1.

Introduction

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) was created by an Act of

Parliament in 1984, following the McDonald Commission of Inquiry in the late 1970s
and the Mackenzie Commission of the 1960s [ CITATION Hip09 \l 1033 ]. The CSIS Act
established a clear mandate for the Service and, for the first time, legislated a
framework of democratic control and accountability for a civilian Canadian security
intelligence service. In meeting its mandated commitments, CSIS provides advance
warning to government departments and agencies about activities which may
reasonably be suspected of constituting threats to the country’s security. Other
departments and agencies, not CSIS, are responsible for taking direct action to counter
security threats [ CITATION Hoo11 \l 1033 ].

CSIS does not have law enforcement powers, therefore, all law enforcement functions
are the responsibility of police authorities. The splitting of functions, combined with
comprehensive legislated review mechanisms, ensures that CSIS remains under the
close control of the federal government. In its early years, much of the Service’s
energy and resources were devoted to countering the spying activities of foreign
governments. Time has passed however, and as the world has changed, so has CSIS.

In response to the rise of terrorism worldwide and with the demise of the Cold War,
CSIS has made public safety its first priority. This is reflected in the high proportion
of resources devoted to counter-terrorism. CSIS has also assigned more of its counter-
intelligence resources to investigate the activities of foreign governments that decide
to conduct economic espionage in Canada so as to gain an economic advantage or try
to acquire technology in Canada that could be used for developing weapons of mass
destruction. Along with these operational changes, CSIS has matured into an
organization with a flexible, dynamic structure and, most importantly, an ingrained
understanding of its responsibilities and obligations to Canadians. The Service’s main
purpose is to investigate and report on threats to the security of Canada. This occurs
within a framework of accountability to government, as well as respect for the law
and the protection of human rights. Nowadays, it also means being more open and
transparent to the people it serves. There are some limits on what the Service can
discuss; that is the nature of its work, but CSIS is anything but a secret organization.
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2. Objective of the Study

The main objective of this study is to examine about Canadian Secret Intelligence
Service.

3. Activities of the CSIS

Among the activities included in the CSIS mandate are the investigation of:

3.1 Political violence and terrorism

Threat or acts of serious violence may constitute attempts at compelling the Canadian
government to respond in a certain way. Acts of serious violence cause grave bodily
harm or death to persons, or serious damage to or the destruction of public or private
property, and are contrary to Canadian law or would be if committed in Canada.
Hostage-taking, bomb threats and assassination attempts are examples of acts of
serious violence that endanger the lives of Canadians. Such actions have been used in
an attempt to force particular political responses and change in this country.
Exponents and supporters of political, religious or ideological violence may try to use
Canada as a haven or a base from which to plan or facilitate violence in other
countries. Such actions compromise the safety of people living in Canada and the
capacity of the Canadian government to conduct its domestic and external affairs
[ CITATION CSI19 \l 1033 ].

3.2 Espionage and sabotage

Espionage includes unlawful or unauthorised attempts to acquire information about

sensitive political, economic, scientific or military matters by a foreign state or its
agents. Sabotage encompasses activities conducted for the purpose of endangering the
safety, security or defence of vital public or private property, such as key
transportation links or power installations.

3.3 Foreign-influenced activities

These include activities that are detrimental to Canadian national interests and that are
directed, controlled or financed by a foreign state or its agents, such as interference
with ethnic communities in Canada. CSIS is also responsible for conducting security
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assessments for all federal government departments and agencies (upon request), with
the exception of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, as well as for immigration,
citizenship and refugee applicants upon referral from Citizenship and Immigration
Canada. CSIS can assist in the collection of foreign intelligence within Canada at the
request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of National Defence.

3.4 Subversion

Activities intended to undermine or overthrow Canada’s constitutionally established

system of government by violence. Subversive activities seek to interfere with or
ultimately destroy the electoral, legislative, executive, administrative or judicial
processes or institutions of Canada.

