Arciga v. Maniwang, Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14. 1981)
 However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed 
August 14, 2012
106 SCRA 591 – Legal Ethics – Gross Immoral Conduct  ap assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney’s fees from
Facts: In 1970, when Maniwang was still a law student, he had a relationship with Arciga,
then a medical technology student. They started having a sexual relationship in 1971. In
1973, Arciga got pregnant. The two then went to Arciga’s hometown to tell the latter’s parent
about the pregnancy. They also made Arciga’s parents believe that they were already
married but they would have to have the church wedding in abeyance until Maniwang passes
the bar exams. Maniwang secured a copy of his birth certificate in preparation of securing a
marriage license.
In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar. But after his oath taking, he stopped communicating with
Arciga. Arciga located his whereabouts and there she found out that Maniwang married
another woman. Arciga confronted Maniwang’s wife and this irked Maniwang so he inflicted
physical injuries upon Arciga.
Arciga then filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral conduct.
Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arciga’s child; that he did promise to marry Arciga
many times; that he broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past because
apparently Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maniwang should be disbarred.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwang’s case is different from the cases of
Mortel vs Aspiras and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwang’s refusal to
marry Arciga was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment (though not much
discussion was provided by the ponente as to why). But the Supreme Court did say that it is
difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is “grossly immoral
conduct” or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as “that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of
the community”.
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON vs. ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO A.C. No. 6116, 1
August 2012
Facts:
According to complainant, respondent undertook to give him 20% commission, later reduced  3249, November 29, 1989
to 10%, of the attorney’s fees the latter would receive in representing Spouses Yap whom he 
referred, in an action for partition of the estate of the spouses relative. Their agreement was r
eflected in a letter dated August 11, 1995.
commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney’s fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or 
about P 40 million. Instead, he was informed through a letter dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Y
 
25% to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his commission which respondent ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards req
uired of his profession for having abandoned his legal wife with whom he has two children, an
d cohabited with another with whom he has four children. He also accused respondent of eng
aging in money-lending business without the required authorization from the BangkoSentraln
gPilipinas
In his defense, he disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that Sp
s. Yap assumed to pay.
Ruling:
Respondent’s defense that forgery had attended the execution of the August 11, 1995 letter 
was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of complaina
nt’s commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violate
d Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divid
e a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases wh
ich do not obtain in the case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to c
ohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children notwithstanding that his moral char
acter as well as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed. Th
e settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage 
is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of m
arriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Consequ
ently, SC find no reason to disturb the IBP’s finding that respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oat
h and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in “unlawful, 
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
However, SC find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have been sufficientl
y established.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO was found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1
.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same 
Code and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1) YEAR.
(Effect of Reconciliation of Parties to Disbarment) Cordova v. Cordova, Adm. Case No.
179 SCRA 680 – Legal Ethics – Moral Delinquency 
In 1985, Atty. Laurence Cordova, while being married to Salvacion Delizo and with two
children, left his wife and children to cohabit with another married woman. In 1986, Salvacion
and Cordova had a reconciliation where Cordova promised to leave his mistress. But
apparently, Cordova still continued to cheat on her wife as apparently, Cordova again lived
with another woman and worse, he took one of his children with him and hid the child away
from Salvacion.
In 1988, Salvacion filed a letter-complaint for disbarment against Cordova. Eventually,
multiple hearing dates were sent but no hearing took place because neither party appeared.
In 1989, Salvacion sent a telegraphic message to the Commission on Bar Discipline
intimating that she and her husband has reconciled. The Commission, since Salvacion failed
to submit her evidence ex parte, merely recommended the reprimand and admonishment of
Cordova.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cordova should be merely reprimanded.
HELD: No. He should be suspended indefinitely until he presents evidence that he has been
morally reformed and that there was true reconciliation between him and his wife. Before a
person can be admitted to the bar, one requirement is that he possesses good moral
character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to
membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition
for membership in the Bar in good standing. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of
a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes “a mockery
of the inviolable social institution or marriage” such was the case in the case at bar.
In Re: SC Decision Dated May 20, 2008 in GR No. 161455 Under Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics – Moral Turpitude – Disbarment 
In May 2008, the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 161455 (Pactolin vs Sandiganbayan), affirmed
the conviction of Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin for violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code
(Falsification by a Private Individual). It was duly proved that Pactolin falsified a letter, and
presented said letter as evidence in a court of law, in order to make it appear that his fellow
councilor acting as OIC-Mayor illegally caused the disbursement of public funds. In said
decisions, the Supreme Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines  for
appropriate administrative actions against Pactolin.
ISSUE: What administrative sanctions can be imposed upon Atty. Pactolin considering his
conviction?
HELD: Rodolfo Pactolin should be, and is henceforth disbarred. The crime of falsification of
public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves
moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
As a rule, the Supreme Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being the
most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative reasons
and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and a member of the bar. But it has always been held that it is
appropriate to disbar a lawyer if he is convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral
turpitude. Further, Pactolin’s situation is aggravated by the fact that although his conviction
has been affirmed, he has not served his sentence yet.
(Effect of Pardon to Disbarment) In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293, 1922
 April 7, 1922Malcolm, J.:FACTS: On February 27, 1918, Atty. Lontok was convicted of the
crime of bigamy
by CFI Zambales. Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision as well making
it final and executory. On 1922, Atty. Lontok was granted by the Governor Generalan
executive pardon. Now, Atty. General seeks the disbarment of Marcelino Lontokbecause of
having been convicted of the crime of bigamy despite the pardon given tohim.ISSUE: W/N
the effect of pardon may prevent Lontok from disbarment.HELD: YES. It is contended by the
government that while the pardon removes thelegal infamy of the crime, it cannot wash out
the moral stain; on the other hand it iscontended by the respondent that the pardon reaches
the offenses for which he wasconvicted and blots it out so that he may not be looked upon as
guilty of it.SC followed the ruling in the case of Ex Parte Garland (1866) wherein the SC held
that: “A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the g
uiltof the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots outof
existence the guilt; so that in the eye of the law, the offender is innocent as if hehad never
committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of thepenalties and
disabilities, consequent upon conviction from attaching; if granted afterconviction, it removes
the penalties and disabilities, and restore him to all his civilrights; it makes him as it were,
a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
 Atty. General’s petition is denied.
(Effect of Conditional Pardon to Disbarment) In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. L-363, July
31, 1962
5 SCRA 661 – Legal Ethics – Conditional Pardon will not bar disbarment
Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in 1956.
He was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion of the
penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President. He was released on the
condition that he shall not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a
disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of the latter’s conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted
pardon.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely
remitted his sentence. It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the
fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon (which he invoked in defense).
The crime was actually qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed
in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (Gutierrez being municipal mayor at the
time) and with the use of motor vehicle.  The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to
justify his being purged from the profession.
(Effect of Pardon to Reinstatement) In Re Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439, September 30,
1982
 ESCOLIN, J.:
This is a petition filed by Quinciano D. Vailoces for readmission to the practice of law and the
inclusion of his name in the roll of attorneys.
The records disclose that the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental in a decision
promulgated on September 30, 1955 found petitioner guilty of falsification of public document,
penalized under Article 117 of the Revised Penal Code, and imposed on him an
indeterminate sentence ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties
to the law, plus fine and costs. In its decision the court found that petitioner, as a member of
the bar and in his capacity as a notary public, aknowledged the execution of a document
purporting to be the last will and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for
probate before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, the genuineness of the
document was impugned by the forced heirs of the alleged testatrix, and the court, finding
that the document was a forgery, denied probate to the will.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict of conviction; and upon finality thereof,
petitioner commenced service of the sentence.
Thereafter, Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, complainant in the criminal case, instituted before this
Court disbarment proceedings against petitioner. The same culminated in his disbarment on
April 12, 1961. 1
On December 27, 1967, the President of the Philippines granted petitioner "absolute and
unconditional pardon" and restored him "to full civil and political rights. 2
Since August 23, 1968, petitioner had repeatedly sought readmission to the practice of law,
the first of which was denied by this Court in a minute resolution dated August 30, 1968.
On February 27, 1970, petitioner reiterated his plea, but consideration thereof was deferred
"until after the integration of the bar has been effected." 3
On December 12, 1977, he filed another petition, attaching thereto copies, among others, of
the following documents, to wit: the resolution of the Negros Oriental Bar Association signed
by 78 members thereof, indorsing his plea for reinstatement 4 ; the certificate of the mayor of
the municipality of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, where petitioner has been residing, to the effect
that the latter "is a person of exemplary moral character, a peace-loving and law-abiding
citizen 5a certification of Governor William B. Villegas of Negros Oriental, attesting to the fact
that since the grant of absolute pardon to petitioner, "he has comported himself as a morally
straight and respectable citizen and that he has been active and has cooperated in civic and
social undertakings, sincere and honest in his desire to lead a decent and dignified life"  6 ; the
certification of Dean Eduardo G. Flores of the College of Law, Siliman University, vouching to
petitioner's "honest, upright and moral life ... and because of his conduct he has earned the
sympathy of the people of the community and regained the confidence of the people and of
his other associates: 7 the statement of Atty. Alexander G. Amor, former president of the
Negros Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, certifying "that Mr.
Quinciano D. Vailoces ... is a person of good moral character, whose integrity is beyond
question" 8 ; and the clearance certificates issued by Judge Romeo R. Solis of the City Court
of Dumaguete, Provincial Fiscal Andrew S. Namukatkat of Negros Oriental, and City Fiscal
Pablo E. Cabahug of Dumaguete City, to the effect that petitioner "is a person of good moral
character" and that since his release from the national penitentiary he "has never been
accused or convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude." 9
When asked to comment, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through its then president,
Atty. Marcelo D. Fernan, favorably indorsed petitioner's request for reinstatement.
On February 13, 1978, Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, complainant in the original disbarment
proceedings, filed an opposition to the petitions for reinstatement; and this was followed by a
telegram of Nicanor Vailoces, barangay captain of Domolog, Bindoy, Negros, Oriental,
addressed to his Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and referred to this Court,
opposing petitioner's readmission to the bar "on grounds of his non-reformation, immoral
conduct and pretensions of being a licensed lawyer."
Anent these oppositions, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through Atty. Fernan, made
the following observations:
By resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 24, 1978, the following matters have been
referred to the Integrated Bar for comment:
(1) The opposition of complainant Ledesma de Jesus-Paras to respondent's petition and
supplementary petition for reinstatement in the roll of attorneys; and
(2) The telegram dated February 16, 1978 of Nicanor Vailoces, Barangay Captain of
Domolog, Bindoy, Negros Oriental, addressed to his Excellency Ferdinand E. Marcos,
requesting the Office of the President to oppose the petition of Quinciano Vailoces for
reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys on grounds stated therein.
It may be recalled that on January 17, 1978, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
transmitted to the Honorable Supreme Court for its favorable consideration the above stated
petition for reinstatement.
Subsequent to its being served with a copy of the resolution of the Supreme Court, the
Integrated Bar received a petition dated February 14, 1978 signed by 'the people of the
Municipality of Bindoy, Province of Negros Oriental' vehemently opposing the reinstatement
of Mr. Vailoces in the Roll of Attorneys. On October 5, 1978 the President of the Integrated
Bar wrote to Mr. Vailoces asking him to comment on the above mentioned petitions and
telegram.
This Office is now in receipt of Mr. Vailoces' comment dated November 3, 1978, which is
being forwarded herewith to the Honorable Supreme Court together with other pertinent
papers.
It is believed that Mr. Vailoces' comment is a satisfactory answer to the adverse allegations
and charges which have been referred to him. The charges of immorality (publicly
maintaining a querida) and gambling are general statements devoid of particular allegations
of fact and may well be disregarded. Then, too, the Municipal Mayor of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental - namely, Mr. Jesus A. Mana-ay - who tops the list of persons who have signed the
February 14, 1978 petition vehemently opposing the reinstatement of Mr. Vailoces, appears
to be the very same official who on October 25, 1977 issued a Certification to the effect that
Mr. Vailoces 'is personally known to me as a person of exemplary character, a peace loving
and law abiding citizen' and that 'he is cooperative in all our civic and social activities and that
he is one of our respectable citizens in our community.' That this official should now sign a
petition containing statements exactly opposite in thrust and tenor is very intriguing, to say the
least, and it is not altogether difficult to believe Mr. Vailoces' imputations of politics in the
conduct of Mayor Mana-ay.
As for the opposition of Mrs. Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, the alleged absence of remorse on
the part of Mr. Vailoces, and his alleged belligerence and display of open defiance and
hostility, etc. are matters so subjective in character that her general allegations and charges
in this regard cannot be properly considered. It is significant that Mr. Vailoces in his comment
states: "If she is indeed that much desperately so in need of cash assistance, considering
really that she is an old woman being recently widowed the second time, for her satisfaction
and as a gesture of goodwill, I am willing to assist her but only with a modest amount
because I am only a small farmer with still three college students to support."
Regarding the telegram dated February 16, 1978 of one Nicanor Vailoces stating as grounds
for denial of Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces' petition for reinstatement the alleged 'grounds of non-
reformation, immoral conduct and pretensions of being a licensed lawyer by soliciting cases,'
there is such a lack of specificity and particularity in such statement of grounds that one is at
a loss as to how a person in the place of Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces could properly defend
himself against such charges.
Thus, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines reaffirmed its indorsement of petitioner's
"reinstatement in the rolls of attorneys."
This Court likewise referred the oppositions interposed by Mrs. Ledesma de Jesus-Paras and
Nicanor Vailoces to the Solicitor General for investigation and recommendation; and on
August 4, 1982, the latter, after conducting an investigation, submitted his report,
recommending that "Quinciano D. Vailoces be reinstated in the roll of attorneys upon taking
his oath anew of the corresponding oath of office."
The Court sustains the conclusion of the Solicitor General that petitioner has sufficiently
proven himself fit to be readmitted to the practice of law. True it is that the plenary pardon
extended to him by the President does not of itself warrant his reinstatement.
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement,
notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the
requirements of reinstatement had been held to be the same as for original admission to the
bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original evidence
[7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 815]
The decisive question on an application for reinstatement is whether applicant is 'of good
moral character' in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law
and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney ...
[7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 816].
Petitioner's conduct after disbarment can stand searching scrutiny. He has regained the
respect and confidence of his fellow attorneys as well as of the citizens of his community. The
favorable indorsements of both the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and its Negros Oriental
Chapter, the testimonials expressed in his behalf by the provincial governor of Negros
Oriental as well as the municipal and barrio officials of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, his active
participation in civic and social undertakings in the community attest to his moral reform and
rehabilitation and justify his reinstatement. Petitioner, now 69 years of age, has reached the
twilight of his life. He has been barred from the practice of his profession for a period of 21
years. Adequate punishment has been exacted.
Chastened by his painful and humiliating experience, he further "pledges with all his honor ...
that if reinstated in the roll of attorneys he will surely and consistently conduct himself
honestly, uprightly and worthily." Indeed, there is reasonable expectation that he will
endeavor to lead an irreproachable life and maintain steadfast fidelity to the lawyer's oath.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Quinciano D. Vailoces is hereby ordered reinstated in the roll of
attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Sebastian v Calis, Adm. Case No. 5118, September 9, 1999
SYNOPSIS
After an investigation, respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis was found to have deceived the
complainant Marilou Sebatian by assuring her that he could give her visa and travel
documents, that despite spurious documents, nothing untoward would happen to her. He also
guaranteed her arrival in the U.S.A. and even promised to refund the fees and expenses
already paid, in case something went wrong. The IBP Board of Governors found the
respondent guilty of gross misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Supreme Court concurred with the resolution of the IBP saying that deception and other
fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. The lawyers oath is not mere
facile words, draft and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. For
his act respondent Dorotheo Calis was disbarred and his name was ordered stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys. The respondent was also ordered to pay the amount of P114,000.00
representing the amount collected from the complainant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; REQUIRED TO BE A
PERSON OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER. - Deception and other fraudulent acts by a
lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are
unacceptable practices. A lawyers relationship with others should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyers oath.
The lawyers oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be
upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be
a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in
the practice of law. The Court has sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer,
whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a
member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW; PRIVILEGE GRANTED WITH CONDITION OF GOOD
BEHAVIOR; VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. - The practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. The Court must stress that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to
practice law only during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be
heard. Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply with the
orders of the IBP and his total disregard of the summons issued by the IBP are contemptuous
acts reflective of unprofessional conduct. Thus, the Court finds no hesitation in removing
respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for his unethical, unscrupulous and
unconscionable conduct toward complainant.
Agbulos v. Viray (Adm. Case No. 7350, February 18, 2013)
A.C. No. 7350. February 18, 2013
(Affiant's Personal Appearance before the Notary Public is a Necessity)
Facts: Atty. Roseller Viray notarized a document denominated as Affidavit of Non-Tenancy,
supposedly executed by Agbulos. However, the latter denies said execution and claims that
the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) she allegedly presented are not hers.
Accordingly, she did not personally appear before respondent for the notarization of the
document. She likewise states that respondent's client, Rolando Dollente, benefited from the
said falsified affidavit as it contributed to the illegal transfer of a property registered in her
name to that of Dollente. In view of this, Agbulos filed this present administrative complaint
against Viray before the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC).
In his Comment, Viray admitted having prepared and notarized the document in
question at the request of his client Dollente, who assured him that it was personally signed
by Agbulos and that the CTC appearing therein is owned by her. He, thus, claims good faith
in notarizing the subject document.
The OBC referred the case to the IBP, which found Viray guilty of violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, and ordered that he
be meted the penalty of six (6) months suspension as a lawyer and six (6) months
suspension as a Notary Public. Viray moved for reconsideration, but the decision was
affirmed with modifications. Hence, he filed this present appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Viray should be held liable for his negligence in notarizing a document
based on a falsified document and without the affiant's personal appearance.
Held: YES, he is liable for breach of the Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondent admits that not only did he prepare and notarize the subject affidavit but
he likewise notarized the same without the affiant’s personal appearance. In notarizing the
document, respondent contented himself with the presentation of a CTC despite the Rules’
clear requirement of presentation of competent evidence of identity such as an identification
card with photograph and signature. With this indiscretion, respondent failed to ascertain the
genuineness of the affiant’s signature which turned out to be a forgery.
To be sure, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person
who signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Without the
appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary public
would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and
to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act or deed. Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest. The notarization
by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible
in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, by law, entitled
to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties.
Respondent’s failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage
to those directly affected by the notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a
notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for
such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. The responsibility to
faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is
more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the
Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the
doing of any. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge
with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest.
BEL-AIR TRANSIT SERVICE CORPORATION (DOLLAR RENT-A-CAR), Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. ESTEBAN Y. MENDOZA, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
In a verified Complaint1 dated June 11, 2003, Bel-Air Transit Service Corporation (Dollar
Rent-A-Car) charged Atty. Esteban Y. Mendoza with grossly immoral and unethical conduct,
praying for his disbarment and that his name be stricken-off from the Roll of Attorneys.
The complainant narrated that, on September 19, 2001, the respondent rented a car from it, a
Toyota Camry with Plate No. WMK 232, for the amount of P5,549.00. Under the terms of the
Rental Agreement No. 97206, 2 which the respondent personally signed, the latter was to be
fetched at his residence at No. 483 Northwestern Street, East Greenhills, Mandaluyong City.
The respondent rented another Toyota Camry from the complainant on September 28, 2001,
this time with Plate No. WRT 557, and was, likewise, fetched at his residence in accordance
with the Rental Agreement No. 97420. 3 This second contract was also personally signed by
the respondent. The statements of account4 were, thereafter, sent to the respondent at his
office and business address at Martinez & Mendoza Law Office, Cityland Show Tower,
Mandaluyong City. Despite repeated demands for payment, the respondent refused to pay
his account, which constrained the complainant to send a formal and final demand for
payment through counsel.5 This formal demand was, likewise, ignored by the respondent,
further compelling the complainant to resort to filing a complaint 6 for recovery of money on
March 12, 2003 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65, docketed as
Civil Case No. 81392.
According to the complainant, the respondent’s refusal to pay for the complainant’s car rental
services constitutes deceit and grossly immoral and unethical conduct, which violates the
Canons of Professional Ethics and Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code on Human
Relations. The complainant further alleged that this is a sufficient ground for the respondent’s
disbarment, considering that the respondent even ignored the complainant’s repeated
demands for payment.7
In his Comment, the respondent denied the allegations against him. He averred that it was
the law firm of Martinez & Mendoza which engaged the services of the complainant, and that
all the trips undertaken were for an out-of-town engagement in Lucena City. To support his
claim, the respondent incorporated a letter 8 addressed to the Chief Operations Manager of
the complainant requesting for the latter’s services.1a\^/phi1.net
The respondent alleged that the driver assigned to him by the complainant during the trip
from Lucena City on September 19, 2001 did not exercise extraordinary diligence. He averred
that they almost figured in an accident, and when he inquired as to why the said driver was
not cautious with his driving, the latter replied that he had just been on another out-of-town
trip driving for another client and only had three hours of sleep the night before. The
respondent decided not to report the incident to the complainant, thinking that it was going to
be the first and last incident. However, during the trip of September 28, 2001, the respondent
again almost figured in an accident, prompting the respondent to contact the complainant to
complain as to why the latter was providing drivers to their law firm who had not had enough
sleep. No one from the complainant’s staff could provide him with a decent answer,
merely "Pasensiya na." The respondent then demanded a meeting with the complainant’s
president in order to resolve the matter, but despite repeated requests, the latter refused to
meet with him. The respondent further averred, thus:
14. It is not only inaccurate but also unfair for the complainant to baselessly accuse
the respondent or M&M of refusing to pay their claims. As shown above, M&M
immediately paid all of complainant’s billings for August 2001. It was only the billings
for September 2001 that remained unpaid because M&M and respondent first wanted
to meet with the President of the complainant to resolve their complaint. M&M and
respondent do not have a history of not honoring their obligations. As officers of the
court, it is cognizant that [they] should conduct [themselves] properly so as not to do
injustice to anyone, including the complainant.
14.1. Respondent almost met an accident because the complainant provided him
with drivers that did not have enough rest and sleep before they drove for him. It is
the respondent who is the aggrieved party here and not the complainant. Thus, it is
very unfortunate that it is the respondent who is slapped with a disbarment case.
M&M did not even file a complaint with the Department of Trade and Industry for
violation of the Consumers Act of the Philippines because it wanted to resolve its
complaint amicably.
14.2 Respondent respectfully manifests that, only to buy peace, the questioned
billings of the complainant which [were] made the subject of a complaint they filed
against him had already been fully satisfied.
A copy of Official Receipt No. 52095 dated 4 September 2003 in the name of "Martinez &
Mendoza Law Office" is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex "H." 9
The respondent concluded that the complainant did not have a cause of action for disbarment
against him, as he was merely exercising his right to contest its questionable billings.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation and was assigned to IBP Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay. During the
hearing of March 1, 2004, the counsel for the complainant manifested that although the
respondent had already paid his account, such payment was made only after the court had
already decided the case against the respondent and after the filing of a motion for
execution,10 which the respondent admitted. Thus, the parties agreed during the hearing that
as far as the monetary obligation was concerned, the said judgment had already been
satisfied by the respondent. The parties were then required to file their respective position
papers, which were basically reiterations of their previous allegations.
In his Report and Recommendation dated April 19, 2004, Commissioner Dulay made the
following findings:
Respondent offers two reasons for non-payment: First, that the obligation was incurred not by
him but by his law office Martinez & Mendoza. Second, that the respondent almost met an
accident on the two occasions he used the services of the complainant and therefore "he
should not be penalized for exercising its right to contest complainants’ questionable billings."
...
As to the first reason, we reiterate that as decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court, respondent
was liable for the obligation to the complainant. Indeed, respondent cannot avoid the
obligation and pass it on to his law firm and just make a complete denial considering that he
is a name partner in the firm and law partnership of Martinez and Mendoza. The Metropolitan
Trial Court, therefore, ruled that respondent was, nevertheless, liable for the obligation of his
law partnership. Independent of the said decision, we find that the documents attached as
Annexes "A" and "B" to the complaint appear to have been signed by the respondent and
even assuming that it was the law firm that was liable, there is nothing on record to show that
the law firm questioned the billings of the complainant or that the respondent referred the
same to the law firm for proper disposition.
As to the second reason, respondent admits that there was no written demand made for the
complainant to account and answer for the "near accidents" alleged by respondent, which
"near accidents" as we understand are his reasons for not immediately paying. We find the
absence of a written demand from the respondent quite odd especially in the case of a lawyer
who is seeking to exercise his "right to contest complainant’s questionable billings" or
otherwise hold complainant accountable for the said "near accidents." It would perhaps be
understandable if the omission was made by a layman; but for a lawyer not to put his demand
in writing, it would be uncharacteristic to say the least. Neither was a demand made by the
law firm of Martinez and Mendoza as a basis for non-payment. We are, therefore, inclined to
look at this reason, (near accident) as a mere afterthought and would not justify respondent in
not paying for two (2) years what appears to be a clear and simple obligation to complainant.
