LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

DIGESTS
CASES 23-38

Block 2E 2022
Atty. Robert Nomar Leyretana
 23. ONG v. REPUBLIC
March 12, 2008 | J. Ynares-Santiago | Possession and Occupation
E. CANCEKO & S. CERILLA
PETITIONER: Charles L. Ong
RESPONDENT: Republic of the Philippines
RECIT-READY: In 1999, Charles Ong (in behalf of his brothers) filed
an Application for Registration of Title over their lot in Pangasinan. They
acquired the lot from the Villamils (original owners were the Cachos).
The OSG opposed their application. They presented their Deed of Sale
and a couple of tax declarations issued since 1971 as evidence.
While the trial court rendered a decision in their favor, the CA reversed it
and found that they failed to prove the required possession mandated by
PD 1529. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Ong and his brothers have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lot since June
12, 1945 or earlier - NO
RULING: Sec. 14 of PD 1529 provides that applicants for registration of
title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable
and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
The first requisite was met. The subject land forms part of the disposable
and alienable lands of the public domain, as established by Reports from
the Bureau of Lands and the DENR. BUT, Ong and his brothers failed to
prove the second requisite.
To prove “possession,” Ong presented tax declarations. However, the
earliest tax declaration they presented was issued only in 1971 in the
names of the Cachos.
Therefore, even if we were to tack Ong’s claim of ownership to that of
their predecessors-in-interest, they still fell short of the required
possession (since June 12, 1945 or earlier).
Regardless, possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable
lands of the public domain. The applicant must prove both possession
and occupation over the subject lot. The word “possession” already
includes constructive possession. So, by adding “and occupation,” it
means that constructive possession is not enough.
Ong and his brothers admitted they never actually occupied the lot.
They only visited from time to time. No other evidence was presented.
DOCTRINE: The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since
these words are separated by the conjunction ‘and’, the clear intention of
the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is
broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the
all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. For an applicant to
qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of
a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it.
FACTS:
● In 1999, Charles Ong (in behalf of his brothers) filed an
Application for Registration of Title over a lot in Pangasinan.
● They acquired their lot by purchase from spouses Villamil in 1998.
● Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, opposed the application for registration of title.
● The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of Ong and his
brothers. In reversing the decision of the trial courts, the Court of
Appeals found that:
○ Ong failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest
have been in adverse possession of the lot since June 12,
1945 or earlier as mandated by PD 1529.
○ Neither was petitioner able to prove that he or his
predecessors-in-interest actually occupied the subject lot
prior to the filing of the application.
 ● Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: W/N Ong and his brothers have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lot since June 12,
1945 or earlier - NO
RATIO:
1. Brief history of the subject lot:
● Original owners were the Cachos.
● The Abelleras bought the lot in 1979.
● The Bautistas bought the land in 1997.
● Ong and his brothers bought it in 1998.
2. Sec. 14 of PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides:
“SEC. 14. Who may apply xxx (1) Those who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in- interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.”
3. There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
● Based on the Reports of the Bureau of Lands and the
DENR (just in case).
4. The earliest tax declaration which was submitted in evidence was
issued in 1971 in the names of spouses Cacho.
5. While tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, they
constitute good indicia of possession in the concept of owner and
a claim of title over the subject property.
6. However, even if we were to tack Ong’s claim of ownership over
the subject lot to that of their predecessors-in-interest, spouses
Cacho in 1971, this would still fall short of the required
possession (June 12, 1945 or earlier).
7. In Republic v. Alconaba:
“The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these
words are separated by the conjunction ‘and,’ the clear
intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law
adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-
encompassing effect of constructive possession xxx for an
applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere
fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it.”
8. Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject
lot from spouses Bautista in 1998, neither he nor his brothers
actually occupied the subject lot. They only visited “on several
occasions.”
9. Ong’s predecessor-in-interest Bautista testified that he and his wife
never actually occupied the subject lot from the time they
bought the same from spouses Abellera in 1997.
10. No other evidence was presented to establish the character of the
possession of the lot.
11. Ong’s evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest
possessed and occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration
required by law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan, and
the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED.
24. CANETE v. GENUINO ICE COMPANY
January 22, 2008
G.R. NO. 154080 | Per Curiam | Friar Lands Act
Made by: Lilyn Maria Sabrina Cerilla

Recit Ready: This case is about a complaint for cancellation of title to
property with 5 designated Transfer Certificate of Title (TCTs). The
petitioners Canete et. al. were contending that the titles were spurious and
fictituous and were issued mysteriously because holders of the title
(respondent Genuino Ice) were never in possession of the property
making them ineligible to acquire title under the Friar Land Act and also,
the property in contention here is part of the Piedad Estate as per the
petitioners. Moreover, they assert that in fact, they are the ones who are
in possession of the property and they should be declared as the bonafide
occupants of the property.
Respondents filed to dismiss due to lack of cause of action .
RTC GRANTED IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS. CA REVERSED
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS and said that only the State may
file this lawsuit.
The issue of this case is whether or not CA erred in its decision for
reversing the RTC’s decision of granting the petitioner’s prayers
The court denied the petition.
2 points have been emphasized:
(1) The CA was correct when it said that only the State may file this
case because the land is owned by the government pursuant to
the Friar Land Act. As per the act, it says that, “Under the Friar
Lands Act, only "actual settlers and occupants at the time said
lands are acquired by the Government" were given preference to
lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings, in disregard of the
settlement and occupation of persons before the government
acquired the lands.”. It is part of the government’s land under
the Regalian Doctrine.
(2) It can be seen from the petitioner’s prayer that they wanted to be
declared as the “bonafide occupants of the property” and the
court ruled that by this, they conceded that the property is owned
by the government. They will just be the preferred
“occupants”/lessees.
Hence, PETITION DENIED for lack of cause of action by the
petitioners..
Doctrine: Friar Lands Act
One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his
successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights to purchase by
reason of occupation from time immemorial, as this contravenes the
historical fact that friar lands were bought by the Government of the
Philippine Islands, pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United States,
approved on July 1, 1902, not from individual persons but from certain
companies, a society and a religious order. Under the Friar Lands Act,
only "actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by
the Government" were given preference to lease, purchase, or acquire
their holdings, in disregard of the settlement and occupation of persons
before the government acquired the lands.
FACTS:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals dated January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64337
entitled "Genuino Ice Company, Inc. v. Hon. Victorino P. Evangelista,
Nelsie B. Cañete, et al.," and its Resolution2 dated June 26, 2002,
dismissing petitioners' "Second Amended Complaint" in Civil Case No. Q-
99-36483 filed in Branch 223 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Records show that on January 11, 1999, petitioners filed a complaint for
cancellation of title to property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) Nos. N-140441;314399;4 RT-94384 (292245);5 RT-94794 (292246);6
and 292247.7 Petitioners alleged that said titles are spurious, fictitious and
were issued "under mysterious circumstances," considering that the holders
thereof - including their predecessors-in-interest - were never in actual,
adverse and physical possession of the property, rendering them ineligible
to acquire title to the said property under the Friar Lands Act. 8 Petitioners
also sought to nullify Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614 from
which the foregoing titles sought to be cancelled originated or were derived.
Respondent Genuino Ice Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action because petitioners are not real
parties-in-interest; that no relief may be granted as a matter of law; and that
petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, but it was denied by
the trial court. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied.
(Contentions are snippets from originals I just chose the relevant ones)
Petitioners’ contention::
plaintiffs (petitioners) and their predecessors-in-interest are among those
who have been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession in
concept of owners of unregistered parcels of land situated at Sitio Mabilog,
Barangay Culiat, Quezon City, Metro Manila, which parcels of land
That the above-described real property is a portion of a friar land known as
"Piedad Estate," which property is intended for distribution among the bona
fide occupants thereof pursuant to the Friar Lands Act.
That defendants are holders of transfer certificates of title of the above-
described property, which transfer certificates of title are null and void
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court that judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against
defendants:
(1) Declaring as null and void defendants' transfer certificates of title over
the property in litigation;
(2) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property in
litigation pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands Act and other
existing laws.
Respondent’s contention:
The complaint states no cause of action because: (1) on the allegations
alone, plaintiffs (petitioners) are not real parties in interest who may bring
suit to cancel defendants' (including respondent) titles;
TRIAL COURT: IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS
COURT OF APPEALS: IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS
HENCE, THIS CASE.
ISSUES: W/N THE CA ERRED IN ITS DECISION
RULING:
NO.
The subject lots are part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land
acquired on December 23, 1903 by the Philippine Government from the
Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad
Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the
Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands, as indicated in Public Act No.
1120 (Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26, 1904.18
After the Piedad Estate was registered in OCT No. 614 in the name of the
Philippine Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496, the area
was subdivided originally into 874 lots. As a result of subsequent surveys
executed in the course of disposition, the number of lots increased to 1,305.
Disposition of these lots was made by the Bureau of Lands thru sales, under
the Friar Lands Act, as early as 1910 and records show that even before the
Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate have been disposed of. 19
The Piedad Estate has long been segregated from the mass of the public
domain and has become private land duly registered under the Torrens
system following the procedure for the confirmation of private lands
prescribed in Act 496. Thus the lands inside the Piedad Estate are no longer
lands of the public domain.20
One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-
in-interest, may not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of
occupation from time immemorial, as this contravenes the historical fact
that friar lands were bought by the Government of the Philippine Islands,
pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United States, approved on July 1,
1902, not from individual persons but from certain companies, a society and
a religious order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only "actual settlers and
occupants" thereof. In other words, petitioners concede the State's
ownership of the property.
Being so, petitioners may not be considered the real parties in interest for
the purpose of maintaining the suit for cancellation of the subject titles. The
Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that only the State, through the
Solicitor General, may institute such suit. Jurisprudence on the matter has
been settled and the issue need not be belabored.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64337 dismissing
petitioners' "Second Amended Complaint" in Civil Case No. Q-99-
36483 and the Resolution dated June 26, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
.

occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the Government" were
given preference to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings, in disregard
of the settlement and occupation of persons before the government acquired
the lands.

As to the second issue raised, petitioners claim that they are bona fide
occupants of the subject property within the contemplation of the Friar
Lands Act, having allegedly been in actual, adverse, peaceful and
continuous possession of the property, although it is not stated for how long
and since when. In their second amended complaint, they seek judgment '

(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property in

litigation pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands Act and other
existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

