Saguisag v Exec Secretary
Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
between the US and the Philippines.
EDCA is an executive agreement which authorizes the
US military forces to have access to and conduct
activities within certain "Agreed Locations". It was not
transmitted to the Senate on the Executive's
understanding that to do so was no longer necessary.
The agreement was signed by the Secretary of National
Defense and the US Ambassador in April 2014 and was
ratified by President Aquino III in June 2014.
Petitioners argue that EDCA should have been in the
form of a Treaty concurred in by the Senate, not an
executive agreement. The Senators, through a
Resolution, expressed that for EDCA to be valid and
effective, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for
deliberation and concurrence.
Issue: Whether the President may enter into an
executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities
Ruling:
Yes.
The role of the President as the executor of the law
includes the duty to defend the State, for which
purpose he may use that power in the conduct of
foreign relations. The President possesses the most
comprehensive and most confidential information
about foreign countries and has unlimited access to
ultra-sensitive military intelligence data. The
presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and he is
accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of
foreign affairs.
Despite the President’s role as defender of the State
and as sole authority in foreign relations, the 1987
Constitution limits his ability in instances when it
involves entry of foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities. Art XVIII Sec 25 of the Constitution prohibits
the entry of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities,
EXCEPT by way of a treaty concurred in by the Senate.
The President, however, may enter into executive
agreement of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
if:
a) It is NOT the instrument that allows the
presence of foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities; or
b) It merely aims to implement an existing law or
treaty
Applying the verba legis rule, the Court in this case held
that the Constitutional restriction refers solely to the
INITIAL ENTRY of the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts
are thereafter subject only to the limitations provided
by the Constitution and Philippine law, and NOT Sec 25
requirement of validity through a Treaty.
Articles I and III of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) –
a treaty already ratified by the Senate and supposedly
being implemented by EDCA– has already allowed
ENTRY of US Military troops and civilian personnel in
the Philippines. What EDCA has effectively done is
merely provide the mechanism to identify the locations
in which US personnel may perform allowed activities
pursuant to the VFA. As the implementing agreement, it
regulates and limits the presence of US personnel in the
country.
The authorized activities of US military and civilian
personnel within the Philippines under EDCA is in
furtherance of the MDT and VFA. The MDT
contemplates a situation in which both countries shall
engage in joint activities to maintain and develop their
defense capabilities. The VFA indicates that the
presence of US military and civilian personnel in the
Philippines is in connection with activities approved by
the Philippine government.
EDCA seeks to be an instrument that enumerates the
Philippine-approved activities of US personnel referred
to in the VFA. According to Art. I of EDCA, one of its
purposes is to maintain and develop the capacities of
both countries to resist an armed attack. The court
found that EDCA has remained within the parameters
set in the MDT and VFA. Mere adjustments in detail to
implement these two treaties can be in the form of
executive agreement and need not be transmitted to
the Senate.
PADILLA V CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR Nos. 231671 & 231694, 25 July 2017
En Banc, Leonardo- De Castro.
On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law
and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Mindanao on the grounds of rebellion and
necessity of public safety pursuant to Article VII, Section
18 of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate and the House
of Representatives respectively deliberated and passed
separate resolutions (Senate Resolution 388 and House
Resolution 1050) expressing support for President
Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 on the declaration of a
State of Martial Law and the suspension of the Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
The consolidated petitions assail the failure
and/or refusal of respondent Congress, composed of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, to
convene in joint session and therein deliberate said
proclamation.
A. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
Yes, the Court has jurisdiction. Since the
principal substantive issue presented in the cases at bar
is the proper interpretation of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, there can be no doubt that the Court may
take jurisdiction over the petitions.
B. Whether or not the petitions satisfy the requisites
for the Court's exercise of its power of judicial review.
Petitioners satisfy the standards. The citizen-
petitioners' challenge of a purportedly unconstitutional
act done in behalf of the general public, gives them
legal standing. An actual case or controversy ripe for
adjudication exists as the petitions allege an omission
on the part of the Congress that constitutes neglect of
their constitutional duties. The petitions also raise
issues concerning the Congress' role in our
government's system of checks and balance; an issue of
transcendental importance deserving the attention of
the Court. And although the main relief prayed for may
arguably have been rendered moot by the lapse of the
original sixty (60) day effectivity of the President's
martial law declaration and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, a definitive ruling from this
Court is imperative to guide the Bench, the Bar, the
public and to clarify the parameters of congressional
conduct required by the Constitution.
C. Whether or not it is mandatory for Congress to
convene jointly upon the President's proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus under Article VII, Section 18 of
the 1987 Constitution.
The Court answers in the negative. The
provision only requires Congress to vote jointly on the
revocation of the President's proclamation and/or
suspension. The plain language of the constitutional
provision does not support the petitioners' argument
that it is obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint
session following the President's proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, under all circumstances.
D. Whether or not a writ of mandamus or certiorari
may be issued in the present cases.
The Court has no authority to compel Congress
to convene in joint session absent a clear ministerial
duty on its part to do so under the Constitution.
