Journal of Pereonality and Social Psychology Copyright 1986 by the American Psychological Association, lac.

1986, Vol. 51, No. 1,140-148 0022-3514/86/$00.75

Social Comparison and Depression: Company's Effect on Misery

Frederick X. Gibbons
Iowa State University

In this article, two studies examine the social comparison processes of depressed and nondepressed
college students. In the first study, subjects' preferences for information from others were assessed
after they had received a manipulation intended to improve or worsen their mood states. The re-
sponses of the depressed subjects provided evidence of downward comparison, as they indicated a
preference for information from people who were experiencing negative affect—but only when they
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themselves were also experiencing relatively negative affect, and not when their moods had been
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temporarily improved. In the second study, subjects' moods were assessed before and after they had
received information indicating another person was currently experiencing very negative affect. This
information had little effect on the nondepressed subjects, however, the mood states of the depressed
persons improved after they read the information. In general, the results indicate that realizing that
others are doing worse may help depressed persons to feel somewhat better.

Although continued interest in Festinger's (1954) social com-
parison theory has resulted in a number of important modifi-
cations (cf. Snyder & Wicklund, 1981; Suls & Miller, 1977), the
basic tenets of the theory have not changed much in the last 30
years. According to Festinger, when people choose targets for
comparison, they usually prefer others who appear to have
slightly more of the trait or the ability in question than they
do—a tendency called upward drive or upward preference. The
reason for this preference is that people who are better off are
thought to be most likely to provide useful information that can
facilitate improvement on the dimension or the behavior being
compared. Festinger recognized, however, and more recent the-
orists have emphasized, that the selection process is not always
done objectively or without bias. In particular, the need to know
may often be overridden by a need to know something
positive—even if it is not entirely accurate—thereby protecting
the ego. Thus, comparison with others who are slightly better is
usually preferred, because it has the potential to boost self-es-
teem if the outcome happens to be favorable, and yet it is not
likely to pose much threat to the ego should the outcome be
disappointing.
Although the topic has received relatively little empirical at-
tention, it seems likely that the same motivation might apply
to comparisons involving affect or mood states. When given a
choice, people should prefer and perhaps even seek out the com-
pany of others who are experiencing positive affect. Mood states
tend to be contagious, and the appeal of persons who are in a
good mood is likely to increase their attractiveness (as an infor-
mation source) in comparison situations. In contrast, it has
been demonstrated that people who are in a bad mood or who
The author would like to thank Sharon Brehm and Meg Oerrard for
their comments on this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Fred-
erick X. Gibbons, Department of Psychology, Iowa State University,
Ames, Iowa 50011.
are depressed tend to be avoided (Coates, Wortman, & Abbey,
1980; Hammen & Peters, 1978), in part, says Coyne (1976a),
because they can make others feel bad. Coyne (1976b) found
that nondepressed subjects reported feeling worse after interact-
ing with depressed persons (also, cf. Howes, Hokanson, &
Loewenstein, 1985), and Hammen and Peters (1978) found the
same reaction to persons enacting a depressed role.
Downward Comparison
In one of the recent modifications of social comparison the-
ory, it is suggested that the upward drive or tendency does not
hold for some people in some situations. Brickman and Bulman
(1977), for example, have suggested that the opposite behavior,
avoidance of persons who are doing well, may occur when it is
thought that the comparison might provide unfavorable infor-
mation. This is especially true for persons whose self-esteem is
low. They may feel threatened by others who are better off and,
as a result, choose to avoid such people and seek out others who
appear to be doing worse than they are—a process that has been
termed downward comparison. In a recent review of the rele-
vant literature in this area, Wills (1981) came to the conclusion
that this particular type of social comparison is most likely to
occur when a person has experienced a decrease in subjective
well-being, and that it is most common among people who are
"most unhappy and least fortunate."
Taylor, Wood, and Lichtman (1983) found anecdotal evi-
dence of downward comparison among persons they inter-
viewed who had been victimized by disease, crime, or other
misfortunes. Similarly, more direct evidence of downward com-
parison among women adjusting to breast cancer is provided by
Wood, Taylor, and Lichtman (1985). The tendency was for these
people to seek out and socially compare with other persons who
had been more severely victimized. Thus, women who had had
lumpectomies might compare with those who had mastecto-
mies, paraplegics with quadriplegics, and so forth. Taylor et al.
argue that although this may appear to be an unusual method

140
 SOCIAL COMPARISON AND DEPRESSION
of coping with misfortune, it also seems to be an effective one.
Seeing someone who is worse off may leave these distressed per-
sons with the impression that they are not so bad off themselves
with regard to either their own coping success or their relative
severity of affliction. As a result, some of their distress and de-
pression may be alleviated.