They do not pray to be declared owners of the subject property - despite

their alleged adverse possession - but only to be adjudged as the "bona fide
25. REPUBLIC V. IAC AND ACME PLYWOOD AND VENEER CO.
| J. Narvasa | SEC. 3, ART. XII, 1987 CONSTITUTION
CHECKER & Sofia David
PETITIONER: Republic, Director of Lands
RESPONDENT: Acme Plywood and Veneer Co.
RECIT-READY: The Director of Lands is assailing the IAC’s decision
on the registration of a land in favor of Acme Plywood, which applied the
the 1935 Constitution, as the land was acquired by them from the Infiels
on 1962. He contends that because the registration proceedings only
began on 1981, the 1973 Constitution applies. And since the 1973
Constitution prohibits private corporations or associations from holding
alienable lands of the public domain, a prohibition not found in the 1935
Constitution, it was wrong for the IAC to permit registration in favor of
Acme.
ISSUE: W/N the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962
could be confirmed in favor of Acme in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution
was already in effect? - Yes
RULING:
As the land was already private land which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title when Acme acquired it from said owners
on 1962, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make
such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in
force.
Even if the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was
actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act,
there can be no serious question of Acme’s right to acquire the land at the
time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might
be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring
interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that
type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.
Just because of the fact that confirmation proceedings were brought
under the 1973 Constitution, which forbids corporations from owning
lands of the public domain, cannot defeat a right already vested before
that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid
and proper. The Constitution can neither have retroactive application and
impair vested rights.
DOCTRINE:
Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for
the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land,
upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of
judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property.
The proceedings of land registration would not originally convert the
land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion
already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period
of possession became complete. As simply put, the registration would not
confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested.
FACTS:
● The Director of Lands is appealing a judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square
meters, acquired by Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
Dumagat tribe, the registration proceedings in accordance to
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
● Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc. wanted to have registered a land
which was ancestrally acquired by them, on 1962, from Mariano
Infiel and Acer Infiel. (As the sale took place on 1962, the 1935
Constitution applies.)
● Context behind the land:
○ The possession of the Infiels dates back before the
Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors
of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from
generation to generation until the same came into the
possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel.
■ From the time that Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.
bought the land in 1962, their possession has
been open, continuous and adverse. Tacking the
possession of the Infiels, the possession is
already considered from time immemorial.
○ The land is private land pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3872. (Republic Act No. 3872 granted
absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian
Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,
whether with the alienable or disposable public land or
within the public domain)
○ Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more
than P45,000,000.00 Pesos worth of improvements.
○ Acme’s ownership was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon,
Isabela, who have negotiated for the donation of the
townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc..
● The Director of Lands assails the applicability of the 1935
Constitution to the matter at hand.
○ He asserts that, the registration proceedings have been
commenced only in 1981, or long after the 1973
Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly
applicable law. As such, the 1973 Constitution should be
applied.
○ Since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands
of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000
hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution
which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the
lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error
to decree registration in favor of Acme.
ISSUES:
W/N the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962
could be confirmed in favor of Acme in 1981 when the 1973
Constitution was already in effect?
RATIO:
● In the 1935 Constitution, the only limitation then was that
corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. 1973 Constitution, on the other
hand, forbids corporations from owning lands of the public
domain.
○ As such, the question depends on the character of the
lands at the time of institution of the registration
proceedings in 1981.
○ If they were then still part of the public domain, Acme
cannot acquire it. If, on the other hand, they were then
already private lands, the constitutional prohibition
against their acquisition by private corporations or
associations obviously does not apply.
● In deciding, the Court revisited a previous ruling in the case of
Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, that the
constitutional prohibition of corporations owning lands of public
domain also applies to alienable lands of the public domain as to
which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial
confirmation.
○ However, Justice Aquino dissented to this ruling of
Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, tracing
the line of cases reaffirmed the doctrine that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable
public land for the period prescribed by law creates
the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of
the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of
 judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and ● We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive
becomes private property. application to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc.
● In the absence of evidence to overcome a conclusive presumption, because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied
confirmation proceedings would only be a little more than a for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
formality, at the most meant to ascertain whether the possession ● The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so
claimed is of the required character and length of time; and holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as
recognize a title already vested. enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable
● The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively
affected by operation of law from the moment the required period for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public
of possession became complete. Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the
● As the land was already private land which the Infiels had a legally mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
sufficient and transferable title when Acme acquired it from said ● Since land subject of this appeal was already private property at
owners on 1962, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme, Acme thereby
right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 acquired a registrable title, there was no prohibition against said
Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 corporation's holding or owning private land at the time.
Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations
from acquiring and owning private lands. WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed
● Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby
land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their affirmed, without costs in this instance..
ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be
no serious question of Acme’s right to acquire the land at the time
it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might
be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring
interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired
that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.
● Just because of the fact that confirmation proceedings were
brought under the 1973 Constitution, which forbids corporations
from owning lands of the public domain, cannot defeat a right
already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate
transactions then perfectly valid and proper. The Constitution
cannot impair vested rights.
 26. REPUBLIC v. T.A.N. PROPERTIES
26 June 2008 | J. Carpio | Sec. 3, Art. XII of the Constitution and the
Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect or Incomplete Titles
M. del Rosario & T. dela Rosa
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: T.A.N. Properties
RECIT-READY: T.A.N. Properties filed from an Application for
Original Registration of title covering a 56.4007 hectares of a lot in a
subdivision plan which is a portion of a consolidated Sto. Tomas
Cadastre in Batangas. The only oppositor was the Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Director of Lands.
ISSUE: (Note: The issues most relevant to the syllabus topic are in bold.)
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable (NO)
2. Whether T.A.N. or its predecessors-in-interest had open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier
(NO)
3. Whether T.A.N. Properties, a private corporation, cannot
apply for registration of the land of the public domain (NO)
4. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of
the land under the Public Land Act (NO)
RULING: T.A.N. Properties cannot apply for registration of the land of
the public domain nor is it qualified to apply for registration of the land
FACTS:
under the Public Land Act.
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. However, in
Director of Lands vs. IAC, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive,
and undisputed possession of alienable land for the period prescribed
by law (30 years by the Public Land Act, as amended) created the legal
fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction ceases to be public
land and becomes private property.
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. T.A.N. acquired
the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his
predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in
open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land for 30 years since
12 June 1945. When respondent acquired the land from Porting, the land
was not yet private property.
Admittedly though, a corporation can at present still apply for original
registration of land under the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act
No. 917642 (RA 9176) further amended the Public Land Act and
extended the period for the filing of applications for judicial confirmation
of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. This period shall apply only where the area applied for
does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: until 31 December 2020.
DOCTRINE: In applying for land registration under the Public
Land Act, a private corporation cannot have any right higher than
its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This
assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding
12 hectares, when the land had already become private land by operation
of law (by OPEN, EXCLUSIVE, and UNDISPUTED POSSESSION of
ALIENABLE land).
In the present case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the
land was already private land when respondent acquired it from Porting
in 1997. It wasn’t even proven to be alienable land.
● T.A.N. Properties filed from an Application for Original
Registration of title covering a 56.4007 hectares of a lot in a
subdivision plan which is a portion of a consolidated Sto. Tomas
Cadastre.
● After publishing the Notice of Initial Hearing, the trial court, on 11
November 1999 called the case for initial hearing. The only
oppositor was the Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Director of Lands.
● T.A.N. Properties presented three witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga
Torres (Torres), its Operations Manager and its authorized
 representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista (Evangelista), a
72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since
birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.
● T.A.N.’s witnesses testified for the transfer of the lands:
1942 – Kabesang Puroy had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous
1960 possession in the concept of an owner.
1960 Upon Kabesang Puroy’s death, he was succeeded by his son
Antonio.
1960 Antonio executed a Deed of Donation in favour of one of his
children, Fortunato. Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato
another piece of land.
1961 Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the
land was adjudicated to one of Antonio’s children, Porting.
1997 Porting sold the land to T.A.N. Properties.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable (NO)
2. Whether T.A.N. Properties, a private corporation, cannot apply for
registration of the land of the public domain (NO)
3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the
land under the Public Land Act (NO)
4. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the
land under the Public Land Act (NO)
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS: See ratio.
RATIO:
1. T.A.N. Properties failed to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
● The rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of
private dominion presumably belong to the State. It is
upon the respondent to overturn such presumption.
● In this case, T.A.N submitted two certifications issued by
the DENR.
● The first one is the 3 June 1997 Certification by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources
Offices (CENRO), Batangas City certified that the
disputed lot falls within the alienable and disposable
zone.
● The second certification in the form of a memorandum
to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional
Technical Director, Forest Management Services of
the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area
falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project
No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
● The two certificates are INSUFFICIENT.
The CENRO certificate presented by T.A.N. covered the entire lot with an
area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is
beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.
BASIS: Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates
of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of
land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.
The FMS-DENR Memorandum has no probative value for lack of authority
of the Regional Technical Director to issue the same.
BASIS: under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land classification.
Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except
rattan;
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for
public infrastructure projects; andcralawlibrary
4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber
dealers.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except
rattan;
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and
lumber dealers;
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity
declared areas for public infrastructure projects; andcralawlibrary
5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five
hectares for public infrastructure projects.
● It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition,
the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
● Only Torres, respondent's Operations Manager, identified the
certifications submitted by respondent. The government officials
who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial
court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have
accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts
stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued
and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in
establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.
2. There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
● Republic: T.A.N. failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest
had held the land openly, continuously, and exclusively for at least
30 years after it was declared alienable and disposable.
● The Court finds Evangelista's uncorroborated testimony
insufficient to prove that respondent's predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more
than 30 years. We cannot consider the testimony of Torres as
sufficient corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of
respondent's acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be related
to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession of the land
was hearsay.
● Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession
of the land before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked on the land
for three years. Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot
near Kabesang Puroy's land.
● Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by
Fortunato. However, he admitted that he did not know the exact
relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is
rather unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did not also
know the relationship between Fortunato and Porting. In fact,
Evangelista's testimony is contrary to the factual finding of the trial
court that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not
by Fortunato who was one of Antonio's children. Antonio was not
even mentioned in Evangelista's testimony.
● Furthermore, the tax declarations presented were only for the years
starting 1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence
of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership. T.A.N.
did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were
 only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas
were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment
of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that
the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only
in that year.
3. T.A.N. Properties, a private corporation, cannot apply for
registration of the land of the public domain.
● The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further
classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited
to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may
not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may
lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more
than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.
● In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, the Court traced the law on
disposition of lands of the public domain.
1935 Constitution - no prohibition against private
corporations from acquiring agricultural land
1973 Constitution - limited the alienation of lands of the
public domain to individuals who were citizens of the
Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly owned
by Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire
alienable lands of the public domain.
1987 Constitution - continues the prohibition against
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
● The constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on
individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable
lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban,
individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable
lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to
acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as
many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual
could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his
nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a
convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on
acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
● EXCEPTION: In Director of Lands v. IAC, the Court allowed the
land registration proceeding filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc. (Acme) which Acme acquired from members of the
Dumagat tribe. Issue: whether the title could be confirmed in favor
of Acme when the proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution which prohibited private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court ruled that
the land was already private land when Acme acquired it from its
owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a registrable title. Under
the 1935 Constitution, private corporations could acquire public
agricultural lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals
could acquire not more than 144 hectares.
● In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive,
and undisputed possession of alienable land for the period
prescribed by law (30 years by the Public Land Act, as amended)
created the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
sanction ceases to be public land and becomes private property.

● Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. T.A.N.
acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with
his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that
date, in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land for
30 years since 12 June 1945. When respondent acquired the land
from Porting, the land was not yet private property.
● The length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot be
tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive
prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of such
acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the public domain.
4. T.A.N. is NOT qualified to apply for registration of the land
under the Public Land Act
● A corporation can at present still apply for original registration of
land under the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No.
917642 (RA 9176) further amended the Public Land Act and
extended the period for the filing of applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain until 31 December 2020.
Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following
section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond
December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits
of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply
only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve
(12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods
of time designated by the President in accordance with
Section Forty-five of this Act shall apply also to the lands
comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this
Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said
persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior
to the period fixed by the President.
● T.A.N. as successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land,
cannot apply for registration of land in excess of 12 hectares. Since
respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the
excess area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab
initio.
● In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot have
any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it
derived its right. This assumes, of course, that the corporation
acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when the land had
already become private land by operation of law. In the present
case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land
was already private land when respondent acquired it from Porting
in 1997.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16 December 1999
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6
in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY the application for
registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
27. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v COURT OF APPEALS &
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPINA AND FLOR DE VEGA
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
August 24, 1944 | BIDIN, J. | DUAL CITIZENSHIP LAW (RA 9225);
CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS ON INTESTATE SUCCESSION;
"Sec. 8 Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a
CONDOMINIUM ACT
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
T. DELA ROSA & R. DYSICO
citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations
provided by law."
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
FACTS:
RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals, Sps. Mario Lapina and Flor De
Vega ● On June 17, 1978 Sps. Mario Lapina and Flor De Vega bought
Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area
RECIT-READY: of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City from Cristela Dazo
Belen
Spouses Mario B. Lapina and Flor De Vega, natural-born Filipino ○ At the time of purchase, Mario and Flor were natural-born
citizens, acquired property in San Pablo City from Cristela Dazo Belen in Filipino citizens
1978. In 1987, they filed an application for the registration of title of the
● On February 5, 1987, Sps. M and F filed an application for
two parcels before the RTC. By that time, they were naturalized
Canadian citizens. The Republic opposed the application but the RTC registration of title of the two parcels of land before the RTC of
approved it. The CA also affirmed the ruling. The lower courts found that San Pablo City.
the spouses were Filipino citizens when they bought the land and so the ○ This time however, there were naturalized Canadian
prohibition against the acquisition of foreign lands by aliens did not citizens already
apply. The CA ruled that registration was not a mode of acquiring ● The Republic filed an opposition
ownership. The Torrens System was not established as a means for the ● The RTC approved the application and confirmed the title and
acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to confirm and
register the title which one may already have. The SC affirmed the lower possession of the spouses.
courts’ ruling. They hold that the spouses were formerly natural-born ● The CA affirmed the RTC ruling
citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could ○ it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino
apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, citizens when they bought the land in controversy from its
Article XII of the Constitution. former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the
acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply. In
DOCTRINE:
justice and equity, they are the rightful owners of the
subject realty considering also that they had paid for it
The Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the
quite a large sum of money. Their purpose in initiating the
contested parcels of land in their favor
instant action is merely to confirm their title over the land,
for, as has been passed upon, they had been the owners of
"Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
the same since 1978
 ● The CA pointed out that registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. The Torrens System was not established as a means for
the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to
confirm and register the title which one may already have
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS
Petitioner
● They submit that the spouses have not acquired proprietary rights
over the subject properties before they acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof
in their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered
lands are presumed to be public lands under the principle that land
of whatever classification belong to the State under the Regalian
doctrine
● Before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in
the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains
to the State.
● Further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to
the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become
privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may
declare it public land, depending on the evidence.
Respondent
● The evidence thus presented established that the spouses, by
themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land applied for
registration of title under a bona- de claim of ownership long
before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is conclusively
presumed that all the conditions essential to the confirmation of
their title over the two adjacent parcels of land are sought to be
registered have been complied with thereby entitling them to the
issuance of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree.
● What is of great significance in the instant case is the circumstance
that at the time the applicants purchased the subject lot in 1978,
both of them were Filipino citizens such that when they led their
application for registration in 1987, ownership over the land in
dispute had already passed to them.
ISSUES: W/N a foreign national can apply for registration of title over
a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of
the Philippines? YES
RATIO:
● Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such
that open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years
of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to private
property
○ This means that occupation and cultivation for more than
30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in- interest,
vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land
from the mass of public land
● The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a)
the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the
concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for
the period prescribed in the Public Land Act
○ When the conditions set by law are complied with, the
possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right
to grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued
● The SC reiterates that the Torrens system was not established as a
means for the acquisition of title to private land. It merely con rms,
but does not confer ownership. As could be gleaned from the
evidence adduced, private respondents were able to establish the
nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest.
● In the case at bar, the spouses were undoubtedly natural-born
Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and
by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the
 process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed
period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the
Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed
a house of strong materials on the contested property, now
occupied by respondent Lapiña's mother
● The SC also cited provisions of the Constitution in support of their
ruling. The Constitution itself allows private respondents to
register the contested parcels of land in their favor
○ "Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
○ "Sec. 8 Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of
this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of
private lands, subject to limitations provided by law."
● Also BP 185
○ "Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal
capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws
may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum
area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban
land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by
him as his residence.”
● It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private
land, were natural born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose
of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land
● It is not significant whether private respondents are no longer
Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the
parcels of land in question.
● What is important is that private respondents were formerly
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a
private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with
the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 28. Director of Lands v Buyco
Nov 27, 1992 | Davide Jr. | DUAL CITIZENSHIP LAW (RA 9225);
CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS ON INTESTATE SUCCESSION;
CONDOMINIUM ACT
R. DYSICO &

