PET

F0C. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal

FACTS:

 Atty. Macalintal questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an
illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
 Petitioner chafes at the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented by a
budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees.
 Petitioner argues that the designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and
Members contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits the
designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law to
any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional for being a
violation of paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 constitution.

Whether or not the designation of members of the supreme court as members of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional for being a violation of Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987
constitution.

HELD:

The PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution

independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court’s method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests,
through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme
Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s
exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative
of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the
whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the
Supreme Court.

Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections

FACTS:

 Poe filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 elections.
 Several petitions were filed against Poe alleging that (1) she committed material
misrepresentation in her COC when she stated that she is a resident of the Philippines for
at least 10 years 11 months up to the day before May 9, 2016 Elections, (2) she is not
natural born considering that Poe is a foundling.
 COMELEC ruled against the petitioner resolving that she is not a natural born citizen and
that she failed to complete the 10-year residency requirement.
  The petitioner argued that the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo
warranto as they focus on establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency and that a petition
for quo warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET) and not the COMELEC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Comelec has the jurisdiction to decide if the petitioner is qualified to be a
Presidential Candidate.

HELD:

COMELEC should restrain itself from going into the issue of qualifications of the candidate. It
cannot, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of a candidate. Not
one of the enumerated powers of the COMELEC as stated in Article IX C, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution grants the commission the power to determine the qualifications of a candidate.
Such powers are granted to the Electoral Tribunal as stated in Article VI Section 17 and the
Supreme Court under Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution.

APPOINTMENT AND SUPERVISION OF JUDICIAL PERSONNEL

REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE/CLARIFICATION ON SECTION 7, RULE III OF RA NO. 10154

FACTS:

 Requesting guidance/clarification on the applicability to the Judiciary of Section 7, Rule III of

the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA) 101541 which states:

“Section 7. Notice of Pendency of Case. The retiring employee shall seek Clearance of
Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from his/her employer agency, Civil Service
Commission (CSC), Office of the Ombudsman, or in case of presidential appointees, from
the Office of the President.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
10154 is applicable to retiring employees of the Judiciary.

HELD:

Section 6 Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution exclusively vests in the Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. As such, it oversees the court
personnel’s compliance with all laws and takes the proper administrative action against them for any
violation thereof.
The Court rules that the subject provision – which requires retiring government employees to
secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from, among others,
the CSC – should not be made to apply to employees of the Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would
disregard the Court’s constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision over its
personnel.
 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

RE COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties

FACTS:

 Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA) found that an
underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court
justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them.
 According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor
vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35
dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En
Banc dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01,3 when it should have applied the
formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A4 dated August 5, 1998.
 Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house
computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA
questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its
guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued in
1997.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judiciary can implement their own guidelines regarding its resources.

HELD:

One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of
fiscal autonomy.
In Bengzon v. Drilon, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary contemplates a guarantee
of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require.
The use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court’s
exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement
privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement
privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and
independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and
privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own
affairs.

RE Save the SC Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of

JDF and Reduction of the Fiscal Autonomy

FACTS:

 Ilocos Norte Representative Rodolfo Fariñas filed House Bill No. 4690, which would require
this court to remit its Judiciary Development Fund collections to the national treasury.
  Iloilo Representative Niel Tupas, Jr., filed House Bill No. 4738 entitled "The Act Creating the
Judicial Support Fund (JSF) under the National Treasury.
 Petitioner Rolly Mijares argues that Congress "gravely abused its discretion with a blatant
usurpation of judicial independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the bills will have usurpation of judicial independence and fiscal autonomy of the
Supreme Court.

HELD:

In Bengzon v. Drilon, the Judiciary must have the independence and flexibility needed in the
discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for
their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of
the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation
of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.
Courts, therefore, must also be accountable with their own budget. The Judiciary
Development Fund, used to augment the expenses of the judiciary, is regularly accounted for by this
court on a quarterly basis.

Re: Petition for recognition of the exemption of the Government Service Insurance System
from payment of legal fees

FACTS:

 Petitioner GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on government-
owned or controlled corporations under Section 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of
Court, for the purpose of preserving and maintaining the actuarial solvency of its funds and
keeping the contribution rates as low as possible.
 The Office of the Solicitor General maintained that the petition should be denied since Rule
141 has been promulgated by the Court pursuant to its exclusive rule-making power under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Thus, it may not be amended or repealed by
Congress.
 The Office of the Chief Attorney recommends that the petition of the GSIS be denied. The
claim of the petitioner for exemption from the payment of legal fees has no legal basis
because legal fees imposed under Rule 141 are not taxes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the legislature may exempt the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from
legal fees imposed by the Court.

HELD:
 The Rules of Court was promulgated in the exercise of the Court’s rule-making power.
It is essentially procedural in nature as it does not create, diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. Corollarily, Rule 141 is basically procedural. It pertains to the procedural requirement of
paying the prescribed legal fees in the filing of a pleading or any application that initiates an action or
proceeding. Payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled,
changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional
independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s
exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the
Executive.

QUALIFICATIONS- LOWER COURTS

Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council

FACTS:

 The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied
for A vacant position of Presiding Judge in a Regional Trial Court.
 The petitioner was informed by the JBC that its decision not to include his name in the list of
applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for
promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in
their current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for
more than a year, he was excluded from the list.
 In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an
RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the
equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year
requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights for
Equal Opportunity of Employment

ISSUE:

Whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before
they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional.

HELD:

1. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary,
this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and
providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate. In carrying out its main function, the
JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for
every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by
the Constitution and law for every position.
2. Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees
does not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not
 discriminate when it employs number of years of service to screen and differentiate
applicants from the competition. The number of years of service provides a relevant
basis to determine proven competence which may be measured by experience, among
other factors. The Court, thus, rules that the questioned policy does not infringe on
the equal protection clause as it is based on reasonable classification intended to
gauge the proven competence of the applicants. Therefore, the said policy is valid
and constitutional.
3. The questioned policy does not violate equality of employment opportunities. The
constitutional provision does not call for appointment to the Judiciary of all who
might, for any number of reasons, wish to apply. As with all professions, it is
regulated by the State. The office of a judge is no ordinary office. It is imbued with public
interest and is central in the administration of justice. So long as a fair opportunity is
available for all applicants who are evaluated on the basis of their individual merits
and abilities, the questioned policy cannot be struck down as unconstitutional.

RE: LETTER OF JUDGE AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ

FACTS:

 Judge Augustus C. Diaz, presiding judge of a Metropolitan Trial Court, informed the Court
that he is an applicant for judgeship in a vacant Regional Trial Court.
 He was told by the JBC to seek judicial clemency due to the fact that he was once fined
₱20,000 "for not hearing a motion for demolition."
 Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council provides:
o SEC. 5. Disqualification. – The following are disqualified from being nominated for
appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:
 1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases;
 2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and
 3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an
administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than
₱10,000, unless he has been granted judicial clemency. 5 (emphasis
supplied)

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court can disqualify someone from being nominated for appointment to any
judicial post.

HELD:

Concerned with safeguarding the integrity of the judiciary, this Court has come down hard
and wielded the rod of discipline against members of the judiciary who have fallen short of the
exacting standards of judicial conduct.
Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the
preservation of public confidence in the courts. The Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it
is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable.

APPOINTMENT
 DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD: