EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT000000

SEC 1- EXECUTIVE POWER

The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

QUALIFICATIONS, ELECTION, AND TERM OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT (SYLLABUS)

SEC 2- QUALIFICATION
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on
the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.

QUALIFICATIONS:
NBC
Registered voter
Read and write
40 years (day of election)
10 year resident

SEC 3- VICE PRESIDENT SAME QUALIFICATION, ELECTION, TERM.. CABINET MEMBER

There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of
office and be elected with and in the same manner as the President. He may be
removed from office in the same manner as the President.

The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such

appointment requires no confirmation.

SEC 4- ELECTION AND TERM AND A LOT OF SHIT

The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people
for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date six years
thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who
has
succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be
qualified for election to the same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was
elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and
Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by
the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of
canvass,
the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the
election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of
the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the
votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in
case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall
forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of
the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.

SUMMARY:
1. 6 years term
2. June 30 noon start
3. No reelection for President or anyone who has succeeded as President and served
for more than 4 years
4. 2 terms for Vice President
5. 2nd Monday of May election
6. Election returns transmitted to and canvassed by Congress
7. Congress shall promulgate canvass rules
8. Majority voting of Congress in case of tie
9. Supreme Court En Banc as the PET

NOTE: CANVASS MINISTERIAL as long as election returns are DULY CERTIFIED and APPEAR
TO BE AUTHENTIC
The congress shall have no power to inquire into or decide questions of alleged
irregularities in the conduct of elections. These matters are appropriate for
election contests
As long as the election returns are DULY CERTIFIED and APPEAR TO BE AUTHENTICE, all
Congress has to do is canvass the same and proclaim the winner.

PRIVILEGES, INHIBITIONS, AND DISQUALIFICATIONS (SYLLABUS)

1. Presidential immunity
2. Presidential privilege

PRIVILEGES FOR PRESIDENT

1. OFFICIAL RESIDENCE- Section 6
2. SALARY CANNOT BE DECREASED- Section 6
3. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT- Inherent
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or
actual incumbency,may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no
need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity
of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be
freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
operation of the Government.

PRESIDENTIAL or EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY

RULES
DURING Term:
1. The President is immune from suit during his tenure. -Jurisprudence
2. An impeachment complaint may be filed against him during his tenure. -1987
Constitution, Art. XI
3. The President may not be prevented from instituting suit. -Soliven vs Makasiar
4. There is nothing in our laws that would event the President from waiving the
privilege. He may shed the protection afforded by the privilege. -Soliven v.
Makasiar
5. Heads of departments cannot invoke the President’s immunity.-Jurisprudence

AFTER Term:
Once out of office, even before the end of the 6-year term, immunity for non-
official acts is lost.
Immunity cannot be claimed to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for
alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office.

LEONEN: PRINCIPLES OF PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY

First, any person may file a civil, criminal, or administrative suit against the
president after his or her tenure for any offense committed during his or her
incumbency;

Second, the president's immunity from suit only covers official acts during his or
her tenure; and

Third, presidential immunity from suit is granted during incumbency for two (2)
reasons only: (1) to prevent the degradation of dignity of the office; and (2) to
prevent the impairment of government operations. It is never granted to shield the
president from any wrongdoing.

DE LIMA vs DUTERTE:
GOLDMINE FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY

IT IS ABSOLUTE DURING TENURE. ALL SUIT INCLUDING HABEAS DATA AND AMPARO

Sen. De Lima posits that her petition for habeas data will not distract the
President inasmuch as the case can be handled by the OSG. But this is inconsistent
with her argument that the attacks of the President are purely personal. It is
further relevant to remind that the OSG is mandated to appear as counsel for the
Government as well as its various agencies and instrumentalities whenever the
services of a lawyer is necessary; thus, a public official may be represented by
the OSG when the proceedings arise from acts done in his or her official capacity.
[66] The OSG is not allowed to serve as the personal counsel for government
officials. If Sen. De Lima's position that the acts complained of are not related
to the official functions of the President, then it also necessarily follows that
the OSG can no longer continue to represent him.

Besides, any litigation, whether big or small, naturally serves as a distraction to

a party-litigant. Even while represented by counsel, a litigant is still
responsible for certain facets of the case, like presenting evidence and disputing
claims, and cannot simply leave the course and conduct of the proceedings entirely
to the discretion of his or her chosen counsel.

Sen. De Lima hinges her allegations of violations of her rights on the Magna Carta
of Women, as well as on Republic Act No. 6713. Although she claims that her present
recourse does not seek to hold the President administratively, civilly, or
criminally liable, it will be impossible for the Court to enable her cause of
action to be established without first determining whether or not said laws, which
carry penal sanctions, had been violated. Any ruling on her petition will
necessarily entail a judgment on whether or not the President violated said laws.

Finally, Sen. De Lima asserts that for every right violated, there must be a
remedy. No one can dispute the validity of her assertion. We agree with her, but at
the same time we must remind her that this ruling will not deny her any available
remedy. Indeed, the Constitution provides remedies for violations committed by the
Chief Executive except an ordinary suit before the courts. The Chief Executive must
first be allowed to end his tenure (not his term) either through resignation or
removal by impeachment. Being a Member of Congress, the petitioner is well aware of
this, and she cannot sincerely claim that she is bereft of any remedy

BUT THE ABOVE RULING IS BY BERSAMIN. A TWO-FACED ASS WHO CONCURRED IN THE RULING IN

RODRIGUEZ vs GMA PENNED BY SERENO

It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or

criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far
as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or
extrajudicial killing. As we held in Razon v. Tagitis:

It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability,
for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to
address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action
or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court
shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil
cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the
other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of
their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed
with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all
these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of
addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his
liberty and security are restored.

IMMUNITY FROM SUIT ONLY PROTECTS ADMINISTRATIVE, CIVIL, OR CRIMINAL LIABILITY

THUS, WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA ARE NOT COVERED
THEY COVER RESPONSIBILITY OR AT LEAST ACCOUNTABILITY
SO THAT THE LIFE OF THE VICTIM IS PRESERVED AND LIBERTY AND SECURITY RESTORED

TO HARMONIZE DE LIMA AND RODRIGUEZ CASE. IF THE PRESIDENT IS SITTING, HE IS IMMUNE

TO ALL SUIT, IF HE IS NO LONGER SITTING, USE THE RODRIGUEZ CASE SAYING THAT THE
IMMUNITY COVERS ONLY ADMINISTRATIVE, CIVIL, OR CRIMINAL LIABILITY.

NON-SITTING PRESIDENT
A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even though the acts
were done during
her tenure. The intent of the framers o Constitution is clear that the immunity of
the
president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. Former
President Arroy cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to
shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context
of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of
Rodriguez.
-Rodriguez v. GMA

PRESIDENTIAL OR EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:

It is the power of the President and high-level executive branch officers to

withhold certain types
of information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.

WHO MAY INVOKE:

ONLY THE PRESIDENT AND ALSO POSSIBLE IF THROUGH THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Executive Secretary must state that the authority is “By order of the President,”
which means he consulted with the President

PROCEDURE IF AN OFFICIAL IS SUMMONED BY CONGRESS

He must be afforded reasonable time to inform Preident or the Executive Secretary

of the
possible need for invoking the privilege, in order to provide the same with fair
opportunity to
consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If,
after the lapse of
that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the
privilege,
Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before
Congress and may
then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance .

REQUISITES:
1. There must be a formal calim of privilege
2. The claim has specific designation and description of the documents within its
scope and with the precise and certain reasons for preserving their
confidentiality.

NEED NOT BE SPECIFIC

The reasons need not be too specific as to disclose the information which of the
executive privilege is meant to protect
Possible precise and certain reason: "communication if disclosed might impair
diplomatic and economic relations with..."

KINDS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

1. STATE SECRET privilege– Invoked by Presidents on the ground that the information
is of such
 nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic
objectives.
2. INFORMER'S privilege– Privilege of the government not to disclose the identity
of
persons who furnish information in violations of law to officers charged with
the
enforcement of the law.
3. GENERIC privilege for internal deliberation– Said to attach to intra-
governmental
documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated.
4. PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS privilege;
5. DELIBERATIVE PROCESS privilege (In Re: Sealed Case No. 96-3124, June 17, 1997).

Elements of Presidential Communications privilege

1. Involves a non-delegable power--> (Appointing, Diplomatic, Pardoning, Commander-
in-Chief)
2. Communication must be with a person within the Operational Proximity of the
president
3. In order to be denied, it must be overcome by adequate showing of a compelling
need to disclose thereof and the unavailability of information elsewhere

TEST OF VALIDITY OF A CLAIM

Whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges
and whether that privilege should be honored given the procedural setting

DELIBERATIVE PROCESS vs PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS

-The first refers to the decision-making process of executive officials, the latter
refers to that of the President.
-Which is why to defeat/overcome the latter requires more scrutiny
-The first is founded on common law while the latter on constitutional law
specifically the separation of powers

The deliberative process privilege applies to decision-making of executive

officials. Unlike the "deliberative process privilege," "the presidential
communications privilege" applies
to documents in their entirety and covers final and post decisional matters, as
well as pre-deliberative ones. The deliberative process privilege includes advisory
opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS IS PRESUMED TO BE PRIVILEGED.

WHY?
Because officials involved in the decision-making process would be unwilling to
freely express their thoughts if the communications were not done in private.
BUT KEYWORD: Presumptive. May be overcome by adequate compelling need to disclose +
unavailability of information elsewhere

DOES THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION COVER NEGOTIATIONS?

YES! But subject to rules on confidentiality.
Thus, only definite propositions of the government are only allowed to be disclosed
and NOT inter-agency exploratory communications
BUT, IF THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE DIPLOMATIC AND BETWEEN COUNTRIES,
Executive privilege may be invoked citing the grounds of : "disclosure might strain
diplomatic relations with blabla"

KEYWORD: DP, definite propositions

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (SYLLABUS) --this very long

GENERAL EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS (SYLLABUS)

RESIDUAL POWERS
can be validly claimed by the President if there’s no violation
of the Constitution, Law or separation of powers
-Marcos vs Manglapus

POWER OF CONTROL and FAITHFUL EXECUTION CLAUSE

SEC 17
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Case: The Truth Commission case: Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission

Majority of the members of the Supreme Court rejected the justification of the
Solicitor General (OSG) that the creation of the PTC finds basis on the president’s
power of control over all executive offices. The Decision stressed that “control”
is essentially the power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely
different from the power to create public offices. The majority also rejected the
OSG’s claim that the E.O. finds basis under sec. 31 of the Administrative Code,
which authorizes the president to restructure the Office of the President. Clearly,
“restructure” under the said provision refers to reduction of personnel,
consolidation or abolition of offices by reason of economy or redundancy. This
presupposes an already existing office. The creation of an office is nowhere
mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.

Nonetheless, the ponencia agreed with the argument of the OSG that the president’s
power to create the PTC may find justification under the president’s duty under
sec. 17, Article VII of the Constitution “to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.” The Court held that while it is true that the authority of the president
to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes, it does not necessarily
mean that he does not have such authority. The president has the obligation to
ensure that all executive officials and employees (whether from past or present
administrations) faithfully comply with the law. The purpose of ad hoc
investigating bodies such as the PTC is to allow an inquiry into matters which the
president is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of
the land.

ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
Power concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents.
To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
-Ople vs Torres
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION- IN GOOD FAITH IF FOR THE ECONOMY OR TO MAKE
BUREAUCRACY MORE EFFICIENT
The President has the continuing authority to reorganize the national government,
which
includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices,
to transfer
functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to
standardize salaries and
materials; it is effected in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to
make bureaucracy more
efficient.
-MEWAP v. Exec. Sec

POWER OF APPOINTMENT (SYLLABUS)

a. In general
b. Limitations on the exercise/power
c. Types of appointment

APPOINTMENT DEFINITION
is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is
to exercise the functions of a given office.

DESIGNATION DEFINITION
It is distinguished from designation in that the latter simply means the imposition
of additional duties, usually by law, on a person already in the public service.
Designation is considered only as an acting or temporary appointment, which
does not confer security of tenure on the person named.
-Binamira v. Garrucho

NOTE: ONE YEAR MAX FOR TEMPORARY DESIGNATION

The President has the power to temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an
office in the executive branch. Temporary designation cannot exceed one year.

COMMISSION DEFINITION
It is also different from the commission in that the latter is the written evidence
of the appointment.

PERMANENT vs TEMPORARY
Permanent appointments are those extended to persons possessing the qualifications
and the requisite eligibility and are thus protected by the constitutional
guarantee of security of tenure.
Temporary appointments are given to persons without such eligibility,
revocable at will and without the necessity of just cause or a valid investigation;

made on the
understanding that the appointing power has not yet decided on a permanent
appointee and that the temporary appointee may be replaced at any time a
permanent choice is made.

NOTE:
A temporary appointment and a designation are not
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Such confirmation, if
given erroneously, will not make the incumbent a permanent appointee
-Valencia vs Peralta
Where a person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he
shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced
at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, a designation is considered
only
an acting or temporary appointment which does not confer security of tenure on
the person named.
-Binamir vs Garrucho

APPOINTMENT PROCESS
Well-settled doctrine that appointment is a process that
1. begins with the signing of the appointment paper
2. followed by the transmittal and receipt of the appointment paper
3. and becomes complete with the acceptance of the appointment

ELEMENTS:
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should
be understood as both complete and effective) appointment:
(1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;
(2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal;
(3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and
(4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

The concurrence of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when the
appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban.
These steps in the appointment process should always concur and operate as a single
process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even one step. And,
unlike the dissent’s proposal, there is no need to further distinguish between an
effective and an ineffective appointment when an appointment is valid
-Velicaria-Gerafil vs Office of the President

APPOINTING PROCEDURE FOR THOSE THAT NEED CA CONFIRMATION

1. Nomination by the President
2. Confirmation by the CA
3. Issuance of commission
4. Acceptance by the appointee
NOTE:
At any time, before all four steps have been complied with, the President can
withdraw the nomination and appointment
-Lacson vs Romero

REGULAR vs AD INTERIM

A regular appointment is one made by the President while Congress is in session,

takes effect only after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
and once approved, continues until the end of the term of the appointee.

An ad interim appointment is one made by the President while Congress is not in

session,
takes effect immediately,
but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or upon the
next adjournment of Congress.

In the latter case, the ad interim appointment is deemed “by-passed” through

inaction. The ad interim appointment is intended to prevent interruptions in vital
government services that would otherwise result from prolonged vacancies in
government offices.
AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT IS PERMANENT
It is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer
be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office.
The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does
not alter its permanent character.
-Matibag v. Benipayo

TERMINATION OF AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT

An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the
Constitution:
(1) disapproval of the appointment by the Commission on Appointments,
(2) adjournment by Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on the
appointment.

EFFECT OF DISAPPROVAL vs BY-PASS

There is no dispute that when the Commission on Appointments disapproves an ad
interim appointment, the appointee can no longer be extended a new appointment,
inasmuch as the
disapproval is a final decision of the Commission in the exercise of its checking
power on the appointing authority of the President.
Such disapproval is final and binding on both the appointee and the appointing
power.
But when an ad interim appointment is by-passed because of lack of time or failure
of the Commission on Appointments to organize, there is no final decision by the
Commission to give or
withhold its consent to the appointment. Absent such decision, the President is
free to renew the ad interim appointment.
-Matibag vs Benipayo

SECTION 16- PROVISION ON APPOINTMENTS

'The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads
of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.

NOTE:
Positions that need confirmation are those in the FIRST SENTENCE ONLY
1. Heads of executive departments
2. Ambassador, public minister, consul
3. Armed FOrces officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain
4. All other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution:
Regular Members of the Judicial and Bar Council
Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission
Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections
Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit
 Members of the Regional and Consultative Commissions
Sectoral Representatives prior to the party-list system (From transitory
provisions Art. XVIII)

NOTE:
He is the default appointer
"He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint"

NO NEED CONFIRMATION:
Bureau of Customs Commissioner
Human Rights Commissioner
Philippine Coast Guard (civilian)
Senior Officers of PNP (civilian)
OMBUDSMAN

NOTE:
The Supreme Court said that Congress cannot, by law, require the confirmation of
appointments of
government officials other than those enumerated in the first sentence of Sec. 16,
Art. VII.
-Manalo vs Sistoza

JBC RECOMMENDATION
Presidential appointments that need prior recommendation or nomination by the
Judicial and Bar Council
1. Members of the Supreme Court and all lower courts
2. Ombudsman and 5 deputies

SECTION 14- APPOINTMENT BY ACTING PRESIDENT VALID AND CAN ONLY BE REVOKED WITHIN
90 DAYS
Shall remain effective unless revoked by the elected President within 90 days from
his assumption/re-assumption

SECTION 15- PROHIBITION ON MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

NOTE:
The two months ban before the next Presidential election and up to the end of
his term does not apply to appointments of the justices of the SC and by
implication, the judiciary
-De Castro Case

APPOINTMENTS IN AN ACTING CAPACITY

In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an Alter Ego of the President, she must
necessarily appoint the alter ego of her choice as Acting Secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress, through a law,
cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or
permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. The office of a
department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office
must necessarily have the President’s confidence.
-Pimentel vs Ermita
MUST NOT EXCEED ONE YEAR
-EO 292, Book III, Title I, Chapter 5, Sec. 17 (3)

POWER OF REMOVAL

GR: From the express power of appointment, the President derives the implied power
of removal.
XPN: Not all officials appointed by the President aalso removable by him since the
Constitution prescribes certain methods for the separation from the public service
of such officers
e.g. impeachment

NOTE: The President is without any power to remove elected local officials since as
provided in the last paragraph of the Local Government Code Section 60.

NO DISCIPLINARY OFFICER OVER OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

The president has no power to dismiss the deputy ombudsman as it will violate
the independence of the office. But the Special Prosecutor can be dismissed by
the President

Thus, Sec. 8(2) of RA 6770 vesting disciplinary authority on the President over the
Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and is,
thus, unconstitutional.
Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose
own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the
Ombudsman's disciplinary
authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman itself. The law directly collided not only with the independence that the
Constitution guarantees to
Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances
that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize. What is true for the
Ombudsman must
be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman
in the performance of their duties.
-Gonzales III vs Ochoa

YES FOR CAREER OFFICIALS

Members of the career service of the Civil Service who are appointed by the
President may be directly disciplined by him.
Provided that same is for cause and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
law.
-Villaluz v. Zaldivar

POWER OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION (SYLLABUS)

a. Doctrine of qualified political agency
b. Executive departments and offices
c. Local government units

POWER OF CONTROL and FAITHFUL EXECUTION CLAUSE

SEC 17
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Case: The Truth Commission case: Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission

Majority of the members of the Supreme Court rejected the justification of the
Solicitor General (OSG) that the creation of the PTC finds basis on the president’s
power of control over all executive offices. The Decision stressed that “control”
is essentially the power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely
different from the power to create public offices. The majority also rejected the
OSG’s claim that the E.O. finds basis under sec. 31 of the Administrative Code,
which authorizes the president to restructure the Office of the President. Clearly,
“restructure” under the said provision refers to reduction of personnel,
consolidation or abolition of offices by reason of economy or redundancy. This
presupposes an already existing office. The creation of an office is nowhere
mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.

Nonetheless, the ponencia agreed with the argument of the OSG that the president’s
power to create the PTC may find justification under the president’s duty under
sec. 17, Article VII of the Constitution “to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.” The Court held that while it is true that the authority of the president
to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes, it does not necessarily
mean that he does not have such authority. The president has the obligation to
ensure that all executive officials and employees (whether from past or present
administrations) faithfully comply with the law. The purpose of ad hoc
investigating bodies such as the PTC is to allow an inquiry into matters which the
president is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of
the land.

CONTROL DEFINITION:
Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
-Mondano v. Silvosa
SUPERVISION DEFINITION:
It is distinguished from supervision in that the latter means overseeing, or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties, and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them,
then the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them
perform
these duties.

AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT REORGANIZATION

The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of
Health under the Constitution and statutes.
This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Art. VII, Sections 1 and
17, of the Constitution.
While the power to abolish an office is generally lodged in the legislature, the
authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch, which may
incidentally include such abolition, is permissible under present laws.

The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also

an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book II, Executive
Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of the Philippines), which grants the President
broad organization powers to implement reorganization measures. Further,
Presidential Decree No. 1772, which amended P.D. 1416, grants the President the
continuing authority to reorganize the national government which includes the
power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, and to
standardize salaries and materials

BAD FAITH NOT ALLOWED IN REORGANIZATION

R.A, 6656 enumerates the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad
faith in the removal of civil service employees as a result of
reorganization:
(a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new
staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;
(b) where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same
functions is created;
(c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and merit;
(d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as
the original offices; and
(e) where the removal violates the order of separation.
-MEWAP vs Romulo

DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY (SYLLABUS)

The acts of the secretaries of the Executive departments performed and promulgated
in regular course of business are presumptively acts of the Chief Executive
-Villena vs Secretary of the Interior

EXCEPTIONS:
1. If the acts are disapproved or reprobated by the President;
2. If the President is required to act in person by law or by the Constition
example: executive clemency or other non-delegable powers

ALL ACTS OF THE ALTER EGO ARE VALID EXCEPT NON-DELEGABLE PRESIDENTIAL ACTS
The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on which
Constitution or the circumstances require the
President to act personally, executive and administrative functions are exercised
through executive departments headed by cabinet
secretaries, whose actare presumptively the acts of the President unless
disapproved by the latter.
There can be no question that the act of the secretary is the act of the President,
unless repudiated by the latter.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND OFFICES

Department Heads may exercise power of control in behalf of the President including
the
power to reverse the judgment of an inferior officer.
For instance, the Sec. of Justice may reverse the judgment of a prosecutor and
direct him t withdraw information already filed.
One, who disagrees, however, may appeal to the Office of th President in order to
exhaust administrative remedies prior filing to the court.

Also, the Executive Secretary when acting “by authority of the President” may
reverse the decision of another department secretary
-Lacson-Magallanes vs Pano

POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OF LGUs

The power of the President over LGUs is only of general supervision. Thus, he can
only interfere in affairs and activities of a LGU if he finds that
the latter acted contrary to law.
The President or any of his alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as
the concerned LGU acts within the parameters of the law and Constitution.
Any directive, therefore, by the President or any of his alter egos seeking to
alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a LGU is a patent
nullity, because it violates the principle of local autonomy, as well as the
doctrine of separation of powers of the executive and the legislative departments
in governing municipal corporations.
-Dadole vs COA

CONTROL vs SUPERVISION

ACCDING TO NATURE
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act.
The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but
he himself does not lay down such rules.

ACCDING TO DISCRETION OF THE OFFICER

If the rules are not followed, the officer in control may, in his discretion, order
the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it
himself.
The supervisor does not have the discretion to modify or replace them.
If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re- done but only to
conform to the prescribed rules.
-Drilon v. Lim