PETITIONER: The Director of Lands

RESPONDENT: Samuel Buyco and Edward Buyco

RECIT-READY: Charles Hankins, an American citizen who was

married to Laura Crescini, resided in Canduyong, Odiongan, Romblon,
died & left a will. He has sons Alexander and William; and grandchildren
Ismael, Samuel and Edgar

On 5 February 1985, the land registration court handed down favorable

decision that "the oral and documentary evidence show applicants and
their predecessors-in-interest -- their grandparents Charles Hankins and
Laura Crescini, to their uncle Alexander Hankins, to them thru their
administrators Gregorio Gabay and later Manuel Firmalo -- have
possessed the property herein sought to be registered in the concept of
owners thereof, and such possession has been continuous, uninterrupted,
adverse, open and public for a period of more than eighty years.

The late Charles Hankins declared said land for taxation purposes under
Tax Declaration No. 15853 and thereafter in the name of applicants
and/or their father Marcelino Buyco since 1949 up to the present time.
Applicants have also paid the real estate taxes thereon since 1948 up to
the present time.

The land in question has been primarily devoted to cattle grazing and to
the cultivation of rice and coconut and it was the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest have been reaping the fruits thereof.

The applicants claim that they can rightfully and did validly acquire title
and ownership over the land in question because they were then Filipino
citizens, their father Marcelino Buyco being a Filipino citizen himself
and their modes of acquisition -- by inheritance, intestate succession, and
donation inter-vivos -- are all legally recognized modes to transfer
ownership to them from their predecessors-in-interest.
They claim that since time immemorial, applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest have exercised all the attributes of dominion and
absolute ownership over the land in question, and have therefore
established their vested proprietary rights and registrable title over the
land in question, rights which they have acquired long before they
became citizens of the United States (Edgar Buyco became a U.S. citizen
only on January 29, 1972; while Samuel H. Buyco, only on September
12, 1975. As a matter of fact, applicant Samuel H. Buyco mortgaged in
favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines the portion belonging
to him in Lot 1, Psu-127238.
ISSUE:
● W/N Charles Hankins owned the land and thus making the
transfer of the inherited lands valid (No)
RULING:
In the instant case, private respondents' evidence miserably failed to
establish their imperfect title to the property in question. Their allegation
of possession since time immemorial, which was conceded by the land
registration court and the public respondent, is patently baseless. There is
an evident failure to comprehend the meaning and import of the term
immemorial. As defined, immemorial simply means beyond the reach of
memory, beyond human memory, or time out of mind. When referring to
possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means possession of
which no man living has seen the beginning, and the existence of which
he has learned from his elders. Such possession was never present in the
case of the private respondents.
Charles Hankins was an American citizen. There is no evidence to show
the date of his birth, his arrival in the Philippines -- particularly in
Odiongan, Romblon -- or his acquisition of the big tract of land; neither
is there any evidence to prove the manner of his acquisition thereof.
Thus, there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the
private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land
for more than eighty (80) years, much less since time immemorial. In Oh
Cho vs. Director of Lands, possession which began in 1880 was not
considered as possession "since time immemorial."
It is obvious then that at the time land registration case was filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Romblon on October 14, 1976, private
respondents did not have in their favor an imperfect title over that which
they claimed to have inherited by representation, from the estate of
Charles Hankins. With greater force does this conclusion likewise apply
with respect to the properties donated to them in 1962 by their father
MarcelinoBuyco. This is because they were not able to prove open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof
under a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least 30 years
immediately preceding the filing of the application or from June 12,
1945.
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens
before such filing, it goes without saying that they acquired no vested
right consisting of an imperfect title over the property before they lost
their Philippine citizenship.
DOCTRINE: It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant
must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his
possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time
immemorial, as ruled in both Cariño and Susi, or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act. Section 48 of the Public Land Act
must secure a certification from the Government that the lands which he
claims to have possessed as owner for more than thirty (30) years are
alienable and disposable. It is the burden of the applicant to prove its
positive averments.
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens
before such filing, it goes without saying that they acquired no vested
right consisting of an imperfect title over the property before they lost
 Comment to the same and by the petitioner of his reply thereto. On
their Philippine citizenship. 17 April 1991, the parties were required to file their respective
Memoranda.
● The records disclose the following material operative facts and
procedural antecedents:
FACTS:
● A certain Charles Hankins, an American who was married to Laura
Crescini and who resided in Canduyong, Odiongan, Romblon, died
● In its Decision of 5 February 1985, Branch 82 of the Regional
on 31 May 1937 leaving a will. He was survived by his widow; his
Trial Court (RTC) at Odiongan, Romblon granted the application
sons Alexander and William; and his grandchildren Ismael,
of the private respondents, who are American citizens, to bring
Samuel and Edgar, all surnamed Buyco, who are the legitimate
within the operation of the Land Registration Act a parcel of land
issues of his deceased daughter Lilia and her husband Marcelino
with an area of 3,194,788 square meters (319.4788 hectares) which
Buyco. The will was submitted for probate before the then Court of
spreads across the barangays of Canduyong, Anahao and Ferrol in
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Romblon. Charles
the municipality of Odiongan, Province of Romblon, and to
Hankins' son Alexander was appointed administrator of the estate
confirm their title thereto.
in Special Proceedings No. 796.
● Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals; he alleged
● Laura Crescini died on 22 December 1941.
therein that the trial court erred (a) in not declaring the private
● It appears that in a Project of Partition dated 25 June 1947 (Exhibit
respondents barred by the Constitution from applying for
"O") and submitted to the probate court in the aforesaid Special
registration because they are American citizens and are thus
Proceedings No. 796, one of the properties of Charles Hankins
disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines, (b) in holding
described as "a parcel of pastureland, rice land and coconut land
that private respondents had established proprietary rights over the
containing an area of about 250 hectares, 21 ares and 63 untares
land even before acquiring American citizenship through
assessed at P6,950.00 as per Tax Declaration No. 15853," was
naturalization, and (c) independently of the issue of alienage, in not
partitioned among his heirs as follows:
dismissing the application for registration on the basis of the
● TO LAURA C. HANKINS,
private respondents' failure to overthrow, by conclusive or well-
● (a) 157 acres x x x comprised in what is known as Carabao
nigh incontrovertible proof, the presumption that the land applied
Pastureland and Milk-Cow Pasture. (This land is a portion of the
for is public land belonging to the State.
land described in tax declaration No. 15853 x x x).
● In its Decision of 21 November 1989 in CA-G.R. CV No. 05824,
● TO ALEXANDER HANKINS,
public respondent dismissed the appeal "for lack of merit.”
● (a) 80 acres of land (pasture) which is a portion of the land
● Petitioner consequently filed this petition on 11 January 1990
described in Tax declaration No. 15853
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Reiterating the issues he
● TO LILIA HANKINS,
raised before the respondent Court, he seeks a review and reversal
● (a) 100 acres of pastureland situated in the barrio of Canduyong
of the latter's decision.
and which is a portion of the entire parcel described in tax
● In the Resolution of 11 July 1990, this Court gave due course to
declaration No. 15853
the petition after the filing by the private respondents of their
● (b) 25 acres of pasture land situated in the barrio of Canduyong
and which is a portion of the entire parcel described in tax
declaration No. 15853.
● TO WILLIAM B. HANKINS
● (a) 100 acres of pastureland situated in the barrio of Canduyong
and which is a portion of the entire parcel described in tax
declaration No. 15853
● (b) 25 acres of pasture land situated in barrio Anajao and which is
a portion of the entire parcel described in tax declaration No.
15853
● The total area so adjudicated is 487 acres, or 197.086 hectares (1
hectare = 2.471 acres).
● On 30 July 1948, Laura's share in the estate of her husband Charles
was partitioned among her children, Alexander and William, and
her grandchildren, Ismael, Samuel and Edgar who were
represented by their father Marcelino Buyco. Thereafter, on the
same date, William sold his hereditary shares in the estate of his
parents to Marcelino Buyco.
● On 20 August 1962, Marcelino Buyco donated to his children the
property acquired from William together with other properties.
● On 8 September 1970, the Buyco brothers partitioned among
themselves the properties acquired by inheritance from their
grandparents and by donation from their father. However, Ismael
waived his right to his share therein in favor of Samuel, one of the
private respondents in this case.
● Edgar and Samuel Buyco became naturalized American citizens on
29 January 1972 and 12 September 1975, respectively.
● On 14 October 1976, Edgar and Samuel, through their attorney-in-
fact, Rieven H. Buyco, filed before the then Court of First Instance
of Romblon an application for the registration of a parcel of land,
described as follows:
● "A parcel of land (Lot I, under surveyed for the heirs of Lilia
Hankins situated in the barrios of Canduyong, Anahao and Ferrol,
Municipality of Odiongan, province of Romblon, Tablas Island
under PSU 127238) LRC Record No._________: Bounded on the
North by properties of the heirs of Rita Fiedacan and Alexander
Hankins; on the Northeast, by Canduyong River and property of
Alexander Hankins; on the East, by properties of Andres Cuasay,
Escolastica Feruelo, Candido Mendoza, Raymundo Goray, Pedro
Goray, Manuel Yap, Feliza Fedri and Silverio Mierculecio; on the
Southeast, by properties of Candido Mendoza, the Heirs of Benita
Formilleza, Silverio Mierculecio, Zosimo Llorca, Lot 2, and
properties of Beatrice Hankins and Zosimo Llorca; on the West, by
properties of Maria Llorca and Miguel Llorca; and on the
Northwest, by property of Catalino Fabio. Point 'I' is S. 33 deg.
24'"., 4075.50 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, Odiongan, Romblon. Area
THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT (3,194,788)
SQUARE METERS, more or less as Exhibit 'C'.” which they claim
to own in fee simple as they acquired the same by inheritance and
donation inter vivos. However, they allege in paragraph 9 of the
application that should the Land Registration Act be inapplicable,
the benefits provided for under C.A. No. 141, as amended, be
made to extend to them since both they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession thereof since time immemorial.
The application was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-48
LRC Record No. N-51706.
● The above description is based on a survey plan prepared by
private land surveyor Santiago Español in 1950 (Exhibit "C") and
subsequently approved by the Director of Lands. While in their
application, private respondents invoked the provisions of the Land
Registration Act, they eventually sought for a confirmation of
imperfect title pursuant to paragraph (b), Section 48 of the Public
Land Act, as further amended by P.D. No. 1073.
● While only the herein petitioner filed an opposition, the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) manifested that the
portion of the property pertaining to Samuel Buyco is covered by a
mortgage in its favor. After the jurisdictional facts had been
established during the initial hearing and a general order of default
entered against all other parties, the lower court designated the
 Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Odiongan as commissioner
to receive the evidence for the parties. Samuel Buyco, William
Hankins, Manuel Firmalo and Jacinta Gomez Gabay (who was 83
years old when she took the witness stand in October of 1979)
testified for the applicants. The first two (2) recounted the history
of the tract of land up to the time of the abovementioned partitions
and the alleged possession of the entire area by the applicants
(private respondents herein).
● On 5 February 1985, the land registration court handed down a
Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
● "PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court hereby orders the
registration of title to the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1
Psu-127238 and its technical description together with all the
improvements thereon, in the name of the herein applicants,
recognizing the interest of the Development Bank of the
Philippines to be annotated on the certificate of title to be issued as
mortgagee for the amount of P200,000.00 with respect to the share
of applicants (sic) Samuel H. Buyco.
● Upon the decision become (sic) final let the corresponding decree
and certificate of title be issued accordingly."
● The favorable decision is based on the court's conclusion that "The
oral and documentary evidence indubitably show applicants and
their predecessors-in-interest -- their grandparents Charles Hankins
and Laura Crescini, to their uncle Alexander Hankins, to them thru
their administrators Gregorio Gabay and later Manuel Firmalo --
have possessed the property herein sought to be registered in the
concept of owners thereof, and such possession has been
continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, open and public for a period of
more than eighty years. And their right over the property is duly
recognized by the adjoining owners in their individual. Moreover,
none of the adjoining owners filed any opposition to the herein
land registration case, thereby indubitably showing their
recognition of the correctness of the boundary (sic) between their
individual lots and that of applicants' land subject of this
registration.
● The late Charles Hankins declared said land for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 15853 and thereafter in the name of
applicants and/or their father Marcelino Buyco since 1949 up to
the present time. Applicants have also paid the real estate taxes
thereon since 1948 up to the present time.
● In 1950, the land of applicants was surveyed by Private Surveyor
Santiago Español and its exact metes and bounds were determined
with accuracy in his survey plan PSU-127238. This survey
corrected the impreciseness of the land area as mentioned in the
several instruments -- the will, project of partition, deed of
partition, deed of sale under which applicants acquired the land in
question. The correctness of this survey is further shown by the
fact that none of the other heirs, like Alexander Hankins nor the
adjoining owners ever made a claim over any portion of the lot
shown in said Psu-127238.
● The land in question has been primarily devoted to cattle grazing
and to the cultivation of rice and coconut and it was the applicants
and their predecessors-in-interest have been reaping the fruits
thereof.
● The evidence further show that applicants can rightfully and did
validly acquire title and ownership over the land in question
because they were then Filipino citizens, their father Marcelino
Buyco being a Filipino citizen himself and their modes of
acquisition -- by inheritance, intestate succession, and donation
inter-vivos -- are all legally recognized modes to transfer
ownership to them from their predecessors-in-interest.
● Since time immemorial, applicants and their predecessors-in-
interest have exercised all the attributes of dominion and absolute
ownership over the land in question, and have therefore established
their vested proprietary rights and registrable title over the land in
question, rights which they have acquired long before they became
citizens of the United States (Edgar Buyco became a U.S. citizen
only on January 29, 1972; while Samuel H. Buyco, only on
September 12, 1975. As a matter of fact, applicant Samuel H.
 Buyco mortgaged in favor of the Development Bank of the
Philippines the portion belonging to him in Lot 1, Psu-127238.
● From the foregoing evidence it has been satisfactorily established
that the applicants have acquired an imperfect and incomplete title
over the parcel of land subject of this registration proceedings in
their own right as citizens of the Philippines so as to entitle them to
a confirmation and registration of said lot in their names.
Consequently Section II, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution
does not apply to this case, neither does this case fall under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 713."
● More specifically, the conclusion regarding possession is based on
the testimonies of Manuel Firmalo, William Hankins and Jacinta
Gomez Gabay which, as summarized by the court, are as follows:
● "Witness Manuel Firmalo testified that from 1970 to 1978 he was
the administrator, of the property of applicants; that the said
property is located in the Barrios of Anahao, Canduyong, and
Tubigon (now forming part of the municipality of Ferrol) and the
same is shown in the survey map marked as Exh. "C" (Psu-
127238); that said lot is separated from the adjacent properties by
concrete monuments, big trees and some barbed wire fence; that
previous to his administration thereof, the same property was
administered by his father-in-law, Gregorio Gabay that during his
administration, a large part of the land was devoted to cattle
grazing and a little portion, to coconuts which are now fruit
bearing; that during his administration no third person ever
claimed ownership over applicants' land; that he was the one who
procured the execution of the affidavits of adjoining owners (Exhs.
"V", "V-1" to "V-21") which were used to support the real estate
mortgage with the DBP over said land; that from the proceeds of
the sale of the copra harvested from the land of applicants, he paid
the real estate taxes thereon specifically the taxes covered by Exhs.
"X-83" to "X-144"; that his administration over said land was
adverse, open continuous and public.
● William Hankins, then 72 years old and a resident of Odiongan,
Romblon, testified x x x; that ever since he was still a small kid, he
knew that the big tract of land subject of their partition was already
owned by his father (Charles Hankins); that the possession of his
father was in the concept of owner, continuous, adverse, public,
and open, up to his (Charles Hankins) death; that after receiving
his hereditary share from the estates of his father and mother, he
sold his said shares to Marcelino Buyco, father of applicants by
executing a Deed of Sale dated July 30, 1948; that during the
lifetime of Charles Hankins, the big tract of land was devoted
primarily to cattle grazing and to coconut and rice; that after he
sold his hereditary shares of Marcelino Buyco, the latter took
possession of his said portion; that after Marcelino Buyco died, the
property of Marcelino Buyco (including his hereditary share sold
under Ex. (sic) "R") was transmitted to his children, namely: Edgar
H. Buyco, Ismael Buyco and Samuel H. Buyco (Samuel and Edgar
Buyco, the applicants herein); that he knows that at present the
owners in possession of the property subject of this registration
proceedings are applicants Samuel Buyco and Edgar Buyco
● Jacinta Gomez Gabay, 83 years (as of October, 1979) testified that
she knew the spouses Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini because
since the time she can remember, she stayed with said spouses up
to their deaths; that having stayed with the Hankins couple, she
knew of their properties because she lived with them in Canduyong
where the property was situated; that when she was living with the
