Presidential system

A presidential system is a democratic and

republican government in which a head of
government leads an executive branch that is
separate from the legislative branch. This
head of government is in most cases also the
head of state, which is called president.

In presidential countries, the executive is

elected and is not responsible to the
legislature, which cannot in normal
circumstances dismiss it. Such dismissal is
possible, however, in uncommon cases, often
through impeachment.
The title "president" has persisted from a
time when such person personally presided
over the governing body, as with the
President of the Continental Congress in the
early United States, prior to the executive
function being split into a separate branch of
government.
A presidential system contrasts with a
parliamentary system, where the head of
government is elected to power through the
legislative. There is also a hybrid system
called semi-presidentialism.
Countries that feature a presidential or semi-
presidential system of government are not
the exclusive users of the title of president.
Heads of state of parliamentary republics,
largely ceremonial in most cases, are called
presidents. Dictators or leaders of one-party
states, popularly elected or not, are also often
called presidents.
Presidentialism is the dominant form of
government in the continental Americas, (e.g. transitional government or unclear political
with 19 of its 22 sovereign states being situations)
presidential republics. It is also prevalent in
Central and southern West Africa and in Central Asia. There are no presidential republics in Europe
(except for Turkey, Belarus, and Cyprus) and Oceania.
Systems of government
Republican forms of government:
Presidential republics with an executive presidency
separate from the legislature
Semi-presidential system with both an executive
presidency and a separate head of government that leads
the rest of the executive, who is appointed by the
president and accountable to the legislature
Parliamentary republics with a ceremonial and non-
executive president, where a separate head of
government leads the executive and is dependent on the
confidence of the legislature
Republics with an executive presidency elected by
the legislature
Monarchical forms of government:
Constitutional monarchies with a ceremonial and
non-executive monarch, where a separate head of
government leads the executive
Constitutional monarchies with a ceremonial
monarch, but where royalty still hold significant executive
and/or legislative power
Absolute monarchies where the monarch leads the
executive
One-party states
Military governments
Countries which do not fit any of the above systems
 Contents
Characteristics
Subnational governments of the world
Advantages
Direct elections
Separation of powers
Speed and decisiveness
Stability
Criticism and disadvantages
Tendency towards authoritarianism
Political gridlock
Lack of accountability
Impediments to leadership change
Differences from a parliamentary system
Overlapping elements
Republics with a presidential system of government
Presidential systems with a prime minister
Presidential systems with a theocratic supreme leader
See also
Notes and references
External links

Characteristics
In a full-fledged presidential system, a politician is chosen directly by the public or indirectly by the
winning party to be the head of government. Except for Belarus and Kazakhstan, this head of
government is also the head of state, and is therefore called president. The post of prime minister
(also called premier) may also exist in a presidential system, but unlike in semi-presidential or
parliamentary systems, the prime minister answers to the president and not to the legislature.

The following characteristics apply generally for the numerous presidential governments across the
world:

The executive can veto legislative acts and, in turn, a supermajority of lawmakers may override
the veto. The veto is generally derived from the British tradition of royal assent in which an act of
parliament can only be enacted with the assent of the monarch.
The president has a fixed term of office. Elections are held at regular times and cannot be
triggered by a vote of confidence or other parliamentary procedures, although in some countries
there is an exception which provides for the removal of a president who is found to have broken a
law.
The executive branch is unipersonal. Members of the cabinet serve at the pleasure of the
president and must carry out the policies of the executive and legislative branches. Cabinet
 ministers or executive departmental chiefs are not members of the legislature. However,
presidential systems often need legislative approval of executive nominations to the cabinet,
judiciary, and various lower governmental posts. A president generally can direct members of the
cabinet, military, or any officer or employee of the executive branch, but cannot direct or dismiss
judges.
The president can often pardon or commute sentences of convicted criminals.

Subnational governments of the world

Subnational governments, usually states, may be structured as presidential systems. All of the state
governments in the United States use the presidential system, even though this is not constitutionally
required. On a local level, many cities use council-manager government, which is equivalent to a
parliamentary system, although the post of a city manager is normally a non-political position. Some
countries without a presidential system at the national level use a form of this system at a subnational
or local level. One example is Japan, where the national government uses the parliamentary system,
but the prefectural and municipal governments have governors and mayors elected independently
from local assemblies and councils.

Advantages
Supporters generally claim four basic advantages for presidential systems:

Direct elections — in a presidential system, the president is often elected directly by the people.
This makes the president's power more legitimate than that of a leader appointed indirectly.
However, this is not a necessary feature of a presidential system. Some presidential states have
an indirectly elected head of state.
Separation of powers — a presidential system establishes the presidency and the legislature as
two parallel structures. This allows each structure to monitor and check the other, preventing
abuses of power.
Speed and decisiveness — A president with strong powers can usually enact changes quickly.
However, the separation of powers can also slow the system down.
Stability — a president, by virtue of a fixed term, may provide more stability than a prime minister,
who can be dismissed at any time.

Direct elections
In most presidential systems, the president is elected by popular vote, although some such as the
United States use an electoral college (which is itself directly elected) or some other method.[1] By this
method, the president receives a personal mandate to lead the country, whereas in a parliamentary
system a candidate might only receive a personal mandate to represent a constituency. That means a
president can only be elected independently of the legislative branch.

Separation of powers
A presidential system's separation of the executive from the legislature is sometimes held up as an
advantage, in that each branch may scrutinize the actions of the other. In a parliamentary system, the
executive is drawn from the legislature, making criticism of one by the other considerably less likely. A
formal condemnation of the executive by the legislature is often considered a vote of no confidence.
According to supporters of the presidential system, the lack of checks and balances means that
misconduct by a prime minister may never be discovered. Writing about Watergate, Woodrow Wyatt,
a former MP in the UK, said "don't think a Watergate couldn't happen here, you just wouldn't hear
about it." (ibid)

Critics respond that if a presidential system's legislature is controlled by the president's party, the
same situation exists. Proponents note that even in such a situation a legislator from the president's
party is in a better position to criticize the president or his policies should he deem it necessary, since
the immediate security of the president's position is less dependent on legislative support. In
parliamentary systems, party discipline is much more strictly enforced. If a parliamentary
backbencher publicly criticizes the executive or its policies to any significant extent then he/she faces
a much higher prospect of losing his/her party's nomination, or even outright expulsion from the
party. Even mild criticism from a backbencher could carry consequences serious enough (in
particular, removal from consideration for a cabinet post) to effectively muzzle a legislator with any
serious political ambitions.

Despite the existence of the no confidence vote, in practice it is extremely difficult to stop a prime
minister or cabinet that has made its decision. In a parliamentary system, if important legislation
proposed by the incumbent prime minister and his cabinet is "voted down" by a majority of the
members of parliament then it is considered a vote of no confidence. To emphasize that particular
point, a prime minister will often declare a particular legislative vote to be a matter of confidence at
the first sign of reluctance on the part of legislators from his or her own party. If a government loses a
parliamentary vote of confidence, then the incumbent government must then either resign or call
elections to be held, a consequence few backbenchers are willing to endure. Hence, a no confidence
vote in some parliamentary countries, like Britain, only occurs a few times in a century. In 1931, David
Lloyd George told a select committee: "Parliament has really no control over the executive; it is a pure
fiction." (Schlesinger 1982)

By contrast, if a presidential legislative initiative fails to pass a legislature controlled by the president's
party (e.g. the Clinton health care plan of 1993 in the United States), it may damage the president's
political standing and that of his party, but generally has no immediate effect on whether or not the
president completes his term.

Speed and decisiveness

Some supporters of presidential systems claim that presidential systems can respond more rapidly to
emerging situations than parliamentary ones. A prime minister, when taking action, needs to retain
the support of the legislature, but a president is often less constrained. In Why England Slept, future
U.S. president John F. Kennedy argued that British prime ministers Stanley Baldwin and Neville
Chamberlain were constrained by the need to maintain the confidence of the Commons.

Other supporters of presidential systems sometimes argue in the exact opposite direction, however,
saying that presidential systems can slow decision-making to beneficial ends. Divided government,
where the presidency and the legislature are controlled by different parties, is said to restrain the
excesses of both the coalition and opposition, and guarantee cross-partisan input into legislation. In
the United States, Republican Congressman Bill Frenzel wrote in 1995:
 There are some of us who think gridlock is the best thing since indoor plumbing. Gridlock
is the natural gift the Framers of the Constitution gave us so that the country would not be
subjected to policy swings resulting from the whimsy of the public. And the competition—
whether multi-branch, multi-level, or multi-house—is important to those checks and
balances and to our ongoing kind of centrist government. Thank heaven we do not have a
government that nationalizes one year and privatizes next year, and so on ad infinitum.
(Checks and Balances, 8)

Stability
Although most parliamentary governments go long periods of time without a no confidence vote,
Italy, Israel, and the French Fourth Republic have all experienced difficulties maintaining stability.
When parliamentary systems have multiple parties, and governments are forced to rely on coalitions,
as they often do in nations that use a system of proportional representation, extremist parties can
theoretically use the threat of leaving a coalition to further their agendas.

Many people consider presidential systems more able to survive emergencies. A country under
enormous stress may, supporters argue, be better off being led by a president with a fixed term than
rotating premierships. France during the Algerian controversy switched to a semi-presidential system
as did Sri Lanka during its civil war, while Israel experimented with a directly elected prime minister
in 1992. In France and Sri Lanka, the results are widely considered to have been positive. However, in
the case of Israel, an unprecedented proliferation of smaller parties occurred, leading to the
restoration of the previous system of selecting a prime minister.

The fact that elections are fixed in a presidential system is considered by supporters a welcome
"check" on the powers of the executive, contrasting parliamentary systems, which may allow the
prime minister to call elections whenever they see fit or orchestrate their own vote of no confidence to
trigger an election when they cannot get a legislative item passed. The presidential model is said to
discourage this sort of opportunism, and instead forces the executive to operate within the confines of
a term they cannot alter to suit their own needs.

Proponents of the presidential system also argue that stability extends to the cabinets chosen under
the system, compared to a parliamentary system where cabinets must be drawn from within the
legislative branch. Under the presidential system, cabinet members can be selected from a much
larger pool of potential candidates. This allows presidents the ability to select cabinet members based
as much or more on their ability and competency to lead a particular department as on their loyalty to
the president, as opposed to parliamentary cabinets, which might be filled by legislators chosen for no
better reason than their perceived loyalty to the prime minister. Supporters of the presidential system
note that parliamentary systems are prone to disruptive "cabinet shuffles" where legislators are
moved between portfolios, whereas in presidential system cabinets (such as the United States
Cabinet), cabinet shuffles are unusual.

Criticism and disadvantages

Critics generally claim three basic disadvantages for presidential systems:
 Tendency towards authoritarianism – some political scientists say presidentialism raises the
stakes of elections, exacerbates their polarization and can lead to authoritarianism (Linz).
Political gridlock – the separation of powers of a presidential system establishes the presidency
and the legislature as two parallel structures. Critics argue that this can create an undesirable and
long-term political gridlock whenever the president and the legislative majority are from different
parties, which is common because the electorate usually expects more rapid results from new
policies than are possible (Linz, Mainwaring and Shugart). In addition, this reduces accountability
by allowing the president and the legislature to shift blame to each other.[2]
Impediments to leadership change – presidential systems often make it difficult to remove a
president from office early, for example after taking actions that become unpopular.
A fourth criticism applies specifically to nations with a proportionally elected legislature and a
presidency. Where the voters are virtually all represented by their votes in the proportional outcome,
the presidency is elected on a winner-take-all basis. Two different electoral systems are therefore in
play, potentially leading to conflicts that are based on the natural differences of the systems.

Tendency towards authoritarianism

A prime minister without majority support in the legislature must either form a coalition or, if able to
lead a minority government, govern in a manner acceptable to at least some of the opposition parties.
Even with a majority government, the prime minister must still govern within (perhaps unwritten)
constraints as determined by the members of his party—a premier in this situation is often at greater
risk of losing his party leadership than his party is at risk of losing the next election. On the other
hand, winning the presidency is a winner-take-all, zero-sum game. Once elected, a president might be
able to marginalize the influence of other parties and exclude rival factions in his own party as well, or
even leave the party whose ticket he was elected under. The president can thus rule without any party
support until the next election or abuse his power to win multiple terms, a worrisome situation for
many interest groups. Yale political scientist Juan Linz argues that:

The danger that zero-sum presidential elections pose is compounded by the rigidity of the
president's fixed term in office. Winners and losers are sharply defined for the entire
period of the presidential mandate ... losers must wait four or five years without any
access to executive power and patronage. The zero-sum game in presidential regimes
raises the stakes of presidential elections and inevitably exacerbates their attendant
tension and polarization.

Constitutions that only require plurality support are said to be especially undesirable, as significant
power can be vested in a person who does not enjoy support from a majority of the population.

Some political scientists say that presidential systems are not constitutionally stable and have
difficulty sustaining democratic practices, noting that presidentialism has slipped into
authoritarianism in many of the countries in which it has been implemented. According to political
scientist Fred Riggs, presidentialism has fallen into authoritarianism in nearly every country it has
been attempted.[3][4] Political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset pointed out that this has taken place
in political cultures not conducive to democracy and that militaries have tended to play a prominent
role in most of these countries. On the other hand, an often-cited list of the world's 22 older
democracies includes only two countries (Costa Rica and the United States) with presidential systems.
In a presidential system, the legislature and the president have equal mandates from the public.
Conflicts between the branches of government might not be reconciled. When president and
legislature disagree and government is not working effectively, there is a strong incentive to use extra-
constitutional measures to break the deadlock. Of the three common branches of government, the
executive is in the best position to use extra-constitutional measures, especially when the president is
head of state, head of government, and commander-in-chief of the military. By contrast, in a
parliamentary system where the often-ceremonial head of state is either a constitutional monarch or
(in the case of a parliamentary republic) an experienced and respected figure, given some political
emergency there is a good chance that even a ceremonial head of state will be able to use emergency
reserve powers to restrain a head of government acting in an emergency extra-constitutional manner
– this is only possible because the head of state and the head of government are not the same person.

Dana D. Nelson, in her 2008 book Bad for Democracy,[5] sees the office of the President of the
United States as essentially undemocratic[6] and characterizes presidentialism as worship of the
president by citizens, which she believes undermines civic participation.[6]

Political gridlock
Some political scientists speak of the "failure of presidentialism" because the separation of powers of a
presidential system often creates undesirable long-term political gridlock and instability whenever the
president and the legislative majority are from different parties. This is common because the
electorate often expects more rapid results than are possible from new policies and switches to a
different party at the next election.[2] Critics such as Juan Linz, argue that this inherent political
instability can cause democracies to fail, as seen in such cases as Brazil and Chile.[7]

Lack of accountability
In such cases of gridlock, presidential systems are said by critics[8] not to offer voters the kind of
accountability seen in parliamentary systems. It is easy for either the president or the legislature to
escape blame by shifting it to the other. Describing the United States, former Treasury Secretary C.
Douglas Dillon said "the president blames Congress, the Congress blames the president, and the
public remains confused and disgusted with government in Washington".[9] Years before becoming
President, Woodrow Wilson (at the time, a fierce critic of the U.S. system of government) famously
wrote "how is the schoolmaster, the nation, to know which boy needs the whipping?"[10]

An example is the increase in the federal debt of the United States that occurred during the presidency
of Republican Ronald Reagan. Arguably, the deficits were the product of a bargain between President
Reagan and the Democratic Speaker of the House of Representatives, Tip O'Neill. O'Neill agreed to
tax cuts favored by Reagan, and in exchange Reagan agreed to budgets that did not restrain spending
to his liking. In such a scenario, each side can say they are displeased with the debt, plausibly blame
the other side for the deficit, and still claim success.

Impediments to leadership change

Another alleged problem of presidentialism is that it is often difficult to remove a president from
office early. Even if a president is "proved to be inefficient, even if he becomes unpopular, even if his
policy is unacceptable to the majority of his countrymen, he and his methods must be endured until
the moment comes for a new election".[11] John Tyler was elected vice president and assumed the
presidency because William Henry Harrison died after thirty days in office. Tyler blocked the Whig
agenda, was loathed by his nominal party, but remained firmly in control of the executive branch.
Most presidential systems provide no legal means to remove a president simply for being unpopular
or even for behaving in a manner that might be considered unethical or immoral provided it is not
illegal. This has been cited as the reason why many presidential countries have experienced military
coups to remove a leader who is said to have lost his mandate.

Parliamentary systems can quickly remove unpopular leaders by a vote of no confidence, a procedure
that serves as a "pressure release valve" for political tension. Votes of no confidence are easier to
achieve in minority government situations, but even if the unpopular leader heads a majority
government, he or she is often in a less secure position than a president. Usually in parliamentary
systems a basic premise is that if a premier's popularity sustains a serious enough blow and the
premier does not as a matter of consequence offer to resign prior to the next election, then those
members of parliament who would persist in supporting the premier will be at serious risk of losing
their seats. Therefore, especially in parliaments with a strong party system, other prominent members
of the premier's party have a strong incentive to initiate a leadership challenge in hopes of mitigating
damage to their party. More often than not, a premier facing a serious challenge resolves to save face
by resigning before being formally removed—Margaret Thatcher's relinquishing of her premiership
being a prominent example.

On the other hand, while removing a president through impeachment is allowed by most
constitutions, impeachment proceedings often can be initiated only in cases where the president has
violated the constitution or broken the law. Impeachment is often made difficult; by comparison the
removal a party leader is normally governed by the (often less formal) rules of the party. Nearly all
parties (including governing parties) have a relatively simple process for removing their leaders.

Furthermore, even when impeachment proceedings against a sitting president are successful, whether
by causing his removal from office or by compelling his resignation, the legislature usually has little or
no discretion in determining the ousted president's successor, since presidential systems usually
adhere to a rigid succession process which is enforced the same way regardless of how a vacancy in
the presidency comes about. The usual outcome of a presidency becoming vacant is that a vice
president automatically succeeds to the presidency. Vice presidents are usually chosen by the
president, whether as a running mate who elected alongside the president or appointed by a sitting
president, so that when a vice president succeeds to the presidency it is probable that he will continue
many or all the policies of the former president. A prominent example of such an accession would be
the elevation of Vice President Gerald Ford to the U.S. Presidency after Richard Nixon agreed to
resign in the face of virtually certain impeachment and removal, a succession that took place
notwithstanding the fact that Ford had only assumed the Vice Presidency after being appointed by
Nixon to replace Spiro Agnew, who had also resigned due to scandal. In some cases, particularly when
the would-be successor to a presidency is seen by legislators as no better (or even worse) than a
president they wish to see removed, there may be a strong incentive to abstain from pursuing
impeachment proceedings even if there are legal grounds to do so.

Since prime ministers in parliamentary systems must always retain the confidence of the legislature,
in cases where a prime minister suddenly leaves office there is little point in anyone without a
reasonable prospect of gaining that legislative confidence attempting to assume the premiership. This
ensures that whenever a premiership becomes vacant (or is about to become vacant), legislators from
the premier's party will always play a key role in determining the leader's permanent successor. In
theory this could be interpreted to support an argument that a parliamentary party ought to have the
power to elect their party leader directly, and indeed, at least historically, parliamentary system
parties' leadership electoral procedures usually called for the party's legislative caucus to fill a
leadership vacancy by electing a new leader directly by and from amongst themselves, and for the
whole succession process to be completed within as short a time frame as practical. Today, however,
such a system is not commonly practiced and most parliamentary system parties' rules provide for a
leadership election in which the general membership of the party is permitted to vote at some point in
the process (either directly for the new leader or for delegates who then elect the new leader in a
convention), though in many cases the party's legislators are allowed to exercise a disproportionate
influence in the final vote.

