Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Presented By: Dr. Timiresh Kumar Das Moderator: Dr. Anita Verma Associate Professor Dept. of Community Medicine
Presented By: Dr. Timiresh Kumar Das Moderator: Dr. Anita Verma Associate Professor Dept. of Community Medicine
1346 – Battle of
Kaffa – Plague
outbreak in Tartar
army – corpses of
infected soldiers
hurled back –>
epidemic
Christian Genoese
sailors fled to Italy
Resulted in the
European Plague of
Black Death.
HISTORY AND EVOLUTION
1767 - French and Indian War
Indians greatly outnumbered the British and were
suspected of being on the side of the French
Sir Jeffrey Amherst, Commander of British Forces,
directs that small-pox bearing blankets be given
to Indians in the Ohio River Valley.
Smallpox decimated the Indians
HISTORY AND EVOLUTION
World War 1:
Germany
Developed anthrax, glanders, cholera and wheat
fungus.
Attempted to spread Cholera in Italy and Plague in
St. Petersburg.
Infected horses in US ( Baltimore) with anthrax
developed by Dr. Anton Dilger.
France
Planned biological sabotage programme against
German livestock – pigs and cattle.
HISTORY AND EVOLUTION
World War 2:
Japan –
Unit 731 in Manchuria, China. Dr. Ishii Shiro.
Human experiments.
Used typhoid warheads against Russians in 1939.
Contaminated wells with typhoid in Harbin, China
(1939-40)
Caused cholera outbreak in Changchun (1940).
Used plague infested rats in Nanking (1941).
Operation Sei-Go (Scorched Earth) (1942).
Unit 731 headquarters: The square building.
HISTORY AND EVOLUTION
World War 2:
Germany –
Suspected of producing and using biological agents
Not proved.
Hitler persuaded by microbiologists and doctors not
to use?
Soviet Union –
Weaponised Bacillus anthracis,Clostridium
botulinum , Yersinia pestis and foot-and-mouth
disease virus.
Developed missiles with biological warheads.
Did not use during war.
HISTORY AND EVOLUTION
World War 2:
United Kingdom –
Paul Fildes headed Bacteriological Warfare
Subcommittee.
Developed cattle cakes with Anthrax.
Aerosolised anti-personel agents developed.
Gruinard island used for testing of Anthrax bombs.
Decontaminated in 1987.
US & Canada –
Mostly anti animal and plant agents.
Developed Anthrax and Botulinum toxin bombs.
Also developed vaccines against rinderpest and botulin
toxin.
Gruinard Island, Scotland
The Black Maria was the first laboratory facility built to
accommodate top secret research in US. Ft. Detrick, Maryland.
HISTORY AND EVOLUTION
Recent times:
Biological warfare to bioterrorism
1979 – Accidental leak of Anthrax spores in Sverdlosk,
USSR 66 people dead.
Iraq (1985 – 1995) – Developed bombs, rockets and
missiles armed with botulin, anthrax and aflatoxin.
South Africa (1981-1994) – Developed toxins for political
assassinations . Anti fertility vaccine against blacks.
1984 – 751 people infected with Salmonella by followers
of Bhagwan Rajneesh in salad bars in Oregon, USA.
2001 – Anthrax spores through mail in US. 22 cases, 5
deaths.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS
Offensive:
Anti-personnel:
high infectivity, high virulence, non-availability of
vaccines, availability of an effective and efficient
delivery system and stability of the weaponized
agent.
Bacteria such as B. anthracis, Brucella spp., V.
cholerae, Y. pestis, etc.
Viral agents such as Variola virus, JE virus, Ebola
virus, Marburg virus, and Yellow fever
Fungal agents like Coccidioides spp.
Toxins like ricin, staphylococcal enterotoxin B,
botulinum toxin.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS
Offensive:
Anti livestock
Foot-and-mouth disease and rinderpest against
cows,
African swine fever for pigs
Psittacosis to kill chicken.
Anthrax against cattle and draught animals
Glanders in horses.
Anti crop/ anti vegetation
Bioherbicides (used by British & US in Vietnam)
Wheat blast & Rice blast were weaponised by US &
USSR
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS
Offensive:
Entomological warfare
Uses insects to attack the enemy
Infecting insects with a pathogen and then
dispersing the insects over target areas
(cholera, plague)
Direct insect attack against crops
Uninfected insects, such as bees, to directly
attack the enemy.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS
Defensive:
Disease surveillance systems
Most biological warfare agents are primarily animal
pathogens animals affected earlier.
