Rey, CAUSE NO. CV-56,877 ‘a0 PILED AUG 19° As ez LAURA NODOLF, § IN THERRESAUSIES qnuee Applicant § ob 7 ; shou vs. § 4415" JU RAKAS TERRY JOHNSON, : a —arputy Respondent § MIDLAND COURMYPREX AS, FINAL ORDER On August 13, 2020, the court heard (1) the Application for Writ of Mandamus filed by Applicant, (2) the Request for Declaratory Relief filed by Applicant, (3) the Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss filed by Respondent, and (4) the Motion to Dismiss the Application for Writ of Mandamus filed by Respondent. Applicant and Respondent appeared with counsel and announced ready. Arguments were presented and the court's final rulings were deferred to accommodate the parties’ requests to submit post-submission briefing. In her operative pleading, Applicant requests the court to (1) issue a writ of mandamus directing Respondent to immediately file a proposed county budget for the 2021 fiscal year, and (2) judicially declare that Respondent is obligated to file @ proposed county budget no later than July 31* of each calendar year (emphasis added). In response, Respondent claims that (1) Applicant lacks proper standing to initiate this proceeding, (2) if standing exists, Applicant's request for mandamus relief is moot and should be dismissed, and (3) if standing exists, Applicant's suit should be dismissed because the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Applicant’s asserted request for declaratory relief. The court has thoroughly reviewed and considered Applicant’s requests for relief, Respondent’s pending motions, the parties’ respective responses, the evidence, exhibits, documents, and stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, the pleadings filed in this cause bythe parties, the post-submission briefing submitted by Applicant on August 18, 2020, the arguments of counsel, and the applicable law. Accordingly, the court FINDS and CONCLUDES: 1 Applicant has standing to initiate this proceeding pursuant to Section 41.009, Tex. Gov't Code, Therefore, Respondent's Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss are DENIED insofar as said dispositive motions challenge Applicant’s standing, In addressing Applicant’s claims for mandamus and declaratory relief, the court’s authority to act is restricted to the specific requests for relief alleged and pleaded in Applicant's operative pleading. Of significance is the pleading terminology used by Applicant. Applicant secks a writ of mandamus directing Respondent to “immediately file” a proposed county budget for the 2021 fiscal year. If warranted, a writ of mandamus will issue to compel a party to perform a cértain act. Here, it is undisputed that Respondent submitted a proposed county budget for the 2021 fiscal year to the Midland County Clerk on August 6, 2020; the proposed budget was filed of record on the same day. Clearly, Respondent has performed the specific act that Applicant was requesting. Because the complained of act may no longer be compelled, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Application for Writ of Mandamus is GRANTED, and Applicant's request for a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED as MOOT. In her request for declaratory relief, Applicant pleads and alleges that Respondent is duty bound to ile proposed county budget no later than July 31* of each calendar year (emphasis added). Similar to Applicant’s request for mandamus relief, one’s ability to file a proposed 2021 fiscal year county budget on or before July 31, 2020 has passed. As such, to grant Applicant relief in the manner she has requested would necessitate that the court judicially declare that Respondent must retrospectively comply with Applicant's suggested deadline, ie. file a proposed 2021 fiscal year county budget on or before July 31, 2020 (emphasis added). Because inipossibility precludes the performance of this requested act, the court is without authority to grant the specific relief Applicant seeks, assuming such relief was justified, Therefore, Applicant’s request for declaratory relief on this basis is DENIED as MOOT. Nevertheless, this determination does not end the analysis. Importantly, the deadline “to file a proposed county budget” allegation is the focus of Applicant's complaint for declaratory relicf (emphasis added). As such, the court’s inquiry restricted to this specifically pleaded allegation. In “filing” a proposed county budget, Respondent must comply with the requirements of Section 111.006(a), Local Gov't Code. Unlike Section 111.003(a), which mandates that the county judge must prepare a proposed county budget by a date certain (no later than July 31° of each calendar year), Section 11 1,006(a) contains no specific or mandated date certain deadline for when the county judge must file a proposed county budget (emphasis added). In fact, Section 111.006(a) is silent as to any definitive, or date certain, deadline to file a proposed county budget. This is a meaningful distinction and presumably indicative of the Legislature's intent of refusing to impose a specific date certain deadline to “file” a proposed budget.7. Applicant posits that Section 111.006(a) “implies” that Respondent's deadline to “file” a proposed county budget is harmonious with and mirrors the “preparation” deadline ‘mandated by Section 111,0U3(@). As such, Applicant believes that the deadline to prepare AND file a proposed county budget is, or should be, the same (July 31% of each calendar year). Despite this contention, the court is unaware of any precedent, and Applicant has cited none, that would support Applicant's argument. 8. The court cannot create or impose a date certain deadline for Respondent to file a proposed county budget when no such deadline exists in Section 111.006(a) (emphasis added). Nor will the court imply such a deadline, as Applicant suggests. Indeed, the imposition of a date certain deadline is solely a legislative function. Here, in the absence of a definitive statutory deadline, and because of the manner in which this claim has been alleged and pleaded by Applicant, Applicant's claim for declaratory relief fails. 9. Moreover, irrespective of Applicant's “implied filing deadline” assertion, substantial compliance with Section 111,006(a) may suffice. In this instance, and for purposes of the 2021 fiscal year, Respondent has substantially complied with the spirit and intent of Section 111.006(a). Therefote, considering the totality of circumstances and for the reasons stated, Applicant’s request for declaratory relief, as pleaded, is DENIED. It is of no consequence whether Applicant's claim targets the 2021 fiscal year or subsequent fiscal years, 10. Finally, Applicant complains in responsive filings that Respondent's delay and delinquency in preparing a proposed county budget has deprived all Midland County citizens of the mandatory time allowed by law to adequately review, analyze, and request reasonable budgetary changes before the Midland County Commissioners Court officially adopts said budget. Although not specifically pleaded in her Application, Applicant has nonetheless globally asserted a claim for “.... all other relief to which [she] ...” may be justly entitled. Here, Applicant's global assertion may be construed to encompass the concerns of the citizenry. 11. The court is mindful of the circumstances at hand, the parties’ intentions, and the concerns of the citizenry. Therefore, in the interest of justice, and consistent with its equitable discretion, the court believes that the “citizens of Midland County” should be provided sufficient time to review and address any potential budgetary concerns. As such, the court ORDERS that the public hearing for the adoption of the Midland County budget shall occur on SEPTEMBER 21, 2020. The court is confident that this brief delay (a) is not contrary to the requirements of Section 111.007, (b) will cause no harm or prejudice to the citizenry or the appropriate governing body, (c) will not interfere with the governing body’s ability to timely adopt a county budget, and (d) will cure any concerns that may exist. 12. In light of the court’s findings, it is not necessary to address the merits of the jurisdictional argument raised by Respondent in his Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss. This FINAL ORDER disposes of all pending claims, and is appealable. All relief requested and not expressly granted herein is DENIED.ITIS SO ORDERED. SIGNED the 19 day of August, 2020. CO). St Cae W. STACY TROTTER, JUDGE PRESIDING SITTING BY ASSIGNMENT