4. Intelligence Cycle

4.1 Requirements and Direction

The CSIS Act gives CSIS the mandate to investigate activities suspected of
constituting threats to the security of Canada, including espionage, terrorism, violent
extremism, foreign influenced activities and subversion of government through
violence. Through this mandate, CSIS receives direction from the Government of
Canada on the intelligence requirements:

4.1.1 Government Intelligence Priorities as established by Cabinet through

discussion and consultation with the relevant Ministers and the Security and
Intelligence community.

4.1.2 Minister’s Direction on Intelligence Priorities, which translates the

Government Intelligence Priorities into specific collection direction for CSIS

4.2 Planning

The Government and Ministerial Direction on Intelligence Priorities, the CSIS Act
and the needs of domestic partners are all taken into consideration when developing
the annual collection strategy. Responding to this direction, CSIS establishes internal
direction and annual collection plans to meet the intelligence needs of Canadian
government departments and agencies.
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4.3 Collection

CSIS uses a variety of methods to collect information on threat actors whose activities
are suspected of constituting a threat to national security. This information is collected
from various sources, including:

4.3.1 Open sources

4.3.2 Members of the public

4.3.3 Human sources

4.3.4 Foreign governments

4.3.5 Canadian partners

4.3.6 Technical interception of communications

Any intrusive measure, or those affecting the privacy of Canadians, requires obtaining
a warrant authorised by the Federal Court.

4.4 Analysis

CSIS analysts use their knowledge of regional, national and global trends to assess the
quality of all types of information collected. The information is analysed in order to
produce useful intelligence for clients and consumers. CSIS analysts examine the
information provided by other Canadian government departments and agencies,
foreign intelligence agencies, intelligence collected through investigations, as well as
open sources. The analysis process results in intelligence reports and threat
assessments.

4.5 Dissemination and Feedback

CSIS disseminates intelligence products primarily to the Government of Canada and

law enforcement authorities. CSIS also disseminates intelligence to its global
intelligence alliance with the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New
Zealand, also known as Five Eyes partners, as well as other foreign partners. An
integral part of the intelligence cycle is collecting feedback on intelligence products
from all partners. CSIS gathers product specific feedback from all partners and
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routinely gathers requirements from the Government of Canada to help shape and
drive collection and production efforts.

5. Threats identified by CSIS

5.1 Terrorism and Violent Extremism

The threat landscape surrounding religiously, politically or ideologically motivated

violent extremism continues to evolve in Canada and is increasingly changing in a
borderless online space. Violent extremist propaganda continues to flourish in this
global landscape and cannot be defined by a single coordinated narrative. While no
single group has a monopoly on this threat, listed terrorist entities such as Daesh and
al-Qaida are well known for leveraging their elaborate online presence to inspire,
enable and direct threat actors in support of their activities. Their success has provided
a playbook for threat actors in other extremist milieus and the impact has been far
reaching influencing those who support these ideologies to travel, train, fundraise,
recruit or plan attacks either within Canada or abroad.

CSIS is mandated to investigate these threats and in certain cases, take measures to
reduce them. In doing so, CSIS is charged with providing advice to the Government
of Canada regarding the threat landscape, identifying Canadian connections to
international groups and identifying potentially violent religiously, politically or
ideologically motivated individuals or cells.

5.1.1 Global

Internationally, security threats impacting Canadians and Canadian interests have

largely come from listed terrorist entities and aligned groups such as Daesh. Despite
the loss of physical territory in Iraq and Syria, the group continues to dominate the
extremist landscape in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Al-Qaida and al-Qaida-
aligned groups also remain present in these regions. In Yemen, both al-Qaida and
Daesh have continued to take advantage of the ongoing civil conflict to effectively
use vast uncontrolled areas to expand their ranks and enhance their capabilities.