As pointed out by complainant, it was only after a writ of execution was issued when payment
was made.
The reason offered by respondent for not paying complainant particularly the alleged "near
accident" is, therefore, not justifiable. The said reason appears to us trite and contrived. Lack
of funds to pay an obligation may perhaps be a good reason but to use as a reason the said
"near accident" on the bare assertion of respondent alone and not supported by any
corroborating evidence may not be readily acceptable. We are, on the other hand, also not
convinced that respondent was deceitful or grossly negligent by his actions. There is no
evidence to show that respondent was acting with deceit in not paying for the obligation
incurred. However, we find respondent lacking in probity and forthrightness in dealing with the
complaint and quite simply negligent in the handling of this particular obligation to
complainant. Taken in the light of the circumstances presented, we believe respondent
should be admonished and warned to avoid such similar conduct in the future.
It was, thus, recommended that the respondent be admonished and advised to be more
forthright in the handling of his monetary obligations in the future. On July 30, 2004, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline then issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-378, adopting and
approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, considering that there was
no evidence to show that the respondent had acted with deceit in not paying for the
questioned obligation.1awphi1.nét
It is settled that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. 11 A
lawyer must, at all times, uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession.l^vvphi1.net Indeed, a lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, a
member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any
degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity in
the legal profession.12 Thus, lawyers must promptly pay their financial obligations. 13Their
conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.14
In this case, the respondent refused to pay for the services of the complainant, constraining
the latter to file charges in order to collect what was due to it under the contracts, in which the
respondent himself was the signatory. Moreover, as pointed out by IBP Commissioner Dulay,
the respondent’s claim that he almost twice figured in accidents due to the negligent drivers
employed by the complainant and that he intended to question the company’s billings (which
he also posited was a valid excuse for non-payment), appears to have been concocted as a
mere afterthought.
Verily, the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and should be
admonished for his actuations.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Esteban Y. Mendoza is hereby ADMONISHED to be more
circumspect in his financial obligations and his dealings with the public. He is STERNLY
WARNED that similar conduct in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondent’s files which are with the Office of
the Bar Confidant, and circularized to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
In re Terrell, 2 Phil. 266, 1903
Facts: Terrel was ordered to show cause why he should not be suspended as a member of
the bar of the city of Manila 
He assisted in the organization “Centro Bellas Artes” Club, after he had been notified that the
organization was made for the purpose of evading the law 
He acted as attorney for said club during the time of and after its organization, which was
known for the purpose of evading the law 
In US vs. Terrel, he was charged with estafa. The court reviewed his testimony and decided
that the charges were true and made an order suspending him from office as lawyer in the
Philippine Islands. 
Issue: Whether or not the court was justified in suspending Terrel. 
Held: Yes, suspended for one year 
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of violating
or evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an
officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his office, and for which
he may be removed or suspended. 
The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the
conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment. 
HOWEVER, Terrel was acquitted in US vs. Terrel on the charge of estafa. While
unprofessional, is not criminal in nature. Hence, Terrel is suspended for one year (as
opposed to permanent suspension).
Donton v. Tansingco, Adm. Case No. 6057, June 27, 2006)
Facts: Peter Donton filed a complaint against Atty. Emmanuel Tansingco, as the notary
public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement, and against others (Duane Stier, and
Emelyn Manggay) for estafa thru falsification of public document.
A disbarment complaint filed by petitioner on May 20, 2003 against respondent Atty.
Emmanual O. Tansingco for serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility arose when respondent Atty.
Tansingco filed a counter-charge of perjury against Donton.
Atty. Tansingco in his complaint stated that he prepared and notarized the Occupancy
Agreement at the request of Mr. Stier, an owner and long-time resident of a real property
located at Cubao, Quezon City. Since Mr. Stier is a U.S. Citizen and thereby disqualified to
own real property in his name, he agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr.
Donton, a Filipino.
Donton averred that Atty. Tansingco’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier is a foreign national, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate
violation of the Code. Donton prayed that Atty. Tansingco be disbarred.
Atty. Tansingco claimed that complainant Donton filed disbarment case against him upon the
instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Aletajan, because he refused to act
witness in the criminal case against Stier and Manggay.
In Resolution dated October 1, 2003, the court referred the matter to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation and for which the latter, through Commissioner Milagros San
Juan of the IBP Commission of Discipline recommended suspension from the practice of law
for two years and cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and recommended
respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six months.
The report was then forwarded to SC as mandated under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or Not Atty. Tansingco is guilty of serious misconduct?
Ruling: Yes. Atty. Tansingco is liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code. The
Court ruled that a lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will
involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey. A lawyer who assists a
client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.
Atty. Tansingco had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the
Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against
foreign ownership of lands. Atty. Tansingco used his knowledge of the law to achieve an
unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be
suspended. As such, respondent is being suspended for six (6) months.
De Ysasi III v. NLRC, GR No. 104599, March 11, 1994.
Facts: Jon De Ysasi and Jon De Ysasi III are father and sons respectively. The elder Ysasi
owns a hacienda in Negros Occidental. De Ysasi III is employed in the hacienda as the farm
administrator. In November 1982, De Ysasi III underwent surgery and so he missed work. He
was confined and while he’s nursing from his infections he was terminated, without due
process, by his father. De Ysasi III filed against his father for illegal dismissal before the
National Labor Relations Commission. His father invoked that his son actually abandoned his
work.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Ysasi III abandoned his work.
HELD: No. His absence from work does not constitute abandonment. To constitute
abandonment, there must be a.) failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and b.) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with
the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt
acts. No such intent was proven in this case.
The Supreme Court, in making its decision, noted that the lawyers for both camps failed to
exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and
especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their
clients especially considering that the parties involved are father and son. This case may
have never reached the courts had there been an earnest effort by the lawyers to have both
parties find an off court settlement but records show that no such effort was made. The useful
function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by
advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic
exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and
a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation. 
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that “(a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.”
Both counsel fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers
of the court. In the same manner, the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has
been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter
“shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his
jurisdiction.”  If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the
proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.
Linsangan v. Tolentino, Adm. Case 6672, September 4, 2009)
Facts:
A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino
for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. Complaint alleged that
respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer
legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance and expeditious
collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and
sent them text messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn
affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his
lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in
exchange for a loan of P50, 000.00. Complainant also attached “respondent’s” calling card.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card.
Issue:
Whether or not Tolentino’s actions warrant disbarment.
Held:
Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting
cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such
actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03 should be read in
connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides that lawyer, shall not for any corrupt
motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause. This rule
proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to
protect the community from barratry and champerty. In the case at bar, complainant
presented substantial evidence (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons
coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed
solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits. Through Labiano’s actions,
respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more
favorable result. Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating
Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. Any act of solicitations constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of the
Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statues warrants serious sanctions for
initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. Thus in
this jurisdiction, the Court adheres to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian
machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Canon 2: A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient
manner compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession. Rule
2.03: A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business
Jasper Rodica vs Atty. Manuel Lazaro et al, AC No. 9259, August 23, 2012
"The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not
on the vindicative principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons."
Facts:
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Rodica against the respondent Atty. Lazaro on
grounds of gross and serious misconduct, deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On May 5, 2011, William Strong was arrested and detained by the Bureau of Immigration for
allegedly being involved in an international gang and conspiracy in Brazil on fraud involving
the creation of hundreds of dollars in illegal securities. Strong requested his friend Philip
Apostol to look for a lawyer. Apostol recommended the Lazaro Law Office represented by
Atty. Manuel Lazaro and his associates who initially declined but later accepted to handle the
deportation case. 
Strong initiated giving the information that his deportation case may be due to the complaint
filed by his live-in partner Jasper Rodica before the RTC against the Hillview Marketing
Corporation for recovery and possession and damages involving a property they have in
Boracay which is represented by Atty. Tan. Rodica was represented by Atty. Ibutnande in this
case. Apparently, Rodica claimed that Atty. Manuel met with Atty. Tan to discuss the
settlement package on the deportation case they filed against Strong on the condition that
Rodica withdraws her complaint from the RTC of Cebu. 
On May 25, 2011 the Bureau of Immigration rendered a judgment deporting Strong to leave
the country. On  June 6, 2011 Rodica filed before the RTC a motion to withdraw her
complaint against Hillview. Rodica now alleges that after Strong was deported and
withdrawing the case before the RTC, she was deceived by Atty Manuel et al for over
settlement of 7 million which was allegedly extorted from her after misrepresenting that the
withdrawal of the case before the RTC is only a part of the settlement package.
It appears on the record that Atty. Espejo, an associate of the Lazaro Law office helped in
drafting the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration after Rodica
pleaded him to prepare the motion and was requested further to indicate the name of the
Lazaro Law Office including the name of Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle to give more weight
on the pleading. Rodica promised Atty. Espejo to talk to Atty. Manuel about it. The case
before the RTC was actually dismissed on March 29, 2011 for failure to show cause of action
but a motion for reconsideration was filed by Rodica. 
Issue: 
Whether or not the allegations of Rodica merit the disbarment of the respondents. 
Ruling:
The court ruled that Rodica failed to overcome the presumption of innocence of the
respondents. As a general rule, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence and the burden
of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove the allegations made against them. The
required quantum of proof is preponderance of evidence which is an evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
On Rodica's claim with regards to the settlement package, the court find it without merit
because she withdrew her complaint only after the deportation of Strong. It was also evident
on record that the said case was already dismissed even before the deportation case was
filed only she filed a motion for reconsideration. Therefore, it cannot be said that her
withdrawal of the complaint is a settlement consideration regarding the deportation case of
Strong. Moreover, Strong is not a party to the case she filed before the RTC therefore there is
no connection between these 2 cases. 
There was sufficient preponderance of evidence that was presented that the cause of her
withdrawal of the complaint is to facilitate the sale of her property in Boracay. According to
Atty. Espejo who helped Rodica draft the motion for withdrawal of the complaint, the said
withdrawal is for the purpose of selling her property to Apostol. Apostol further corroborated
that he told Rodica he is willing to purchase the property once it is free from any pending
case. Rodica promised him to work on the termination of the pending case attached to the
property to make the sale. 
On her claim to have paid 7 million to Atty. Manuel et al, she failed to substantiate such claim
despite showing off withdrawals from her bank account certain amount of money after failing
to prove that the said amount was paid to the respondents. Moreover, the court held that
Rodica is not a client of Lazaro Law Office. They merely handled the deportation case of
Strong.
As for Atty. Espejo, the court found him to have aided Rodica for misrepresenting before the
court that she was aided by the Lazaro Law Office when in fact she is not. Atty. Espejo
explained that Rodica assured him to talk to Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle about including
their name on the pleading but she did not do so. Atty. Espejo should have known better that
Atty. Ibutnande was the counsel on record on the case before the RTC and therefore it is not
his duty to prepare said pleading. He also should have known that all pleadings before the
court are acted based on merit or the lack of it and not by the name of the law firm. However,
the court give due recognition on the fact that Atty. Espejo expressed remorse on his conduct
and made a sincere apology to the RTC for wrongly employing the name of the Lazaro Law
Office and that he was newly admitted to the Bar in 2010, the court find it proper to give him a
warning to become more prudent on his actuation in the practice of his profession.
The complaint for disbarment was dismissed.
Dacanay v. Baker & Mckenzie, Adm. Case No. 2131, May 10, 1985
Facts: In November 1979, Atty. Vicente Torres sent a letter to one Rosie Clurman,
represented by Atty. Adriano Dacanay, asking Clurman to release some shares to Torres’
client. The letterhead contained the name “Baker & McKenzie”. Dacanay denied Clurman’s
liability and at the same time he asked why is Torres using the letterhead “Baker &
McKenzie”, a foreign partnership established in Chicago, Illinois. No reply was received so
Dacanay filed an administrative complaint enjoining Torres from using “Baker & McKenzie”.
Later, Torres said that he is an associate of the law firm Guerrero & Torres; that their law firm
is a member of Baker & McKenzie; that the said foreign firm has members in 30 cities all over
the world; that they associated with them in order to make a representation that they can
render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others
engaged in foreign trade and investment.
Issue: Whether or not the use of a foreign law office name is allowed.
Held: No.  Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines.
Such use of foreign law firm name is unethical therefore Torres and his law firm are enjoined
from using “Baker & McKenzie” in their practice of law.