Downward Comparison and Affect
The downward comparison literature tends to complicate the
affect/social comparison relation discussed earlier, because it
suggests that the tendency to prefer happy people and avoid un-
happy persons (Coates et al., 1980; Gergen & Wishnow, 1965)
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is not consistent. In particular, it may be the case that persons
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who are experiencing some kind of emotional or affect-related
distress do not prefer the company of others who are in a good
mood. Instead they may do just the opposite—seek out others
who are not doing well or not feeling particularly happy. In fact,
there is some indirect evidence in the literature to support this
hypothesis. Coates and Winston (1983), for example, examined
self-help groups for persons experiencing physical illness and
emotional distress, and suggested that depressed persons in
these groups seek out other depressed persons in order to obtain
some information as to how well they themselves are doing.
In another study by Coates (Coates & Peterson, 1982), de-
pressed college students gave some indication that they enjoyed
talking with others who were instructed to act unhappy. Similar
results came from a survey of college students' reactions to dys-
phoria by Funabiki, Bologna, Pepping, and Fitzgerald (1980).
In that study, mildly depressed students were somewhat (i.e.,
nonsignificantly) more likely to endorse what the authors la-
beled as a "misery loves company" variable, which consisted of
the items "When I am depressed . . . I want to be with other
depressed people," and "I get joy out of making others de-
pressed." Finally, Bell (1978) found that subjects whose mood
states had been temporarily depressed preferred subsequently
to work with a happy person, but were more willing than nonde-
pressed subjects to work with another who they thought was
also feeling sad. Paradoxically, it may be that being in the pres-
ence of others who are also feeling bad (or worse) may help de-
pressed persons to feel better. Although consistent with Wills's
(1981) reasoning, this hypothesis remains unproven. The pur-
pose of the current two studies was to examine this hypothesis
directly.
Study 1: Overview
In the first study, depressed and nondepressed college stu-
dents' preferences for social comparison partners were assessed.
Subjects were first asked to write a self-disclosure statement
about an event that had happened to them recently, which had
either a significant negative or a significant positive effect on
them. Then, after their mood states had been assessed, they
were asked to choose one group of statements from a list of
seven categories that they had been presented, which they were
to read and evaluate. The statements supposedly belonged to
other subjects, and the categories were based on the type of
affect (very positive to very negative) displayed in those state-
141
ments. The predictions were that (a) the nondepressed subjects
would prefer to read positive statements; whereas (b) the de-
pressed subjects would prefer positive statements when their
mood states had been improved, but negative statements when
their mood states had been worsened (cf. Wills, 1981). Thus a
Type of Statement X Depression group interaction was antici-
pated on the choice variable. In the second study, the effect of
reading negatively toned statements on mood states was exam-
ined.
Method
Subjects
Twenty-five undergraduate males and 20 undergraduate females par-
ticipated as part of an introductory psychology course extra credit op-
tion. The data from 2 women were not included in the final analysis
because of procedural problems. In both experiments, subjects were
administered the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Men-
delsohn, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) during large mass-testing sessions
from 2 to 6 weeks prior to participation in the study. Only those with
BDI scores of 3 or less or 11 or more were chosen to participate. In the
first experiment, the mean BDI score of the low group was 1.81, and the
mean BDI score of the high group was 21.59. The majority of subjects
in the latter group fell into Beck's (1978) "moderate-severe depression"
category (i.e., scores of 20-29) at the time of testing.
Procedure
The PEQ. Subjects were run individually. Initial information pro-
vided by the experimenter (who was unaware of the subj ect's BDI score)
indicated that the study concerned impression formation, or "the pro-
cess whereby people get to know one another." Subjects were informed
that they would be providing some information about themselves and
reacting to information given to them in different forms by other people.
After receiving the initial instructions, subjects were taken to a cubicle
where they were told they would have 10 min to perform the first task.
This consisted of writing a self-disclosure statement, or what was called
a Personal Events Questionnaire (PEQ). In the positive condition, the
PEQ asked subjects to write about an event, which had happened to
them in the last year, that had a significant positive effect on them; in
the negative condition, the word positive was replaced by the word nega-
tive. At the end of the session, the experimenter returned, collected the
PEQ from the subject, and then left him or her alone in the cubicle. All
of the remaining instructions were presented via an intercom, and there
was no further contact between the experimenter and the subject.
The questions. The experimenter told the subject to open up the first
folder as soon as she left and answer it. This questionnaire contained six
mood items (sad, cheerful, calm, worried, discouraged, and pleasant),
which were selected from the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (Zuck-
erman & Lubin, 1965). Each item was accompanied by a 9-point scale
(from not at all to very). Upon completion of this scale, subjects were
instructed to place it back in the folder and then they were allowed to
wait alone for 8 min. The purpose of this waiting period was to give
subjects time to reflect back on the incident they had described. Al-
though no specific instructions were given to subjects to reflect, pilot
research had indicated that this period enhanced the effectiveness of the
PEQ manipulation.
Statement selection and Mood 2. At the end of the waiting period,
subjects were instructed to take the questionnaire out of the next folder
and answer it. This questionnaire contained one item, which was the
primary dependent variable. It indicated that subjects would now be
asked to read and evaluate (i.e., provide their opinions of) a number of
 142 FREDERICK X. GIBBONS
Table 1
Study 1: Mood Self-Report and Statement Selection
Variable
Subject N Mood 1" Mood 2 Choice"
Negative statement 0
Nondepressed 11 7.45, 8.27, 5.64,
Depressed 11 0.00y -.37, 3.82,
Positive statement"
Nondepressed 10 13.00, 15.00, 5.80,
Depressed 11 4.00,y 7.54, 6.00,
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Note. For each variable, cells without common subscripts differ at the
p < .05 level according to Newman-Keul's tests.a Mood indexes (self-
rating) = Sum of positive items — Sum of negative items. Range = —24
to 24. b Level of affect of statements subject chose to read. A low score
indicates preference for statements containing relatively negative affect
(Scale = 1 -7).c Valence of statement written by the subject.
PEQ statements from persons who had previously participated in the
study. To facilitate this process, the statements had supposedly already
been read once (preliminarily) and then grouped into one of seven cate-
gories according to the type of affect that was displayed in them by the
authors. The categories were numbered from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very
positive). Subjects were told that statements from all seven categories
needed to be read eventually, but that each subject would have a choice
as to which single group of statements she or he wanted to read. As soon
as this item had been completed, subjects were instructed to answer the
second mood scale, which was intended as a check on their mood states
at the time they answered the choice question. This scale consisted of
six mood items, which were the polar opposites of those on the first scale
the subjects had filled out (i.e., happy, gloomy, upset, peaceful, encour-
aged, and irritated). Opposite adjectives were used on the second scale
in order to reduce subject suspicion regarding the mood variable. When
they finished this questionnaire, subjects were informed that they would
not be reading any more PEQ statements, and then they were debriefed
and dismissed.
Results
Mood Items
Mood Indexes were calculated for both the first and second
scales by subtracting the sum of the three negative items from
that of the three positive items. Intercorrelations among the ad-
jectives of the positive and the negative indexes averaged .44 for
the first scale and .52 for the second. Correlations between the
two scales and the BDI scores were -.40 and -.41 (JK < .004).
A 2 factor (Depression Group X Statement) unweighted means
analysis of variance was performed on this first mood index.
This analysis revealed a significant main effect of depression
group, and a slight trend toward a main effect of statement, as
the depressed subjects and those who wrote about a negative
event tended to report more negative affect, Fs(l, 39) = 8.32
and 2.20, ps < .006 and .11, respectively (see Table 1). Both of
these main effects were highly significant on the second mood
scale, which was filled out after the waiting period and state-
ment selection, Fs( 1, 39) = 11.52 and 9.51, both ps < .004.'
Statement Selection
An analysis of subjects' responses regarding selection of PEQ
statements revealed a main effect of type of statement written,
F(l, 39) = 5.44, p < .03, ij2 = .11, as subjects who had written
positive statements preferred to read more positive statements
(M = 5.91 vs. 4.73; see Table 1). However, this main effect was
qualified by a Statement X Group interaction, F(l, 39) = 4.03,
p = .05, i)2 = .08.2 As expected, the depressed subjects who had
written about a negative event requested the most negative PEQ
statements to read (ps for all comparisons < .05, according to
Newman-Keul's tests).
Discussion
In general, subjects did prefer to read the positive statements,
and this was especially true if they had written a positive state-
ment themselves. As expected, the only exception to this ten-
dency came from the depressed subjects, who had been exposed
to a mood lowering manipulation; these subjects did not ask for
positive affect statements. Thus, the results offer support for the
hypothesis and provide some evidence of downward social com-
parison in terms of target preference: (a) with regard to affect
and (b) among depressed college students, relative to nonde-
pressed students.
Why downward comparison? Although the responses of the
depressed subjects suggest they were interested in engaging in a
form of downward comparison, the data provide little indica-
tion of why they wanted to do it. Researchers who have worked
in this area (e.g., Taylor etal., 1983; Wills, 1981) have suggested
that people engage in downward comparison because it helps
them feel better, either through self-aggrandizement or simply
alleviation of negative mood. In the second study, the impact of
downward comparison on mood states was examined in order
to test this hypothesis directly.
Study 2: Overview
Depressed and nondepressed subjects were asked to write
PEQ statements this time about any event, regardless of out-
1
Although the mean Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) score of 21.6
was well above the cut-off score for depression (10) at the time subjects
took the scale, several researchers (e.g., Sacco, 1981) have indicated that
BDI scores tend to be unstable over time. Thus, although the differences
on the mood scales did indicate that the depressed group was experienc-
ing more negative affect than was the nondepressed, it is possible that
some of these subjects may have moved out of the depression category
by the time of their participation in the experiment. (It is also possible,
although not very likely, that some subjects moved up from the nonde-
pressed to the depressed category during this time interval.) Hence, it
may actually be technically more accurate to label these subjects as the
negative affect or dysphoric group. In short, the term depressed is used
to describe one group of subjects relative to the other and is not meant
to imply any type of clinical disorder.
2
Analyses for both studies were conducted a second time including
sex of subject as an independent variable. These analyses produced re-
sults comparable to the present set, with no significant main effects or
interactions involving this variable (all Fs < 1.6). Thus, data from both
sexes are presented together.
 SOCIAL COMPARISON AND DEPRESSION
come, that had an impact on them. After writing their state-
ments, subjects' moods were assessed, and then they were asked
to read a false PEQ statement, supposedly written by their part-
ner, that was very negative in tone. Mood states were then as-
sessed again after subjects had read their partner's PEQ. Once
again the primary predictions involved the depressed subjects:
Based on the reasoning of Taylor et al. (1983) and Wills (1981),
it was predicted that the realization that their partner was expe-
riencing negative affect—more negative than their own—would
result in some alleviation of dysphoria for the depressed sub-
jects.
Three additional groups of variables were also included in
this study, all of which were intended to assess subjects' reac-
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tions to the PEQ statements that they had written and read. The
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first group consisted of attributions (i.e., internal vs. external)
that subjects made for the event that they had described. In this
case, it was thought that the depressed subjects might differ
from the nondepressed in the amount of responsibility they ac-
cepted for the event, especially if those events happened to be
negative in tone (cf. Gong-Guy & Hammen, 1980). This type
of attribution could also have an impact on their mood states,
thereby making it difficult to determine how much of an effect
their partner's PEQ had on them. Similarly, subjects' percep-
tions of the intimacy of their statements were assessed. Again,
the purpose here was to determine if subjects' perceptions of
their own self-disclosure statements would be related to their
mood states. Finally, the third dependent variable was subjects'
assessments of the mood reflected in their partner's PEQ. This
was intended primarily as a check on the PEQ manipulation,
and the prediction here was simply that all subjects would see
their partner's mood as being very negative, in fact, more nega-
tive than their own. However, evidence from two recent studies
suggests that this tendency might be stronger for the nonde-
pressed subjects. Tabachnik, Crocker, and Alloy (1983) re-
ported that nondepressed persons generally tend to view others
as being more depressed than they perceive themselves to be.
Similarly, Kuiper and MacDonald (1982) found that nonde-
pressed subjects rated themselves as less depressed than either
a generalized or a well-known other, whereas depressed subjects
saw themselves as more depressed than a generalized, but not a
well-known other.
Self-focus and affect. There is another, secondary aspect of
this next study that concerns the relation between self-focused
attention and depression. In a recent study, Gibbons et al.
(1985) examined the hypothesis that self-focused attention can
enhance awareness of chronic mood traits. As expected, clini-
cally depressed subjects in that study did report more negative
affect when their attention was self-focused than when it was
not. Part of the significance of this finding centered around the
fact that previous studies demonstrating emotional amplifica-
tion under conditions conducive to self-focus (e.g., Scheier,
1976; Scheier, Carver, & Gibbons, 1981) all involved situations
in which subjects' mood states had been temporarily manipu-
lated by a stimulus of some kind. However, because of a poten-
tial procedural problem in the Gibbons et al. study, the question
of how self-focused attention affects chronic mood traits has not
been answered unequivocally. That is, the self-reported affect of
the psychiatric patients in that study was assessed after they had
143
completed a questionnaire that concerned the extent of their
psychiatric problems as well as their responsibility for them. It
seems possible that asking subjects to ruminate on such issues
might have actually served as a mood manipulation of sorts.
For this reason, the relation between chronic mood and self-
focused attention was examined again in the current study. In
this case, half of the subjects responded to the mood questions
in the presence of a mirror, but without any direct mood manip-
ulation. The prediction, once again, was that self-awareness
would affect (i.e., exacerbate) subjects' chronic mood tenden-
cies. In sum, the design of the study was a 2 X 2 (High/Low
Depression x Self-Aware/Not Self-Aware) factorial.
Method
Subjects
The subjects were 28 male and 29 female undergraduates. The mean
score on the BDI for the low group was .48 and for the high group the
mean was 17.11. The data from 2 subjects were not included in the final
analysis: one because he did not read the partner's PEQ and one because
she doubted it's authenticity.
Procedure
Subjects were run in same-sex pairs. Instructions were similar to
those given in the first experiment, but with modifications reflecting the
fact that there were 2 subjects instead of 1. Initially they were greeted
in a waiting room and told that the experiment concerned impression
formation. During the study they would be asked to provide informa-
tion about themselves to one another so that they could get to know
each other a little better. After determining that the subjects were not
acquainted, the experimenter led them to separate cubicles where they
were to fill out the PEQ.
The PEQ. This PEQ asked subjects to write about an event, which
had happened to them in the recent past, that led to an outcome that
had a "significant impact" on them. The favorability of the outcome
was not specified, so that subjects could write about any type of event
they wanted to. Ten minutes were allowed for the PEQ. At the end of
the period, the statements were collected, and then one of the subjects
was randomly chosen to be moved into another cubicle, supposedly so
that the first cubicle could be "set up for use later in the experiment."