Both Daesh and al-Qaida affiliate Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM) have
conducted frequent and complex attacks in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso and
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continue to pose a threat to stability in the region. In November 2019, suspected

violent extremists attacked a convoy of buses transporting local employees of a
Canadian mining company in eastern Burkina Faso. 38 people were killed and dozens
more were injured. Al-Qaida-aligned al-Shabaab remains the dominant terrorist group
in the Horn of Africa. Military activities against al-Shabaab by the United States and
other foreign militaries have not hampered its expansion into new areas or diminished
the lethalness of its attacks. The growth of networks sympathetic to al-Shabaab and
their form of extremism laid the groundwork for the eventual spread of Daesh
affiliates into Somalia and the development of Daesh affiliates in East Africa. In April
2019, Daesh formally recognized the wilayat Central Africa, further expanding the
official footprint of Daesh to include the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Mozambique. Canadians in this region continue to face an elevated risk of being
targeted in terrorist attacks. On July 12, 2019, a Canadian journalist was killed in an
al-Shabaab attack on a hotel in Kismayo, Somalia. The global reach of al-Qaida and
Daesh makes both groups an ongoing threat to Canada’s national security.

5.1.2 Domestic

Recent acts of serious violence in the West have been typically characterized by low-
resource, high-impact events. While previously seen as the hallmark of religiously
motivated violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida or Daesh, these strategies are
being employed across the violent extremist spectrum. Examples include repeated use
of firearms, vehicles and knives in attacks throughout Europe and North America.
Despite the decrease in sophistication, the impact and lethality of attacks remain high,
as perpetrators often strike soft targets.

5.2 Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism

Ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) is often driven by a range of

grievances and ideas from across the traditional ideological spectrum. The resulting
worldview consists of a personalized narrative which centres on an extremist’s
willingness to incite, enable and or mobilize to violence. Extremists draw inspiration
from a variety of sources including books, images, lectures, music, online discussions,
videos and conversations. Given the diverse combination of motivations and
personalized worldviews of recent mass-casualty attackers, the use of such terms as
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“right-wing” and “left-wing” is not only subjective, but inaccurate in describing the
complexity of motivations of IMVE attacks in Canada and abroad.

On January 13, 2020, an individual pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted murder
and one count of breach of probation. The individual stabbed a woman multiple times
and injured her baby on June 3, 2019. He self-identified as an Incel (involuntarily
celibate) and took some inspiration from the 2018 Toronto van attack in which 10
people were killed and 16 wounded.

5.2.1 Xenophobic Violence

Xenophobic violence is defined as the fear or hatred of what is perceived to be

foreign, different or strange, which leads to racially motivated violence. This has
traditionally been referred to in the Canadian context as white supremacy or neo-
Nazism.

5.2.2 Anti-authority Violence

Anti-authority violence is defined as the opposition to, or rejection of, the authority of
the State which leads to anti-Government and violence against law enforcement. The
2014 Moncton shooting is an example of antiauthority violence.

5.2.3 Gender-driven Violence

Gender-driven violence is defined as the hatred of those of a different gender and or

sexual orientation which can lead to violent misogyny. The 2018 Toronto van attack
is an example of gender-driven violence.

5.2.4 Other Grievance-driven and Ideologically Motivated Violence

Some ideologically motivated violent extremists act without a clear affiliation to an

organized group or external guidance. They are nevertheless shaped by the echo
chambers of online hate that normalize and advocate violence. More than ever, the
internet allows individuals to not only share their extreme views, but also their
manifestos and details of attacks. All these activities can inspire others to conduct
attacks of their own.

5.3 Espionage and Foreign Influenced Activities

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As a core part of its mandate, CSIS investigates and advises the Government of
Canada on threats posed by espionage and foreign-influenced activities. These
activities are almost always conducted to further the interests of a foreign state, using
both state and non-state entities. Espionage and foreign-influenced activities are
directed at Canadian entities both inside and outside of Canada, and directly threaten
Canada’s national security and strategic interests. These threats continue to persist
and, in some areas, are increasing. Canada’s advanced and competitive economy, as
well as its close economic and strategic partnership with the United States, makes it
an ongoing target of hostile foreign state activities. Canada’s status as a founding
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its participation in a
number of multilateral and bilateral defence and trade agreements has made it an
attractive target for espionage and foreign interference. Canadian interests can be
damaged by espionage activities through the loss of sensitive and or proprietary
information or leading-edge technologies, and through the unauthorized disclosure of
classified and sensitive government information. A number of foreign states continue
their attempts to covertly gather political, economic and military information in
Canada. Multiple foreign states also target non-government organizations in Canada
including academic institutions, other levels of government, the private sector and
civil society to achieve these goals.

