Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19650             September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee, 

vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.

Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

CASTRO, J.:

In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived and laid the groundwork
for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest", it calls for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex
station will dispense during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its
advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor
vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be
paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request at
each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.

A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called "Dealer Contest", the contestant
whose estimate is closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the
first prize; the next closest, the second; and the next, the third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene
stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second; and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight
with batteries and a screwdriver set for third. The first-prize winner in each station will then be qualified to join in the
"Regional Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of the qualified contestants in each region will be
deposited in a sealed can from which the first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners of that region will be
drawn. The regional first-prize winners will be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila,
accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National Contest". The regional second-
prize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of P500 and P300, respectively. At the national level, the stubs
of the seven regional first-prize winners will be placed inside a sealed can from which the drawing for the final first-
prize, second-prize and third-prize winners will be made. Cash prizes in store for winners at this final stage are:
P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third; and P650 as consolation prize for each of the remaining four
participants.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the
transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for
the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of which read as follows:

SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. — No matter belonging to any of the following classes,
whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be
deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or
employee of the Bureau of Posts:

Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying or
purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in
whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or
property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.

"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.—Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or company is engaged in
conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal
property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme,
device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts may instruct any postmaster or
other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the person, depositing the same in the mails, with the
word "fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever
class mailed by or addressed to such person or company or the representative or agent of such person or
company.

SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer service.—The Director
of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is engaged in conducting any
 lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or
enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of any postal money
order or telegraphic transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such person or company,
whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of any kind, and
may provide by regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic
transfers drawn in favor of such person or company or its agent.

The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31, 1960, in which the
Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does
not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined
that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance. In
its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that there
being involved no consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest was not, under controlling authorities,
condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated
case seven years before (Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that the
contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by
the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the
proposed contest but as well threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued
against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".

Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster
General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be
violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to
the attention of the public". After issues were joined and upon the respective memoranda of the parties, the trial
court rendered judgment as follows:

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest'
announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the rules marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not
violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the
mails.

The respondent appealed.

The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first, whether the petition states a
sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and second, whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest"
violates the Postal Law. We shall take these up in seriatim.

1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the applicable legal basis for the
remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available to any person "whose rights are affected by a
statute . . . to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration of
his rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably to
established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there must be
a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for
judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951;
Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R.
No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of the appellant's stand being that the petition herein states no sufficient
cause of action for declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing crucible.

As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a number of significant points stand
out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some consequence, concededly has the
unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means, and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate
increased patronage for its products. In contrast, the appellant, as the authority charged with the enforcement of the
Postal Law, admittedly has the power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof — particularly thru the
issuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, against legally non-
mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for the sales promotion scheme
hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails,
amongst other media, it was found expedient to request the appellant for an advance clearance therefor. However,
likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the
appellant saw a violation thereof in the proposed scheme and accordingly declined the request. A point of difference
as to the correct construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus reached. Communications in which the
parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged. The confidence with which the appellee insisted
upon its position was matched only by the obstinacy with which the appellant stood his ground. And this impasse
was climaxed by the appellant's open warning to the appellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud
order will have to be issued against it and all its representatives."
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The appellee's insistent assertion of its
claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the
appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot
be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other,
concerning a real — not a mere theoretical — question or issue. The contenders are as real as their interests are
substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of construction
hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To the appellant, the suppression of the appellee's
proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the
appellee's bent to hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the
contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences
are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be
said that merely the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others" — which
admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy
when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz.,
251, 284 Pac. 350).

We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question of construction because the
said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the
contest", hence, there is no room for declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from
the assumption that, if the circumstances here presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be divorced
from the matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or
process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its
application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the
given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case
here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the
Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is
as much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.

Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the matter at hand can amount to
nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is anathema to a declaratory relief action. Of
course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the construction
thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal
issues susceptible of immediate resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety —
nay, the necessity — of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity, passion
and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132
and cases cited), cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31
Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the
situation into which it has been cast, would be to force it to choose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot
obtain a final and definitive pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law apply to its
proposed contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it launches the contest and uses the mails for purposes
thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with its
concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it abandons the contest, it
becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous censorship
which is constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh these considerations in one equation and in the spirit of liberality
with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order to promote their object (section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules
of Court) — which, in the instant case, is to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to,
rights and duties under a law — we can see in the present case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or
prematurity in our intervention.

The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we hand down in this case if he
believes that it will not have the final and pacifying function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At
the very least, the appellant will be bound. But more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction,
"Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the
Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations
not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.
Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that our resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at hand.

It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not without precedent.
In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promotional
advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a
lottery, and that if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it
was held that the corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to
determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207,
234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.

In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identical terminology in sections
1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the Postmaster
General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any
information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or
personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second
issue posed in this appeal.

Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44
Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the power of the postal authorities under the abovementioned
provisions of the Postal Law, this Court declared that —

While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for this jurisdiction is that of
the United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do with the power of the United States
Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance,
such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling.
The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. (Horner
vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and
Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39
Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)

Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the
disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently as the appellant himself concedes, the field of
inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the element of consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task is
considerably lightened inasmuch as in the same case just cited, this Court has laid down a definitive yard-stick in
the following terms —

In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of
property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance,
but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or
indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.

Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the language in which the invitation to
participate therein is couched. Thus —

No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't have to buy anything?
Simply estimate the actual number of liter the Caltex gas pump with the hood at your favorite Caltex dealer
will dispense from — to —, and win valuable prizes . . . ." .

Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be
rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to
a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for
the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible
consideration which would brand it as a lottery. Indeed, even as we head the stern injunction, "look beyond the fair
exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking
to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the scheme does not only
appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.

There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy Caltex products simply to win
a prize would actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the privilege to join the contest. Perhaps this would be
tenable if the purchase of any Caltex product or the use of any Caltex service were a pre-requisite to participation.
But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needs reiterating, does not have to buy anything or to give anything of value. 1awphîl.nèt

Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales promotion, would naturally benefit the
sponsor in the way of increased patronage by those who will be encouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only to get
the chance to draw a prize by securing entry blanks". The required element of consideration does not consist of the
benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137
Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether
those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of the prize. Perspective
properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not that of the sponsor. The following, culled
from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter at rest:

The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does receive, some benefit in
the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing; does not supply the element of
consideration. Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).

Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by the
appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with under the Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or
personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", which is equally prescribed? Incidentally, while the
appellant's brief appears to have concentrated on the issue of consideration, this aspect of the case cannot be
avoided if the remedy here invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both curative and
preventive justice. Recalling that the appellant's action was predicated, amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217,
Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which opined in effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for want of
consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which that element is not essential, the determination of
whether or not the proposed contest — wanting in consideration as we have found it to be — is a prohibited gift
enterprise, cannot be passed over sub silencio.

While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in explicit words, there appears
to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is commonly applied to a sporting
artifice of under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a
chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law
Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck,
257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5
Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is
no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open
to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.

Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be encompassed within the broadest
sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of being extended, we think that the appellant's pose will gain no
added comfort. As stated in the opinion relied upon, rulings there are indeed holding that a gift enterprise involving
an award by chance, even in default of the element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited
(E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E., 88;
State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this is
only one side of the coin. Equally impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the
prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People,
157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12
N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12
Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18 Words and
Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the specific
statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In some cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery"
and "gift enterprise" are used interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the necessity for the element of
consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs.
State, supra; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The lesson that we derive from
this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore, that every case must be resolved upon the particular
phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.

Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association with the word "lottery".
With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a
sociis — which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned
— it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is
consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a
consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the
slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.