Hankins spouses, said spouses already owned and were in
possessionof the land and nobody ever claimed any portion
thereof; that this property extended from barrio Canduyong up to
barrio Anahao; that after Charles Hankins died, his property was
divided among his children Alexander Hankins, William Hankins
and Lilia Hankins and the latter's share was received by her
children named Ismael, Samuel and Edgar all surnamed Buyco;
that before Charles Hankins' estate was partitioned it was placed
under the administration of Alexander Hankins (one of the heirs);
that after the partition, the portion (sic) that went to the Buyco
children (as heirs of Lilia Hankins) were administered by her
husband Gregorio Gabay; that her husband's administration over
 said property started 3 or 4 years after the war which (sic) lasted
about 25 years or until Gregorio Gabay died; that his son-in-law
Manuel Firmalo took over the administration of applicants'
property; that the land she was referring to is utilized as a pasture
land and it has been a pasture land since the time it was owned by
spouses Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini up to the present
time; that Edgar, Samuel and Ismael, all surnamed Buyco have
been receiving the fruits of the portion that went to Lilia Hankins;
that Charles Hankins' possession of that big tract of land was in the
concept of owner, continuous, adverse, open and public; that a
portion of this big tract of land went to Edgar H. Buyco, Samuel H.
Buyco and Ismael H. Buyco as the heirs of Lilia Hankins; that the
possession of the said heirs of the late Lilia Hankins over the
portion that went to them was in the concept of owner, continuous,
adverse, open and public up to the present time; that as far as she
can remember the Hankins family possessed said property for
more than eighty (80) years."
● The land registration court also summarized the testimony of
private respondent Samuel H. Buyco as to possession in this wise:
(basically they all testify that Hankins are in possession of the land
since time immemorial)
● As earlier adverted to, petitioner's appeal from the said decision
was dismissed by the public respondent for lack of merit. As to the
private respondents' title to the land subject of the application,
public respondent makes the following findings:
● "Undisputably, applicants-appellees anchored their title to the land
in question by means of hereditary succession as well as donation
from their own father, Marcelino Buyco, who purchased the entire
hereditary share of William Hankins. Subsequently, applicants-
appellees and their brother, Ismael, partitioned their hereditary
share from their grandparents, the spouses Hankins, including the
property donated by their father, Marcelino Buyco, in an
instrument dated September 8, 1970. In this partition, the share of
Ismael H. Buyco went to applicant-appellee Samuel H. Buyco.
● From the records extant in this case, it is Our considered view that
from almost (sic) time immemorial or a period of eighty (80) years,
applicants-appellees through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in actual, continuous, and peaceful possession of the property
in question so that the inescapable conclusion is that all along it is
private land and had been segregated from the dominium (sic) of
the State. Thus, We sustain the conclusion reached by the court a
quo that the latter (applicants-appellees) thru their predecessors-in-
interest have acquired title by acquisitive prescription over the
same
● As to the issue of the private respondents' citizenship, public
respondent held that: “it is beyond per adventure (sic) of doubt that
applicants-appellees were still Filipinos when they acquired their
title thereto. From the death of their grandfather Charles Hankins
on May 31, 1937, applicants-appellees' right of succession was
already vested. Moreover, as early as the year 1962, their father
Marcelino Buyco transferred his title thereto by donation inter-
vivos so that on September 8, 1970, when the Buyco brothers
partitioned the property in question among themselves, they could
validly register the same as they already possess the necessary
qualifications to have their title perfected under the Torrens system
of registration."
ISSUES:
● W/N Charles Hankins owned the land and thus making the transfer
of the inherited lands valid
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):
● Petitioner:
● Respondent:
RATIO:
● The petition is meritorious. As could be gleaned from the evidence
adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee simple
ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory information title
under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private
respondents did not present any proof that they or their
predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish grant
such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant; (b) the "concession
especial" or special grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado" title
or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase;
and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or possessory information
title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title.
The primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves and
their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The land
registration court and the public respondent are of the opinion, and
so held, that the private respondents had this in their favor. Thus,
both courts declared that the land applied for had been segregated
from the public domain and had become private land.
● If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in
possession since time immemorial, the rulings of both courts could
be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho vs. Director of
Lands:
● "All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to
the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession
of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had
been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. (Cariño
vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. ed., 594.) The
applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest
possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in
1880."
● This exception was reiterated in Susi vs. Razon, where the first
possessor was in possession for an undetermined period of time
prior to 1880. We stated therein:
● "x x x In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section
45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with,
for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and
through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public
domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July
26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. x x x If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands."
● Although this additional pronouncement was rippled by the ruling
in Manila Electric Co. vs. Castro-Bartolome to the effect that land
would cease to be public only upon the issuance of a certificate of
title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, and that a piece of land over which an imperfect
title is sought to be confirmed remains public, this Court, speaking
through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres R.
Narvasa, in Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
reiterated the Cariño and Susi doctrines, :
● It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must
prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his
possession, in the concept abovestated, must be either since
time immemorial, as ruled in both Cariño and Susi, or for the
period prescribed in the Public Land Act. Section 48 of the
Public Land Act must secure a certification from the Government
that the lands which he claims to have possessed as owner for
more than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is
the burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.
● In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to
prove that the property subject of the application is an alienable
and disposable parcel of land of the public domain. On the
contrary, based on their own evidence, the entire property which is
 alleged to have originally belonged to Charles Hankins was pasture
land. According to witness Jacinta Gomez Gabay, this land has
been pasture land, utilized for grazing purposes, since the time it
was "owned" by the spouses Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini
up to the present time In Director of Lands vs. Rivas, this Court
ruled:
● "Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under section 1,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution and sections 8, 10 and 11 of
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. Section 10 distinguishes
strictly agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing lands
(inalienable)."
● The instant application was filed, heard and decided under the
regime of the 1973 Constitution.
● As to the second matter to be proved, the applicant must present
evidence of an imperfect title such as those derived from the old
Spanish grants. He may also show that he has been in continuous,
open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership and for the period prescribed under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act. Simply put, a person who seeks the
registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by
himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by
clear and convincing evidence. In the 1913 case of Maloles vs.
Director of Lands this Court already held that in order that a
petitioner may be entitled to have a parcel of land registered
under the Torrens system, he has to show that he is the real
and absolute owner, in fee simple, of the said land; moreover, it
is the duty of the court, even in the absence of any oppositor, to
require the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of the evidence
and by positive and absolute proof, so far as it is possible, that he
is the owner in fee simple of the land in question.
● In Santiago vs. de los Santos, this rule was to find anchorage in
policy considerations based no less on one of the fundamental
objectives of the Constitution, namely the conservation and
utilization of our natural resources. We held in the said case that
there would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary
does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of
real estate. This Court then set the quantum of evidence needed to
be established by the applicant, to wit: well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence.
● In the instant case, private respondents' evidence miserably failed
to establish their imperfect title to the property in question. Their
allegation of possession since time immemorial, which was
conceded by the land registration court and the public respondent,
is patently baseless. There is an evident failure to comprehend the
meaning and import of the term immemorial. As defined,
immemorial simply means beyond the reach of memory, beyond
human memory, or time out of mind. When referring to
possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means
possession of which no man living has seen the beginning, and the
existence of which he has learned from his elders. Such possession
was never present in the case of the private respondents. The trial
court and the public respondent based the finding of the more than
eighty (80) years of possession by the private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest on the sole testimony of Mrs. Gabay who
was eighty-three (83) years old when she testified in October of
1979. Thus, she must have been born in 1896. If the asserted
possession lasted for a period of more than eighty (80) years at the
time she testified, the same must have commenced sometime in
1899, or at the time that she was barely three (3) years old. It is
quite impossible that she could fully grasp, before coming to the
age of reason, the concept of possession of such a big tract of land
and testify on the same some eight (8) decades later. In short,
therefore, she cannot be relied upon to prove the possession by
Charles Hankins of the said property from 1899.
● Charles Hankins was an American citizen. There is no evidence to
show the date of his birth, his arrival in the Philippines --
particularly in Odiongan, Romblon -- or his acquisition of the big
tract of land; neither is there any evidence to prove the manner of
his acquisition thereof. Thus, there does not even exist a reasonable
 basis for the finding that the private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than eighty
(80) years, much less since time immemorial. In Oh Cho vs.
Director of Lands, possession which began in 1880 was not
considered as possession "since time immemorial."
● There is, as well, no evidence on record to show that Charles
Hankins cultivated, had control over or used the whole or even a
greater portion of the big tract of land for grazing purposes. None
of the witnesses testified as to the number of heads of cattle which
were brought by Charles into the land. There is likewise no
competent proof that he declared the land in his name for taxation
purposes or that he had paid the taxes thereon. Although his will
made mention of Tax Declaration No. 15853, neither the said
declaration nor any tax receipt was presented in evidence. Because
of such non-production, it cannot be determined when Charles
initially declared his alleged land for taxation purposes and what
exactly were its natural boundaries if any. It is clear that the non-
production of this tax declaration accounted for the obvious
inability of the witnesses to testify with certainty as to the extent of
the area of the property. As correctly observed by the petitioner,
none of the private respondents' witnesses could give the court a
definite idea thereon.
● In any event, even if Charles had indeed declared the property for
taxation purposes and actually paid taxes, such facts are still
insufficient to justify possession thereof, much less a claim of
ownership thereon. This Court has repeatedly held that the
declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment on the
payment of the tax is not sufficient to prove ownership.
● To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that
Charles Hankins had possessed the property -- allegedly covered
by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both his
last will and testament and the project of partition of his estate
among his heirs -- in such a manner as to remove the same from
the public domain under the Cariño and Susi doctrines. Thus,
when he died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever,
with respect to the said property, to his heirs. This being the case,
his possession cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents
for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their application. It
would have been entirely different if the possession of Charles was
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and under a bona fide claim
of ownership as provided under Section 48 of the Public Land Act.
Even if he were an American citizen at that time, he would have
had the same civil rights as Filipino citizens pursuant to the
original ordinance appended to the 1935 Constitution. The
pertinent portion of said ordinance reads:
● "(17) Citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy in
the Commonwealth of the Philippines all the civil rights of the
citizens and corporations, respectively, thereof."
● The import of said paragraph (17) was confirmed and reinforced
originally by Section 44 of Act No. 2874 and Section 127 of C.A.
No. 141 (The Public Land Act of 1936); the latter provided that:
● "SEC. 127. During the existence and continuance of the
Commonwealth, and before the Republic of the Philippines is
established, citizens and corporations of the United States shall
enjoy the same rights granted to citizens and corporations of the
Philippines under this Act."
● This right, however, vanished with the advent of the Philippine
Republic on 4 July 1946.
● Verily, private respondents had to rely exclusively on their own
possession. Under the applicable law at the time, it was incumbent
upon them to prove that they had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
land of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding
the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure.
● By their own evidence, private respondents admitted that they were
never in actual possession of the property prior to the filing of their
application. During the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 796,
the estate of Charles Hankins appeared to have been administered
by his son Alexander. This administration was terminated in 1948
upon the execution of the Project of Partition. Private respondents
and their brother Ismael did not take possession of the share which
pertained to their mother, Lilia; instead, they allegedly hired
Gregorio Gabay to administer the same. There is, however, no
competent evidence to show the extent of such administration.
Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that Gregorio had the property
declared for taxation purposes, the correct area and boundaries of
the same have not been proven. As evidenced by the Project of
Partition, the share of Lilia was only 125 acres or 50.59 hectares,
which is clearly not the portion applied for. The area applied for
consists of 319.4788 hectares of land based on a survey plan
prepared by private land surveyor Español on the basis of a survey
conducted in 1950. Obviously, therefore, the plan was not prepared
to determine Lilia's share alone for, as admitted by the private
respondents themselves, this plan includes William Hankins' share
which was sold to Marcelino Buyco, private respondents' father,
and the other properties which the latter donated to the private
respondents and Ismael Buyco on 20 August 1962. However, there
is no competent evidence as to the respective boundaries and areas
of the properties constituting the said share of William Hankins;
neither are there reliable descriptions of the other alleged
properties belonging to Marcelino Buyco. Be that as it may, when
the survey was conducted by Español, private respondents and
their brother Ismael did not immediately acquire the portion
originating from William Hankins and the other alleged properties
of Marcelino Buyco; hence, there was no valid basis for the
inclusion of said properties in the survey. And even if both
William's share and Marcelino Buyco's properties were included,
there would still be nothing to support the application for the entire
319.4788 hectares considering that as per the Project of Partition,
the share pertaining to William consisted only of 50.59 hectares.
There was, moreover, no evidence to show the extent of the
alleged "other properties" of Marcelino Buyco. Given such
circumstances, it would be reasonable to presume that what was
surveyed in 1950 was the entire pasture land alleged to form part
of the estate of Charles Hankins, covered by Tax Declaration No.
15853, and which necessarily included the share of Alexander
Hankins. Significantly, the latter's share is specified as part of the
property covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853. The inclusion
then of Alexander's share in the survey and the plan may provide
the clue to this unusual increase in the area covered by the survey
plan.
● Nevertheless, even if We are to assume for argument's sake that
there was nothing irregular in the inclusion in the survey plan of
the share of William Hankins and the other properties of Marcelino
Buyco, the fact remains that the "ownership" thereof could have
been acquired by the private respondents and Ismael Buyco only
on 20 August 1962 upon the execution of the deed of donation in
their favor. To be thus benefited by the possession of William or
Marcelino for purposes of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act,
there should be proof that said predecessors had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereof. Unfortunately, no such proof was offered.
● It is palpably obvious then that at the time Land Registration Case
No. N-48 was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon on 14
October 1976, private respondents did not have in their favor an
imperfect title over that which they claimed to have inherited, by
representation, from the estate of Charles Hankins. With greater
force does this conclusion likewise apply with respect to the
properties donated to them in 1962 by their father Marcelino
Buyco. This is because they were not able to prove open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereof under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at
least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application or from 12 June 1945.
● Considering that the private respondents became American citizens
before such filing, it goes without saying that they had acquired no
 vested right, consisting of an imperfect title, over the property
before they lost their Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of