People v. Gacott, BR No. 116049, March 20, 1995.
G.R. No. 116049 March 20, 1995
Bidin, J.
Facts: On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108)
was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes. The
accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending that since the power to
prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No. 1130, the
City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or authority to file the same. The
prosecution filed an opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been
abolished by Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972. Despite such opposition,
however, respondent judge granted the motion espousing the position that the Letter Of
Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the “law” contemplated in Article 7 of the
New Civil Code which can repeal another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in
the assailed order of March 18, 1994 held that the City Prosecutor has no power or authority
to file and prosecute the case and ordered that the case be quashed.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash gravely abused his
discretion as to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari
Held: Yes. The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious
in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish
the Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted
LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his
opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have
immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in
implementation of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI No. 2 reads:
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23, 1972, Reorganizing the
Executive Branch of the National Government, the following agencies of the Department of
Justice are herebyreorganized or activated in accordance with the applicable provisions of
the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the following instructions: . . . (emphasis supplied).
General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. 1, issued by the former President Marcos
under his martial law powers have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by
Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62 SCRA 275
[1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued, or
done by the former President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal,
binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order
issued by former President Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers to implement
P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly impliedly
revised, revoked, or repealed, both continue to have the force and effect of law.
Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the Constitution explicitly ordains:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed, or revoked.
Payod v. Metila, Adm. Case No. 3944, July 27, 2007
A lawyer who accepts a case must give it his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence,
and his negligence in connection therewith renders him liable.
Facts: Atty. Metila failed to submit important documents to the Court of Appeals (CA) and the
serious consequences brought by such act became prejudicial to the case of Lea Payod.
Payod said they made sufficient follow ups with Atty. Metila but the latter failed to show up in
appointed meetings at the Court. Pagod thereafter charged Atty. Romeo P. Metila for willful
neglect and gross misconduct in the discharge of her duties.
Atty. Metila denied the charges and insisted that there was no attorney-client relationship
between him and Payod for there was no Special Power of Attorney authorizing Payod’s
mother to hire him as a lawyer.
After investigation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline, to
which the complaint was referred, found Atty. Metila guilty of simple negligence and
recommended that he be seriously admonished. The IBP Board of Directors adopted the
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that Atty. Metila be seriously
admonished.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of Atty. Metila to submit documents to the CA constitute
gross negligence
Held: The circumstances attendant to Atty. Metila’s initial handle of Payod’s case do not
warrant a finding of gross negligence, or sheer absence of real effort on his part to defend her
cause.
Atty. Metila accepted Payod’s case upon her mother’s insistence, with only six days for him to
file a petition for review before this Court, and without her furnishing him with complete
records, not to mention money, for the reproduction of the needed documents. Despite these
constraints, Atty. Metila exerted efforts, albeit lacking in care, to defend his client’s cause by
filing two motions for extension of time to file petition. And he in fact filed the petition within
the time he requested, thus complying with the guideline of this Court that lawyers should at
least file their pleadings within the extended period requested should their motions for
extension of time to file a pleading be not acted upon.
Neither do the circumstances warrant a finding that Atty. Metila was motivated by ill-will. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, a lawyer enjoys a presumption of good faith in his favor.
Collantes vs. Renumeron 200 SCRA 584 (1991)
FACTS:
 Nature of the Complaint: Disbarment against Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City
 This is in relation to the administrative case filed by Atty. Collantes, counsel for V& G
Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty. Renomeron, for the latter’s
irregular actuations with regard to the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro
forma Deed of Absolute Sale with Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots in its
subdivision.
 Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, Renomeron suspended the
registration of the documents with certain “special conditions” between them, which
was that V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila
plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent’s
Quezon City house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.
 Eventually, Renomeron formally denied the registration of the documents. He himself
elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator
Bonifacio (of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration-NLTDRA).
The Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the documents.
 Despite the resolution of the Administrator, Renomeron still refused the registration
thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional
requirements not adverted in his previous denial.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not Atty. Renomeron, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the Court for
his malfeasance as a public official.
  Whether or not the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service REYES, J.:
in the discharge of official tasks.
This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer
(complainants) against herein respondents Isabel E. Florin (Florin), Marcelino Jomales
(Jomales) and Pedro Vega (Vega).
HELD: Yes to both issues.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

RATIO DECIDENDI: Remedios Berenguer-Lintag, Carlo Berenguer and Belinda Berenguer-Aguirre, Rosario
On Issue No. 1 Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer (Berenguers) are the registered owners of a
58.0649-hectare land in Bibingcahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Sometime in April 1998, a notice
 A lawyer’s misconduct as a public official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a of coverage was issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) regarding the
lawyer. acquisition of their landholding pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Berenguers protested and applied for the exclusion
 The lawyer’s oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or of their land with the DAR and for a notice to lift coverage based on the ground that their
malice. landholdings have been used exclusively for livestock pursuant to DAR Administrative Order
No. 09.2
 The lawyer’s oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a ground for his
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action. On October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary, without acting on the application for
exclusion, cancelled the Berenguers’ certificates of title on the land and issued Certificates of
Land Ownership Award3 (CLOAs) in favor of the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Development Cooperative (BARIBAG).
On Issue No. 2

 The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the discharge
of their official tasks (Canon 6).
 The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any man’s cause “for
any corrupt motive or interest” (Rule 1.03).
Eventually, DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Dalugdug) denied their application for
exclusion from the CARP’s coverage in the Order4 dated February 15, 1999 based on the
Investigation Report dated February 9, 1999 submitted by the DAR Region V Investigation
that said area sought to be excluded is principally devoted to coconuts and not the raising of
livestock.5
Aggrieved, the Berenguers filed a notice of appeal6 with the Secretary of DAR.

RULING: Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron is disbarred from the practice of law in the While the case was pending appeal, BARIBAG filed a petition 7 for the implementation of the
Philippines, and his name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. Order dated February 15, 1999 before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD).
This was granted by Florin, as RARAD, in an Order 8 dated March 15, 1999. Accordingly,
Florin directed the issuance and implementation of the Writ of Possession. 9

A.C. No. 5119               April 17, 2013 On March 19, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion for reconsideration, 10 claiming that they
were denied due process as they were not furnished with a copy of BARIBAG’s petition for
ROSARIO BERENGUER-LANDERS and PABLO BERENGUER, Complainants,  implementation. Florin denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in an
vs. Order11 dated March 22, 1999.
ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN, ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES and ATTY. PEDRO
VEGA, Respondents. On March 25, 1999, the Berenguers appealed 12 to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB).
BARIBAG, on other hand, filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession. 13 The
DECISION Berenguers opposed14 the motion saying that the execution would be premature in view of
their pending appeal before the DARAB. Nevertheless, BARIBAG still filed a Motion for the
Appointment of a Special Sheriff.15
In his Order16 dated April 6, 1999, DAR Acting Secretary Conrado S. Navarro denied the
Berenguers’ appeal.
On April 8, 1999, Florin issued a Resolution, 17 which granted BARIBAG’s Motion for the
Appointment of a Special Sheriff and ordered the issuance of the writ of possession prayed
for.
On April 13, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion to set aside 18 the Resolution dated April 8,
1999, arguing that: the DARAB already acquired jurisdiction over case when they seasonably
filed an appeal before it; and that Florin should have waited until the DARAB has decided the
appeal. In an Order19 dated April 21, 1999, Florin denied the said motion prompting the
Berenguers to move for her inhibition20 on ground of partiality.
The Berenguers elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA),
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51858, which was denied outright on procedural grounds, to
wit: (1) copy of the assailed order bears the words "certified true copy" but the name and
authority of the person certifying is not indicated as required in SC Circular No. 3-96, and the
signature therein is illegible; (2) only one of the petitioners signed the certification on non-
forum shopping which is an insufficient compliance of Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Court; and (3) there is non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as the assailed order of the
Regional Director is not directly reviewable by the CA.21
Undaunted, the Berenguers filed a second petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 53174, which questioned the Orders dated March 15, 1999 and March 22, 1999
issued by Florin. The petition was also denied on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and wrong
mode of appeal.22
Thus, Florin issued on April 21, 1999 a Writ of Possession 23 in favor of BARIBAG.
Florin subsequently directed the full implementation of the writ of possession pursuant to Rule
71 of the Rules of Court in spite of the Berenguers’ protestations. 24
On June 3, 1999, the Berenguers moved to quash25 the Writ of Possession, to no avail.
On August 4, 1999, the complainants filed the instant Complaint 26 for the disbarment of
respondents Florin, Jornales, in his capacity as Assistant Regional Director for DAR, and
Vega, in his capacity as DAR Legal Officer V, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in
the commission of the following acts:
A. ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN AS REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR KNOWINGLY
RENDERING AN UNJUST JUDGEMENT, ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS
ADVERSE AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTEREST OF PETITIONERS;
B. ISSUING AN ORDER AND GRANTING A WRIT OF EXECUTION EX-PARTE
AND SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUING AND SIGNING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION
WITHOUT CERTIFICATION OF FINALITY ISSUED BY THE PROPER OFFICER
FULLY KNOWING THAT SHE HAS NO AUTHORITY AND TOTALLY
DISREGARDING THE APPLICABLE RULES AND IN CONTRAVENTION WITH THE
NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD; FURTHER, HIDING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION FROM
PETITIONERS INSPITE OF REQUEST FOR A COPY;
C. REFUSING TO TAKE ACTION ON PLEADINGS FILED BY PETITIONERS THRU
COUNSEL AND FAILING AND REFUSING TO CONDUCT A HEARING AS
PRAYED FOR BY COUNSEL; FAILING AND REFUSING TO FORWARD THE
APPEAL TO THE PROPER APPELLATE BOARD;
D. UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS TO
THE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONERS AND LAWYER; ABUSE OF AUTHORITY TO
CITE COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT AND ISSUING AN ORDER OF
ARREST WITHOUT HEARING CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF COURT;
E. ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES AND ATTY. PEDRO VEGA, INSPITE OF THEIR
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION,
PERSISTED AND ASSISTED IN THE ILLEGAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT
OF POSSESSION TO THE PREJUDICE OF LEGITIMATE FARMERS AND
PETITIONERS.27
Florin filed her Comment28 stating, among others, that: (1) the writ of possession is anchored
on the CLOAs issued by the Register of Deeds, and not on a final and executory decision that
would require a certification of finality as prescribed by the DARAB rules; (2) Atty. Federico
De Jesus (De Jesus), as Berenguers’ counsel, was not furnished with a copy of the writ
because it was not yet issued at the time when it was requested; (3) there was no intent to
hide the writ; (4) when the writ of possession was finally signed, it was delivered to the sheriff
for service and enforcement; (4) it was unfair to impute illegal acts against Vega and Jornales
as DAR lawyers in view of the DAR’s denial of the motion for a cease and desist order and
because of the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty; (5) the
petitions for certiorari filed with the CA were both dismissed; and (6) the findings of DAR and
the issuance of the CLOAs remain undisturbed. Florin also claimed that it is Atty. De Jesus
who wants her disbarred and not the Berenguers.
In a separate Comment,29 Vega denied the allegations against him arguing that: (1) the writ of
possession is not illegal in the absence of a court order stating its invalidity; (2) he did not
participate in the issuance of the writ of possession because he did not appear as the
farmers’ counsel; (3) the Legal Division he heads has no control or influence over the
DARAB; and (4) his presence in the execution of the writ of possession was to ascertain that
no violations against any law are committed by the person/s executing the writ. 30
Jornales’ Comment,31 for his part, stated that: (1) the writ has no prima facie infirmity; (2) he is
not privy to the issuance thereof; (3) he has no supervision and control over the DAR which
issued the writ; and (4) he has no authority to determine the writ’s validity or invalidity.
Jornales admitted, however, that he was in the meeting presided by the PNP Provincial
Director of Sorsogon prior to the writ’s implementation in his capacity as Regional Assistant
Director for Operations of DAR Region V and not as a lawyer. He added that the disbarment
complaint against him is not only malicious for lack of legal basis but is also meant to harass
and intimidate DAR employees in implementing the CARP. 32
After the complainants filed their Consolidated Reply, 33 the case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
IBP Commissioner Milagros San Juan (Commissioner San Juan) Recommended 34 that Florin
be "suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, Orders and Resolutions adverse and prejudicial to the interests of the
Complainants."
