the voluntary plane of action and the emergence of reflective
regulation of the individual action based on “the actual verbal-
sign model/concept” (Davydov 1960).
Study of the sign/symbol function as it pertains to the speech

action also uncovers essential features of the processes whereby
learning activity, as such, forms. The broader context of these
problems is the aspect of the ages at which object-related activity
and communication emerge and develop, especially transitional
periods, when to already developed communications tools are
added auxiliary (prosthetic) tools whose linguistic-semeiological
orientation supports the process of learning new object-related
content through those periods’ means of representing and trans-
mitting this content in cooperative activity. The realization of the
sign/symbol function on a learning model’s various vehicles is an
experimental reconstruction of semiosis using a number of pros-
thetic forms of physical-material, graphic, and sign/symbol
reflection of aspects of the subject matter of communication
during teaching of children’s native language that is constructed
on the principles of learning activity.
Part III: Cooperative Activity and the Development of

Conscious Thinking
There are two fundamentally different approaches reflected in the
diverse research into cooperative activity as a condition for chil-
dren’s development. One sees the way in which cooperative
activity unfolds and the relationships that emerge from it as
being predetermined by the individual features of its participants,
such as personal traits, level of mental and intellectual develop-
ment, and established behavioral norms, among others. Adherents
of this approach focus on studying the group’s composition, the
mental features of its members, the place where the group works
in the process of interaction, the nature of the problems presented,
among others. The other approach considers the content and
structure of the cooperative activity to be what determines both
relationships within the group and its participants’ processes of
mental development.
The first approach is based on Jean Piaget’s theories about
children’s intellectual development. These theories view child-
hood cooperation in the context of the social environment and its
influence on children’s development. They also see the social

environment as one of the factors, in parallel with contemplation
and individual experience, influencing the development of opera-
tional structures of thinking. This influence consists in the fact
that the stages of intellectual development can be accelerated or
retarded depending on a child’s cultural and educational sur-
roundings. Central to Piaget’s approach is the conviction that
the intellect develops through individual activity. Cooperation,
like the social environment in general, stands in opposition with
the individual, and the individual’s incorporation into it is gov-
erned by the general law of “the equilibrium not just of indivi-
dual, but also of inter-individual actions” (Piaget 1969, 218).
Studies representing the second approach to cooperative activ-
ity as a determinant of children’s intellectual and personal devel-
opment are based on L.S. Vygotsky’s theory of mental
development through the social to the individual. Distinguishing
between relationships toward others that are immediate or
mediated (through the sign), Vygotsky assigned decisive impor-
tance to interactions between the adult and the child, believing
that this situation contains the main sociocultural mechanism by
which models are conveyed to children. Vygotsky associated the
specifically human way of regulating behavior and the mind with
the use of signs and symbols serving the function of tools for
managing activity. Furthermore, Vygotsky saw the construction
and use of special sign objects as being the necessary condition
for the formation of all higher mental functions.
It is clear, however, not all forms of adult–child interaction
lead to the emergence of new actions. In other words, not all of
the forms that cooperation between adults and children (and
among children themselves) typically take will determine
a child’s zone of proximal development. The challenge is identi-
fying those forms of adult–child interaction that are a source of
development and that can be counted among the social situations
of development that determine the genesis of cognitive processes,
that tis, the genesis of children’s cognitive learning actions first
and foremost. As obvious as this position may seem, it should be
recognized that the idea of organizing cooperative activity as
a social situation of development is in need of special theoretical

and experimental elaboration.
In the following chapters, we will describe the results of
experimental investigation into the organization of cooperative
activity viewed from the perspective of the genesis and develop-
ment of cognitive learning actions in children and the processes
of analysis, planning, and reflection that enable that genesis.
Chapter 1: Modeling and the Cooperative Solving of Learning

Problems
We approached our analysis of modeling and the role and
functions of models in instruction from the standpoint of learn-
ing activity theory. As V.V. Davydov has described it, the
learning model is “a form of scientific abstraction of a special
sort in which identified essential relationships of an object of
assimilation are fixed in vividly perceived and presented con-
nections and relationships among material or sign elements”
(Davydov 1972, 282).
This understanding of a model defines its place and function in
learning activity: first, a model makes it possible to represent the
studied object’s identified universal relationship in objective,
graphic, or sign form; second, transforming the model of the
relationships creates conditions for the study of its properties in
“pure form”; and third, realizing the model within a system of
particular problems forms the learning action’s object-relatedness.
By now, cooperative forms of instruction have a rather long
tradition within both Soviet and foreign psychology and peda-
gogy, having originated with Vygotsky’s theory that children’s
psychological development moves from the social to the indivi-
dual. From this standpoint, cooperative activity is viewed as
a necessary stage and internal mechanism of individual activity.
However, not all scholars share the same understanding of the
concept of cooperative activity (CA). For example, L.I. Umanskii
has identified three main models of CA, which, he defines as
activity solving one common problem “in one space and at one
and the same time” (Umanskii 1977, 57).
1. The cooperative-individual model involves a group that is doing the

same assignment simultaneously “on one and the same field of
labor,” but with every member of the group doing his or her own
part of this common work independently.
2. Under these same conditions, the common assignment is done
successively by each member of the group.
3. Again, under these same conditions, the problem is solved through
the immediate and simultaneous interaction of each member of the
group with all other members.
In our view, without qualitative analysis of the structure of

group activity, the content of individual actions, and the
ways in which they are coordinated, such superficial criteria
are not reliable measures for whether or not activity is
cooperative.
Traditionally, activity is categorized as cooperative if func-
tions, roles, positions, actions, operations, and so forth, are dis-
tributed among the participants in the interaction, either by
spontaneously arising or being externally imposed. This type of
CA is always characterized by a lack of direct dependence
between the roles assigned to participants (such roles might
include, for example, idea generator, organizer, researcher, con-
troller, critic, etc.) and the specific content of their CA. The
operationally organized type of CA is characterized by the fact
that it is the structural elements of the participants’ performance
of the activity and the content-determined logical and object-
related analysis of the object of assimilation that are distributed
among the participants.
In our opinion, the advantages of any given way of organizing
CA can be identified only by considering and analyzing the
specific content of the CA and of the problems being solved
through it, such as the qualitative result derived from the activity,
the development of group cohesion, mastery of ways of cooperat-
ing, assimilation of knowledge, and the participants’ individual
development.
Despite the diversity of experimental studies investigating
the organization of various forms of cooperative learning
activity, they realize two main approaches. The first is pri-

marily oriented toward identifying the individual-personal
(starting level of knowledge, motivation, sociability, etc.)
and group (structure, cohesion, leadership-subordination,
relationships, etc.) factors determining the qualitative features
of the cooperative learning activity (effectiveness, “creativ-
ity,” nature of errors, etc.). The second approach focuses on
ways of distributing individual actions within the cooperative
activity that improve its effectiveness, create productive
forms of cooperation, and, in the final analysis, influence
the individual development of participants in the CA. For
example, G.A. Tsukerman has expressed the opinion that
only in a CA with peers can a child master the main learning
actions of modeling, assessment, and control (Tsukerman
1983). Studies by V.V. Rubtsov have demonstrated the role
of organizing group actions in searching for the solution to
learning problems and forming theoretical concepts (Rubtsov
1987).
There is no fundamental contradiction between these pro-
cesses; in fact, they complement one another, since they are
focused on different stages of the realization of CA. At the
stage during which cooperativeness emerges, it is the principles
governing the distribution of individual actions, their real content,
and their sequence and significance vis-à-vis the end result that
determine the methods of interaction. It is these principles that
have an essential influence on the group dynamic when it comes
to developing ways of cooperating and productive forms of
communication and, through them, on personal motivation, sub-
jective involvement in the cooperative activity, the assimilation of
classroom content, and mastery of the structure of learning
actions. During the following stages of cooperative activity, the
intragroup relationships that have developed and personal traits of
its participants can, in turn, begin to have a significant influence
on the qualitative characteristics of the CA that gave rise to them
and on its content and productiveness (Andreeva et al. 1987).
Tasks and methods of the study
Given the overall objective of studying modeling patterns in the

cooperative solving of learning problems, we had two groups of tasks:
● Analysis of the place and functions of models within the structure of
problem solving;
● Analysis of how the specific features of a cooperative activity’s
organization and how these features influenced the successfulness
of the problem-solving.
Analysis of the model’s place and functions in solving cogni-

tive learning problems involves a number of specific tasks. In
this chapter, we will focus on the particular tasks that enabled
us to assess the role of various factors of model representa-
tions’ content and form in solving learning problems. For this
we will:
1. Compare the capabilities and qualitative features of the action of

realizing an assigned readymade model in solving a class of
concrete-practical problems with the actions of modeling the essen-
tial properties and relationships of the object’s elements;
2. Investigate the models that schoolchildren constructed in terms of
how well the essential properties of the studied object-relatedness
represented in them was generalized;
3. Assess capabilities to transform the original object-related model
that was independently constructed by the schoolchildren when the
class of concrete problems was expanded;
4. Analyze the features of modeling action under conditions whereby
a set of model elements was assigned and whereby the children
needed to independently construct the elements out of which the
object-related model was to be designed.
To analyze the influence of various ways of organizing coopera-

tion on the solving of cognitive learning problems, we also
identified a series of concrete investigative tasks.
They are associated with assessing the role of such variables
as:
5. Whether the distribution of the CA’s individual actions was spon-

taneous or assigned;
6. The relationship with the material (in some sub-series the follow-
ing variations were presented: the participants were each given
their own separate set of elements to model or with which to
realize a model in a concrete problem; the set of elements was
shared, but within it all the participants had “their own” elements
that did not intersect with the other elements with which they were
working; the set was shared, and any participant could use any
element from the set);
7. The relationship to the result (the overall result was the aggregate
of individual results; the result was cooperative, but all the parti-
cipants had their own individual product clearly distinct from the
overall result; a cooperative meaningful product from which the
results of participants’ individual actions were not distinct and did
not have independent significance).
The criteria for assessing the role and functions of these factors in
solving cognitive learning problems include such contentful char-
acteristics of problem solving as its precision, the qualitative
analysis of errors, the appropriateness of modeling of assimilated
educational content, and the ability to realize a model using
concrete material.
Our research studied children’s utterances in English and their
lexical-grammatical models. In selecting our material, we consid-
ered the objective frequency with which various grammatical
constructions are used in English, as well as the frequency with
which lexicon is used in textbooks for learning English and in
oral speech in class. The experiment used: a) readymade sen-
tences reproducing various English-language grammatical con-
structions; b) grammatical models of the structure of verbal
utterances; and c) sets of specific meaningful and auxiliary lexical
elements for constructing sentences based on assigned models,
sets of names of parts of speech and auxiliary elements (articles,
endings characteristic of certain verb tense forms and used to
signify the number of nouns) for constructing grammatical mod-
els, the names of sentence components and their elements (aux-
iliary verbs as components of the predicate, the endings of verbs
and nouns, etc.) for constructing speech models, as well as sym-

bolic and graphic signifiers commonly used in this field of
knowledge.
Seventh graders from a number of Moscow high schools (271
students in total) took part in the experiment. They were orga-
nized into groups of two (dyads).
Given the influence of individual and group traits on the
effectiveness and qualitative features of the cooperative solving
of cognitive learning problems described in the literature, in
putting together dyads for educational interaction we considered:
a. Students’ starting level of subject-area knowledge as measured

through academic performance, expert assessment, and qualitative
analysis of errors during lessons.
b. Mutual sympathy and antipathy, as well as the place within the
structure of relationships in the class assessed using traditional socio-
metric surveys based on functional and emotional criteria.
The subjects who took part in the experiment were divided into
three categories based on their level of knowledge: excellent
students of English, average students with mastery of the lexicon
and grammar used in the experiment (as attested to by their
responses during foreign language classes), and lagging students,
who did not use either the grammatical constructions or lexicon
incorporated into the experiment in their oral responses.
Subjects were organized into the following four types of
dyads:
1. Where both partners had the same low starting level of knowledge
(signified by “– –”);
2. Where both partners had the same average starting level of knowl-
edge (“0 0”);
3. Where the starting level of knowledge differed, with one partner
having good mastery of the material and the other being at the
average level (“0 +”);
4. Where both partners had the same high starting level of knowledge
(“+ +”).
Since our study did not include the task of analyzing the effect of
personal and group (interpersonal) factors on the effectiveness
and qualitative features of cooperative learning activity, we
included in the experiment only pairs starting out with mutually
neutral relationships. In other words, there was no mutual socio-
metric selection or rejection based on either functional or emo-
tional criteria.
The factors described in the study’s tasks were the variables in
the method we developed.
The experiment included six series of exercises.
Series 1. The exercise consisted in constructing a sentence out
of an assigned set of lexical elements based on an assigned model.
The assigned model: a) reproduced, in generalized form, the gram-
matical structure of the perfect tense group; b) corresponded to the
sequence of lexical elements of a declarative sentence; and c) did not
involve criteria for assessing the semantic correctness of the sentence
constructed. The assigned set of lexical elements: a) in terms of
quantity, provided the necessary and sufficient conditions for con-
structing three sentences conveying a semantic load involving com-
pletely different topics; and b) included words and expressions given
in grammatical forms that allowed for the construction of a sentence
appropriate to the assigned grammatical model and conveying
a certain semantic content (for each topic in the set there was only
one complete set of such elements). The consistency of solutions
was provided for by: a) common material (the pairs were given
a single set of lexical elements); and b) a common means of solving
the problem: a generalized model of the structure of the declarative
sentence in the perfect tense group. The solution product was indi-
vidual (participants had to construct their own sentences).
Procedure: Pairs of subjects were given a readymade model
and set of cards with words and expressions in particular gram-
matical forms (the singular and plural of nouns and pronouns and
Forms I, II, and III for verbs, etc.) and the following instructions:
“Using this set of elements, each student should construct one
sentence each that adheres to the assigned model and conveys
a certain meaningful content.15 Once it is constructed, the result
should be entered into the protocol.”
Series 2. The task was the same as in Series 1 (constructing

a sentence based on its grammatical model from a given set of
lexical elements). The model: a) reproduced, in generalized form,
the grammatical structure of the perfect tense group; b) corresponded
to the sequence of lexical elements in a constituent question; and c)
did not involve criteria for assessing the semantic aspect of the
sentence constructed. The lexical elements included an expanded
word set of words, some of which were appropriate in terms of
their meanings and grammatical form for constructing a meaningful
sentence based on the assigned model; some of the set could not be
used in the sentence constructed based on the assigned model. For
example, the set for constructing a past (past indefinite) tense inter-
rogative sentence included as one of the elements the adverb zavtra
(tomorrow). The consistency of the solution: a) was provided for by
common material, means, and product (the pair had to construct one
sentence based on the assigned model using the expanded set of
lexical elements); and b) was not provided for in the sense of having
someone else organize the way individual actions were to be divided
up and coordinated (this had to occur spontaneously).
Procedure: Just as in Series 1, pairs of subjects were given
a grammatical model, an expanded set of cards with lexical
elements, and instructions: “Using this set of elements, together
construct one sentence that adheres to the assigned model and has
a certain meaningful content. Be careful: not all elements in the
set are appropriate for constructing a sentence based on the
assigned model.”
Series 3. This task and the specific nature of the assigned
grammatical model and expanded set of words was the same as in
Series 2, however subjects were now required to divide up the
actions necessary to derive a common end product. One of the
subjects in the pair (A) was responsible for picking out only the
elements for the sentence that were associated with its grammatical
(tense) characteristics, while the other (B) was responsible only for
the sentence’s meaningful content. The expanded set of words for
constructing the sentence in this series was put together based on
requirements fundamental to the organization of cooperative work:
a) in terms of quantity, each of the participants had a greater number
of lexical and grammatical elements in the original material than was

needed to realize the assigned model of the lexical-grammatical
structure of the sentence; b) only one combination of assigned
elements permitted the construction of a sentence corresponding to
the method’s two main requirements — that it correspond to the
assigned model and make sense; and c) the element hindering
realization of any other meaningful sentence structure was
a possessive pronoun in the set of Subject B. This meant that
correctly completing this series required a complex coordination of
actions by participants in order to realize the model using the
specific lexical-grammatical material by discovering the fundamental
limitations implicitly present in the overabundant set of elements.
Series 4. The task here was to construct a model of the gram-
matical structure of a sentence given as a sample. The given sen-
tence: a) realized the grammatical construction of the present
continuous tense; b) reproduced the sequence of lexical elements
of a declarative sentence; and c) was semantically complete. The set
of elements for modeling: a) included the names of parts of speech
and sentence components; b) was sufficient for constructing a model
of the sentence structure in the assigned grammatical construction at
any level of generalization; and c) had an overabundance of words,
in other words included not only those elements that were needed to
construct a model of the assigned sentence, but also others that were
not suitable for it. The consistency of the solution was provided for
by: a) a common set of grammatical elements for constructing the
model; b) a common model presented in the form of a specific
declarative sentence in the present continuous tense; and c) the
common task of cooperatively constructing a model out of assigned
elements. Subjects were not told how to divide up their actions in the
cooperative modeling activity; therefore, this division was sponta-
neous in nature.
Series 5. The task here consisted of a cooperative, divided
searching activity involving modeling and realizing a model in
a specific sentence. In this series, one of the subjects (A) was
given a set containing elements of all possible English-language
grammatical forms. Subject A had to pick from this set elements
corresponding to a particular grammatical structure known to
Subject B and construct a model of this structure. Subject B was

given a different set that included a large number of various lexical
units and auxiliary words (auxiliary verbs, articles, etc.) needed to
construct any grammatical form. Subject B had to construct
a specific sentence that was complete in terms of content and
grammatically correct and that corresponded to the model assigned
by Subject A.
Unlike the previous series, here the two subjects were given
their own individual sets of elements and arrived at their own
results, which were then evaluated. Organizing cooperative activ-
ity with this division of tasks meant that one participant had to first
perform the entire sequence of actions needed to construct
a grammatical model of a sentence and then the other had to
construct a sentence based on that model. Finally, the fact that
both sets offered so many options gave the participants great free-
dom in choosing the necessary elements but also increased the risk
that they would make specific mistakes (such as incorrectly con-
structing a particular English-language grammatical form).
Series 6. This complex series, which had several stages, was
both diagnostic and formative in nature. In Stage 1, the students
were given the definition of the present continuous tense and an
explanation of when this tense is used. They were then given
a sample sentence and the following instructions:
I want to check whether you are able to independently con-

struct a sentence using this tense out of the sets of words I am
going to give you. To make this exercise easier for you, give
yourself a prompt. For this, look carefully at the sentence on
the board and construct a model (diagram) of it. It can be any
model. What matters is that you understand it and that it helps
you construct sentences in the present continuous tense. You
are making this prompt only for yourself, so you yourself
should choose what it is.
During the following stages, the students were given, one after
the other, two overabundant sets of lexical elements in various
grammatical forms, some of which would enable them to create
a sentence with the necessary grammatical construction.
After they had constructed each sentence, the students were

