PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING
7
CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-61623 December 26, 1984
FACTS:
In February 1960, herein petitioner People’s Homesite
& Housing Corporation (PHHC) passed a resolution,
subject to the approval of the Court Court Council of the
PHHC’s consolidation subdivision plan, awarding Lot 4
with an area of 4,182.2 square meters located at
Diliman, Court City to respondents Rizalino and
Adelaida Mendoza (spouses Mendoza) at a price of
twenty-one pesos (P21.00) per square meter. The Court
Council disapproved the consolidation subdivision plan
in August 1960 but approved in February 1964 its
revised version where Lot 4 was reduced to an area of
2,608.7 square meters. Then in October 1965, the PHHC
withdrew the tentative award of Lot 4 to the spouses
Mendoza for the latter’s failure neither to pay its price
nor to make a 20% initial deposit, and re-awarded said
lot jointly and in equal shares to Miguela Sto. Domingo,
Enrique Esteban, Virgilio Pinzon, Leonardo Redublo and
Jose Fernandez, all of whom made the initial deposit.
The subdivision of Lot 4 into five lots was later approved
by the Court council and the Bureau of Lands. The
spouses Mendoza asked for reconsideration and for the
withdrawal of the said 2nd award to Sto. Domingo and
four others, and at the same time filed an action for
specific performance plus damages. The trial court
sustained the award but the Court of Appeals reversed
the said decision, declared void the re-award to Sto.
Domingo and four others, and ordered the PHHC to sell
Lot 4 with an area of 2,608.7 square meters at P21.00
per square meter to spouses Mendoza.
ISSUE: Whether or not, there was a perfected sale of
Lot 4, with the reduced are, to the Mendozas.
HELD:
There was no perfected sale of Lot 4. The said lot was
conditionally or contingently awarded to the Mendozas
subject to the approval by the city council of the
proposed consolidation subdivision plan and the
approval of the award by the valuation committee and
higher authorities. When the plan with the area of Lot 4
reduced to 2,608.7 square meters was approved, the
Mendozas should have manifested in writing their
acceptance of the award for the purchase of Lot 4 just
to show that they were still interested in its purchase
although the area was reduced and to obviate ally
doubt on the matter. Thus, under the facts of this case,
the Supreme Court cannot say there was a meeting of
minds on the purchase of Lot 4 with an area of 2,608.
square meters at P21 a square meter.
ERNESTO DICHOSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 55613 :  December 10, 1990.]
192 SCRA 169
FACTS:
An Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate executed on
November 22, 1945, shows that, 4/6 of the entire land
or 11.2477 hectares was adjudicated to Vivencia Prila,
1/6 or 2.8119 hectares to Asuncion Pacamara and
another 1/6 or 2.8119 hectares to Custodio Parcia. In
1955, Vivencia Prila sold her 4/6 portion with an area of
11.2477 hectares to the petitioner Ernesto Dichoso. On
the other hand, in a Deed of Sale dated June 17, 1948,
Asuncion Pacamara sold to the wife of private
respondent Teodolfo Ramos her 1/6 share, but the
deed mentions the area of the lot sold as 4.1250
hectares; in excess of Pacamara's 1/6 share in the
property of 2.8119 hectares. Hence, aforesaid 4.1250
hectares which Ramos claims to have possessed, is now
the land in question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Teodolfo Ramos is the owner of the
4.1250 hectare land in question.
HELD:
Teodolfo Ramos is not the owner of the entire 4.1250
hectare land in question. This Court has held that in
cases of conflict between areas and boundaries, it is the
latter which should prevail. In a contract of sale of land
in a mass, it is well established that the specific
boundaries stated in the contract must control over any
statement with respect to the area contained within its
boundaries. Thus, Ramos is hereby LIMITED to 2.8119
hectares in accordance with the boundaries indicated in
the deed of sale in favor of his wife.
HEIRS OF CAYETANO PANGAN and CONSUELO
PANGAN vs. SPOUSES ROGELIO PERRERAS and
PRISCILLA PERRERAS
G.R. No. 157374               August 27, 2009
The spouses Pangan were the owners of the lot and
two-door apartment (subject properties) located at
1142 Casañas St., Sampaloc, Manila.5 On June 2, 1989,
Consuelo agreed to sell to the respondents the subject
properties for the price of ₱540,000.00. On the same
day, Consuelo received ₱20,000.00 from the
respondents as earnest money, evidenced by a receipt
(June 2, 1989 receipt)6 that also included the terms of
the parties’ agreement.
In compliance with the agreement, the respondents
issued checks payable to Consuelo in the amounts of
₱200,000.00 and ₱250,000.00 on June 15, 1989.
Consuelo, however, refused to accept the checks by
saying that her children (the petitioners-heirs) – co-
owners of the subject properties – did not want to sell
the subject properties. For the same reason, Consuelo
offered to return the ₱20,000.00 earnest money she
received from the respondents, but the latter rejected
it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, there was a perfected contract
between the parties.
HELD:
There was a perfected contract between the parties
since all the essential requisites of a contract were
present. The presence of Consuelo’s consent and the
existence of a perfected contract between the parties
are further evidenced by the payment and receipt of
₱20,000.00, an earnest money by the contracting
parties’ common usage. The law on sales, specifically
Article 1482 of the Civil Code, provides that whenever
earnest money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be