This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to the determination
thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to
prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are
declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the
recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com.
vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be hazarded
for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to
participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held —

Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as a
device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the
chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286,
41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).

we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to hold that, under
the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar
schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.
Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for
purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and that the
"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the
provisions of the Postal Law.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988

RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO DAOANG, petitioners, 
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and AMANDA RAMOS-
AGONOY, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971, rendered by the respondent judge * in Spec. Proc. No. 37 of Municipal Court of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners", the
dispositive part of which reads, as follows:

Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be,
to all legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy
and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be freed from legal obedience and maintenance by their
respective parents, Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos
and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family names 'Bonilla' and 'Marcos' be
changed with "Agonoy", which is the family name of the petitioners.

Successional rights of the children and that of their adopting parents shall be governed by the
pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code.

Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the records of the Local Civil Registry of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, for its legal effects at the expense of the petitioners.  1

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled:
"In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy,
petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec. Proc. No. 37.  2

The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be served upon the office of
the Solicitor General and ordered published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the
province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City.  3

On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the
petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero
and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March
1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.  4

After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was presented. Thereafter, the Municipal
Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendred its decision, granting the petition for adoption.  5

Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court).

The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and
Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:

Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal
fiction;

xxx xxx xxx

In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondents judge held that "to add grandchildren in this
article where no grandchil is included would violate to (sic) the legal maxim that what is expressly included would
naturally exclude what is not included".

But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the case of In re Adoption of Millendez,  that the adoption of Quirino
6

Bonilla and Wilson Marcos would not only introduce a foreign element into the family unit, but would result in the
reduction of their legititimes. It would also produce an indirect, permanent and irrevocable disinheritance which is
contrary to the policy of the law that a subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person
deprives the latter of the right to disinherit and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made.

We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons
who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in
law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need
not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the
subject of statutory construction. 
7

Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines, obviously intended that only
those persons who have certain classes of children, are disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was
once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article
174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the
spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren,
the petitioners herein. But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was
changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.

Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no child of their
own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none
exists by blood relationship.   The present tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare
8

of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained
to promote that objective.  Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children,
9

or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt. 

10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in Spec.
Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED. Without pronouncement as to costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 189600               June 29, 2010

MILAGROS E. AMORES, Petitioner, 
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J.
VILLANUEVA,Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Via this petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the Decision of May 14, 2009 and
Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (public respondent),
which respectively dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto questioning the legality of the assumption of
office of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the party-list organization Citizens’
Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of Representatives, and denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.

In her Petition for Quo Warranto1 seeking the ouster of private respondent, petitioner alleged that, among other
things, private respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his
certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to
Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; and his change of affiliation
from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six
months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA
No. 7941.

Not having filed his Answer despite due notice, private respondent was deemed to have entered a general denial
pursuant to public respondent’s Rules.2

As earlier reflected, public respondent, by Decision of May 14, 2009, 3 dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Quo
Warranto, finding that CIBAC was among the party-list organizations which the COMELEC had partially proclaimed
as entitled to at least one seat in the House of Representatives through National Board of Canvassers (NBC)
Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007. It also found the petition which was filed on October 17, 2007 to be out of
time, the reglementary period being 10 days from private respondent’s proclamation.

Respecting the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941, public respondent
held that it applied only to those nominated as such during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of
the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth
sector, which CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization, is not.

In the matter of private respondent’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and
their families sector, public respondent held that Section 15 of RA No. 7941 did not apply as there was no resultant
change in party-list affiliation.

Her Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution No. 09-130 dated August 6, 2009, 4 petitioner filed
the present Petition for Certiorari.5

Petitioner contends that, among other things, public respondent created distinctions in the application of Sections 9
and 15 of RA No. 7941 that are not found in the subject provisions, fostering interpretations at war with equal
protection of the laws; and NBC Resolution No. 07-60, which was a partial proclamation of winning party-list
organizations, was not enough basis for private respondent to assume office on July 10, 2007, especially
considering that he admitted receiving his own Certificate of Proclamation only on December 13, 2007.

In his Comment,6 private respondent avers in the main that petitioner has not substantiated her claims of grave
abuse of discretion against public respondent; and that he became a member of the overseas Filipinos and their
families sector years before the 2007 elections.