asked to compare it to the model and, if necessary, correct the
model-sample such that it would be easier to use during the
following exercise.16
Each experimental series included two exercises designed to
enable, in situations of either individual activity or cooperative
activity with spontaneous division of individual contributions,
assessments of: a) the educational factor; b) the ability to repro-
duce (transfer) a found method of action onto new material; c) the
ability to realize a model in various concrete-practical problems;
and d) the durability of a spontaneously arising structure for
distributing individual actions within a cooperative action. In
situations where the cooperative activity was organized in
a way that imposed separate actions, the fact that there were
two assignments gave both participants a chance to perform all
the actions involved in solving the learning problem.
Because of the complexity of the experiment’s structure and
the fact that each series allowed for the simultaneous identifica-
tion and assessment of the influence a broad range of cooperation
and modeling parameters had on the ways in which cognitive
learning problems were solved, the role of each of these series in
achieving specific research tasks should be clarified.
For solving the first group of tasks, the distribution of model-
ing variables was as follows.
In Series 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, the students individually or coop-
eratively “objectified” the models in sentences. In Series 4, 5, and
6, the solution consisted specifically in the action of modeling. To
analyze this variable, which corresponded to the first specific
research task, we compared the results of Series 1 and 6.
Our second specific task was qualitative analysis of the levels
of generalization represented in the models and their appropri-
ateness to the class of problems during the solution of which
they were constructed. For this, we have relied on the results of
Series 6.
The third specific task was assessing the possibility of trans-
forming the model in the course of solving a sequence of
concrete-practical tasks. This was also studied in Series 6.
In order to isolate how the fact that students were given more
elements than they needed for modeling affected the qualitative
features of model construction (which was the fourth specific
research task), we compared the results of Series 4 and 5.
The fifth task involved comparing the results of Series 4 and 5,
in which the elements used to create a model for constructing
a sentence using a verb tense was given to the students in ready-
made form, with the results of Series 6, where the subjects
themselves selected the elements from which to model
a particular grammatical structure.
For the second group of tasks, the distribution of variables
involved in organizing cooperative activity for each series was as
follows.
In Series 1, cooperative activity was organized so that subjects
worked individually using the same material and the same model;
in Series 2 and 4, the cooperative activity took shape over the
course of the problem-solving itself and was spontaneous in
nature; in Series 3 and 5, the nature of cooperation was assigned
through a strict division of actions and limitations on individual
operations and actions. To analyze the role of the specific way in
which cooperative activity was organized, which corresponded to
the sixth specific task of our research, we compared the results of
Series 1, 2, and 3.
The seventh specific task of our research was assessing how
the relationship to material influenced the formation of coopera-
tive activity. For example, in Series 5, the participants in the CA
had their own individual sets of original elements to complete
their assignment, while in Series 1 and 3 the set outwardly
appeared to be common, however each of the participants, due
to the specific division of actions, could only use “their own” part
of the elements. In Series 2 and 4, both participants had equal
rights to the entire set of elements for modeling and realizing
a model using specific subject-matter material.
Finally, the eighth specific research task was to assess how
participants’ relationship to the result affected the success of the
CA. In our experiment, the product of cooperative activity was
common to both participants in Series 2, 3, and 4. In Series 5,
within the common product it was easy to separate out and

assess the results of each individual participant’s problem sol-
ving. In Series 1, both members of the dyad derived their own
individual result.
Results
In discussing the results of our experiment, we sought to deter-

mine how the qualitative features of solution to language pro-
blems would be affected by varying such essential aspects of
a learning activity’s organization as the incorporation of model
tools and the action of modeling into the problem-solving, as well
as spontaneous versus experimentally assigned ways of dividing
up and coordinating individual actions within a cooperative
action. We will, therefore, use only a portion of the extensive
empirical data and quantitative indicators we have compiled and
primarily for illustrative purposes. Some of our findings have
been spelled out in greater detail in an article (Dubovskaia,
Ulanovskaia, and Iarkina 1987, 93).
To identify the qualitative features of the design of a model
representing the structure of sentence using a particular verb tense
based on a specific sample and the reverse action of realizing
a readymade model in a specific sentence, we will examine the
individual problem-solving methods used for these tasks in Series
1 and 6, respectively.
In Series 1, subjects were given a model assigning the
sequence of words in a declarative sentence, the grammatical
verb-tense construction of which included two elements: an aux-
iliary verb and form III [the past participle] of the main verb.
This model was rather general and could be realized in present
perfect or past perfect tense sentences. However, the set of words
and grammatical forms for realizing the given grammatical model
in a specific sentence included auxiliary verbs only of the present
tense (have, has), and the choice of specific forms of these verbs
was determined by the number and person of the noun or pro-
noun fulfilling the function of the grammatical subject.
Completing this outwardly simple exercise required students to

perform, at least, the following actions: a) analyze the given
model to identify the specific features of the grammatical struc-
ture and type of sentence (interrogative, declarative, etc.) repre-
sented in it; b) analyze the elements of the set from the
perspective of how well they corresponded to the given model;
c) analyze the elements of the set from the perspective of plan-
ning the content of the sentence being constructed and unifying
the lexical elements into a meaningful group; d) analyze (within
the confines of the general model) the grammatical correctness of
the sentence being constructed; and e) analyze the semantic
completeness of the sentence with consideration of its adherence
to the assigned model and its grammatical correctness.
The experiment’s results showed that all the students, once
they started using models as tools, were able to construct sen-
tences that corresponded to a present perfect tense declarative
sentence in terms of grammatical structure and word order.
However, only 36.3 percent of subjects who produced an appro-
priate reproduction of the model produced sentences that were
both meaningful and grammatically correct. To break down errors
in terms of type, assuming that all errors made performing this
assignment represent 100 percent, then grammatical errors relat-
ing to agreement between the specific form of the auxiliary verb
and the subject (in terms of the subject’s person and number)
made up 85.7 percent. Typical wordings reflecting this mistake
included “mother have,” “Lena have,” and in one case, “we has.”
Another 14.3 percent of errors resulted from choices from the set
of elements that, although they agreed grammatically, did not
create a meaningful sentence. One example of such a sentence
was: “We have served a medal.”
The distribution of these errors within groups of students with
different levels of linguistic knowledge is interesting. Based on
our results, in the first exercise in this series, the average number
of mistakes made composing the first sentence in the group with
the high starting level of knowledge (+ +) was 0.75; in the mixed
pairs (+ 0) it was 0.25; in pairs with an equal and average level of
knowledge (0 0) it was 0.7, and finally, for those with the lowest
level of knowledge (– –) it was 0.75. In other words, there was no

observed relationship between the correct completion of the
assignment and the starting level of knowledge.
These results obviously attest to the fact that, overall, the
model is an effective tool for solving concrete-practical problems.
1. When they relied on the model of the sentence’s grammatical struc-

ture, all the students (even the weakest ones, who would not nor-
mally be able to complete this exercise under ordinary conditions)
were able to construct a sentence in the present perfect tense.
2. Using the generalized model allowed all the students to correctly
reproduce the declarative sentence word order represented in the
model.
3. However, as previously mentioned, the sentence models that
were used in the experiment: a) did not include criteria for
assessing the semantic aspect of the utterance being constructed;
and b) since the assigned model reproduced only the general
structure of a declarative sentence in the perfect tense group, it
did not offer specific ways of assuring agreement between the
auxiliary verb to have and the number and person of the subject.
Using the generalized model would therefore be effective only if
the specific and necessary rules for constructing a grammatically
correct sentence out of the assigned set of words were developed
in advance and consolidated, since these rules were not repre-
sented in the model. In the present case, this would be the rule
for selecting the specific form of the auxiliary verb that would
be consistent with the grammatical characteristics of the subject
with which this part of the compound predicate had to agree.
This would explain the errors in the group with average and low
levels of knowledge.
4. Finally, the model itself did not provide any clear indication of
how generalized it was. This could have caused its immediate
embodiment in a sequence of lexical elements to create conditions
for the emergence of mistakes even among those students who in
past work had exhibited rather good mastery of the specific
grammar rule that was not represented in the generalized model
but that was necessary for constructing a correct sentence out of
the assigned set of words. This would explain errors in the strong
group of students.
In order to test this hypothesis, we asked the members of pairs

using the same lexical set and the same grammatical models to
read their partners’ sentence, translate it, discuss any questions
and difficulties that arose, correct their partner’s mistakes, and, in
conclusion, to grade their own and their partner’s work using
a five-point scale. After this, the partners were given a new set of
lexical and grammatical elements for an analogous exercise.
When they repeated the exercise, all the sentences correctly
reproduced the grammatical structure and word order of
a declarative present perfect tense sentence. In other words,
they corresponded to the assigned grammatical model.
Furthermore, 81.8 percent of subjects constructed sentences that
were correct in terms of both grammar and meaning. The mis-
takes made by the other 18.2 percent of subjects involved the
incorrect choice of the specific form of the auxiliary verb for the
given person and number of the subject. The dyads made up of
the stronger students did not make any mistakes in the second
exercise of Series 1. These pairs’ cooperative discussion of results
and their checking and assessment of each other’s work were
effective ways of uncovering the model’s level of generality, as
well as the specific grammatical requirements (not represented in
the model) that, if taken into account, would ensure the correct
completion of the exercise.
The mistakes made by members of the pairs made up of
average and weak students had to do with the direct transfer of
the incorrect (and not corrected after the first exercise) way of
making the auxiliary verb agree with the subject to the second
exercise’s new lexical material. For example, one pair that was
very weak in terms of their starting level of knowledge, Roma
K. and Pavel F., reused a construction that was appropriate to the
first-person subject in the first exercise, but was no longer sui-
table after the subject’s person and number had changed, resulting
in a typical mistake: we have →”Lena have.” Apparently, for
these students, specific models or a series of models reproducing
all the relevant characteristics of the sentence would have been
more effective.
Finally, Liuda S. and Sergei Ia., who in terms of their starting

knowledge belonged to the (+ 0) group, used an interesting strat-
egy in Series 1. They completed the first exercise very quickly
(18–20 seconds). Liuda, who is a very “strong” student, according
to expert assessment, made the common mistake of failing to
match the form of the auxiliary verb with the selected subject.
Sergei Ia., who had correctly completed the analogous assignment,
did not correct Liuda’s mistake and gave her a “5” (while giving
himself a “4”). In the second exercise he spent a long time selecting
a form of auxiliary verb from the set and changed his mind several
times. After two minutes he settled on a version that reproduced his
partner’s mistake in the previous exercise. This confirms the
importance of considering the starting level of knowledge and
the relationship between participants when analyzing the qualita-
tive features of their cooperative activity.
The Series 1 results demonstrated, on one hand, that using
modeling in solving learning problems was highly effective and,
on the other, that both the model’s level of generalization and the
starting level of knowledge affected the strategy and qualitative
characteristics of problem solving. This suggests that the possi-
bility of having the students construct their own models while in
the process of solving language learning problems and the level
of generalization during modeling, among other questions, should
be investigated.
We analyzed the results of Series 6 with this idea in mind. In
this series, students were given a sample present continuous tense
declarative sentence and asked to create a model of this gramma-
tical construction. The instructions’ wording — “You are making
this prompt (model) only for yourself, so you yourself should
choose what it is” — gave us an opportunity to uncover students’
ability to identify the object’s essential properties and represent
them in a model. In other words, the instructions allowed us to
assess the level of formation of the action of modeling and,
indirectly, through the model, to assess how well students under-
stood the essential properties and features of the grammatical
structure being studied.
As previously explained, for this exercise, we recruited four

groups of students who had not taken part in the experiment’s
other series. We started by evaluating their knowledge of English.
The results showed that:
1. Regardless of their starting level of knowledge, the majority of

students created a model of the grammatical construction of the
sentence based on the sample (only 1 student out of 70 refused to
do this exercise);
2. The students offered a large number of different models (total of 57)
that varied in terms of degree of generalization and how well the
model reflected both the essential properties of the grammatical
construction of the sample sentence and its particular features.
Since the group of subjects were studying under two different
teachers and this affected the results, we will examine the classes
separately.
In the two groups that studied under the first teacher (total of 34
students) there was only one case where two students created the
same model. Marina E. and Iulia T. (class 7A) both came up with:
subject – predicate – ing – secondary elements of the sentence.
The rest of the models all differed from one another, although the
signifiers used frequently overlapped.
In the groups studying under the second teacher (total of 36
students), Denis Sh. and Marat S. proposed a combined model:
is __ . __ . __ . __ . __,
using traditional ways of signifying sentence elements in Russian.

The most generalized model was encountered four times:
subject – predicate – secondary elements of the sentence –
and the model I–0–II–III, was encountered eight times. We were

only able to decipher this model with help from their teacher. It
turned out that, in creating the model, the students used signifiers
borrowed from the teacher’s explanation of word order when
constructing a general question in English. Apparently, the use
of these elements was associated with the fact that model
representations were not used in traditional language instruction.

This is why the students, who had only one experience using
a specific type of grammatical model to solve one class of
language problems, immediately reproduced it when they worked
on a new language exercise;
3. Although the models were extremely diverse, they mostly differed

in terms of completeness, level of generalization, and the form in
which they were presented.
Based on the indicator of completeness, we identified three

classes of models:
a. Models that reproduced only the structure of the grammatical form

that was represented in the sample. In creating the model of the
grammatical construction, a different level of generalization was
chosen–from the direct reproduction of the specific form of the
present continuous tense used in the sample, to a maximally general-
ized representation that did not uncover the specific features of this
grammatical construction.
For example, the following models were offered by Anas

Iu.: … – is – verb – ing …; Elena B.: be – -ing; and Sveta M.:
auxiliary verb – main verb;
b. Models that reproduced the structure of the part of the sentence

given as a sample. These models also represented a different
level of generalization of the language topic being studied. For
example, Volodia P.’s model incorporated the following ele-
ments: subject – be – -ing, while Masha M. offered: noun – -
ing – preposition …;
c. Models incorporating not only elements of the grammatical
construction but also reproducing the entire structure of the
sample sentence. Two of the most striking examples of these
models were found in the work of Sergei Ch. (“subject, is,
predicate, ending -ing, preposition, article, adverbial modify-
ing of place”) and Sergei F., who simply reproduced the
sample sentence word-for-word.
In terms of the level of generalization, the analysis of which was

our second research task, the models could be divided into four
classes.
1. Some of the models attempted a particular kind of generalization

oriented either toward sentence structure or the construction of the
present continuous tense grammatical form. In the first case (Olga
S.), Place I was occupied by so structurally complex an element as
noun or personal pronoun, and in the second (Natasha I.), the
element is or are was in Place II. Despite the diversity of these
variations, they shared one essential feature: the chosen level of
generalization, while it did not directly reproduce the structure of
the sample or the grammatical construction represented in it, it was
nevertheless insufficiently high to adequately describe all the possi-
ble versions of declarative sentences in the grammatical form being
learned. Whether or not they fully represented the sample sentence’s
order and the qualitative composition of lexical elements, we cate-
gorized these models as “specific.”
2. Some of the models, relying on a more or less complete reproduc-
tion of the sample’s structure, incorporated a set of elements that was
necessary and sufficient for describing the essential features of the
grammatical structure under study. Depending on the specific ele-
ments they chose to use in constructing the model, they were more
or less detailed in nature. Examples included:
a. be (in the present tense) — -ing;
b. subject — is (are, am) — verb of undetermined form — -ing …;
c. personal pronoun or noun — is, am, are – verb — -ing … ‘
d. subject — auxiliary verb to be (am, is, are) — predicate (verb in
infinitive without to) — -ing — other sentence elements;
e. ________ to be -ing …
However detailed these models were or how varied their specific

signifiers were (for parts of speech, sentence elements, and spe-
cific grammatical forms, parts of words, symbols), this type of
model was included in the “appropriate” category, since they
represented in general form (or by listing the entire set of specific
options) the present continuous tense grammatical structure,
including its two main elements: the auxiliary verb to be in one of

its present tense forms, depending on the person and number of
the subject, and the main verb in Form I with the -ing ending that
is used in the present continuous.
3. The next category of models was oriented not on reproducing the

essential properties and features of the grammatical form used in
the sample on any particular level, but rather on reflecting the
general structure of a declarative sentence, which did actually
correspond to the sample sentence. Various elements were used
in doing this. Examples include the following:
a. subject — predicate — secondary elements;
b. __________ ______ . ____ . ____ . ____ . ____ . ______
c. I — 0 — II — III;
d. noun — verb — conjunction — other elements.
These models, which roughly reproduced the order of lexical

elements in most declarative sentences, could be used for con-
structing a declarative sentence in any grammatical form, includ-
ing the form represented in the sample sentence. The fact that
these models lacked the essential properties of the grammatical
construction under study led us to classify them as “generalized”
models.
Finally, some models did not fully present the present contin-
uous tense grammatical structure or reproduced it with various
degrees of generalization. Examples of this included:
1. __________ is ____ . ____ .;

2. subject — to be — predicate — …;
3. noun — verb + -ing … ‘
4. subject — auxiliary verb — main verb + -ing — secondary elements.
The contradictory nature or mixture of levels seen here (a strict

limitation on the type of auxiliary verb but no constraints on the
form of the main verb or, conversely, no constraints on the choice
of auxiliary verb but a strictly assigned form of the main verb,
etc.) meant that these models were generally inappropriate for
solving the class of problems for which they were designed. This
class of model was therefore categorized as “inappropriate.”
Within the groups studying under the two different teachers,
the four types of models (concrete, appropriate, generalized,
inappropriate) were not represented in the same proportions.
This difference in the distribution of different types of models
in the classes of these two teachers might have been associated
with different proportions of strong versus weak students in their
groups. However, based on both expert assessments and an
analysis of the academic performance of both teachers’ groups,
the distribution was apparently similar. Nevertheless, within the
groups studying under the second teacher, 69 percent of students
with a high level of knowledge of English and 91 percent with
weak knowledge constructed generalized models. It can therefore
be assumed that, given the fact that the learning action of model-
ing was poorly formed in all of them, the level of generalization
in these students’ models had largely to do with the signifiers
(specific or universal, appropriate or inappropriate for the model-
ing of grammatical constructions) that they chose as an element
of their model’s structure. For the students of the first teacher,
who did not use model representations at all, the choice of
signifiers for the elements of the grammatical models were not
determined by their past educational experience and were uncon-
strained in nature, which led all of these students to construct
grammatical models that differed in terms of generalization,
amount of detail, and the make-up of specific elements.
The second teacher’s students, as previously mentioned, had
only one experience using a readymade model in their study of
a foreign language, and it was presented in the form of a series of
numbers representing the order of sentence elements. Since the
exercise in this series of experiments was outwardly similar to the
situation in which they previously used a model, the students,
regardless of their knowledge of English, transferred the pre-
viously learned model to this new educational task.
Finally, in terms of the form of representation, the grammatical
models of the structure of a present continuous tense declarative
sentence that students constructed included the following elements:
a) names of the sentence elements: subject, predicate secondary

sentence elements, adverbial modifier of place; b) the names of
parts of speech and their specific forms: noun, verb, auxiliary verb,
main verb, infinitive, Form I verb, conjunction, preposition; c) the
names of parts of words: ending, -ing ending; d) graphic signifiers of
sentence elements:, ___ . ___ ., ; and e) roman and arabic numerals.
Some grammatical models featured signifiers from one level (such as
subject, predicate, secondary sentence elements), while others com-
bined various levels (_____ auxiliary verb preposition ___ . ___ .). In
a number of models, the students themselves translated one level of
signifier into another (I [subject], II [predicate], III [secondary ele-
ments]). And while numerical signifiers were only encountered in
generalized models (and only once, in an inappropriate model), and
the names of parts of words were only encountered in specific,
appropriate, and inappropriate models, the other types of signifiers
were equally represented in all types of models.
Figure 16. Grammatical models of signifiers.
To address our third research task, we included a sequence of

exercises in Series 6: a) to model the grammatical structure of
a sentence using an assigned sample (Model I); b) to construct
a new sentence in the grammatical form being studied based on the
created model using an assigned, specially selected set of lexical
and grammatical elements (Sentence I); c) to correct Model I based
on what was learned constructing Sentence I (Model II); d) to
construct Sentence II out of a new set of elements based on the
corrected model, Model II; and e) to correct Model II taking into
consideration what was learned constructing Sentence II.
Analyzing how these exercises were performed allowed us to
assess the qualitative features of the action of transforming
a model given an expanded class of specific language problems
solved using model tools that the subjects constructed
themselves.
Analysis of the experimental results showed that after the

original models were used to construct a new sentence (I), 70 per-
cent of them remained unchanged. Since the original models had
differing degrees of generalization, clearly not all specific lexical
sets were able to provoke students to transform their model.
Therefore, in order to assess the result, we had to examine how
it broke down across our four classes of models (specific, appro-
priate generalized, and inappropriate) and whether or not
Sentence I constructed by the students who did not revise
Model I included grammatical elements not reflected on
a particular level of generalization in the original model.
The results were surprising. Constructing a sentence out of
a new set of lexical elements had the least influence on whether
or not specific original models were changed (83.3 percent of
specific models remained unchanged after this task), and the
largest number of changes was made to generalized models
(63 percent of which were not changed). Appropriate models
were kept in their original form in 75 percent of cases; for
inappropriate models that figure was 69.2 percent.
Among students who did not update their original model after
using it to construct the first sentence, 68 percent constructed
sentences that reproduced that model. Clearly, that solution to
a practical language problem, although most of the sentences
were correct (there were grammatical mistakes in only 18.8 per-
cent of the sentences and semantic errors in 12.5 percent), did not
inspire an effort to transform the original model. Another unex-
pected finding was that in 34 percent of cases the original model
was reproduced after construction of sentences whose gramma-
tical structure did not coincide with the original model. Analysis
showed that the sentences constructed in such instances a) in
most cases were incorrect (67 percent contained grammatical
errors, 60 percent had semantic errors stemming from picking
specific lexical elements from the set that were inappropriate to
the overall content) and b) in 26.7 percent did not correspond to
an original generalized model; in 33.3 percent, to an original
appropriate Model I; in 20 percent, to an original specific
Model I; and in 20 percent, to an original inappropriate Model I.
Overall, the fact that most students did not revise their models
after constructing a sentence that did not correspond to it and the
lack of a correlation between how correct a sentence was and
how well it fit the model or the model’s generalization, are, in our
opinion, evidence that:
1. The action of modeling had not yet formed in most students;