Premises considered, the Congress did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it did not jointly convene
upon the President's issuance of Proclamation No. 216
prior to expressing its concurrence thereto.
LAGMAN v. MEDIALDEA
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774, 4 July 2017
En Banc, Del Castillo
President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao. Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to
Congress a written Report on the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216, pointing out that for decades,
Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless
violence which only escalated and worsened with the
passage of time. The Congress, expressing full support
to the martial law proclamation, found it to be
satisfactory, constitutional, and in accordance with the
law.
Three petitions were filed seeking the nullification of
the Proclamation, and for the power of the Court to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law, as vested to it by Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution:
The Lagman Petition argues that acts of terrorism in
Mindanao do not constitute rebellion since there is no
proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any
part thereof from allegiance to the Philippines, its laws,
or its territory.
The Cullamat Petition (1) avers that the supposed
rebellion described in Proclamation No. 216 relates to
events happening in Marawi City only and not in the
entire region of Mindanao; and (2) assails the inclusion
of the phrase "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No.
216 for being vague as it failed to identify these rebel
groups and specify the acts of rebellion that they were
supposedly waging.
The Mohamed Petition posits that martial law is a
measure of last resort and should be invoked by the
President only after exhaustion of less severe remedies.
It maintains that the President has no discretion to
choose which extraordinary power to use.
In its consolidated Comment, the OSG posits that
although Section 18, Article VII lays the basis for the
exercise of such authority or power, the same
constitutional provision fails to specify the vehicle,
mode or remedy through which the "appropriate
proceeding" mentioned therein may be resorted to. The
OSG suggests that such refers to a Petition for Certiorari
pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII.
A. Does “appropriate proceeding” refer to a
Petition for Certiorari?
No. The jurisdiction of the Court under Section 18,
Article VII is sui generis. It is a special and specific
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those
enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. It could
not have been the intention of the framers of the
Constitution that the phrase "in an appropriate
proceeding" would refer to a Petition for Certiorari
pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The
standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether
the respondent has committed any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
the performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not
the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation or suspension.
The phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing
on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to
any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of
questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as
in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint,
a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.
B. Should the extraordinary power of the
President be dispensed sequentially?
No. Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President,
as Commander-in-Chief, a 'sequence' of 'graduated
powers.' From the most to the least benign, these are:
the calling out power, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to
declare martial law." It must be stressed, however, that
the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope
and effect. It does not in any manner refer to a
sequence, arrangement, or order which the
Commander-in-Chief must follow. The power to choose,
initially, which among these extraordinary powers to
wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call on
the part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his
powers are broad enough to include his prerogative to
address exigencies or threats that endanger the
government, and the very integrity of the State.
C. May the Proclamation be considered vague
and thus void because of (a) its inclusion of " other
rebel groups"; and (b) the absence of any guideline
specifying its actual operational parameters within the
entire Mindanao region?
No. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is
facially invalid if "men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.” The vagueness doctrine applies only in free
speech cases, developed for testing “on their faces”
statutes in such cases. Clearly, facial review of
Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds of vagueness is
unwarranted. It does not regulate speech, religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights that may be
facially challenged. What it seeks to penalize is conduct,
not speech.
D. Does the scope of the power of the Court to
review include determining whether the decision of
the President is correct?
No. Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial
review by the introduction of the "sufficiency of the
factual basis" test. The Court's power to review is
limited to the determination of whether the President
in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis.
Thus, such would be limited to an examination on
whether the President acted within the bounds set by
the Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his
possession prior to and at the time of the declaration or
suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial law
or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. As
Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole
discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the
revocation of Congress and the review of this Court.

E. Is there sufficient factual basis for the

declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao?
Yes. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid,
there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or
invasion and the public safety requirement. In his
Report, the President noted that the acts of violence
perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were
directed not only against government forces or
establishments but likewise against civilians and their
properties. In addition and in relation to the armed
hostilities, he enumerated particular scenarios which
convinced him that the atrocities had already escalated
to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled
him to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.

Further, the Constitution grants to the President the

discretion to determine the territorial coverage of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines
or only a part thereof under martial law.