It bears noting that the term of office of party-list representatives elected in the May, 2007 elections will expire on
June 30, 2010. While the petition has, thus, become moot and academic, rendering of a decision on the merits in
this case would still be of practical value. 7
The Court adopts the issues framed by public respondent, to wit: (1) whether petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto
was dismissible for having been filed unseasonably; and (2) whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to
private respondent.

On the first issue, the Court finds that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in considering
petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto filed out of time. Its counting of the 10-day reglementary period provided in its
Rules8 from the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-60 on July 9, 2007 is erroneous.

To be sure, while NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in the May, 2007 elections,
along with other party-list organizations,9 it was by no measure a proclamation of private respondent himself as
required by Section 13 of RA No. 7941.

Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the
COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to the
COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.

AT ALL EVENTS, this Court set aside NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC10 after revisiting the formula for allocation of additional seats to party-
list organizations.

Considering, however, that the records do not disclose the exact date of private respondent’s proclamation, the
Court overlooks the technicality of timeliness and rules on the merits. Alternatively, since petitioner’s challenge goes
into private respondent’s qualifications, it may be filed at anytime during his term.

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. 11

On the second and more substantial issue, the Court shall first discuss the age requirement for youth sector
nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941 reading:

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less
than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of
age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

The Court finds no textual support for public respondent’s interpretation that Section 9 applied only to those
nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a
sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is
no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. 12

As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election,  so it must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on
election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the
Party-List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.

As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There is thus no reason to apply Section 9
thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of
the Constitution in 1987. Under this interpretation, the last elections where Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995
or two months after the law was enacted. This is certainly not sound legislative intent, and could not have been the
objective of RA No. 7941.

There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondent’s ratiocination that after the third congressional term from
the ratification of the Constitution, which expired in 1998, Section 9 of RA No. 7941 would apply only to sectoral
parties registered exclusively as representing the youth sector. This distinction is nowhere found in the law. Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish. 13

Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of textual support for public respondent’s
ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private respondent’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to
its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation.
Section 15 reads:

Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or
sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party
orsectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list
representative under his new party or organization. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation. And the
latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the
Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be
eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before
the elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This is the plain meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim
index animi sermo or speech is the index of intention. 14

It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.

The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth sector or the overseas
Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections.

The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in May, 2007, it being
stipulated that he was born in August, 1975. 15 Moreover, he did not change his sectoral affiliation at least six months
before May, 2007, public respondent itself having found that he shifted to CIBAC’s overseas Filipino workers and
their families sector only on March 17, 2007. 16 1avvphi1

That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later upheld, is of no moment. A party-list
organization’s ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of preference, their qualifications according to law are a
different matter.

It not being contested, however, that private respondent was eventually proclaimed as a party-list representative of
CIBAC and rendered services as such, he is entitled to keep the compensation and emoluments provided by law for
the position until he is properly declared ineligible to hold the same. 17

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09-130 dated
August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are SET ASIDE. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva is
declared ineligible to hold office as a member of the House of Representatives representing the party-list
organization CIBAC.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28463 May 31, 1971

REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC., petitioner, 

vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

Agrava & Agrava for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor
Santiago M. Kapunan for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

It is a novel question that this petition for the review of a decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals presents.
Petitioner Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would have this Court construe the words "products of the Philippines" found in
Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code  as excluding bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) on the ground that, coming
1

as they do from wheat grain which is imported in the Philippines, they are merely waste and not the products, which
is the flour produced.  That way, it would not be liable at all for the wharfage dues assessed under such section by
2

respondent Commission of Customs. It elevated the matter to respondent Court, as the construction it would place
on the aforesaid section appears too strained and far remote from the ordinary meaning of the text, not to mention
the policy of the Act. We affirm.