Foreign governments also continue to use their state resources and their relationships
with private entities to attempt foreign interference activities in Canada. These
activities are carried out in a clandestine or deceptive manner and can target
communities or democratic processes across multiple levels throughout the country.
Foreign powers have attempted to covertly monitor and intimidate Canadian
communities in order to fulfil their own strategic and economic objectives. In many
cases, clandestine influence operations are meant to support foreign political agendas
a cause linked to a conflict abroad or to deceptively influence Government of Canada
policies, officials or democratic processes.

5.4 Cyber Threats

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Cyber-espionage, cyber-sabotage, cyber-foreign-influence, and cyberterrorism pose

significant threats to Canada’s national security, its interests, as well as its economic
stability.

Cyber threat actors conduct malicious activities in order to advance their geopolitical
and ideological interests. They seek to compromise both government and private
sector computer systems by using new technologies such as Artificial Intelligence and
Cloud technologies or by exploiting security vulnerabilities or users of computer
systems. Such activities are collectively referred to as “Computer Network
Operations”, or CNOs. State-sponsored entities and terrorists alike are using CNOs
directed against Canadians and Canadian interests, both domestically and abroad.
Canada remains both a target for malicious cyber activities, and a platform from
which hostile actors conduct CNOs against entities in other countries.

State-sponsored cyber threat-actors use CNOs for a wide variety of purposes. These
include theft of intellectual property or trade secrets, disruption of critical
infrastructure and vital services, interference with elections, or conducting
disinformation campaigns. In addition, non-state actors such as terrorist groups also
conduct CNOs in order to further their ideological objectives such as recruitment and
distribution of propaganda.

Canada’s National Cyber Security Strategy views cyber security as an essential

element of Canadian innovation and prosperity. CSIS, along with partners,
particularly the Communications Security Establishment’s Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security, plays an active role in shaping and sustaining our nation’s cyber resilience
through collaborative action in responding to evolving threats of malicious cyber
activity. While the CSE and CSIS have distinct and separate mandates, the two
agencies share a common goal of keeping Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests
safe and secure. In today’s global threat environment, national security must be a
collaborative effort. In responding to cyber threats, CSIS carries out investigations
into cyber threats to national security as outlined in the CSIS Act. By investigating
malicious CNOs, CSIS can uncover clues that help profile cyber threat actors,
understand their methods and techniques, identify their targets of interest, and advise
the Government of Canada accordingly.
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6. Accountability

CSIS is one of the most open and accountable security organizations in the world.
This is achieved through a system of control and review mechanisms and processes,
prescribed by the CSIS Act, that include the following:

6.1 Security Intelligence Review Committee

CSIS is reviewed by the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) established

under section 34 of the CSIS Act. In addition to overseeing the actions of CSIS
agents, the SIRC also reviews reports of the Director of CSIS and directions issued by
the Minister of defence. Lastly, the SIRC administers to complaints made by citizens
regarding the conduct of the Service. This power is largely designed for individuals
who have been denied security clearance following CSIS investigation. The SIRC is
composed of five members and has a staff of numerous investigators. It publishes an
annual report, some of which remains secret. The SIRC has access to almost all of the
Service's top security intelligence. The only information that can lawfully be withheld
from the SIRC is a confidence of the Queen's Privy [ CITATION Far94 \l 1033 ].

6.2 Minister of Public Safety Canada

The Minister is responsible to Parliament for CSIS as a whole and for its general
direction. The Minister issues policy guidelines concerning operational procedures, is
informed of security operations and problems and approves cooperative agreements
and relationships with foreign agencies.

6.3 Deputy Minister of Public Safety Canada

The Deputy Minister provides advice to the Minister on general direction to CSIS,
and monitors how CSIS implements this direction.

6.4 Director of CSIS

The Director of CSIS is accountable to the Minister for the management and control
of CSIS. The Director submits periodic reports on CSIS activities to the Minister, and
chairs internal committees that are aimed at enhancing the organization's management
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and accountability. Two of these committees are directly responsible for, and have
authority over, CSIS' use of investigative techniques.

