1
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT
AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101,
charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with
the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of
severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such
bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by
the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced
to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The
application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T.
Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the
probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was
allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the
Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to
admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue
of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from
the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has
filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it.
Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be
lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having
persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's
right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to
other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a
character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the
applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means
that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should,
or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least
resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not
to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a
moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its
ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his
life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to
aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW
710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the
straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of
profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to
possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar
examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be made of the
moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument,
therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to
the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil
must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has
once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far
more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment
and for the recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry
on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those
who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire
to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up
to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who
pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are
allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to

punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning, is
merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect
the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet
what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to
be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not
bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible
consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who,
having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the
administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the
general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas.
187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the
practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral character. The
possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the
public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning. Legal
learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the
threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his
character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an
ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his
community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or
a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.
The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for
disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice
is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the
court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been
guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be
sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the
court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects
2
honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that
might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of
necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very
real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate
moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's
confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of
good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical
injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character
flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their
moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved,
reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a
useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan
constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a
finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de
novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral
character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be
demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be
now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to
the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who
have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he
has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person
now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names
and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within
ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if
any, of Raul Camaligan.
DIGESTED:
In Re: Al C. Argosino 246 SCRA 14 (1995)
IN MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO
DOCTRINES:

 The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special
education qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
 Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the general public and proper
administration of justice is concerned. 
 All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to
the Bar.
 Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must
be a necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public.
 Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a
finding that the participant was possessed of good moral character.  guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all
 Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated at the time of the
application for permission to take the bar examinations and more importantly at the time of application for
admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
FACTS:
On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the crime of homicide in connection with
the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan stemmed from the affliction of severe physical injuries
upon him in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the university fraternity initiation rites. On February 11, 1993, the
accused were consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years. Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application
for probation with the lower court. The application was granted on June 18 1993. The period of probation was set at
two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him. Less
than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar exam. He was allowed and he passed the exam, but was
not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office. On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed  a petition to allow him to take the
attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice of law. He averred that his probation period had been terminated. It is
noted that his probation period did not last for more than 10 months.  requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with
ISSUE: Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be admitted to the practice of law
HELD:
Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of
good moral character imposed upon those who are seeking admission to the bar. He should show to the Court how
he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to
the community at large. In short, he must show evidence that he is a different person now, that he has become
morally fit for admission to the profession of law. He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names of the parents or brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH
3
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-
taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not
pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the
accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation
Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the
order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution
the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed
by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner
likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the
hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer
to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather
than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the
neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only
out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on
Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and
compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his
son's involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father
who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely
demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits
the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration o f justice. It is the sworn duty of
this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of
equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of
lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing
petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant
and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the
participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character."[1]
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether
petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's
child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in
cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third
parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than
praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find room for
forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's
oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad
moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for
civic duties and public service.
4
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every
lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's
oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community.
As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of
society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date
to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
DIGESTED
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH
FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant. Petitioner Al
Caparros Argosino was previously involved with hazing which caused the death of Raul Camaligan a neophyte
during fraternity initiation rites but he was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. He was
sentenced with 2 years and 4 months of imprisonment where he applied a probation thereafter which was approved
and granted by the court. He took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take the oath. He filed for a
petition to allow him to take the lawyer’s oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law averring that his
probation was already terminated. The court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was
terminated.
ISSUE: Whether or not Al Argosino may take the lawyer’s oath office and admit him to the practice of law.
HELD: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the STRICT, INTELLECTUAL and
MORAL QUALIFICATIONS required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of
justice. The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good moral character of all Bar members, keeping in mind
that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned.
Hence he was asked by the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and has become a
responsible member of the community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for truth
and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify that he is morally fit to
the admission of the law profession. The petitioner is then allowed to take the lawyer’s oath, sign the Roll of
Attorney’s and thereafter to practice the legal profession.
In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and that he who acts as his own lawyer has a fool for a client.
There would seem to be more than a grain of truth in these aphorisms; and they appear to find validation in the
proceeding at bench, at least.
The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law books, and
ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural rules.
Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now,
from 1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically
pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court. In the picturesque
language of former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, he has "with all the valor of ignorance," 1 been verbally
jousting with various adversaries in diverse litigations; or in the words of a well-known song, rushing into arenas
"where angels fear to tread." Under the illusion that his trivial acquaintance with the law had given him competence
to undertake litigation, he has ventured to represent himself in numerous original and review proceedings.
Expectedly, the results have been disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of his interminable and quite
unreasonable resort to judicial proceedings, he has seen fit to compose and circulate many scurrilous statements
against courts, judges and their employees, as well as his adversaries, for which he is now being called to account.
Respondent Borromeo's ill-advised incursions into lawyering were generated by fairly prosaic transactions with three
(3) banks which came to have calamitous consequences for him chiefly because of his failure to comply with his
contractual commitments and his stubborn insistence on imposing his own terms and conditions for their fulfillment.
These banks were: Traders Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank & Trust Co.
(SBTC). Borromeo obtained loans or credit accommodation from them, to secure which he constituted mortgages
over immovables belonging to him or members of his family, or third persons. He failed to pay these obligations, and
when demands were made for him to do so, laid down his own terms for their satisfaction which were quite
inconsistent with those agreed upon with his obligees or prescribed by law. When, understandably, the banks
refused to let him have his way, he brought suits right and left, successively if not contemporaneously, against said
banks, its officers, and even the lawyers who represented the banks in the actions brought by or against him. He
sued, as well, the public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial Courts, and the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court who at one time or another, rendered a judgment, resolution or order adverse to him, as well as the
Clerks of Court and other Court employees signing the notices thereof. In the aggregate, he has initiated or spawned
in different fora the astounding number of no less-than fifty (50) original or review proceedings, civil, criminal,
administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now, to repeat, he has been continuously cluttering the Courts with his
repetitive, and quite baseless if not outlandish complaints and contentions.
I. CASES INVOLVING TRADERS
ROYAL BANK (TRB)
The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2,
1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate mortgage created over two
parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria
(his sister) and Teresita Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from TRB in the
amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as security a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V.
Borromeo, covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was vested in him by a Special
Power of Attorney executed by their respective owners.
Additionally, on April 23, 1980, Borromeo obtained a Letter of Credit from TRB in the sum of P80,000.00, in
consideration of which he executed a Trust Receipt (No. 595/80) falling due on July 22, 1980. 2
5
Borromeo failed to pay the debts as contracted despite demands therefor. Consequently, TRB caused the extra-
judicial foreclosure of the mortgages given to secure them. At the public sale conducted by the sheriff on September
7, 1981, the three mortgaged parcels of land were sold to TRB as the highest bidder, for P73,529.09.
Within the redemption period, Borromeo made known to the Bank his intention to redeem the properties at their
auction price. TRB manager Blas C. Abril however made clear that Borromeo would also have to settle his
outstanding account under Trust Receipt No. 595/80 (P88,762.78), supra. Borromeo demurred, and this
disagreement gave rise to a series of lawsuits commenced by him against the Bank, its officers and counsel, as
aforestated.
A. CIVIL CASES
1. RTC Case No. R-22506; CA G.R.
CV No. 07015; G.R. No. 83306
On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in the Cebu City Regional Trial Court for specific performance and
damages against TRB and its local manager, Blas Abril, docketed as Civil Case No. R-22506. The complaint sought
to compel defendants to allow redemption of the foreclosed properties only at their auction price, with stipulated
interests and charges, without need of paying the obligation secured by the trust receipt above mentioned. Judgment
was rendered in his favor on December 20, 1984 by Branch 23 of the Cebu City RTC; but on defendants' appeal to
the Court of Appeals — docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 — the judgment was reversed, by decision dated
January 27, 1988. The Court of Appeals held that the "plaintiff (Borromeo) has lost his right of redemption and can
no longer compel defendant to allow redemption of the properties in question."
Borromeo elevated the case to this court where his appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 83306. By Resolution dated
August 15, 1988, this Court's First Division denied his petition for review "for failure . . . to sufficiently show that the
respondent Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment, it appearing on the
contrary that the said decision is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts and applicable
law." Reconsideration was denied, by Resolution dated November 23, 1988. A second motion for reconsideration
was denied by Resolution dated January 30, 1989, as was a third such motion, by Resolution dated April 19, 1989.
The last resolution also directed entry of judgment and the remand of the case to the court of origin for prompt
execution of judgment. Entry of judgment was made on May 12, 1989. By Resolution dated August 7, 1989, the
Court denied another motion of Borromeo to set aside judgment; and by Resolution dated December 20, 1989, the
Court merely noted without action his manifestation and motion praying that the decision of the Court of Appeals be
overturned, and declared that "no further motion or pleading . . . shall be entertained . . . ."
2. RTC Case No. CEB 8750;
CA-G.R. SP No. 22356
The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentioned before Borromeo initiated another civil action in the same
Cebu City Regional Court by which he attempted to litigate the same issues. The action, against the new TRB
Branch Manager, Jacinto Jamero, was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-8750. As might have been anticipated, the
action was, on motion of the defense, dismissed by Order dated May 18, 1990,3 on the ground of res judicata, the
only issue raised in the second action — i.e., Borromeo's right to redeem the lots foreclosed by TRB — having been
ventilated in Civil Case No. R-22506 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Blas C. Abril and Traders Royal Bank) (supra) and,
on appeal, decided with finality by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in favor of defendants therein.
The Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 22356.

3. RTC Case No. CEB-9485;
CA-G.R. SP No. 28221
In the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506, TRB consolidated its ownership over the
foreclosed immovables. Contending that act of consolidation amounted to a criminal offense, Borromeo filed
complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against the bank officers and lawyers. These complaints were
however, and quite correctly, given short shrift by that Office. Borromeo then filed suit in the Cebu City RTC, this time
not only against the TRB, TRB officers Jacinto Jamero and Arceli Bustamante, but also against City Prosecutor
Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants, Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva A. Igot, and the TRB lawyers, Mario Ortiz and the
law, firm, HERSINLAW. The action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9485. The complaint charged Prosecutors
Pareja, Belarmino and Igot with manifest partiality and bias for dismissing the criminal cases just mentioned; and
faulted TRB and its manager, Jamero, as well as its lawyers, for consolidating the titles to the foreclosed properties
in favor of the bank despite the pendency of Case No. R-22506. This action also failed. On defendants' motion, it
was dismissed on February 19, 1992 by the RTC. (Branch 22) on the ground of res judicata (being identical with Civil
Case Nos. R-22506 and CEB-8750, already decided with finality in favor of TRB), and lack of cause of action (as to
defendants Pareja, Belarmino and Igot).
Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 28221) was dismissed by that Court's 16th
Division4 on October 6, 1992, for the reason that the proper remedy was appeal.
4. RTC Case No. CEB-10368;
CA-G.R. SP No. 27100
Before Case No. CEB-9845 was finally decided, Borromeo filed, on May 30, 1991, still another civil action for the
same cause against TRB, its manager, Jacinto Jamero, and its lawyers, Atty. Mario Ortiz and the HERSINLAW law
office. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10368, and was described as one for "Recovery of Sums of
Money, Annulment of Titles with Damages." The case met the same fate as the others. It was, on defendants'
motion, dismissed on September 9, 1991 by the RTC (Branch 145) on the ground of litis pendentia.
The RTC ruled that —
Civil Case No. CEB-9485 will readily show that the defendants therein, namely the Honorable
Jufelinito Pareja, Enriqueta Belarmino, Eva Igot, Traders Royal Bank, Arceli Bustamante, Jacinto
Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW are the same persons or nearly all of them who are
impleaded as defendants in the present Civil Case No. CEB-10368, namely, the Traders Royal
Bank, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW. The only difference is that more
defendants were impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, namely, City Prosecutor Jufelinito
Pareja and his assistants Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva Igot. The inclusion of the City Prosecutor
and his two assistants in Civil Case No. CEB-9485 was however merely incidental as apparently
they had nothing to do with the questioned transaction in said case. . . .
The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for were the same as those sought in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, and
the factual bases of the two cases were essentially the same — the alleged fraudulent foreclosure and consolidation
of the three properties mortgaged years earlier by Borromeo to TRB.
For some reason, the Order of September 9, 1991 was set aside by an Order rendered by another Judge on
November 11, 1991 6 — the Judge who previously heard the case having inhibited himself; but this Order of
November 11, 1991 was, in turn, nullified by the Court of Appeals (9th Division), by Decision promulgated on March
6
31, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27100 (Traders Royal Bank vs. Hon. Celso M. Gimenez, etc. and Joaquin T.
Borromeo), 7 which decision also directed dismissal of Borromeo's complaint.
5. RTC Case No. CEB-6452
When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointed for TRB, Cebu City, Borromeo forthwith made that event
the occasion for another new action, against TRB, Ronald Sy, and the bank's attorneys — Mario Ortiz, Honorato
Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo Navarro and HERSINLAW firm. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6452,
and described as one for "Annulment of Title with Damages." The complaint, dated October 20, 1987, again involved
the foreclosure of the three (3) immovables above mentioned, and was anchored on the alleged malicious, deceitful,
and premature consolidation of titles in TRB's favor despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 22506. On defendant's
motion, the trial court 8 dismissed the case on the ground of prematurity, holding that "(a)t this point . . ., plaintiff's
right to seek annulment of defendant Traders Royal Bank's title will only accrue if and when plaintiff will ultimately
and finally win Civil Case No. R-22506."
6. RTC Case No. CEB-8236
Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrate to the courts the "merit" of his cause against TRB and its
officers and lawyers, Borromeo now took a different tack by also suing (and thus also venting his ire on) the
members of the appellate courts who had ruled adversely to him. He filed in the Cebu City RTC, Civil Case No. CEB-
8236, impleading as defendants not only the same parties he had theretofore been suing — TRB and its officers and
lawyers (HERSINLAW, Mario Ortiz) — but also the Chairman and Members of the First Division of the Supreme
Court who had repeatedly rebuffed him in G.R. No. 83306 (SEE sub-head I, A, 1, supra), as well as the Members of
the 5th, 9th and 10th Divisions of the Court of Appeals who had likewise made dispositions unfavorable to him. His
complaint, dated August 22, 1989, aimed to recover damages from the defendants Justices for —
. . . maliciously and deliberately stating blatant falsehoods and disregarding evidence and
pertinent laws, rendering manifestly unjust and biased resolutions and decisions bereft of
signatures, facts or laws in support thereof, depriving plaintiff of his cardinal rights to due
process and against deprivation of property without said process, tolerating, approving and
legitimizing the patently illegal, fraudulent, and contemptuous acts of defendants TRB, (which)
constitute a) GRAVE DERELICTION OF DUTY AND ABUSE OF POWER emanating from the
people, b) FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS
DUE PROCESS, ART. 27, 32, CIVIL CODE, Art. 208, REV. PENAL CODE, and R.A. 3019, for
which defendants must be held liable under said laws.
The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "fake titles obtained fraudulently by TRB/HERSINLAW," and
recovery of "100,000.00 moral damages; 30,000.00 exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 litigation expenses." This
action, too, met a quick and unceremonious demise. On motion of defendants TRB and HERSINLAW, the trial court,
by Order dated November 7, 1989,9 dismissed the case.
7. RTC Case No. CEB-13069
It appears that Borromeo filed still another case to litigate the same cause subject of two (2) prior actions instituted
by him. This was RTC Case No. CEB-13069, against TRB and the latter's lawyers, Wilfredo Navarro and Mario
Ortiz. The action was dismissed in an Order dated October 4, 1993, 10 on the ground of res judicata — the subject
matter being the same as that in Civil Case No. R-22506, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 as well as by this Court in G.R. No. 83306 11 — and litis pendentia — the subject matter

being also the same as that in Civil Case No. CEB-8750, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. SP No. 22356.12
8. RTC Criminal Case No. CBU-19344;
CA-G.R. SP No. 28275; G.R. No. 112928
On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed an information with the RTC of Cebu (Branch 22) against
Borromeo charging him with a violation of the Trust Receipts Law. 13 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
CBU-19344. After a while, Borromeo moved to dismiss the case on the ground of denial of his right to a speedy trial.
His motion was denied by Order of Judge Pampio A. Abarintos dated April 10, 1992. In the same order, His Honor
set an early date for Borromeo's arraignment and placed the case "under a continuous trial system on the dates as
may be agreed by the defense and prosecution." Borromeo moved for reconsideration. When his motion was again
found without merit, by Order dated May 21, 1992, he betook himself to the Court of Appeals on a special civil action
of certiorari, to nullify these adverse orders, his action being docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28275.
Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appeals declared that the facts did not show that there had been
unreasonable delay in the criminal action against him, and denied his petition for being without merit. 14
Borromeo then filed a petition for review with this Court (G.R. No. 112928), but by resolution dated January 31, 1994,
the same was dismissed for failure of Borromeo to comply with the requisites of Circulars Numbered 1-88 and 19-91.
His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by Resolution dated March 23, 1994.
a. Clarificatory Communications to
Borromeo Re "Minute Resolutions"
He next filed a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 calling the Resolution of March 23, 1994 "Un-Constitutional,
Arbitrary and tyrannical and a gross travesty of 'Justice,'" because it was "signed only by a mere clerk and . . . (failed)
to state clear facts and law," and "the petition was not resolved on MERITS nor by any Justice but by a mere
clerk." 15
The Court responded with another Resolution, promulgated on June 22, 1994, and with some patience drew his
attention to the earlier resolution "in his own previous case (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals and Samson
Lao, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990; 186 SCRA 1) 16 and on the same issue he now raises." Said Resolution of June
22, 1994, after reiterating that the notices sent by the Clerk of Court of the Court En Banc or any of the Divisions
simply advise of and quote the resolution actually adopted by the Court after deliberation on a particular matter,
additionally stated that Borromeo "knew, as well, that the communications (notices) signed by the Clerk of Court start
with the opening clause —
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of this Court dated.
_________,
thereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk of Court who prepared or signed the resolutions."
This was not, by the way, the first time that the matter had been explained to Borromeo. The record shows that on
July 10, 1987, he received a letter from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) dealing with
the subject, in relation to G.R. No. 77243. 17 The same matter was also dealt with in the letter received by him from
Clerk of Court Luzviminda D. Puno, dated April 4, 1989, and in the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second Division)
7
Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19, 1989. 18 And the same subject was treated of in another Resolution of this Court,
notice of which was in due course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897. 19
B. CRIMINAL CASES
Mention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt — with "all the valor of ignorance" — to fasten not only civil,
but also criminal liability on TRB, its officers and lawyers. 20 Several other attempts on his part to cause criminal
prosecution of those he considered his adversaries, will now be dealt with here.
1. I. S. Nos. 90-1187 and 90-1188
On March 7, 1990, Borromeo filed criminal complaints with the Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor against Jacinto
Jamero (then still TRB Branch Manager), "John Doe and officers of Traders Royal Bank." The complaints (docketed
as I.S. Nos. 90-1187-88) accused the respondents of "Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents." He claimed,
among others that the bank and its officers, thru its manager, Jacinto Jamero, sold properties not owned by them:
that by fraud, deceit and false pretenses, respondents negotiated and effected the purchase of the (foreclosed)
properties from his (Borromeo's) mother, who "in duress, fear and lack of legal knowledge," agreed to the sale
thereof for only P671,000.00, although in light of then prevailing market prices, she should have received
P588,030.00 more.
In a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990, 21 the Cebu City Fiscal's office dismissed the complaints observing that
actually, the Deed of Sale was not between the bank and Borromeo's mother, but between the bank and Mrs.
Thakuria (his sister), one of the original owners of the foreclosed properties; and that Borromeo, being a stranger to
the sale, had no basis to claim injury or prejudice thereby. The Fiscal ruled that the bank's ownership of the
foreclosed properties was beyond question as the matter had been raised and passed upon in a judicial litigation;
and moreover, there was no proof of the document allegedly falsified nor of the manner of its falsification.
a. I.S. Nos. 87-3795 and 89-4234
Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for reckless filing of unfounded complaints, the Fiscal also adverted to
two other complaints earlier filed in his Office by Borromeo — involving the same foreclosed properties and directed
against respondent bank officers' predecessors (including the former Manager, Ronald Sy) and lawyers — both of
which were dismissed for lack of merit. These were:
a. I. S. No. 87-3795 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. ATTY. MARIO ORTIZ and RONALD SY) for
"Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents, Deceit and False Pretenses." — This case
was dismissed by Resolution dated January 19, 1988 of the City Prosecutor's Office because
based on nothing more than a letter dated June 4, 1985, sent by Bank Manager Ronald Sy to
the lessee of a portion of the foreclosed immovables, advising the latter to remit all rentals to the
bank as new owner thereof, as shown by the consolidated title; and there was no showing that
respondent Atty. Ortiz was motivated by fraud in notarizing the deed of sale in TRB's favor after
the lapse of the period of redemption, or that Ortiz had benefited pecuniarily from the transaction
to the prejudice of complainant; and
b. I.S. No. 89-4234 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. RONALD SY, ET AL.) for "Estafa Through
False Pretenses and Falsification of Public Documents." — This case was dismissed by
Resolution dated January 31, 1990.