Commissioner San Juan, meanwhile, recommended that the charges against Jornales and
Vega be dismissed for failure of the complainants to substantiate the charges against them. 35
Commissioner San Juan’s recommendation against Florin is based on the findings 36 of the
CA in its Decision dated December 26, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 53174, 37 which reads:
The Petition for Certiorari filed by the complainants before the Court of Appeals was treated
as a petition for review and the court found the following errors:
"1) Respondent DAR Secretary has no jurisdiction over the subject properties being devoted
to pasture and livestock and already classified as residential and industrial land, hence,
outside the coverage of Republic Act 6657. (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) The
generation and issuance of Certificate of Landownership Award (CLOA) was therefore void;"
2) Being outside the coverage of CARL (Republic Act 6657), respondent Hon. Isabel E. Florin
who is exercising delegated jurisdiction from the DARAB has no jurisdiction over Petitioners’
Properties as held in Krus na Ligas Farmer’s Coop vs. University of the Philippines; G.R. No.
107022, 8 December 1992, which is squarely in point with the case at bar."
Anent the issue regarding the qualified beneficiaries of the subject land, the Court ruled thus
– "Assuming that the lands are indeed agricultural, we cannot understand why the DAR
awarded them to members of respondent Baribag and not to the farmers in the area, in
violation of Sec. 22 of the CARL x x x."
The court further stated – "We cannot xxx close this discussion without mentioning our
observation on the actuations of Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Isabel Florin. Just
why she issued a writ of execution and eventually a Writ of Possession in favor of respondent
Baribag puzzles us no end. She knew that Baribag is not a party in petitioners’ application for
exclusion filed with the Office of DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug. Obviously, she
never acquired jurisdiction over Baribag. She also knew that petitioners appealed to the DAR
Secretary from the Order of Regional Director Dalugdug dismissing petitioners’ application for
exclusion. Clearly, such order was not yet final and executory when she issued the assailed
writs of execution and possession. Thus, the writ are [sic] void and would be set aside." 38
On May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVII-2006-282
modifying the recommended penalty, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and for knowingly rendering an unjust Judgment, Orders and Resolutions, adverse and
prejudicial to the interest of the complainants, Atty. Isabel F. Florin is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year. The charges against Atty. Marcelino Jornales and
Atty. Peter Vega are DISMISSED for failure of the complainants to substantiate the charges
against Respondents.39
In her opposition,40 Florin averred that: (1) jurisdiction was acquired over BARIBAG at the
time it filed a petition for the implementation of the Order dated February 15, 1999; (2) the
DARAB has jurisdiction to issue the CLOAs; (3) as RARAD, she has concurrent jurisdiction
with DARAB; (4) the Berenguers were not denied due process; and (5) the Berenguers never
questioned the regularity of the DAR’s acquisition of their landholding nor did they file a
petition for the cancellation of the CLOAs issued to BARIBAG.
This Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors but modifies the penalty to
be imposed.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.—A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party without authority so to do. x x x.
In Lahm III v. Mayor, Jr.,41 the Court ruled that:
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency
in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Gross misconduct is any
inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the
administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose.42 (Citations omitted)
In the instant case, the Berenguers want this Court to impose disciplinary sanction against
the three (3) respondents as members of the bar. The grounds asserted by the complainants
in support of the charges against the respondents, however, are intrinsically connected with
the discharge of their quasi-judicial functions. Nevertheless, in Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty.
Dasig,43 the Court already ruled that if a misconduct as a government official also constitutes
a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then a lawyer may be disciplined by this Court as a
member of the Bar, viz:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.
However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath
as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
xxxx
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations.
Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not
meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those
in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 44 of said Code. Lawyers in government are
public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more
sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the
ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
x x x For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission
which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must
also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing.1âwphi1 Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper
of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher
than her brethren in private practice.45 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Thus, in Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,46 the Court ruled that an administrative case against a
lawyer for acts committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the DARAB may be
likened to administrative cases against judges considering that he is part of the quasi-judicial
system of our government.47
Similarly in this case, Florin, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government,
performs official functions of a RARAD that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the
present controversy may be likened that of a judge whose decision, including the manner of
rendition, is made subject of an administrative complaint.
Going now to the acts complained of, Section 29 of DAR Administrative Order No. 06-00
provides:
SEC. 29. Effect of Appeal.—Appeal to the Secretary, the Office of the President, or the Court
of Appeals shall have the following effects:
(a) Appeal from the Regional Director or Undersecretary to the Secretary.—The appeal shall
stay the order appealed from unless the Secretary directs execution pending appeal, as he
may deem just, considering the nature and circumstances of the case (Executive Order No.
292 [1987], Book VII, Chapter 4, Sec. 21).
xxxx
Based on the foregoing provision, the appeal of the Berenguers to the DAR Secretary clearly
stayed the implementation of Regional Director Dalugdug’s Order dated February 15, 1999.
Moreover, it is the DAR Secretary who has jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal.
Records reveal that there was no order by the DAR Secretary directing execution of the
Order dated February 15, 1999 during the pendency of the Berenguers’ appeal.
Corollarily, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides for the instances when execution
may be had, namely: (1) after a decision or order has become final and executory; 48 (2)
pending appeal, only upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due
hearing;49 and (3) execution of several, separate or partial judgments. 50
Moreover, Rule XX of the 2009 Rules of the DARAB reads:
Sec. 1. Execution Upon Final Order or Decision.—Execution shall issue upon an order,
resolution or decision that finally disposes of the action or proceeding. Such execution shall
issue as a matter of course and upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no
appeal has been duly perfected.
The Adjudicator concerned may, upon certification by the proper officer that a resolution,
order or decision has been served to the counsel or representative on record and to the party
himself, and has become final and executory, and, upon motion or motu proprio, issue a writ
of execution ordering the DAR Sheriff or any DAR officer to enforce the same. In appropriate
cases, the Board or any of its Members or its Adjudicator shall deputize and direct the
Philippine National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines or any of their component units or
other law enforcement agencies in the enforcement of any final order, resolution or decision.
Sec. 2. Execution Pending Appeal. — Any motion for execution of the decision of the
Adjudicator pending appeal shall be filed before the Board which may grant the same upon
meritorious grounds, upon the posting of a sufficient bond in the amount conditioned for the
payment of damages which the aggrieved party may suffer, in the event that the final order or
decision is reversed on appeal, provided that the bond requirement shall not apply if the
movant is a farmer-beneficiary/pauper litigant. (Emphasis ours)
In this case, the Order dated February 15, 1999 of DAR Regional Director Dalugdug denying
the Berenguers’ application for exclusion from CARP is yet to become final and executory as
it was seasonably appealed to the DAR Secretary. There is also nothing in the records that
will show whether BARIBAG posted a bond pursuant to the Rules.
While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was
made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice, 51 the facts on hand prove
otherwise. Florin’s issuance of the writ of execution and writ of possession in order to fully
implement Regional Director Dalugdug’s Order dated February 15, 1999 clearly constitutes
ignorance of the law for as a rule, a writ of execution is issued only after the subject judgment
or order has already become final and executory. 52 As aptly stated by IBP Commissioner San
Juan, Florin ordered the issuance of such writs despite the pendency of the appeal with the
DARAB.53 Consequently, the Court finds merit in the recommendation of suspension.
As to the penalty –
Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to
do injustice will be administratively sanctioned. 54 In this case, it appears, however, that this is
the first time that Florin has been made administratively liable. Although there is no showing
that malice or bad faith attended the commission of the acts complained of, the same does
not negate the fact that Florin executed an act that would cause an injustice to the
Berenguers. To our mind, the act of issuing the writ of execution and writ of possession is not
simply an honest error in judgment but an obstinate disregard of the applicable laws and
jurisprudence.
With all these, the Court deems it reasonable to reconsider the penalty recommended and
instead impose the penalty of suspension for three (3) months 55 without pay. As also held in
Rallos v. Judge Gako, Jr.,56 three (3) months suspension without pay was imposed against a
judge after finding out that the ignorance of the law he committed was not tainted with bad
faith.
With respect to the complaint against Jornales and Vega, the Court agrees and adopts the
finding of the IBP that no sufficient evidence was adduced to substantiate the charges against
them. Hence, the complaint against them should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN is found guilty
of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is penalized with
SUSPENSION from the practice of law for three (3) months effective upon notice hereof. The
complaint against Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Pedro Vega is DISMISSED for lack of
sufficient evidence.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Misamin v. San Juan, Adm. Case No. 1418, August 31, 1976
Facts: Herein respondent admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar’s Bakery in
the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan
Police. Respondent contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of
his profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel while holding a government
position is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or
removal of attorneys.
Issue: Whether or not the administrative case against the defendant should prosper
Held: The court ruled in the negative. The court ruled that the matter is to be decided in an
administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor General.
Nonetheless, the court held that while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be
inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety.
Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the
concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal
knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the
office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly
compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest,
is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member
of the bar should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his
fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not
worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor
remains unsullied.
PCGG vs. SB 5th Division (G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005.)
FACTS:
Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza was the Solicitor General until 1986. He resumed his private
practice of law. He appeared as counsel for Lucio C. Tan, et. al. before the Sandiganbayan
involving civil cases of sequestration of properties allegedly ill-gotten wealth.
When still the Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank on how to proceed with the
liquidation of GENBANK which became saddled with banking problems. GENBANK was later
bought by the ALLIED Bank owned by Lucio C. Tan, et. al. Atty. Mendoza continues
defending both the interests of the Central Bank and Lucio Tan, et. al.
PCGG filed a Motion to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza anchored on Rule 6.03 reading ---
“A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is disqualified to appear as counsel for Lucio Tan, et.
al. under Rule 6.03.
HELD: Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of
paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive
phrase “investigated and passed upon” with the word “intervened.” It is, therefore, properly
applicable to both “adverse-interest conflicts” and “congruent-interest conflicts.”
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as
Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et. al. in
Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case No. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless,
there remains the issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to
disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et. al.
xxx
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
xxx
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice
to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting
disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably in
individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. The client with a disqualified lawyer must
start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter. The effects of the prejudice
to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of
due process.
xxx
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer
of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the
disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm.
Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.
It is however, preferred that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of
public confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public
perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best which can lead to untoward results. No
less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government
attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the
government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to protect. Notably, the
appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and some courts have abandoned per se disqualification based on
Canon 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the
interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public.
Atty. Mendoza was not disqualified by the Supreme Court.
Santos, Jr. v. Llamas, Adm. Case No. 4749, January 20, 2000
FACTS:
Atty. Francisco Llamas was complained of not paying his IBP dues.He was also cited in the
complaint as not paying his professional tax or PTR as it was intermittently indicated in his
pleadings filed in court. It was also an alleged falsity when he included his “IBP-Rizal 259060”
where in fact he was not in good standing. Petitioner cited that Atty. Llamas was dismissed as
Pasay City Judge. But later revealed that the decision was reversed and he was
subsequently promoted as RTC Judge of Makati. He also had criminal case involving
estafabut was appealed pending in the Court of Appeals. In the numerous violations of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he expressed willingness to settle the IBP dues and plea
for a more temperate application of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, or until he has
paid his IBP dues.
RATIO:
Even if he had “limited” practice of law, it does not relieve him of the duties such as payment
of IBP dues. Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. without prejudice. respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 7 but the trial court denied it
in its Order8 dated July 23, 2009 
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus with the CA assailing the July
2, 2009 and July 23, 2009 Orders of the RTC of Roxas City.
G.R. No. 207041, November 09, 2015
In its presently assailed Decision, the CA denied respondent's petition and affirmed the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE CITY questioned RTC Orders.  Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by
PROSECUTOR, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ROXAS CITY, Petitioner, v. JESUS A. the CA in its disputed Resolution. 
ARROJADO, Respondent.
Hence, the present petition for review on  certiorari raising a sole Assignment of Error, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
DECISION
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE FAILURE
PERALTA, J.: OF THE INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR TO INDICATE HER MCLE COMPLIANCE
NUMBER AND DATE OF ISSUANCE THEREOF IN THE INFORMATION AGAINST
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision1 and RESPONDENT JESUS A. ARROJADO WARRANTED THE DISMISSAL OF THE
Resolution2of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 8, 2011 and April 18, 2013, SAME.9cralawlawlibrary
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 04540. The assailed Decision affirmed the Orders of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 16, dated July 2, 2009 and July 23, 2009 in
Petitioner contends that: (1) the term "pleadings" as used in B.M. No. 1922 does not include
Criminal Case No. C-75-09, while the questioned Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for
criminal Informations filed in court; (2) the failure of the investigating prosecutor to indicate in
Reconsideration.
the Information the number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance is a
mere formal defect and is not a valid ground to dismiss the subject Information which is
The pertinent factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
otherwise complete in form and substance.
