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Slide 1
Abstract…
Quantitative risk analysis is a widely accepted technique within the chemical and
process industries. It has been adopted to form legislative requirements in many
countries within Europe and Asia.
Slide 2
Contents…
¾ Consequence Modeling
¾ Probability Modeling
¾ Risk Mitigation
¾ Case Studies
Slide 3
History of QRA…
Early Development:
¾ Chemical & Process industry applications began in the late 1970s and early 1980s
by HSE, UK (Canvey Reports) and Rijnmond Public Authority, Netherlands
(Rijnmond Report)
Early Drivers:
¾ Mexico City, Mexico (1984, Vapor Cloud Explosion, BLEVE, 650 deaths)
Slide 4
Basics of QRA…
Individual Risk:
“Individual Risk is the risk of some specified event or agent harming a statistical (or
hypothetical) person assumed to have representative characteristics.” - HSE, 1995
¾ Results typically given as likelihood of death (or dangerous dose) per year
Slide 5
Basics of QRA…
1 x 10-5
1 x 10-4
Slide 6
Basics of QRA…
Societal Risk:
“Societal Risk is the risk of widespread or large scale detriment from the realisation
of a defined hazard.” - HSE, 1995
¾ Technique can be modified to show financial risk rather than fatality risk
Slide 7
Basics of QRA…
Slide 8
Acceptance of QRA…
“QRA is equivalent to counting the number of angels that can stand on the
head of a pin. It can be concluded that risk analysis is likely to be a waste of
time if applied to chemical processes.”
Slide 9
QRA in practice…
Slide 10
UK legislation…
Inner Zone
Middle Zone
Outer Zone
Consultation
Distance
Slide 11
UK legislation…
¾ Inner Zone: 10 chances per million (cpm) per year, of receiving a dangerous dose
¾ Middle Zone: 1 chance per million per year, of receiving a dangerous dose
¾ Outer Zone: 0.3 chances per million per year, of receiving a dangerous dose
Slide 12
QRA methodology…
Define Scope
& Objectives
Hazard Identification
Risk Determination
Risk No
Acceptability Develop Control
Measures
Yes
Operate
Slide 13
Hazard Identification…
Commonly applied techniques of hazard identification:
¾ What-If Analysis
Broader scope than HAZOP
Uses checklist technique
¾Flammable hazards
Jet Fire
Pool Fire
Flash Fire
BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion)
¾Explosive hazards
Confined Vapor Cloud Explosion
Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion
Dust Explosion
Runaway Reaction
Slide 15
Hazard Identification…
- Trevor Kletz
Slide 16
Consequence Modeling…
Now that the hazards are identified, what are the consequences?
Slide 17
Consequence Modeling…
Stages involved:
Discharge
Storage conditions, flow rate, composition,
phase, release type (leak, line rupture),
release duration, orientation
Dispersion
Weather conditions, topographical
conditions, release composition,
orientation, concentrations of interest
Consequences
Flammable, Explosive, Toxic
Slide 18
Consequence Modeling…
Flammable consequences:
BLEVE
(Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion)
Flammable consequences:
Jet Fire
¾ Intentional (flare)
Slide 20
Consequence Modeling…
Flammable consequences:
Pool Fire
Slide 21
Flammable Criteria…
Flammable consequences:
Slide 22
Consequence Modeling…
Flammable consequences:
Slide 23
Consequence Modeling…
Explosion consequences:
Flixborough, UK
1974
Slide 24
Consequence modeling…
Explosion consequences:
Slide 25
Explosion Criteria…
Explosion consequences:
Slide 26
Consequence Modeling…
Explosion consequences:
Slide 27
Consequence Modeling…
Toxic consequences:
Slide 28
Consequence Modeling…
Toxic consequences:
Slide 29
Consequence Modeling…
Toxic consequences:
Slide 30
Consequence Modeling…
Toxic consequences:
Slide 31
Toxic Criteria…
Toxic consequences:
Slide 32
Consequence Modeling…
Toxic consequences:
Probit Equation
Pr = a + b ln ( Cn x t )
Cn x t= dose
Slide 33
Consequence Modeling…
Toxic consequences:
Slide 34
Consequence Modeling…
Toxic consequences:
Slide 35
Consequence Modeling…
Toxic consequences:
Slide 36
Probability Analysis
¾ Introduction
¾ Method
¾ Models
¾ Uncertainties
Slide 37
Introduction
R=p3c
Slide 38
Method
Slide 39
@Risk methodology
Slide 40
Method – The Ten Commandments
Slide 41
Method – The Ten Commandments
Slide 42
Models
¾ What-if analysis
¾ Qualitative method used to systematically
identify hazards by the use of the question
”what if…?”.