Surveillance systems include public health
specialists and veterinarians.
Early warning helps reduce morbidity & mortality.
E.g. In Anthrax infections almost 80% of exposed
persons can be given antibiotics before
development of symptoms if the surveillance and
early warning systems are good.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS
Defensive:
Identification of bioweapons (Diagnosis)
integrate the sustained efforts of the security agencies,
medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic, and law
enforcement communities.
Doctors & public health officers - 1st line of defence.
First Gulf War - United Nations activated a biological and
chemical response team, Task Force Scorpio.
Specific field tools that perform on-the-spot analysis and
identification of encountered suspect materials.
Multiple sandwich ELISA using gold & silver nanowires.
BiosparQ developed by TNO Labs, Netherlands.
BioPen by Ben Guiron Labs, Israel.
AGENTS OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
Key Features of Biologic Agents Used as Bioweapons
1. High morbidity and mortality
2. Potential for person-to-person spread
3. Low infective dose and highly infectious by aerosol
4. Lack of rapid diagnostic capability
5. Lack of universally available effective vaccine
6. Potential to cause anxiety
7. Availability of pathogen and feasibility of
production
8. Environmental stability
9. Database of prior research and development
10. Potential to be "weaponized"
AGENTS OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
CDC Category A, B, and C Agents
Category A: High priority agents
easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person
high mortality rates
potential for major public health impact
might cause public panic and social disruption
require special action for public health preparedness
Category B: 2nd highest priority
moderately easy to disseminate,
moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates
require specifically enhanced diagnostic capacity
AGENTS OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
CDC Category A, B, and C Agents
Category C: emerging pathogens
general population lacks immunity,
could be engineered for mass dissemination in the future
because of availability,
ease of production, ease of dissemination,
potential for high morbidity and mortality, and
major public health impact.
CATEGORY A CATEGORY B CATEGORY C
Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) Psittacosis (Ch. psittaci) (Emerging
infections)
Botulism (Cl. botulinum toxin) Epsilon toxin of Cl. Perfringens Hantavirus
Plague (Yersinia pestis) Melioidosis (B. pseudomallei) SARS coronavirus,
Smallpox (Variola major) Glanders (Burkholderia mallei) Pandemic influenza
Tularemia (Francisella tularensis) Food safety threats (e.g., Nipah
Salmonella spp., E.coli O157:H7,
Shigella)
Viral hemorrhagic fevers: Lassa, Viral encephalitis [alphaviruses
New World (Machupo, Junin, (e.g., Venezuelan, eastern, and
Guanarito,Sabia), Crimean Congo, western equine encephalitis)]
Rift Valley, Ebola, Marburg
Brucellosis (Brucella spp.)
Q fever (Coxiella burnetii)
Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis
(castor beans)
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B
Water safety threats (e.g., V.
cholerae, Cr. parvum)
Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)
Infection – By cutaneous and inhalational route
Signs/Symptoms-
Cutaneous Pulmonary
95% cases 5% cases
1-5 days 1-6 days (60 days)
Fever, tiredness, headache Fever, Headache, Cough
Pustules, eschar Dyspnea, Chest pain
Diagnosis :
Skin biopsy for cutaneous
Blood culture
ELISA, PCR
Day 5 Day 12
2 months
Hilar prominence and
right perihilar infiltrate
widened mediastinum,
perihilar infiltrates,
peribronchial cuffing,
air bronchograms.
Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)
Treatment :
Ciprofloxacin, Penicillin, Doxycycline.
Treated for 60 days.
Prevention:
Vaccination – 6 doses over 18 months, booster anually.
Chemoprophylaxis – Cipro/ Doxy 4 weeks before
exposure.
Ulcer
Plague (Yersinia pestis)
Diagnosis:
Clinical features
Microscopic examination of bubo fluid/ sputum
Cultures
PCR/ DFA
Treatment:
Gentamicin, Streptomycin, Doxycycline
Prevention:
Formalin fixed vaccine
Flea control measures
Plague (Yersinia pestis)
Spread:
Through bite of infected fleas.
Through droplet spread from pneumonic plague patients.
Through direct contact with non intact skin.
Weapon potential:
Labile in environment ( 1 hour)
Highly contagious, person to person spread.
Can be weaponised as aerosols. (10 km)
Smallpox (Variola)
By 1980, close to whole world population was
immune not important as bioweapon then.
Now susceptible population (50%).
High infectivity, can spread at a factor of 10-20.
10-30% mortality in untreated.
Signs/ Symptoms:
Incubation period = 7 – 17 days (12-14)
Fever, malaise, headache, backache, emesis
Maculopapular to vesicular to pustular skin lesions
Centrifugal, same stage of development
Hemorrhagic & malignant forms (5- 10%)
Smallpox (Variola)
Diagnosis:
Culture, PCR, Electron Microscopy
Treatment:
Supportive treatment.
Cidofovir, Antivaccinia immunoglobulin
Prevention:
Vaccinia immunisation
Weaponisation:
Infected fomites (historical use)
Aerosol sprays
Tularemia (F. tularensis)
Extremely infectious. (10-50 by inhalation)
Infection through non intact skin, mucous
membrane, GI tract, Respiratory tract.
Rabbits, ticks, water rats, deer.
Signs/ Symptoms:
1-14 days
Ulceroglandular (75%) & Typhoidal (25%)
Fever, chills, malaise, myalgia, headache
Chest discomfort, dyspnea,,
Skin rash, Pharyngitis, conjunctivitis
Hilar adenopathy on chest x-ray
Tularemia (F. tularensis)
Diagnosis:
Gram stain, culture (blood, ulcer discharge, sputum)
Immunohistochemistry, PCR
Treatment:
Streptomycin, Gentamycin, Doxycycline, Ciprofloxacin
Prevention:
Chemoprophylaxis - Doxycycline, 100 mg PO bid x 14 d
or Ciprofloxacin, 500 mg PO bid x 14 days
Weaponisation:
Aerosol sprays.
Hemorrhagic Fever Viruses
Includes:
Arenaviridae: Lassa, New World (Machupo, Junin,
Guanarito, and Sabia)
Bunyaviridae: Crimean Congo, Rift Valley
Filoviridae: Ebola, Marburg
Diagnosis:
Mouse bioassay
Toxin immunoassay
Botulinum toxin (Cl. Botulinum)
Treatment:
Supportive ( Intubation, Mechanical ventilation, TPN)
Equine antitoxin (only against A &B)
Prevention:
Botulinum toxoid is available for high risk workers
Lab workers, military personnel
Botulinum toxin (Cl. Botulinum)
Examples of use:
Botulinum toxin was the primary focus of the pre-1991
Iraqi bioweapons program. (19000 l conc. toxin.)
Aum Shrinrikyo cult unsuccessfully attempted on a least
three occasions to disperse botulism toxin into the
civilian population of Tokyo.
1990 - Outfitted a car to disperse botulinum toxin through
an exhaust system and drove the car around Parliament.
1993 - Attempted to disrupt the wedding of Prince
Naruhito by spreading botulinum in Tokyo via car.
1995 - Planted 3 briefcases designed to release botulinum
in a Tokyo subway.
Cholera (Vibrio cholera)
Causes acute, potentially severe gastroenteritis.
Spread through contaminated drinking water.
Signs/ Symptoms:
Begins in 12-72 hrs.
Watery rice water diarrhoea.
Abdominal pain, cramps.
Dehydration, Electrolyte imbalance
Seizures and Cardiovascular collapsein children
Diagnosis:
Stool microscopy – dark field
Cholera (Vibrio cholera)
Treatment:
Fluid & electrolyte replacement
Antibiotics – Doxycycline, Ciprofloxacin, Erythromycin.
Prevention:
Live vaccine – 50% efficacy, 2 doses + booster.
Inactivated vaccine – rapid protection, 2 doses, 85%
efficacy, 2-3 years.
Spread:
By contamination of drinking water supply.
Easily destroyed by heat, boiling, chemical disinfectants.
SAMPLES TO BE COLLECTED
WEAPONISATION
It is the process of converting the biological agent
into a usable weapon.
Delivery device-
Bombs
Missiles
Spray systems – Aerial, Aerosol based.
Non traditional – food, water supplies, animals, insects.
ADVANTAGES
1. Multiple Methods For Delivery
2. Wide Utility - non-discriminating, cause sickness,
death, panic, may disseminate widely, may be
persistent
3. Good Logistics - cheap to make and store
4. Versatile - can be in small or large quantities
5. Defence May Be Difficult
6. Cause No Damage To Infrastructure
7. Easy To Conceal
8. ‘Status’ WMD - ‘poor man’s nuclear weapon’
DISADVANTAGES
1. Slow onset (except toxins)
2. Indiscriminate
3. Difficult to control distribution ( IF contagious)
4. Preventive and/or Treatment measures
available for some.