6.5 Inspector General

The Inspector General is responsible for monitoring CSIS' compliance with

operational policies, reviewing its operational activities, and reviewing and issuing a
certificate indicating the degree of satisfaction with the Director's annual operational
report. The certificate and the report are forwarded to the Security Intelligence
Review Committee (SIRC). At the request of the Minister or SIRC, the Inspector
General may conduct a review of specific CSIS activities. The Inspector General has
access to all information under CSIS' control (except for Cabinet confidences).

6.6 Federal Court

The power to authorize intrusive investigation techniques rests solely with the Federal
Court of Canada. Before such an authorization can be made, CSIS must provide solid
justification for the proposed use of these techniques in an affidavit, which is
reviewed by a senior CSIS committee chaired by the Director and comprised of
representatives from the Department of Justice, and Public Safety Canada. If the
committee endorses the intrusive technique, the affidavit is submitted to the Minister
of Public Safety Canada for approval. If the Minister gives approval, the affidavit is
then submitted to the Federal Court, which must issue a warrant before CSIS can
proceed with the intrusive investigative technique [ CITATION Col13 \l 1033 ].

6.7 Public Reporting

CSIS provides information to Parliament and the public through the Minister's Annual
Statement on National Security and the CSIS Public Report. These documents provide
Canadians with an assessment of the current security intelligence environment and
detail the government's efforts to ensure national security. More specifically, the CSIS
Public Report is aimed at increasing awareness of CSIS' functions and the processes it
employs, and dispelling some of the myths surrounding security intelligence work.

7. Analysis of the CSIS

7.1 Limited to Domestic Operation

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CSIS had been limited to domestic operation, however it has co-operated with various
nation's secret service for the analysis of data. For the foreign operation Canada has
dedicated Foreign Intelligence Service known as Canadian Foreign Intelligence
Agency is established.

7.2 Transparency of the Operation

CSIS are held accountable by SIRC as per the CSIS act. It has created an environment
where report against the CSIS could be investigated by the SIRC and the investigation
report prepared by CSIS are accessible to SIRC.

7.3 Screening of Immigrant

CSIS screens number of migrants in the Canada and their activities. It has helped to
analyze their activities to ensure that they are not threat to the society.

7.4 Cyber Intelligence

CSIS also uses the technology with the co-operation of other security forces to
analyze the threat.

8. Conclusion

CSIS is a domestic intelligence agency of the Canada, which has been operating to
protect the country from various internal threat. It has identified terrorism as a major
threat to peace in the country. Further it has worked to analyze the activities of
various immigrant that enter the country through screening. CSIS influence in the
cyber intelligence has a huge impact on the modern-day security.

9. Recommendation

9.1 CSIS looks over the domestic intelligence, while CFIA works in the foreign
country. Such division of work and arena has ensure that there is no duplication of the
responsibilities. Nepal should also expand its intelligence in a similar manner.
Development of NID for domestic affairs and another intelligence for the
International affairs.
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9.2 As, the use of cyber and internet has been huge in the present day, the
government should also empower the intelligence service in the cyber security as
well.

9.3 There is a well co-ordination between the various intelligence of the country
and outside country with CSIS. Such relation helps in retrieving the valuable
information. Hence, intelligence service of Nepal also develop a similar relationship
with various intelligence of the various country.
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REFERENCES

Colin, F. (2013, November 25). CSIS not being forthcoming with court, federal judge
says. Retrieved from The Globe and Mail:
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/csis-not-being-forthcoming-
with-court-federal-judge-says/article15599674/

CSIS. (2019). CSIS Public Report. Toronto: CSIS.

Farnsworth, C. (1994, August 28). Canada's Security Agency Accused of Spying on

Canadians . Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/28/world/canada-s-security-agency-
accused-of-spying-on-canadians.html: New York Times

Hippner, C. (2009). A Study into the size of the world's intelligence industry.
Pennsylvania: Mercyhurst College.

Hoover, R. (2011). Mission Statement of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

Remaking Domestic Intelligence, 83-93.