the public respondent of 21 November 1989 in CA-G.R. CV No. 05824 is
hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision of 5 February 1985 of Branch 82 of
the Regional Trial Court of Romblon in Land Registration Case No. N-48,
LRC Record No. N-51706 is REVERSED.
 29. Republic v Guzman
Feb 18, 2000 | Bellosillo. | DUAL CITIZENSHIP LAW (RA 9225);
CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS ON INTESTATE SUCCESSION;
CONDOMINIUM ACT
S. Espiritu
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: Avid Rey Guzman, represented by his Attorney-in-
Fact, Lolita G. Abela, and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, Meycauayan
branch
RECIT-READY: In 1968, Simeon, a naturalized American citizen, died
leaving to his sole heirs, Helen and David, his estate consisting of several
parcels of land located in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Helen is an
American citizen while David is a natural-born American citizen. In
1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
the Estate of Simeon Guzman dividing and adjudicating to them all the
property belonging to the estate of Simeon.
After eleven years from the time the said deed of extrajudicial settlement
was executed, Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning, transferring
and conveying to her son David her undivided one-half interest on all the
parcels of land subject matter of the said deed of extrajudicial settlement.
Helen executed another document, a Deed of Quitclaim, confirming the
earlier deed of quitclaim as well as modifying the document to
encompass all her other property in the Philippines
In 1989, David executed a Special Power of Attorney where he
acknowledged that he became the owner of the parcels of land subject of
the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen. This Special Power of
Attorney empowered Atty. Lolita G. Abela to sell or otherwise dispose of
the lots
The petitioner assailed that the two (2) deeds of quitclaim executed by
Helen Meyers Guzman had no legal force and effect so that the
ownership of the property subject thereof remained with her
ISSUE:
Whether or not Helen validly repudiated her right to inherit from the
decedent? NO
RULING:
There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already
accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together with David,
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon
Guzman on 29 December 1970 dividing and adjudicating between the
two (2) of them all the property in Simeon's estate. By virtue of such
extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were registered in her and her
son's name in undivided equal share and for eleven (11) years they
possessed the lands in the concept of owner
Nothing on record shows that Helen's acceptance of her inheritance from
Simeon was made through any of the causes which vitiated her consent
nor is there any proof of the existence of an unknown will executed by
Simeon. Thus, pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot belatedly execute an
instrument which has the effect of revoking or impugning her previous
acceptance of her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property from
Simeon's estate. Hence, the two (2) quitclaim deeds which she executed
eleven (11) years after she had accepted the inheritance have no legal
force and effect.
DOCTRINE: Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides:
The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made is irrevocable
and cannot be impugned, except when it was made through any of the
causes that vitiate consent or when an unknown will appears.
FACTS:
● In 1968, Simeon, a naturalized American citizen, died leaving to
his sole heirs, Helen and David, his estate consisting of several
parcels of land located in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Helen is
an American citizen while David is a natural-born American
citizen.
● In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman dividing and
 adjudicating to them all the property belonging to the estate of
Simeon.
● The taxes due thereon were paid through their attorneys-in-fact,
Attys. Juan L. Austria and Lolita G. Abela, and the parcels of land
were accordingly registered in the name of Helen Meyers Guzman
and David Rey Guzman in undivided equal shares.
● After eleven years from the time the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement was executed, Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed
assigning, transferring and conveying to her son David her
undivided one-half interest on all the parcels of land subject matter
of the said deed of extrajudicial settlement. Helen executed another
document, a Deed of Quitclaim, confirming the earlier deed of
quitclaim as well as modifying the document to encompass all her
other property in the Philippines
● In 1989, David executed a Special Power of Attorney where he
acknowledged that he became the owner of the parcels of land
subject of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen. This Special
Power of Attorney empowered Atty. Lolita G. Abela to sell or
otherwise dispose of the lots
● Atty. Mario A. Batongbacal wrote the Office of the Solicitor
General and furnished it with documents showing that David's
ownership of the one-half (1/2) of the estate of Simeon Guzman
was defective. On the basis thereof, the Government filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan a Petition for Escheat
praying that one-half (1/2) of David's interest in each of the subject
parcels of land be forfeited in its favor.
● The petitioner is contesting that the two quitclaims deeds that
Helen executed have no legal force and effect
ISSUE:
Whether or not Helen validly repudiated her right to inherit from the
decedent? NO
RULING:
There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted
her share of the inheritance when she, together with David, executed a Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman on 29
December 1970 dividing and adjudicating between the two (2) of them all
the property in Simeon's estate. By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement
the parcels of land were registered in her and her son's name in undivided
equal share and for eleven (11) years they possessed the lands in the
concept of owner
Nothing on record shows that Helen's acceptance of her inheritance from
Simeon was made through any of the causes which vitiated her consent nor
is there any proof of the existence of an unknown will executed by Simeon.
Thus, pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot belatedly execute an instrument
which has the effect of revoking or impugning her previous acceptance of
her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property from Simeon's estate. Hence,
the two (2) quitclaim deeds which she executed eleven (11) years after she
had accepted the inheritance have no legal force and effect.
The repudiation being of no effect whatsoever the parcels of land should
revert to their private owner, Helen, who, although being an American
citizen, is qualified by hereditary succession to own the property subject of
the litigation.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals which
sustained the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
dismissing the petition for escheat is AFFIRMED. No costs.
30. ESTATE OF SERRA v. HEIRS OF HERNAEZ
August 9, 2005 | Ynares-Santiago, J.| Dual Citizenship Law (RA 9225);
Civil Code Provisions on Intestate Succession; Condominium Act
K. LOPEZ DE LEON & DIEGO GABRIEL E. MONTESA(Checker)
PETITIONER: Estate of Salvador Serra Serra and Gregorio Serra
RESPONDENT: Heirs of Primitivo Hernaez
RECIT-READY: On December 27, 1967, the heirs of Eleuterio
Hernaez: Primitivo, Rogaciana, and Luisa, filed for a petition for
reconstitution of alleged lost original certificates of title and owner’s
duplicate copies, for parcels of land in Negros Occidental. On April 6,
1968, the CFI of Bacolod City granted the petition and ordered the
reconstitution of the subjects OCTs and its duplicate copies. However,
the reconstituted OCTs were cancelled upon presentation of Hernaez of a
“declaration of heirship” for which a TCTs were issued in their names.
Salvador Serra Serra, upon learning of the existence of the TCTs,
registered in behalf of their co-heirs, their adverse claim and moved for
the cancellation of reconstituted titles. They claimed that they are the
holders of valid and existing certificates of title over the subject
properties and have been in continuous and actual possession thereof.
The trial court denied the petitioner’s motion, but instead granted
Hernaez’ prayer they be placed in possession of the subject properties.
On June 7, 1971, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction which
was lifted in a resolution dated August 3, 1971. Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
● W/N the petitioners Serra are the actual owners of the lands in
question (NO)
RULING: SC ruled petitioners are not the actual owners of the subject
land. Petitioners’ alleged possession of TCTs and actual possession of the
subject lands, although strong proof of ownership, are not necessarily
conclusive where the assertion of proprietary rights is founded on
dubious claim of ownership. They claimed that their title over the subject
properties emanated from Salvador Serra; yet they failed to present in
evidence the OCT in the name of the latter. Since petitioners impugn the
proprietary claim of Hernaez over the properties, the burden rests on
them to establish their superior right over the latter. To recall, the trial
court found that the evidence they presented have not established
superior proprietary rights over the respondents’ on the subject lots. It
held that the non-presentation of the OCTs cast doubt on the veracity of
their claim. He who asserts must prove. It is also undisputed that
petitioners are all Spanish citizens. Under Philippine law, foreigners can
acquire private lands only by hereditary succession or when they were
formerly natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship. In
this case, petitioners did not present proof that they acquired the
properties by inheritance. Neither did they claim to be former natural-
born Filipinos. On the contrary, they declare in this petition that they are
all Spanish citizens residing in Mallorca, Spain
DOCTRINE: Under Philippine law, foreigners can acquire private lands
only by hereditary succession or when they were formerly natural-born
Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship. In this case, petitioners did
not present proof that they acquired the properties by inheritance.
FACTS:
● On December 27, 1967, a petition for reconstitution of alleged lost
original certificates of title (OCT) and owner’s duplicate copies in
the name of Eleuterio Hernaez covering lots in the Province of
Negros Occidental, was filed by his successors-in-interest
Primitivo, Rogaciana and Luisa, all surnamed Hernaez (Hernaez)
with then CFI of Bacolod City.
● On April 6, 1968, the CFI granted the petition and ordered the
reconstitution of the subject OCTs and its duplicate copies.
● These reconstituted OCTs were cancelled on May 29, 1969 upon
presentation by Hernaez of a "declaration of heirship" and in lieu
thereof, TCTs were issued in their name.
● Upon learning of the existence of the above TCTs, Salvador Serra
Serra, for and in behalf of his co-heirs, registered their adverse
claim and moved for the cancellation of the reconstituted titles.
They averred that they are holders of valid and existing certificates
of title over the subject properties and have been in continuous and
actual possession thereof.
● RTC denied petitioners’ motion to cancel the reconstituted titles
and granted instead Hernaez’ prayer that they be placed in
possession of the subject properties.
 ● CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction which was ordered by inheritance. Neither did they claim to be former natural-born
lifted in a resolution dated August 3, 1971. Petitioners’ motion for Filipinos. On the contrary, they declare in this petition that they are
reconsideration was denied. all Spanish citizens residing in Mallorca, Spain.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision and the

ISSUES: resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
● W/N the petitioners Serra Serra are the actual owners of the lands
in question (NO)

RATIO:

● Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners are
Spanish citizens and as such, disqualified from acquiring lands in
the Philippines.
● As a rule, only a Filipino citizen can acquire private lands in the
Philippines and the only instances when a foreigner can own
private lands are by hereditary succession and if he was formerly a
natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship.
● The records are bereft of any showing that petitioners derived their
title by any mode which would qualify them to acquire private
lands in the country.
● Petitioners’ possession of TCTs and actual possession of the
subject lands, although strong proof of ownership, are not
necessarily conclusive where the assertion of proprietary rights is
founded on dubious claim of ownership.
● They claimed that their title over the subject properties emanated
from Salvador Serra Serra; yet they failed to present in evidence
the OCT in the name of the latter. Since petitioners impugn the
proprietary claim of Hernaez over the properties, the burden rests
on them to establish their superior right over the latter.
● It is also undisputed that petitioners are all Spanish citizens. Under
Philippine law, foreigners can acquire private lands only by
hereditary succession or when they were formerly natural-born
Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship. In this case,
petitioners did not present proof that they acquired the properties
31. VALENTIN SUSI V. ANGELA RAZON AND THE DIRECTOR
OF LANDS
December 9, 1925 | J. Villareal | When is a land of public domain
alienable and disposable
DIEGO GABRIEL E. MONTESA & CHECKER
PETITIONER: Valentin Susi
RESPONDENT: Angela Razon and The Director of Lands
RECIT-READY: An action was commenced by Valentin Susi against
Angela Razon and The Director of Lands praying for judgment that
plaintiff be declared the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land in
the complaint, annulment of the Director of Lands in favor of Angela
Razon, and ordering the cancellation of title to Angela Razon, sentencing
the latter to pay the sum of P500 as damages, with costs. The Director of
Lands denied every allegation, alleging that the land in question was a
property of the Government of the United States under the administration
and control of the Philippine Islands, before its sale to Angela Razon.
The CFI of Pampanga rendered a decision declaring Valentin Susi
entitled to possession of the land, annulling the sale made to Angela
Razon and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to
her. The Director of Lands appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
● Whether Valentin Susi or Angela Razon is the rightful owner of
the land?
RULING: The Court ruled in favor of Valentin Susi. It clearly appears
from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in
question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and
through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five
years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already
made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can
hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period
of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. When on
August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land,
Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and
through his predecessors for thirty-four years. In favor of Valentin Susi,
there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that
all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession,
personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the
public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July
26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act.
DOCTRINE: It is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued
in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No.
2874.
FACTS:
● This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela
Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a)
Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of
land described in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b)
annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of
Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private property; (c)
ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said
Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum
of P500 as damages, with the costs.
● For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each
and every allegation contained therein and, as special defense,
alleged that the land in question was a property of the Government
of the United States under the administration and control of the
Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was
made in accordance with law.
● After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring
the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the
sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and
ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her,
 with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the
Director of Lands took an appeal.
ISSUES:
● Whether Valentin Susi or Angela Razon is the rightful owner of
the land
RATIO:
● The Court ruled in favor of Valentin Susi. It clearly appears from
the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land
in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly,
personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that
is, for about forty-five years. When on August 15, 1914, Angela
Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had
already been in possession thereof personally and through his
predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account
that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when
he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when
he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long
that it is beyond the reach of memory.
● In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris
et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No.
2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements
for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been
in actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a
right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for
the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should
be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of
section 47 of Act No. 2874.
FOR THE FORGOING, and no error having been found in the
judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts,
without special pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED..
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
● The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac
sold the land in question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia
and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to
repurchase the same. After having been in possession thereof for
about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed,
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold
it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to
repurchase it. Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin
Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land,
availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the
proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property.
The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, by
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi
has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any
interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except
when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an
action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the
possession of said land, wherein after considering the evidence
introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of
Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint.
Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in
question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director
of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914. Having
learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition
thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land
for twenty-five years. After making the proper administrative
investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of
Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said
grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921,
issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with
said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the
land in question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action
for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of
Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
the case being one of title to real property . Valentin Susi then
brought this action
 32. REPUBLIC v DOLDOL
September 10, 1998 | Romero, J. | When is a land of public domain
alienable and disposable
M.NOEL
PETITIONER: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENT: NICANOR DOLDOL
RECIT-READY: Doldol had been occupying a portion of land since
1959. In 1965 The provicncial board of Misamis Oriental passed a
resolution reserving that same lot as a school site. In 1987, president
Aquino issued a proclamation reserving the area for Opol National
School. Since Doldol refused to vacate the subject porperty, Opol
National School filed a case. The RTC ruled in their favor, but the CA
reversed the decision citing sec. 48 of the Public Land Act which states
that possession for over 30 years gives one the right to public alienable
land.
ISSUE:
● Whether or not Doldol has met the requisites to claim right over
alienable public land. (NO)
RULING: The provision cited by the CA is outdated and has since been
amended that instead of possession for over thirty years, it now requires
possession before or ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Since he
only started occupying the subject land in 1959, Doldol does not meet the
requisites set forth in the public land act, and therefore must vacate the
land in favor of Opol National School.
DOCTRINE:
● Two requisites to claim alienable public land: (a) that the land is
alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same must
either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed
in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
FACTS:
● 1959- Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio
Pontacan, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental.
● 1963- Doldol filed an application for saltwork purposes for the
area with the Bureau of Forest Development.
● 1965 - Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution
reserving the lot in which Doldol was occupying as a school site.
● 1968- Director of Forestry rejected Doldol’s application.
● 1970- In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School
transferred to the site.
● 1987- President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 180
reserving the area, including the portion in dispute, for the Opol
High School, now renamed the Opol National Secondary
Technical School. Needing the area occupied by Doldol for its
intended projects, the school made several demands for him to
vacate said portion, but he refused to move.
● 1991- As Doldol refused to vacate, Opol National School filed a
complaint for accion possessoria. The RTC ruled in the school's
favor and ordered Doldol to vacate the land.
● The CA reversed the decision of the court ruling that Doldol was
entitled to the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same
for thirty-two years, from 1959 up to the time of the filing of the
complaint in 1991.
ISSUE:
● Whether or not Doldol has met the requisites to claim right over
alienable public land. (NO)
RULING
● The petition is meritorious.
● Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act):
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certification of title therefor under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
● (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
wars or force majeure…
● The CA used sec. 48 of the Public Land Act to justify that as
Doldol was in possession of alienable public land for over 30
years, he was entitled to the land he occupied- “As interpreted in
several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing
provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would he
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent.”
● SC: CA relied on an outdated version of sec. 48.
● As amended (by PD1073), Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented
by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.
● Two requisites to claim alienable public land: (a) that the land is
alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same must
either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in
the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
● Since the land in question is an alienable public land, Doldol thus
meets the first requirement.
● The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that
Doldol had been occupying the portion reserved for the school site
only since 1959. The law, as presently phrased, requires that
possession of lands of the pubic domain must be from June 12,
1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
● Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed
lot since his occupation of the same started only in 1959. Not
having complied with the conditions set by law, Doldol cannot be
said to have acquired a right to the land in question as to segregate
the same from the public domain. Doldol cannot, therefore, assert a
right superior to the school, given that then President Corazon
Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol National School.
 ● In sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession
over the land in dispute.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of

Appeals dated October 27, 1997, and Resolution dated March 27, 1998,
are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated August 25, 1992, is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 33. BRACEWELL v. CA
January 25, 2000 | J. Ynares-Santiago | Land of Public Domain: When
Alienable and Disposable
OPINION & CHECKER
PETITIONER: James R. Bracewell
RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals
RECIT-READY: Maria Cailles acquired a 9,657 sqm parcel in Las
Pinas in 1908. She sold the parcel of land to her son, James Bracewell
(Petitioner). In 1963, James filed an action for confirmation of imperfect
title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, asserting that he
and his predecessors-in-interest have had open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject parcels of land since
1908. The Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General,
opposed petitioner’s application. The SolGen argues that since the
subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable or disposable on
March 27, 1972, petitioner did not have any title to confirm when he filed
his application in 1963. Neither was the requisite thirty years possession
met. Lower courts ruled in favor of the government.
ISSUE:
● W/N James Bracewell has right of title - NO
RULING: The court ruled against petitioner. CA No. 41 was
superseded by R.A. No. 1942 and amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove
that:
a. The land is alienable public land and
b. His open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same must be since time immemorial or
for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act
The applicant must prove that the land is alienable public land.
Petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his
application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was
conclusively shown by the government that the same were only
classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972. Even granting
that petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same
since 1908, he still cannot claim title by virtue of such possession since
the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable land at that time nor
capable of private appropriation.
DOCTRINE: The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant
of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or
disposable portions of the public domain.
There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet
classified as disposable or alienable.
FACTS:
● In 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr., acquired a
9,657 sqm parcel of land located in Las Piñas, Metro Manila from
the Dalandan and Jimenez families of Las Piñas. After which
corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria
Cailles.
● In 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of land to her son, the
petitioner, James Bracewell, by virtue of a Deed of Sale which was
duly annotated and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig,
Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter issued in the name of
petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax Declarations issued to
Maria Cailles.
● In 1963, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of
Pasig, Rizal an action for confirmation of imperfect title under
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
● In 1964, the Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor
General, opposed petitioner’s application on the grounds that
neither he nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title
to the subject land nor have they been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same for
at least thirty (30) years prior to the application, and that the
subject land is part of the public domain.
 ● In 1985, the entire records of the registration case were forwarded
to the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Solicitor General
resubmitted his opposition to the application on July 22, 1985, this
time alleging the following additional grounds: (1) the failure of
petitioner to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time; and (2) that the tax declarations attached to the complaint do
not constitute acquisition of the lands applied for.
● The court ruled in favor of the Solicitor General.
ISSUES:
1. W/N James Bracewell has right of title - NO
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):
● Petitioner: Asserts his right of title to the subject land under
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, having by himself
and through his predecessors-in-interest been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
parcels of land, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since 1908.
● Respondent: Since the subject parcels of land were only classified
as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972, petitioner did not
have any title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963.
Neither was the requisite thirty years possession met.
RATIO:
1. Requisites to acquire title to public land (Republic vs. Doldol):
a. “x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141
provided for possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain since July 26, 1894.
b. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942 which provided
for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation
by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title.
c. The same, however, has already been amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25,
1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
i. “(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those
shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.”
2. Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act
requires that the applicant must prove that:
a. The land is alienable public land and
b. His open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same must be since
time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the
Public Land Act
3. The applicant must prove that the land is alienable public land.
Petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his
application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was
conclusively shown by the government that the same were only
classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972.
4. Even granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had
occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title by virtue
of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet
alienable land at that time nor capable of private appropriation.
5. Reyes v. CA:
 a. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source
of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony. This same
doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 340).
b. Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration. The
applicant must show that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.
6. Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were
classified as inalienable or indisposable, therefore, the same could
not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. There can be
no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified
as disposable or alienable. In the absence of such classification,
the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom
and open to disposition. Indeed, it has been held that the rules on
the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the
land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby

DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
 34. CHAVEZ v. PEA
July 9, 2002 | J. Carpio | LAND OF PUBLIC DOMAIN: WHEN
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
N. SABBAN & B. SALAZAR
PETITIONER: Francisco I. Chavez
RESPONDENT: Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation
RECIT-READY: In 1973, the Commissioner on Public Highways
entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under
P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These
lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the
Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA
entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP
would be funded and owned by PEA. By 1988, President Aquino issued
Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the
transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of
Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
“Freedom Islands”. Subsequently, PEA entered into a joint venture
agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop
the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI
entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This
caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public domain.
Petitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for
mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of
reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA.
Following these events, under President Estrada’s admin, PEA and
AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Chavez claims that the
contract is null and void.
ISSUE:
● Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement
for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to
be reclaimed, violate the 1987 Constitution? (YES)
RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative. Under the Public Land Act
(CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution. The
157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of
the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but
may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.
PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Clearly,
the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose
“object or purpose is contrary to law,” or whose “object is outside the
commerce of men,” are “inexistent and void from the beginning.”
FACTS:
● In 1973, the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract
with the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas
of Manila Bay.
● The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry
out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total
reclaimed land.
● In 1977, Pres.Marcos issued PD 1084 creating PEA, which is
tasked "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas,"
and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all
kinds of lands."
● Through PD 1085, the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and
offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) were also transferred to PEA.
 ● Pres. Cory Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and
transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)
● PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a
private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also
required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of
submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the
configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern
Reclamation Project-MCCRRP.
● PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation
without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors
of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8,
1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
ISSUES:
● Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement
for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to
be reclaimed, violate the 1987 Constitution? (YES)
RATIO:
● Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 provides
○ “Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence
of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces,
pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall
become the property of the party constructing such works,
unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of
authority."
● Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea
belonged to the party undertaking the reclamation, provided the
government issued the necessary permit and did not reserve
ownership of the reclaimed land to the State.
● Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the
lease of reclaimed and foreshore lands provides: “ control and
disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing law, and the
title to all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the
Government by dredging or filling or otherwise throughout the
Philippine Islands, shall be retained by the Government”
● Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General
shall give notice to the public that such parts of the lands so
made or reclaimed as are not needed for public purposes will be
leased for commercial and business purposes… which shall be
disposed of to the highest bidder.
● Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA is created to: “to
reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by
dredging, filling or other means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
…. To lease and sell any and all kinds of lands…”
● The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares.
Only 157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project
have been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still
submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay
● Under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a
maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be
titled in its name.
● The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but
also an additional 592.15 hectares which are still submerged
and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or
Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition.
These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or
certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these submerged
areas form part of the public domain, and in their present state are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
● Under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code, the government is required to sell
valuable government property through public bidding
● When government property has become unserviceable for any
cause, or is no longer needed, it shall, upon application of the
officer accountable therefor, be inspected by the head of the
agency or his duly authorized representative in the presence of the
 auditor concerned and, if found to be valueless or unsaleable, it
may be destroyed in their presence. If found to be valuable, it may
be sold at public auction to the highest bidder under the
supervision of the proper committee on award or similar body in
the presence of the auditor concerned or other authorized
representative of the Commission, after advertising by printed
notice in the Official Gazette, or for not less than three
consecutive days in any newspaper of general circulation, or
where the value of the property does not warrant the expense of
publication, by notices posted for a like period in at least three
public places in the locality where the property is to be sold. In the
event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a
private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same committee
or body concerned and approved by the Commission."
● The original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the
Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be
reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another
350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the
reclamation area to 750 hectares The failure of public bidding on
December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares is not a valid
justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double
the area publicly auctioned.
● The Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 140 of the Civil Code,
contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose
"object is outside the commerce of men," are "inexistent and void
from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend
and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended
JVA null and void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates

Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint
Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab
initio.
 35. CALICDAN v. CENDAÑA
February 5, 2004 | G.R. No. 155080 | Ynares-Santiago, J. | Land of Public
Domain: When Alienable and Disposable
B. SALAZAR
PETITIONER: Soledad Calicdan, represented by her guardian
Guadalupe Castillo
RESPONDENT: Silverio Cendaña, substituted by his legal heir Celsa
Cendaña-Alaras
RECIT-READY:
Sixto Calicdan was the owner of an unregistered land in Pangasinan. He
died intestate in 1941 and was survived by his wife (Fermina) and 3
children (Soledad, Jose, and Benigno). In 1947, Fermina donated the land
to Silverio Cendana. Silverio then entered into possession of the land.
Petitioner herein filed a complaint for recovery of ownership alleging that
the donation was void. Respondent alleged that the land was donated to
him and that he has been publicly, peacefully, continuously, and
adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45 years. RTC favored
petitioner but the CA reversed the decision and ruled that the donation
was valid.
ISSUE:
W/N the donation inter vivos is valid – NO.
W/N petitioner lost ownership of the land by prescription – YES.
RULING: Donation was not supported by convincing proof. Respondent
himself admitted during the cross examination that he had no personal
knowledge of whether Sixto Calicdan in fact purchased the subject land
from Felomino Bautista. Hearsay evidence are not admissible.
Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, respondent has become
the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
DOCTRINE: Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession
in good faith and with just title for ten years. In extraordinary
prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable
property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession
thereof.
FACTS:
● Case involves a 760 square meter parcel of unregistered land
located in Poblacion, Pangasinan. The land was formerly owned by
Sixto Calicdan, who died intestate in 1941. He was survived by his
wife (Fermina) and 3 children (Soledad, Jose, and Benigno).
● 1947 - Fermina executed a deed of donation inter vivos whereby
she conveyed the land to Silverio Cendaña. Silverio immediately
entered into possession of the land, built a fence around the land,
and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon. He resided
there until his death in 1998.
● 1992 – Petitioner, through guardian, filed a complaint for
“Recovery of Ownership, Possession, and Damages” against
respondent, alleging that the donation was void. She alleged that
respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the
land, and that she merely tolerated respondent’s possession of the
land.
● Respondent alleged that the land was donated to him by Fermina
and that he has been publicly, peacefully, continuously, and
adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45 years. He
argued that the complaint was barred by prior judgment in the
special proceedings for the "Inventory of Properties of
Incompetent Soledad Calicdan", where the court decreed the
exclusion of the land from the inventory of properties of the
petitioner.
● RTC favored petitioner and ordered Silverio to vacate the land and
surrender ownership to plaintiff. CA reversed this decision and
declared that the donation was VALID. CA also held that
petitioner lost her ownership of the property by PRESCRIPTION.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
● W/N the donation inter vivos is valid – NO.
● W/N petitioner lost ownership of the land by prescription – YES.
RATIO:
● The trial court found the donation of the land void because
Fermina was not the owner thereof, considering that it was
inherited by Sixto from his parents. Thus, the land was not part of
the conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan,
because under the Spanish Civil Code (the law applicable when
Sixto died in 1941) the surviving spouse had a right of
usufructonly over the estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently,
respondent, who derived his rights from Fermina, only acquired
the right of usufruct as it was the only right which the latter could
convey.
● SC now finds that the CA’s ruling that the donation was valid was
not supported by convincing proof. Respondent himself admitted
during the cross examination that he had no personal knowledge of
whether Sixto Calicdan in fact purchased the subject land from
Felomino Bautista.
○ Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of
his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from
his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be
hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as "evidence not of
what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard
from others."·
● Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation , respondent has
become the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary
acquisitive prescription.
● Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other
real rights over immovable property. It is concerned with lapse
of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law,
namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.
● [HELLO OBLICON] Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary
or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession in good faith and with just title for ten years.In
extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights
over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years without the need of
title or good faith.
● The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief
that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner
thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For purposes of
prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other
real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.
● Assuming that ordinary acquisitive prescription is unavailing in the
case at bar as it demands that the possession be "in good faith and
with just title," nevertheless, his adverse possession of the land for
more than 45 years aptly shows that he has met the requirements
for extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
○ The records show that the subject land is an
unregistered land. When the petitioner led the instant
case on June 29, 1992, respondent was in possession of
the land for 45 years counted from the time of the
donation in 1947.
o There is strong evidence of ownership:
§ Fenced and built a house;
§ Cultivating and reaping fruits;
§ Declared the land for taxation - Although tax
declarations or realty tax payment of
property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good
indicia of possession in the concept of
 owner, for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or constructive possession.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.

36. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v MANNA PROPERTIES,
INC.
January 31, 2005 | CARPIO, J | Land of Public Domain; When
Alienable & Disposable
H SANCHEZ
PETITIONER: Republic of the PH
RESPONDENT: Manna Properties Inc, Represented by its President
Jose Tanyao
RECIT-READY: Manna wants to register titles over 2 parcels of land.
But, the OSG, representing the Republic, said the applicant is a private
corporation disqualified under the new Philippine Constitution to hold
alienable lands of public domain.
ISSUE:
● W/N the land in question has not become private land and
remains part of the public domain? - YES
RULING: Under Section 48 of CA 141, land is converted into private
land if the applicant or their predecessors-in-interest were in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Lands that fall
under Section 48 of CA 141 are effectively segregated from the public
domain by virtue of acquisitive prescription. But, before this right can be
claimed, the claimant has to first prove open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed.
Here, Manna failed to show proof to show he or his predecessors-in-
interest have compiled with the required length of possession under CA
141. So, the land remains to be public domain. It wasn’t been converted
into a private one because of CA 141.
DOCTRINE: Lands that fall under Section 48 of CA 141 are effectively
segregated from the public domain by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
But, before this right can be claimed, the claimant has to first prove open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed.
FACTS:
● Manna Properties filed an Application for the registration of title of
two (2) parcels of land
● The Opposition to the application said the applicant is a private
corporation disqualified under the new Philippine Constitution to
hold alienable lands of public domain.
● But, the court granted Manna’s application prompting the OSG
(for the Republic) to appeal this decision to the CA. The CA
dismissed the appeal.
ISSUES:
● W/N the land in question has not become private land and remains
part of the public domain? - YES
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):
● Petitioner:
○ Petitioner claimed in its opposition to the application of
Manna Properties that, as a private corporation, Manna
Properties is disqualified from holding alienable lands of
the public domain, except by lease.
○ Petitioner cites the constitutional prohibition in Section 3
of Article XII in the 1987 Constitution.
○ Petitioner also claims that the land in question is still part
of the public domain.
RATIO:
● The governing law is CA 141 or the "Public Land Act."
● CA 141 Sec 48(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
 ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately preceding or predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the land since 12
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when June 1945 or earlier.
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively ● At best, Manna Properties can only prove possession since 1952.
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Manna Properties relied on shaky secondary evidence like the
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under testimony of Manuel and substitute tax declarations.
the provisions of this chapter.
● Lands that fall under Section 48 of CA 141 are effectively WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. We REVERSE the
segregated from the public domain by virtue of acquisitive Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2000 in CA-G.R.
prescription. CV No. 52562. The Application for Registration filed by Manna
● Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land Properties, Inc. over Lots No. 9515 and 1006 of Cad. 539-D, with a total
for the period prescribed by CA 141 ipso jure converts such land area of One Thousand Four Hundred Eighty (1,480) square meters
into private land. situated in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union, is
● Judicial confirmation in such cases is only a formality that merely DENIED.
confirms the earlier conversion of the land, the conversion having
occurred in law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete.
● Following our ruling in Director of Lands v. IAC, Manna
Properties, a private corporation, may apply for judicial
confirmation of the land without need of a separate
confirmation proceeding for its predecessors-in-interest first.
● However, before one can claim rights under CA 141, he has to first
prove open, continuous and adverse possession for the requisite
period of time.
● But, any applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the
burden of proving that he is qualified to have the land titled in his
name.
● Here, Manna used testimony of one of its predecessors-in-interest,
Manuel Sobrepeña, transferee's affidavits, and several tax
declarations to prove the required length of possession.
● The tax declaration submitted by Manna indicates that it is actually
a substitute tax declaration issued on Nov 28, 1950 and was issued
to replace the 1945 tax declaration covering the land in question.
A substitute is not enough.
● Manuel’s testimony was also insufficient and self-serving on its
own. Manuel did not also specifically testify that he, or his parents
 37. REPUBLIC v. NAGUIT
January 17, 2005 | J. Tinga | Land of Public Domain: When Alienable
● If the property has already been classified as alienable and
and Disposable
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an
H. SEGOVIA & R. SERRANO
intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: The Honorable Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit
● Even if the possession of the alienable public land
RECIT-READY: Naguit filed a petition for the registration of title of a commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and
parcel of land in Aklan. The land was occupied by Naguit and her possession being open, continuous and exclusive, then the
predecessors-in-interest openly and in the concept of owner without any
possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of
objection from any private person or even the government until she filed
her application for registration. The Republic contested the application Sec. 14(2) of P.D. 1529.
on the grounds that the land applied for was declared alienable and
disposable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 as required by Sec.
14 of P.D. 1529, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or ● In the case, the land was found to be cocal in nature, it having
disposable. been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. The
inherent nature of the land confirms its certification in 1980 as
alienable, hence agricultural.
ISSUE:
● W/N it is necessary under Sec. 14(1) of P.D. 1529 that the land
be first classified as alienable and disposable before the
applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership ● There is no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of
could even start. - NO the Property Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished by
the lower courts.
RULING:
● Sec. 14 (1) merely requires the property to be sought to
● The ownership of the land can be traced back to that of Naguit’s
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. predecessors-in-interest, which commenced since 1945 or for
almost fifty (50) years, it is beyond doubt that she has acquired
● If the State, at the time the application is made , has not yet title thereto, which may be properly brought under the operation
deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or of the Torrens System.
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to DOCTRINE:
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
Sec. 14 (1) merely requires the property to be sought to registered as
adverse possession even if in good faith.