2. I.S.Nos. 88-205 to 88-207
While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was still pending before the Supreme Court, 22 an affidavit was
executed in behalf of TRB by Arceli Bustamante, in connection with the former's fire insurance claim over property
registered in its name — one of two immovables formerly owned by Socorro B. Thakuria (Joaquin Borromeo's sister)
and foreclosed by said bank. 23 In that affidavit, dated September 10, 1987, Bustamante stated that "On 24 June
1983, TRB thru foreclosure acquired real property together with the improvements thereon which property is located
at F. Ramos St., Cebu City covered by TCT No. 87398 in the name or TRB." The affidavit was notarized by Atty.
Manuelito B. Inso.
Claiming that the affidavit was "falsified and perjurious" because the claim of title by TRB over the foreclosed lots
was a "deliberate, wilful and blatant fasehood in that, among others: . . . the consolidation was premature, illegal and
invalid," Borromeo filed a criminal complaint with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office against the affiant (Bustamante) and
the notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso) for "falsification of public document, false pretenses, perjury." On September 28,
1988, the Fiscal's Office dismissed the complaint. 24 It found no untruthful statements in the affidavit or any malice in
its execution, considering that Bustamante's statement was based on the Transfer Certificate of Title in TRB's file,
and thus the document that Atty. Inso notarized was legally in order.
3. OMB-VIS-89-00136
This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 83306 dated August 15, 1988 — sustaining the judgment of
the Court of Appeals (10th Division) of January 27, 1988 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015, supra, was made the subject of
a criminal complaint by Borromeo in the Office of the Ombudsman, Visayas, docketed as OMB-VIS-89-00136. His
complaint — against "Supreme Court Justice (First Div.) and Court of Appeals Justice (10th Div)" — was dismissed
for lack of merit in a Resolution issued on February 14, 1990 25 which, among other things, ruled as follows:
It should be noted and emphasized that complainant has remedies available under the Rules of
Court, particularly on civil procedure and existing laws. It is not the prerogative of this Office to
make a review of Decisions and Resolutions of judicial courts, rendered within their competence.
The records do not warrant this Office to take further proceedings against the respondents.
In addition, Sec. 20. of R.A. 6770, "the Ombudsman Act states that the Office of the
Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission
complained of if it believes that (1) the complainant had adequate remedy in another judicial or
quasi-judicial body;" and Sec. 21 the same law provides that the Office of the Ombudsman does
not have disciplinary authority over members of the Judiciary.
II. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUT
PLANTERS BANK (UCPB)
As earlier stated, 26 Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The mortgage was
constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot covered by TCT No. 75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot
was afterwards sold on August 7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its
repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge and
consent of UCPB.
A. CIVIL CASES
8
Now, just as he had defaulted in the payment of the loans and credit accommodations he had obtained from the
Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo failed in the fulfillment of his obligations to the UCPB.
Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, and obviously to obviate or minimize the ill effects of the latter's
delinquency, Lao applied with the same bank (UCPB) for a loan, offering the property he had purchased from
Borromeo as collateral. UCPB was not averse to dealing with Lao but imposed several conditions on him, one of
which was for Lao to consolidate his title over the property. Lao accordingly instituted a suit for consolidation of title,
docketed as Civil Case No. R-21009. However, as will shortly be narrated, Borromeo opposed the consolidation
prayed for. As a result, UCPB cancelled Lao's application for a loan and itself commenced proceedings foreclose the
mortgage constituted by Borromeo over the property.
This signaled the beginning of court battles waged by Borromeo not only against Lao, but also against UCPB and the
latter's lawyers, battles which he (Borromeo) fought contemporaneously with his court war with Traders Royal Bank.
1. RTC Case No. R-21009; AC-G.R.
No. CV-07396; G.R. No. 82273
The first of this new series of court battles was, as just stated, the action initiated by Samson Lao in the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu (Branch 12), docketed as Case No. R-21009, for consolidation of title in his favor over the 122-
square-meter lot subject of the UCPB mortgage, in accordance with Article 1007 of the Civil Code. In this suit Lao
was represented by Atty. Alfredo Perez, who was later substituted by Atty. Antonio Regis. Borromeo contested Lao's
application.
Judgment was in due course rendered by the RTC (Branch 12, Hon. Francis Militante, presiding) denying
consolidation because the transaction between the parties could not be construed as a sale with pacto de
retro being in law an equitable mortgage; however, Borromeo was ordered to pay Lao the sum of P170,000.00,
representing the price stipulated in the sale a retro, plus the amounts paid by Lao for capital gains and other taxes in
connection with the transaction (P10,497.50).
Both Lao and Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals. Lao's appeal was dismissed for failure of his lawyer to file
brief in his behalf. Borromeo's appeal — AC-G.R. No. CV-07396 — resulted in a Decision by the Court of Appeals
dated December 14, 1987, affirming the RTC's judgment in toto.
The Appellate Court's decision was, in turn, affirmed by this Court (Third Division) in a four-page Resolution dated
September 13, 1989, promulgated in G.R. No. 82273 — an appeal also taken by Borromeo. Borromeo filed a motion
for reconsideration on several grounds, one of which was that the resolution of September 13, 1989 was
unconstitutional because contrary to "Sec. 4 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution," it was not signed by any Justice of the
Division, and there was "no way of knowing which justices had deliberated and voted thereon, nor of any
concurrence of at least three of the members." Since the motion was not filed until after there had been an entry of
judgment, Borromeo having failed to move for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the same was simply
noted without action, in a Resolution dated November 27, 1989.
Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordance with established rule and practice, sent to Borromeo over
the signatures of the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court (namely: Attys. Julieta Y. CARREON and Alfredo
MARASIGAN, respectively).
a. RTC Case No. CEB-8679

Following the same aberrant pattern of his judicial campaign against Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo attempted to
vent his resentment even against the Supreme Court officers who, as just stated, had given him notices of the
adverse dispositions of this Court's Third Division. He filed Civil Case No. CEB-8679 in the Cebu City RTC (CFI) for
recovery of damages against "Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and Asst.
Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, and Atty. Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of Judicial Records Office." He charged them
with usurpation of judicial functions, for allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake, baseless and
unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273."
Summonses were issued to defendants by RTC Branch 18 (Judge Rafael R. Ybañez, presiding). These processes
were brought to the attention of this Court's Third Division. The latter resolved to treat the matter as an incident in
G.R. No. 82273, and referred it to the Court En Banc on April 25, 1990. By Resolution (issued in said G.R. No.
82273, supra) dated June 1, 1990, the Court En Banc ordered Judge Ybañez to quash the summonses, to dismiss
Civil Case No. CEB-8679, and "not to issue summons or otherwise to entertain cases of similar nature which may in
the future be filed in his court." Accordingly, Judge Ibañez issued an Order on June 6, 1990 quashing the
summonses and dismissing the complaint in said Civil Case No. CEB-8679.
The Resolution of June 1, 1990 27 explained to Borromeo in no little detail the nature and purpose of notices sent by
the Clerks of Court of decisions or resolutions of the Court En Banc or the Divisions, in this wise:
This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against officials of the
Court. In several letter complaints filed with the courts and the Ombudsman, Borromeo had
repeatedly alleged that he "suffered injustices," because of the disposition of the four (4) cases
he separately appealed to this Court which were resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly in
violation of Sections 4 (3), 13 and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. His invariable
complaint is that the resolutions which disposed of his cases do not bear the signatures of the
Justices who participated in the deliberations and resolutions and do not show that they voted
therein. He likewise complained that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and
that they did not state the facts and the law on which they were based and were signed only by
the Clerks of Court and therefore "unconstitutional, null and void."
xxx xxx xxx
The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases
by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as were a case is patently
without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is
in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records
that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-
compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course always gives the legal basis. As
emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987], "[T]he Court is not 'duty
bound' to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions
and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a
case" . . . This is the only way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and, accordingly,
discharge its constitutional functions. . . .
. . . (W)hen the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings,
manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states that
the questions raised are factual, or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision is
shown, or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with
the constitutional requirement . . . (of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution "that no petition
9
for review or motion for reconsideration shall be refused due course or denied without stating the
legal basis thereof").
For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are promulgated by the Court
through the Clerk of Court, who takes charge of sending copies thereof to the parties concerned
by quoting verbatim the resolution issued on a particular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to
inform the parties of the action taken on their cases quoting the resolution adopted by the Court.
The Clerk of Court never participates in the deliberations of a case. All decisions and resolutions
are actions of the Court. The Clerk of Court merely transmits the Court's action. This was
explained in the case — G.R. No. 56280, "Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, et al.,"
where, in a resolution dated July 6, 1981, the Court 
said — "[M]inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the
petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this
Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of
Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or
dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order together with its
findings of facts and legal conclusions.
Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the
deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to require
members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of
its resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions more properly
performed by the Clerk of Court and which time could be more profitably used in the analysis of
cases and the formulation of decisions and orders of important nature and character. Even with
the use of this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs accumulated over
the years and meet the ever increasing number of cases coming to it. . . .
b. RTC CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-(6501)
6740; G.R. No. 84054
It is now necessary to digress a little and advert to actions which, while having no relation to the UCPB, TRB or
SBTC, are relevant because they were the predicates for other suits filed by Joaquin Borromeo against
administrative officers of the Supreme Court and the Judge who decided one of the cases adversely to him.
The record shows that on or about December 11, 1987, Borromeo filed a civil action for damages against a certain
Thomas B. Tan and Marjem Pharmacy, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6501. On January 12, 1988, the trial court
dismissed the case, without prejudice, for failure to state a cause of action and prematurity (for non-compliance with
P.D. 1508).
What Borromeo did was simply to re-file the same complaint with the same Court, on March 18, 1988. This time it
was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6740, and assigned to Branch 17 of the RTC of Cebu presided by Hon. Mario
Dizon. Again, however, on defendants' motion, the trial court dismissed the case, in an order dated May 28, 1988.
His first and second motions for reconsideration having been denied, Borromeo filed a petition for review before this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Tomas Tan and Non. Mario Dizon).
In a Resolution dated August 3, 1988, the Court required petitioner to comply with the rules by submitting a verified
statement of material dates and paying the docket and legal research fund fees; it also referred him to the Citizens
Legal Assistance Office for help in the case. His petition was eventually dismissed by Resolution of the Second

Division dated November 21, 1988, for failure on his part to show any reversible error in the trial court's judgment.
His motion for reconsideration was denied with finality, by Resolution dated January 18, 1989.
Borromeo wrote to Atty. Fermin J. Garma (Clerk of Court of the Second Division) on April 27, 1989 once more
remonstrating that the resolutions received by him had not been signed by any Justice, set forth no findings of fact or
law, and had no certification of the Chief Justice. Atty. Garma replied to him on May 19, 1989, pointing out that "the
minute resolutions of this Court denying dismissing petitions, like the petition in the case at bar, which was denied for
failure of the counsel and/or petitioner to sufficiently show that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17, had
committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment [resolution dated November 21, 1988], are the result of a
thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its
judicial function to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns. When the petition is denied or dismissed by the Court, it
sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions."
Borromeo obviously had learned nothing from the extended Resolution of June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, supra (or
the earlier communications to him on the same subject) which had so clearly pointed out that minute resolutions of
the Court are as much the product of the Members' deliberations as full-blown decisions or resolutions, and that the
intervention of the Clerk consists merely in the ministerial and routinary function of communicating the Court's action
to the parties concerned.
c. RTC Case No. CEB-9042
What Borromeo did next, evidently smarting from this latest judicial rebuff, yet another in an already long series, was
to commence a suit against Supreme Court (Second Division) Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and Assistant Clerk of
Court Tomasita Dris. They were the officers who had sent him notices of the unfavorable resolutions in G.R. No.
84054, supra. His suit, filed on June 1, 1990, was docketed as Case No. CEB-9042 (Branch 8, Hon. Bernardo Salas
presiding). Therein he complained essentially of the same thing he had been harping on all along: that in relation to
G.R. No. 91030 — in which the Supreme Court dismissed his petition for "technical reasons" and failure to
demonstrate any reversible error in the challenged judgment — the notice sent to him — of the "unsigned and
unspecific" resolution of February 19, 1990, denying his motion for reconsideration — had been signed only by the
defendant clerks of court and not by the Justices. According to him, he had thereupon written letters to defendants
demanding an explanation for said "patently unjust and un-Constitutional resolutions," which they ignored;
defendants had usurped judicial functions by issuing resolutions signed only by them and not by any Justice, and
without stating the factual and legal basis thereof; and defendants' "wanton, malicious and patently abusive acts" had
caused him "grave mental anguish, severe moral shock, embarrassment, sleepless nights and worry;" and
consequently, he was entitled to moral damages of no less than P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00,
and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.
On June 8, 1990, Judge Renato C. Dacudao ordered the records of the case transmitted to the Supreme Court
conformably with its Resolution dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, entitled "Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Hon. Court
of Appeals and Samson-Lao," supra — directing that all complaints against officers of that Court be forwarded to it
for appropriate action. 28
Borromeo filed a "Manifestation/Motion" dated June 27, 1990 asking the Court to "rectify the injustices" committed
against him in G.R. Nos. 83306, 84999, 87897, 77248 and 84054. This the Court ordered expunged from the record
(Resolution, July 19, 1990).
2. RTC Case No. R-21880; CA-G.R.
CV No. 10951; G.R. No. 87897
10
Borromeo also sued to stop UCPB from foreclosing the mortgage on his property. In the Cebu City RTC, he filed a
complaint for "Damages with Injunction," which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21880 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs.
United Coconut Planters Bank, et al.). Named defendants in the complaint were UCPB, Enrique Farrarons (UCPB
Cebu Branch Manager) and Samson K. Lao. UCPB was represented in the action by Atty. Danilo Deen, and for a
time, by Atty. Honorato Hermosisima (both being then resident partners of ACCRA Law Office). Lao was represented
by Atty. Antonio Regis. Once again, Borromeo was rebuffed. The Cebu RTC (Br. 11, Judge Valeriano R. Tomol, Jr.
presiding) dismissed the complaint, upheld UCPB's right to foreclose, and granted its counterclaim for moral
damages in the sum of P20,000.00; attorney's fees amounting to P10,000.00; and litigation expenses of P1,000.00.
Borromeo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 10951. That Court,
thru its Ninth Division (per Martinez, J., ponente, with de la Fuente and Pe, JJ., concurring), dismissed his appeal
and affirmed the Trial Court's judgment.
Borromeo filed a petition far review with the Supreme Court which, in G.R. No. 87897 dismissed it for insufficiency in
form and substance and for being "largely unintelligible." Borromeo's motion for reconsideration was denied by
Resolution dated June 25, 1989. A second motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 31,
1989 which directed as well entry of judgment (effected on August 1, 1989). In this Resolution, the Court (First
Division) said:
The Court considered the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 4, 1989 filed by petitioner
himself and Resolved to DENY the same for lack of merit, the motion having been filed without
"express leave of court" (Section 2, Rule 52, Rules of Court) apart from being a reiteration
merely of the averments of the Petition for Review dated April 14, 1989 and the Motion for
Reconsideration dated May 25, 1989. It should be noted that petitioner's claims have already
been twice rejected as without merit, first by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu and then by the
Court of Appeals. What petitioner desires obviously is to have a third ruling on the merits of his
claims, this time by this Court. Petitioner is advised that a review of a decision of the Court of
Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and will be granted only when
there is a special and important reason therefor (Section 4, Rule 45); and a petition for review
may be dismissed summarily on the ground that "the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted
manifestly for delay or the question raised is too unsubstantial to require consideration" (Section
3, Rule 45), or that only questions of fact are raised in the petition, or the petition otherwise fails
to comply with the formal requisites prescribed therefor (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 45; Circular No.
1-88). Petitioner is further advised that the first sentence of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution refers to a decision, and has no application to a resolution as to which said section
pertinently provides that a resolution denying a motion for reconsideration need state only the
legal basis therefor; and that the resolution of June 26, 1989 denying petitioner's first Motion for
Reconsideration dated May 25, 1989 does indeed state the legal reasons therefor. The plain
and patent signification of the grounds for denial set out in the Resolution of June 26, 1989 is
that the petitioner's arguments — aimed at the setting aside of the resolution denying the petition
for review and consequently bringing about a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals —
had failed to persuade the Court that the errors imputed to the Court of Appeals had indeed
been committed and therefore, there was no cause to modify the conclusions set forth in that
judgment; and in such a case, there is obviously no point in reproducing and restating the
conclusions and reasons therefor of the Court of Appeals.
Premises considered, the Court further Resolved to DIRECT ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.
On August 13, 1989 Borromeo wrote to Atty. Estrella C. Pagtanac, then the Clerk of Court of the Court's First
Division, denouncing the resolution above mentioned as "a LITANY OF LIES, EVASIONS, and ABSURD SELF-

SERVING LOGIC from a Supreme Court deluded and drunk with power which it has forgotten emanates from the
people," aside from being "patently UNCONSTITUTIONAL for absence of signatures and facts and law: . . . and
characterizing the conclusions therein as "the height of ARROGANCE and ARBITRARINESS assuming a KING-
LIKE AND EVEN GOD-LIKE  and advice" — and declaring that he had "not advised and . . . (had) no hand in the filing of (said) Civil Case CEB
POWER totally at variance and contradicted by . . . CONSTITUTIONAL provisions . . ." To the letter Borromeo
attached copies of (1) his "Open Letter to the Ombudsman" dated August 10, 1989 protesting the Court's "issuing
UNSIGNED, UNSPECIFIC, and BASELESS 'MINUTE RESOLUTIONS;'" (2) his "Open Letter of Warning" dated
August 12, 1989; and (3) a communication of Domingo M. Quimlat, News Ombudsman, Phil. Daily Inquirer, dated
August 10, 1989. His letter was ordered expunged from the record because containing "false, impertinent and
scandalous matter (Section 5, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court)." Another letter of the same ilk, dated November 7, 1989,
was simply "NOTED without action" by Resolution promulgated on December 13, 1989.
3. RTC Case No. CEB-4852; CA G.R.
SP No. 14519; G.R. No. 84999
In arrant disregard of established rule and practice, Borromeo filed another action to invalidate the foreclosure
effected at the instance of UCPB, which he had unsuccessfully tried to prevent in Case No. CEB-21880. This was
Civil Case No. CEB-4852 of the Cebu City RTC (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. UCPB, et al.) for "Annulment of Title with
Damages." Here, UCPB was represented by Atty. Laurence Fernandez, in consultation with Atty. Deen.
On December 26, 1987, the Cebu City RTC (Br. VII, Hon. Generoso A. Juaban, presiding) dismissed the complaint
on the ground of litis pendentia and ordered Borromeo to pay attorney's fees (P5,000.00) and litigation expenses
(P1,000.00).
Borromeo instituted a certiorari action in the Court of Appeals to annul this judgment (CA G.R. SP No. 14519); but
his action was dismissed by the Appellate Court on June 7, 1988 on account of his failure to comply with that Court's
Resolution of May 13, 1988 for submission of certified true copies of the Trial Court's decision of December 26, 1987
and its Order of February 26, 1988, and for statement of "the dates he received . . . (said) decision and . . . order."
Borromeo went up to this Court on appeal, his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 84999. In a Resolution dated
October 10, 1988, the Second Division required comment on Borromeo's petition for review by the respondents
therein named, and required Borromeo to secure the services of counsel. On November 9, 1988, Atty. Jose L.
Cerilles entered his appearance for Borromeo. After due proceedings, Borromeo's petition was dismissed, by
Resolution dated March 6, 1989 of the Second Division for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had
committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment. His motion for reconsideration dated April 4, 1989, again
complaining that the resolution contained no findings of fact and law, was denied.
a. RTC Case No. CEB-8178
Predictably, another action, Civil Case No. CEB-8178, was commenced by Borromeo in the RTC of Cebu City, this
time against the Trial Judge who had lately rendered judgment adverse to him, Judge Generoso Juaban. Also
impleaded as defendants were UCPB, and Hon. Andres Narvasa (then Chairman, First Division), Estrella
G.Pagtanac and Marissa Villarama (then, respectively, Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the First
Division), and others. Judge German G. Lee of Branch 15 of said Court — to which the case was raffled — caused
issuance of summonses which were in due course served on September 22, 1989, among others, on said
defendants in and of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution dated October 2, 1989 — in G.R. No. 84999 —
this Court, required Judge Lee and the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the Cebu RTC to show cause
why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for issuing said summonses.
11
Shortly thereafter, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles — who, as already stated, had for a time represented Borromeo in G.R. No.
84999 — filed with this Court his withdrawal of appearance, alleging that there was "no compatibility" between him
and his client, Borromeo — because "Borromeo had been filing pleadings, papers; etc. without . . . (his) knowledge
8178 before the Regional Trial Court in Cebu. On the other hand, Judge Lee, in his "Compliance" dated October 23,
1989, apologized to the Court and informed it that he had already promulgated an order dismissing Civil Case No.
CEB-8178 on motion of the principal defendants therein, namely, Judge Generoso Juaban and United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB). Atty. Cerilles' withdrawal of appearance, and Judge Lee's compliance, were noted by the
Court in its Resolution dated November 29, 1989.
4. RTC Case No. CEB-374; CA-G.R.
CV No. 04097; G.R. No. 77248
It is germane to advert to one more transaction between Borromeo and Samson K. Lao which gave rise to another
action that ultimately landed in this Court. 29 The transaction involved a parcel of land of Borromeo's known as the
"San Jose Property" (TCT No. 34785). Borromeo sued Lao and another person (Mariano Logarta) in the Cebu
Regional Trial Court on the theory that his contract with the latter was not an absolute sale but an equitable
mortgage. The action was docketed as Case No. CEB-374. Judgment was rendered against him by the Trial Court
(Branch 12) declaring valid and binding the purchase of the property by Lao from him, and the subsequent sale
thereof by Lao to Logarta. Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals, but that Court, in CA-G.R. CV No. 04097,
affirmed the Trial Court's judgment, by Decision promulgated on October 10, 1986.
Borromeo came up to this Court. on appeal, his review petition being docketed as G.R. No. 77248. By Resolution of
the Second Division of March 16, 1987, however, his petition was denied for the reason that "a) the petition as well
as the docket and legal research fund fees were filed and paid late; and (b) the issues raised are factual and the
findings thereon of the Court of Appeals are final." He moved for reconsideration; this was denied by Resolution
dated June 3, 1987.
He thereafter insistently and persistently still sought reconsideration of said adverse resolutions through various
motions and letters, all of which were denied. One of his letters — inter alia complaining that the notice sent to him
by the Clerk of Court did not bear the signature of any Justice — elicited the following reply from Atty. Julieta Y.
Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, dated July 10, 1987, reading as follows:
Dear Mr. Borromeo:
This refers to your letter dated June 9, 1987 requesting for a copy of the actual resolution with
the signatures of all the Justices of the Second Division in Case G.R. No. 77243 whereby the
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition was denied for lack of merit.
In connection therewith, allow us to cite for your guidance, Resolution dated July 6, 1981 in G.R.
No. 56280, Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, Jr., et al., wherein the Supreme Court
declared that "(m)inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions
like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members
of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk
of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or
dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order together with its
findings of facts and legal conclusions." It is the Clerk of Court's duty to notify the parties of the
action taken on their case by quoting the resolution adopted by the Court.