Whenever a leadership election becomes necessary on account of a vacancy arising suddenly, an

interim leader (often informally called the interim prime minister in cases where this involves a
governing party) will be selected by the parliamentary party, usually with the stipulation or
expectation that the interim leader will not be a candidate for the permanent leadership. Some
parties, such as the British Conservative Party, employ some combination of both aforementioned
electoral processes to select a new leader. In any event, a prime minister who is forced to leave office
due to scandal or similar circumstance will usually have little if any ability to influence his party on
the final selection of a new leader and anyone seen to be having close ties to such a prime minister will
have limited if any serious prospect of being elected the new leader. Even in cases when an outgoing
prime minister is leaving office voluntarily, it is often frowned on for an outgoing or former premier to
engage in any overt attempt to influence the election (for example, by endorsing a candidate in the
leadership election), in part because a party in the process of selecting a new leader usually has a
strong incentive to foster a competitive leadership election in order to stimulate interest and
participation in the election, which in turn encourages the sale of party memberships and support for
the party in general.

Walter Bagehot criticized presidentialism because it does not allow a transfer in power in the event of
an emergency.

Under a cabinet constitution at a sudden emergency the people can choose a ruler for the
occasion. It is quite possible and even likely that he would not be ruler before the occasion.
The great qualities, the imperious will, the rapid energy, the eager nature fit for a great
crisis are not required—are impediments—in common times. A Lord Liverpool is better in
everyday politics than a Chatham—a Louis Philippe far better than a Napoleon. By the
structure of the world we want, at the sudden occurrence of a grave tempest, to change the
helmsman—to replace the pilot of the calm by the pilot of the storm.

But under a presidential government you can do nothing of the kind. The American
government calls itself a government of the supreme people; but at a quick crisis, the time
when a sovereign power is most needed, you cannot find the supreme people. You have
got a congress elected for one fixed period, going out perhaps by fixed installments, which
cannot be accelerated or retarded—you have a president chosen for a fixed period, and
 immovable during that period: ... there is no elastic element ... you have bespoken your
government in advance, and whether it is what you want or not, by law you must keep
it ...[12]

Opponents of the presidential system note that years later, Bagehot's observation came to life during
World War II, when Neville Chamberlain was replaced with Winston Churchill.

However, supporters of the presidential system question the validity of the point. They argue that if
presidents were not able to command some considerable level of security in their tenures, their direct
mandates would be worthless. They further counter that republics such as the United States have
successfully endured war and other crises without the need to change heads of state. Supporters argue
that presidents elected in a time of peace and prosperity have proven themselves perfectly capable of
responding effectively to a serious crisis, largely due to their ability to make the necessary
appointments to his cabinet and elsewhere in government or by creating new positions to deal with
new challenges. One prominent, recent example would be the appointment of a Secretary of
Homeland Security following the September 11 attacks in the United States.

Some supporters of the presidential system counter that impediments to a leadership change, being
that they are little more than an unavoidable consequence of the direct mandate afforded to a
president, are thus a strength instead of a weakness in times of crisis. In such times, a prime minister
might hesitate due to the need to keep parliament's support, whereas a president can act without fear
of removal from office by those who might disapprove of his actions. Furthermore, even if a prime
minister does manage to successfully resolve a crisis (or multiple crises), that does not guarantee and
he or she will possess the political capital needed to remain in office for a similar, future crisis. Unlike
what would be possible in a presidential system, a perceived crisis in the parliamentary system might
give disgruntled backbenchers or rivals an opportunity to launch a vexing challenge for a prime
minister's leadership.

Finally, many have criticized presidential systems for their alleged slowness to respond to their
citizens' needs. Often, the checks and balances make action difficult. Walter Bagehot said of the
American system, "the executive is crippled by not getting the law it needs, and the legislature is
spoiled by having to act without responsibility: the executive becomes unfit for its name, since it
cannot execute what it decides on; the legislature is demoralized by liberty, by taking decisions of
others [and not itself] will suffer the effects".[12]

Defenders of presidential systems argue that a parliamentary system operating in a jurisdiction with
strong ethnic or sectarian tensions will tend to ignore the interests of minorities or even treat them
with contempt – the first half century of government in Northern Ireland is often cited as an example
– whereas presidential systems ensure that minority wishes and rights cannot be disregarded, thus
preventing a "tyranny of the majority" and vice versa protect the wishes and rights of the majority
from abuse by a legislature or an executive that holds a contrary viewpoint especially when there are
frequent, scheduled elections. On the other hand, supporters of parliamentary systems contend that
the strength and independence of the judiciary is the more decisive factor when it comes to protection
of minority rights.
British-Irish philosopher and MP Edmund Burke stated that an official should be elected based on
"his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience", and therefore should reflect
on the arguments for and against certain policies before taking positions and then act out on what an
official would believe is best in the long run for one's constituents and country as a whole even if it
means short-term backlash. Thus defenders of presidential systems hold that sometimes what is
wisest may not always be the most popular decision and vice versa.

