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BOLSA FAMILIA
BACKGROUND
Brazil is considered to be one of the world’s progressive countries. It is the world’s fifth largest
country in terms of geography and population. Its progressiveness is attributed to being one of the
world’s megadiverse countries for having various natural resources, diverse wildlife and a variety of
ecosystems. Its economy is steadily rising and growing through the various economic reforms being
implemented. It is now the world’s 9th largest country in terms of nominal GDP and is a member of
the BRICS group (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014). Amidst this, Brazil still experiences inequality and
poverty.
Prior Programs to Bolsa Familia, Brazil implemented different conditional cash transfer programs to
address inequality and poverty. “The use of CCTs as an instrument of social policy reflects the
widespread belief in Brazil that people are poor due to the ‘fault of an unjust society’‐‐exclusion” (p.
9)‐‐and that education, health, and social welfare are fundamental right of Brazilian citizens (De la
Briere et. al, 2007). These programs are as follows:
Recognizing that the government has conflicting and overlapping social assistance programs,
President Lula in 2003 decided to consolidate them into one comprehensive program called the Bolsa
Familia Program (BFP). The program aims to (1) help reduce current poverty through direct transfer of
funds to low income families and; (2) break the cycle of poverty passing from one generation to the
next thus helping to reduce future poverty
IMPLEMENTATION
Coverage. In Brazil, there is no official poverty line so eligibility to BFP is based on price ceilings as
determined by the monthly per capita income of families (De la Briere et al., 2007). Poor families are
further classified into two categories: Poor and Extremely Poor. Over the years, eligibility thresholds
are increased via laws and decrees, so as to account for increases in the cost of living (Gazolla
Hellman, 2015). TABLE 1 shows this particular evolution while TABLE 2 shows the number of family
beneficiaries of the BFP.
Targeting Mechanism. Cadastro Unico is
a central database of low‐income families in Brazil
(International Labour Office, 2014). To become a beneficiary of Bolsa Familia, a family must satisfy
the income criteria and be enrolled in the Cadastro Unico. The first phase is data collection and entry .
Municipalities are responsible for collecting and registering families into the Cadastro Unico. The next
phase is data consolidation and management , handled by the Federal Economic Fund (Caixa). The final
phase in the system is program eligibility determination , administered by the Ministry of Social
Development (MDS) . Initial program quotas were adjusted in 2006 (Gazolla Hellmann, 2015) that as
early as 2007, the BFP already covers 100 percent of the poor in Brazil (De la Briere et al., 2007). The
MDS sets these municipal program quotas based on a “spatial poverty map” information from census
and household surveys conducted by municipalities, determines other family eligibility criteria, and
applies them. FIGURE 1 summarizes the three phases in this targeting system.
Payment. Within 30‐45 days after being registered, electronic benefit cards (EBCs) are distributed by
Caixa through postal mail, which the beneficiaries use to access the benefits provided by the BFP.
FIGURE 4 and FIGURE 5 show an example of a Bolsa Familia Social and Bank Cards respectively. The
differences between them are listed in TABLE 4.
Prior to the first withdrawal of the benefits,
beneficiaries must first register their personal identification numbers (PIN) at a Caixa agency.
The
amount that beneficiaries of the Bolsa Familia receive every month has four components: (1) a basic
benefit (BB) of R$ 77 or 884.731 pesos which only the extremely poor families receive; (2) a variable
benefit (BV) of R$ 35 or 402.15 pesos for every woman in the family who are pregnant or lactating
and for every child up to 15 years of age, which can be received up to five times; (3) a variable youth
benefit (BVJ) of R$ 42 or 482.58 pesos for every adolescent who is 16‐17 years of age, which can be
received up to five times; and (4) a benefit to overcome extreme poverty (BSP) is given to families
who despite their income and benefits do not exceed the poverty line, a sample computation of this is
shown in FIGURE 3 (Gazolla Hellmann, 2015). Entitlement to each and every component is dependent
on the composition and income of the family. TABLE 3 shows the possible configurations between the
first three components.
Budget. In a presentation entitled “Brazil’s Conditional Cash Transfer Programme: Bolsa Familia”
during the International Conference on South‐South Cooperation held in New Delhi last March 2012,
it was said how the total cost of BFP is less than 1% of Brazilian GDP and about 2.5% of total
government expenditures.
Conditionalities. Conditionalities of the BFP greatly reflect one of the main objectives of the program
which is to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Education conditionalities under the
BFP focus on enrollment and daily attendance (minimum of 85% of total class days) of children aged
6‐15 years old. Health conditionalities include completion of vaccines and regular health check‐ups
and growth monitoring for children aged 0‐7 years old, and pre‐ and post‐natal check‐ups for
pregnant women. Municipalities also require attendance to seminars on health and nutrition but in
practice, these are not monitored by the federal government (De la Briere et al., 2007). TABLE 5
summarizes education and health conditionalities for the BFP.
1
Exchange rate values are obtained from the Reference Exchange Rate Bulletin released by the Treasury Department
of the bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Monitoring and Evaluation. Monitoring of Compliance with Conditionalities. The Ministry of
Education (MEC) is responsible for the monitoring of education conditionalities. FIGURE 6 illustrates
the process of monitoring education conditionalities. On the other hand, the Ministry of Health is
responsible for monitoring health conditionalities. With regard to health conditionalities, compliance
is dependent upon access to services, that is why beneficiary families are given assistance by the
Family Health Program and local health centers or hospitals. FIGURE 7 illustrates the process of
monitoring health conditionalities. The consequences for non‐compliance with the BFP
conditionalities come in four stages: warning, blockage, suspension, and cancellation of benefits.