considered as part of the price and proof of the
perfection of the contract. Although the presumption is
not conclusive, as the parties may treat the earnest
money differently, the explicit terms of the June 8, 1989
receipt provide no occasion for any reading that the
agreement is subject to the petitioners-heirs’ favorable
consent to the sale. Hence, the case contains no
element, factual or legal, that negates the existence of a
perfected contract between the parties.
SACOBIA HILLS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
ALLAN U. TY
G.R. No. 165889 September 20, 2005
FACTS:
Sacobia Hills Development Corporation (Sacobia) is the
developer of True North Golf and Country Club (True
North) located inside the Clark Special Economic Zone in
Pampanga. On February 12, 1997, respondent Allan U.
Ty wrote to Sacobia a letter expressing his intention to
acquire one (1) Class A share of True North and
accordingly paid the reservation fee. Sacobia approved
the purchase application and membership of
respondent, subject to certain terms and conditions.
However, on January 12, 1998, respondent notified
Sacobia that he is rescinding the contract and sought
refund of the payments already made due to the latter’s
failure to complete the project on time as represented.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the contract entered into by the parties
may be validly rescinded under Article 1191 of the Civil
Code.
HELD:
No, the contract entered into by the parties may not be
validly rescinded under Article 1191 of the Civil Code.
For in the notice of approval, which embodies the terms
and conditions of the agreement, Sacobia signified its
intent to retain the ownership of the property until such
time that the respondent has fully paid the purchase
price. This condition precedent is characteristic of a
contract to sell. In the present cae, Ty did not pay the
full purchase price which is his obligation under the
contract to sell, therefore, it cannot be said that Sacobia
breached its obligation. No obligations arose on its part
because respondent’s non-fulfillment of the suspensive
condition rendered the contract to sell ineffective and
unperfected. Indeed, there can be no rescission under
Article 119117 of the Civil Code because until the
happening of the condition, i.e. full payment of the
contract price, Sacobia’s obligation to deliver the title
and object of the sale is not yet extant. A non-existent
obligation cannot be subject of rescission.
SPOUSES ROQUE vs. AGUADO, et.al.
G.R. No. 193787 April 7, 2014
FACTS:
On July 21, 1977, petitioners-spouses Roque and the
original owners of the then unregistered Lot 18089 –
namely, Rivero, et al. executed the 1977 Deed of
Conditional Sale over a 1,231-sq. m. portion of Lot
18089 for a consideration of P30,775.00. The parties
agreed that Sps. Roque shall make an initial payment of
P15,387.50 upon signing, while the remaining balance
of the purchase price shall be payable upon the
registration of Lot 18089, as well as the segregation and
the concomitant issuance of a separate title over the
subject portion in their names. After the deed’s
execution, Sps. Roque took possession and introduced
improvements on the subject portion which they
utilized as a balut factory.
On August 12, 1991, Sabug, Jr, applied for a free patent
over the entire Lot 18089 and was eventually issued
OCT No. M-59558 in his name on October 21, 1991.
On June 24, 1993, Sabug, Jr. and Rivero, in her personal
capacity and in representation of Rivero, et al.,
executed the 1993 Joint Affidavit, acknowledging that
the subject portion belongs to Sps. Roque and
expressed their willingness to segregate the same from
the entire area of Lot 18089. On December 8, 1999,
however, Sabug, Jr., through the 1999 Deed of Absolute
Sale, sold Lot 18089 to Aguado for P2,500,000.00, who,
in turn, caused the cancellation of OCT No. M-5955 and
the issuance of TCT No. M-96692 dated December 17,
199911 in her name. Thereafter, Aguado obtained an
P8,000,000.00 loan from the Land Bank secured by a
mortgage over Lot 18089. When she failed to pay her
loan obligation, Land Bank commenced extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings and eventually tendered the
highest bid in the auction sale. Upon Aguado’s failure to
redeem the subject property, Land Bank consolidated
its ownership, and TCT No. M-11589513 was issued in
its name on July 21, 2003. On June 16, 2003, Sps. Roque
filed a complaint for reconveyance, annulment of sale,
deed of real estate mortgage, foreclosure, and
certificate of sale, and damages before the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale is a

conditional contract of sale or a contract to sell.

HELD:

It is a CONTRACT TO SELL. in a contract to sell,

ownership is retained by the vendor and is not to pass
to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price.
Here, it is undisputed that Sps. Roque have not paid the
final installment of the purchase price. As such, the
condition which would have triggered the parties’
obligation to enter into and thereby perfect a contract
of sale in order to effectively transfer the ownership of
the subject portion from the sellers (i.e., Rivero et al.) to
the buyers (Sps. Roque) cannot be deemed to have
been fulfilled. Consequently, the latter cannot validly
claim ownership over the subject portion even if they
had made an initial payment and even took possession
of the same. The Court further notes that Sps. Roque
did not even take any active steps to protect their claim
over the disputed portion. . Thus, in view of the
foregoing, Sabug, Jr. – as the registered owner of Lot
18089 borne by the grant of his free patent application
– could validly convey said property in its entirety to
Aguado who, in turn, mortgaged the same to Land Bank