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The petition lacks merit.
In an Information dated March 23, 2009, herein respondent was charged with the crime of
murder by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Roxas City, Capiz.  The case was docketed as
Pertinent portions of B.M. No. 1922, provide as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Criminal case No. C-75-09 and was raffled off to Branch 16 of the Regional Trial COurt of
Roxas City, Iloilo (RTC of Roxas City).
xxxx
3
On June 16, 2009, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss  the Information fiked against him on
The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Education
the ground that the investigating prosecutor who filed the said Information failed to indicate
and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings
therein the number and date of issue of her Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their
Certificate of Compliance, as required by Bar Matter No. 1922 (B.M. No. 1922) which was
MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the
promulgated by this Court via an En Banc Resolution dated June 3, 2008. 4
immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the required information would
cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.
Herein petitioner filed its Comment/Opposition5 to respondent's Motion to Dismiss contending
that: (1) the Information sought to be dismissed is sufficient in form and substance; (2) the
x x x10cralawlawlibrary
lack of proof of MCLE compliance by the prosecutor who prepared and signed the
Information should not prejudice the interest of the State in filing charges against persons
who have violated the law; and (3) and administrative edict cannot prevail over substantive or Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines pleadings as the written
precedural law, by imposing additional requirements for the sufficiency of a criminal statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for
information. appropriate judgment. Among the pleadings enumerated under Section 2 thereof are the
complaint and the answer in a civil suit. On the other hand, under Section 4, Rule 110 of the
On July 2, 2009, the RTC of Roxas City issued an Order6 dismissing the subject Information same Rules, an information is defined as an accusation in writing charging a person with an
offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. In accordance with the above
definitions, it is clear that an information is a pleading since the allegations therein, which
charge a person with an offense, is basically the same as a complaint in a civil action which
alleges a plaintiffs cause or cause of action. In this respect, the Court quotes with approval
the ruling of the CA on the matter, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
[A]n information is, for all intents and purposes, considered an initiatory pleading because it is
a written statement that contains the cause of action of a party, which in criminal cases is the
State as represented by the prosecutor, against the accused. Like a pleading, the Information
is also filed in court for appropriate judgment. Undoubtedly then, an Information falls squarely
within the ambit of Bar Matter No. 1922, in relation to Bar Matter 850. 11cralawlawlibrary
Even under the rules of criminal procedure of the United States, upon which our rules of
criminal procedure were patterned, an information is considered a pleading. Thus, Rule 12(a),
Title IV of the United States Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, states that: "[t]he pleadings
in a criminal proceeding are the indictment, the information, and the pleas of not guilty, guilty,
and nolo contendere." Thus, the Supreme Court of Washington held
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
An information is a pleading. It is the formal statement on the part of the state of the facts
constituting the offense which the defendant is accused of committing. In other words, it is the
plain and concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action. It bears the same
relation to a criminal action that a complaint does to a civil action; and, when verified, its
object is not to satisfy the court or jury that the defendant is guilty, nor is it for the purpose of
evidence which is to be weighed and passed upon, but is only to inform the defendant of the
precise acts or omissions with which he is accused, the truth of which is to be determined
thereafter by direct and positive evidence upon a trial, where the defendant is brought face to
face with the witnesses.12cralawlawlibrary
In a similar manner, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that "[a]n indictment in a criminal case
is a pleading, since it accomplishes the same purpose as a declaration in a civil suit, pleading
by allegation the cause of action in law against [a] defendant." 13
As to petitioner's contention that the failure of the investigating prosecutor to indicate in the
subject Information the number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance is a
mere formal defect and is not a valid ground to dismiss such Information, suffice it to state
that B.M. No. 1922 categorically provides that "[f]ailure to disclose the required information
would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records."
In this regard, petitioner must be reminded that it assailed the trial court's dismissal of the
subject Information via a special civil action for certiorari filed with the CA. The writ
of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions that acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.14 Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.15 To justify the issuance of the writ
of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to
having acted without jurisdiction.16 Since the trial court's dismissal of the subject Information
was based on a clear and categorical provision of a rule issued by this Court, the court a
quo could not have committed a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment nor did it
exercise its discretion in an arbitrary or despotic manner. Thus, the CA did not commit error in
dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari.
In harping on its contention that the ends of justice would be best served if the criminal case
would be allowed to proceed in order to determine the innocence or culpability of the
ciccused, petitioner sounds as if the dismissal of the Information left the prosecution with no
other recourse or remedy so as to irreversibly jeopardize the interests of the State and the
private offended party. On the contrary, the Court agrees with the CA that the dismissal of the
Information, without prejudice, did not leave the prosecution without any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy. To avoid undue delay in the disposition of the subject criminal case
and to uphold the parties' respective rights to a speedy disposition of their case, the
prosecution, mindful of its duty not only to prosecute offenders but more importantly to do
justice, could have simply re-filed the Information containing the required number and date of
issue of the investigating prosecutor's MCLE Certificate of Compliance, instead of resorting to
the filing of various petitions in court to stubbornly insist on its position and question the trial
court's dismissal of the subject Information, thereby wasting its time and effort and the State's
resources.
The Court is neither persuaded by petitioner's invocation of the principle on liberal
construction of procedural rules by arguing that such liberal construction "may be invoked in
situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading,
provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least
a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules." The prosecution has never shown any
reasonable attempt at compliance with the rule enunciated under B.M. No. 1922. Even when
the motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order dismissing the subject Information was filed,
the required number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor's MCLE Certificate of
Compliance was still not included nor indicated. Thus, in the instant case, absent valid and
compelling reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural
rules appear to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted.
In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by a
counsel's failure to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her
MCLE Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued an En Bane Resolution, dated January 14,
2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from
the records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required information would subject
the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action." Thus, under the amendatory
Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of
issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the
case and expunction of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, such failure will subject
the lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.
In light of the above amendment, while the same was not yet in effect at the time that the
subject Information was filed, the more prudent and practical thing that the trial court should
have done in the first place, so as to avoid delay in the disposition of the case, was not to
dismiss the Information but to simply require the investigating prosecutor to indicate therein
the number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, dated September 8, 2011 and April 18, 2013, respectively, in CA-G.R. SPNo. 04540
are AFFIRMED.
Arnado v. Adaza, A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015
Facts: Atty. Samuel Arnado called the attention of the Court to the practice of Atty.
Homobono Adaza (respondent) of indicating “MCLE application for exemption under process”
in his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 201, and “MCLE Application for Exemption for
Reconsideration” in a pleading filed in 2012.  When he inquired from the MCLE office, he
learned that respondent did not comply with the requirements of Bar Matter No. 850 for the
First (2001-2004), Second (2004-2007), and Third (2007-2010) Compliance Periods.  When
the case was referred to the MCLE Committee for evaluation, report and recommendation,
the Committee came out with its findings:  respondent applied for exemption for the First and
Second Compliance Periods, on the ground of “expertise in law”.  The MCLE Governing
Board denied the request on January 14, 2009.  He also did not apply for exemption nor
complied with the Third Compliance Period.  The Court then required the respondent to file
his comment.  In his comment, he alleged that he did not receive a copy of the letter of the
complainant, who belongs to the Romualdo and Arnaldo Law Office, the law office of his
political opponent, the Romualdo family.  He then enumerated his achievements as a lawyer
and claimed that he had been practicing law for about 50 years.  His achievements ranged
from appearing as counsels to several poetical personalities, writing books, becoming a
public servant, and even refusing to be appointed a Supreme Court justice.
In its report and recommendation, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that “respondent had
been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC stated that respondent’s failure to
comply with the MCLE requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients because the
pleadings he filed could be stricken off from the records and considered invalid.
The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the Bar and
guilty of non-compliance with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further recommended
respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six months with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The OBC
also recommended that respondent be directed to comply with the requirements set forth by
the MCLE Governing Board.”
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Adaza should be held administratively liable for failure to comply
with MCLE requirements.
Ruling: Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal
education “to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the
practice of law.”1 The First Compliance Period was from 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the
Second Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007; and the Third
Compliance Period was from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010. Complainant’s letter covered
respondent’s pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 which means respondent also
failed to comply with the MCLE requirements for the Fourth Compliance Period from 15 April
2010 to 14 April 2013.
The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the four
compliance periods. The records also showed that respondent filed an application for
exemption only on 5 January 2009. According to the MCLE Governing Board, respondent’s
application for exemption covered the First and Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did
not apply for exemption for the Third Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied
respondent’s application for exemption on 14 January 2009 on the ground that the application
did not meet the requirements of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No.
850. However, the MCLE Office failed to convey the denial of the application for exemption to
respondent. The MCLE Office only informed respondent, through its letter dated 1 October
2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano, when it received inquiries from complainant, Judge Sinfroso
Tabamo, and Camiguin Deputy Provincial Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of
respondent’s MCLE compliance. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after one
year, or on 23 October 2013, which the MCLE Governing Board denied with finality on 28
November 2013. The denial of the motion for reconsideration was sent to respondent in a
letter2  dated 29 November 2013, signed by Justice Pardo.
Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar
Matter No. 850. His application for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods
was filed after the compliance periods had ended. He did not follow-up the status of his
application for exemption. He furnished the Court with his letter dated 7 February 2012 3  to
the MCLE Office asking the office to act on his application for exemption but alleged that his
secretary failed to send it to the MCLE Office.4  He did not comply with the Fourth Compliance
Period.
Robert Divinagracia 5
In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to comply with the
requirements for the First to Third Compliance periods. It was reiterated in the 29 November
2013 letter denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration of his application for exemption.
The OBC also reported that a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13
August 2013. Under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent has
60 days from receipt of the notification to comply. However, in his Compliance and Comment
before this Court, respondent stated that because of his involvement in public interest issues
in the country, the earliest that he could comply with Bar Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14
February 2014 and that he already registered with the MCLE Program of the University of the
Philippines (UP) Diliman on those dates.
Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations provides:
Section 12. Compliance Procedures
xxxx
(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or
evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.
A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement will receive a
Non-Compliance Notice stating his specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from
the receipt of the notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the
requirements. Such notice shall be written in capital letters as follows:
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR
PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM
RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT
MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS
ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.
The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the MCLE
requirement. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance
with the prior period requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are earned in
which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.
A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-
compliance fee of PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP by the IBP
Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case Rule
13 9-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.
Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would
only cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the
Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has not been furnished proof of
compliance for the First Compliance Period.
The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with the
requirements of Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed that his application for exemption, filed after
the compliance periods, would be granted. He purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up
the status of his application but claimed that his secretary forgot to send the letter. He now
wants the Court to again reconsider the MCLE Office’s denial of his application for exemption
when his motion for reconsideration was already denied with finality by the MCLE Governing
Board on 28 November 2013. He had the temerity to inform the Court that the earliest that he
could comply was on 10-14 February 2014, which was beyond the 60-day period required
under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, and without even indicating
when he intended to comply with his deficiencies br the Second, Third, and Fourth
Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to allow him to continue practicing law while
complying with the MCLE requirements.
The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent’s application
for exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office three years to inform respondent of the
denial of his application. The MCLE Office only informed respondent on 1 October 2012 and
after it received inquiries regarding the status of respondent’s compliance. Hence, during the
period when respondent indicated “MCLE application for exemption under process” in his
pleadings, he was not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing Board on his application
for exemption. However, after he had been informed of the denial of his application for
exemption, it still took respondent one year to file a motion for reconsideration. After the
denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still aking, his time to
satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when respondent indicated “MCLE
Application for Exemption for Reconsideration” in a pleading, he had not filed any motion for
reconsideration before the MCLE Office.
Respondent’s failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives of
the MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP. While the MCLE
Implementing Regulations state that the MCLE Committee should recommend to the IBP
Board of Governors the listing of a lawyer as a delinquent member, there is nothing that
prevents the Court from using its administrative power and supervision to discipline erring
lawyers and from directing the IBP Board of Governors o declare such lawyers as delinquent
members of the IBP.
The OBC recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of aw for six months. We
agree. In addition, his listing as a delinquent member of the IBP is also akin to suspension
because he shall not be permitted to practice law until such time as he submits proof of full
compliance to the IBP Board of Governors, and the IBP Board of Governors has notified the
MCLE Committee of his reinstatement, under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper to declare respondent as a delinquent member of the
IBP and to suspend him from the practice of law for six months or until he has fully complied
with the requirements of the MCLE for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance
Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and
reinstatement fees.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:
(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on matters that
require its immediate attention, such as but not limited to applications for exemptions, and to
communicate its action to the interested parties within a reasonable period;
(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE compliance as
the matter had already been denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28
November 2013;
(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully
complied with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance
Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and
reinstatement fees.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A. Adaza’s personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land. Let copies be also furnished the MCLE Office and the
IBP Governing Board for their appropriate actions.
SO ORDERED.
CARPIO, J.:
Del Castillo, Mendoza, Leonen, and Jardeleza,* JJ., concur.
Leda v. Tabang, Administrative Case No. 2505, February 21, 1992)
Facts: Complainant Evangeline Leda and Respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang contracted
marriage performed under Article 76 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character. The
parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his
law studies and had taken the Bar examinations, allegedly to ensure a stable future for them.
Complainant admits, though, that they had not lived together as husband and wife.
Complainant, thereafter, filed a Petition for Disbarment against respondent alleging, among
others, for having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his
application to take the bar exam and for being not of good moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the Supreme Court. Respondent averred that he and
Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the marriage for the reason that said marriage
was void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code
thus he could not have abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as
husband and wife and that when he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly
believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.  Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle misunderstanding.
Issue: Whether or not Respondent lacks of good moral character and violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility 
Held: Yes, Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious
tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has violated Canon 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer
should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member
of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court. Hence, respondent is subjected to suspension
from the practice of law until further Orders.
In the matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee, Haron S. Meiling in the 2002 bar
examinations and for disciplinary action as member of Philippine Shari'a Bar,
Melendrez.
FACTS:
MELENDREZ filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S.
Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate
disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
Alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he
has three (3) pending criminal cases both for Grave Oral Defamation and for Less Serious
Physical Injuries.
Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media
practitioners and other people. 
Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to
the latter.
Alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications, as Secretary to
the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
MELING explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases because retired Judge Corocoy
Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral
ascendancy over them, considered the three cases that arose from a single incident as
“closed and terminated.”  law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted
Denies the charges and added that the acts do not involve moral turpitude.
Use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really contained
the word “Attorney” as they were typed by the office clerk.
Office of Bar Confidant disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling:
Meling should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not
a retired judge nor a law professor.  In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending. 
Even if these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the
Court to ascertain his good moral character.
ISSUE: WON Meling’s act of concealing cases constitutes dishonesty. YES.
HELD: PETITION IS GRANTED. MEMBERSHIP IS SUSPENDED until further orders from
the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent
Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a
member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and
academic (Meling did not pass the bar).
Rule 7.01: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the
bar.”
He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason
why he signed as “attorney” whoever may have typed the letters.                    mortgage was later foreclosed and the land subsequently sold at public auction and
i.     Unauthorized use of the appellation “attorney” may render a person
liable for indirect contempt of court.
PRACTICE OF LAW IS A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE.
Limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
Requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far
as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned,
than the possession of legal learning.
Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant that applicant to
aver that he or she “has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by
for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving
moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her.” 
Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate
silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
Tan v. Sabandal, Bar Matter No. 44, February 24, 1992)
DOCTRINES:
1 The practice of law is not a matter of right.
2 No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or
candor. 
FACTS:
Respondent Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but was denied to take his oath in
view of the finding of the Court that he was guilty of unauthorized practice of law. Since then,
he had filed numerous petitions for him to be allowed to take his lawyer's oath.
Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the province where
Sabandal is domiciled to submit a comment on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of
the Bar. In compliance therewith, the executive judge stated in his comment that he is not
aware of any acts committed by the respondent as would disqualify him to from admission to
the Bar. However, he added that respondent has a pending civil case before his court for
cancellation/reversion proceedings, in which respondent, then working as Land Investigator
of the Bureau of Lands, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title
to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not
susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the bank. The
respondent has not redeemed the land since then.
The case was however been settled through amicable settlement. The said amicable
settlement canceled the OCT under Free Patent in the name of Sabandal and his mortgage
in the bank; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the RD for proper
annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid
certificate of title with respondent refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership
over the said land. Respondent also paid the bank a certain sum for the loan and interest.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law considering that he
already submitted three (3) testimonials regarding his good moral character, and his pending
civil case has been terminated.
HELD: His petition must be denied.
Time and again, it has been held that practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character.  Inc., one of the financial consultancy firms. Respondent alleged that complainant was
It should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands.
Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over the property which he
could not but have known was a public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not
speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public
service, which cannot be erased by the termination of the case and where no determination
of guilt or innocence was made because the suit has been compromised. This is a sad
reflection of his sense of honor and fair dealings.
Moreover, his failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed
against him during the period that he was submitting several petitions and motions for
reconsiderations reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.
Although, the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined
as "including at least common dishonesty." It has also been held that no moral qualification
for membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.
Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012.  the City Prosecutor of Manila. He also informed the Commission that he filed Petition for
FACTS: Complainant, Manuel G. Villatuya filed a Complaint for Disbarment on December 06,
2004 against respondent, Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos. In a resolution, the court required the
respondent to file a comment, which the respondent did. The complaint was then referred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.
In a mandatory conference called for by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP,
complainant and his counsel, and the respondent appeared and submitted issues for
resolution. The commission ordered the parties to submit their verified position papers.
In the position paper submitted by the complainant on August 1, 2005, he averred that he
was employed by the respondent as financial consultant to assist the respondent in a number
of corporate rehabilitation cases. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement
whereby he would be entitled to ₱50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the
cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients.
Notwithstanding, 18 Stay Orders that was issued by the courts as a result of his work and the
respondent being able to rake in millions from the cases that they were working on together,
the latter did not pay the amount due to him. He also alleged that respondent engaged in
unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two financial consultancy firms as fronts for his
legal services. On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of
committing two counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage
was subsisting.
In his defense, respondent denied charges against him and asserted that the complainant
was not an employee of his law firm but rather an employee of Jesi and Jane Management,
unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job and that there was no verbal agreement
between them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his
clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had been paid.
Respondent also denied committing any unlawful solicitation. To support his contention,
respondent attached a Joint Venture Agreement and an affidavit executed by the Vice-
President for operations of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. On the charge of gross
immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit of a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant
himself. Respondent did not specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged
bigamous marriages with two other women
On January 9, 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts of
respondent wherein he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to
in the Certification issued by the NSO.
On January 16, 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by
complainant, claiming that he was not given the opportunity to controvert them. He disclosed
that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the Office of
Declaration of Nullity of the first two marriage contracts. In both petitions, he claimed that he
had recently discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO
bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano on different
occasions.
The Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007. Respondent
moved for the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against him, pending
outcome of petition for nullification he filed with RTC, but was denied. The Commission
resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for resolution.
On February 27, 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and Recommendation
addressing the specific charges against respondent. The first charge, for dishonesty for the
nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. On the second
charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of
client for having advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended
that he be reprimanded for the violation. As for the third charge, the Commission found
respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Due to the
gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and
that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
On April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154,
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
On August 1, 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the
recommendation to disbar him was premature.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and
affirmed their Resolution dated April 15, 2008 recommending respondent’s disbarment.
ISSUES: 1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
nonpayment of fees to complainant;
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation; and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.
RULING:
First charge: Dishonesty for non-payments of share in the fees.
Supreme Court affirmed the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, but did not
concur with the rationale behind it. The first charge, if proven to be true is based on an
agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer
is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rende-red
with a person not licensed to practice law. In the case of Tan Tek Beng v. David, Supreme
Court held that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected
from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be
disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainant’s allegations in this case had
not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.
Second charge: Unlawful solicitation of clients.
In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had
violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that
was breached. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which
prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety
arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to
be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises
when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional
employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the
lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the
practice of law.
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle
used by respondent as a means to
procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the
former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations
related to the practice of law. In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether
respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this
practice by respondent, the Supreme Court affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter
for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third charge: Bigamy.
The Supreme Court have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is
on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the
procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, in Garrido v. Garrido:
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of pleadings
and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant — do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to
depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the
public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the
practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire
into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. In this case,
complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two
marriages while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied
entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount
to a negative pregnant.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage
twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we
held thus:
[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only
as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued
membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was
committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer
may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who
cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in
his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not
to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The
administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the
court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the
courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and
are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58
The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and
ordered that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Tapucar v. Tapucar (Administrative Case No. 4148, July 30, 1998)Facts:
 In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar
sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing
grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous
circumstances.
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for
conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on
April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of
six months suspension without pay, while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-
CFI, which were consolidated, this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from
service of respondent.
Issue: Whether or not respondent violated canon 1 of the code of professional responsibility
Ruling:  Yes.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
 A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. Exacted
from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield
in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and
responsibility that have been compendiously described as “moral character.” To achieve such
end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his
profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the administration
of justice.
Bugaring v. Espanol, G.R. No. 133090,
(GR No 133090, January 19, 2001)
DOCTRINE/S:
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation
of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates
of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.
FACTS:
The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing of a Civil Case, entitled
Royal Becthel Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al., in the sala
of respondent judge Dolores S. Espanol of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial
court issued an order on February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Cavite to annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant
Spouses Alvaran on April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. Petitioner, the newly
appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel
lis pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and filed a Rejoinder to Opposition
and a Motion for Contempt of Court.
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with one (1)
operating a video camera who was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case while
counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect that he was ready
to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in contempt of court) the
Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause the
appearance of the cameraman to take pictures, however, he admitted that they came from an
event, and that was the reason why the said cameraman was in tow with him and the
plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the alibi given, the counsel sent out the cameraman after the Court
took exception to the fact that although the proceedings are open to the public and that it
being a court of record, and since its permission was not sought, such situation was an abuse
of discretion of the Court.
When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he needed the
services of counsel and right then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to represent him,
the case was allowed to be called again. On the second call, Atty. Bugaring started to insist
that he be allowed to mark and present his documentary evidence in spite of the fact that
Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary
evidence and was raring to argue as in fact he was already perorating despite the fact that
Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished with his manifestation. He would frequently utter “your
honor please”. As Atty. Bugaring appears to disregard orderly procedure, the Court directed
him to listen and wait for the ruling of the Court for an orderly proceeding.
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so. Thus,
the Court declared him out of order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up and uttered
words insulting the Court; such as: that he knows better than the latter as he has won all his
cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows better the Rules of Court; that he
was going to move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for allegedly being antagonistic to
his client, and other invectives were hurled to the discredit of the Court.
Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the Courts
sheriff to arrest and place him under detention.
Due to this, he was sentenced to 3 days imprisonment and a fine of P3,000.00.
In CA
The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic
notes of the hearing, it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant, at times
impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent of being disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic
towards the court. It affirmed the order of the respondent judge, but found that the fine of
P3,000.00 exceeded the limit of P2,000.00 prescribed by the Rules of Court, and ordered the
excess of P1,000.00 returned to petitioner.
ISSUE/S:
WON the respondent Judge has factual and legal basis in declaring petitioner in contempt?
(YES.)
HELD:
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioners alleged deference to the
trial court in consistently addressing the respondent judge as “your Honor please” throughout
the proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:
1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court is contrary to Rule
11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer
shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
Courts.
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of the
other party is against Rule 11.04, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
enjoins lawyers from attributing to a judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.
3. behaving without due regard to the trial courts order to maintain order in the proceedings is
in utter disregard to Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyers
duty to maintain towards the courts (1) respectful attitude in order to maintain its importance
in the administration of justice, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which mandates lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner’s use of the
phrase your honor please. For, after using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the
court in his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot
and should not be countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during
court proceedings.
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to
the extent of interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed disrespect to said
counsel and the court, was defiant of the courts system for an orderly proceeding, and
obstructed the administration of justice. 
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments,
orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of
justice. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the
case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing. Hence, petitioner cannot claim
that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order
inside her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an
immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court
during the hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for
reconsideration of the contempt order on the same day
Wherefore, decision of CA is AFFIRMED.
In re Clemente M. Soriano, GR No. June 30, 1970
FACTS: Atty. Clemente Soriano entered his appearance in the case People’s Homesite vs
Mencias and Tiburcio et al. He sought to represent Marcelino Tiburcio. The odd thing is that,
when he entered his appearance before the Supreme Court, the case has long been decided
by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court then directed Atty. Soriano to show cause why he
should not be subjected to disciplinary actions.
Atty. Soriano, in his defense, stated that he merely relied on the assurance made by one Atty.
Dalangpan who assured him that the case is still pending with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Soriano should be suspended.
HELD: No. But he is severely censured. The only reason why he’s not suspended is that he
exhibited candor before the Supreme Court in acknowledging his mistake. He has been
negligent in his duty and this violates his duty to be diligent on his responsibility to his client.