TABLE 7 elaborates on this further.
Program Oversight and Controls. FIGURE 8 is an illustration of the general oversight and controls in
the BFP. There is first the “Oversight and Controls Network” comprised by General Controllers Office
(CGU), Federal Court of Audit (TCU), and Public Prosecution Office (MP) (De la Briere et al., 2007). At
the same time, the Ministry of Social Development has their own program controls (De la Briere et al.,
2007). Likewise, municipalities also conduct social controls and have local contacts (De la Briere et al.,
2007).
Monitoring and Evaluation Systems for the BFP. FIGURE 9 provides an overview of the monitoring and
evaluation system (M&E) for the BFP. It has four levels: continuous monitoring of program execution;
monitoring and evaluating program implementation processes; monitoring of intermediate program
results; and evaluating program impacts (De la Briere et al., 2007).
Challenges. Just like any government program, the Bolsa Familia program also experienced challenges
in its implementation. These challenges can be grouped into errors, frauds, political agendas and
quality of implementation (Rabis et al., 2010; de Souza, 2012). The first group are unintentional
actions of both the implementing agency and the beneficiaries. This may include the wrong encoding
of data and lack of understanding about the rules and procedures of Bolsa Familia. The second type of
challenge refers to the intentional misuse of Bolsa Familia. Such challenges include the provision of
wrong data by the beneficiaries and the intercepting of BEC cards for personal or commercial use. The
third type focuses on the use of Bolsa Familia for political agenda. Bolsa Familia has been used by
politicians in their electoral campaigns given the popularity and wide support it has gathered from the
people. The last challenge refers to the quality of implementation as well as its trade‐offs. One of
which is registration quotas. Many municipalities cannot find enough poor people to fill their quota,
and in even more municipalities there are not enough benefits to go around. Another concern is the
quality of implementation given decentralization. The central government cannot completely assure
efficiency in the municipalities and of third‐party organizations. Lastly, there is a trade‐off between
the Bolsa Familia program and other long‐term programs. Given the direct impact of Bolsa Familia to
the citizens, it is given preference over other long‐term but important projects in terms of funding and
processing. This makes municipalities overly dependent on the program than creating other means of
alleviating poverty in their area.
ANALYSIS
Bolsa Familia Program is both a monetary and capability approach in addressing the issue of poverty
and underdevelopment. Programs under the capability approach focuses on addressing well‐being; It
refers on the individual’s ability to utilize commodities. In other words, man’s efficiency to use their
resources. Efficiency relates to skills or social habit. Skills and social habits are formed through
educational institutions. Thus, requiring children to go to school is in accordance to this theory.
However, this evaluation tool needs more refining as mere attendance is not enough to gauge
learning and skills formation. In terms of monetary aid, the government provides aid to the poor
families. With additional capital, families are able to purchase more for their needs or to invest in
opportunities wherein they can get more income. This allows them to get out of poverty in the long
run.
REFERENCES
Brazil’s Conditional Cash Transfer Programme Bolsa Família. (2012, March). Paper presented at the
IBSA International Conference on South‐South Cooperation entitled “Innovations in Public
Employment Programmes & Sustainable Inclusive Growth”, New Delhi, India. Powerpoint slides
retrieved 17 January, 2016 from
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/‐‐‐asia/‐‐‐ro‐bangkok/‐‐‐sro‐new_delhi/documents/presen
tation/wcms_175274.pdf
Central Intelligence Agency. (2016). Brazil. In The World Factbook. Retrieved from
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the‐world‐factbook/geos/br.html
De la briere, B., Hobbs, J., Linder, A. & Lindert, K. (2007).
The Nuts and Bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Família
Program: Implementing Conditional Cash Transfers in a Decentralized Context . Retrieved 20 January,
2016, from
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP‐Discussion‐papers/Safety‐Nets
‐DP/0709.pdf
De Souza, P. (2012) Poverty, Inequality and Social Policies in Brazil 1995‐2009. Retrieved 23 January,
2016, from http://www.ipc‐undp.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper87.pdf
Gazolla Hellmann, A. (2015). How does Bolsa Familia Work? Best Practices in the Implementation of
Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Latin America and the Caribbean . Retrieved 23 January, 2016,
from
https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/7210/How_does_Bolsa_Familia_Work.pdf?seq
uence=5
International Labour Office. (2014). Cadastro Único ‐ Operating a registry through a national public
bank. Retrieved 17 January, 2016, from
http://www.socialprotectionfloor‐gateway.org/files/Building_SPFs_brief._Brazil.pdf
Ribas, R. P
., Soares, F. V. & Soares, S. (2010).
TARGETING AND COVERAGE OF THE BOLSA FAMÍLIA
PROGRAMME: WHY KNOWING WHAT YOU MEASURE IS IMPORTANT IN CHOOSING THE
NUMBERS .Retrieved 25 January, 2016, from
http://www.ipc‐undp.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper71.pdf
Treasury Department, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. (2016). Reference Exchange Rate Bulletin.
Retrieved 25 January, 2016 from
http://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/sdds/exchrate.htm