Very truly
yours,
JULIETA Y.
CARREON
B. CRIMINAL CASES
Just as he had done with regard to the cases involving the Traders Royal Bank, and similarly without foundation,
Borromeo attempted to hold his adversaries in the cases concerning the UCPB criminally liable.
1. Case No; OMB-VIS-89-00181
In relation to the dispositions made of Borromeo's appeals and other attempts to overturn the judgment of the RTC in
Civil Case No. 21880, 30 Borromeo filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) on August 18, 1989, a
complaint against the Chairman and Members of the Supreme Court's First Division; the Members of the Ninth
Division of the Court of Appeals, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez, Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III,
and Cebu City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja, charging them with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and the Revised Penal Code.
By Resolution dated January 12, 1990, 31 the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed Borromeo's complaint, opining
that the matters therein dealt with had already been tried and their merits determined by different courts including the
Supreme Court (decision, June 26, 1989, in G.R. No. 87987). The resolution inter alia stated that, "Finally, we find it
unreasonable for complainant to dispute and defiantly refuse to acknowledge the authority of the decree rendered by
the highest tribunal of the land in this case. . . ."
2. Case No. OMB-VIS-90-00418
A second complaint was filed by Borromeo with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), dated January 12, 1990,
against Atty. Julieta Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, Supreme Court, and others, charging them with a
violation of R.A. 3019 (and the Constitution, the Rules of Court, etc.) for supposedly usurping judicial functions in that
they issued Supreme Court resolutions (actually, notices of resolutions) in connection with G.R. No. 82273 which did
not bear the justices' signatures. 32 In a Resolution dated March 19, 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed
his complaint for "lack of merit" declaring inter alia that "in all the questioned actuations of the respondents alleged to
constitute usurpation . . . it cannot be reasonably and fairly inferred that respondents really were the ones rendering
them," and "it is not the prerogative of this office to review the correctness of judicial resolutions." 33
III. CASES INVOLVING SECURITY
BANK & TRUST CO. (SBTC)
A. CIVIL CASES
1. RTC Case No. 21615; CA-
G.R. No. 20617; G.R. No. 94769
12
The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court battles, was the Security Bank &
Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate sum of P189,126.19,
consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp.
(Summa) issued a performance bond which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in the
case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB, Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations.
Hence, SBTC brought an action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.
The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21615, and was assigned to Branch 10, Judge Leonardo Cañares,
presiding. Plaintiff SBTC was represented by Atty. Edgar Gica, who later withdrew and was substituted by the law
firm, HERSINLAW. The latter appeared in the suit through Atty. Wilfredo Navarro.
Judgment by default was rendered in the case on January 5, 1989; both defendents were sentenced to pay to SBTC,
solidarily, the amount of P436,771.32; 25% thereof as attorney's fees (but in no case less than P20,000.00); and
P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs. A writ of execution issued in due course pursuant to which an
immovable of Borromeo was levied on, and eventually sold at public auction on October 19, 1989 in favor of the
highest bidder, SBTC.
On February 5, 1990, Borromeo filed a motion to set aside the judgment by default, but the same was denied on
March 6, 1990. His Motion for Reconsideration having likewise been denied, Borromeo went to the Court of Appeals
for relief (CA-G.R. No. 20617), but the latter dismissed his petition. Failing in his bid for reconsideration, Borromeo
appealed to this Court on certiorari — his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 94769. On September 17, 1990, this
Court dismissed his petition, and subsequently denied with finality his motion for reconsideration. Entry of Judgment
was made on December 26, 1990.
However, as will now be narrated, and as might now have been anticipated in light of his history of recalcitrance and
bellicosity, these proceedings did not signify the end of litigation concerning Borromeo's aforesaid contractual
commitments to SBTC, but only marked the start of another congeries of actions and proceedings, civil and criminal
concerning the same matter, instituted by Borromeo.
2. RTC Case No. CEB-9267
While G.R. No. 94769 was yet pending in the Supreme Court, Borromeo commenced a suit of his own in the Cebu
RTC against SBTC; the lawyers who represented it in Civil Case No. R-21625 — HERSINLAW, Atty. Wilfredo
Navarro, Atty. Edgar Gica; and even the Judge who tried and disposed of the suit, Hon. Leonardo Cañares. He
denominated his action, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9267, as one for "Damages from Denial of Due Process,
Breach of Contract, Fraud, Unjust Judgment, with Restraining Order and Injunction." His complaint accused
defendants of "wanton, malicious and deceitful acts" in "conniving to deny plaintiff due process and defraud him
through excessive attorney's fees," which acts caused him grave mental and moral shock, sleepless nights, worry,
social embarrassment and severe anxiety for which he sought payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as
litigation expenses.
By Order dated May 21, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16 (Hon. Godardo Jacinto, presiding) granted the
demurrer to evidence filed by defendants and dismissed the complaint, holding that "since plaintiff failed to introduce
evidence to support . . . (his) causes of action asserted . . ., it would be superfluous to still require defendants to
present their own evidence as there is nothing for them to controvert."
2. RTC Case No. CEB-10458;
CA-G.R. CV No. 39047

Nothing daunted, and running true to form, Borromeo filed on July 2, 1991 still another suit against the same parties
— SBTC, HERSINLAW, and Judge Cañares — but now including Judge Godardo Jacinto, 34 who had rendered the
latest judgment against him. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10458, was, according to Borromeo, one "for
Damages (For Unjust Judgment and Orders, Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws Violation of the Constitution,
Fraud and Breach of Contract)." Borromeo faulted Judges Cañares and Jacinto "for the way they decided the two
cases (CVR-21615 & CEB NO. 9267)," and contended that defendants committed "wanton, malicious, and unjust
acts" by "conniving to defraud plaintiff and deny him equal protection of the laws and due process," on account of
which he had been "caused untold mental anguish, moral shock, worry, sleepless nights, and embarrassment for
which the former are liable under Arts. 20, 21, 27, and 32 of the Civil Code."
The defendants filed motions to dismiss. By Order dated August 30, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 15 (Judge
German G. Lee, Jr., presiding) dismissed the complaint on grounds of res judicata, immunity of judges from liability
in the performance of their official functions, and lack of jurisdiction.
Borromeo took an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which docketed it as CA-G.R. CV No. 39047.
In the course thereof, he filed motions to cite Atty. Wilfredo F. Navarro, lawyer of SBTC, for contempt of court. The
motions were denied by Resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special 7th Division) dated April 13, 1993. 35 Said the
Court:
Stripped of their disparaging and intemperate innuendoes, the subject motions, in fact, proffer
nothing but a stark difference in opinion as to what can, or cannot, be considered res
judicata under the circumstances.
xxx xxx xxx
By their distinct disdainful tenor towards the appellees, and his apparent penchant
for argumentum ad hominen, it is, on the contrary the appellant who precariously treads the
acceptable limits of argumentation and personal advocacy. The Court, moreover, takes
particular note of the irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored and finds them highly
reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts. That
he is not a licensed law practitioner is, in fact, the only reason that his otherwise contumacious
behavior is presently accorded the patience and leniency it probably does not deserve.
Considering the temperament he has, by far, exhibited, the appellant is, however, sufficiently
warned that similar displays in the future shall accordingly be dealt with with commensurate
severity.
IV. OTHER CASES
A. RTC Case No. CEB-2074; CA-G.R,
CV No. 14770; G.R. No. 98929
One other case arising from another transaction of Borromeo with Samson K. Lao is pertinent. This is Case No.
CEB-2974 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. It appears that sometime in 1979, Borromeo was granted a loan of
P165,000.00 by the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) on the security of a lot belonging to him in San
Jose Street, Cebu City, covered by TCT No. 34785.36 Later, Borromeo obtained a letter of credit in the amount of
P37,000.00 from Republic Planters Bank, with Samson Lao as co-maker. Borromeo failed to pay his obligations; Lao
agreed to, and did pay Borromeo's obligations to both banks (PBCom and Republic), in consideration of which a
13
deed of sale was executed in his favor by Borromeo over two (2) parcels of land, one of which was that mortgaged to
PBCom, as above stated. Lao then mortgaged the land to PBCom as security for his own loan in the amount of
P240,000.00.
Borromeo subsequently sued PBCom, some of its personnel, and Samson Lao in the Cebu Regional Trial Court
alleging that the defendants had conspired to deprive him of his property. Judgment was rendered against him by the
Trial Court. Borromeo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where his appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
14770. On March 21, 1990, said Court rendered judgment affirming the Trial Court's decision, and on February 7,
1991, issued a Resolution denying Borromeo's motion for reconsideration. His appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 98929, was given short shrift. On May 29, 1991, the Court (First Division) promulgated a Resolution denying his
petition for review "for being factual and for failure . . . to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any
reversible error in its questioned judgment."
Stubbornly, in his motion for reconsideration, he insisted the notices of the resolutions sent to him were
unconstitutional and void because bearing no signatures of the Justices who had taken part in approving the
resolution therein mentioned.
B. RTC Case No. CEB-11528
What would seem to be the latest judicial dispositions rendered against Borromeo, at least as of date of this
Resolution, are two orders issued in Civil Case No. CEB-11528 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City (Branch 18),
which was yet another case filed by Borromeo outlandishly founded on the theory that a judgment promulgated
against him by the Supreme Court (Third Division) was wrong and "unjust." Impleaded as defendant in the action
was former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, as Chairman of the Third Division at the time in question. On August
31, 1994 the presiding judge, Hon. Galicano O. Arriesgado, issued a Resolution inter alia dismissing Borromeo's
complaint "on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and res judicata." His Honor made the following pertinent observations:
. . . (T)his Court is of the well-considered view and so holds that this Court has indeed no
jurisdiction to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme
Court. The acts or omissions complained of by the plaintiff against the herein defendant and the
other personnel of the highest Court of the land as alleged in paragraphs 6 to 12 of plaintiff's
complaint are certainly beyond the sphere of this humble court to consider and pass upon to
determine their propriety and legality. To try to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order
of the Honorable Supreme Court would appear not only presumptuous but also contemptuous.
As argued by the lawyer for the defendant, a careful perusal of the allegations in the complaint
clearly shows that all material allegations thereof are directed against a resolution of the
Supreme Court which was allegedly issued by the Third Division composed of five (5) justices.
No allegation is made directly against defendant Marcelo B. Fernan in his personal capacity.
That being the case, how could this Court question the wisdom of the final order or judgment of
the Supreme Court (Third Division) which according to the plaintiff himself had issued a
resolution denying plaintiffs petition and affirming the Lower Court's decision as reflected in the
"Entry of Judgment." Perhaps, if there was such violation of the Rules of Court, due process and
Sec. 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution by the defendant herein, the appropriate remedy should not
have been obtained before this Court. For an inferior court to reverse, interpret or review the
acts of a superior court might be construed to a certain degree as a show of an uncommon
common sense. Lower courts are without supervising jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the
judgment of the higher courts.

Borromeo's motion for reconsideration dated September 20, 1994 was denied "for lack of sufficient factual and legal
basis" by an Order dated November 15, 1994.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 3433
A. Complaint Against Lawyers
of his Court Adversaries
Borromeo also initiated administrative disciplinary proceedings against the lawyers who had appeared for his
adversaries — UCPB and Samson K. Lao — in the actions above mentioned, and others. As already mentioned,
these lawyers were: Messrs. Laurence Fernandez, Danilo Deen, Honorato Hermosisima, Antonio Regis, and Alfredo
Perez. His complaint against them, docketed as Administrative Case No. 3433, prayed for their disbarment.
Borromeo averred that the respondent lawyers connived with their clients in (1) maliciously misrepresenting a deed
of sale with pacto de retro as a genuine sale, although it was actually an equitable mortgage; (2) fraudulently
depriving complainant of his proprietary rights subject of the Deed of Sale; and (3) defying two lawful Court orders,
all in violation of their lawyer's oath to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court. Borromeo alleged
that respondents Perez and Regis falsely attempted to consolidate title to his property in favor of Lao.
B. Answer of Respondent Lawyers
The respondent lawyers denounced the disbarment complaint as "absolutely baseless and nothing but pure
harassment." In a pleading dated July 10, 1990, entitled "Comments and Counter Motion to Cite Joaquin Borromeo
in Contempt of Court;" July 10, 1990, filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City Chapter, signed by
Domero C. Estenzo (President), Juliano Neri (Vice-President), Ulysses Antonio C. Yap (Treasurer); Felipe B.
Velasquez (Secretary), Corazon E. Valencia (Director), Virgilio U. Lainid (Director), Manuel A. Espina (Director),
Ildefonsa A. Ybañez (Director), Sylvia G. Almase (Director), and Ana Mar Evangelista P. Batiguin (Auditor). The
lawyers made the following observations:
It is ironic. While men of the legal profession regard members of the Judiciary with deferential
awe and respect sometimes to the extent of cowering before the might of the courts, here is a
non-lawyer who, with gleeful abandon and unmitigated insolence, has cast aspersions and
shown utter disregard to the authority and name of the courts.
And lawyers included. For indeed, it is very unfortunate that here is a non-lawyer who uses the
instruments of justice to harass lawyers and courts who crosses his path more especially if their
actuations do not conform with his whims and caprices.
Adverting to letters publicly circulated by Borromeo, inter alia charging then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan with
supposed infidelity and violation of the constitution, etc., the lawyers went on to say the following:
The conduct and statement of Borromeo against this Honorable Court, and other members of
the Judiciary are clearly and grossly disrespectful, insolent and contemptuous. They tend to
bring dishonor to the Judiciary and subvert the public confidence on the courts. If unchecked,
the scurrilous attacks will undermine the dignity of the courts and will result in the loss of
confidence in the country's judicial system and administration of justice.
14
. . . (S)omething should be done to protect the integrity of the courts and the legal profession. So
many baseless badmouthing have been made by Borromeo against this Honorable Court and
other courts that for him to go scot-free would certainly be demoralizing to members of the
profession who afforded the court with all the respect and esteem due them.
Subsequently, in the same proceeding; Borromeo filed another pleading protesting the alleged "refusal" of the Cebu
City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to act on his disbarment cases "filed against its members."
C. Decision of the IBP
On March 28, 1994, the National Executive Director, IBP (Atty. Jose Aguila Grapilon) transmitted to this Court the
notice and copy of the decision in the case, reached after due investigation, as well as the corresponding records in
seven (7) volumes. Said decision approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation dated December 15,
1993 of Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi, President, IBP, Cebu City Chapter, representing the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, recommending dismissal of the complaint as against all the respondents and the issuance of a "warning
to Borromeo to be more cautious and not be precipitately indiscriminate in the filing of administrative complaints
against lawyers." 37
VI. SCURRILOUS WRITINGS
Forming part of the records of several cases in this Court are copies of letters ("open" or otherwise), "circulars," flyers
or leaflets harshly and quite unwarrantedly derogatory of the many court judgments or directives against him and
defamatory of his adversaries and their lawyers and employees, as well as the judges and court employees involved
in the said adverse dispositions — some of which scurrilous writings were adverted to by the respondent lawyers in
Adm. Case No. 3433, supra. The writing and circulation of these defamatory writing were apparently undertaken by
Borromeo as a parallel activity to his "judicial adventures." The Court of Appeals had occasion to refer to his
"apparent penchant for argumentum ad hominen" and of the "irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored . . .
(which were found to be) highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of the
Courts."
In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers ignorant, corrupt, oppressors, violators of the
Constitution and the laws, etc.
Sometime in July, 1990, for instance, he wrote to the editor of the "Daily Star" as regards the reported conferment on
then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan of an "Award from the University of Texas for his contributions in upholding the
Rule of Law, Justice, etc.," stressing that Fernan "and the Supreme Court persist in rendering rulings patently
violative of the Constitution, Due Process and Rule of Law, particularly in their issuance of so-called Minute
Resolutions devoid of FACT or LAW or SIGNATURES . . ." He sent a copy of his letter in the Supreme Court.
He circulated an "OPEN LETTER TO SC justices, Fernan," declaring that he had "suffered INJUSTICE after
INJUSTICE from you who are sworn to render TRUE JUSTICE but done the opposite, AND INSTEAD OF
RECTIFYING THEM, labeled my cases as 'frivolous, nuisance, and harassment suits' while failing to refute the
irrefutable evidences therein . . .;" in the same letter, he specified what he considered to be some of "the terrible
injustices inflicted on me by this Court."
In another letter to Chief Justice Fernan, he observed that "3 years after EDSA, your pledges have not been fulfilled.
Injustice continues and as you said, the courts are agents of oppression, instead of being saviours and defenders of
the people. The saddest part is that (referring again to minute resolutions) even the Supreme Court, the court of last
 15

resort, many times, sanctions injustice and the trampling of the rule of law and due process, and does not comply TYRANTS will never admit that they are tyrants. But their acts speak for themselves! NARVASA
with the Constitution when it should be the first to uphold and defend it . . . ." Another circulated letter of his, dated & ASSOC: ANSWER AND REFUTE THESE SERIOUS CHARGES OR RESIGN!!
June 21, 1989 and captioned, "Open Letter to Supreme Court Justices Marcelo Fernan and Andres Narvasa,"
repeated his plaint of having "been the victim of many . . . 'Minute Resolutions' . . . which in effect sanction the theft
IMPEACH NARVASA
and landgrabbing and arson of my properties by TRADERS ROYAL BANK, UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK,
AND one TOMAS B. TAN — all without stating any FACT or LAW to support your dismissal of . . . (my) cases,
despite your firm assurances (Justice Fernan) that you would cite me such facts or laws (during our talk in your • ISSUING UNSIGNED, SWEEPING, UNCLEAR, UNCONSTITUTIONAL
house last March 12 1989);" and that "you in fact have no such facts or laws but simply want to ram down a most "MINUTE RESOLUTIONS" VIOLATIVE OF SECS. 4(3), 14, ART. 8,
unjust Ruling in favor of a wrongful party. . . ." Constitution

In another flyer entitled in big bold letters, "A Gov't That Lies! Blatant attempt to fool people!" he mentions what he • VIOLATING RULES OF COURT AND DUE PROCESS IN ORDERING
regards as "The blatant lies and contradictions of the Supreme Court, CA to support the landgrabbing by Traders CASE AGAINST SC CLERKS (CEB-8679) DISMISSED DESPITE THE
Royal Bank of Borromeos' Lands." Another flyer has at the center the caricature of a person, seated on a throne LATTER'S FAILURE TO FILE PLEADINGS; HENCE IN DEFAULT
marked Traders Royal Bank, surrounded by such statements as, "Sa TRB para kami ay royalty. Nakaw at nakaw!
Kawat Kawat! TRB WILL STEAL!" etc Still another "circular" proclaims: "So the public may know: Supreme Court
• CORRUPTION AND/OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN RULING,
minute resolutions w/o facts, law, or signatures violate the Constitution" and ends with the admonition: "Supreme
THAT CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION,
Court, Justice Fernan: STOP VIOLATING THE CHARTER." 38
CONTRADICTING LAW AND SC'S OWN RULINGS — TO ALLOW CRONY
BANK TRB TO STEALS LOTS WORTH P3 MILLION
One other "circular" reads:
• CONDONING CRONY BANK UCPB'S DEFIANCE OF TWO LAWFUL
SC, NARVASA — TYRANTS!!! COURT ORDERS AND STEALING OF TITLE OF PROPERTY WORTH P4
— CODDLERS OF CROOKS! MILLION
— VIOLATOR OF LAWS
• BEING JUDGE AND ACCUSED AT THE SAME TIME AND
by: JOAQUIN BORROMEO PREDICTABLY EXONERATING HIMSELF AND FELLOW CORRUPT
JUSTICES
NARVASA's SC has denied being a DESPOT nor has it shielded CROOKS in the judiciary.
Adding "The SCRA (SC Reports) will attest to this continuing vigilance Of the supreme Court." • DECLARING HIMSELF, JUSTICES, and even MERE CLERKS TO BE
These are lame, cowardly and self-serving denials and another "self-exoneration" belied by IMMUNE FROM SUIT AND UN-ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE and
evidence which speak for themselves (Res Ipsa Loquitor) (sic) — the SCRA itself. REFUSING TO ANSWER AND REFUTE CHARGES AGAINST HIMSELF

It is pure and simply TYRANNY when Narvasa and associates issued UNSIGNED, UNCLEAR, JOAQUIN T.
SWEEPING "Minute Resolutions" devoid of CLEAR FACTS and LAWS in patent violation of BORROMEO
Secs. 4(3), 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution. It is precisely through said TYRANNICAL, and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL sham rulings that Narvasa & Co. have CODDLED CROOKS like crony
Mabolo, Cebu City
bank TRB, UCPB, and SBTC, and through said fake resolutions that Narvasa has LIED or
shown IGNORANCE of the LAW in ruling that CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION (GR 83306). Through said despotic resolutions, NARVASA & CO. have Te. 7-56-49.
sanctioned UCPB/ACCRA's defiance of court orders and naked land grabbing — What are
these if not TYRANNY? (GR 84999).
VI. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS 
OF PROCEEDINGS AT BAR
Was it not tyranny for the SC to issue an Entry of Judgment without first resolving the motion for
reconsideration (G.R No. 82273). Was it not tyranny and abuse of power for the SC to order a
case dismissed against SC clerks (CEBV-8679) and declare justices and said clerks "immune A. Letter of Cebu City Chapter
from suit" — despite their failure to file any pleading? Were Narvasa & Co. not in fact trampling IBP, dated June 21, 1992
on the rule of law and rules of court and DUE PROCESS in so doing? (GR No. 82273).
Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into the hands, among others, of some members of the Cebu City
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Its President thereupon addressed a letter to this Court, dated June
21, 1992, which (1) drew attention to one of them — that last quoted, above — " . . . .sent to the IBP Cebu City

Chapter and probably other officers . . . in Cebu," described as containing "highly libelous and defamatory remarks
against the Supreme Court and the whole justice system"— and (2) in behalf of the Chapter's "officers and
members," strongly urged the Court "to impose sanctions against Mr. Borromeo for his condemnable act."
B. Resolution of July 22, 1993
Acting thereon, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution on July 22, 1993, requiring comment by Borromeo on the
letter, notice of which was sent to him by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The resolution pertinently reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The records of the Court disclose inter alia that as early as April 4, 1989, the Acting Clerk of
Court, Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno, wrote a four page letter to Mr. Borromeo concerning G.R. No.
83306 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Traders Royal Bank [referred to by Borromeo in the "circular"
adverted to by the relator herein, the IBP Cebu City Chapter]) and two (2) other cases also filed
with the Court by Borromeo: G.R. No. 77248 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Samson Lao and Mariano
Logarta) and G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Hon. Mario Dizon and Tomas Tan), all
resolved adversely to him by different Divisions of the Court. In that letter Atty. Puno explained
to Borromeo very briefly the legal principles applicable to his cases and dealt with the matters
mentioned in his circular.
The records further disclose subsequent adverse rulings by the Court in other cases instituted
by Borromeo in this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 87897 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, et al.)
and No. 82273 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals and Samson Lao), as well as the
existence of other communications made public by Borromeo reiterating the arguments already
passed upon by the court in his cases and condemning the court's rejection of those arguments.
Acting on the letter dated June 21, 1993 of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines thru its above named, President, and taking account of the related facts on record,
the Court Resolved:
1) to REQUIRE:
(a) the Clerk of Court (1) to DOCKET the matter at bar as a proceeding for contempt against
Joaquin T. Borromeo instituted at the relation of said Cebu City Chapter, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and (2) to SEND to the City Sheriff, Cebu City, notice of this resolution and copies of
the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993 together with its annexes; and
(b) said City Sheriff of Cebu City to CAUSE PERSONAL SERVICE of said notice of resolution
and a copy of the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993, together with its annexes, on Joaquin T.
Borromeo at his address at Mabolo, Cebu City; and
2) to ORDER said Joaquin T. Borromeo, within ten (10) days from receipt of such notice and the
IBP Chapter's letter of June 21, 1993 and its annexes, to file a comment on the letter and its
annexes as well as on the other matters set forth in this resolution, serving copy thereof on the
relator, the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Palace of Justice
Building, Capitol, Cebu City.
16
SO ORDERED.
1. Atty. Puno's Letter of April 4, 1989
Clerk of Court Puno's letter to Borromeo of April 4, 1989, referred to in the first paragraph of the resolution just
mentioned, explained to Borromeo for perhaps the second time, precisely the principles and established practice
relative to "minute resolutions" and notices thereof, treated of in several other communications and resolutions sent
to him by the Supreme Court, to wit: the letter received by him on July 10, 1987, from Clerk of Court Julieta Y.
Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) (in relation to G.R No. 77243 39) the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second
Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19, 
1989, 40 and three resolutions of this Court, notices of which were in due course served on him, to wit: that dated July
31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897; 41 that dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82274 (186 SCRA 1), 42 and that dated June 11,
1994 in G. R. No. 112928. 43
C. Borromeo's Comment of August 27, 1993
In response to the Resolution of July 22, 1993, Borromeo filed a Comment dated August 27, 1993 in which he
alleged the following:
1) the resolution of July 22, 1993 (requiring comment) violates the Constitution which requires
"signatures and concurrence of majority of members of the High Court;" hence, "a certified copy
duly signed by Justices is respectfully requested;"
2) the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit themselves "since they
cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time, . . . (and) this case should be heard by an
impartial and independent body;"
3) the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP Cebu Chapter)
Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out "what particular
statements in the circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and does not appear that
Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those accused in the
"libelous circular;"
4) in making the circular, he (Borromeo) "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of
expression, and to petition the government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by the
Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the accountability of public officials;" the
circular merely states the truth and asks for justice based on the facts and the 
law; . . . it is not libelous nor disrespectful but rather to be commended and encouraged; . . .
Atty. Legaspi . . . should specify under oath which statements are false and lies;
5) he "stands by the charges in his circular and is prepared to support them with pertinent facts,
evidence and law;" and it is "incumbent on the Hon. Chief Justice and members of the High
Court to either refute said charges or dispense the justice that they are duty bound to dispense.
D. Resolution of September 30, 1993

After receipt of the comment, and desiring to accord Borromeo the fullest opportunity to explain his side, and be
reprsented by an attorney, the Court promulgated the following Resolution on September 30, 1993, notice of which
was again served on him by the Office of the Clerk of Court.
. . . The return of service filed by Sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino, Office of the Clerk of Court
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, dated August 26, 1993, and the Comment of Joaquin
Borromeo, dated August 27, 1993, on the letter of President Manuel P. Legaspi of the relator
dated June 21, 1993, are both NOTED. After deliberating on the allegations of said Comment,
the Court Resolved to GRANT Joaquin T. Borromeo an additional period of fifteen (15) days
from notice hereof within which to engage the services or otherwise seek the assistance of a
lawyer and submit such further arguments in addition to or in amplification of those set out in his
Comment dated August 27, 1993, if he be so minded.
SO ORDERED.
E. Borromeo's Supplemental Comment
of October 15, 1992
Borromeo filed a "Supplemental Comment" dated October 15, 1992, reiterating the arguments and allegations in his
Comment of August 27, 1993, and setting forth "additional arguments and amplification to . . . (said) Comment," viz.:
1) the IBP and Atty. Legaspi have failed "to specify and state under oath the alleged 'libelous'
remarks contained in the circular . . .; (they should) be ordered to file a VERIFIED COMPLAINT .
. .(failing in which, they should) be cited in contempt of court for making false charges and
wasting the precious time of this Highest Court by filing a baseless complaint;
2) the allegations in their circular are not libelous nor disrespectful but "are based on the TRUTH
and the LAW", namely:
a) "minute resolutions" bereft of signatures and clear facts and laws are
patent violations of Secs. 4(32), 13, 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution;
b) there is no basis nor thruth to this Hon. Court's affirmation to the Appelate
Court's ruling that the undersigned "lost" his right of redemption price, since
no less than this Hon. Court has ruled in many rulings that CONSIGNATION
IS UNNECESSARY in right of redemption;
c) this Hon. Court has deplorably condoned crony banks TRB and UCPB's frauds and defiance
of court orders in G.R. Nos. 83306 and 878997 and 84999.
F. Borromeo's "Manifestation" of
November 26, 1993
Borromeo afterwards filed a "Manifestation" under date of November 26, 1993, adverting to "the failure of the IBP
and Atty. Legaspi to substantiate his charges under oath and the failure of the concerned Justices to refute the
charges in the alledged "libelous circular" and, construing these as "and admission of the thruth in said circular,"
17
theorized that it is "incumbent on the said Justices to rectify their grave as well as to dismiss Atty. Legaspi's baseless
and false charges."
VII. THE COURT CONCLUSIONS
A. Respondent's Liability
for Contempt of Court
Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse of
and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct
directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of justice. 44 He has stubbornly litigated issues already
declared to be without merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely to him in many suits
and proceedings, rulings which had become final and executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting on the
application of his own individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more than his personal (and quite
erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he has insulted the judges and court officers, including the
attorneys appearing for his adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried the patience of the
judges and court employees who have had to act on his repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and
motions. He has wasted the time of the courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court employees who have had
the bad luck of having to act in one way or another on his unmeritorious cases. More particularly, despite his
attention having been called many times to the egregious error of his theory that the so-called "minute resolutions" of
this Court should contain findings of fact and conclusions of law, and should be signed or certified by the Justices
promulgating the same, 45 he has mulishly persisted in ventilating that self-same theory in various proceedings,
causing much loss of time, annoyance and vexation to the courts, the court employees and parties involved.
1. Untenability of Proffered Defenses
The first defense that he proffers, that the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit themselves
"since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time . . . (and) this case should be heard by an impartial
and independent body, is still another illustration of an entirely unwarranted, arrogant and reprehensible assumption
of a competence in the field of the law: he again uses up the time of the Court needlessly by invoking an argument
long since declared and adjudged to be untenable. It is axiomatic that the "power or duty of the court to institute a
charge for contempt against itself, without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting officer, is essential to the
preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from litigants, lawyers and the public. Were the intervention of the
prosecuting officer required and judges obliged to file complaints for contempts against them before the prosecuting
officer, in order to bring the guilty to justice, courts would be inferior to prosecuting officers and impotent to perform
their functions with dispatch and absolute independence. The institution of charges by the prosecuting officer is not
necessary to hold persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that
the law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be
heard by himself or counsel. The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person. . . ." 46
His claim — that the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP Cebu Chapter)
Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out what particular statements in the circular
are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and it does not appear that Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or file a
complaint "in behalf of those accused in the 'libelous' circular" — is in the premises, plainly nothing but superficial
philosophizing, deserving no serious treatment.
Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his other contention that in making the allegations claimed to be
contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition the government for
redress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the accountablity of

public officials." The constitutional rights invoked by him afford no justification for repetitious litigation of the same
causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court employees; and other persons, for abusing the processes and
rules of the courts, wasting their time, and bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.
B. Basic Principles Governing
the Judicial Function
The facts and issues involved in the proceeding at bench make necessary a restatement of the principles governing
finality of judgments and of the paramount need to put an end to litigation at some point, and to lay down definite
postulates concerning what is perceived to be a growing predilection on the part of lawyers and litigants — like
Borromeo — to resort to administrative prosecution (or institution of civil or criminal actions) as a substitute for or
supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review provided by law from court judgments or orders.
1. Reason for courts; Judicial 
Hierarchy
Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement of controversies. In every country there is a more or less
established hierarchical organization of courts, and a more or less comprehensive system of review of judgments
and final orders of lower courts.
The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several levels of litigation, i.e., the presentation of evidence by the
parties — a trial or hearing in the first instance — as well as a review of the judgments of lower courts by higher
tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation of the factual and legal issues through briefs or
memoranda. The procedure for review is fixed by law, and is in the very nature of things, exclusive to the courts.
2. Paramount Need to end 
Litigation at Some Point
It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence, after the procedures
and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or
terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the
losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no
moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public
policy demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon
accorded absolute finality. 47 As observed by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, a 1967 decision, 48 a
party "may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he
feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden
into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that
courts are the temples of right."
3. Judgments of Supreme Court 
Not Reviewable
The sound, salutary and self-evident principle prevailing in this as in most jurisdictions, is that judgments of the
highest tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by any other agency, branch, department, or official of Government.
Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there the matter must rest. Its decision should not and cannot be appealed to
or reviewed by any other entity, much less reversed or modified on the ground that it is tainted by error in its findings
18
of fact or conclusions of law, flawed in its logic or language, or otherwise erroneous in some other respect. 49 This, on
the indisputable and unshakable foundation of public policy, and constitutional and traditional principle.
In an extended Resolution promulgated on March 12, 1987 in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta — involving an attempt by a
lawyer to prosecute before the Tanod bayan "members of the First Division of this Court collectively with having
knowingly and deliberately rendered an 'unjust extended minute Resolution' with deliberate bad faith in violation of
Article 204 of the Revised penal Code ". . . and for deliberatly causing "undue injury" to respondent . . . and her co-
heirs because of the "unjust Resolution" promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act . . . —
the following pronouncements were made in reaffirmation of established doctrine: 50
. . . As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986, which the Court
hereby adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme — the third great
department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality
all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its
judgments or declare them "unjust." It is elementary that "(A)s has ever been stressed since the
early case of Arnedo vs.Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) "controlling and irresistible reasons
of public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error,
judgments of courts determining controversies submitted to them should become final at some
definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter
beyond the control even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of
fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for
which the courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions
submitted to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the parties. (Luzon Brokerage
Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317)
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether an en banc or division,
speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or
inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs.
Pons, 34 Phil. 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil. 1) The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t is well settled that the
enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive [as claimed by
petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees] — on which we cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democractic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial decree" is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court orders, resolutions
and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347,
350. (Citing Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1;
Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1).
The Court has consistently stressed that the "doctrine of separation of powers calls for
the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left alone to discharge their duties as
they see fit" (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the same way that the
judiciary has a right to expect that neither the President nor Congress would cast doubt on the
mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden
forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch into acting the way it did. The

concept of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and between the three
departments of the government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287).
4. Final and Executory Judgments of
Lower Courts Not Reviewable
Even by Supreme Court
In respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies available under law to a party who is adversely
affected by their decisions or orders are a motion for new trial (or reconsideration) under Rule 37, and an appeal to
either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on whether questions of both fact and law, or of law
only, are raised, in accordance with fixed and familiar rules and conformably with the hierarchy of
courts. 51Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on the ground that it was rendered without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, may be had through the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition
pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
However, should judgments of lower courts — which may normally be subject to review by higher tribunals —
become final and executory before, or without, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they, too, become inviolable,
impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in anyway modified directly or indirectly, by a
higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of
Government. 52
C. Administrative Civil or Criminal Action
against Judge. Not Substitute for Appeal;
Proscribed by Law and Logic
Now, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there has been of late a regrettable increase in the resort to
administrative prosecution — or the institution of a civil or criminal action — as a substitute for or supplement to
appeal. Whether intended or not, such a resort to these remedies operates as a form of threat or intimidation to
coerce judges into timorous surrender of their prerogatives, or a reluctance to exercise them. With rising frequency,
administrative complaints are being presented to the Office of the Court Administrator; criminal complaints are being
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman or the public prosecutor's office; civil actions for recovery of damages
commenced in the Regional Trial Courts against trial judges, and justices of the Court of Appeals and even of the
Supreme Court.
1. Common Basis of Complaints
Against Judges
Many of these complaints set forth a common indictment: that the respondent Judges or Justices rendered
manifestly unjust judgments or interlocutory orders 53 — i.e., judgments or orders which are allegedly not in accord
with the evidence, or with law or jurisprudence, or are tainted by grave abuse of discretion — thereby causing
injustice, and actionable and compensable injury to the complainants (invariably losing litigants). Resolution of
complaints of this sort quite obviously entails a common requirement for the fiscal, the Ombudsman or the Trial
Court: a review of the decision or order of the respondent Judge or Justice to determine its correctness or
erroneousness, as basic premise for a pronouncement of liability.
2. Exclusivity of Specific Procedures for
Correction of Judgments and Orders
19
The question then, is whether or not these complaints are proper; whether or not in lieu of the prescribed recourses
for appeal or review of judgments and orders of courts, a party may file an administrative or criminal complaint
against the judge for rendition of an unjust judgment, or, having opted for appeal, may nonetheless simultaneously
seek also such administrative or criminal remedies.
Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and the lower
courts established by law, the question submits to only one answer: the administrative or criminal remedies are
neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result
thereof.
Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that any contrary postulation can have only
intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party who feels aggrieved by a judicial order or decision not yet final and
executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal prosecution for unjust judgment against the issuing judge
would, at a minimum and as an indispensable first step, confer the prosecutor (or Ombudsman) with an incongruous
function pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the determination of whether the questioned disposition is erroneous
in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. If he does proceed despite that impediment, whatever
determination he makes could well set off a proliferation of administrative or criminal litigation, a possibility here after
more fully explored.
Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already pointed out, within the power of public
prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies, directly or vicariously, to review judgments or final orders or
resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review — by appeal or special civil action — is not only lodged
exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be exercised in accordance with a well-defined and long established
hierarchy, and long-standing processes and procedures. No other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be
interminable, and vexatiously repetitive.
These principles were stressed in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, supra. 54
Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to
"rendering knowingly unjust judgment," refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case
submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment
on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court with
jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court.
Respondents should likewise know that said penal article has no application to the members of
a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation
and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows,
consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the
ground that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper.
xxx xxx xxx
To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a member
of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the regular exercise of
official duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that very independence of the
judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. "For it is a general principle of the
highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the
authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself
aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom,

and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or
useful." (Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U. S. 335).
xxx xxx xxx
To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the members acted "with
deliberate bad faith" and rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty of
their high office to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at
hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts
and resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of official duty.
To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role
of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.
Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation of powers
mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum the final judgment of this Court on legal
issues submitted by them and their adversaries for final determination to and by the Supreme
Court and which fall within the judicial power to determine and adjudicate exclusively vested by
the Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.
This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise appealable, which have become final and executory. Such
judgments, being no longer reviewable by higher tribunals, are certainly not reviewable by any other body or
authority.
3. Only Courts Authorized, under Fixed
Rules to Declare Judgments or Orders
Erroneous or Unjust
To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or not a judgement or order is unjust — or was (or was not)
rendered within the scope of the issuing judge's authority, or that the judge had exceeded his jurisdiction and powers
or maliciously delayed the disposition of a case — is an essentially judicial function, lodged by existing law and
immemorial practice in a hierarchy of courts and ultimately in the highest court of the land. To repeat, no other entity
or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service or any other branch; nor any functionary
thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision — whether final and executory or not — and
pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust
judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone.
4. Contrary Rule Results in Circuitousness
and Leads to Absurd Consequences
Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution for supposed rendition of unjust judgments or interlocutory
orders of the type above described, which, at bottom, consist simply of the accusation that the decisions or
interlocutory orders are seriously wrong in their conclusions of fact or of law, or are tainted by grave abuse of
discretion — as distinguished from accusations of corruption, or immorality, or other wrongdoing. To allow institution
of such proceedings would not only be legally improper, it would also result in a futile and circuitous exercise, and
lead to absurd consequences.
Assume that a case goes through the whole gamut of review in the judicial hierarchy; i.e., a judgment is rendered by
a municipal trial court; it is reviewed and affirmed by the proper Regional Trial Court; the latter's judgment is
20
appealed to and in due course affirmed by the Court of Appeals; and finally, the appellate court's decision is brought
up to and affirmed by the Supreme Court. The prosecution of the municipal trial court judge who rendered the
original decision (for knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment) would appear to be out of the question; it
would mean that the Office of the Ombudsman or of the public prosecutor would have to find, at the preliminary
investigation, not only that the judge's decision was wrong and unjust, but by necessary implication that the decisions
or orders of the Regional Trial Court Judge, as well as the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
who affirmed the original judgment were also all wrong and unjust — most certainly an act of supreme arrogance
and very evident supererogation. Pursuing the proposition further, assuming that the public prosecutor or
Ombudsman should nevertheless opt to undertake a review of the decision in question — despite its having been
affirmed at all three (3) appellate levels — and thereafter, disagreeing with the verdict of all four (4) courts, file an
information in the Regional Trial Court against the Municipal Trial Court Judge, the fate of such an indictment at the
hands of the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court would be fairly predictable.
Even if for some reason the Municipal Trial Court Judge is convicted by the Sandiganbayan or a Regional Trial
Court, the appeal before the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals would have an inevitable result: given the
antecedents, the verdict of conviction would be set aside and the correctness of the judgment in question, already
passed upon and finally resolved by the same appellate courts, would necessarily be sustained.
Moreover, in such a scenario, nothing would prevent the Municipal Trial Judge, in his turn, from filing a criminal
action against the Sandiganbayan Justices, or the Regional Trial Court Judge who should convict him of the offense,
for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or against the Justices of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court
who should affirm his conviction.
The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances of the case may be modified, and regardless of whether it is a
civil, criminal or administrative proceeding that is availed of as the vehicle to prosecute the judge for supposedly
rendering an unjust decision or order.
5. Primordial Requisites for Administrative
Criminal Prosecution
This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of rendering an unjust judgment
or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the foregoing considerations, the indispensable requisites are that
there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character
of the challenged judgment or order, and there be also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable
negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgement or order. That final declaration is ordinarily
contained in the judgment rendered in the appellate proceedings in which the decision of the trial court in the civil or
criminal action in question is challenged.
What immediately comes to mind in this connection is a decision of acquittal or dismissal in a criminal action, as to
which — the same being unappealable — it would be unreasonable to deny the State or the victim of the crime (or
even public-spirited citizens) the opportunity to put to the test of proof such charges as they might see fit to press
that it was unjustly rendered, with malice or by deliberate design, through inexcusable ignorance or negligence, etc.
Even in this case, the essential requisite is that there be an authoritative judicial pronouncement of the manifestly
unjust character of the judgment or order in question. Such a pronouncement may result from either (a) an action
of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the; judgment, as having been rendered without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process to the
prosecution; or (b) if this be not proper, an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge
precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Until and unless there is such a final,
 21

authoritative judicialdeclaration that the decision or order in question is "unjust," no civil or criminal action against the
judge concerned is legally possible or should be entertained, for want of an indispensable requisite.
D. Judges Must be Free from
Influence or Pressure
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors. They should not be
subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they
may make in the performance of their duties and functions. Hence it is sound rule, which must be recognized
independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in
good faith.
This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every
erroneous order or decision he renders. 55 To hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassment and would make
his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 56 The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious,
or incurred with evident bad faith; 57 it is only in these cases that administrative sanctions are called for as an
imperative duty of the Supreme Court.
Instead, the continued leniency and tolerance extended to him were read as signs of weakness and impotence.
Worse, respondent's irresponsible audacity appears to have influenced and emboldened others to just as
flamboyantly embark on their own groundless and insulting proceedings against the courts, born of affected bravado
or sheer egocentrism, to the extent of even involving the legislative and executive departments, the Ombudsman
included, in their assaults against the Judiciary in pursuit of personal agendas. But all things, good or bad, must
come to an end, and it is time for the Court to now draw the line, with more promptitude, between reasoned dissent
and self-seeking pretense. The Court accordingly serves notice to those with the same conceit or delusions that it
will henceforth deal with them, decisively and fairly, with a firm and even hand, and resolutely impose such punitive
sanctions as may be appropriate to maintain the integrity and independence of the judicial institutions of the country.
WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt repeatedly committed
over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end that he may ponder his serious errors and
grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of
imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses of which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or
other offense against courts, judges or court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing doctrine is that "judges of superior and general jurisdiction are
not liable to respond in civil action for damages for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when
acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction."58 Based on Section 9, Act No. 190, 59 the doctrine is still good law,
not inconsistent with any subsequent legislative issuance or court rule: "No judge, justice of the peace or assessor
shall be liable to a civil action for the recovery of damages by reason of any judicial action or judgment rendered by
him in good faith, and within the limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction."

Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 of the Civil Code, providing that any public officer or employee, or
any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any
of the enumerated rights and liberties of another person — which rights are the same as those guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights (Article III of the Constitution); — shall be liable to the latter for damages. However, such liability is not
demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
But again, to the extent that the offenses therein described have "unjust judgment or "unjust interlocutory order" for
an essential element, it need only be reiterated that prosecution of a judge for any of them is subject to
the caveat already mentioned: that such prosecution cannot be initiated, much less maintained, unless there be a
final judicial pronouncement of the unjust character of the decision or order in issue.

E. Afterword

Considering the foregoing antecedents and long standing doctrines, it may well be asked why it took no less than
sixteen (16) years and some fifty (50) grossly unfounded cases lodged by respondent Borromeo in the different
rungs of the Judiciary before this Court decided to take the present administrative measure. The imposition on the
time of the courts and the unnecessary work occasioned by respondent's crass adventurism are self-evident and
require no further elaboration. If the Court, however, bore with him with Jobian patience, it was in the hope that the CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995
repeated rebuffs he suffered, with the attendant lectures on the error of his ways, would somehow seep into his
understanding and deter him from further forays along his misguided path. After all, as has repeatedly been
declared, the power of contempt is exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive principle. Unfortunately the SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant, 
Court's forbearance had no effect on him. vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.

RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline, National
Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M.
Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit:
representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which
complainant might obtain.
The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal Case No. 7635-55,
for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action Civil Case No. 56934,
where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated
in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito
Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.
During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection of a sum of money
based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case
Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for
their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by
a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same
property previously attached by complainant was levied upon.
It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and
Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number to wit" Permanent
Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-
88.
Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of
the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might obtain in Civil Case No.
56934.
After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and recommendations:
Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the records is a xerox copy of
TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it
clearly appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta
and her husband was registered and annotated in said title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio
Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a
superior lien on the said registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.
Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme
to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the
Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on.
However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and in their pleadings the same
IBP No. "246722 dated
22
1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using, apparently thru his negligence,
the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP National
Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under
IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.
The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated
March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija
in the appearance and pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her
employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he
pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme
Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.
The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 2-4, Resolution)
The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the practice of law
is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess,
the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance
of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing
and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this
reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's
oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in
the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
DIGESTED:
Bongalonta vs. Castillo, 240 SCRA 310
Facts:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline, National
Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta charged PablitoM.
Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit:
representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which
complainant might obtain. The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, aseparate civil action, where she was able to
obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and
registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid
criminal and civil cases.During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed a civil case for collection of a
 23

sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, 
said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in vs.
default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading andevidence ex-parte was received against them THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
followed by a judgment by defaultrendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued
and the same property previously attached by complainant was levied upon. It is further alleged that in all the
R E SO L U T I O N
pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the
same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number.Thus, complainant concluded that the civil case
filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of themoney REGALADO, J.:
judgment which complainant might obtain in the civil case he filed.After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it
Resolution with the followingfindings and recommendations:Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of
Bongalonta and attachedto the records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents
the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
on aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband was registered and annotated in said title
of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice of
levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said registered property of the Abuel spouses The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
over that of Gregorio Lantin.Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her
husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on. However, as to the fact that indeed the two Annex A
respondents placed in their appearances and in their pleadings the same IBP No., respondent Atty. Pablito M.
Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using, apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of SECRET MARRIAGE?
respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.  The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in ANNULMENT. VISA.
due time the IBP membership dues of her employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and
obligation of every lawyer to see toit that he pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he practices
before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of evidence. Annex B

Held:
GUAM DIVORCE.
The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the practice of law
is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, DON PARKINSON
the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of theserequirements is the observance
of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled toexpect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing
and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty tosatisfy that expectation. for this an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.WHEREFORE, finding beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res.
months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
more severe penalty. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.1 Tel.
521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning
of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the
reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims
that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the
use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly 
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the United
States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P.
Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion
International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their
memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly
be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present
hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the
memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily
dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that
document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas,
constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's
foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it
strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to
advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
24
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law
practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation
is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is)
the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very
name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully
submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present
case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is
being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature
of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as
claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal
support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no
room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only
meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family
Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
 25

spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of
the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted
that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of
and woman entered into accordance with law for the establishment of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code. Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time
and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will
accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but
be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be
considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice. Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal
practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more
importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in the profession may be
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance
encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex
only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar.
"A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on
Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the
its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public
marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social
in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be
institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its
undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual
sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages
considerations involved.
celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage
license.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited
outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the
are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be
above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The
prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed 
course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction
rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of
of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.
action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal
the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or
services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
perform legal services.
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar. The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed
to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law
xxx xxx xxx
practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before
 26

allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By- 4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and
the Rules of Court.5 immoral advertising.

2. Philippine Bar Association: xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx. Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders
"legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment).
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal
But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd.
Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The
Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations
a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence
to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems;
commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.
fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is
offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them
call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation
practice of law."7
cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously,
this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the
public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, 4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the
business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the
the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or
members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name,
entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is
not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5
Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top
law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar
are the persons engaged in unethical law practice.6 examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association: While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of
justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify
these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do
not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with
the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may
be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently
under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant
immoral; and
case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
 27

"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to
those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which
are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The
Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression
again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression
that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical
clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of
Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of
gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is
illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers
authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting
marriage is not necessary.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by
an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services
rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not
unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent
(assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the
law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective
service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be
careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . .
. .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend,
do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men
know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance
with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law — accurate or
inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for
ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and
laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching
their particular business or profession. A good example is the architect, who
must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards
that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in
allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the National
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such
Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not,
as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever
provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and
merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become
the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
justifiable.
problem.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret
lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where
the like, then an architect who performed this function would probably be
in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines.
considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys.
It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be
Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or
able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be
custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But
done.
this is not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of

them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee
matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and
skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service that the
larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession
for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The
court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-
established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have
no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools
cannot be used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work
for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant
being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's
obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of
course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case
before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and
psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must
work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of
building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information
defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice of
law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed
services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would
be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew
employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer
in the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without
a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent
for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject
under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the
employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there
may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most
real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the
value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role
of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer
and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a
statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not
reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the
proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative
agencies of the federal government, especially before trial examiners of the
28
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government,
acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is
without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation
before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the
National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person,
or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed
attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his
work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even
arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in
Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may
involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with
the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A"
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the
problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of
law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials
may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer
buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what
courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's
paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such
would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a
legal text which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice.
And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect
this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the
text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many
approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at
large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so
necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF
LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not
purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's publication
does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person in a particular situation — in their
publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes
the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the
statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction
against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any
printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in
the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having
an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and
against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser.
The record does fully support, however, the finding that for the change of
$75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of
personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the
preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause
of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation
of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of
advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of
particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of
separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348,
NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It
is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling,"
such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits
that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
29
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate
the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be
secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is
not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal
services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination
of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the
subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines
explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves
legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not
be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional
activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of
documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients
before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according
to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who
confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the
latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an
opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to
determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken ,
129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies
and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining
or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-
666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc.
v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned
criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations
that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
30
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to
laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use
of computers and modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries
that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of
preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or
software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and
other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or
the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information,
for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it
were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client
the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by
said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be
paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be
altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of
authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the
Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take
care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you,
they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we
operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These
The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale
or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or
the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa
hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea,"
explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a
rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the
right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal
with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you
would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and
gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that
it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the
ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that
the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client
may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of
these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of
law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted
as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled
to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if
he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject
to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his
thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and
have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a
lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the
rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired
31
through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal
science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with
respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the
practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons
over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals
as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits,
respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of
unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and
universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the
Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the
American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973).
Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the
United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc.
and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal
service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited
representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority,
a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice
cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he
pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to
attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional
Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such
as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with
causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the
interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious
Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It
is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to
the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as
the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good
and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The
exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily
implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and
may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices;
posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law
lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine,
trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the
dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
32
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to
task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we
find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon
request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present
Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that
state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent,
can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands,
as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the
attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped
significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication
of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating
public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair,
criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all
efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his
services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that
Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is
a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal
Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an
obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is
merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a
different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be
organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support
services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor
General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That
spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the
circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar
tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this
resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the
Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and
Quiason, JJ., concur
DIGESTED:
ULEP v. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. Bar Matter No. 550, June 17, 1993
FACTS: In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales was to move
toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep
filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latter’s advertisements which contain the following:
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am – 6:00pm 7 th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday
during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree’s
Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for
Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. 7 th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal Problems” in Star Week of Philippine
Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s
problem no matter how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take care
33
of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medicolegal problems, labor, litigation and
family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the US which now allows it
(John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement is merely making known to the public
the services that The Legal Clinic offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is allowed; whether or not its
advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not allowed. The Legal
Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include various legal problems wherein a client may
avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in
the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is
in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a
merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret
marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly
reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best advertising possible for a lawyer
is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of
character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing
itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper.
A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees
the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The
Supreme Court also enumerated the following as allowed forms of advertisement:
1. Advertisement in a reputable law list
2. Use of ordinary simple professional card
3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization

[B.M. 850. October 2, 2001]
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed
and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve, as it
hereby approves, the following Revised Rules for proper implementation:
Rule 1. PURPOSE
SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain
the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.
Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. Within two (2) months from the approval of these Rules by the
Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted and shall commence the implementation of
the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program in accordance with these Rules.
SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall complete
every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE
Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit units.
(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills equivalent to four (4) credit units.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution equivalent to five (5) credit
units.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural laws, and
jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit units.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacy equivalent to four (4)
credit units.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international conventions equivalent
to two (2) credit units.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE
Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units.
Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD
SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. -- The initial compliance period shall begin not later than three (3)
months from the adoption of these Rules. Except for the initial compliance period for members admitted or
readmitted after the establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall
begin the day after the end of the previous compliance period.
SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP not exempt from the MCLE requirement shall be divided
into three (3) compliance groups, namely:
34
(a) Compliance group 1. -- Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila are assigned
to Compliance Group 1.
(b) Compliance group 2. -- Members in Luzon outside NCR are assigned to Compliance Group 2.
(c) Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas and Mindanao are assigned to Compliance Group 3.
Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity wherever it may be available to
earn credit unit toward compliance with the MCLE requirement.
SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after establishment of the program. Members
admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program shall be assigned to the appropriate
Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the date of admission or readmission.
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first day of the month of
admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance
Group.
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after admission or readmission,
the member is not required to comply with the program requirement for the initial compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member shall be required to complete a number of hours of approved continuing
legal education activities equal to the number of months remaining in the compliance period in which
the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall be required to complete a number of
hours of education in legal ethics in proportion to the number of months remaining in the compliance
period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the next whole number.
Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU)
SECTION 1. Guidelines. - CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT HOURS. CREDIT UNITS
measure compliance with the MCLE requirement under the Rules, based on the category of the lawyers
participation in the MCLE activity. The following are the guidelines for computing credit units and the
supporting documents required therefor:
PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS,
WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND
OTHER RELATED RULES
1.1 PARTICIPANT/ 1 CU PER HOUR OF CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDEE ATTENDANCE ATTENDANCE WITH
NUMBER OF HOURS
1.2 LECTURER FULL CU FOR THE PHOTOCOPY OF RESOURCE SUBJECT PER PLAQUE OR
SPEAKER COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORS CERTIFICATION
1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR 1/2 OF CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION COMMENTATOR/ SUBJECT PER FROM
MODERATOR/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORING COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATIONFACILITATOR
2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW

2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT FULL CU FOR THE PUBLISHED BOOK LESS THAN 100 PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.2 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY WITH PROOF AS
EDITOR
2.3 RESEARCH PAPER 1/2 OF CU FOR THE DULY INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ SUBJECT PER CERTIFIED/
CREATIVE PROJECT COMPLIANCE PERIOD PUBLISHED TECHNICAL REPORT/PAPER
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT 1/2 OF CU FOR THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE LEAST TEN (10) PAGES SUBJECT
PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED LAW JOURNAL EDITOR NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL
2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ FULL CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF BAR REVIEW LECTURE SUBJECT
PER LAW DEAN OR LAW TEACHING/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD BAR REVIEW DIRECTOR
Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS
SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units. -- Credit units are either participatory or non-participatory.
SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. -- Participatory credit units may be claimed for:
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, conventions, symposia, in-house
education programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussion.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator, resource speaker,
moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. Non-participatory credit units may be claimed per compliance
period for:
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or accepted for publication, e.g., in
the form of an article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to the legal education of the
author member, which were not prepared in the ordinary course of the members practice or
employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)
SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. -- Credit hours are computed based on actual time spent in an
education activity in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour reported in decimals.
Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS
SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. -- The following members of the Bar are exempt from the
MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of
Executive Departments;
35
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired members of
the judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers
covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least ten
(10) years in accredited law schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and Professorial Lecturers
of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. The following Members of the Bar are likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors.
SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement A member may file a verified request
setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post graduate study abroad, proven
expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of the requirements, including an extension of time
for compliance, in accordance with a procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 4. Change of status. The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month in which a member
ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the same day as that of all other
members in the same Compliance Group.
SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE requirement shall be
under oath and supported by documents.
Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF EDUCATION ACTIVITIES
SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. Subject to the implementing regulations that may be adopted by
the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education program may be granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the
provider of the activity is an accredited provider and certifies that the activity meets the criteria of Section 2 of this
Rule; and (2) the provider is specifically mandated by law to provide continuing legal education.
SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. All continuing legal education activities must meet the following
standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.

(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to legal subjects and the legal
profession, including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that enhance
legal skills or the ability to practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written materials must be
distributed to all participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before the time the activity is
offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free from
interruption like telephone calls and other distractions.
Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS
SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. -- Accreditation of providers shall be done by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. Any person or group may be accredited as a provider
for a term of two (2) years, which may be renewed, upon written application. All providers of continuing legal
education activities, including in-house providers, are eligible to be accredited providers. Application
for accreditation shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;
(b) Contain all information requested in the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.
SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. -- All approved accredited providers shall agree to the following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the provider for at
least four (4) years after the completion date. The provider shall include the member on the official
record of attendance only if the members signature was obtained at the time of attendance at the
activity. The official record of attendance shall contain the members name and number in the Roll of
Attorneys and shall identify the time, date, location, subject matter, and length of the education
activity. A copy of such record shall be furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(b) The provider shall certify that:
(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the amount of ________ hours of which ______
hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity;
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities prescribed by these Rules and such
regulations as may be prescribed by the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying the time, date, location, subject
matter and length of the activity.
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved continuing legal education activity by THE
MCLE COMMITTEE, members of the IBP Board of Governors, or designees of the Committee and IBP
staff Board for purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules.
36
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the activity, the time devoted to each
topic and identity of the instructors. The provider shall make available to each participant a copy of THE
MCLE COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity Evaluation Form.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation Forms for a period of not less than
one (1) year after the activity, copy furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this program or issues a spurious
certificate in violation of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.
SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation. The accreditation of a provider may be renewed every two (2)
years. It may be denied if the provider fails to comply with any of the requirements of these Rules or fails to provide
satisfactory education activities for the preceding period.
SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. -- the accreditation of any provider referred to in Rule 9 may
be revoked by a majority vote of the MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing and for good cause.
Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER
SECTION 1. Payment of fees. Application for approval of an education activity or accreditation as a provider
requires payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the Schedule of MCLE Fees.
Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. Compliance card. -- Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card
before the end of his compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath that he has complied
with the education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance Card
must be returned to the Committee not later than the day after the end of the members compliance period.
SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. -- Each member shall maintain sufficient record of compliance or
exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be provided to the members by the provider
pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 9 should be a sufficient record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-
participatory activity shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.
Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. The following shall constitute non-compliance:
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt status) within
the prescribed period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within sixty (60)
days from receipt of non-compliance notice;
(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period;
(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade
compliance with the MCLE requirements.
 37

SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance. -Members failing to comply will
receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of
notification to file a response clarifying the deficiency or otherwise showing compliance with the requirements. Such
notice shall contain the following language near the beginning of the notice in capital letters:
IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY
(INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE LISTED AS A DELINQUENT
MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE
PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.
SEC. 2. Duty of committee. The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such implementing rules as may
be necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. It shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of Governors,
prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the approval of the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. Subject to approval by the Supreme Court, the MCLE Committee
shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping, auditing, reporting, approval and other
necessary functions.
SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget. The MCLE Committee shall submit to the Supreme Court for approval,
an annual budget [for a subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain the MCLE Program.

Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may use this period to attain the
adequate number of credit units for compliance. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted
toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are
earned, in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.
This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000, following its publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001.

Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE

SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. -- A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the end of
the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.

SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. -- A member who fails to comply with the requirements after the sixty
(60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be conducted by
the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee.

SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. -- Membership fees shall continue to accrue at the active rate against a
member during the period he/she is listed as a delinquent member.

Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT

SECTION 1. Process. -- The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated when the member
provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment of non-compliance fee. A member may
attain the necessary credit units to meet the requirement for the period of non-compliance during the period the
member is on inactive status. These credit units may not be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement. Credit units earned during the period of non-compliance in excess of the number needed to satisfy the
prior compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.

SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process. The termination of listing as a

delinquent member is administrative in nature AND it shall be made by the MCLE Committee.

Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Composition. The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members, namely, a retired
Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4) members respectively nominated by the IBP, the Philippine
Judicial Academy, a law center designated by the Supreme Court and associations of law schools and/or law
professors.

The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall be appointed by the
Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as may be determined by the
Court.
 38

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978 SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
Case No. MDD-1)

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:
RESOLUTION

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as

CASTRO, C.J.:
the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or
may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from
the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...
its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice.
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights
in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court
be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial
for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which
support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to
reads:
liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions
of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly
inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above;
inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the
he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution
ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the
unanimous pronouncement that it was

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of ... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine
the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...
(hereinabove cited).
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra),
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
reads:
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
 39

objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in
professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the
order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking
welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes
solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules
upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once
becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is
not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to
in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The
conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the
practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference
common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts
and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police
power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court
to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member
Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his
on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body
constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a
corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of
member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi
member. 8
est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings
undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom. of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which
he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest
in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9
the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of

regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a
property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not
here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of
this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its
Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions
and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of
Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no
less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar,
particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a
determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from
overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or
prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the
power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon
should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.
DIGESTED
40
IN RE: EDILLON (1978)
FACTS:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. On November 1975, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) unanimously recommended  to the Court the removal of the name of Edillon
from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP notwithstanding multiple due
notices sent to him.
ISSUES:
WHETHER THE COURT IS WITHOUT POWER TO COMPEL HIM TO BECOME A MEMBER OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
WHETHER THE PROVISION OF THE COURT RULE REQUIRING PAYMENT OF A MEMBERSHIP FEE IS VOID.
WHETHER THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PENALTY PROVISIONS WOULD AMOUNT TO A DEPRIVATION OF
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS AND HENCE INFRINGES ON ONE OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
WHETHER THE POWER OF SC TO STRIKE THE NAME OF A LAWYER FROM ITS ROLL OF ATTORNEYS IS
VALID.
HELD:
1.     To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of Edillon’s constitutional freedom to
associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion
to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in
this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.
But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
2.      Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — from requiring members
of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
3.      Whether the practice of law is a property right, the respondent’s right to practice law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But it must be emphasized that the practice of law is not a property right but a    mere   privilege, and as such must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.
4.      Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from
its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial
functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon is disbarred, and his name was ordered to be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of
the Court.

[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004] NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES
BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his
eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting
and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order.[1]
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of
respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living separately from each other. They
have two children namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years
old both of whom are in complainants custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile,
there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before the Court of
Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et
al.
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainants residence in Tanjay City, Negros
Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a
photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for
temporary child custody. [2]Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any
motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but
respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted that it bore two dates:
November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children
to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC Learning Center
in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to him
the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully take them away with the help of his companions, whom he
claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The responding policemen
subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could be clarified and settled peacefully. At the
police station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the
NBI, formally served on complainant the appellate courts resolution/order. [3] In order to diffuse the tension,
complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition that he would not take
them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito
Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived at the hotel
where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City. Complainant rushed to the hotel and
took the children to another room, where they stayed until later in the morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a verified
petition[4] for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children on the basis of the
alleged Court of Appeals resolution. In the meantime, complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and
41
obtained a certification dated January 18, 2002 [5] from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering
complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear.
Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorneys oath by
manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution in and outside a court of law.
Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in
the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline for
investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three years with a warning that another offense of this nature will result in his
disbarment.[6] On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
recommendation of the Commission with the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on
and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court of Appeals
Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact that he used and
presented the spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed
Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ
of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898, [7] which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City
to recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious
Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it
could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of
verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is
expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a clients cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth.
[8]
 Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility states:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by
repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing
complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as
befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. [9] The lawyers arguments whether written
or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly
addressed by one gentlemen to another. [10] By calling complainant, a sly manipulator of truth as well as a vindictive
congenital prevaricator, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
 42

Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct
and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find that the period of six years is too
harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the
offense committed, is hereby imposed on respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Bar and
furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.
DIGESTED:
NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO v. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, A.C. No. 5624, January 20, 2004
Proc. Case No. 3898 which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought
the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from
complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its
fabrication.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a
spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
HELD: Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it
could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of
verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is
expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a clients cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth.
Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct and the
sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find that the period of six years is too harsh
a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the offense
committed, is hereby imposed on respondent. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C.
Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years

FACTS: An administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his
eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting
and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order.
Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido, the complainant, averred that she was the legitimate spouse of the respondent Atty.
James Benedict Florido, the respondent, but because of the estranged relation, they lived separately. They have two
children whom the complainant has the custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage;
meanwhile there, was another related case pending in the Court of Appeals. Sometime in the middle of December
2001, respondent went to complainant’s residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of
their two minor children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued
by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody.

Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any motion for temporary child
custody filed by respondent. Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the
Court of Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted
that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to give
custody of their children to respondent. The complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a
certification from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody of
their children to respondent had been issued.

Respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly
believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution
several times. As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by
respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
 
G.R. No. 123698 August 5, 1998
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSE SEELIN, respondents.
MARTINEZ, A.M., J.:
This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation has come to this Court assailing the
execution of the judgment dated August 24, 1989, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Civil
Case No. C-9297. Apparently, hope springs eternal for petitioner, considering that the issues raised in this second
petition for review are but mere reiterations of previously settled issues which have already attained finality. We now
write finis to this controversy which has dragged on for seventeen (17) years, for as we ruled in Gomez vs.
PresidingJudge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City: 1
. . . litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, it being essential to the
effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be
not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts must guard
themselves against any scheme to bring about that result, for constituted as they are to put an
end to controversies, they should frown upon any attempt to prolong it. Public policy and sound
practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final
and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium.
The facts:
The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondent-spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a
complaint against Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity) for quieting of title and for
declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 205942) issued in the name of said corporation,
docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.
On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, 2 the dispositive portion of which reads:
43
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942 null and void.
Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without pronouncement as to costs.
The aforesaid decision was affirmed 3 by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989 on June 25, 1991
and eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. No. L-101819 on November 25, 1991. Said dismissal became final on
March 5, 1992. 4
The RTC decision, having become final and executory, private respondents moved for execution which was granted
by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the decision was issued.
Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ of
Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed by herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corporation contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is completely unaware of the
suit between private respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is the true and registered owner of the lot having bought
the same from Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good faith.
On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents' motion. Another Order was issued on August 18, 1992
by the trial court holding that the judgment was binding on petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of defendant
Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. On September 30, 1992 the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment dismissing the petition, excerpts of which read:
We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no compelling reason to disturb the same.
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing
Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered
therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to
be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or
suit may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the
transferee 5
The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court of Appeals on February 18, 1993. 6
On further appeal to this Court, petitioner's petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 109076, was
denied in a resolution dated August 2, 1993. 7 Upon finality of said resolution, this Court issued Entry of Judgment
dated October 21, 1993. 8
Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for the issuance of a second writ of execution before the trial
court which was granted in the Order of July 20, 1994.

Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration. Petitioner's motion was initially granted 9 on August 29,
1994 by the trial court thru Judge Arturo Romero. However, upon motion of private respondents, the said order was
reconsidered on December 19, 1994 10 by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who succeeded Judge Romero.
Forthwith, alias writs of execution were issued.
Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for the second time, filed a petition for certiorari 11 with
respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36591), arguing inter alia: that the judgment cannot be
executed against it because it was not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297; that the decision of the trial court in said
case never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession of the property to the private respondents; that certain
facts and circumstances which occurred after the finality of the judgment will render the execution highly unjust,
illegal and inequitable; that the issuance of the assailed writ of execution violates the lot buyers' freedom of religion
and worship; and that private respondents' title is being questioned in another case.
On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered judgment 12 dismissing the petition for certiorari on the
ground that the lower court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final and executory. It ruled, thus:
This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that the respondent Court's decision in Civil Case No.
9297 had long become final and executory. The respondent court's writs of execution and
possession could have been implemented a long time ago if not for the series of legal
maneuvers of petitioner Eternal Gardens. . . . Petitioner Eternal Gardens cannot anymore stop
the execution of a final judgment by raising issues which actually have been ruled upon by this
Court in its earlier case with Us in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797. To Our mind, the instant petition is a
mere continuation of petitioner's dilatory tactics so that plaintiffs, although prevailing party, will
not benefit at all from a final judgment in their favor. Thus, the instant petition is obviously,
frivolous and dilatory warranting the assessment of double costs of this suit against petitioner
Sec. 3, Rule 142 of the Revised Rules of Court).
Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, the instant petition has
already become moot and academic as the property in question was already turned over by the
Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the writs of execution and possession fully satisfied. Thus,
hopefully, putting the legal battle of this case to rest. (Emphasis ours.)
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on January 30, 1996. 13
Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention reiterating in essence the same line of arguments espoused in
their petition before the respondent Court of Appeals.
The petition must fail.
It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it
are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any matter related to the controversy litigated come to
an end.
Petitioner's argument that the trial court cannot order it and the one hundred (100) memorial lot owners to surrender
and/or deliver possession of the property in dispute on the ground that they were never parties to the case between
private respondents and Central Dyeing, has long been resolved by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
28797 when it ruled.
44
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing
Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered
therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to
be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or
suit may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the
transferee. 14
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 109076 and attained finality on October 21, 1993.
There is, therefore, no need for us to belabor the same issue here.
Further, petitioner's contention that a determination of the issue of possession should first be resolved before the
issuance of a writ of possession is untenable.
Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical effect or consequence
of the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. As correctly argued by
the private respondents, they do not have to institute another action for the purpose of taking possession of the
subject realty.
Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and circumstances transpired after the finality of judgment in Civil Case
No. C-9297 which will reader the execution of the said judgment unjust and illegal. It points to the pendency of Civil
Case No. C-11337 before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City filed by the Republic of the Philippines against
private respondents for nullification of 22 titles which include the title to the subject property. Petitioner argues that
the pendency of the said case provides a reasonable justification why execution of the aforesaid judgment and
delivery of possession of the subject property should be permanently stayed or at least held in abeyance until after
the final resolution of the case.
We do not agree.
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the Republic against private respondents will
not justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so because the
petitioner's title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was already annulled in the judgment sought
to be executed, and which judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if,
in the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private respondents' title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as
argued by petitioner, the supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make petitioner the
rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present petition was instituted merely to delay the execution of the
judgment.
Finally, petitioner's fear that the grave lots will be disturbed, desecrated and destroyed once the execution of the
judgment proceeds is more imagined than real. A perusal of the Orders of the trial court with regard to the execution
of the judgment reveals that the interests of said burial lot owners have been taken into account by the trial court
when it took steps and made suggestions as to how their rights could be amply protected. In its Order dated
February 13, 1995, the trial court, through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., stated:
The defendant-petitioner are (sic) however not completely without recourse or remedy because
they can still go after the original party-defendant or transferor of the property in question which
is Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of
 45

Court. And should it be difficult or nay impossible for plaintiff-respondents to be placed in of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the
possession of the subject property, due to defendant-petitioners' arguments that the same have facts and the law should advise them when a case such as this, should not be permitted to be
already been sold to burial lot buyers, then it should be incumbent for the defendant-petitioners filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of
to negotiate with the plaintiff-respondents for payment in cash of the property subject of their law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the
complaint to avoid demolition or desecration since they benefited from the sale of the burial attention of the courts.
lots. 15
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following directive was given, to wit:
SO ORDERED.
The court directs and orders the defendant to give access to the plaintiffs and as proposed by
the plaintiffs, they are given authority to destroy a small portion of the fence so that they can
DIGEST
have access to the property. But as to the demolition of the burial lots, negotiation could be
made by the defendant with the former owner so that cash payment or cash settlement be
made. 16 ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA
and JOSE SEELIN G.R. No. 123698 August 5, 1998
Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero, in his Order dated July 20, 1994, imposed the following
limitation on the writ of execution, as follows: FACTS:
private respondent-spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seeli won against Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation i
n their complaint for quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of 
Moreover, considering the manifestation that large areas within the Eternal Gardens have been said corporation. However, the execution thereof was delayed for 17 years  by the Eternal Gardens, who was the bu
sold to so many persons who now have buried their beloved ones in the grave lots adjoining the yer of the subject lot from Dyeing, through petitions for review.
lot in question, it is therefore, in the interest of justice and equity, that the enforcement of the writ
of possession and break open order should be applied only to the gate of Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park at the eastern side nearest to the parcel of land in question where the factory of
the defendant is located, in order to avoid disturbing the peace of the resting souls over the  RULING: 
graves the parcels of land within the said memorial park. 17

From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen that the issue as to the status of the burial lot owners has been
properly addressed.
Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of the fact that the questioned AliasWrit
of Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already
been implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the "Sheriffs Return," 18 dated March 31, 1995, with the attached "Turn
Over Premises" 19 indicating therein that private respondents took possession of the subject property.
A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17) years to the
prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner has thwarted execution, interment on the
disputed lot has long been going on, so that by the time this case is finally terminated, the whole lot shall have
already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for private respondents, the real owners of the property. This is
a mockery of justice.
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and z
eal in the defense of their client’s right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every 
effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of pr
ocedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court pro
cesses.  In Banogan et. al. vs. Cerna, et. al.,  SCruled: As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assis
t in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to th
e workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and 
the law should advise them when a case such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the alread
y congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for 
sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.

We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's
right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of
justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. 20 In Banogan
et. al. vs. Cerna, et. al., 21 we ruled:

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of
justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL
ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25,
1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme
Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become
"one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol
of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer
that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in
the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of
the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967,
the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals
without any reason.
46
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay
P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme
Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the
present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its
attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious
"lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice,
who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In
connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that
the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in
which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his
client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he
moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of
the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the
judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the
adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion
for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration,
however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself,
who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no
objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that
the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for
reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a
notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which

did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was
perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the
same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on
May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of
the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May
8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that
of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24,
1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in
the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme
Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine
laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal,
based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was
much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was
June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the
Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the
main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub
silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26,
1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs.
Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied
the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a
second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967.
Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the
records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as
its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall have
actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him.
So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this
Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with
Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September
47
28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not
accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this Court
on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give
reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This
Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons
for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this
resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard
and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity
and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in
person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter
was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty.
Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and
innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you
judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be
measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and
yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy
brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a
beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own
eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's
eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them:
for this is the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the
contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that
the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the
entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a
member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted
with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest

interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness
to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get
from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the
unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness
towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the
violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural
things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good
faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any
semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he
reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the
Philippines today, that even our own President, said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is
to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to
be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a
commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the
decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of
necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court
has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But
in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our
client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness,
confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth
and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to
be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's
famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare
48
say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices
are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct
such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be
generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf
in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our
beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED,
not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above
statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for
which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what
has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed
sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to
choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but
disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of
this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this
Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the criticisms 2 expressed
against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to
state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful
thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours
meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell,
however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The
rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been
generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be
unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court,
as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present
questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved."
Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:

A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different
reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying
petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons
for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to
discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in
effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217,
224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied,
respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its
work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases.
The tune that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated
different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a
particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court,
through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners
counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice
Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we
held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement.
They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions
of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It
should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's
denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals'
opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in alleviating its heavy
docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for
review are often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had
the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be
moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court
of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion,
indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined
by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
49
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the
exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and
records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law
and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no
need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have
known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only
serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and
place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs.
Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections
4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of
hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And
according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without
proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a
useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing
Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil.
866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant
sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party
agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the
Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame.
His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift
away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he
assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of
vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no
justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know that it
is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a
meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only
the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, 4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right
is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, 6 because then the court's actuations are
thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of
Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them,
criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official
actions before the chancery of public opinion."

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty,
with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment
on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as
members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous
and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer
of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the
shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For like
the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the
periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and
respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of
appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal
pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill
v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of
opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They
have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant
attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under
liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge
or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to
be  the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider
it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into
the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of
Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with
the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no
other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State
Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best
position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the
50
bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound
silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect
to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His
investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good
fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to
courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take
upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor
in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive
conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647,
652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice.
Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to
rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and
it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but
discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to
tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering
respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege.
And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some
such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a
court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the
temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26,
1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in
the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.

Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in
office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any
conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and
the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona
fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are
not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when
the likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous
accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled
"JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so
prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As
a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is
also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a
lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the
court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney
who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The
circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial
office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of
the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it
extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless
insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v.
Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac.
220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an
attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a
nature as to justify the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those
made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those
who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of
the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end
that the public confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and
usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
51
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been
granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening
letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from
the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such
drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and
said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men.
Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious
complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the
proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the
courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting
language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of
the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public
confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an
attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of
the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and
calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and
greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized
any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered
suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against
whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an
unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen.
The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination,
are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney
transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his
liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court, is
always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court
an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court
said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted
and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he
considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising
the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting

on the administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by
corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the
right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to
remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of
his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly
administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon
reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them  private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him,
or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons
announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of
their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are
criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the
administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are
bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is
guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners,
it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow
residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged
criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the
motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon
the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to demean himself
with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which
he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a
sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days,
saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public
good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself,
as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance
under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment
that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a
judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech to any
individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn
to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is
52
administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by
designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by
members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the
less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward
the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence
the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the
judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands
retribution — not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending
action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal
confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall,"
and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer
was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be
allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said
Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated
litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his
plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or
umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue 
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of
assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to
duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the
University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if
any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for
the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is
made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as
follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to
the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very
purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the
Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity.
Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any
case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It
would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity.
Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any
reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert.
No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by
methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or
indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by
a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does
not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these

respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from
his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are
applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights
of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to
which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to
be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had
assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief
Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary,
willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This
obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court,
but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
the judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646.
And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the indignity
of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for
like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or
elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts
addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well
sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case,
as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions
which are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in
that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the
power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official
acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the
judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the
indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking the law
in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such
conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional
delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided.
"An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice,
complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct
and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87
The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter
case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City
Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it
common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such
conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the
Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel
learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with
ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be
long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like
manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of
justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as
the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge,
which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which
referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been
53
one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having
"willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby
breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its
application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19
L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People
v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl.
134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it
our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to
others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a
letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed
him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and
decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge,
but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general
conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the
court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect
for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of
years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral
turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an
intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable:
Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether
amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and
thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other
lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as
the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as
those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of
under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a
different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as
"absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the
popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do
so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him
to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect
which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be
resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its
dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter
disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with
having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the
imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news
item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our
High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency
or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and
injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to
change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and
democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary."
He there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress
would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his
avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the
respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was
then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only
intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next
Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the
number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the
Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to
influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court
for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so
many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose
favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by
this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to
which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
54
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be
the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions,
which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct
and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of
attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where
counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous
"erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our
condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice
Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration,
implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this
Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes
into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this
Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis
of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all
these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial
court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It
pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional
boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the
jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from
the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members
— and some former members of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted
yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of
jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not
now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious statements
made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt
may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a
pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a
contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made
only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime,
this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when,
in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking
 55

thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their
rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was confidence and respect. So much so that —
adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a
farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed.
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect
confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the
that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran
court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar,
in Alarcon:
to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and
disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy
public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental
likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind
power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important
duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of
contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of whether or
calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be
influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part.
pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would
Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he
lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.
went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade
against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now under contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of
consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and
liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal. dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the
Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as
"calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post litigation
forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the
utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have
public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed
confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn
no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative
duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals
attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate
inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the
hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-
pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the
purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate
criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to
himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst
them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no
others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding
redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less
authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued
than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the
membership in the Bar. Thus —
Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary
powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental
power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a
To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts
viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent
and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any respectable authority,
and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism
and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this
is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached
state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial
only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness
discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen
would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one
in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at
hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense
a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a
body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members.
Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but.
only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30So that, in a very
real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members
thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed
at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to
discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit
persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot
abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be
conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot
disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise
the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly
of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his
transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or
disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal
animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar
be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However,
heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the
end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty.
Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice
under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor
offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we
are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
56
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no
reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the
compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to
determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension
becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended
from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for
their information and guidance.
DIGEST
In Re: Vicente Almacen
31 SCRA 562 – Legal Ethics – A Lawyer’s Right to Criticize the Courts
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said civil case but Almacen
filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and
place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied
his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an
appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.
This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed before the
Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue
practicing his profession when members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore
without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He
further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why
and that he became “one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” He also stated “that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.”
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition as  the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to ctually
surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyer’s certificate though as he now argues that he chose
not to. Almacen then asked that he may be permitted “to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing.” He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme
Court is “the complainant, prosecutor and Judge.” Almacen was however unapologetic.
ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court
cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable
to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide “only those cases
which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties
involved.” It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court’s denial. For one thing, the
facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is
insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court
 57

and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of Republic of the Philippines
courts and judges.  His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and SUPREME COURT
the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the Manila
cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.
SECOND DIVISION
In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a motion for
reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and G.R. No. 112869             January 29, 1996
will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen
was suspended indefinitely.
KELLY R. WICKER and ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. PAUL T. ARCANGEL, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 134, respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the orders dated December 3, 1993 and December 17, 1993 of respondent
Judge Paul T. Arcangel of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 134 of Makati, finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt
and sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering Co., brought suit in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the annulment of certain deeds by
which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was allegedly fraudulently
titled in the name of the defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by the latter to codefendant Jose Poe. The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 14048, was assigned to Branch 134 formerly presided over by Judge Ignacio Capulong
who later was replaced by respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

It appears that on November 18, 1993, Wicker's counsel, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition
of respondent judge from the consideration of the case. 1 The motion alleged in pertinent part:

1. That before the Acting Presiding Judge took over, defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. was able to
maneuver the three (3) successive postponements for the presentation for cross-examination of Mrs.
Remedios Porcuna on her 10 August 1992 Affidavit, but eventually, she was not presented;

2. Meantime, Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his station. In one
hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that set hearing, counsel for
defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His Honor was not reporting did not likewise
appear while other counsels were present;

3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from the south by
Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time member of the Judicial and
Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796, and although said
case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos'
relief;
 58

4. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and integrity of His Honor and to give a fighting chance for case be reraffled to another sala of the RTC of Makati, while in their petition dated November 29, 1993, which they
plaintiffs to prove their case, since this will be the last case to recover the partnership property, plaintiffs filed with the Office of Court Administrator, petitioners asked that Judge Capulong be allowed to continue hearing the
feel that His Honor inhibit himself and set this case for re-raffle; case on the ground that he had a "full grasp of the case."

5. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and jurisprudence that in the first instance that a litigant
doubts the partiality and integrity of the Presiding Judge, he should immediately move for his inhibition.
The motion was verified by Kelly Wicker.
Considering the allegations to be "malicious, derogatory and contemptuous," respondent judge ordered both counsel
and client to appear before him on November 26, 1993 and to show cause why they should not be cited for contempt
of court.2
In reply to the last allegation of respondent judge, petitioners claim that although they wanted a reraffle of the case, it
was upon the suggestion of respondent judge himself that they filed the petition with the Court Administrator for the
retention of Judge Capulong in the case.
What is involved in this case is an instance of direct contempt, since it involves a pleading allegedly containing
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending,
as distinguished from a pleading filed in another case. The former has been held to be equivalent to "misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same" within the
meaning of Rule 71, §1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, direct contempt.6

In a pleading entitled "Opposition to and/or Comment to Motion to Cite for Direct Contempt Directed Against Plaintiff
It is important to point out this distinction because in case of indirect or constructive contempt, the contemnor may be
Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel," Atty. Rayos claimed that the allegations in the motion did not necessarily express
punished only "[a]fter charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by
his views because he merely signed the motion "in a representative capacity, in other words, just lawyering," for Kelly
himself or counsel," whereas in case of direct contempt, the respondent may be summarily adjudged in contempt.
Wicker, who said in a note to him that a "young man possibly employed by the Court" had advised him to have the
Moreover, the judgment in cases of indirect contempt is appealable, whereas in cases of direct contempt only
case reraffled, when the opposing counsel Atty. Benjamin Santos and the new judge both failed to come for a
judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs are appealable.7
hearing, because their absence was an indication that Atty. Santos knew who "the judge may be and when he would
appear." Wicker's sense of disquiet increased when at the next two hearings, the new judge as well as Atty. Santos
and the latter's witness, Mrs. Remedios Porcuna, were all absent, while the other counsels were present. 3 Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for respondent judge to hold a hearing. Hence even if petitioners are
right about the nature of the case against them by contending that it involves indirect contempt, they have no ground
for complaint since they were afforded a hearing before they were held guilty of contempt. What is important to
Finding petitioners' explanation unsatisfactory, respondent judge, in an order dated December 3, 1993, held them
determine now is whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners liable for
guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.
direct contempt.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order of
We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the
December 17, 1993. In the same order respondent judge directed petitioners to appear before him on January 7,
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect
1994 at 8:30 a.m. for the execution of their sentence.
without which the administration of justice will fail.8 The contempt power ought not to be utilized for the purpose of
merely satisfying an inclination to strike back at a party for showing less than full respect for the dignity of the court. 9
In their petition 4 before this Court, Kelly Wicker and Atty. Orlando A. Rayos contend that respondent judge
committed a grave abuse of his discretion in citing them for contempt. They argue that "when a person, impelled by
Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge
justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful manner, asks a judge to inhibit himself from hearing his case, he
Arcangel's finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. A reading of the allegations in petitioners' motion for
does not thereby become guilty of contempt."
inhibition, particularly the following paragraphs thereof:

In his comment,5 respondent judge alleges that he took over as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
2. Meantime, Judge Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his station. In one hearing,
Makati, Branch 134 by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93 dated September 2, 1993 of this Court and not
the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that set hearing, counsel for
because, as petitioners alleged, he was "personally recruited from the South" by Atty. Santos and/or his wife, Atty.
defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His Honor was not reporting did not likewise
Ofelia Calcetas-Santos; that he assumed his new office on October 11, 1993 and started holding sessions on
appear while other counsels were present;
October 18, 1993; that when all male personnel of his court were presented to petitioner Kelly Wicker he failed to
pick out the young man who was the alleged source of the remarks prompting the filing of the motion for inhibition;
that he was not vindictive and that he in fact refrained from implementing the execution of his order dated December 3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from the south by
3, 1993 to enable petitioners to "avail themselves of all possible remedies;" that after holding petitioners in contempt, Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time member of the Judicial and
he issued an order dated December 8, 1993 inhibiting himself from trying Civil Case No. 14048; that Atty. Rayos' Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796, and although said
claim that he was just "lawyering" and acting as "the vehicle or mouthpiece of his client" is untenable because his case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos'
(Atty. Rayos') duties to the court are more important than those which he owes to his client; and that by tendering relief;
their "profuse apologies" in their motion for reconsideration of the December 3, 1993 order, petitioners acknowledged
the falsity of their accusations against him; and that the petitioners have taken inconsistent positions as to who
should try Civil Case No. 14048 because in their Motion for Inhibition dated November 18, 1993 they asked that the
 59

leads to no other conclusion than that respondent judge was beholden to the opposing counsel in the case, Atty.
Benjamin Santos, to whom or to whose wife, the judge owed his transfer to the RTC of Makati, which necessitated
"easing out" the former judge to make room for such transfer.
These allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent judge and constitute an unwarranted
criticism of the administration of justice in this country. They suggest that lawyers, if they are well connected, can
manipulate the assignment of judges to their advantage. The truth is that the assignments of Judges Arcangel and
Capulong were made by this Court, by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93, precisely "in the interest of an
efficient administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. 5 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution." 10 This is a matter of record
which could have easily been verified by Atty. Rayos. After all, as he claims, he "deliberated" for two months whether
or not to file the offending motion for inhibition as his client allegedly asked him to do.
In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims he merely did what he had been bidden to do by his client of
whom he was merely a "mouthpiece." He was just "lawyering" and "he cannot be gagged," even if the allegations in
the motion for the inhibition which he prepared and filed were false since it was his client who verified the same.
To be sure, what Wicker said in his note to Atty. Rayos was that he had been told by an unidentified young man,
whom he thought to be employed in the court, that it seemed the opposing counsel, Atty. Santos, knew who the
replacement judge was, because Atty. Santos did not show up in court on the same days the new judge failed to
come. It would, therefore, appear that the other allegations in the motion that respondent judge had been "personally
recruited" by the opposing counsel to replace Judge Capulong who had been "eased out" were Atty. Rayos' and not
Wicker's. Atty. Rayos is thus understating his part in the preparation of the motion for inhibition.
disqualify the judge, done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent and disrespectful manner, that movants were held in
contempt of court.
It is the second sentence rather than the first that applies to this case.
Be that as it may, the Court believes that consistent with the rule that the power to cite for contempt must be
exercised for preservative rather than vindictive principle we think that the jail sentence on petitioners may be
dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the court. In the case of petitioner Kelly Wicker there is greater reason
for doing so considering that the particularly offending allegations in the motion for inhibition do not appear to have
come from him but were additions made by Atty. Rayos. In addition, Wicker is advanced in years (80) and in failing
health (suffering from angina), a fact Judge Arcangel does not dispute. Wicker may have indeed been the recipient
of such a remark although he could not point a court employee who was the source of the same. At least he had the
grace to admit his mistake both as to the source and truth of said information. It is noteworthy Judge Arcangel was
also willing to waive the imposition of the jail sentence on petitioners until he came upon petitioners' description of
him in the instant petition as a judge who cannot make the grade in the RTC of Makati, where complex cases are
being filed. In response to this, he cited the fact that the Integrated Bar of the Philippines chose him as one of the
most outstanding City Judges and Regional Trial Court Judges in 1979 and 1988 respectively and that he is a 1963
graduate of the U.P. College of Law.
In Ceniza v. Sebastian, 15 which likewise involved a motion for inhibition which described the judge "corrupt," the
Court, while finding counsel guilty of direct contempt, removed the jail sentence of 10 days imposed by the trial court
for the reason that

Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an Here, while the words were contumacious, it is hard to resist the conclusion, considering the background
instrument of his client. His client came to him for professional assistance in the representation of a cause, and while of this occurrence that respondent Judge in imposing the ten-day sentence was not duly mindful of the
he owed him whole souled devotion, there were bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not exacting standard [of] preservation of the dignity of his office not indulging his sense of grievance sets the
overstep. 11 Even a hired gun cannot be excused for what Atty. Rayos stated in the motion. Based on Canon 11 of limits of the authority he is entitled to exercise. It is the view of the Court that under the circumstances the
the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the contemptuous allegations fine imposed should be increased to P500.00.
in the motion for inhibition as his client.
The same justification also holds true in this case.
Atty. Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins
him to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by
WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is MODIFIED by DELETING the sentence of imprisonment for five (5)
others" 12 and "not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the case." 13
days and INCREASING the fine from P100.00 to P200.00 for each of the petitioners.

After the respondent judge had favorably responded to petitioners' "profuse apologies" and indicated that he would
SO ORDERED.
let them off with a fine, without any jail sentence, petitioners served on respondent judge a copy of their instant
petition which prayed in part that "Respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel be REVERTED to his former station. He
simply cannot do in the RTC of Makati where more complex cases are heared (sic) unlike in Davao City." If nothing DIGEST
else, this personal attack on the judge only serves to confirm the "contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant
belligerence" first evident in petitioners' motion for inhibition belying their protestations of good faith.
Kelly R. Wicker et. al vs. hon. Paul T. Arcangel G.R. No. 112869. Jan. 29, 1996. 252 SCRA 444 PONENTE:
Mendoza
Petitioners cite the following statement in Austria v. Masaquel: 14
FACTS: It appears that on Nov 18, 1993, Wicker's counsel, Atty. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of the
respondent Judge Arcangel from the case. Respondent judge found offense in the allegations on the motion for
Numerous cages there have been where judges, and even members of the Supreme Court, were asked to inhibit
inhibition filed by complainants and in an order, held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer
themselves from trying, or from participating in the consideration of a case, but scarcely were the movants punished
imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which
for contempt, even if the grounds upon which they based their motions for disqualification are not among those
respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order of Dec 17, 1993.
provided in the rules. It is only when there was direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn insistence to
 60

HELD: The power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle.
Only occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect without which the administration of justice will fail.
Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge
Arcangel's finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the
allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an instrument of his client. His client came to him for professional
assistance in the representation of a cause, and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were bounds set
by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep. Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition
as his client. Atty. Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins him to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to]
insist on similar conduct by others" and "not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have
materiality to the case."
EN BANC

A.C. No. 5054           May 29, 2002

SOLEDAD NUÑEZ, Represented by ANANIAS B. CO, Attorney-in-Fact for Complainant, petitioner, 

vs.
ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative complaint filed on 21 April 1999 by Soledad Nuñez, a septuagenarian represented by her
attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the ground of
grave misconduct.

From the documents submitted by the complainant, it appears that sometime in October 1982 she authorized
respondent to sell her two parcels of land located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to give respondent 10
percent of the price as commission. Respondent succeeded in selling the lots, but despite complainant’s repeated
demands, he did not turn over to her the proceeds of the sale. This forced complainant to file against respondent and
his wife an action for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-93-15052.

For his failure to file an answer, respondent was declared in default and complainant was required to present ex-
parte her evidence. On 29 September 1993, the court rendered its decision (Annex "C" of the Complaint) ordering
respondent herein to pay complainant the sum of P16,000 as principal obligation, with interest thereon at the legal
rate from the date of the commencement of the action, i.e., 8 March 1993, until it is fully paid, and to pay the costs of
suit.1âwphi1.nêt

Respondent and his wife appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal was dismissed for
failure to pay the required docket fee within the reglementary period despite notice.

On 23 October 1995 complainant filed in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution, which the court granted on 30 October 1995. The next day, the alias writ of execution was issued (Annex
"B" of Complaint). It appears that only a partial satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving P13,800
 61

thereof unsatisfied. In payment for the latter, respondent issued four postdated checks drawn against his account in validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were
China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City. drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation as proved by the fact
that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay the obligation.
Upon presentment, however, the checks were dishonored because the account against which they were drawn was
closed (Annexes "D" and "E" of Complaint). Demands for respondent to make good the checks fell on deaf ears, thus All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
forcing complainant to file four criminal complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Quezon City (Annexes "F," "G," "H" and "I" of the Complaint).
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the "Joint Affidavit" of respondent and his wife filed with the Office of the Prosecutor, Quezon City, respondent
admitted having drawn and issued said four postdated checks in favor of complainant. Allegedly believing in good
Respondent’s claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has already encashed all
faith that said checks had already been encashed by complainant, he subsequently closed his checking account in
checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26 February 1996. He knew that there were still other
China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City, from which said four checks were drawn. He was not notified that the
checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which could not be encashed before their maturity dates.
checks were dishonored. Had he been notified, he would have made the necessary arrangements with the bank.

By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public
We required respondent to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite our favorable action on his three
confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busiños v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA 622
motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure to do so compelled complainant to file on 10 March
[2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal
2000 a motion to cite respondent in contempt on the ground that his strategy to file piecemeal motions for extension
profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra).
of time to submit the comment "smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a member of the bar and a
law dean."
Respondent’s act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered by
the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite demands
In our resolution of 14 June 2000, we noted the motion for contempt; considered respondent to have waived the filing
and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as
of a comment; and referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippine (IBP) for investigation, report and
an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold.
recommendation or decision within ninety days from notice of the resolution.

To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, respondent even had the temerity of
In her Report and Recommendation dated 12 September 2000, Investigating Commissioner Atty. Milagros V. San
making a mockery of our generosity to him. We granted his three motions for extension of time to file his comment
Juan concluded that respondent had no intention to "honor" the money judgment against him in Civil Case No. Q-93-
on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file the comment, he as well did not even bother to explain
15052 as can be gleaned from his (1) issuance of postdated checks; (2) closing of the account against which said
such failure notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of the comment. To the Highest
checks were drawn; and (3) continued failure to make good the amounts of the checks. She then recommends that
Court of the land, respondent openly showed a high degree of irresponsibility amounting to willful disobedience to its
respondent be declared "guilty of misconduct in his dealings with complainant" and be suspended from the practice
lawful orders (Thermochem Incorporated v. Naval, 344 SCRA 76, 82 [2000]; Sipin-Nabor v. Atty. Baterina, Adm.
of law for at least one year and pay the amount of the checks issued to the complainant.
Case No. 4073, 28 June 2001).

In its Resolution No. XV-2001-244 of 27 October 2001, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted
Atty. San Juan’s Report and Recommendation.
We concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and approved by the Board of Governors
of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant.
Indeed, the record shows respondent’s grave misconduct and notorious dishonesty.
There is no need to stretch one’s imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely abused
the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of
the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery
of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefor. Then, despite his
deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in default, he appealed from the
judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the docket fee
despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to
enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully
done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant of
what he had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been
Respondent then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide that lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time
to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for their failure to do so.1âwphi1.nêt
The penalty of suspension "for at least one (1) year" imposed by the Board of Governors of the IBP is both vague
and inadequate. A suspension may either be indefinite or for a specific duration. Besides, under the circumstances of
this case a suspension for a year is plainly very light and inadequate. For his deliberate violation or defiance of Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 12:03 and 12:04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, coupled with his
palpable bad faith and dishonesty in his dealings with the complainant, respondent deserves a graver penalty. That
graver penalty is indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby INDEFINITELY
SUSPENDED from the practice of law, and is directed to pay complainant Soledad Nuñez the amount of P13,800
within ten (10) days from notice of this resolution.

This resolution shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondent’s personal record; the Office of the President; the Department of Justice; the Court of
Appeals; the Sandiganbayan; and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator shall also furnish all
lower courts with copies of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
Nunez v Ricafort (382 SCRA 381)
Facts:
An administrative complaint was by Soledad Nuñez, a septuagenarian represented by her attorney-in-fact Ananias
B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the ground of grave misconduct.
Sometime in October 1982, Soledad authorized Atty. Ricafort to sell her two parcels of land located in Legazpi City
for P40,000. She agreed to the lawyer 10% of the price as commission. Atty. Ricafort succeeded in selling the lots,
but despite Soledad’s repeated demands, he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale. This forced Soledad to file
an action for a sum of money before the RTC, Quezon City.
The court rendered its decision ordering the Atty. to pay Soledad the sum of P16,000 as principal obligation, with at
the legal rate from the date of the commencement of the action.
An appeal to the CA was made. However, the appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the required docket fee within
the reglementary period despite notice.
Soledad filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. But it appears that only a partial satisfaction of
the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving P13,800 unsatisfied. In payment for the latter, Atty. issued four postdated
checks but was dishonored because the account against which they were drawn was closed.
Hence, Soledad was forced to file four criminal complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the MTC, Quezon City.
In a joint affidavit, Atty. Ricafort admitted having drawn and issued said four postdated checks in favor of Soledad.
Allegedly believing in good faith that said checks had already been encashed by Soledad, he subsequently closed
his checking account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City, from which said four checks were drawn. He was
not notified that the checks were dishonored. Had he been notified, he would have made the necessary
arrangements with the bank.
The court required Atty. to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite the favorable action on his three
motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure to do so compelled Soledad to file a motion to cite Atty.
in contempt on the ground that his strategy to file piecemeal motions for extension of time to submit the comment
“smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a member of the bar and a law dean.”
62
The IBP findings show that the Atty. had no intention to “honor” the money judgment against him. It recommended
that Atty. be declared “guilty of misconduct in his dealings with complainant” and be suspended from the practice of
law for at least one year and pay the amount of the checks issued to the complainant.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant.
Held:
YES.  There is a blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. diminished public confidence in
the law and the lawyers. Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the
standards of the legal profession.
His act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered by the trial
court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite demands and the
criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an
officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold.
To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, he even had the temerity of making
a mockery of the court’s generosity to him. We granted his three motions for extension of time to file his comment on
the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file the comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such
failure notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of the comment. To the SC, Atty.
openly showed a high degree of irresponsibility amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful orders.
Atty. Ricafort then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility stating that:
Lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, should
not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for their failure to do so.
The SC indefinitely suspended Atty. Ricafort from the practice of law and directed to pay Soledad P13,800.
DIGEST 2:
SOLEDAD NUÑEZ VS. ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT
A.C. NO. 5054. MAY 29, 2002
Facts:
Sometime in October 1982 petitioner authorized respondent attorney to sell her two parcels of land
located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to give respondent 10 percent of the price as
 63

commission. Respondent succeeded in selling the lots, but despite complainant’s repeated demands, he
did not turn over to her the proceeds of the sale. This forced complainant to file against respondent and
his wife an action for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Respondent was declared in default and judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner. Respondent
appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals but the same was dismissed for failure to pay the docket
fee within the required period.
A writ of execution was issued, it appeared however that only a partial amount has been paid by the
lawyer. Four postdated checks were subsequently issued to cover the balance. Said checks however,
upon presentment were dishonored because the account against which they were drawn was closed.
Demands to make good the checks were to no avail so a case for violation of BP 22 was filed by
petitioner.
The lawyer denied the allegations and filed several motions for extension of time to file comment.
Complainant filed a motion to cite lawyer for contempt for his alleged delaying tactics unbecoming of a THIRD DIVISION
lawyer and a law dean.
A.C. No. 6252             October 5, 2004
Issue:
What is the liability of the lawyer?
JONAR SANTIAGO, complainant, 
Held: vs.
Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant. Rule 1:01 of Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN, respondent.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that “A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct”. DECISION
Respondent had no intention to “honor” the money judgment against him in as can be gleaned from his
(1) issuance of postdated checks; (2) closing of the account against which said checks were drawn; and
(3) continued failure to make good the amounts of the checks. PANGANIBAN, J.:

Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are impressed with public
interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court
will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or neglect observance thereof.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a verified Complaint1 filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan
with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 138 2 of the Rules of Court; and
violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.033, Canon 54, and Canons 12.075 and 12.08 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the complainant
in this wise:

"x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing several
documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper notation regarding the cedula or
community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial
register; and c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents
he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.

"Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the
same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges
 64

that on a certain date, Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant after the The CBD received complainant’s Memorandum 18 on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any.
hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words
and veiled threats."6
The IBP’s Recommendation

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD,7 Atty. Rafanan filed his verified Answer.8He
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-17219 approving and adopting
admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint. He
the Investigating Commissioner’s Report that respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on
believed, however, that the non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits
the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiant’s
was allowed.
residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified,
however, the recommendation20 of the investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to "₱3,000 with a warning
He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty."
was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government offices. He pointed out
that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the
The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and
residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older
12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
practitioners -- indicate the affiants’ residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in their
notarial register for these documents.
The Court’s Ruling
9
As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112  of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance to the
attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.
Respondent’s Administrative Liability

As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on behalf of their
Violation of the Notarial Law
clients "on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of justice." Complainant
charged respondent’s clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house when the
alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice." The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party
to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the
residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification. 21 They are also required
Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing of their
to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to "give to each
case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register
Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident
[and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded."22 Failure to perform these
and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted Certifications 10 from the Cabanatuan
duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public. 23
City Police and the Joint Affidavit11 of the two police officers who had assisted them.

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance and
Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him, because he was the
evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions are presumed to
counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP
be aware of these elementary requirements.
against complainant.