2. The students’ models of the grammatical construction were not
actually used as a means of solving the concrete-practical language
problem;
3. The actions of modeling and realizing a model using specific lexical
material seemed to be different, unassociated learning procedures, so
the success with which one of them was performed did not deter-
mine the success of the other.
The results from the construction of Sentence II in this series and

the way it was used to correct Model II, characterizing a certain
dynamic both in the development of modeling and in the solving
of this class of language problem, generally support these
conclusions.
Comparing the results of Series 6 with the results of Series 4
and 5 offers answers the questions associated with Tasks 4 and 5
of our study and reveals the factors that had an essential influence
on the qualitative features of the action of modeling (including
whether the elements in the grammatical set for constructing the
model were limited or overabundant, as well as whether elements
were assigned or had to be constructed by the subjects
themselves).
Our findings show that modeling was much more effective
when such factors were coupled as having a limited set of
grammatical elements and combining the action of modeling
with an assigned specific sample grammatical construction of
the sentence. These conditions were met in Series 4. The strategy
for completing the Series 4 exercise involved the following series
of actions: a) analyze the sample sentence provided to isolate the
essential features of the grammatical structure that were specifi-
cally reproduced in it and analyze the order of its lexical and
grammatical elements; b) analyze the limited set of grammatical

elements available for constructing the model and choose from
among them the elements that were needed to reproduce the
sentence’s grammatical structure; c) reproduce in the right order
the elements of the lexical-grammatical structure of the sentence
in the model elements; and d) discuss with the partner throughout
the problem-solving process how it was proceeding and its result.
The combination of these factors enabled subjects to correctly
complete 50 percent of the Series 4 exercises. Among groups
with various levels of starting knowledge in the subject area, the
results were distributed in the following way: for (+ +) and (+ 0)
pairs, 75 percent of models were constructed correctly and 25 per-
cent had mistakes in modeling the grammatical construction (an
element inappropriate for representing the form of the main verb
was selected to signify it). In pairs with an average level of
knowledge (0 0) the students correctly completed 50 percent of
the exercises and refused to complete the remaining ones.
Finally, in dyads with a low level of knowledge (– –), the
students were not able to handle 75 percent of the exercises at all,
and 25 percent of their models inappropriately represented the
grammatical structure of the sample sentence. All the models that
the students constructed in this series were specific in nature: a)
they reproduced non-essential features of the present continuous
tense’s grammatical structure (in the first exercise) or of the
present perfect tense (in the second), instead reproducing the
specific forms that were represented in the sample sentences; b)
they reproduced in toto the structure and word-order of the
sample sentence’s lexical elements (for example, Pavel D. and
Roma K. wrote for the first exercise pronoun–noun–is–verb+ing–
article–object and, for the second, pronoun–have–verb Form III
[past participle]–modifier–noun–preposition–adverbial modifier).
Apparently, the fact that in 100 percent of cases the specific type
of model was chosen regardless of the level of linguistic knowl-
edge was governed by the size and content of the set that was
given to subjects as the material from which to construct the
model: first, the fact that it was limited in size (each set included
only two elements that were fundamentally unsuitable for
constructing the model of the given sentence) and, second, that it

included elements that directly reproduced the concrete gramma-
tical forms of the assigned linguistic constructions.
The results of Series 6, in which partners did not have the
ability to discuss the modeling, either while they were doing
it or once they had a result, and in which elements that
would unambiguously determine the model construction’s
level of generalization were not given, are described above.
The poorest results came from Series 5. Not a single stu-
dent with low or average levels of knowledge could complete
the grammatical-construction modeling exercise, nor could
67 percent of students with high levels of knowledge. This
result is associated with the fact that in Series 5, in which
subjects could choose from a large set of elements for mod-
eling and were able to discuss the results of their modelling
with their partners, a crucial model-constructing condition
was missing. This condition was access to a readymade gram-
matical sample that students could have reproduced in the
model with a greater or lesser degree of generalization. The
standard first steps in solving this problem involved: a)
choosing and presenting in specific or generalized form the
structure of a specific grammatical structure not externally
assigned and b) choosing the order of lexical and grammatical
elements (also not stipulated in the instructions) in
a particular type of sentence (interrogative, negative, declara-
tive). The other actions were analogous to actions performed
in Series 4 and 6.
It was therefore concluded that the essential factors determin-
ing the effectiveness of actions for modeling the grammatical
structures of English sentences with different verb tenses were:
1. Having a specific sample sentence that reproduced the given gram-

matical construction using a particular order of lexical and gramma-
tical sentence elements;
2. Having a readymade set of grammatical signifiers that could be used
as elements in the model;
3. Signifiers’ specificity or generality and their appropriateness for

constructing special linguistic models; and
4. Organizing modeling actions in individual and cooperative forms.
This final factor, which is tied to our second group of research

tasks, merits special discussion.
To assess the role of cooperation in solving practical language
problems, we will compare subjects’ ability to correctly construct
sentences with an assigned grammatical model when this task
was performed individually, cooperatively with spontaneous self-
organization, and cooperatively with the distribution of learning-
activity tasks externally organized (as in Series 1, 2, and 3 of our
experiment, respectively).
In the previous section, we offered a qualitative analysis of the
process by which sentences were individually constructed using
an assigned set of lexical and grammatical elements and a model
of the grammatical structure and sequence of elements in
a present perfect tense declarative sentence that were shared by
both members of a dyad. When subjects were asked to work on
an analogous problem cooperatively in Series 2, they were 17
times more likely to correctly come up with a correct result. The
only grammatical error in this series was the choice of a main
verb from the set given to the pair that was in a grammatical form
that did not correspond to the model. For example, Anya A. and
Yulia B., who had a very low level of knowledge, constructed the
sentence: “Where did we spend childhood?” In five sentences, the
secondary element, which was part of the lexical set but was not
in the assigned generalized model, was omitted. It is important to
note that not a single pair was observed to distribute functions,
actions, or elements of the set between themselves as they were
working on the Series 2 exercises. Each elementary action (select-
ing an element and determining its place within the sentence
structure) was performed jointly, discussed, and assessed both
in terms of content-related criteria and adherence to the assigned
model. When subjects worked cooperatively on the analogous
language problem in Series 3, where members of the dyad were
assigned a strict distribution of actions between themselves,
correct results were achieved only 1.7 times more often than
when the exercises were worked on individually. To interpret
our results, we performed a qualitative analysis of errors.
Taking all the incorrectly constructed sentences in Series 3 as
100 percent, then: a) in 67 percent of cases, errors were gramma-
tical in nature (for example: “What did the pioneers read tomor-
row?”) and in 33 percent they were semantic (for example: “Who
did the pioneers read at school?)”; b) 33 percent of incorrect
sentences did not correspond to the assigned model; c) 43 percent
of incorrect sentences resulted from mistakes by one participant
(in all of our cases, it was the one responsible for the lexical part
of the set who made the error, in other words the one responsible
for constructing a sentence with a particular semantic content,
resulting in errors such as: “What does tomorrow read at
school?”), and in 57 percent of cases the mistakes were deter-
mined by a lack of correspondence of sentence elements chosen
by one participant to elements chosen by the other. Furthermore,
in one quarter of instances where errors of this type were made,
the sentence’s verb tense did not fit in the constructed sentence
(for example, the auxiliary verb, the past tense “did,” that was
selected by one member did not match the adverb of time
“tomorrow” selected by the other), while in three quarters of
cases, the verb form did not match the grammatical form in
which the content was expressed (for example, the present inde-
finite auxiliary third-person singular verb “does” did not match
the plural number of the subject, “the pioneers”).
Comparison of the results and problem-solving methods used
under the conditions imposed for the solving of Series 1, 2, and 3
practical language problems, as well the qualitative make-up of
errors, suggested that the way in which cooperative activity was
organized determined the psychological content of learning
actions. For example, while in Series 1 problem solving involved
coordinating the order in which individuals selected sentence
elements to correspond to the assigned model (individual actions
↔ model), in Series 2, the model was coordinated with the result
of a previously constructed cooperative action (cooperative action
↔ model). Solving the Series 3 problem required participants to
analyze the content of both levels of connections: a correct sen-

tence, given the assigned distribution of actions, could be con-
structed only if both participants coordinated their individual
actions with their partner’s actions and then the result of this
cooperative action with the assigned model. Clearly, the limita-
tions placed on each participant’s individual actions, on one hand,
by the model they created jointly (the sentence), and on the other,
by their partner’s actions, complicated the problem-solving pro-
cess, something that was expressed in the large number of errors.
Nevertheless, it was specifically this way of dividing up the
students’ actions that by necessity presumed the identification
of essential features of the constructed grammatical form as
they worked (in order to perform individual actions coordinated
by the assigned model tool), of shared opportunities for realizing
the form (assuming the limitations imposed by the assigned set of
lexical and grammatical elements), as well as of the specific
forms in which it could be reproduced (by coordinating their
opportunities presented by their part of the set for constructing
a verb tense grammatical structure with their partners’ opportu-
nities, determined by specific grammatical characteristics of the
lexical portion of the set). This makes the cooperative-distributed
way of organizing a learning activity an effective means of
framing and solving learning problems.
Other specific tasks in studying cooperative learning activity
included analyzing the extent to which dividing up starting mate-
rial and having a common final product of activity affected the
qualitative features of cooperation.
According to our original hypothesis, giving individual parti-
cipants their own separate set of elements for modeling or for
constructing a specific sentence based on a model and formulat-
ing individual goals in the instructions should have promoted
individual forms of learning activity. We also hypothesized that
shared starting material and the setting of a common goal would
provide for a cooperative solution.
The first set of conditions was present in Series 5. In that
series, one participant was given a large set of elements for
modeling and the task of constructing a corresponding sentence
model while the other was given a set of lexical elements to

construct a specific sentence based on the partner’s model. Within
some pairs, subjects really did work individually. However, the
experimental conditions (subjects worked together at a two-
person desk and the second participant had a direct interest in
what the first was doing) compelled some participants to refor-
mulate their goal. After completing this exercise, one subject
said: “We designed a puzzle and a solution.” In other words,
from their subjective perspective, the goal was not just to con-
struct the model that they had been assigned to make, but also to
find the solution to the puzzle that this model represented–a
specific sentence. This is why the subject of the solution was
referred to as “we.” This was reflected in the strategy used by
Vasya Kh. and Lena N. (Turning to his partner when selecting the
next element, Vasya commented, “What do you think? Does it
fit?” Also, Vasya switched an element of the model after Lena
commented, “Don’t you have any pity for me at all?”). In all the
pairs where the partner designing the model took into considera-
tion the realistic ability of the other to realize this model in
a specific sentence, the partners graded one another’s perfor-
mance similarly, which also serves as evidence that they subjec-
tively perceived the problem solving as cooperative.
In Series 1, the problem-solving was individual in that both
partners needed to achieve an individual result — a sentence —
and the original set of elements, although it was shared by two
people, contained sufficient elements so that each partner could
complete the task independently. Most pairs did indeed work
independently. However, there were also cases where, at
a particular point in individual problem-solving, both participants
wanted to use the same element in their sentence. The resulting
conflict proved productive in nature. As part of their efforts to
convince their partners that they needed a specific element in
a specific form that was in short supply, they analyzed the
structure and specific grammatical features of their sentences.
Since at this level of analysis, no solution could be found (indeed,
when both students selected a plural subject to model a present
perfect tense sentence, they needed the verb “have,” of which the
set had only one), the next step was to jointly analyze all the
grammatical and lexical elements in the set, classify them based
on their possible functions in the sentence, and identify the
essential grammatical properties that could be correctly combined
within a sentence. As a result of this analysis, they listed all the
possible combinations of specific elements. In the specific set
used in Series 1, these elements were the subject (in the singular
and plural) and an auxiliary verb “to have” in the specific form
(“have” or “has”) required by the subject’s number. At the next
stage, participants agreed which one of them would work with
which combination of these elements to construct the sentence. If,
subsequently, the partners did not lay claim to the same element,
the exercise was completed individually. Clearly, in this series,
the specific content and structure of the set of elements given as
shared material for solving individual problems greatly influ-
enced the degree of cooperation.
Above, when analyzing the results of Series 2, 3, and 4, we
provided a detailed description of the strategy used to solve
shared learning problems where partners shared material and
elements of the set were strictly distributed between them. It is
important to point out here that, although the problem solving in
all these series was cooperative in nature, the level and “function”
of cooperation was different. When subjects organized their
cooperative effort spontaneously in working with shared material
and achieving a common end product, interaction was realized
within each elemental action in selecting an element and incor-
porating it into a commons structure, whether the sentences in
Series 2 or the grammatical model in Series 4. When the dis-
tribution of elements within a shared set and of the specific
problem-solving tasks of each partner working on a common
problem was imposed from outside (Series 3), interaction was
provided for by the very method for dividing up the actions,
whereby a specific common result was determined by the correct-
ness of individual solutions and their correspondence to one
another within a cooperative and integral product.
The level of cooperation was determined by the possibility that
individual actions would intersect. This possibility was
determined by the content of the shared material (conflict over

subject matter), by a shared goal (or by individual goals being
interpreted as components of a shared goal), and by the way in
which individual actions were distributed (either based on
instructions or spontaneously).
Chapter 2: Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Cooperative

Activity
There is currently a pressing need to develop ways of organizing
cooperative activity that promote the effective development of
cognitive-learning actions, in particular the systematicity of these
actions in young schoolchildren. This need arises out of the
following circumstances. First, the formation of young school-
children’s ability to analyze an object-related model as a system
of connected elements is viewed as an integral characteristic of
a full-fledged learning activity. Such activity is correlated with
theoretical analysis as the ability to identify an object’s geneti-
cally original relationship (Davydov 1972) and is considered to
be a precondition for the formation of children’s logical opera-
tions (Piaget 1969). Second, the findings introduced in Part
I (Chapter 4) attest that there is a vital connection between the
degree of learning actions’ systematicity and classroom perfor-
mance. While, overall, the level of learning actions’ systematicity
rises with age and education, this is a slow process. Third,
a number of studies have examined the effectiveness of coopera-
tive activity not only in terms of teaching ways to solve indivi-
dual problems, but also as it applies to the formation of particular
intellectual operations and actions. This has enabled examination
of the very organization of cooperative activity as a basis for
developing cognitive learning actions, including so important
a component of these actions as systematicity.
We have conducted a study focused on identifying the com-
parative effectiveness of various ways of organizing cooperative
activity and to assess the factors governing their effectiveness
(Rivina 1988).
Developmental and pedagogical psychology describe two pri-

mary ways in which cooperative learning activity is organized.
The first can provisionally be referred to as positional and
the second as object-related and contentful.
The positional distribution of children within a cooperative
activity involves different ways of grouping individuals: either
putting together those who started out having different perspec-
tives on the problem being solved (Mugny and Doise 1978;
Mugny, Giroud, and Doise 1979; Perret-Clermont 1980), or
based on positions that are assigned with the help of the experi-
menter, who assigns the roles played in cooperative activity
(Aidarova 1978; Poluianov 1983; Tsukerman 1980), or through
the children’s own actions under conditional (anticipated) circum-
stances (Venger 1977; Nedospasova 1972; Filippova 1977;
Elkonin 1978). When cooperative activity is organized in this
way, development is achieved as a result of the fact that differ-
ences in position and perspectives provoke an inevitable compar-
ison of these perspectives, which leads to a fuller understanding
of the nature of the problem being solved.
Object-related and contentful distribution primarily organizes
children by dividing up operations. The structural elements of the
performed activity, which are determined by logical and object-
related analysis of the objects being assimilated, are distributed
among the members of a group (Rubtsov 1984). The decisive role
in this case is played by participants’ construction of the very
way in which cooperative activity is organized. The organization
must be appropriate for identifying contentful and generalized
ways of solving a class of problems (Gromyko 1985; Guzman
1980; Kravtsov 1977; Polivanova, Rubtsov, and Semenova 1987;
Rivina 1988; Rubtsov 1980).
With this approach, the main factors governing effectiveness
are the distribution and object-related and contentful way in
which participants exchange actions and the use of graphic and
sign models as tools in organizing group work and ensuring the
mediation of the objective content of the very form of cooperative
action.
To the factors previously listed can be added the play form of

cooperative activity and the possibility of introducing an object-
and conflict-related conflict into play. Research into these factors
governing the effectiveness of cooperative activity has enabled us
to provide a brief characterization of each of them.
Distribution and trading of actions among participants.

The features of this distribution are determined by the logical and
contentful analysis of the object of assimilation and are the psy-
chological basis for organizing cooperative activity within the
framework of the object- and content-related approach. Numerous
works centered around the concept of learning activity have
demonstrated the effectiveness of distributing actions and exchan-
ging them as factors in the development of theoretical thinking (in
particular, understanding and reflection) and in improving the qual-
ity of knowledge. Studies have also found evidence that distribut-
ing and exchanging actions can promote children’s assimilation of
generalized problem-solving methods, as well as in the assimilation
of mathematical, physical, linguistic, and other concepts
(Dubovskaia, Ulanovskaia, and Iarkina 1987; Kravtsov 1977;
Polivanova 1988; Polivanova, Rubtsov, and Semenova 1987;
Rivina 1988; Rubtsov 1975).
Modeling. The concept of learning activity assigns fundamental
importance to modeling that uses such tools as graphic schemata,
sign forms, and so forth. Modeling is viewed as a necessary step in
mastering a general problem-solving method (Davydov and
Vardanian 1981). Organizing cooperative activity in keeping with
the object- and content-related approach involves incorporation of
various models for the participants’ action into the activity. In this
activity, the partners’ work with a model (which is usually carried
out in two stages: the construction of a contentful model and the
reverse action of constructing an object based on the model) serves
to coordinate their individual procedures and also promotes the
participants’ identification of the original principle underlying the
problem’s structure. Insofar as these models bring together both the
content of the studied object and an algorithm for the participants’
action, the object’s content can be well assimilated through a certain
organization of the interaction. Within this approach, model tools are

therefore recognized as a decisive factor in pupils’ learning and their
development.
Conflict. One factor of considerable importance in the effective
organization of cooperative activity is the artificially created conflict
situation, which forces the participants in cooperative work to revise
their customary way of interacting and opens up new possibilities for
solving the assigned problem.
Play as cooperative activity. Findings show that preschool
and elementary school children’s play interaction increases their
motivation in solving mathematical and certain other types of pro-
blems, improves their cognitive activity, and promotes the develop-
ment of imaginative thinking, among other benefits (Zhikalkina
1986; Koroviakovskaia and Iudina 1980; Matiushkin 1982;
Mukhina 1975; Smolentseva 1987; Elkonin 1978).
Guided by these assumptions regarding the factors governing
the effectiveness of cooperative activity, we developed
a methodology for studying the positional approach to organizing
cooperative activity and three methodologies for studying the
object- and content-related approach. Before and after every
group experiment, the subjects underwent a diagnostic process
to determine how systematic their learning actions were (this
process included the Series of Rings and Constructing Series of
Rings experiments described in Part I, Chapter 4). Those children
diagnosed as having Level III systematicity went on to participate
in further studies. These subjects were then evaluated using one
of the approaches to organizing cooperative activity. The effec-
tiveness of each factor was determined based on the number of
subjects that attained Level I or II systematicity as a result of their
cooperative work.
A total of 88 first and second graders from Moscow’s School
No. 91 took part in the study.
Positional distribution and its influence on the development
of cognitive learning actions. These experiments tested the fac-
tors of position, conflict, and play. Eighteen subjects (3 in each
group) took part in this experiment. Each group was given the task
of constructing a series out of seven rings, selecting them in turn out

of a large total set of rings. The experimenter put the first ring into
the series as a reference point, and this series differed from the
diagnostic series in terms of the sizes of the rings.
The positions were distributed as follows: the first subject was
assigned the position of focusing on the outer diameter of the ring;
the second, on the inner diameter; and the third, on the place
occupied by a given ring within the series. The introduction of this
third position was necessary because the parameter “place within the
series” is a special feature of a system that has to be taken into
account when arranging an object-related series out of a large num-
ber of elements. The experiment was conducted in play form, with
points being earned for each correct move. Whether or not a move
was correct was assessed by the subjects themselves. Furthermore,
the subjects judged both their own work and the work of the other
participants only from the position that the experimenter had
assigned them. This situation created the potential for conflict due
to clashes between the subjects’ various positions. This conflict was
expected to promote the discovery of the principle governing the
problem’s structure for all participants in the exercise.
As a result of this experiment, 11 percent of subjects advanced to
Level II systematicity of learning actions and 27 percent advanced to
Level I. The overall rate of advancement was 38 percent.
One important finding that emerged was the following: the
majority of subjects who advanced had been assigned a different
position in cooperative activity than they had occupied before the
experiment, during the diagnostic procedure (83 percent of the
subjects who advanced). Almost all subjects who had been
focused on the outer diameter of the rings during the diagnostic
phase and on the inner diameter during cooperative activity
advanced to a higher level of learning action systematicity. This
suggests that not only positional conflict but also the adoption of
a different position (in this case, one assigned by the experimen-
ter) promotes identification of connections among an object’s
(problem’s) essential features. This factor should also be taken
into account in organizing effective ways of developing
systematicity.
In our search for ways to improve instructional effectiveness,

we developed three object- and content-related methods that
incorporated various combinations of effectiveness factors.
Object- and content-related distribution and its influence on
developing cognitive learning actions.
Method 1 (Object- and Content-Related Distribution)

Twenty subjects participated in the experiment using this metho-
dology, 2 per group. The primary factor forming systematicity in
this method was the distribution of operations and model tools
(graphic schemata).
This way of organizing cooperative activity achieved object-
relatedness through the action of measurement. Unlike experi-
ments using the positional method, where the participants in
cooperative work were all assigned a focus on a particular feature
of the object (the outer or inner diameter of the ring), even though
their actions involved the entire object (the ring), in this experi-
ment, subjects operated either with the outer or the inner diameter
of the ring.
The group was given a series consisting of four rings (but not
the same series as in the diagnostic procedures) and a set of sticks
of various lengths lying in random order. One participant used
a stick to measure the outer diameter of the ring and the other, to
measure the inner diameter. The subjects then used these sticks to
make a figure (a cross) before moving on to measuring the
diameter of the following ring. When they were done, they had
a series of four crosses that constituted an object-related schema
of the series of four rings.
The subjects were then assigned the task of transferring the
series of crosses to a drawing. In other words, they had to draw
a graphic schema. Each cross had to be depicted in one of four
squares on the drawing.
During the second stage of the experiment, the drawing that
the children had made was taken away and they were given
a readymade schema that showed a different pattern that altered
two essential features. The experimenter asked the subjects to
perform the reverse operation: to use the readymade schema to

arrange a series of sticks and, based on this series, to construct
a series of rings.
In this experiment, 5 percent of subjects advanced to Level II
systematicity of action and 35 percent advanced to Level I.
To find the reason for such a modest improvement, we
analyzed the experimental transcripts. The first thing we
noticed was that the process of constructing the schema
based on the physical series was difficult for the first graders.
Often, not understanding what a schema was, they tried to
literally move the cross made of sticks onto the paper. First
grader Inara I. picked up a cross and attempted to put it into
the first square: “But it doesn’t fit….” Some subjects had
difficulty correlating the schema they had drawn and the
physical series they were given. For example, they were not
able to answer when asked what the horizontal and vertical
sticks in each cross represented, forgetting the fact that they
had used a horizontal cross to measure the outer diameter of
the ring and a vertical one to measure the inner diameter.
Based on these findings we concluded that before the sys-
tematicity of cognitive learning actions could form in first
graders, they would have to learn how to work with
a schema.
Overall, based on the results of the study using this methodol-
ogy, it can be concluded that in a number of cases collectively
distributed activity that introduces a model tool of organization
promotes learning action systematicity, but improving the effec-
tiveness of learning requires that other factors be introduced into
the experiment.
Method 2: (Object- and Content-Related Distribution)

A total of 18 subjects participated in this experiment, 2 per
group. The primary factors governing the effectiveness of
cooperative activity were the distribution of operations, the
use of model tools, and the redistribution of procedures
involving the object. The experimental procedure was almost
exactly the same as that of the second experiment, but when

the children put together the physical series based on the
schema, they exchanged operations. In other words, the par-
ticipant who measured the rings’ external diameter when the
schema was being created now measured the internal dia-
meter, and vice versa.
An amendment was made to the instructions to help the chil-
dren learn to work with a schema. Now, the experimenter pointed
out to the schoolchildren the similarity between the series of rings
and the series of crosses arranged based on it and the similarity
between the drawing and the series of rings. The experimenter
also asked the children to indicate the difference between the
schema and the physical series. The indicators of learning using
this method were higher than those obtained in the previous
experiments. In 44 percent of cases, subjects advanced to Level
I systematicity of action: they demonstrated an ability to construct
a new problem based on the discovered principle of the connec-
tion between elements. The subjects began having an easier time
assimilating the concept of a schema, and in a number of cases
they clearly formulated the fundamental distinction between the
schemata they drew from the one they were given by the experi-
menter. As first grader Tanya V. commented: “In this drawing the
cross’s horizontal and vertical sticks get smaller, while in the
picture that we made together, the horizontal sticks get smaller
but the vertical ones get bigger.”
One hindrance to the learning process was some subjects’ lack
of interest in the experiment.
For example, first grader Seryozha K., when measuring the
rings’ outer diameters, acted haphazardly, picking up a stick
at random. Seryozha’s partner, first grader Anton A., attempted
to correct his mistake: “Can you really use that stick to mea-
sure? Take the other one.” Seryozha: “I can use this one; that’s
how I want to do it. And anyway, I don’t have time, I’m
hurrying to the poetry contest.”
To motivate the children, a play situation was introduced into the

cooperative activity.
Method 3 (Complex of Effectiveness Factors)

A total of 32 subjects participated in this experiment, 2 per group.
In this case, the task was to discover the influence a complex of
factors had on how effectively systematicity was formed. The
following primary factors were examined: the distribution of
operations; model tools; the redistribution of object-related pro-
cedures; conflict between a schema of action and a physical
series; a game, which was used in all stages of the fourth experi-
ment (for every move — whether constructing a schema or
selecting the right stick for measuring — a point was either
added or subtracted from a participant’s score). All these factors,
except for the game, were introduced into the experiment one
after the other.
The procedures started out exactly as in the two previous experi-
ments. A conflict was then introduced: the children were presented
with another set of rings and a graphic schema, one that could not
be used to construct a physical series out of the available rings.
This set of objects consisted of six rings arranged in a random order
whose external diameters were constant while the internal dia-
meters varied. In the graphic schema, both diameters varied: mov-
ing from left to right, the vertical and horizontal lines became
shorter and shorter. The children were asked to select rings from
this set to match the schema and to cooperatively construct a series
out of them. If the subjects arrived at the conclusion that the series
did not fix the schema, the experimenter then asked them to draw
a schema that matched the physical series.
After completing these exercises, both participants were simul-
taneously given three schemata (drawings of crosses) that
matched three physical series. The experimenter asked the chil-
dren to select the two out of three schemas in which two features
differed: both the horizontal and vertical lines.
The subjects managed to successfully complete all of these
tasks and were given one more: one participant in the interaction
had to independently draw a schema of crosses that had not
previously been given, and the other, based on that schema, had
to construct a matching series of rings.
The most significant advance in forming systematicity was

achieved during this concluding experiment: after performing this
cooperative work, 56 percent of subjects advanced to Level
I learning action systematicity. As a result, the level of learning action
rose systematicity overall to 66 percent of the children involved in the
study.
In fact, even when the subjects were still in the process of
performing their cooperative work, it was evident that they were
developing systematicity. Their verbal utterances in particular
offered evidence of this. For example, many of them were able
to clearly formulate the difference between the three schemata
(the one given to them by the experimenter and the two that they
themselves had drawn).
Second grader Katya K.: “In the first drawing, the horizontal
sticks get smaller, but in the third one they’re the same; the vertical
sticks in the first drawing get bigger, but in the third one they get
smaller. That means that the first drawing is different from the
third one in two ways.” Experimenter: “And what about in the
series of rings?” Katya K.: “It’s the same. After all, the drawings
look like the series of rings that we constructed, except they have
holes and circles, while here we have sticks.”
One of the criteria for measuring learning action systematicity
was children’s ability to realize on their own that a conflict had
made it impossible to construct a series based on the schema they
had been given.
After carefully studying the schema, second grader
Mika M. picked up two rings and held them up next to one
another: “You can’t pick rings based on this drawing since the
wheels are the same on the outside.” His partner, second grader
Misha G.: “Here we need to make a different drawing that fits.” In
a number of cases, subjects arrived at similar conclusions only
after a failed attempt to construct a series and leading questions
from the adult. Experimenter: “What do you think: did you con-
struct it correctly?” Second grader Anton E.: “Oh, right: these
rings are all the same, but in the drawing, they aren’t.”
Experimenter: “Then make a correct drawing.” Second grader
Tikhon K.: “So that means that I have to draw sticks that are the
same and you have to draw ones that get smaller and smaller.”
The exercise where the children had to draw a new schema and
construct a physical series based on it proved to be the most
difficult. Here is one example where this task was handled
correctly:
First grader Leva K.: “Now I’m going to draw one where the
vertical sticks are equal and the horizontal ones get smaller.
There wasn’t one like that yet.” After looking at his partner’s
drawing, first grader Ilya G. addressed the experimenter: “From
these, you can’t pick a ring that fits the drawing; give us other
rings where the inner circles are equal.”
Subjects who performed all the tasks in this multi-faceted study

advanced to Level I learning action systematicity.
Relative effectiveness of ways of organizing young school-
children’s cooperative and individual activity. In order to com-
pare the effectiveness of cooperative and individual activity in
developing learning action systematicity, we conducted an additional
study to investigate the formation of systematicity in each subject
individually using a special method designed for individual
instruction.
First and second graders from Moscow’s Schools No. 637 and
91 participated in this experiment, a total of 21 children.
The activity of individual subjects was organized following the
object- and content-related approach used for cooperative activity
during the Complex of Effectiveness Factors experiments. The
individual and cooperative activity was similar in that both incor-
porated model tools and conflict as factors. The experimental
procedures differed in that individual activity could not include
such factors as the distribution of operations, the exchanging of
procedures, and play. The absence of a competitive motive was
compensated for by the fact that the subject had to accumulate
a certain number of points that were earned based on how
successfully operations were completed. The sequence of proce-
dures here was the same as during the cooperative activity: each
individual child independently produced a schema, measuring the
elements of the physical series based on essential features, and
then, using the prepared schema, constructed an analogous
physical series. Next, they were supposed to identify the mis-

match between the physical series and a schema they had been
given (the conflict) and produce a schema that matched the series.
The results demonstrated the significant educational advantages
of cooperative distributed activity.
The main findings of the experimental study to determine the
most effective ways of forming Level I learning activity systema-
ticity are summarized in Table 8.
These findings suggest the following conclusions.
First, a comparison of the method incorporating elements of
the positional way of distributing cooperative activity and the
method incorporating elements of the object- and content-related
type of distribution (Nos. 1 and 2) show that the latter has certain
advantages over the former when it comes to forming learning
action systematicity (the respective advancement indicators were
38 versus 40 and 44 percent of cases).
Second, comparing methods No. 1 and 2 to the complex method
showed that all examined effectiveness factors (distribution of
operations, model tools, exchange of object-related procedures,
Table 8
Relative effectiveness of different ways of organizing children’s

activity.
Number of subjects (%)

advancing from Level III
learning action systematicity to
a higher level
Method Level I Level II
Individual Learning 20 0
Positional Distribution 27 11
Object- and Content-Related Distribution (No. 1) 35 5
Object- and Content-Related Distribution (No. 2) 44 0
Complex of Effectiveness Factors (No. 3) 56 10
conflict, play) significantly improved the effectiveness of group

learning in cases where they were introduced into an experiment in
conjunction with one another, as a complex (66 percent of subjects
advanced when the complex method was used).
Third, given the above findings and bearing in mind the dis-
covery that the level of learning action systematicity is associated
with young schoolchildren’s classroom performance, it is advisa-
ble to make use of methods such as the Complex of Effectiveness
Factors as propaedeutic methods for 6–10-year-olds.
Forming cognitive learning actions with the help of personal
computers. The computerization of instruction brought about as
part of educational reform has confronted educators with the task of
developing effective propaedeutic methods in the form of computer
programs. The computer is a specific tool for organizing children’s
cooperative activity in various forms and presents new opportunities
both for participants to interact as a group and for them to manip-
ulate systematic objects in the construction process. In particular,
there are programs that use play techniques and methods. There is
evidence for the developmental effect of didactic computer games
and the benefits offered by incorporating play elements into learning
situations, especially in the system of preschool education and in the
early grades of elementary school. Using computers for propaedeutic
purposes can be particularly beneficial.
We have developed a cycle of computer applications
designed for forming Level I learning action systematicity in
6–10-year-olds.17
All of these applications were designed as constructor games in
which material was presented in accordance with a certain logic
to enable the organization of cooperative activity of the object-
and content-related type and the distribution of actions among
participants. The cycle was designed to combine applications
depending on children’s age and diagnosed starting level of
learning action formation, as well as the pace at which they
were developing the ability to solve problems involving
a connection between two essential features (conditions). This
cycle of computer applications, which was designed in accor-
dance with children’s intellectual development, facilitates the
assimilation of classroom material and enables improved class-

room performance in young schoolchildren.
Computer diagnostic method. A computerized version of the
diagnostic method described in Part I, Chapter 4 (the Series of Rings
and Constructing New Series methods), was used. The computerized
version made it possible to discover and analyze subjects’ activity as
they were in the process of manipulating various kinds of systematic
objects. This ability came about as a result of subjects’ relative
freedom in operating the keyboard, as well as the wide variability
of solutions in the construction process, which increased the chil-
dren’s interest in the work and their effort to act independently.
As an example, first grader Misha V. said: “I didn’t pick the right
ring; I’ll fix that now, but don’t help me!” When he was construct-
ing the third series he exclaimed: “And now you’ll be amazed by
the series I’m about to make!” When the non-computerized version
of the diagnostic method was being used, the experimenter often
had to ask subjects whether they could construct series out of the
set they had been given. However, when they were working on
a computer the subjects would already be busy with that task
before the question could be asked. For example, before he had
even constructed the first series, first grader Seryozha
K. exclaimed: “I can construct lots of series!”
Crucially, computerized diagnosis allows educators to test an
entire class in a relatively short time, thereby identifying every
single child needing help and determining what method should be
used to raise their level of learning action systematicity.
The results of the computerized testing of 62 subjects proved
to be comparable to the findings obtained with the non-
computerized version of this method. This confirms the reliability
of this diagnostic instrument.
The didactic cycle comprised computer applications in the
form of constructor games. The cooperative activity was orga-
nized based on the effectiveness factors previously described. The
computer enabled the creation of vivid visual models of the
object, as well as models of the wide variety of children’s inter-
actions. The limitations that a computer program imposes on the
actions of partners in the game led to actions creating educational

content-related conflict. The computerized form of the game
heightened the developmental effect of the game in children of
young school age.
The need to develop an entire complex of educational
methods was confirmed by the experimental testing of one
of the constructor games (Let’s Build a Car), which was used
in both computerized and non-computerized versions. A total
of 42 subjects took part in the experiment (a preschool class
from Kindergarten No. 729 and first graders from School No.
91). The game comprised two methods. In the first, subjects
building the body of a car out of sections had to coopera-
tively (taking turns) select the element needed for
a particular part and install it in the correct position so that
it did not extend beyond the car’s outline and correctly fit
with the other sections. As an example, illustrating children’s
cooperative activity in the process of the computerized con-
struction we offer a description of the second method used in
the game (Putting Wheels on the Car). The game was
designed to teach children to focus on the connection
between two features of an element (in this case, the large
and small circumferences of a tire) by adding elements to
a systematic object, as well as to start developing the ability
to work with a schema.
The conditions under which the goal was realized included:
a) the introduction of a graphic schema, the exchange of
operations, and the facilitation of a conflict situation; and b)
the selection of elements out of a set, some of which “fit” and
others of which did not.
Object-related building material. The body constructed dur-
ing the previous exercise was of a sports car without wheels.
Only the rear and front fenders and the ends of the axles to
which the wheels were to be attached were represented. Each
place for a wheel (Nos. 1 and 2) was represented by the combi-
nation of the arc of the fender (X1, X2) under which a chosen
wheel has to fit based on the size of the outer diameter, and the
end of the axle (Y1, Y2), to which that same wheel had to fit
based on its inner diameter. Meanwhile, the X1 arc was smaller
than the X2 arc, and the end of the axle Y1 was larger than the
end of the Y2 axle. This meant that (X1, Y1) and (X2, Y2) were
object-related schemata that had to be used to select the correct
wheel.
There was a total of eight wheels to choose from, simulta-
neously presented in random order. There were four for place No.
1: one that fit only in terms of the inner diameter; one that fit only
in terms of the outer diameter; and two that fit in terms of both
the outer and inner diameters; and there were four for No. 2: one
that fit only in terms of the outer diameter; one that fit only in
terms of the inner diameter and two that fit neither place in terms
of either the inner or outer diameter.
The outer diameter of wheel No. 9 was much smaller than
the arc of the bumper for place No. 2, and the inner diameter
was much larger than the end of the place No. 2 axle. This
wheel was only presented after the children became convinced
in the process of searching that they did not have a wheel for
place No. 2.
This game was played by two children. Both subjects started
out selecting a wheel for place No. 1 and then for place No. 2. If
they selected a wheel that did not fit, it would fall away when
they tried to insert it. The game was divided into two stages.
During the first stage, each participant had a full set of operable
keys that they could use to play the game. In this case, the
children were playing with one another, which introduced an
element of competition. This aspect of the application is illu-
strated by a brief computer script written as instructions for the
subjects.
How the game unfolds depends on the subjects’ actions
(installation of the front wheels).
Version 1. The wheel is correctly installed (after the correct
actions of either player).
Version 2. The wheel is incorrectly placed (after the incorrect
choice by either player).
Table 9
Instructions on the screen.
Text Picture
1. Here are the outer diameters of the 1. The wheel’s outer diameters flash.
wheel. They are different.
2. Which wheel has an outer diameter 2. The wheels are rolling toward the
that fits the car’s semi-circle? semi-circles in a disorderly manner.
3. Whoever is sitting on the left should fit 3. The outer diameters of the wheel
the wheel based on the outer edge. and the car’s semi-circles flash.
That child will be called the outer
edge mounter.
4. And here are the wheels’ inner 4. The wheel’s inner diameters flash.
diameters. They are also different
(some are bigger, some are smaller).
5. The wheels are installed on the axle 5. The wheels crowd around the axle in
based on these openings. a disorderly manner (as if they are
all trying to get onto it).
6. Whoever is sitting on the right should 6. The wheels’ outer diameters and the
fit the wheel based on the size of the ends of the axles flash.
inner opening. That child will be called
the inner edge mounter.
7. First, the outer edge mounter will put 7. The front semi-circle and the entire
in a wheel that fits the front bumper. outer diameter of the wheel light up.
8. Then you will take turns. 8. No pictures.
Table 10
Feedback after su ccessful solution.
Text Picture
1. The wheel fits! Good job! 1. The wheel is attached to the car.
2. And now the other player places 2. The car turns to face the other way,
the front wheel. showing the opposite side.
The first stage concluded when both front wheels were in

place. During the second stage, the set of operations by each
subject was limited in that each of them had the ability to operate
Table 11
Feedback after unsuccessful solution.
Text Picture
1. No text. 1. Attempts to put the wheel in its place but

unsuccessful, and the wheel falls away from the car.
2. Now it’s the other 2. The picture resets to the original image: the
players turn! unsuitable wheel returns to its previous position
among the other wheels.
with only one feature (the outer or inner diameter) of an element

(a wheel). After a cooperative discussion or cooperative attempts,
the players would realize that the set did not contain a suitable
wheel (the introduction of a conflict situation). At this point they
were given wheel No. 9 and asked to adjust its size so that it will
fit place No. 2.
The players each had their own limited set of keys they could
use to choose one of three sizes (large, medium, and small) for
both the outer and inner diameter of a wheel. They adjusted the
size of the parameter (the outer or inner diameter) that they could
control until the wheel fit where it needed to go. They wound up
with a wheel that fit in terms of both parameters, and then
the second rear wheel was installed in the same way on the
other side of the car. At this stage, the computer assesses the
players’ cooperative activity. In other words, it is as if the two
children are playing with the computer.
This method demonstrated that using a computer improves the
effectiveness of cooperative learning activity in young
schoolchildren.
Crucially, the computer was able to record every attempt that
was made by the children as the object was being constructed,
something that is extremely difficult when children are manipu-
lating physical objects but that is essential for selecting the right
combination of educational methodologies for each group of
subjects.
There are two reasons for computers’ effectiveness as educa-

tional tools: working on a computer gives participants greater
independence in group work and increases the competitive
motive. Solving problems on a computer, children are able to
independently manage the selection, placement, and movement of
a system’s elements on the screen using a keyboard, which is
a strong motivating factor. The computer’s instantaneous
response to children’s actions (feedback) gives them a sense
that they are the subjects of their own actions, which also greatly
increases their interest in the work. Improving motivation
undoubtedly mobilizes children’s intellectual abilities, which
makes learning easier and improves its effectiveness. For exam-
ple, many children, even 6-year-olds, remember the entire
sequence of keystrokes needed to select or replace a wheel on
the car after their very first successful attempt.
The following are examples of children’s interactions when
they were working on a computer, excerpted from experimental
transcripts:
Masha D. (when constructing the body of a car): “It’s hard to
tell by looking — or maybe not. I have to choose this one”
(indicates the needed element). Zhanna T.: “But you have to
turn it before putting it in.” Masha D. (when selecting the next
section): “And here, on the screen, does it say where it goes?”
Zhanna T.: “You have to select this little figure — can’t you see
it?” Masha D.: “You always have to turn them around, and
I know which way — you have to turn this figure to the left!”
The following example demonstrates how children resolved

a conflict situation and how they then distributed operations in
selecting a wheel for the car.
Sasha A. (after trying several wheels from the existing set):
“There’s a trap here; none of the wheels in the pile fit!”
Gulya M.: “Yes, we need a different wheel!” After wheel No.
9 appears, Sasha A. compares the sizes of the outer and inner
diameters with the corresponding parameters of the object
schema and tells Gulya: “We both have to change the sizes;
I probably have to increase my diameter so it will fit the car,
and you, Gulya, have to make it so that the wheel fits correctly
on the green square” (the axle’s tip). Gulya M.: “That’s right.
But for that I have to make my diameter smaller. Let’s try it!”
Another example shows the possibility for sign mediation when

working with a keyboard.
Rostislav L.: “Here we need for the wheel to fit the car in terms
of both diameters; I have to press the S key to make my
diameter smaller.” Zhenya L.: “I wonder how — and it’s like
I have to inflate the wheel’s tire; I press the B key, and it makes
my diameter bigger!”
It was specifically this ability to break down an element into

features, to immediately control them, as well as the sign media-
tion of the operations provided by the keyboard, that we see as
the indisputable advantage of using a computer as compared with
physical construction activity.
It should also be noted that this cycle of computer experiments
was designed for schoolchildren in the early grades, who, in the
process of forming the systematicity of learning actions, simulta-
neously acquired computer skills that would prepare them for
information science classes in later grades.
Experimental studies have demonstrated that the methods for
forming learning action systematicity in 6–10-year-olds described
in this chapter are highly effective. They should therefore be
widely tested by kindergarten educators and teachers in the
early grades and then introduced into propaedeutic instruction.
The following recommendations can already be proposed.
Our cycle of methods can be used to develop cognitive learn-
ing actions in 6–10-year-olds and, given the right conditions, can
have a strong educational effect. Since it will be some time before
all preschool and educational institutions are fully equipped with
computers, we recommend the use of either of these forms of
instruction (computerized or non-computerized). These forms can
be used either separately or in conjunction with one another. Of
course, the ultimate purpose of using the developmental methods
described in this chapter is forming in all the children in the lower
grades a full-fledged Level I learning action systematicity: the
ability to solve problems designed around the connection
between essential features confidently, consciously, and on the

mental plane. Therefore, it is not only children with Levels IV,
III, and II systematicity who need propaedeutic instruction, but
also those diagnosed as having Level I systematicity that is not
complete or stable (see Part I, Chapter 4).
In describing these computer applications, we refer to the
specific ages and levels of learning action systematicity of the
children for whom they are designed. In doing so, our intention is
not to strictly limit the use of these applications. The necessary
combination of methods used for a particular child is highly
individual. These combinations can change during the learning
process depending on a child’s performance. Furthermore, learn-
ing can take place in several stages using various combinations of
methods, something that often proves necessary in working with
6-year-olds and children with Level IV learning action
systematicity.
It should be noted that computerized learning can obviously
not be fully automated, at least for 6-year-olds and the pupils in
early grades. The dialog between the computer and the child
often requires the assistance of an adult. In some cases, the
children need to have the instructions on the display read to
them, and they also need to have mistakes using the keyboard
corrected, as in the following examples.
First grader Margarita K., after undergoing computerized diag-
nosis, asked: “What’s written here? I’m not good at reading.”
While constructing a series, she kept turning to the experimen-
ter: “What button should I press now? I forget.” Third grader
Andrei A. pressed the wrong key and a frame appeared on the
screen indicating that the session had ended: “Oh, no! How can
I get back? I wanted to construct another series.”
Ten percent of studied first graders had difficulty caused by their

inability to immediately manipulate (measure, move, etc.)
a system’s elements. First grader Natasha Kh. tried to use her
fingers to measure and thereby compare two of the rings on the
screen before choosing one: “If only I could pick them up!” This
attests to the fact that working with a computer is difficult for
those children, primarily first graders, who have yet to form the
mental plane of action.
All this suggests that when computers are used to diagnose and
teach young schoolchildren, some of them will need an additional
training series specially designed to prepare them to follow the
instructions and operate a keyboard. Otherwise, the lack of these
abilities could reduce their interest in the experiment, thereby
limiting the advantages of using computers for educational
purposes.
Using computers to develop the systematicity of cognitive
learning actions in 6–10-year-olds requires detailed study and
thoughtfully organized research. Such research is currently
being planned.
We have reached the following conclusions regarding the
factors that increase the effectiveness of cooperative activity:
1. The genesis and development of cognitive learning actions in young

schoolchildren largely depend on how cooperative learning actions
involving interaction among children or between children and adults
are organized. These actions must be organized in a way that:
involves the distribution and exchange among participants of opera-
tions that correspond to the structure of the studied object; intro-
duces into the activity models as tools that enable coordination of
their individual procedures; provokes conflict situations that compel
participants to restructure familiar ways of interacting; and incorpo-
rates play forms of cooperative work.
2. Six–10-year-olds require targeted methods for forming the systema-
ticity of cognitive learning actions. Because children lacking this
ability have poor academic performance, diagnostic methods that
can be used to determine the level of learning action systematicity in
young school children should be introduced into educational prac-
tice. Also needed are educational methods that prepare children to
assimilate an educational course by forming their ability to identify
the relationship between two essential features of an object (ele-
ments in a system) in problems designed based on the nature of such
relationships, as well as the ability to transfer their understanding of
such relationships in solving problems of the same class.
3. Computers are an effective tool for diagnosing and developing

cognitive learning actions, as they enable the dynamic transforma-
tion of an object (objective structures) so as to facilitate the search
for content-related characteristics and properties.
Chapter 3: Ways of Interacting as Indicators of the Search for

Learning Problem Solutions
Psychological research into problem solving by groups primarily
compares how an individual and a group solve one and the same
problem, as well as particular ways of organizing cooperative
forms based on one or another law governing the functioning of
groups. Furthermore, the primary focus of this research is socio-
psychological phenomena such as the dividing up and distribu-
tion of functions and roles among participants in a group and the
influence of interpersonal communication situations on the emer-
gence of productive cognitive activity in members of a group, on
how well the group functions, and on the link between a group’s
interpersonal relationships and the results it achieves. Much less
frequently investigated are forms of cognitive group interaction.
One striking example of instrumental modeling in an experi-
ment investigating cooperative activity uses the “Homeostat”
method (Novikov 1981). In this method, a group of operators
with cooperative control of needle indicators (their own and their
partners’) manage, through a coordinated effort, to move a needle
to a particular position while focused only on their own indicator.
From a control panel, the experimenter has the ability to monitor
the subjects’ actions and record the parameters of their activity.
The experimenter is also able to regulate the partners’ interde-
pendence by changing their interconnection coefficient and intro-
duce discord into the system of subjects’ actions, thereby creating
a sense of conflict and tension within the group. Unfortunately,
the methodological potential of this method was not fully realized
and the study’s authors were primarily interested in the effective-
ness of the style of managing the group, as well as the price
(degree of emotional tension) paid for interpersonal interaction by
each member of the group. Another instrumental method for
modeling group work, the “cybernometer” (Obozov 1981), had

participants with different levers cooperatively solve a problem
getting through a labyrinth as quickly as possible or solve
a perceptual-thought problem in which they had to determine
the outline of objects (letters).
These studies identified various factors promoting effective
cooperation relating to both the process of group functioning
and the features of the individuals taking part in the cooperative
problem solving. They also traced the extent to which group
problem-solving depends on the number of elements in
a problem, how these elements are connected, and how roles
are distributed among different members of the group. These
dependency measures were used to demonstrate the possibility
of experimentally managing the process of cooperative work.
Most researchers primarily attribute a marked improvement in
the effectiveness of group problem solving to the special features
of communication and the functioning of roles within the group.
Certain successful sets of roles for participants in cooperative
problem solving have been identified: “the planner” (researches
the problem’s conditions and plans attempts to solve it), “the
executive” (makes attempts to solve the problem), “the critic/
monitor” (checks how well the execution corresponds to the
intention and assesses the solution), “the leader” and “the
led” — all of whom are assigned their roles in advance at the
start of the experiment (Danilova 1983; Tsukanova 1981;
Shcherbo 1984). However, in studies by Ia.A. Ponomarev
(Ponomarev 1981), attempts to impose a particular role on part-
ners in advance were unsuccessful, and a stable role structure was
achieved only during the starting and concluding phases of sol-
ving a creative problem; during the remaining phases, this struc-
ture proved too unstable. Ponomarev believes that the way in
which functional roles are spontaneously distributed within
a group is largely determined by the individual traits of the
partners. According to findings by N.P. Shcherbo, when roles
are differentiated spontaneously in a group of equal participants,
there is usually either an assertive appropriation of the role of
intellectual leader by one of the partners or a mutually agreed
upon distribution of roles. When participants have mutual regard

for each other’s intellectual capabilities, they tend to shy away
from rigidly fixed roles and exchange roles by mutual consent
(Shcherbo 1984). This suggests that effective role differentiation
is achieved when there is consensus on how to divide up and
restructure roles, which allows management of the problem-
solving process to move flexibly from one partner to another.
On the other hand, insufficient agreement regarding actions
between strong partners pretending to leadership causes their
struggle to dominate, and cooperative activity turns into
a competition rather than problem solving.
Other phenomena have been identified as undermining inter-
action, manifested primarily in the disruption of communication
(Kuchinskii 1981) and the dominance of expressive interpersonal
activity over the cognitive process of analysis (Tsukanova 1985).
However, when intellectual problems are being solved, it is
specifically the cognitive aspect of interaction that is of decisive
significance for the successful realization of cooperative activity.
Particularly worthy of attention in this regard are factors influ-
encing the effectiveness of the cognitive search for cooperative
solutions to problems. One such factor is the partners’ summar-
ization of their cognitive experience. This involves not only the
summarization of information, but also discussion of an expanded
field of alternatives and hypotheses and of changing the types of
group strategies for seeking a solution. B.F. Lomov has estab-
lished that group decision-making is predominated by
a “focusing” strategy, whereby several of the most divergent
hypotheses are chosen from the totality of those proposed and
become the focus of the group’s attention (Lomov 1980). In
individual problem solving, a “scanning” strategy is often used,
which involves considering many hypotheses one after another.
Obozov has found that, from the standpoint of individual con-
tributions by members of a group, the pairs with homogeneous
and balanced problem solving using a cooperative strategy that is
the combined result of the partners’ individual strategies are the
most successful (Obozov 1981). An example of this sort of
cognitive complementing of one another by participants in
group decision-making is the situation where individual members

“personify” various systems of relationships and qualities of the
studied object (Putliaeva and Sverchkhova 1982). This personi-
fication serves to distribute the object of cognition among the
members of the group, which, on one hand, makes problem
solving easier, but, on the other, can make partners “blind and
deaf” to one another or leads them to differ among themselves
over issues of content. These destructive aspects can be partially
attributed to the specific nature of group interaction during closed
and open stages of decision making (Matiushkin 1982), as well as
to different members of a group going through different phases in
the solving of a creative problem at different times, thereby
undermining the unified focus on content (Protopopov 1974).
The emergence of content-related disagreements among part-
ners is one of the most significant factors promoting group
cooperation. G.M. Kuchinskii has shown that both when an entire
group is in agreement and shares a common perspective and
when its members’ perspectives are completely and immovably
incompatible, dialog–the interaction of points of view — comes
to a halt (Kuchinskii 1981). However, achieving a unified per-
spective about what has to be done and in what order is an
absolutely essential aspect of the emergence of true cooperation.
Having a gap between participants’ positions can serve as
a determinant of genuine communication: partners arrive at coop-
erative activity more quickly and they are more focused on
determining one another’s contribution and achieving consensus
(Kuchinskii 1981).
The subjective productivity of people’s thinking when they
work in a group merits special examination. An important aspect
of this examination is identifying the psychological conditions
under which thinking develops in cooperative activity: the emer-
gence of productive cognitive activity; the orientation of indivi-
dual cognitive activity toward a partner, which improves its
structure, level of awareness, and validity; and the intensification
of the actions of reflection, planning, control, and assessment.
Research into the development of children’s intellect carried out
by V.V. Rubtsov and his colleagues has shown that cooperation is
the very source of mental development (Ageev, Davydov, and

Rubtsov 1985; Rubtsov 1987). Within the cooperative learning
action, cooperation “constitutes an integral part of an object’s
mediation through action and is involved in processes whereby
the schemata of work with the object that had previously taken
shape in the child are transformed” (Rubtsov 1982, 152). This
research has blazed a new trail in the study of cooperative actions
from the perspective of forming cognitive learning activity, which
establishes a connection between the relationships of participants
in cooperative activity and the relationships of the object, which
constitute the content of the corresponding intellectual operations.
From this standpoint, the form of partners’ cooperation is inter-
preted as the specific modeling of the content of realized intel-
lectual operations in the make-up of the relationships of
participants in the activity. This approach enables the formation
of the required level of cognitive learning actions in children by
dividing up integral group activity in a particular way, distribut-
ing this activity among children, and organizing the specific ways
in which they interact.
Problem. Research into cooperative cognitive learning activity
has established that the posing and solving of a learning problem
requires participants to analyze the basis of their cooperative work
and search for new ways to organize it. This orientation toward the
basis of the cooperative action being constructed, which is specific
to the reflective mechanisms of children’s collective thinking, does
not, however, always emerge, and depends on a number of special
conditions. The following points have already been established: first,
focusing on how to organize activity is a separate action by its
subject; second, the object of this action is the very way in which
collective-distributed activity is organized (methods of interaction)
and specifically the features of how actions are distributed and
exchanged among its participants; third, the condition under which
this specific action emerges is participants’ search for the connection
between the way in which cooperative action is organized and the
content of the corresponding generalized problem-solving method
for the given class of problems.
In a special study of the mechanisms by which cooperative

actions were organized, we identified three levels of subjects’
interaction and three corresponding levels of the development of
reflection of the way in which an action was organized when
there was an assigned object-related model (Polivanova 1988;
Polivanova, Rubtsov, and Semenova 1987). The first level is
the coordination of individual operations in cooperative action
when the result of interaction can be immediately monitored.
The second is the preservation of an established method for
coordinating individual operations in the absence of a way of
immediately monitoring the result. The third is the restructuring
of an established method by changing the object-related and
operational characteristics of action. The essential difference
between these levels has to do with the specific nature of the
reflective orientation of the partners in interaction: whether it is
focused on the object-related model or how to construct it. If it is
focused on the latter of these, a generalized method for problem
solving takes shape. These conclusions were arrived at using
a perception-and-motion problem in which participants’ interac-
tion involved the rather simple coordination of elementary motion
operations.
The objective of this research was to study the psychological
features of the interaction that took shape when participants used
various strategies for the cooperative solving of combinatorial
problems demanding a rather complex coordination of operations
divided among participants. We were particularly interested to see
how the partners would analyze and plan the overall work and the
reflection of individual actions in relation to the overall schema of
activity given the independent coordination of separate starting
operations.
Method. Our experimental method was designed to provide for
the following organizational aspects: 1) the exercises were to be
sequenced in a way so that the ability to operate with elements of
the object’s structure would gradually become more limited and the
operational structure of their transformation would become increas-
ingly complex; 2) the starting operations were to be divided between
two participants in a way that made it impossible for either to solve

a problem individually and so that specifically these elementary
operations could be used to form the more complex combinations
that were needed; and 3) the restrictions placed on how elements of
the object’s structure could be transformed were intended to make
coordination more complex. Furthermore, in accordance with the
requirements for organizing educational conflict involving
a contradiction between a schema of cooperative action and the
structure of an object obtained using it, outwardly similar methods
of action yielded opposite results or the same transformations of the
object had to be brought about in different ways. This form of
content-related conflict stimulated an active search for new, more
appropriate methods of action.
This research was designed to investigate the operational inter-
action of participants in cooperative problem solving and the
development of this problem solving. To actualize this develop-
ment in the sequence of exercises, the solution of each successive
exercise required that operations be organized into increasingly
complex operational groupings and that these groupings be co-
organized to adhere to a certain algorithm of cooperative action.
Subjects’ design of differing schemata for organizing cooperative
action could be traced based on the changes they made to the
various operational units of cooperative action as the conditions
of activity changed.
Experimental material. The material we selected for our pro-
blem solving was a constructor set of interlocking pieces. The
problem primarily consisted of finding a way to operate the struc-
tural elements that demonstrated a problem-solving method aimed at
putting them in order. The conditions for operating the object were
such that solving the problem consisted less in discovering the basis
for connecting the elements of the object’s structure than finding the
sequence of operations that would provide for the required way of
combining the object’s structural elements.
The problem’s medium was brightly colored elements of
a puzzle out of which subjects had to put together spatial combi-
nations. The problem was displayed on the screen of a Yamaha
educational computer set.18 The problem-solving field, which
was filled by a geometric pattern, looked like a rectangular board

made of identical square elements (a four-by-four arrangement of
vertical and horizontal elements). Each geometric fragment, being
part of a pattern, occupied its own four elements of the board
(two-by-two) and could be shown separately from the other parts
of the pattern. There was a total of four fragments in each version
of the matrix.
After being presented to the subjects, the pattern was
“scrambled” before their eyes after any key on the keyboard
was pressed. The elements of the initial geometric figures appear
on the screen out of order. The scrambling was such that all of the
matrix’s square elements stayed where they were but were rotated
counterclockwise on their axis. This meant that in order to con-
struct the original geometric figures, the matrix elements did not
have to be moved around the field; they just had to be rotated
until the adjoining sides fell back in place. Fully rotating each
element required four strokes of a particular key (in other words,
one keystroke turned an element 90°). All of the pattern’s geo-
metric figures not only belonged in a particular spot; they also
had different colors, which made them easy to distinguish after
they had been scrambled. Two different matrix patterns were used
in the experiment.
There was an operational limitation imposed on rotations of the
matrix elements: each keystroke simultaneously moved three
elements of the matrix that shared a horizontal row or vertical
column by 90°. Which specific elements could be rotated was
determined by pointing to them with one of two cursors: one
could only move along the rows, the other, along the columns.
The fourth element of a row or column located at the intersection
of the row and column indicated by the cursors did not move.
This limitation meant that when assembling one of the pattern’s
four fragments, each rotation of three elements always involved
elements from another neighboring geometric fragment along the
same row or column.
In order to assemble the matrix pattern (either the entire pattern
or part of it), participants in the experiment had to perform the
following actions:
1. Select elements to be transformed. This action consisted in moving

the cursors to the corresponding row or column of the matrix;
2. Determine the element needed to keep in its present place. This
consisted in operations to establish the intersection of the row and
column corresponding to the cursors;
3. Rotate the selected elements until they attained the desired position
through one or more 90° rotations.
Movement of the elements was achieved using the keyboard of

a microcomputer. Keyboard function was arranged in the fol-
lowing way: a) each operation was performed using a particular
key; there were two keys corresponding to the rows and col-
umns; there were four keys that moved the cursors (up, down,
left, right); b) the keys for performing operations of different
sorts were in different zones of the keyboard; c) the keys were
marked with the appropriate symbols — arrows showing the
direction of cursor movements (←, →, ↑, ↓) and of the rotation
of elements of a row () or a column (); and d) all of the
participants’ operations were recorded onto a diskette and
could be replayed by the experimenter after the experiment
concluded.
The cooperative problem solving consisted in two partici-
pants’ effort to restore the pattern of the entire matrix working
within a common field. They each had their own separate set
of operations: one subject had to manipulate both of the
cursors to identify the elements that would be transformed or
Figure 17. Moving elements with cursor.
Figure 18. Restoring the pattern by rotation of elements with cursor.

stay in place; the other had to rotate the identified elements

until they attained the desired position in relation to one
another. The operations needed to solve the problem were
thus divided between the participants, each of whom could
perform only one set of operations, which was insufficient to
solve the problem on its own. However, despite the fact that
the participants had a separate set of operations, they were
forced to act within a common field, which required them to
decide cooperatively which elements to transform and to coor-
dinate their individual operations on the selected elements.
Achieving concurrence and coordination was only possible
given a high level of content-related overcoming of one
another’s limitations.
Experimental exercises. The subjects were given exercises in
a particular order that divided the task of restoring the scrambled
pattern into stages. The more elements were put back in place, the
more limited their ability to move the remaining elements became,
which forced the subjects to conceive increasingly complicated
operational units and increasingly complicated ways of coordinating
individual operations within their cooperative activity.
Exercise 1. Subjects had to restore the upper left portion of the
matrix (which was a red circle in both versions of the experiment)
without considering the position of the elements of the remaining
parts of the overall pattern. Exercise 1 was the easiest, since subjects
were able to freely move all of the matrix’s elements. This exercise
involved the following actions: 1) identify how elements of the
given figure could connect by assessing how their contours would
relate to one another when the elements were in various positions; 2)
appropriately use the original sets of operations by placing the
cursors to indicate the elements that would be transformed and the
element that would not and also by transforming the selected frag-
ments by rotating the indicated elements; and 3) to coordinate
individual operations and agree on the order in which they should
be performed.
Exercise 2. Subjects had to restore the upper right portion of
the matrix (a white square or two rectangles) while preserving the
figure that had already been restored and without paying attention to
the configuration of the pattern’s other elements. One condition of
this exercise was the limitation that subjects could not manipulate
the four elements of the matrix that had been restored during
Exercise 1. This limitation made the problem much more difficult,
since operating simultaneously with three elements forced subjects
to move from operating single elements to identifying their structural
complexes: rows and columns. Now, in addition to the actions
identified in Exercise 1, they had to identify the operational zone
of the matrix within which the transformed elements were structured.
In particular, in this exercise subjects could only effectively use
vertical elements, those forming columns. Furthermore, actions
were complicated by the need to keep a larger number of elements
in place (to preserve the first figure) and, as a result, devise a stricter
sequence of individual operations with other elements.
Exercise 3. Subjects had to construct the lower left figure (a
black rectangle or pink rhombus) without destroying the two
restored fragments and without considering the positions of elements
in the remaining parts of the matrix. In terms of difficulty, this
exercise was similar to the previous one, but differed from it in
that the structural elements that had to be identified and transformed
were oriented in a different way (they were arranged horizontally, in
a row) and had an even more limited manipulation zone.
Exercise 4. Subjects had to arrange the lower right figure (a
yellow circle or black oval) and thereby complete the pattern’s
restoration. The requirement that the previously constructed figures
not be affected was lifted, since it was impossible to fulfill given the
original limiting condition that elements could only be rotated three
at a time. However, by the end of this exercise, all the figures had to
be back in place. This was the most difficult exercise, and it required
not only the identification of integral units of the structure, but also
the devising of more complex operational combinations that would
enable the target transformations of various structural sets. These
combinations of original operations, organized in a particular
sequence, clustered operations targeting clusters of elements to be
transformed. We identified several combinations of operations that
could be considered standard: a) bringing two, b) three, c) and four
elements of the structure into the same position in relation to the

target state, and d) turning all four elements of an integral structural
unit the same number of rotations, in other words manipulating an
entire row or column.
The fact that the general method for transforming the object’s
structure grew increasingly complex required the subjects to orga-
nize their cooperation — the vehicle for developing problem-
solving strategies — in increasingly complicated ways. The rela-
tionship central to the content of this problem that the subjects had
to identify in their cooperative problem solving was the depen-
dence of the sequence of actions on changes to the degree of
limitation of the zone of object transformation in which the original
operations could be performed. The order of exercises presumed
that the participants’ interaction would develop: from them both
attaining a sense of the original operations divided between them
and the ability to construct from these operations coordinated
sequences of individual contributions, to the coordination of indi-
vidual actions within a shared strategy for transformation, within
which the place of each participant would be clearly defined and
they would monitor and evaluate each other’s actions. This would
culminate in their ultimate mastery of a shared method for operat-
ing any elements on the basis of a holistic transformation that they
would organize, with a schema spelling out the coordinated
sequences of alternating individual operations. It was important
for us to be able to monitor their search for, construction of, and
restructuring of ways of organizing their cooperative action
depending on the nature of their problem-solving strategy through-
out the stages of its formation.
Assessing the organization of group problem solving. We
kept records of such immediately evident procedural characteristics
as the overall time each problem took to solve, the overall number of
operations performed (the computer program allowed us to record
and reproduce every operation performed by each of the partici-
pants), the effectiveness of the solution, the clarity of communication
between participants, the features of partners’ speech and gestures as
they interacted, any conflicts between them, and the notes and
drawings they made.
The analytical criteria used to assess the group effort’s strategies

and types of cooperativeness were: the level of complexity of the
most difficult exercise successfully completed; whether or not the
partners’ cooperative problem-solving strategy featured such
actions as independent attempts to co-organize operations by com-
paring plans for transformative action with the result of that action;
comparisons of actual results with their models; the planning of the
sequence of operations within the structure of the formed coopera-
tive action; the reflection of schemata of detailed sequences of
operations as stable operative units of transformation; and
a content-oriented attitude toward mistakes and their correction.
Thirty pairs of subjects took part in these experiments, ten
pairs each from the third, fifth, and eighth grades of Moscow’s
School No. 91. Since mental processes are best benefitted when
people with mutually positive or neutral relationships collaborate,
we composed our dyads of classmates who expressed a desire to
work with one another.
Results. We should start by noting that subjects of all ages
demonstrated an enduring interest in working under our experimen-
tal conditions. Furthermore, the division of actions between subjects
provoked partners’ clearly expressed mutual attentiveness toward
one another.
It should also be noted that such quantitative characteristics of
the problem-solving process as the overall time and number of
moves proved not to be very indicative in this case, due to
subjects’ large number of mistaken keystrokes. This is why, in
analyzing our experimental results, we relied primarily on the
qualitative aspects of the structuring of moves as cooperation
developed, including the number and nature of specific combina-
tions of individual operations at various stages of decision
making.
The problem-solving process in some cases unfolded as
a sequence of random combinations of individual operations,
while in others, they represented a system of content-related
reflective attempts followed by the planning and realization of
systematic actions. Based on the kinds of strategies used to solve
the problem, the subjects can be divided into three main

categories.
1. Some used an impulsive strategy, whereby partners demonstrated

something that might be described as “field” behavior–with each of
them repeatedly pressing keys to rotate something on the screen in
an uncoordinated manner. In some cases, this was just “playing
around” by subjects before they became involved in problem sol-
ving, or when they took breaks from content-related work. This
playful attitude toward the situation was more characteristic of
older pupils. Young subjects had a more cautious attitude toward
pressing keys, since for them this manipulative activity was of
greater significance and had to be learned. In other cases, this was
a way of becoming familiarized with the situation and of figuring
out how the manipulative operations brought about transformations
on the display screen. This way of assimilating the given conditions
was characteristic of subjects of all ages. For some children, impul-
sive action expressed an actual problem-solving strategy aimed at
attaining the desired result by getting the transformed elements to
match the model, with participants working chaotically and sepa-
rately. This method was most typical of the youngest subjects and to
a lesser extent those who fell in the middle of the age spectrum. In
a number of cases, the problem-solving process never developed
beyond this strategy of impulsiveness, although Exercises 1, 2, and
even 3 were ultimately completed. However, such successes can be
considered a matter of chance, since there was no reflection or
transfer of a particular problem-solving method, and each problem
was approached as if completely new and the problem-solving was
again chaotic. Overall, the impulsive strategy did not involve any
coordinated attempts, mapping out of cooperative action, compar-
ison of that action with its results, or planning of cooperative action.
2. Some used a fragmentary strategy, dominated by efforts to construct
separate fragments of the overall structure out of individual initial
elements, but without thinking ahead about how these fragments
would fit with other fragments once they have been rotated. This
approach was taken by the largest group of subjects and was typical
of subjects of all ages. Subjects began using the fragmentary strategy
when working on Exercise 2, and once formed, this strategy’s
method of combining operations to select one element and rotate
a separate unit of the structure (along a column or row) was trans-

ferred to solving Exercises 3 and 4. The fragmentary strategy is
somewhat grounded in content, since it tests individual ways of
transforming units of the object’s structure and their relationship to
the result. But it is particular, involving a specific set and certain
arrangement of individual elements, but not reflective of a general
method that would provide for a variety of ways to transform the
matrix’s elements. It therefore lacks thoughtful planning of the order
in which the cooperative action’s individual operations should be
performed.
3. Finally, some subjects used a holistic strategy. For them, the entire
process of realizing this strategy was guided by the sole idea of
discovering all the different ways of transforming the object’s struc-
ture. Participants devised a universal strategy based on figuring out
how close the position of each element of a specific set in a unit that
they were planning to transform was to the predicted positions of
corresponding elements in the interim model or in the assigned
model. The partners determined the specific relationships among
elements of the selected unit, determined the extent to which they
deviated from the required position, and sought a series of opera-
tions that could be packaged into operational units to bring elements
of the object’s unit into the same degree of closeness to the required
position. We referred to this method of action as “equalizing the
deviation.” Specific operational units turned out to differ in terms of
their complexity and their inclusion of original individual opera-
tions, depending on the complexity of the exercise and the extent to
which the manipulation of elements of the object field were limited,
as well as in terms of the ways in which the pair of subjects
interacted. However, the way in which these operations were orga-
nized (the schema used to coordinate operations) was the same,
which is what allowed us to see these versions of coordination as
stable units of transformation. In the best cases, the subjects were
able to clearly verbally formulate their solutions. The discovery of
a schema for transforming integral sets of elements, leading to an
understanding of a general method for solving the given problems,
occurred when these subjects were working on Exercise 4. The first
three exercises gradually pushed the subjects to identify a general
method for solving the problem, forming in them preliminary spe-
cific operational units. It should be noted that it was specifically the
realization of holistic strategies that enabled subjects to understand

their mistakes, not only assessing them emotionally, but also analyz-
ing them as the result of the actions they had taken. Only four pairs
of subjects exhibited this holistic problem-solving strategy: three
pairs in the oldest age group and one in the middle group.
By tracing the formation of strategies and how they evolved as

the exercises grew increasingly difficult, we were able to identify
the features of the stages through which the method of coopera-
tive problem solving went. When they were solving Exercise 1,
the subjects identified separate elements of the environment and
interacted with them on the level of isolated individual opera-
tions. At that point, their reflection was aimed at the object, and
there was no awareness of the content of operational possibilities
for manipulating elements. During Exercise 2, reflection was
aimed not at individual elements of the transformed object, but
on the units into which they were organized (the matrix’s rows
and columns). The subjects began to more precisely select and
apply individual operations, and the order in which they were
performed became an object of special consideration. When they
advanced to Exercise 3, the subjects began to form actual coop-
erative actions: some of them began planning the order in which
individual operations would be performed and relate this order to
the object’s transformation. Here, the reflective process was
focused not only on changing the object, but on its connection
to the act of transformation, as well as on the structure of the
operational action that provided for the needed transformation.
When working on Exercise 4, those few pairs who successfully
completed it demonstrated a reflective search for a method of
action: at first, they formulated a theoretical basis for the targeted
transformation and then they constructed a coordinated sequence
of individual operations. Evidently, the overall poor performance
on Exercise 4 across all age groups (only 13 percent of pairs
completed it) had to do with its actual difficulty associated with
the need to construct an appropriate algorithm for manipulating
elements. Furthermore, the computer program used for this series
of experiments did not provide for a special system of sign tools,
which made it harder for subjects to independently construct

a full-fledged learning activity as such using the computer. In
the course of the experiment, the subjects had a hard time tearing
themselves away from the screen, and, as a result, they did not
devise external sign, representational, modeling, and schematiz-
ing tools, which significantly hindered their problem solving.
Breaking down the performance of subjects by age, the third
graders, at best, achieved an ability to identify individual ele-
ments and arrange them, both individually and in simple sets.
None of them managed to complete Exercise 4, although most of
the youngest subjects did manage to complete the first three
exercises.
The fifth graders did better, and one pair succeeded in com-
pleting all four exercises. The main difficulty for this age group
was that they usually limited themselves to a verbal statement of
their understanding of the connection between transformations
and a set of operations, but they were not able to organize active
exploratory tests of various sequences that would uncover this
connection. This is why they were unable to revise the coordina-
tion of individual operations that they had devised when they
advanced to new conditions of activities.
Most of the subjects from the higher grades achieved aware-
ness of or, in some cases, an ability to verbally formulate
a hypothetical general problem-solving method, but they were
unable to realize it by devising a specific algorithm for bringing
the elements into a particular position and a schema for appro-
priately transforming it. As mentioned above, only three pairs
from the higher grades, after solving the problem theoretically,
found a general method of action that allowed them to purpose-
fully construct and restructure any configuration of the structure’s
elements.
In a number of cases, especially in the youngest age group, the
children’s inability to communicate with their partner in coopera-
tive work and the fact that they had not yet developed tools for
object-focused interactions were important factors in the ineffec-
tiveness of their problem solving. Evidently, to promote effective
cooperative activity, experiments have to be organized so as to
provide for a sufficiently broad field of communicative actions

with specially developed supporting tools.
Levels of interaction. As analysis of experimental results has
shown, the extent to which cooperation takes shape is directly tied to
the nature of the problem-solving strategy. An impulsive strategy is
likely to come with a manipulative (mechanical) level of coopera-
tion, manifested in the children taking turns pressing keys. Subjects
kept a close watch to make sure their partner only pressed “their
own” keys; meanwhile, they pressed keys in no particular order,
relying on the random chance of success. The overall number of
keystrokes during this sort of problem solving was exceptionally
high (up to a thousand). This level of interaction was typical of the
youngest age group, especially during the stage when they first
entered the experimental situation and when they were working on
the hardest exercises, at which point the children abandoned the
content-related means of interacting that had taken shape during
the three previous exercises.
The fragmentary strategy, which focused on the transformation
of specific groups of elements, involved a certain “tactical”
cooperation. In this case, subjects reflected grounds for coordi-
nating their operations and attempted to devise from them opera-
tive procedures for a planned transformation. The coordination of
operations in these efforts was rather stable and appropriate to the
required transformation of elements.
Finally, when subjects reached the level of a holistic problem-
solving strategy, they discussed the problem’s content with one
another and attempted to test whether the procedures they devised
were appropriate to the object’s predicted transformations given
increasing limitations in the object-related field of transforma-
tions. This sort of interaction transpired both in the form of
making assumptions and assessing them theoretically (the
sequence of procedures was kept in mind, and the rotations of
elements were sketched in the air over the corresponding sections
of the screen) and in the form of real testing and actual actions.
This was “strategic” cooperation, where partners were able to
plan and relate their interaction to the object and its content
and, when conditions changed, to make revisions.
We should pause to examine the nature of mismatched indivi-

dual operations that frequently arose in the course of problem
solving. These misalignments were observed in all pairs of sub-
jects using all types of strategies, but these uncoordinated actions
had a variety of causes, including: 1) purely mechanical errors
involving pressing the wrong key or the right key but the wrong
number of times; 2) the chaotic execution of individual opera-
tions in those following an impulsive problem-solving strategy;
3) one partner changing his or her prediction of the result of the
procedure and assessment of the planned transformation as the
planned action was being carried out (these cases suffered from
an inability to communicate, expressed in the individual decision-
making); and 4) various sorts of interpersonal conflicts observed
when partners were organizing their cooperative effort.
We intervened whenever partners started making accusations
against one another, squabbling, or pushing one another away
from the keyboard, but maintained a firm policy of allowing
content-related conflicts. We noticed the following three types
of conflicts that were expressed in debates about emerging break-
downs in the coordination of operations. Although it was hard at
times to draw clear lines between one conflict and another, we
have provisionally divided them into the following categories:
1. Conflict over the choice of what to transform, caused by

a disagreement between partners about which elements of the struc-
ture should be transformed, without focusing on the operational
component.
2. Conflict over operations, expressed in conflicting assessments of the
connection between particular sequences of original operations and
the transformation of the matrix’s elements they would presumably
cause.
3. Conflict over actions, arising when partners were devising opera-
tional units out of original operations and comparing different ways
of carrying out a necessary transformation under various experimen-
tal conditions.
These types of conflicts can be designed into the cooperative

action or arise during its spontaneous construction. The condi-
tions for forming a cooperative cognitive learning action should
be designed to provide a way of appropriately resolving conflicts
over content, in particular through the timely elevation of conflict
from a low (in our case, the level of the object) to a higher level
(the level of action). This requires introducing into the problem-
solving process special developmental tools for reflecting the
basis of the action in the form of various sign models and
schemata of the object’s structure and how to operate it. With
this goal in mind, when using computers in experiments, con-
sidering how focused children become on the screen, it is impor-
tant to provide them the ability to freely select and manipulate
various letter, number, and graphic symbols. In our study, the lack
of this ability prevented the schoolchildren from being able to
map out the object and operational transformations.
In summary, the results of our study have led to the following
conclusions:
1. To solve transformative combinatorial problems, it is not enough for

partners in a cooperative effort to identify how the positions of
elements in a structure relate to a provided model. Implementing
the necessary transformations requires the formation of certain trans-
formational units that are universal in terms of the primary method
for connecting individual operations (in an alternating sequence) but
revised (changing their order) in a way appropriate to changes in the
conditions imposed on the material.
2. The level of coordination of the cooperative search, which relies on
a schema of action that participants devise on their own, is deter-
mined by the how well the structure of the object to be transformed
corresponds to the schema of the operations to transform it.
3. Developing a way of solving these problems required participants to
reflect the limitations of individual actions as the structure of the
object became gradually more complete. These limitations could be
overcome by partners planning their interaction and assessing its
effectiveness as they formed and revised ways of coordinating
individual operations.
4. Analysis of the spoken communication between subjects as they

were solving the problem shows that their overall sense of the
cooperative activity was defined by the moments when they turned
specifically to the method of action, in particular when conflict over
objective content arose. Over the course of problem solving, the
partners’ original conceptual positions could change (they would
either be rejected or developed), but the partners would preserve
their unity by forming a shared conceptual perspective on their
interaction aimed at devising a way of solving the problem.
Conclusion
The results described in this book offer an understanding of the
emergence of reflective-theoretical thinking and a sense of the
field of research into this problem. This field is associated with
the exploration of the dialectical mutual mediation of ideas about
constructive contentful analysis, thinking’s planning function,
premeditated searching, and reflection. In essence, what is being
studied here is the genesis of the thought act, which is realized as
the unity of these main components of thinking and arises under
conditions of the specially organized activity of adult and child.
The requirements imposed on the researching and diagnosing of
the bases of reflective thinking and on determining the learning
situations that promote the development of such thinking in
children are therefore far from trivial.
The first group of these requirements is associated with the
choice of material defining the object-related and contentful
basis of the diagnostic situation. Fulfilling these requirements
will ensure that the research process provides for unity
between, on one hand, the logical and psychological basis
of the concrete object (the system of corresponding concepts
and schemata as units of the material under study) and, on the
other, the cognitive learning actions and operations through
which learners can successfully discover the process by
which theoretically generalized knowledge comes about and
ways to use graphic and sign modeling to study the object’s
original relationship.
This group’s requirements include:
Delineating and describing the field of knowledge that constitutes the

concrete object of study by determining its original elements and
their relationships; determining the types of connections between
elements (the axiomatics) that characterize the object as a certain
whole (system);
Determining the logical and object-related context of the object
of assimilation’s existence with the help of a description of the
conditions adequate to bring it about, transform it, and con-
struct it;
Determining the type of sign tools that make it possible to study the
properties of the original relationship in “pure form” and to trans-
form and construct the object of study (object-related, graphic, and
sign/symbol models);
Determining and describing the system of educational and concrete-
practical problems as conditions for analyzing an object by mod-
eling it; determining the conceptual content of educational pro-
blems and ways to assimilate concepts;
Problematizing the conceptual content of problems in a way that, on
one hand, prevents or significantly limits the use of empirical
searching strategies (trial and error), and on the other, makes the
production of problem-solving tools, methods, and techniques
accessible and attainable (the discoverability of the general
relationship).
Because of these requirements, researching and diagnosing the

development of reflective thinking is a complicated and many-
layered system that incorporates: a) an exhaustive set of elements
from the “natural” level of object-relatedness so that the object of
the studied field of knowledge’s essential properties can be
reproduced on the visual-image plane; and b) an exhaustive set
of actions and operations that are “natural” for this object-
relatedness:
Provisions for the voluntary choice of type of action, the pace at

which it will be performed, the level of a problem’s complexity,
and the type of model that will be used to reproduce, transform,
and construct the object of assimilation;
The special planning of searching and trying actions once the instruc-
tions for solving educational and concrete-practical problems have
been assimilated;
Provisions for the ability to model learning actions in the materia-
lized form necessary for a reflective relationship between what is
being learned and the problem-solving method as such. This
means that the ability to effectively imagine the content and the
result of action has to be preserved. To create this situation, the
positedness of concrete-practical goals typical for the solution
stage of concrete practical problems must be “sublated,” and
learners’ ability to perform a broad spectrum of transformations
of the object and reflective actions (various representations, sche-
mata, and signifiers, etc.) must be provided for;
Provisions for the operational representation of problems’ solu-
tions and the ability to record each individual operation
(operation-by-operation monitoring). Such monitoring is
a special diagnostic sub-system that can be immediately built
into the process of the learning activity or partially and func-
tionally separated from it.
Cooperative activity, as the basis for generating content-

reflective thinking, also requires theoretical-experimental
validation, since far from all forms of cooperativeness enable
children’s zone of proximal development. For example, our
research has found that thinking reaches its object through the
special cooperativeness of adults and children (one adult and
a group of children, as well as cooperation within a group of
children themselves) whereby various means of acting with
objects and their differentiation are incorporated into coop-
erative action. In this case, cooperation serves as the original
form of cognitive action mediating the S – O relationship,
and as the cultural medium through which appropriate cultu-
rally significant means of knowledge are cultivated.
Our results offer evidence of the following:
First, the unique nature of the advance from the situation of

adult–child interaction to the generation of the cognitive
learning action based on reflection cannot be explained by
either the “from the external to the internal” or the “from the
internal to the external” formula. This is just a characteristic
of the overall framework determining the direction of devel-
opment. The problem of this advance is a problem requiring
special analysis of forms of cooperativeness, on one hand, and
on the other, the study of the development of various types of
adult–child communion in ontogenesis, culture, and history.
Second, that the genesis of cognitive action depends on the way in
which cooperatively constructed action is organized. This organi-
zation must provide for the distribution of individual actions and
the exchange of actions in a way that enables the necessary
differentiation of various actions. From this perspective, how
cooperative activity is organized is critical to participants’ ability
to cooperatively construct, realize, and represent culturally signifi-
cant tools (signs and symbols) for analyzing the object and for
regulating their own actions.
Third, that studying the situation of interaction in order to study
the genesis of cognitive learning actions in children requires
the development of new experimental techniques for organiz-
ing cooperative actions and, more broadly, a new genetic
psychology able to discover the psychological laws governing
the origin and development of communions that are incorpo-
rated into participants’ cooperative action. Here, the develop-
mental aspect of studying cooperative actions is of special
importance: from the asymmetrical interactions between the
infant and the adult to socially-determined situations, such as
child-to-child (peer) interaction.
Admittedly, the creation of these techniques is a task for the

future, and, for now, we have more questions about this than
answers. Nevertheless, in this book we have tried to present
findings that will promote a discussion about the specific
nature of cooperative activity as a way of generating new
cognitive learning actions in children and shed light on the
psychological meaning of the social situation of development
as a situation that creates culturally significant methods of
action. Ultimately, we can say that such specially organized
cooperative activity as the cognitive learning action is a form
of activity-based deobjectification of object-related content

and represents a dynamically developmental communion that
has among its components the distribution of initial actions
and operations, exchange of actions, mutual understanding,
communication, planning, and group reflection. At the same
time, the origination of the cognitive learning action depends
on participants’ reflective and contentful analysis of the very
form of the emerging cooperative actions, which must express
the method of interaction and coordination of individual
actions and the subsequent planning of new ways of organiz-
ing cooperative work that are appropriate to the object’s
content — specifically, it depends on those components that
characterize a high level of development of reflective and
contentful thinking.
One outcome of this research is the conclusion that the
psychological features of reflection under conditions of orga-
nized cooperative actions are determined by schoolchildren’s
use of signs and symbols of operations and, using these signs
and symbols, by the formation of holistic schemata of an
action. The dynamic transformations of such schemata,
aimed at the premeditated search for possible ways to trans-
form the object, enable the reflective and contentful study of
the basis for the emerging action and the consolidation of
newly acquired ways of performing it. This conclusion will
shape future research, insofar as the use of sign/symbol tools
for constructing an action (schemata of action) in the
problem-solving process open the door to the development
of new instructional and diagnostic techniques that rely on
integrating the content of the objects of assimilation using
generalized methods of action. One promising way of realiz-
ing these techniques is the broad-based use of computers,
which enable the modeling of objects and situations based
on the sign representation of both object-related and opera-
tional characteristics of action.
Notes
1. Here, “object-related” and “object-relatedness” are used to translate “pre-
dmetnyi” and “predmetnost’,” which are sometimes translated as “objective”
and “objectivity.” For a discussion of the translation difficulties posed by these
terms, see Note 17, pp. 384 – 385, in L.S. Vygotsky’s The Collected Works of
L. S. Vygotsky: Problems of the Theory and History of Psychology, vol. 3, ed.
Robert W. Rieber and Jeffrey Wollock. “Contentful” is used here as
a translation of soderzhatel’nyi.—Trans.
2. For a more detailed critical analysis of methods that we conducted pre-
viously, see Nezhnov and Medvedev 1988.
3. V.Kh Magkaev addresses this approach to studying thinking in Part
I (Chapter 1) of this book.
4. Here “(field of knowledge)” has been added by the translator as
a clarification. Throughout this book, the Russian word predmet is always
translated as “object” for consistency, but in some cases it could just as easily
be translated as “field of knowledge” or “subject matter” (wording added
parenthetically below).—Trans.
5. In light of Postulate 7 and Theorem II, we do not address the inverse relations.
6. In the Soviet/Russian system, five is the highest grade and four, three, and
two are roughly equivalent to B, C, and D.—Trans.
7. These problems are used in an experimental physics program for grades six
and seven and were developed under the leadership of V.V. Rubtsov in 1976 –
1978 (see Mul’darov 1987; Mul’darov and Rubtsov 1987; Rubtsov 1975).
8. I.S. Iakimanskaia argues that the image and the concept should not be treated
as separate. From her perspective: “In the actual process of thinking (the assimilation
of knowledge), both ‘figurative’ and ‘conceptual’ logic are simultaneously present
(and actually functioning); furthermore, these are not two independent logics
(although their specific nature is obvious), but rather the unified logic by which
the thinking process occurs. If they are the slightest bit in conflict, the formation and
usage of scientific knowledge will inevitably be distorted” (Iakimanskaia 1985, 7).
9. A similar structure is used in the research of N.G. Salmina, who relies
on the triad of “reality–meaning–sign.” In examining children’s sign/symbol
activity, Salmina describes its various forms, such as modeling, coding,
schematization, and substitution (Salmina 1988).
10. We find a distinguishing between the model and the image, in particular, in
a series of works by A.N. Leontiev. He points out that a model does not have the
property of subjectivity and represents “a system (set) whose elements are in
a relationship of likeness (homomorphism, isomorphism) with elements of
a certain other system (what is being modeled)” (Leontiev 1970, 40). He continues:
“The mental image is not something passively mirrored in the language of its own
modalities, something that reproduces in its own ‘subjective code’ the parameters of
an isolated object acting on sense organs. It is in this regard that the mental image can
be poorer than a possible mathematical or physical model of a given object. But it is
infinitely richer than any model because it reflects the object incorporated into the
system of connections and relationships of objective reality. In this sense, the sensory
image of an object is not ‘isolate’; instead, it is an element of a picture of the world

opening up before a human being” (Leontiev 1970, 44).
11. Henceforth, we will use the following abbreviations of terms: R for
reality, M for model, and S for sign.
12. In our time, the phenomenon of “functional illiteracy” — an inability (despite
having received an education) to read and write to the extent necessary to use these
skills in a work environment — has become increasingly widespread.
13. Word as sign is “being for the other” or “immediate contemplation
representing an absolutely different content than the one that it has for the
self” (Hegel 1973, 414).
14. It is telling that at this stage, children show an interest in producing their
own symbolism, codes, and ciphers that can be used to figure out words.
15. Form I is the infinitive without “to,” Form II is the past simple tense form,
and Form III is the past participle.—Trans.
16. Series 6 used a separate contingent of students and only on an individual
basis. It had to use a new contingent so that when these students constructed
a prompt they would not be able to use the models and their elements that the
experimenter gave subjects in the previous series. The individuality with which
Series 6 exercises were completed was determined by the fact that the complexity
of the assignment itself (it took approximately 40 minutes to complete) and the
frontality with which it was conducted did not provide for a clear delineation or
registration of the ways in which individual actions were divided up in cooperative
work or their dynamic and effectiveness at various stages of problem solving.
17. The Yamaha computer program is based on a computer method jointly
developed by N. Ermekov, B. Zezev, and M. Stepanskii.
18. A.L. Pazhitnov assisted in developing the method. He also provided the
necessary computer programming.
References
1. Ageev, V.V., V.V. Davydov, and V.V. Rubtsov. 1985. “Oprobovanie kak mekhanizm
postroeniia sovmestnykh deistvii.” Psikhologicheskii zhurnal, no. 4.
2. Aidarova, L.Ia. 1978. Psikhologicheskie problemy obucheniia mladshikh shkol’nikov
russkomu iazyku. Moscow.
3. Aidarova, L.I., and G.A. Tsukerman. 1978. “Opyt postroeniia kollektivno-
raspredelennoi uchebnoi deiatel’nosti v nachal’noi shkole.” In Psikhologicheskie probl-
emy protsessa obucheniia mladshikh shkol’nikov. Tezisy dokladov Vsesoiuznoi konfer-
entsii 24 – 26 oktiabria 1978. Moscow.
4. Amonashvili, Sh.A. 1981. “Mekhanizmy pis’mennoi rechi i metodika obucheniia
pis’mu.” In Tezisy dokladov Vsesoiuznoi konferentsii. Moscow.
5. Amud, B.A. 1973. “Sootnoshenie empiricheskogo i teoreticheskogo obobshcheniia
v umstvennoi deiatel’nosti mladshikh shkol’nikov.” Cand. psych. sc. diss. Moscow.
6. Andreeva, G.M., and Ia. Ianoushek, A.I. Dondtsov, eds. 1987. Obshchenie
i optimizatsiia sovmestnoi deiatel’nosti. Moscow.
7. Arsen’ev, A.S., V.S. Bibler, and B.M. Kedrov. 1967. Analiz razvivaiushchegosia ponia-
tiia. Moscow: Izd.-vo MGU.
8. Bibler, V.S. 1969. “Tvorcheskoe myshlenie kak predmet logiki (problemy

i perspektivy).” In Nauchnoe tvorchestvo. Moscow.
9. _____. 1975. Myshlenie kak tvorchestvo (vvedenie v logiku myslennogo dialoga).
Moscow.
10. Bogoiavlenskii, D.N. 1966. Psikhologiia usvoeniia orfografii. Moscow.
11. Bruner, Dzh. 1977. “Psikhologiia poznaniia.” In Za predelami neposredstvennoi infor-
matsii. Moscow. [Jerome S. Bruner. 1973. Beyond the Information Given: Studies in the
Psychology of Knowing. W.W. Norton & Company].
12. Brushlinskii, A.V. 1970. Psikhologiia myshleniia i kibernetika. Moscow.
13. Danilova, V.L, 1983. “K probleme kollektivno-raspredelennoi deiatel’nosti v reshenii
zadach ‘na soobrazhenie.’” In Kategorii, printsipy i metody psikhologii. Psikhicheskie
protsessy, Pt. 2: Tezisy nauchnykh soobshchenii sovetskikh psikhologov k VI
Vsesoiuznomu s”ezdu Obshchestva psikhologov SSSR. Moscow.
14. Davydov, V.V. 1960. “Analiz struktury myslitel’nogo akta.” Doklady APN RSFSR, no.
2. Moscow.
15. _____. 1966. Vozrastnye vozmozhnosti usvoeniia znanii, Moscow.
16. _____. 1972. Vidy obobshcheniia v obuchenii. Moscow.
17. _____. 1986. Problemy razvivaiushchego obucheniia. Moscow.
18. _____. 2008. Problems of Developmental Instruction: A Theoretical and Experimental
Psychological Study, tr. Peter Moxhay, New York.
19. Davydov, V.V., and V.P. Andronov. 1979. “Psikhologicheskie usloviia proiskhozhdeniia
ideal’nykh deistvii.” Voprosy psikhologii, no. 5.
20. Davydov, V.V., and A. Vardanian. 1981. Uchebnaia deiatel’nost’ i modelirovanie.
Erevan.
21. Davydov, V.V., D.V. El’konin [Elkonin], and A.K. Markova. 1978. “Osnovnye voprosy
sovremennoi psikhologii detei mladshego shkol’nogo vozrasta.” Problemy obshchei,
vozrastnoi i pedagogicheskoi psikhologii. Moscow.
22. Dishkant, G.P. 1965. “Formal’naia sistema elementarnoi mekhaniki.” In Logicheskaia
struktura nauchnogo znaniia. Moscow.
23. Dubovskaia, E.M., I.M. Ulanovskaia, and O.V. Iarkina. 1987. “Eksperimental’noe
issledovanie soderzhaniia refleksivnogo komponenta sovmestnoi uchebnoi deiatel’-
nosti.” In Problemy refleksii: Sovremennye kompleksnye issledovaniia. Novosibirsk.
24. El’konin [Elkonin], B.D. 1960a. Detskaia psikhologiia. Moscow: Uchpedgiz.
25. _____. 1960b. “Opyt psikhologicheskogo issledovaniia v eksperimental’nom klasse.”
Voprosy psikhologii, no. 5.
26. _____. 1962. “Eksperimental’nyi analiz nachal’nogo etapa obucheniia chteniiu.”
Voprosy psikhologii uchebnoi deiatel’nosti mladshikh shkol’nikov. Moscow.
27. _____. 1966. “Intellektual’nye vozmozhnosti mladshikh shkol’nikov i soderzhanie
obucheniia.” In Vozrastnye vozmozhnosti usvoeniia znanii (mladshie klassy shkoly).
Moscow.
28. _____. 1974. Psikhologiia obucheniia mladshego shkol’nika. Moscow.
29. _____. 1978. Psikhologiia igry. Moscow.
30. _____. 1980. “Psikhologo-pedagogicheskaia diagnostika: problemy i zadachi.” In
Psikhodiagnostika i shkola. Tallinn.
31. _____. 1981. “O sposobe oposredstvovaniia pri reshenii zadach ‘na soobrazhenie.’”
32. _____. 1982. “Rol’ znakovogo oposredstvovaniia v reshenii zadach ‘na soobrazhenie.’”
Cand. psych. sc. diss. Moscow.
33. Filippova, E.V. 1977. “Psikhologicheskie predposylki formirovaniia logicheskikh oper-