In the decision of respondent Court now sought to be reviewed, after stating that what was before it was an appeal
from a decision of the Commissioner of Customs holding petitioner liable for the sum of P7,948.00 as wharfage due
the facts were set forth as follows: "Petitioner, Republic Flour Mills, Inc., is a domestic corporation, primarily
engaged in the manufacture of wheat flour, and produces pollard (darak) and bran (ipa) in the process of milling.
During the period from December, 1963 to July, 1964, inclusive, petitioner exported Pollard and/or bran which was
loaded from lighters alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade while anchored near the breakwater The
respondent assessed the petitioner by way of wharfage dues on the said exportations in the sum of P7,948.00,
which assessment was paid by petitioner under protest."  The only issue, in the opinion of respondent Court, is
3

whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law. The main contention before
respondent Court of petitioner was "that inasmuch as no government or private wharves or government facilities
[were] utilized in exporting the pollard and/or bran, the collection of wharfage dues is contrary to law."  On the other
4

hand, the stand of respondent Commissioner of Customs was that petitioner was liable for wharfage dues "upon
receipt or discharge of the exported goods by a vessel engaged in foreign trade regardless of the non-use of
government-owned or private wharves."  Respondent Court of Tax Appeals sustained the action taken by the
5

Commissioner of Customs under the appropriate provision of the Tariff and Customs Code, relying on our decision
in Procter & Gamble Phil. Manufacturing Corp. v. Commissioner of Customs.  It did not feel called upon to answer
6

the question now before us as, in its opinion, petitioner only called its attention to it for the first time in its
memorandum.

Hence, this petition for review. The sole error assigned by petitioner is that it should not, under its construction of the
Act, be liable for wharfage dues on its exportation of bran and pollard as they are not "products of the Philippines",
coming as they did from wheat grain which were imported from abroad, and being "merely parts of the wheat grain
milled by Petitioner to produce flour which had become waste."  We find, to repeat, such contention unpersuasive
7

and affirm the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals.

1. The language of Section 2802 appears to be quite explicit: "There shall be levied, collected and paid on all
articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines ... exported from the Philippines,
a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage ...." One category refers to what is imported. The
other mentions products of the Philippines that are exported. Even without undue scrutiny, it does appear quite
obvious that as long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section.
Petitioner appeared to have entertained such a nation. In its petition for review before respondent Court, it
categorically asserted: "Petitioner is primarily engaged in the manufacture of flour from wheat grain. In the process
of milling the wheat grain into flour, petitioner also produces 'bran' and 'pollard' which it exports abroad."  It does
8

take a certain amount of hair-splitting to exclude from its operation what petitioner calls "waste" resulting from the
production of flour processed from the wheat grain in petitioner's flour mills in the Philippines. It is always timely to
remember that, as stressed by Justice Moreland: "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to
apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them."  Petitioner ought to have been aware that deference to such a doctrine
9

precludes an affirmative response to its contention. The law is clear; it must be obeyed. It is as simple, as that.  10

2. There is need of confining familiar language of a statute to its usual signification. While statutory construction
involves the exercise of choice, the temptation to roam at will and rely on one's predilections as to what policy
should prevail is to be resisted. The search must be for a reasonable interpretation. It is best to keep in mind the
reminder from Holmes that "there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what
obviously means."   To paraphrase Frankfurter, interpolation must be eschewed but evisceration avoided. Certainly,
11

the utmost effort should be exerted lest the interpretation arrived at does violence to the statutory language in its
total context. It would be then to ignore what has been stressed time and time again as to limits of judicial freedom
in the construction of statutes to accept their view advanced by petitioner.

3. Then, again, there is the fundamental postulate in statutory construction requiring fidelity to the legislative
purpose. What Congress intended is not to be frustrates. Its objective must be carried out. Even if there be doubt as
to the meaning of the language employed, the interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to be attained.
No undue reflection is needed to show that if through an ingenious argument, the scope of a statute may be
contracted, the probability that other exceptions may be thought of is not remote. If petitioner were to prevail,
subsequent pleas motivated by the same desire to be excluded from the operation of the Tariff and Customs Code
would likewise be entitled to sympathetic consideration. It is desirable then that the gates to such efforts at undue
restriction of the coverage of the Act be kept closed. Otherwise, the end result would be not respect for, but defiance
of, a clear legislative mandate. That kind of approach in statutory construction has never recommended itself. It
does not now.  12

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 27, 1967 is affirmed. With costs
against petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Castro, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-25316 February 28, 1979

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC., petitioner-

appellant, 
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, respondent appellee.

Gregorio E. Fajardo for appellant.

Gregorio Baroque for appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court, petitioner-appellant would seek a reversal of such decision
relying on what it considered to be a right granted by Section 62 of the Republic Act No. 2023, more specifically the
first two paragraphs thereof: "... (1) A member of a cooperative may, notwithstanding the provisions of existing laws,
execute an agreement in favor of the co-operative authorizing his employer to deduct from the salary or wages
payable to him by the employer such amount as may be specified in the agreement and to pay the amount so
deducted to the co-operative in satisfaction of any debt or other demand owing from the member to the co-
operative. (2) Upon the exemption of such agreement the employer shall if so required by the co-operative by a
request in writing and so long as such debt or other demand or any part of it remains unpaid, make the claimant and
remit forth with the amount so deducted to the co-operative." 1

To show that such is futile, the appealed decision, as quoted in the brief for petitioner-appellant, stated the following:
"Then petitioner contends that under the above provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by credit union to its
members enjoy first priority in the payroll collection from the respondent's employees' wages and salaries. As can
be clearly seen, there is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act 2023 hereinabove quoted which provides that obligation
of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees'
wages and salaries. The only effect of Rep. Act 2023 is to compel the employer to deduct from the salaries or
wages payable to members of the employees' cooperative credit unions the employees' debts to the union and to
pay the same to the credit union. In other words, if Rep. Act 2023 had been enacted, the employer could not be
compelled to act as the collecting agent of the employees' credit union for the employees' debt to his credit union
but to contend that the debt of a member of the employees cooperative credit union as having first priority in the
matter of deduction, is to write something into the law which does not appear. In other words, the mandatory
character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the employees' debt from the
latter's salary and turn this over to the employees' credit union but this mandatory character does not convert the
credit union's credit into a first priority credit. If the legislative intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of Rep. Act
2023 were to give first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit
unions, then, the law would have so expressly declared. Thus, the express provisions of the New Civil Code, Arts.
2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on preference of credits.  2

Such an interpretation, as could be expected, found favor with the respondent-appellee, which, in its brief, succinctly
pointed out "that there is nothing in said provision from which it could be implied that it gives top priority to
obligations of the nature of that payable to petitioner, and that, therefore, respondent company, in issuing the
documents known as Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "P", which establish the order of priority of payment out of the salaries
of the employees of respondent-appellee, did not violate the above-quoted Section 62 of Republic Act 2023. In
promulgating Exhibit "3", [and] Exhibit "P" respondent, in effect, implemented the said provision of law.  3

This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law relied upon being clear on its face, it would appear
that no favorable action can be taken on this appeal. We affirm.

1. The applicable provision of Republic Act No. 2023 quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity. As thus
worded, it was so applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise any valid objection. For the lower court to view
it otherwise would have been to alter the law. That cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly
appertains to the legislative branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals:   "It has been repeated time
4

and time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to
apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently
born to that effect.  .
5

2. Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Petitioner-appellant was unable to show a clear legal right. The very law on
which he would base his action fails to supply any basis for this petition. A more rigorous analysis would have
prevented him from instituting a a suit of this character. In J.R.S. Business Corporation v. Montesa,   this Court held.
6

"Man-damus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the
performance of an act, which specifically the law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use
and enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled.   The opinion continued in this wise:"According to former Chief
7

Justice Moran," only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal
rights are of the petitioner are not well defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed. In support of the
above view, Viuda e Hijos de Crispulo Zamora v. Wright was cited. As was there categorically stated: "This court
has held that it is fundamental that the duties to be enforced by mandamus must be those which are clear and
enjoined by law or by reason of official station, and that petitioner must have a clear, legal right to the thing and that
it must be the legal duty of the defendant to perform the required act.' As expressed by the then Justice Recto in a
subsequent opinion: "It is well establish that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right
sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful." To
the same effect is the formulation of such doctrine by former Justice Barrera: "Stated otherwise, the writ never
issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power
already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed."   So it has been since then.   The latest reported
8 9

case, Province. of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission,   this court speaking through Justice Concepcion Jr.,
10

reiterated such a well-settled doctrine: "It has also been held that it is essential to the issuance of the writ of
mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and it must be the imperative duty
of the defendant to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases.  11