He should have checked with the former lawyer of Tiburcio as to the status of the case. If not,
he could have simply checked with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court instead of relying
upon the assurances of Atty. Dalangpan (who even denied before the Supreme Court that he
made such assurances).
Camacho vs. Pangulayan 328 SCRA 631 (March 22, 2000)
FACTS: PANGULAYAN INDICTED FOR VIOLATION OF CANON 9: Lawyer should not
communicate upon subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less
should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal
with his counsel. Lawyer must avoid everything that may tend to mislead party not
represented by counsel and should not advise him as to law.
HIRED LAWYER OF DEFENDANTS who had compromised agreements
with CAMACHO’S CLIENTS.
Required them to waive all kinds of claims they might have had against
AMACC (principal defendant) and to terminate all civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings filed against it.
Denied that they had negotiations, discussion, formulation or execution.
No longer connected with Pagulayan and Associates Law Offices.
Re-Admission Agreements nothing to do with DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE involving 9
students of AMACC.
Civil case involved publishing of features or articles in Editorial Board of DATALINE.
Found guilty by Student Disciplinary Tribunal of using indecent language and unauthorized
use of student publication funds.
Expulsion
Students appeal and was denied by the AMACC President which gave rise to civil case.
During civil case, apology letters and Re-Admission Agreements were separately executed
by some expelled students.
ISSUE: Does the Re-Admission Agreements have nothing to do with DISMISSAL OF CIVIL
CASE involving 9 students of AMACC?
HELD: 3 MONTHS SUSPENSION AND DISMISSAL OF CASE AGAINST OTHER
RESPONDENTS THAT DID NOT TAKE PART IN THE NEGOTIATION.
Individual letters and Re-Admission Agreements were formalized in which
PANGULAYAN was already counsel of AMACC.
Had full knowledge; did not discuss it with the student’s parents or their
counsel.
              Re-Admission Agreements affected the dismissal of the civil case because
signatories agreed to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings against
AMACC.
In Re: Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys Michael A. Medado, Bar Matter No. 2540,
September 24, 2013
Statement of Facts: Petitioner Michael Medado, who obtained his law degree in the year
1979, took and passed the same year’s bar examinations and took the Attorney’s Oath, failed
to sign the Attorney’s Roll. After more than 30 years of practicing the profession of law, he
filed the instant Petition on February 2012, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys. Medado said that he was not able to sign the Roll of Attorneys because he
misplaced the notice given to him and he believed that since he had already taken the oath,
the signing of the Roll of Attorneys is not urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer.
 The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) after conducting clarificatory conference on
the matter recommended to the Supreme Court that the instant petition be denied for
petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.
Issue: WON the petitioner be allowed to sign in the roll of attorneys?
Ruling: Yes, the Court allowed the petitioner to sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to the
payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice
of law.
The Court cannot forbid the petitioner from signing the Roll of Attorneys because
such action constitutes disbarment. Such penalty is reserved to the most serious ethical
transgressions of members of the Bar.
The Court cited three main points which demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a
full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. First, Medado demonstrated good faith and good
moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. It was
Medado himself who admitted his own error and not any third person. Second, petitioner has
not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law. He strove to
adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession and that he has prima facie
shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar. Third,
Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at the Laurel Law Office, Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil
Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.
However, the Court cannot fully free Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.
His justification of his action, that it was “neither willful nor intentional but based on a
mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment” was opposed by the Court.
“A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
presumed to know the law and its consequences.” Although an honest mistake of fact could
be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts he could no longer claim
it as a valid justification by the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an
attendance record. His action of continuing the practice of law in spite of his knowledge of the
need to take the necessary steps to complete all requirements for the admission to the bar
constitutes unauthorized practice of law. Such action transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
With respect to the penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law. However, in the instant case the Court could
not warrant the penalty of suspension from the practice of law to Medado because he is not
yet a full-fledged lawyer. Instead, the Court see it fit to impose upon him a penalty similar to
suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one ( 1) year after receipt of the
Resolution and to fine him in the amount of P32,000.
The instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is Affirmed. Petitioner Michael A.
Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of the
Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized
practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and
is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has
signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by the Court.
G.R. No. 3593            March 23, 1907
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff, 
vs.
C.W. NEY and JUAN GARCIA BOSQUE, defendants.
Attorney-General Araneta for plaintiff.
C.W. Ney for defendants.
TRACEY, J.:
This proceeding is to punish the defendants for contempt.
In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia Bosque, was not entitled to
admission to practice law in the Philippine Islands, upon the ground that after the change of
sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and as such was not qualified for
admission to the bar (In re Bosque, 1 Phil. Rep., 88), and an order was entered accordingly.
In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant Ney, a practicing attorney, to
carry on business together, sending out a circular signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that they
had established an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands and
that Bosque would devote himself especially to consultation and office work relating to
Spanish law. The paper was headed "Law Office — Ney & Bosque. Juan G.
Bosque,  jurisconsulto español — C.W. Ney, abogado americano."
Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personally appeared in the courts, and with
one exception, occuring through an inadvertance, papers from the office were signed not with
the firm name alone nor with any designation of the firm as attorneys, but with the words "Ney
& Bosque — C.W. Ney, abogado."
On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on September 15, 1906, this court
refused to consider petitions so singed with the names of the defendants and the practice
being repeated, on the 2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers sent to the Attorney-
General to take appropriate action thereon, and he thereupon instituted this proceeding.
The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend their acts as being within the
law.
Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every pleading must be subscribed
by the party or his attorney, does not permit, and by implication prohibits, a subscription of the
names of any other persons, whether agents or otherwise; therefore a signature containing
the name of one neither a party nor an attorney was not a compliance with this section, nor
was it aided by the too obvious subterfuge of the addition of the individual name of a licensed
attorney. The illegality in this instance was aggravated by the fact that one of the agents so
named was a person residing in these Islands to whom this court had expressly denied
admission to the bar. The papers in question were irregular and were properly rejected. We
refuse to recognize as a practice any signature of names appended to pleadings or other
papers in an action other than those specified in the statute. A signature by agents amounts
to a signing by non-qualified attorneys, the office of attorney being originally one of agency.
(In re Cooper, 22 N.Y., 67.) We do not, however, mean to discountenance the use of a
suitable firm designation by partners, all of whom have been duly admitted to practice.
It is to be noted that we are not now considering an application for the suspension or removal
of the defendant Ney from his office as attorney. The defendant Bosque, not being an officer
of the court, could not be proceeded against in that way, and probably for that reason the
Attorney-General instituted this form of proceeding.
Should either of these defendants be thus punished for contempt?
Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as follows:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a
court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;
2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions.
Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts is restricted to punishment for acts
so defined. (Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S., 505.)
As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order or command of this court has been
disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney. The only order that the defendant Bosque can
have disobeyed is the one denying him the right to practice law. This order, however, was
directly binding upon him, notwithstanding proceedings taken for its review, and any hope on
his part of ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for its violation. Even had he been
entitled under the statute to practice law without any license from the court and without an
application to it, yet its order made on his own petition. A mandate of the court, while in force,
must be obeyed. The irregular signature to papers, though affixed by his associate, had his
authorization and constitutes a substantial attempt to engage in practice. Moreover the firm
circular in setting forth the establishment of an office for the general practice of law in all the
courts of the Islands, amounted to an assertion of his right and purpose, not effectively
qualified by the addition that he would devote himself to consultation and office work relating
to Spanish law. Spanish law plays an important part in the equipment of a lawyer in the
Archipelago, standing on a different footing from the law of other foreign countries, in regard
to which a skilled person might as a calling, advise without practicing law. The fact stated on
the circular that he was a Spanish lawyer did not amount to a disclaimer of his professional
character in the Islands. Independent of statutory provisions, a foreigner is not by reason of
his status disqualified from practicing law. One of the most eminent American advocates was
an alien barrister admitted to the bar after a contest in the court of New York State. (In
re Thomas Addis Emmett, 2 Cain's Cases, 386.) Consequently the conduct of the defendant
Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in a proceeding to which he was a party.
Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is obviously not answerable,
inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court. On the other hand, under this subdivision, the
defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct amounted to misbehavior. We
are of the opinion that it did. In the offense of Bosque in holding himself out as a general
practitioner Ney participated, and for the improper signature of the pleadings he was chiefly
and personally responsible. It is impossible to say that the signature itself was a violation of
the law, and yet hold guiltless the man who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we regret to add
that his persistent and rash disregard of the rulings of the court has not commended him to
our indulgence, while the offensive character of certain papers recently filed by him forbids us
from presuming on the hope of his voluntarily conforming to the customary standard of
members of the bar.
The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in the sum of 200 pesos, to
be paid into the office of the clerk of this court within ten days, with the costs de oficio. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Willard, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., does not concur in the result.
Alawi v. Alauya, A.M. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997
Facts of the Case:
Sophia Alawi is a sales representative of EB Villarosa & Partners, Co. Ltd. Of Davao City,
while Ashari Alauya is an incumbent executive clerk of court of 4th Judicial Shari’a District in
Marawi City.
Alawi and Alauya were classmates and friends. Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was ex-
ecuted for the purchase on instalments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the
abovemen- tioned firm. Thereafter, a housing loan was granted to Alauya by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). On December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a
letter to the President of Vil- larosa and Co. advising the termination of contract with the
company, on the ground that Alauya’s con- sent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation,
deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by sales agent which makes the contract
void ab initio.
Alauya also wrote to Vice President of Credit and Collection Group of National Home
Mortgage Fi- nance Corp. (NHMFC) repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with
Villarosa & Co. and asking for a cancellation of his housing loan.
Alauya also wrote to Ms. Corazon Ordonez, Head of Fiscal Management and Budget Office,
and to the Chief, Finance Division of Supreme Court to stop deductions from his salary.
Alawi filed on SC a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996, to which she appended a copy
of the letter and accused Alauya of:
Imputation of libellous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith.
Causing undue injury.
Unauthorized enjoyment of free postage.
Usurpation of the title “attorney” which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may use.
Alauya thereafter claims that Alawi was only en- vious of him for being an Executive Clerk of
Court but also a scion of a Royal Family. He also claimed that Alawi falsified his signature.
As with the use of the title attorney, he justified it by assertion that it is synonymous with
Counsellors-at-Law. He preferred to use attorney because coun- sellor is often mistaken for
“councillor”.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya is guilty of libel- lous charges without solid grounds through bad faith.
Whether or not Alauya is entitled to use the appellation attorney.
Court Ruling:
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. 6713)
enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in
the public ser- vice. Public officials and employees must at all times respect the rights of
others and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, public safety and public interest.
The conduct of behaviour of every official and employee of an agency involved in
administration of justice from presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with heavy burden of responsibility.
He must “act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith”.
As to Alauya’s usurpation of the title “attorney”, the Court has declared that persons who
passed the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledge members of the Philippine bar. His disinclination to
use the title “counsellor” does not warrant his use of the title “attorney”.
In In re Meling, the Court said that the title “attorney” is reserved only to those, who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing, and it is they who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia v. Attys. Charlie Bancolo and Janus Jarder;
A.C. No. 9604. March 20, 2013
A.C. No. 9604
March 20 20!3
Attorney; a lawyer shall not assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
FACTS: Rodrigo Tapay and Anthony Rustia, both employees of the Sugar Regulatory
Administration received an Order from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them
to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public
document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr., a
co-employee. The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by Atty. Charlie
L. Bancolo. When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter
informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them. Atty. Bancolo denied that he
represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia and declared that the
signature in the Complaint was not his. Thus, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying the
said signature. This affidavit was used by Tapay and Rustia in filing a counter-affidavit
accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia, denying the
same, presented as evidence an affidavit by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty.
Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the
Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty.
Bancolo’s instructions. The case was then dismissed.
Tapay and Rustia then later filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines a complaint to
disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged
that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were
also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people. In
their Answer, respondents admitted that due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted
that the pleadings be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. After investigation,
Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo
violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder
violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code, and recommended that Atty. Bancolo be
suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his
failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is guilty of violating Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the
Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. He likewise
categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings
filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Clearly,
he violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which
provides:

CANON 9 – A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer.
Further, under the Rules of Court, a counsel’s signature serves as a certification that (1) he
has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good
ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay. Thus, by affixing one’s signature to
a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give
legal effect to the document. For violating rule 9.01 of the CPR, Atty. Bacolo was meted with
the penalty the suspension from the practice of law for one year.