atsii u detei doshkol’nogo vozrasta.” Cand. psych. sc. diss. Moscow.
34. Filosofskii slovar’. 1987. Moscow.
35. Gal’perin [Galperin], P.Ia. 1957. “O formirovanii chuvstvennykh obrazov i poniatii.”
Materialy soveshchanii po psikhologii. Moscow.
36. Gal’perin [Galperin], P.Ia.. 1966. “Psikhologiia myshleniia i uchenie o poetapnom
formirovanii umstvennykh deistvii.” Issledovanie myshleniia v sovetskoi psikhologii.
Moscow.
37. Gamezo, M.V. 1977. “Znaki i znakovoe modelirovanie v poznavatel’noi deiatel’nosti.”
Doctor of psychological sc. diss. Moscow.
38. Gegel’, G.V.F. [G.W.F. Hegel]. 1913. Fenomenologiia dukha [The Phenomenology of
Spirit]. St. Petersburg.
39. _____. 1973. Estetika [Aesthetics], vol. 4. Moscow.
40. _____-. 1975. Filosofiia prirody [Philosophy of Nature], Entsiklopediia filosofskikh
nauk, vol. 2., Moscow.
41. Gromyko, Iu.V. 1985. “Rol’ vzaimoponimaniia pri reshenii uchebnykh zadach
v sovmestnoi deiatel’nosti.” Cand. psych. sc. diss. Moscow.
42. Guzman, R.Ia. 1980. “Rol’ modelirovaniia sovmestnoi deiatel’nosti v reshenii ucheb-
nykh zadach.” Voprosy psikhologii, no. 3.
43. Gvozdev, A.N. 1948. Usvoenie rebenkom zvukovoi storony russkogo iazyka. Moscow.
44. _____. 1949. Formirovanie u rebenka grammaticheskogo stroia russkogo iazyka, pts. I,
II. Moscow.
45. Iakimanskaia, I.S. 1985. “Osnovnye napravleniia issledovaniia obraznogo myshleniia.”
46. Il’enkov [Ilyenkov], E.V. 1984. Dialekticheskaia logika (ocherki istorii i teorii).
Moscow.
47. Isaev, E.I. 1984. “Psikhologicheskie osobennosti planirovaniia deistvii u mladshikh
shkol’nikov.” Cand. psych. sc. diss. Moscow.
48. Kagan, V.F. 1963. Ocherki po geometrii. Moscow.
49. Kedrov, B.M., I. Gerasimov, et al. 1962. Dialektika i logika. Formy myshleniia.
Moscow.
50. Kopnin, P.V., and M.V. Popovich, eds. 1965. Logika nauchnogo issledovaniia.
Moscow.
51. Koroviakovskaia, E.P., and O.N. Iudina. 1980. “K psikhologicheskoi kharakteristike
effektivnosti uchebno-rolevykh igr.” Voprosy psikhologii, no. 1.
52. Kravtsov, G.G. 1977. “Psikhologicheskie osobennosti uchebnoi deiatel’nosti mladshikh
podrostkov.” Cand. psych. sc. diss. Moscow.
53. Kuznetsov, I.V. 1967. “Struktura fizicheskoi teorii.” Voprosy filosofii, no. 11.
54. Kuchinskii, G.M, 1981. “Dialog v protsesse sovmestnogo resheniia myslitel’nykh
zadach.” Problemy obshcheniia v psikhologii. Moscow.
55. Leont’ev [Leontiev], A.A. 1969. Psikholingvisticheskie edinitsy i porozhdenie reche-
vogo vyskazyvaniia. Moscow.
56. Leont’ev [Leontiev], A.N. 1970. “Psikhicheskii obraz i model’ v svete leninskoi teorii
otrazheniia.” Voprosy psikhologii, no. 2.
57. _____. 1983. Izbrannye psikhologicheskie sochineniia v 2 tomakh. Moscow.
58. Leontiev, A.N. 2005. “Lecture 14. The Structure of Consciousness.” Journal of Russian
and East European Psychology, vol. 43, no. 5.
59. Levinova, L.A. 1974. “Osobennosti suzhdenii detei pri orientirovke na otnoshenie
velichin.” Psikhologo-pedagogicheskie problemy obucheniia i vospitaniia, Pt. 1.
Dushanbe.
60. Lobachevskii, N.I. 1946. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, vol. 2. Moscow.
61. Lomov, B.F. 1980. “Osobennosti poznavatel’nykh protsessov v usloviiakh obshche-
niia.” Psikhologicheskii zhurnal, vol. 1, no. 5.
62. Losev, A.F. 1968. “Vvedenie v obshchuiu teoriiu iazykovykh modelei.” Uchenye
zapiski MGPI im. V. I. Lenina, no. 307. Moscow.
63. _____. 1982. Znak. Simvol. Mif. Moscow.
64. Luriia [Luria], A.R., and L.S. Tsvetkova. 1966. Neiropsikhologicheskii analiz resheniia
zadach. Moscow.
65. Magkaev, V.Kh. 1974a. “Nekotorye printsipy postroeniia diagnosticheskoi metodiki
razvitiia myshleniia v mladshem shkol’nom vozraste.” In Psikhologo-pedagogicheskie
problemy obucheniia i vospitaniia, pt. 1. Dushanbe.
66. _____. 1974b. “Eksperimental’noe izuchenie planiruiushchei funktsii myshleniia
v mladshem shkol’nom vozraste.” Voprosy psikhologii, no. 5.
67. Maksimov, L.K 1979. “Razvitie osnovnykh komponentov teoreticheskogo myshleniia
shkol’nikov.” Cand. psych. sc. diss. Moscow.
68. Markova, A.K. 1969. “Ovladenie slogovym sostavom slova v rannem vozraste.”
69. Matiushkin, A.M. 1982. “Psikhologicheskaia struktura, dinamika i razvitie poznavatel’-
noi aktivnosti.” Voprosy psikhologii, no. 4.
70. Mikulina, G.G. 1982. “Kharakteristika osnovnykh kriteriev kachestva znanii uchash-
chikhsia.”“ In Psikhologiia uchebnoi deiatel’nosti shkol’nikov: Tezisy dokladov II
Vsesoiuznoi konferentsii po pedagogicheskoi psikhologii. Moscow.
71. Miller, A.V. 2004. Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
72. Minskaia, G.I. 1966. “Formirovanie poniatiia chisla na osnove izucheniia otnosheniia
velichin.” In Vozrastnye vozmozhnosti usvoeniia znanii. Moscow.
73. Mugny, С., and W. Doise. 1978. “Socio-cognitive conflict and structuration of indivi-
dual and collective performances.” European Journal of Social Psychology, no. 8, pp.
181– 192.
74. Mugny G., J. Giroud, and W. Doise. 1979. “Conflict de centration et progres cognitif. ”
Bulletin de Psychologie, no. 32.
75. Mukhina, V.S. 1975. Psikhologiia doshkol’nika. Moscow.
76. Mul’darov, V.K. 1987. “Psikhologicheskii analiz deistviia modelirovaniia v protsesse
resheniia shkol’nikami uchebno-poznavatel’nykh zadach.” Cand. psych. sc. diss.
Moscow.
77. Mul’darov, V.K, and V.V. Rubtsov. 1987. “Metod normativnoi diagnostiki urovnei
sformirovannosti uchebno-poznavatel’nykh deistvii u shkol’nikov.” Voprosy psikholo-
gii, no. 5.
78. Nedospasova, V.A. 1972. “Psikhologicheskii mekhanizm preodoleniia tsentratsii
v myshlenii detei doshkol’nogo vozrasta.” Cand. psych. sc. diss. Moscow.
79. Nezhnov, P.G., and A.M. Medvedev. 1988. “Metod issledovaniia soderzhatel’nogo
analiza u shkol’nikov.” Vestnik MGU, ser. 14, Psikhologiia, no. 2.
80. Nosatov, V.T. 1976. Psikhologicheskie osobennosti analiza kak osnovy teoreticheskogo
obobshcheniia. Moscow.
81. Novikov, M.A. 1981. “Psikhofiziologicheskie i ekopsikhologicheskie aspekty mezh-
lichnostnogo vzaimodeistviia v avtonomnykh usloviiakh.” Problema obshcheniia
v psikhologii. Moscow.
82. Obozov, N.N. 1981. “Psikhologicheskie protsessy i funktsii v usloviiakh individual’noi

i sovmestnoi deiatel’nosti.” Problema obshcheniia v psikhologii. Moscow.
83. Perret-Clermont, A-N. 1980. Social interaction and Cognitive Development in
Children. London.
84. Piazhe, Zh. [Jean Piaget]. 1932. Rech’ i myshlenie rebenka. [The Language and
Thought of the Child]. Moscow: Uchpedgiz.
85. _____ [Jean Piaget]. 1969. Izbrannye psikhologicheskie trudy. Moscow.
86. Piaget, Jean. 2003. The Psychology of Intelligence, tr. Malcolm Piercy and D.E.
Berlyne, New York: Routledge.
87. Podd’iakov, Ia.N. 1977. Myshlenie doshkol’nika. Moscow.
88. Polivanova, N.Ia. 1988. “Nagliadno-obraznaia reguliatsiia pri sovmestnom reshenii
zadach.” Voprosy psikhologii, no. 5.
89. Polivanova, N.I.; V.V. Rubtsov; and M.A. Semenova. 1987. “Refleksiia i ee rol’
v protsesse organizatsii i postroeniia kollektivno-raspredelennogo deistviia u detei.”
Problemy refleksii: Sovremennye kompleksnye issledovaniia. Novosibirsk.
90. Poluianov, Iu.A. 1983. “Razvitie vzaimoponimaniia mezhdu det’mi v uchebnoi deiatel’-
nosti.” Razvitie psikhiki shkol’nikov v protsesse uchebnoi deiatel’nosti. Moscow.
91. Ponomarev, Ia.A. 1981. “Rol’ neposredstvennogo obshcheniia v reshenii zadach, tre-
buiushchikh tvorcheskogo podkhoda.” Problema obshcheniia v psikhologii. Moscow.
92. Protopopov, V.Ia. 1974. “Spetsifika uchebnoi deiatel’nosti mladshego shkol’nika pri
obuchenii grammatike i iazykovaia sposobnost’.” Eksperimental’nye issledovaniia po
problemam usovershenstvovaniia uchebno-vospitatel’nogo protsessa v nachal’nykh
klassakh i podgotovki detei k shkole: Materialy II Vsesoiuznogo simpoziuma, pt. 1.
Tbilisi.
93. Psikholingvistika: Sbornik statei. 1984. Moscow.
94. Putliaeva, L.V., and R.T. Sverchkhova. 1982. “Osobennosti poznavatel’noi deiatel’nosti
v situatsiiakh neposredstvennogo obshcheniia.” Myshlenie: protsess, deiatel’nost’,
obshchenie. Moscow.
95. Repkin, V.V. 1976. “O poniatii uchebnoi deiatel’nosti. Stroenie uchebnoi deiatel’no-sti.
” Vestnik Khar’kovskogo universiteta. Psikhologiia, no. 132, vyp. 9.
96. Rivina, I.V. 1988. “Razvitie uchebno-poznavatel’nykh deistvii u detei 6–10 let.” Cand.
psych. sc. diss. Moscow.
97. Rubtsov, V.V. 1975. “Psikhologicheskie osobennosti vvedeniia shkol’nikov v oblast’
teoreticheskikh poniatii.” Voprosy psikhologii, no. 5.
98. _____. 1980. “Rol’ kooperatsii v razvitii intellekta detei.” Voprosy psikhologii, no. 4.
99. _____. 1984. “Kompleksnyi metod diagnostiki urovnei sformirovannoe uchebnoi deia-
tel’nosti u shkol’nikov.” In Novye issledovaniia v psikhologii, no. 1 Moscow.
100. _____. 1987. Organizatsiia i razvitie sovmestnykh deistvii u detei v protsesse obuche-
niia. Moscow.
101. Rubtsov, V.V., and I.V. Rivina. 1985. “Urovni sistemnosti v formirovanii uchebno-
poznavatel’noi deiatel’nosti.” Voprosy psikhologii, no. 2.
102. Salmina, Ia.G. 1988. “Struktura, funktsionirovanie, formirovanie znakovo-
simvolicheskoi deiatel’nosti.” Ph.D. diss. Moscow.
103. Semenova, M.A. 1985. “Kriterii sformirovannosti poniatiia velichiny u mladshikh
shkol’nikov.” Voprosy psikhologii, no. 1. [not cited in the original.–Ed.]
104. Shcherbo, N.P. 1984. “Osobennosti individual’nogo i gruppovogo resheniia zadach
v usloviiakh sovmestnoi deiatel’nosti.” Voprosy psikhologii, no. 2.
105. Shekhter, M.S. 1959. “Ob obraznykh komponentakh rechevogo myshleniia:
Soobshchenie 1.” Doklady APN RSFSR, no. 3.
106. Shtern, V. 1922. Psikhologiia rannego detstva. Petrograd.

107. Shuleshko, E.E. 1964. “Obuchenie chteniiu i prepodavanie russkogo iazyka.”
Sovetskaia pedagogika, no. 8.
108. Shvachkin, Ia.X. 1948. “Razvitie fonematicheskogo vospriiatiia rechi v rannem
detstve.” Izvestiia APN RSFSR, vyp. 13.
109. Smolentseva, A.A. 1987. “Siuzhetno-didakticheskie igry s matematicheskim soderzha-
niem.” Moscow.
110. Stepanov, Iu.S. 1975. Osnovy obshchego iazykoznaniia. Moscow.
111. _____. 1981. Imena. Predikaty. Predlozheniia. Moscow.
112. Tavanets, P.V., and V.S. Shvyrev. 1962. “Nekotorye problemy logiki nauchnogo poz-
naniia.” Voprosy filosofii, no. 10.
113. Tsukanova, E.V. 1981. “Vliianie mezhlichnostnykh otnoshenii na protsess obshcheniia
v usloviiakh sovmestnoi deiatel’nosti.” In Problema obshcheniia v psikhologii.
Moscow.
114. _____. 1985. “Destruktivnye parametry vzaimodeistviia v situatsii vremennogo defit-
sita.” Psikhologicheskie issledovaniia obshcheniia. Moscow.
115. Tsukerman, G.A. 1980. “Kollektivno-raspredelennaia forma resheniia uchebnykh
zadach.” Novye issledovaniia v psikhologii, vyp. 2. Moscow.
116. _____. 1983. “Formy uchebnoi kooperatsii v rabote mladshikh shkol’nikov.” Razvitie
psikhiki shkol’nikov v protsesse uchebnoi deiatel’nosti. Moscow.
117. Umanskii, L.N. 1977. “Metody eksperimental’nogo issledovaniia sotsial’no-
psikhologicheskikh fenomenov.” In Metodologiia i metody sotsial’noi psikhologii.
Moscow.
118. Wertsch, James V., ed. 1986. Culture, Communication, and Cognition: Vygotskian
Perspectives. New York.
119. Venger, A.L. 1977. “Formirovanie operatsii i organizatsii deistvii u detei doshkol’nogo
vozrasta.” Cand. psych. sc. diss. Moscow.
120. Vygotskii [Vygotsky], L.S. 1956. Izbrannye psikhologicheskie issledovaniia. Moscow.
121. _____. 1960. Razvitie vysshikh psikhicheskikh funktsii. Moscow.
122. _____. 1982 – 1984. Sobranie sochineniia v 6 tomakh, vol. 2, 3, 6. Moscow.
123. _____. 1987. The Collected Works of L. S. Vygotsky: Volume 1: Problems of General
Psychology, ed. Robert W. Rieber and Aaron S. Carton. New York.
124. Zak, A.Z. 1976. “Psikhologicheskie osobennosti refleksii u detei mladshego shkol’nogo
vozrasta.” Cand. psych. sc. diss. Moscow.
125. _____. 1984. Razvitie teoreticheskogo myshleniia u mladshikh shkol’nikov. Moscow.
126. Zakharova, A.V. 1978. “Funktsii kontrol’no-otsenochnykh deistvii v strukture uchebnoi
deiatel’nosti.” In Psikhologicheskie problemy protsessa obucheniia mladshikh shkol’ni-
kov: Tezisy dokladov Vsesoiuznoi konferentsii 24–26 oktiabria 1978 g. Moscow.
127. Zakharova, A.V., and T.Iu. Andrushchenko. 1980. “Issledovanie samootsenki mlad-
shego shkol’nika v uchebnoi deiatel’nosti.” Voprosy psikhologii, no. 4.
128. Zhikalkina, T.K. 1986. Igrovye i zanimatel’nye zadaniia po matematike. Moscow.
129. Zhinkin, N.I. 1978. “Sensornaia abstraktsiia.” In Problemy obshchei, vozrastnoi
i pedagogicheskoi psikhologii. Moscow. [not cited in the original.–Ed.]
130. Zhuikov, S.F. 1986. “Psikhologicheskie predposylki sovershenstvovaniia uchebnikov
po russkomu iazyku dlia nachal’nykh klassov.” Voprosy psikhologii, no. 6.
131. Zubchenko, A.A. 1972. “O sootnoshenii gromkogo chteniia i chteniia pro sebia
u mladshikh shkol’nikov.” Novye issledovaniia v psikhologii, no. 2. Moscow.
132. _____. 1987. “Kommunikativno-konstruktivnye funktsii uchebnoi modeli v sisteme

rechevogo deistviia (na materiale obucheniia mladshikh shkol’nikov rodnomu iazyku).”
Cand. psych. sc. diss. Moscow.
133. Zubchenko, A.A., and L.Iu. Nevueva. 1974. “Opyt formirovaniia smyslovogo chteniia
v pervom klasse.” In Eksperimental’nye issledovaniia po problemam usovershenstvo-
vaniia uchebno-vospitatel’nogo protsessa v nachal’nykh klassakh i podgotovki detei
k shkole: Materialy II Vsesoiuznogo simpoziuma, pt. 1. Tbilisi.
134. _____. 1978. “Pauzativnye kharakteristiki vyrazitel’nogo (smyslovogo) chteniia
u mladshego shkol’nika.” Novye issledovaniia v psikhologii, no. 1. Moscow.
135. _____. 1979. “Opyt formirovaniia rechevogo deistviia u sel’skogo shkol’nika.”
Kommunisticheskoe vospitanie uchashchikhsia v protsesse ovladeniia osnovami nauk:
Tezisy dokladov Vsesoiuznoi konferentsii (Alma-Ata, 15–18 maia 1979 g.). Moscow.

Developing Reflective Thinking in The Process of Learning Activity

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Developing Reflective Thinking in The Process of Learning Activity

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Journal of Russian & East European Psychology

ISSN: 1061-0405 (Print) 1558-0415 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mrpo20

Developing Reflective Thinking in the Process of

V.V. Davydov & V.V. Rubtsov

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10610405.2018.1536008

Published online: 12 Dec 2018.

Submit your article to this journal

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

V.V. DAVYDOV AND V.V. RUBTSOV

Developing Reflective Thinking in the

learning activity. During the adolescent years that follow, socially

and structure of its components: analysis, planning, and reflection

transformed (moved, changed) as a single, integral whole. The

Chapter 1 of Part II subjects the function of signs and symbols that

verb tense in English to analyze the functions and qualitative fea-

components of cooperative action. Each type of strategy was asso-

Part I: Content, Functional Structure, and Dynamic of the

The idea of creating an informative psychological diagnostic (as

Relying on the basic ideas regarding the laws of mental devel-

serve as an objective means of managing (observing, assessing,

determined by the way in which cooperative activity and com-

emergence; and 4) learners’ activity is organized to be explora-

criterion of the level of mental development, its “norm” and

Main definitions of reflective thinking

In dialectical logic theory and in psychological research, thinking

reject their own schemata and methods of action. In the course of

A. Thinking is humans’ vital activity, their universal method of

turn, the formation of more substantive levels of thought function-

Within humans’ holistic thinking activity, these definitions exist

essence of objectively existing things — the laws of their internal

a generally accessible and meaningful form this focus on their

Structure of reflective thinking and the problem-solving process

Experimental research into the development of thinking has almost

three interconnected components: analysis, an internal plan of

A critical review of these works by P.G. Nezhnov and A.M.

connections and relationships and their qualitative uniqueness

as a plan for future practical actions, and the construction of

relationships and connections are being assimilated. The emer-

study the specific nature of reflection undertaken by A.Z. Zak

Logical and psychological analysis of action and its generalized

The universal logical definition of an action, as mentioned pre-

change, reworking, and movement of the present state of an

not on everyday information and ideas about “natural” objects

based on assimilated “readymade” information about the external

Uncovering the laws governing the emergence and development

being, in other words, a future object that is being built in the

“in depth” based on the appropriate reproduction of the objective

a problem expressed in very indicative acts of “thinking through”

Of course, intentionality is also characterized by a number of

continually developing objective content of reality and a rigidly

What is demanded of problem-solvers is that they change the

1. A human action reproduces the didactic “nature” of its object, its

Chapter 2: Studying Contentful Analysis as a Component of

Dialectical logic distinguishes two main forms of thought:

Bibler, and Kedrov 1967; Bibler 1969, 1975; Ilyenkov 1984).

An essential aspect of theoretical analysis is the modeling of

In his Philosophical Notebooks, in discussing Hegel’s proposi-

This focus on the method of action (intentional or uncon-

From this standpoint, the specific nature of scientific cognition

the others, is, in our opinion, impossible. Therefore, dealing with

the situation that brings together: 1) the object’s numerous pos-

As a characteristic of analysis, intentionality is a sign that