already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed.
If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it
proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the
State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good
faith.
If the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property.
● To prove that the land subject of an application for registration
is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as:
○ a presidential proclamation or an executive order;
○ an administrative action;
○ investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and
○ a legislative act or a statute.
FACTS:
● On January 5, 1993, Corazon Naguit filed with the MCTC of
Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a
parcel of land in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan.
● The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, and contains an
area of 31,374 sq. meters.
● The parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in
ISSUES:
the name of Ramon Urbano in 1945 until 1991. Urbano executed a
Deed of Quitclaim and renounced his rights to the property,
confirming the sale made by his father to Maming.
● Heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
Naguit, who started occupying the same. Naguit constituted
Manuel Blanco Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator.
● Blanco introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany,
coconut and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees
which were then 50 to 60 years old and paid the corresponding
taxes due on the land.
● Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land
openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from
any private person or even the government until she filed her
application for registration.
● The MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the land be brought
under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or
P.D. No. 1529 and that the title be registered and confirmed in
the name of Naguit.
● The Republic thru the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration.
OSG stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable
and disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification of
the Executive Director Geollegue of DENR, Region VI.
● RTC and CA ruling: There is no need for the government’s prior
release of the subject lot from the public domain before it can be
ordered alienable and disposable within the meaning of P.D. 1529
and Naguit had been in possession of the lot in the concept of
owner for the required period.
W/N it is necessary under Sec. 14(1) of P.D. 1529 that the land be first
classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start. - NO
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):
● Petitioner: OSG argued that the property which is in open,
continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable.
Since the land was only declared alienable on Oct. 15, 1980,
Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 as required by Sec. 14 of P.D.
1529, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable.
● Respondent: Alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
RATIO:
1. Section 14. Who may apply. -- The following persons may file in
the proper CFI an application for the registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
a. Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
b. Those who have acquired ownership over private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
12. There are three requisites for the filing of an application for
registration of title under Sec. 14(1) -
a. that the property in question is alienable and disposable
of the public domain
b. Applicants or their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation, and
c. Such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
13. The Court adopted the OSG’s view and held that Sec. 14 (1)
merely requires the property to be sought to registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed.
14. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith.
15. If the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention
on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative
over the property.
16. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as:
a. a presidential proclamation or an executive order;
b. an administrative action;
c. investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and
d. a legislative act or a statute.
17. The present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of
Sec. 14(1) of P.D. 1529, which pertains to original registration
through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file the
application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of
ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the
 claimant’s open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
18. A similar right is given under Section 48(b) if the Public Land
Act
a. Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but
those titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
b. xxx xxx xxx
c. (b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
19. When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the
period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to
register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain
commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was
amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide
claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30)
years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was
again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the
reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is
concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
20. The enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 DID NOT preclude the application for
registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession
over which commenced only after June 12, 1945, considering
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs
and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
21. Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the
Civil Code. Properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and
exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. With such
conversion, property may fall within the contemplation of “private
lands” under Sec. 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through prescription.
22. Even if the possession of the alienable public land commenced on
a date later than June 12, 1945, and possession being open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to
register the land by virtue of Sec. 14(2) of P.D. 1529.
23. In the case, the land was found to be cocal in nature, it having
been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. The
inherent nature of the land confirms its certification in 1980 as
alienable, hence agricultural.
24. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished by the
lower courts.
25. The ownership of the land can be traced back to that of her
predecessors-in-interest, which commenced since 1945 or for
almost fifty (50) years, it is beyond doubt that she has acquired
 title thereto, which may be properly brought under the operation of
the Torrens System.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of

the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED.
38. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v JEREMIAS AND DAVID
HERBIETO
26 May 2005 | G.R. No. 156117 | Chico- Nazario, J | When is a land of
public domain alienable and disposable
Made by:SERRANO
Recit Ready:
On September 23, 1998, Herbieto brothers,, Jeremias and David, filed
with the MTC a single application for registration of 2 parcels of land
located in Cabangahan Consolacion Cebu (Subject Lots). They claim to
be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots which was purchased from
the parents. (Sps. Gregorio Herbieto nd Isabel Owatan) on June 25,
1976. In their application, the brothers included supporting documents
such as certifications by the Registrar of Deeds of Cebu on the absence of
certificates of title covering the Subject Lots, CENRO certifications
finding that the lands were alienable and disposable by virtue of Admin
Order N 1063 dated June 25, 1963 and deed of Definite Sale executed on
June 25, 1976 issued in favor of the brothers by their parents, among
others.
Respondents claim that their parents had been in possession of the
Subject Lots in the concept of owner since 1950. Moreover, as
predecessors in interest, their open, continuous, exclusive possession of
the Subject Lots is enough for them to acquire Subject Lots.
FACTS:
The MTC and CA granted the application. They both held the land
sought to be registered has been classified within the alienable and
disposable zone since June 25, 1963. In accordance to Section 12(4) of
PD 1529, which allows individuals to own land in any manner provided
by law.
However, the Republic appealed and averred that the CA erred in
granting the petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the period of possession of the Subject Lots (Public Land) enough
for the application to be granted to the respondents. NO
RULING:
The Court held that since the respondents filed their application to the
MTC, they sought for a judicial declaration or legalization of imperfect
and incomplete title. By doing so, provisions of the Public Lands Act, as
amended, should have been followed. Under Sec. 48(b) of the said act,
possession of the Subject Lots should have been on or before June 12,
1945. Clearly, the respondents lacked the number of years needed. It is
also important to note that the number of years counted for the
acquisition must be computed from the day the Subject Lots was declared
to be alienable and disposable. The respondents also failed to satisfy this
requirement. In the case at bar, the PLA, being a special law, should
prevail over the Civil Code.
Doctrine: Judicial confirmation or legalization of public lands follows
the Public Lands Act, as amended. As Sec. 48(b) clearly states,
occupants of lands of public domain should have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation on or
before June 12, 1945
● This petition seeks to reverse the judgment granting the application
for land registration of the respondents.
● Herbieto brothers (Jeremias and David as respondents) filed a
single application for registration of two parcels of land (Lots No.
8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu
(Subject Lots).
● The brothers claim to be in fee simple of the Subject Lots which
they purchased from their parents, Sps. Herbieto and Isabel
Owatan on June 25, 1976.
● With their application for registration, the brothers also submitted
the ff set of documents:
○ Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of
respondent Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot
No. 8423, in the name of respondent David
○ The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;
○ Certifications by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) dispensing with the need for
Surveyor's Certificates for the Subject Lots;
○ Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City
on the absence of certificates of title covering the
Subject Lots;
○ Certifications by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources (CENRO) of the DENR on its
finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and
disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative
Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963;
○ Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property
(ARP) No. 941800301831, in the name of Jeremias,
covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No.
941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot
No.8423, also issued in 1994; and
○ TEHDIA Deed of De􀀾nite Sale executed on 25 June
1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan
selling the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to
their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for
P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No.
8423 was sold to David.
● On 11 December 1998, petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) filed an opposition to the application of the Subjects
Lots because of the ff argument :
○ Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse
possession as required by law;
○ Respondents muniment of title were not genuine and did
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona
fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and
○ Subjects Lots were part of public domain belonging to
the Republic and were not subject to private
appropriation.
● MTC set a hearing and allowners of land adjoining the Subject
Lots were sent copies of Notice of Initial Hearing. Copies wrealso
placed on a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots as well as the
bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion Cebu
where the lots were located and duly published in the Official
Gazette.
● MTC: promulgated its judgement ordering the registration and
confirmation of the title of Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and Dacid
over Lot No. 8423. The order also directed the Administrator of
the RA to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots.
● CA: Affirmed the MTC judgment saying that the land sought to be
registered as within the alienable and disposable zone. CA also
acknowledge that the parents of the appellees have acquired
subject parcels of land since 1950 and cultivated it with jackfruits,
bamboos, coconuts, and other trees In sort, it is undisputed that the
appellees are predecessors-in-interest.
● The subject property being alienable since 1963 as shown by
CENRO Report may now be the object of prescription
○ Art. 1137: appellees are with much greater right to apply
for registration pursuant to Sec. 12(4) of PD 1529 on the
same year that CENRO declared the parcels of land in
open, continuous and in the concept of the owner for 35
years already when they applied for registration.
● Republic appealed the decision of the CA.
● Republic Arguments:
○ Respondents failed to establish that they and their
predecessor-in-interest has been in open, continuous , and
adverse possession of the Subject Lot.
 ○ Possession of lands prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be
considered in determining compliance with the periods
of possession required by law.
○ Commonwealth Act No. 141 aka Public Land Act
requires that possession of land of the public domain must
be from 12 June 1945 or earlier for the same to be
acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title
○ The application for fatal infirmity as the subject of the
application consisted of 2 parcels of land individually and
separately owned by two applicants.
■ In violation of PD No .1529 stating that the
application for registration of title to land shall
be filed by a single applicant.
ISSUE:
(1) W/N MTC has jurisdiction to hear an application for registration
filed by the brothers. YES
(2) RELEVANT: W/N the period of possession of the Subject Lots
(Public Land) enough for the application to be granted to the
respondents. NO
RATIO:
(1) The procedural lapse ( having one application for two lots) does
not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed and hear their
application for registration. The Property Registration Decree
(PRD) recognizes that single filing of application is allowed when
several parcels of land are located within the same province.
However, PRD is silent regarding having two applicants filing a
single application for 2 parcels of land.
HOWEVER, Republic was unable to call the attention of MTC to
correct the non application of misjoinder of causes of action.
(2) Respondents failed to comply with the required period of
possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation of
legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.
● Even if respondents claim that they were in possession of the
property since 25 June 1976 and their parents had been in
possession of the Subject Lots in 1950, DENR CENRO
Certification declared the said lots to be “within Alienable and
Disposable and outside the Kotkot-Lusuran Mananga Watershed
Forest Reservation per PD 932 on 25 June 1963. Thus, are part
of the public domain.
● No public land can be acquired by private persons without grant,
express or implied, from the government. In the case at bar, mode
of acquisition applicable is the Public Land Act which explicitly
enumerates means by which public lands may be disposed of: by
confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles by: a) judicial
legalization or b) by administrative legalization.
● By entering an application to the MTC, the respondents opted for
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title by judicial
legalization. By doing so they subjected their acquisition under the
PLA .
● Sec 48 of PLA as amended by PD 1073 states:
Sec. 48: The ff described citizens of the PH occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein but whose titles have not been perfected or completed may
apply to CFI where land is located for confirmation of their claims
and issuance of a certificate of title thereafter under the Land
Registration Act:
b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of
applications for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
 have performed all conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter .
● Clearly, Subject Lots only became alienable and disposable on 25
june 1963. Thus, any period of possession prior to the date
indicated should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession because such possession can never ripen
into ownership unless declared alienable and disposable.
● CA erred in basing the claim of respondents under the Property
Registration Decree. Since the PLA is a special law, it supersedes
the Civil Code. Thus, acquisition should not be based on
extraordinary prescription under Art. 1113.
● PLEASE NOTE:
○ Property Registration Decree: there exists a title which is
confirmed by the court. (This is inapplicable since the
subject lots does not have a title yet as evidenced in the
submitted documents by the respondents)
○ Public Land Act: presumption is always that the land
applied for pertains to the State and occupants and
possessors only claim interest by virtue of their imperfect
title or continuous, open, and notorious possession.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22
November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of
Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and
its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID.
Respondents' application for registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.