Differences from a parliamentary system

A number of key theoretical differences exist between a presidential and a parliamentary system:

In a presidential system, the central principle is that the legislative,executive and judicial branches
of government are separate. This leads to the separate election of president, who is elected to
office for a fixed term, and only removable for gross misdemeanor by impeachment and dismissal.
By contrast, in parliamentarianism, the executive branch is led by a council of ministers, headed
by a Prime Minister, who are directly accountable to the legislature and often have their
background in the legislature (regardless of whether it is called a "parliament", an "assembly", a
"diet", or a "chamber").
As with the president's set term of office, the legislature also exists for a set term of office and
cannot be dissolved ahead of schedule. By contrast, in parliamentary systems, the prime minister
needs to survive a vote of confidence otherwise a new election must be called. The legislature
can typically be dissolved at any stage during its life by the head of state, usually on the advice of
either Prime Minister alone, by the Prime Minister and cabinet, or by the cabinet.
In a presidential system, the president usually has special privileges in the enactment of
legislation, namely the possession of a power of veto over legislation of bills, in some cases
subject to the power of the legislature by weighted majority to override the veto. The legislature
and the president are thus expected to serve as checks and balances on each other's powers.
Presidential system presidents may also be given a great deal of constitutional authority in the
exercise of the office of Commander in Chief, a constitutional title given to most presidents. In
addition, the presidential power to receive ambassadors as head of state is usually interpreted as
giving the president broad powers to conduct foreign policy. Though semi-presidential systems
may reduce a president's power over day-to-day government affairs, semi-presidential systems
commonly give the president power over foreign policy.
Parliamentary systems certainly provide greater flexibility in the process of transition to any
consolidation of democracy. [13]
Presidential systems also have fewer ideological parties than parliamentary systems. Sometimes in
the United States, the policies preferred by the two parties have been very similar (but see also
polarization). In the 1950s, during the leadership of Lyndon B. Johnson, the Senate Democrats
included the right-most members of the chamber—Harry Byrd and Strom Thurmond, and the left-
most members—Paul Douglas and Herbert Lehman. This pattern does not prevail in Latin American
presidential democracies.

Overlapping elements
In practice, elements of both systems overlap. Though a president in a presidential system does not
have to choose a government under the legislature, the legislature may have the right to scrutinize his
or her appointments to high governmental office, with the right, on some occasions, to block an
appointment. In the United States, many appointments must be confirmed by the Senate, although
once confirmed an appointee can only be removed against the president's will through impeachment.
By contrast, though answerable to parliament, a parliamentary system's cabinet may be able to make
use of the parliamentary 'whip' (an obligation on party members in parliament to vote with their
party) to control and dominate parliament, reducing parliament's ability to control the government.

Republics with a presidential system of government

Italics indicate states with limited recognition.

Afghanistan Liberia
Angola Malawi
Argentina Maldives
Benin Mexico
Bolivia Nicaragua
Brazil Nigeria
Burundi Palau
Chad Panama
Chile Paraguay
Colombia Peru
Comoros Philippines
Costa Rica Senegal
Cyprus Seychelles
Dominican Republic Sierra Leone
Ecuador South Sudan
El Salvador Turkey
Gambia Turkmenistan
Ghana United States
Guatemala Uruguay
Honduras Venezuela
Indonesia Zambia
Kenya Zimbabwe

Presidential systems with a prime minister

The following countries have presidential systems where a post of prime minister (official title may
vary) exists alongside with that of president. Differently from other systems, however, the president is
still both the head of state and government and the prime minister's roles are mostly to assist the
president. Belarus and Kazakhstan, where the prime minister is effectively the head of government
and the president the head of state, are exceptions.