This cubicle contained a (64 cm X 120 cm) mirror along with a set of
folders, an intercom, and some excess electronic equipment (e.g., an
oscilloscope). The experimenter indicated to the subject that the extra
equipment, including the mirror, belonged to another experimenter; no
subjects expressed any suspicions about the mirror.
Mood 1. Another minute was allowed (for the self-aware subject to
become adjusted to the cubicle), and then both subjects were instructed
to answer the first mood questionnaire, which consisted of a 6-item
mood scale (happy, tense, peaceful, angry, apathetic, and secure).
Self PEQ Assessments. The next questionnaire asked subjects first to
make attributions for the events that they had described. For each event,
they indicated how much each of the following four factors contributed
to the outcome: ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck. They were then
asked to assess the intimacy of the statement in terms of how personal
it was, as well as how much they revealed about themself and how much
affect they had displayed in it.
Other PEQ. After completing this questionnaire, subjects were told
that their PEQ statements would now be switched so that they would
have an opportunity to read and react to each other's statements. In
fact, all subjects were then presented with the same bogus PEQ. This
 144 FREDERICK X. GIBBONS
Table 2
Study 2: Mood Assessments: Self and Other
Initial Other
Subject N mood* mood"
Self-aware
Nondepressed 13 12.61, -10.08xy
Depressed 15 2.33y -13.87,
Nonself-aware
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Nondepressed 14 14.78, -12.35xy
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Depressed 13 7.47ly -8.84,,
Note. For each variable, cells without common subscripts differ at thep < .05 level according to Newman-Keul's tests.
• Scale for self = -24 to 24; for other = -25 to 15.
" Mood 2 - Mood 1; a positive number means a positive mood change. Main effect of depression = p < .05.
c
Attribution to factor of ability for incident described by subject. Scale = 1 (not at all important) to 9 (very important).
statement concerned an accident which had happened to the author's
nephew while she or he was (supposed to have been) babysitting the
child. In addition to broken Angers, the accident was apparently also
going to leave the boy with a permanent scar on his face, and it was
clear that the incident had had a negative impact on the author, who
expressed some guilt and implied some responsibility for it. After read-
ing the statement, subjects were asked to put it away and then evaluate
it in terms of how much affect was displayed in it. This was done on a 5-
item scale (happy, upset, depressed, enthusiastic, and lonely). A different
scale was used, once again, in order to reduce suspicion regarding the
purpose of the mood questions.
Mood 2. The final questionnaire consisted of a second mood scale
containing the polar opposites of the six items in the first mood scale
(i.e., sad, calm, upset, good-natured, interested, and hopeless). A com-
parison of subjects' responses to this second mood scale with those on
the first provided an indication of the impact that reading their partner's
PEQ statement had on their mood states. Debriefing occurred as soon
as the final mood questionnaire was completed.
Results
PEQ Statements
All of the subjects' PEQ statements were read by a group of
10 undergraduate raters and then evaluated as to how personal
they were, as well as the amount of positive and negative affect
displayed in them by the authors (the alphas for the three ratings
were .91, .95, and .93, respectively, suggesting reasonable agree-
ment). The 10 ratings were then averaged, and a score was as-
signed to each subject for each rating. Analyses of these scores
revealed no differences between the depressed and the nonde-
pressed subjects on any of the dimensions (all Fs < 1.0). This
suggests two things: (a) the PEQ itself did not affect subjects'
moods, thus the test of the impact of self-focused attention on
chronic mood traits was not "contaminated" by a state mood
manipulation; (b) subjects' responses to the mood scales most
likely reflected reactions to their partner's and not their own
PEQ statements. In short, the self-disclosure statement that
Variable
Ability
Final Mood attribution
mood change11 (self)"
13.84, 1.23 3.77
5.93y 3.60 6.73
13.00, -1.78 4.07
11.69, 4.22 5.62
subjects wrote appears not to have interfered with either the
self-awareness or the partner PEQ manipulations.
Mood Variables
Initial mood and other's mood. The average intercorrelations
for the positive and negative adjectives of the first scale were .53
and .25, and for the second scale they were .32 and .55.3 The
correlation between the first scale and the BDI was —.44 (p <
.001). An analysis of this first mood index revealed a main effect
of depression group, F(\, 51) = 15.35, p< .001 (see Table 2).
As expected, the mean of the self-aware depressed group was
the lowest of all, but it was not significantly different from the
nonself-aware depressed group, /(51) = 1.64, p< . 11. Looking
at subjects' assessments of their partner's affect (Table 2), it can
be seen that they did think she or he was in a worse mood than
they were, even considering the fact that the scales were not
identical.4 An analysis of this variable revealed an unexpected
Self-Awareness X Group interaction, F(\, 51) = 4.53, p < .04,
but no main effect of depression,/; > .30. Thus, the expectation
that nondepressed subjects would evaluate their partner's mood
more negatively (cf. Kuiper & MacDonald, 1982) was not sup-
ported by the data. As can be seen in Table 2, the cell that was
discrepant with this prediction was that of the self-aware de-
pressed subjects. This mean (—13.87) was quite low, in fact, sig-
3
In both cases there was an adjective that did not correlate well with
the others (interested in the positive, Scale 1; apathetic in the negative,
Scale 2). Analyses of variance conducted when these adjectives were
removed produced essentially the same results, however.