Slide 43
Decision Tree
Choice of mitigation Choice of insurance Does release occur? Different types of releases
Type A 1
Type A 2
Type A 3
None
No
None
Half
Full
Example
Mitigation 1
Mitigation 2
Slide 44
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Release of ammonia
Top Event
Release
Slide 45
Example of a FTA
¾ FTA of equipment
failure
¾ The probability is
used in the ETA
Slide 46
Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
Slide 47
Models
Slide 48
Uncertainties
Slide 49
Uncertainties
Where can I find information about the probabilities for specific events?
¾ Previous analysis
¾ Literature
¾ Statistics
Slide 50
Risk Mitigation…
¾ Reduction
¾ Substitution
¾ Moderation
¾ Simplification
Slide 51
Risk Mitigation…
Slide 52
Risk Mitigation…
Slide 53
Risk Mitigation…
Slide 54
Risk Mitigation…
¾ Simplification - make the plant and process simpler to design, build and operate;
hence less susceptible to equipment, control or human error
Slide 55
Risk Mitigation…
Consequence Reduction:
¾ Use minimum pipe sizes to minimise potential release rate, in the event of pipe
failure
Slide 56
Risk Mitigation…
Consequence Reduction:
¾ Facility siting can locate hazardous inventories away from main operating areas, or
areas of population
Slide 57
Risk Mitigation…
Likelihood Reduction:
Slide 58
Risk Mitigation…
Likelihood Reduction:
¾ Install gas detectors for early identification of toxic or flammable gas releases
¾ Ensure safe working practices are followed, and all potential hazards have been
identified
Slide 59
Risk Mitigation…
Slide 60
Cost Benefit Analysis
¾ Purpose
¾ Method
¾ Calculation
¾ Uncertainties
¾ Examples
Slide 61
Purpose
Slide 62
Method
¾ Define the policy strategy for the CBA (site and/or legislative)
Slide 63
Cost
¾ Operating expenditure
Slide 64
Benefit
¾ Loss of life
¾ Loss of property
¾ Loss of goodwill
¾ Insurance
Slide 66
Example 1: Costs for improvement of warehouse
Slide 67
Example 2: Valuations of life for the UK
Slide 68
Example 3: Inherently safer design
Slide 69
Example 4: Cost-effective risk reduction
More
tolerable
Risk-Based
Safety Design
Amount of Risk
Reduction
Traditional Process
Safety Design
Less
tolerable
Slide 70
Case Study I…
¾ Anhydrous Ammonia
¾ 3000 tons transferred from supply ship to 4000 tons refrigerated atmospheric
storage tank
Purpose of study:
¾ Identify and quantify hazards and risks related to the unloading and storage of
refrigerated ammonia in a new tank at the terminal;
¾ Determine hazards/risks due to possible accident scenarios which will lead to fire,
explosion or toxic release;
¾ Facilitate the development of emergency response plans to deal with all possible
accident scenarios.
Slide 71
Case Study I…
Slide 72
Case Study I…
Slide 73
QRA methodology…
Define Scope
& Objectives
Hazard Identification
Risk Determination
Risk No
Acceptability Develop Control
Measures
Yes
Operate
Slide 74
Hazard Identification…
¾ Therefore, jet fire, pool fire and explosion hazards resulting from releases of
refrigerated liquid ammonia are extremely unlikely
Slide 76
Criteria…
Slide 77
Criteria…
Slide 78
Probability Analysis…
Slide 79
Probability Analysis…
2.7 Line in Service 2.2 x10-2 16 hours per cooldown and transfer x
12 times per yr. gives 192 hrs/yr.
Slide 80
Results Summary…
Slide 81
Results Summary…
Slide 82
Results Summary…
Slide 83
Results Summary…
Slide 84
Results Summary…
Slide 85
Results Summary…
Slide 86
Case Study II…
Purpose of study:
Slide 87
Case Study II…
Scenarios identified:
¾ Vessel failure
¾ Overfilling
¾ Hose failure
¾ External Fire
¾ Contamination
¾ Mischarge
Slide 88
Case Study II…
Slide 89
Case Study II…
Findings:
¾ Main risks are dominated by toxic releases through pressure safety valves, due to
runaway reactions or external fires
Slide 90
Case Study II…
Currently
Findings: releases to Emergency Relief System (proposed)
atmosphere
Flare
stack
Typical
Distillation Condensate
Column
Feed
Catch Tank
Distillate
Slide 91
Case Study II…
Slide 92
Case Study II…
Slide 93
Case Study II…
0.01
0.001
MITIGATE PSVs DISCHARGE
0.0001
Risks Requiring
Further Study to
1E-005 Determine Mitigation
1E-007
1E-008
1 10 100 1000
Number of Fatalities, N
Slide 94
Case Study II…
Slide 95
Conclusions…
Slide 96
References…
Slide 97