In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,24 the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as follows:
After receipt of respondent’s Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for
hearing on June 5, 2001, at two o’clock in the afternoon. Notices12 of the hearing were sent to the parties by
registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared. Respondent was unable "The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an
to do so, apparently because he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001. 13 The hearing was reset to July 3, empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who
2001 at two o’clock in the afternoon. are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a
public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies
On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply14 to the verified Answer of respondent. The latter’s
and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001. 15 It also received complainant’s Letter-Request16 to dispense
appended to a private instrument."
with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order 17 dated July 24, 2001, issued through
Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days
from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.
 65

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod Lawyer as Witness for Client
methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost
care in the performance of their duties,25 which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest.
Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating
the defense of alibi proffered by respondent’s clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: "A lawyer shall
It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the Notarial Law by avoid testifying in behalf of his client."
failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of
the notarial registry.
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for affidavits relative
"Rule 12.08 – A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
to cases pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in
Nueva Ecija.
a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and the
like;
We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to affidavits is
patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no qualification or
exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in
others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel."
law.
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness, 31 except only in certain cases
We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of respondent’s pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship. 32
clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses’ Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-
2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainant’s brother against the aforementioned clients. These documents
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to their
became the basis of the present Complaint.
clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In
contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to
As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one
expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.
authorized to administer the oath -- to "certify that he has personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied
that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits." Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject
"Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind criticism
Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to comply with
and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as
the certification requirement.
disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyer’s
client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial and untruthful." 33
law and legal processes.26 They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of
law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause, the
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. 27 It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so,
principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently
to withdraw from active management of the case.34
their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we
Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath to
cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the following reasons:
obey the laws.28 No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to
the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial
Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public. First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by law for
the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the latter’s life and liberty are at stake. 35 It is
the fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges against them.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainant’s plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to
They are entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt;
disbar must be exercised with great caution.29 Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of
and to ensure that if they are convicted, such conviction is according to law.
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be
decreed.30Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to
that the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case. spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to present -- by all fair and

honorable means -- every defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his
clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law. 36
The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the
fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have possibly
committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of
respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies during the trial.
In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely
inquisitorial.37 Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of
securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and
public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the
State from useless and expensive prosecutions.38 The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be
followed by the trial proper.
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment in any
matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective client.
Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the "ends of justice," the canons
of the profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.
No Proof of Harassment
The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not supported by
evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated with liability. 39 It is not the
self-serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent that is more credible, considering that the latter’s
allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City
Police.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED ₱3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
JONAR SANTIAGO vs. ATTY. EDISON V. RAFANANA.C. No. 6252, October 5, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Complainant Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, lodged a disbarment
complaint against respondent Atty. Edison Rafanan before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines alleging, inter alia,
that Atty. Rafanan violated Rule 12.07 and Rule 12.08 of Canon 12of the Code of Professional Responsibility when
66
the latter executed an affidavit in favour of his client and offered the same as evidence in a case where he is actively
representing his client. The complaint also alleged that after the hearing of the case, respondent accompanied by
several persons waited for complainant and after confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter
uttered insulting words and veiled threats.
In his answer, respondent denied having disarmed the complainant and uttered insulting words nor veiled
threats against the latter. He however admitted that he executed an affidavit in favour of his client and offered the
same as evidence in a case where he is actively representing his client but interposed the defense that lawyers
could testify on behalf of their clients "on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends
of justice." Complainant charged respondent’s clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they
were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice.
“The IBP, while finding that administrative offense was committed by respondent for violating the notarial
law, recommended the dismissal of the complaint for alleged violation of Rule 12.07 and Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for insufficiency of evidence. Hence, the present action was commenced.
ISSUE:
May a lawyer testify on substantial matters relative to the cause of the party which he is actively representing in a
case without violating the Code of Professional Responsibility?
HELD:
YES. Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness, except only in
certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship. The
reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to
their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In
contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to
distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one
of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a
cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should
they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case.
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his
clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized
by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the latter’s life and liberty are at
stake. Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected
to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. The Affidavit executed by Atty.Rafanan was
clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and
time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime
charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent
or suggest the falsity of its contents.
 67

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their Republic of the Philippines
testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation SUPREME COURT
which, as such, was merely inquisitorial. Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary Manila
investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble
SECOND DIVISION
as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive
prosecutions. The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper.
 
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment
in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective A.M. No. 1769 June 8, 1992
client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the "ends of justice," the
canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.
CESAR L. LANTORIA, complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action against respondent Irineo L.
Bunyi, member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts of "graft and
corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption
of the judge and bribery", in connection with respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then pending
before the Municipal Court of Experanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over by Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia 1 in
which respondent Bunyi was the counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas.

Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of d farm located in
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said farm,
receiving as such a monthly allowance. 2 It appears that the complaint in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to
eject the squatters from the aforementioned farm. 3 These cases were assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza,
Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of which was the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time
the regular judge of the municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). 4 The defendants in the mentioned civil cases
were, in due course, declared in default.

In relation to the same three (3) civil cases, the records of the present case show that complainant Lantoria wrote a
letter to respondent Bunyi, dated 23 April 1974, which reads as follows:

Butuan City
23 April 1974

Atty. Ireneo Bunye

928 Rizal Avenue
Santa Cruz, Manila

Dear Atty. Bunye:


xxx xxx xxx
Upon informing him of your willingness to prepare the corresponding judgements (sic) on the 3
defaulted cases he said he has no objection in fact he is happy and recommended that you mail
the said decisions in due time thru me to be delivered to him.
xxx xxx xxx
I will communicate with you from time to time for any future development.
My best regards to you and family and to Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas and
all.
On 1 June 1974, respondent Bunyi wrote to the complainant regarding the said three (3) cases, in this wise:
June 1, 1974
Dear Major Lantoria,
At last, I may say that I have tried my best to respond to the call in your several letters received,
which is about the preparation of the three (3) Decisions awaited by Judge Galicia. The delay is
that I have been too much occupied with my cases and other professional commitments here in
Manila and nearby provinces. Not only to Mrs. Mascarinas I would say that I am so sorry but
also to you. Mrs. Mascarinas has been reminding me but I always find myself at a loss to
prepare these Decisions at an early date sa (sic) possible. So also with my calendar as to the
dates for the next hearing of the remaining cases over there.
Herewith now, you will find enclosed the three (3) Decisions against the (3) defaulted
defendants. I am not sure if they will suit to satisfy Judge Galicia to sign them at once. However,
it is my request to Judge Galicia, thru your kind mediation, that if the preparation of these
Decisions do not suit his consideration, then I am ready and willing to accept his suggestions or
correction to charge or modify them for the better. And to this effect, kindly relay at once what he
is going to say or thinks if he signs them readily and please request for each copy for our hold.
xxx xxx xxx
Please excuse this delay, and thanks for your kind assistance in attending to our cases there.
Regards to you and family and prayer for your more vigor and success.
Brotherly yours,
(SGD.) IRINEO L. BUNYI 6
Counsel
68
It also appears that respondent Bunyi wrote an earlier letter to complainant Lantoria, dated 04 March 1974, the
contents of which read as follows:
928 Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz, Manila
March 4, 1974
Dear Major Lantoria,
This is an additional request, strictly personal and confidential. Inside the envelope addressed to
Judge Vicente C. Galicia, are the Decisions and Orders, which he told me to prepare and he is
going to sign them. If you please, deliver the envelope to him as if you have no knowledge and
information and that you have not opened it. Unless, of course, if the information comes from
him. But, you can inquire from him if there is a need to wait from his words about them, or copies
to be furnished me, after he signs them, it could be made thru you personally, to expedite
receiving those copies for our hold. According to him, this envelope could be delivered to him at
his residence at No. 345 M. Calo St., Butuan City, during week end. or, at Bayugan if you
happen to go there, if he is not in Butuan City.
Thanking You for your kind attention and favor.
Truly yours,
(SGD.) L. BUNYI 7
Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed with this Court the present administrative case against
respondent Bunyi, predicated mainly on the above-quoted three (3) letters dated 04 March, 23 April and 01 June,
1974. Complainant contends that respondent won the said three (3) cases because to (respondent) was the one who
unethically prepared the decisions rendered therein, and that the preparation by respondent of said decisions
warranted disciplinary action against him.
By way of answer to the complaint, respondent, in a motion to dismiss 8 the administrative complaint, admitted the
existence of the letter of 01 June 1974, but explained the contents thereof as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
b) In the second place, the said letter of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks for itself,
that if ever the same was written by the Respondent, it was due to the insistence of the
Complainant thru his several letters received, that the decisions in question be drafted or
prepared for Judge Galicia, who considered such preparation as a big help to him, because he
was at that time holding two (2) salas — one as being the regular Municipal Judge of Bayugan
and the other, as the acting Judge of Esperanza, both of Agusan del Sur, with many pending
cases and it was to the benefit of the Complainant that the early disposition of the cases
involved would not suffer inconsiderable delay. But, the intention to draft or prepare the
decisions in question was never spawned by the Respondent. Instead, it came from the under-
standing between the Judge and the complainant who, from his several letters, had
demonstrated so much interest to eject at once the squatters from the farm he was entrusted to
manage. Furthermore, the Complainant's conclusion that the said decisions were lutong

macao is purely non-sense as it is without any factual or legal basis. He himself knew that Judge
Galicia asked for help in the drafting of said decisions as at any rate they were judgments by
default, the defendants lost their standing in court when they were declared in default for failure
to file their answers and to appear at the place and time set for hearing thereof (See first
paragraph, letter of June 1, 1974)
c) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in the form of drafts, as in fact, the
letter mentioned subject to suggestion or correction to change or modify for the better by Judge
Galicia (Second paragraph, Ibid);
d) Fourthly, in the some letter, Responding (sic) even apologized for the delay in sending the
same to the Complainant and expressed his gratitude for his assistance in attending to the
cases involved (Last paragraph, Ibid.)
In its resolution dated 28 November 1977, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation. 9 On 21 July 1980, the Solicitor General submitted his report to the Court, with the
following averments, to wit: 1) that the case was set for hearing on April 12, September 29, and December 18, 1978,
but in all said scheduled hearings only respondent Bunyi appeared; 2) that in the hearing of 16 January 1979, both
respondent and complainant appeared; 3) that at the same hearing, the Solicitor General reported the following
development —
Atty. Mercado submitted a letter of complainant dated January 16, 1979 sworn to before the
investigating Solicitor, praying that the complaint be considered withdrawn, dropped or
dismissed on the ground that complainant "could hardly substantiate" his charges and that he is
"no longer interested to prosecute" the same. For his part, respondent manifested that he has no
objection to the withdrawal of the complaint against him. At the same time, he presented
complainant Lantoria as a witness are elicited testimony to the effect that complainant no longer
has in his possession the original of the letters attached to his basic complaint, and hence, he
was not prepared to prove his charges. 10(emphasis supplied)
In his aforesaid report, the Solicitor General found as follows: a) that the letters of respondent Bunyi (dated 4, March
and 1 June 1974), addressed to complainant, showed that respondent had indeed prepared the draft of the decisions
in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 of the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, which he submitted to Judge
Vicente Galicia thru the complainant; b) that those letters indicated that respondent had previous communications
with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the decisions; c) that the testimony of complainant to the effect that
he had lost the original of said letters, and complainant's withdrawal of the complaint in the case at bar are of no
moment, as respondent Bunyi, and his motion to dismiss filed with the Supreme Court, admitted that he prepared the
draft of the decisions in the said civil cases, and be affirmed the existence of the letters.
Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that respondent is guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional
conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the court, to help promote the independence of the judiciary
and to refrain from engaging in acts which would influence judicial determination of a litigation in which he is
counsel. 11 The Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year. He filed with the Court the corresponding complaint against respondent.
In his answer 12 to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General, respondent manifested that in the future he would be
more careful in observing his duties as a lawyer, and in upholding the provisions of the canons of professional ethics.
69
On 10 December 1980, the date set by this Court for the hearing of this case, the hearing was postponed until further
notice. On 9 March 1981, respondent filed a manifestation 13 alleging that no hearing was as yet set in the case since
the last setting on 10 December 1980, and he requested that the next hearing be not set until after six (6) months
when be expected to return from the United States of America where he would visit his children and at the same time
have a medical check-up.
On 28 October 1981, the date set by this Court for bearing in this case, respondent Bunyi and the Solicitor General
appeared, and respondent was directed to submit his memorandum. Respondent Bunyi filed his memorandum on 16
November 1981. In said memorandum, 14 respondent submitted that although he prepared the draft of the decisions
in the civil cases, he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift or consideration to influence the Judge in allowing him to
prepare the draft decisions. 15 He also offered his apology to the Court for all the improprieties which may have
resulted from his preparation of the draft decisions.
We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the determination of the merits of the instant case should
proceed notwithstanding complainant's withdrawal of his complaint in the case, the respondent himself having
admitted that the letters in question truly exist, and that he even asked for an apology from the Court, for whatever
effects such letters may have had on his duty as a lawyer.
With the admission by respondent of the existence of the letters upon which the present administrative complaint is
based, the remaining issue to be resolved is the effect of the acts complained of on respondent's duty both as a
lawyer and an officer of the Court.
We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent, by way of disciplinary action, deserves
suspension from the practice of law.
The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge Galicia regarding the
preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and which he in fact prepared. Although nothing
in the records would show that respondent got the trial court judge's consent to the said preparation for a favor or
consideration, the acts of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the
Court.
Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were enforced at the time
respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which provides as follows:
3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for by the
personal relations of the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of
motive and should be avoided. A lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the
judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device
or attempt to gain from a judge special personal consideration or favor. A self-respecting
independence in the discharge of professional duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy
and respect due the judge's station, is the only proper foundation for cordial personal and official
relations between bench and bar.
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility 16 a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as shown in
Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:
 70

CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. He filed with the Court the
which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court. corresponding complaint against respondent.

Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.
Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court where he had
pending civil case. 17
In his answer to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General, respondent manifested that in the future he
would be more careful in observing his duties as a lawyer, and in upholding the provisions of the canons of
professional ethics.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bunyi is guilty of unethical conduct.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one HELD: We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent, by way of
(1) year from the date of notice hereof. Let this decision be entered in the bar records of the respondent and the disciplinary action, deserves suspension from the practice of law.
Court Administrator is directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.
The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge Galicia
SO ORDERED. regarding the preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and which he in fact prepared.
Although nothing in the records would show that respondent got the trial court judge's consent to the said preparation
for a favor or consideration, the acts of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an
DIGEST:
officer of the Court. Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were
enforced at the time respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which provides as follows:
LANTORIA v. BUNYI A.M. Case No. 1769, June 8, 1992
3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court
FACTS: This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action against respondent
Irineo L. Bunyi, member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts of "graft
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for by the personal
and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
relations of the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of motive and should be avoided. A
corruption of the judge and bribery", in connection with respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then
lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves
pending before the Municipal Court of Experanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over by Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia
rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special personal consideration or favor. A
in which respondent Bunyi was the counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas.
selfrespecting independence in the discharge of professional duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy and
respect due the judge's station, is the only proper foundation for cordial personal and official relations between bench
Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of d farm located and bar.
in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said farm,
receiving as such a monthly allowance. 2 It appears that the complaint in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as
eject the squatters from the aforementioned farm. 3 These cases were assigned to the Municipal Court of
shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:
Esperanza, Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of which was the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the
same time the regular judge of the municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court. Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend
Respondent admitted the existence of the letter but explained the contents thereof as follows: a) the said
extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges. Therefore, this
letter of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks for itself, that if ever the same was written by the Respondent,
Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court where he had pending civil
it was due to the insistence of the Complainant thru his several letters received, that the decisions in question be
case.
drafted or prepared for Judge Galicia, b) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in the form of
drafts, as in fact, the letter mentioned subject to suggestion or correction to change or modify for the better by Judge
Galicia (Second paragraph, Ibid); c) Fourthly, in the some letter, Responding (sic) even apologized for the delay in WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
sending the same to the Complainant and expressed his gratitude for his assistance in attending to the cases (1) year from the date of notice hereof. Let this decision be entered in the bar records of the respondent and the
involved Court Administrator is directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.

The Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 21
July 1980, the Solicitor General submitted his report to the Court, Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found
that respondent is guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of
the court, to help promote the independence of the judiciary and to refrain from engaging in acts which would
influence judicial determination of a litigation in which he is counsel. The Solicitor General recommended that

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
 
A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995
VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD
NORDISTA, complainants,  Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were willing to submit this case for
vs.
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.
DAVIDE JR., J.:
In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the respondent, pray that the latter be
disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be discovered during the actual investigation of this
complaint." They attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically allege:
1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals Case No. CA-G.N. CV No.
38153 of which to our surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition [sic]. A close perusal of
the case reveals the serious misconduct of our attorney on record, Atty. Amado Fojas
tantamount to malpractice and negligence in the performance of his duty obligation to us, to
defend us in the aforesaid case. That the said attorney without informing us the reason why and
riding high on the trust and confidence we repose on him either abandoned, failed to act
accordingly, or seriously neglected to answer the civil complaint against us in the sala of Judge
Teresita Capulong Case No. 3526-V-91 Val. Metro Manila so that we were deduced [sic] in
default.
2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was in order. That he had
already answered the complaint so that in spite of the incessant demand for him to give us a
copy he continued to deny same to us. Only to disclose later that he never answered it after all
because according to him he was a very busy man. Please refer to Court of Appeals decision
dated August 17, 1993.
3. That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and malpractice of law we lost the Judge
Capulong case and our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it is only proper that Atty. Fojas
be disciplined and disbarred in the practice of his profession.
In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No.
3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which was unfortunately
denied by the court. He asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the complainants because it
71
was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA)
which was declared unlawful in the final decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus, "[t]he unfavorable judgment in the
Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable to the merits of the case, i.e., the decision
in the Expulsion case wherein defendants (complainants herein) illegally removed from the union (FEUFA)
membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the complainants filed this case to harass him because
he refused to share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for them. The respondent then prays
for the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file the answer was cured and, even
granting for the sake of argument that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of the law profession.
The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.
decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed. In their separate compliance, both manifested in the
affirmative.
The facts in this case are not disputed.
Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were the
President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the
union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a
complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union.
In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal Salvador's expulsion and
directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador's name in the roll of union members with all the rights and
privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a
complaint against the complainants herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, under
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.
As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of (1) res
judicata by virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since
what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to
dismiss.
The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case. Upon
Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated the case, and
required the complainants herein to file their answer within a nonextendible period of fifteen days from notice.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This motion
having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, which was later referred to the Court
of Appeals and docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.
Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied, the respondent still did not
file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the complainants
were declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.

The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the ex-parte reception of evidence
before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff
Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or corrective
damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.
The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, however,
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for
the complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.
The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant
disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which reason the
latter were declared in default and judgment was rendered against them on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence,
which was received ex-parte.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become his client. He has the right to decline employment, 1 subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.2 He must serve the client with competence
and diligence,3 and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. 4 Elsewise stated, he
owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and
the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the
rules of law, legally applied. 5 This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense.6 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it
the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs
his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does
honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 7
The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. He justifies his failure to do
so in this wise:
[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial court, 8 [he] instead, thru honest
mistake and excusable neglect, filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the Honorable Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . .
And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred, dismissed the petition, he again
"inadvertently" failed to file an answer "[d]ue to honest mistake and because of his overzealousness as
stated earlier. . . . "
In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not an honest mistake but was
"deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the legal disadvantage, to their damage and prejudice" for, as
admitted by him in his motion to set aside the order of default, his failure to do so was "due to volume and pressure
of legal work."9 In short, the complainants want to impress upon this Court that the respondent has given inconsistent
reasons to justify his failure to file an answer.
72
We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent explained his
non-filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of
legal work, while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to his
overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court.
Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal work" on the other are two distinct
and separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes the respondent's full and continuing awareness of his duty to
file an answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had committed a reversible
error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of Salvador's
complaint and in denying the motion to reconsider the said order. The second ground is purely based on
forgetfulness because of his other commitments.
Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not comply with his duty to file
an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief that the trial
court committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer even after he
received the Court of Appeals' decision in the certiorari case. There is no showing whatsoever that he further
assailed the said decision before this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to prove his
claim of overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order. Neither was it shown that he alleged in his motion to lift
the order of default that the complainants had a meritorious defense. 10 And, in his appeal from the judgment by
default, he did not even raise as one of the errors of the trial court either the impropriety of the order of default or the
court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift that order.
Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's inability to exercise due diligence in
the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill,
and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires
him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which
provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable."
The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause"
for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter
declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought
which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he
should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly provides:
A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understanding the prospects of the
case.
Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand why he took all the trouble
of filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction and of questioning the
adverse ruling thereon initially with this Court and then with the Court of Appeals, unless, of course, he
meant all of these to simply delay the disposition of the civil case. Finally, the complainants were not
entirely without any valid or justifiable defense. They could prove that the plaintiff was not entitled to all the
damages sought by him or that if he were so, they could ask for a reduction of the amounts thereof.
 73

We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame for the sad fate of the
complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more
careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.
Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent’s inability to exercise due diligence in
the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill,
and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Furthermore, a breach
of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants
herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: “A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.”

SO ORDERED.
Atty. Fojas’s negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a “losing cause”. The
Supreme Court held that he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of
DIGEST the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides: A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid
and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the client’s case, neither overstating nor understanding the
prospects of the case.
Santiago v Fojas AC 4103

REPRIMANDED AND ADMONISHED

TOPIC: Legal Ethics, Canon 14 CPR

FACTS:

An expulsion case was faced by the complainants contending that they have illegally removed from the union
(FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. The lower court resolved in favor of Salvador and ordered the
complainants to pay, jointly and severally, Mr. Salvador. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals. The
complainants lost in their petition at the Court of Appeals due to abandonment, failure to act accordingly, or serious
neglect of their counsel, Atty. Fojas to answer the civil complaint on an expulsion case. Atty. Fojas assured them
that everything was in order and he had already answered the complaint. However, the appellants soon discovered
that he never answered it after all because, according to him, he was a very busy man. Atty. Fojas admitted his
“mistake” in failing to file an answer for the expulsion case, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion
for reconsideration. However, such motion for reconsideration was denied. Atty. Fojas defended his negligence with
the reason that the case was a losing cause after all. Atty. Fojas also asserts that he was about to appeal the said
decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and
unilaterally terminated by complainant. Complainants then filed for a disbarment case.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the
complainants an answer

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court upheld Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up
the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. This means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. In his
motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent explained his non-filing of the required answer by
impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in
this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to question the denial
order of the trial court. Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not
comply with his duty to file an answer.