4
Given that the self- and other mood scales did not contain the same
(or opposite) adjectives, statistical comparison is not possible. However,
the means on the two indexes are so discrepant (9.2 vs. -11.4 on the
combined index, 2.1 vs. 13.8 on the two 3-item negative scales) as to
suggest a strong difference in subjects' perceptions on this variable.
Moreover, a comparison of the item happy, which was on both scales,
did reveal a strong self/other contrast effect, 1^1, 51) = 94.63, p < .001.
 SOCIAL COMPARISON AND DEPRESSION
15
SUBJECTS
10 Nondepressed
Depressed
5 in downward comparison on the dimension of affect is because
Time 1 Time 2
MEASURE
Figure 1. Study 2: Mood change after reading the
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partner's Personal Events Questionnaire,
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nificantly lower than that of the nonself-aware depressed sub-
jects (-8.84), and lower (but not significantly) than that of the
(two) nondepressed cells (-11.26).
Final mood and mood change. The same pattern of results
appeared on the second as on the first mood assessment. An
analysis of this index revealed only a main effect of depression
group, F(\, 51) = 5.41, p < .03. However, this time the self-
aware depressed group did report more negative affect than did
the nonself-aware depressed subjects (M = 5.93 vs. 11.69; t =
2.07, p < .05), and more than the other two groups of subjects
(both p < .05 according to Newman-Keul's tests). As can be
seen in Table 2, a comparison of the first and second mood as-
sessments indicated that there was a slight decline overall in the
self-reported moods of the nondepressed subjects (M change =
-.24). However, as expected, there was a significant improve-
ment in the moods of the depressed subjects after reading the
negative PEQ (Mchange = 3.92). A repeated measures analysis
of variance indicated that the increase in mood scale scores was
significant for both depressed groups (rs[ 13 and 15] = 2.38 and
2.17, ps < .05; see Figure 1). In addition this difference in mean
change scores between the depressed and nondepressed groups
was also significant, F(l, 51) = 5.74, .p < .02, T,2 = .10.
PEQ self-assessments. With one exception, there were no
significant effects on the self-attribution items (all/? > .25), The
exception occurred on the ability variable, which the depressed
subjects saw as much more relevant to the incident they had
described, F( 1,51) = 9.69, p < .003. In addition, a multivariate
analysis of variance was performed on the three questions per-
taining to the intimacy of subjects' (own) statements (personal,
reveal, and affect displayed). This analysis revealed only a sig-
nificant main effect of depression, as the depressed subjects gen-
erally thought their statements were more intimate, F{3,49) =
3.05, p < .04. Although it might be interesting to speculate on
the antecedents of both of these effects, neither one of them was
included in the prediction, so they will not be discussed further.5
More importantly, correlational analyses indicated that neither
the self-perceptions nor the attributions were related to the pri-
mary dependent variables, which were the affect items (all p >
.20). Thus, the concern that subjects' perceptions of their own
PEQ might have affected their mood states appears to have been
unfounded.
145
Discussion
As expected, the negative PEQ statements did have the effect
of improving the mood states of the depressed subjects. Thus,
the results of the second study help to answer a question raised
by the first study and also by previous research; that is, one
reason why depressed (or dysphoric) subjects choose to engage
it helps them to feel better. The situation was quite different
for the nondepressed subjects. Reading about the misfortune of
their partner and his or her associated negative affect had little
impact on their mood states. Thus, these results provided no
evidence that depressed persons' negative moods can rub off on
others who are not feeling bad (as had been suggested by Coyne,
L976b, and Hammen & Peters, 1978). In this case, however,
there was no direct contact between the nondepressed person
and the depressed partner. It may be that direct contact is
needed in order for mood states to be affected in this way (cf.
Gotlib & Robinson, 1982; Howes etal., 1985).
Choice Versus Impact
There was no mood manipulation in the second experiment;
thus, the results indicate that depressed subjects mood states do
not have to be exacerbated in order for downward comparison
to have a favorable effect on them. Apparently, even in the ab-
sence of such a manipulation, their mood states are typically
negative enough that there is plenty of room for improvement.
However, because there was not a (no-mood manipulation) con-
trol condition in Experiment 1, it is not possible to tell for sure
whether depressed subjects will still choose to downward com-
pare in the absence of a mood manipulation—even though their
mood states are improved when such comparison does happen
(as was the case in Experiment 2). Likewise, these data do not
indicate whether involuntary downward comparison will im-
prove the mood states of depressed persons who are already ex-
periencing relatively positive affect. Although it can be con-
cluded from the results of Experiment 1 that depressed persons
will not choose to downward compare when they are in a rela-
tively good mood, that does not mean, of course, that their
moods would not be improved were they to engage in it for some
reason.
Self-Awareness and Perceptions of Others
Subjects' assessments of their partner's mood states were gen-
erally very negative and, for the most part, consistent with ex-
5
All of the PEQ statements were also evaluated by raters as to the
number of self-references contained in them. An analysis of these rat-
ings indicated that the depressed subjects made more self references
(p < .06) than did the nondepressed group. The same was true in the
first study (p < .02; see Gibbons, in press). Thus it is possible that the
results on the ability attribution item and on the self-assessments of
intimacy may both have reflected a general tendency toward self-preoc-
cupation (cf. Gibbons, in press) and, relatedly, toward internal attribu-
tions (cf. Coyne & Gotlib, 1983) by the depressed subjects. Once again,
however, there was no evidence that either of these unexpected findings
was related to the primary concern of this study, which was the subjects'
mood reports.
 146 FREDERICK X. GIBBONS
pectations. The exception here was the self-aware depressed
group who imputed much more negative affect to their partner
than was expected. Because this topic has generated very little
research (or theorizing), it is difficult to speculate on why this
happened. One possibility, however, is that just as self-focused
attention intensifies depressed persons' awareness of their own
mood states, it may also intensify awareness of, or perhaps sen-
sitivity to, affect in others. Another, similar possibility is that
self-awareness in this type of small group setting may enhance
projection. Thus, the negative affect that the depressed subjects
saw in themselves, they may also have seen, perhaps to a greater
extent, in their partners. Of course, this reasoning is very specu-
lative. However, given that there are a number of potentially
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
important clinical implications surrounding this issue, espe-
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
cially with regard to group therapy techniques, then it would
appear that the topic of self-focused attention and perceptions
of others also deserves further investigation.
General Discussion
Downward Comparison and Affect
Who
In terms of social comparison, the nondepressed subjects in
these two studies responded very differently from the depressed
subjects. However, the responses of the former group were sim-
ilar to those of other nondepressed subjects in previous research
on at least one dimension, and that is they did show a clear
preference for the positive affect statements and virtually no
interest in the negative—further evidence of a general desire or
tendency to avoid people who are experiencing negative affect
(Coates et al., 1980; Hammen & Peters, 1978). This occurred
even when their mood states had been lowered as a result of
writing the negative self-disclosure statement. The lack of re-
sults among the nondepressed subjects on the choice variable
and on the mood change variable in Study 2, suggest that per-
sons who are not experiencing chronic negative mood do not
seek to downward compare on the dimension of affect. More-
over; even when it does happen (as in Study 2), it apparently has
little effect on them. There is no reason to believe, however, that
downward comparison has a mood amelioration effect only for
depressed or even negative affect persons. It seems quite possi-
ble that anxious persons, or alcoholics, or most any distressed
group, might be heartened to learn that there are others who
have an equal or even more severe affliction. Generalization of
the findings to other such groups shall have to remain for future
research.
When
In contrast to the nondepressed group, the depressed subjects
in the first study showed a definite preference for the more nega-
tive statements. This occurred, however, only after they them-
selves had written a negative statement and were feeling bad.
The fact that the depressed subjects did not choose negative
statements after their mood had been temporarily elevated indi-
cates that they were not interested in downward comparison
when they were not experiencing dysphoria. In general, the re-
sponses of the depressed subjects support Wills's (1981) conten-
tion that downward comparison is primarily a habit of people
who are "most unhappy" and is most likely to occur when they
have experienced a "decrease in subjective well-being."
Why
Taken together, the two studies indicate that downward com-
parison does occur among depressed persons, and they offer
some evidence as to why it happens. For people who are de-
pressed, realizing that there are others who are also experienc-
ing negative affect can provide some useful comparative infor-
mation, either in terms of evidence of a relative lack of coping
success (Coates & Winston, 1983), or, in some cases, evidence
that "things could be worse" (Taylor et al., 1983). In the current
studies, we have dealt more directly with the latter type of infor-
mation than the former, because the statements subjects re-
ceived concerned their partner's affective reaction to the prob-
lem she or he was facing and contained little information about
how they were dealing with it. Moreover, looking at subjects'
self- and other mood ratings, it can be seen that even the de-
pressed subjects believed that their partner was feeling worse
than they were. With regard to downward comparison and cop-
ing, however, even though the results do not provide any direct
evidence, they do have some implications for the study of coping
mechanisms.