5. Level of technical sophistication required for
effective delivery.
6. International taboo (deterrent to state/
nations)
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
BWC, 1972:
Signed – 15th January, 1973
Ratified – 15th July, 1974
MoHFW
NCMC
NDRF MoD
INDIAN SCENARIO
National Disaster Management Authority:
Coordinating & mandating government policies for
disaster reduction/ mitigation
Devising plans to counter the threat of biological
disaster, both natural and man-made (bioterrorism).
Ensuring preparedness at all levels
BW MoD
BT MoHA
Outbreak MoHFW
INDIAN SCENARIO
Ministry of Defence:
Evacuation, Logistics, Control & Coordination, Clinical
First responders
DRDO:
R&D
Equipment & Materials
AFMS:
Command and direction
Stockpiling of vaccines/ medicines
Exercises and drills
Immunisation of 1st responders
25 hospitals for biological disaster management
INDIAN SCENARIO
Indian biodefence establishments under DRDO:
Defence Research and Toxicology, Immunology, Biochemical
Development Pharmacology, Development of diagnostic
Establishment (DRDE), Gwalior kits, Decontamination equipment.
NBC sensors & shelters.
Defence Materials and Stores Personal Protective Equipment
Research and Development development & Manufacture,
Establishment (DMSRDE) , Gloves, Boots, Protective suits,
Kanpur Self contained biological suit (u/d)
Defense Bioengineering and Canisters, Face Masks, Respirators,
Electromedical Laboratory NBC filter fitted evacuation bags
(DEBEL), Bangalore
Vaccines – NIV,
Medicines – With states, Pharmaceutical
manufacturers
PPE – State RRTs, Central RRT, DMSRDE
Containment equipment – DMSRDE, DRDE
INDIAN SCENARIO
Patient isolation precautions:
Standard precautions
Wash hands before and after patient contact
Wear gloves, Wear masks/ face covers
Proper handling of equipment & Linen
Airborne precautions (Smallpox, Plague, Anthrax)
private room with negative air pressure, a 6 air changes per
hour, and appropriate filtration of air.
Wear respiratory protection when dealing with patient
Droplet precautions
private room or group with same patients
Wear mask and also use mask on patient during movt.
INDIAN SCENARIO
Patient isolation procedure:
Contact precautions (VHFs)
Private room/ group patients together
Gloves. Change gloves after contact.
Wear gowns.
Use shoe covers
Dedicate non-critical equipment that requires contact
(stethoscope)
INDIAN SCENARIO
Sample collection guidelines:
Early post-exposure: when it is known that an individual
has been exposed to a bioagent aerosol, aggressively
attempt to obtain samples as indicated.
Clinical: samples from those individuals presenting with
clinical symptoms.
Convalescent/Terminal/Postmortem: samples taken
during convalescence, the terminal stages of infection or
toxicosis or postmortem during autopsy.
INDIAN SCENARIO
Sample collection guidelines:
Clean line and exit and entry strategy
3 person team is recommended, with 1 clean and 2 dirty.
Personnel protective equipment
Waterproof disposable cameras and waterproof notepads
What to collect –
Aerosol – aerosol collector required
Swabs/ paper – from any contaminated site
Dead animals or humans or parts
Packed in double ziploc bags (Inner bag decontaminated
with bleach before putting outer bag)
REFERENCES:
1. U.S. Army report to the Senate Committee on Human
Resources, 1977.
2. United Nations definition. Report of the secretary
general titled “Chemical and Bacteriological
(Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible
Use,” 1969.
3. National Disaster Management Guidelines—
Management of Biological Disasters, 2008. A
publication of National Disaster Management
Authority, Government of India. July 2008, New Delhi.
4. McLaughlin K., Nixdorf K.; BWPP Biological Weapons
Reader: Geneva, 2009.
5. Harrison’s Principles of Internal Medicine; 18th ed:
2011. Edited by Fauci AS, Kasper DL, Longo DL.
REFERENCES:
6. http://www.cdc.org . Website of the Centre for Disease
Control and Prevention, Dept. of Health and Human
Services, USA.
7. Hunger I. Bioweapons Monitor 2011, 1st ed: 2011.
8. National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats;
National Security Council of USA, 2009.
9. http://www.emedicinehealth.com/script/main/art.asp?
articlekey=58836
10. www.mapw.org.au ; website of the Medical
Association for Prevention of War Australia
(MAPW).
11.http://www.proliferationnews.org ; website of
the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.