Argentina Equatorial Guinea

Belarus Gabon
Cameroon Georgia (1995-2004)
Central African Republic Guinea (Guinea-Conakry)
Cuba Guyana
Djibouti Haiti
 Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire) Sudan
Kazakhstan[14] Tajikistan
Peru Tanzania
Rwanda Togo
South Korea Uganda
Uzbekistan

Presidential systems with a theocratic supreme leader

Iran[15]

See also
List of countries by system of government
Parliamentary system
Westminster system
Semi-presidential system
Coalition government

Notes and references

1. The "presidential" model implies that the Chief Executive is elected by all those members of the
electoral body: Buonomo, Giampiero (2003). "Titolo V e "forme di governo": il caso Abruzzo (dopo
la Calabria)" (https://www.questia.com/projects#!/project/89381752). Diritto&Giustizia Edizione
Online. – via Questia (subscription required)
2. George, Edwards; Warrenberg, Martin (2016). Government in America: People, Politics, and
Policy, AP* Edition – 2016 Presidential Election, 17th Edition. Pearson Higher Education. p. 16.
ISBN 9780134586571.
3. Riggs, Fred W. (1997). "Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism: Implications for
Representativeness and Legitimacy". International Political Science Review. 18 (3): 258.
doi:10.1177/019251297018003003 (https://doi.org/10.1177%2F019251297018003003).
JSTOR 1601343 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/1601343).
4. "Conceptual homogenization of a heterogeneous field: Presidentialism in comparative
perspective". Comparing Nations: Concepts, Strategies, Substance: 72–152. 1994.
5. Nelson, Dana D. (2008). Bad for Democracy: How the Presidency Undermines the Power of the
People (https://books.google.com/books?id=qgAWphms5oMC&pg=PA223&lpg=PA223&dq=Dana
+Nelson+vanderbilt%3F+%22bad+for+democracy%22#v=onepage&q=&f=false). Minneapolis,
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. p. 248. ISBN 978-0-8166-5677-6.
6. David Sirota (August 22, 2008). "Why cult of presidency is bad for democracy" (http://www.sfgate.
com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/08/21/EDCQ12G3M0.DTL). San Francisco Chronicle.
Retrieved 2009-09-20.
7. Linz, J. (1990). The perils of presidentialism. The journal of democracy, Volume 1(1), pp. 51-69.
8. Linz, J. (1985). Democracy: Presidential or Parliamentary does it make a difference. Connecticut:
Yale university press
9. Sundquist, James (1992). Constitutional Reform and Effective Government (https://archive.org/det
ails/constitutionalre00sund_1). Brookings Institution Press. p. 11 (https://archive.org/details/constit
utionalre00sund_1/page/11).
10. Wilson, Congressional Government (1885), pp. 186–187.
11. Balfour. "Introduction". The English Constitution.
12. Balfour. "The Cabinet". The English Constitution.
13. Linz, J. (1985) Democracy: Presidential or Parliamentary does it make a difference? Connecticut:
Yale university press.
14. "Nazarbaev Signs Kazakh Constitutional Amendments Into Law" (http://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhsta
n-nazarbaev-signs-constitutional-amendments/28361743.html). Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
10 March 2017. Retrieved 10 March 2017. For more information: please see Abdurasulov,
Abdujalil (6 March 2017). "Kazakhstan constitution: Will changes bring democracy?" (https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-asia-39177708). BBC News. Retrieved 7 March 2017.
15. Iran combines the forms of a presidential republic, with a president elected by universal suffrage,
and a totalitarian theocracy, with a Supreme Leader who is ultimately responsible for state policy,
chosen by the elected Assembly of Experts. Candidates for both the Assembly of Experts and the
presidency are vetted by the appointed Guardian Council.

External links
The Great Debate: Parliament versus Congress (http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Sites/LOP/Infoparl/englis
h/issue.asp?param=108&art=573)
Castagnola, Andrea/Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal: Presidential Control of High Courts in Latin America: A
Long-term View (1904-2006) (http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/view/41/41), in:
Journal of Politics in Latin America, Hamburg 2009.

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