Downward Comparison Outside the Laboratory
The fact that the depressed subjects in Study 1 were choosing
to socially compare with other (relatively) depressed persons
does not necessarily mean that they would prefer to affiliate
with other depressed persons outside the laboratory. It does ap-
pear, however, that they are more willing than nondepressed
persons to associate with others who are having similar prob-
lems. Moreover, there are some specific circumstances under
which this willingness might translate into behavioral prefer-
ence. One such circumstance might occur when a person de-
cides to join a self-help or support group. The literature in this
area has indicated that one reason why people join these groups
is because of the "shared stress" atmosphere they offer
(Schachter, 1959; Zimbardo & Formica, 1963). Another rea-
son, apparently, is because of the opportunity that the group can
provide for downward comparison. In this regard, the results
of the current study suggest that these support groups can be
effective in helping to alleviate negative affect of the partici-
pants, but perhaps only when they believe there are others in
the group who are doing at least as poorly, if not worse than
they are. In fact, a persual of the literature in the area suggests
that self-help groups are certainly not always effective in allevi-
ating negative affect or depression (e.g., Videka-Sherman, 1982;
Wortman&Dunkel-Schetter, 1979).
It would appear, then, that the participant is taking a risk by
joining this type of group. On the one hand, it may very well be
that the group does provide its members with an opportunity
for self-aggrandizement through comparison with others who
are doing worse. On the other hand, it could also be the case
that individuals in the group might perceive there are others
 SOCIAL COMPARISON AND DEPRESSION
with similar or even more serious afflictions who appear to be
doing as well or even better than they are. Although the impact
of this type of involuntary "upward comparison" on the mood
states of depressed or victimized people has never been assessed,
it seems likely that such an effect might be different from that
associated with the situation in the current study. Both types of
comparison are likely to take place in groups of this nature but,
presumably, with different results.
Self-Awareness and Depression
The results of the second study offer further evidence that
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
self-awareness (in and of itself) can exacerbate the mood states
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
of people who are already experiencing prolonged negative
affect. Based on similar results, Gibbons et al. (1985) concluded
that caution is warranted when therapists use self-confrontation
techniques that involve some self-focusing by depressed clients
(e.g., videotape playback). In particular, they suggested that
self-confrontation by itself, without the direct guidance of a
therapist, is likely to enhance the dysphoria that the client is
experiencing at the time. The current results support this con-
tention and suggest another caveat, also relevant to therapeutic
concerns, which involves the potential impact of self-focused
attention on members of self-help groups. According to self-
awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975),
being the primary focus of attention in a group is likely to lead
to an increase in self-focused attention. This means that mem-
bers of self-help or support groups would be expected to experi-
ence some heightened self-awareness, which presumably, would
be associated with an intensification of negative affect as well.
Although probably more of a problem for some clients than
for others, in most cases, this exacerbation of mood is likely to
interfere with the groups' therapeutic goals.
Another finding from the current study is also relevant here.
The fact that the self-focused depressed subjects tended to read
more negative affect into their partner's statement suggests that
they might have been projecting some of their own negative
moods onto their depressed partner or, perhaps, that they were
experiencing some feelings of similarity with him or her—
feelings that were enhanced by their self-focused state (cf. Ste-
phenson & Wicklund, 1983, 1984). To the extent that the latter
explanation is accurate, then it suggests that self-focus in this
type of situation may, in fact, be a two-edged sword. On the one
hand, it could have the effect of increasing empathy or identifi-
cation with other members of the group who are seen as similar.
Presumably, this effect would be beneficial in a setting of this
nature. Once again, however, it is also possible that it could ex-
acerbate the person's dysphoria, or their insecurity, fears, and
self-esteem—or whatever problem caused them to be in the
group in the first place. The conclusion to be drawn here, then,
appears to be similar to that reached by Gibbons et al. (1985):
The effect of self-focus in therapeutically relevant situations is
complicated, and it can be harmful as well as beneficial. Given
the popularity of self-confrontation techniques and the extent
of involvement of self-awareness in them, it seems clear that
more investigation into the self-focus/therapy relation is
needed.
147
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Integrating Personality and Social Psychology: Call for Papers

The editors intend to publish a special issue devoted to papers demonstrating that social behav-
ior is best understood by integrating the diverse concerns of the three sections ofJPSP. Papers
are invited that deal with particular substantive issues crossing the boundaries of individual
differences, social cognition, and interpersonal relations. Papers should represent practical
demonstrations that the diverse concerns of this journal belong together in a full understanding
of social behavior. We seek previously unpublished contributions, primarily empirical studies,
but we are also amenable to syntheses of long-term research programs and to innovative theo-
retical statements.

Contributions intended for the special issue should be sent to the guest editor:

John F. Kihlstrom, PhD

W. J. Brogden Psychology Building
University of Wisconsin
1202 West Johnson Street
Madison, Wisconsin 53706

Interested authors should send an abstract of their article to the guest editor by September 1,
1986 and plan to submit a completed manuscript by December 1, 1986, at which time the
paper will become subject to the usual peer review process.

Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology editors:

Attitudes and Social Interpersonal Relations and Personality Processes and

Cognition Group Processes Individual Differences
Steven J. Sherman Harry T. Reis Irwin G. Sarason
Charles M. Judd Norbert L. Kerr Edward F. Diener
Warren H. Jones