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68729 May 29, 1987

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, 

vs.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and KAYUMANGGI RADIO NETWORK
INCORPORATED, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR, J.:

This petition seeks the reversal of the decision of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) which
ordered petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Incorporated (RCPI) to desist from operating its radio
telephone services in Catarman, Northern Samar; San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Sorsogon, Sorsogon.

Petitioner has been operating a radio communications system since 1957 under its legislative franchise granted by
Republic Act No. 2036 which was enacted on June 23, 1957.

In 1968, the petitioner established a radio telegraph service in Sorsogon, Sorsogon. In 1971, another radio
telegraph service was put up in San Jose, Mindoro followed by another in Catarman, Samar in 1976. The
installation of radio telephone services started in 1971 in San Jose, Mindoro; then in Sorsogon, Sorsogon and
Catarman, Samar in 1983.

In a decision dated June 24, 1980 in NTC Case No. 80-08, private respondent Kayumanggi Radio Network
Incorporated was authorized by the public respondent to operate radio communications systems in Catarman,
Samar and in San Jose, Mindoro.

On December 14, 1983, the private respondent filed a complaint with the NTC alleging that the petitioner was
operating in Catarman, Samar and in San Jose, Mindoro without a certificate of public covenience and necessity.
The petitioner, on the other hand, counter-alleged that its telephone services in the places subject of the complaint
are covered by the legislative franchise recognized by both the public respondent and its predecessor, the Public
Service Commission. In its supplemental reply, the petitioner further stated that it has been in operation in the
questioned places long before private respondent Kayumanggi filed its application to operate in the same places.

After conducting a hearing, NTC, in its decision dated August 22, 1984 ordered petitioner RCPI to immediately
cease or desist from the operation of its radio telephone services in Catarman Northern Samar; San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro; and Sorsogon, Sorsogon stating that under Executive Order No. 546, a certificate of public
convenience and necessity is mandatory for the operation of communication utilities and services including radio
communications.

On September 4, 1984, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an order dated
September 12, 1984.

On October 1, 1984, the present petition was filed raising the issue of whether or not petitioner RCPI, a grantee of a
legislative franchise to operate a radio company, is required to secure a certificate of public convenience and
necessity before it can validly operate its radio stations including radio telephone services in Catarman, Northern
Samar; San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Sorsogon, Sorsogon.

The petitioner's main argument states that the abolition of the Public Service Commission under Presidential Decree
No. 1 and the creation of the National Telecommunications Commission under Executive Order No. 546 to replace
the defunct Public Service Commission did not affect sections 14 and 15 of the Public Service Law (Commonwealth
Act. No. 146, as amended).

The provisions of the Public Service Law pertinent to the petitioner's allegation are as follows:
 Section 13. (a) the Commission shall have jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all public
services and their franchises, equipment and other properties, and in the exercise of its authority, it
shall have the necessary powers and the aid of public force: ...

Section 14. The following are exempted from the provisions of the preceding section:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Radio companies except with respect to the fixing of rates;

xxx xxx xxx

Section 15. With the exception of those enumerated in the preceding section, no public service shall
operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public
Service Commission, known as "certificate of public convenience," or "certificate of convenience and
public necessity," as the case may be, to the effect that the operation of said service and the
authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner. ...

We find no merit in the petitioner's contention.

Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23,1972, reorganizing the executive branch of the National
Government, the Public Service Commission was abolished and its functions were transferred to three specialized
regulatory boards, as follows: the Board of Transportation, the Board of Communications and the Board of Power
and Waterworks. The functions so transferred were still subject to the limitations provided in sections 14 and 15 of
the Public Service Law, as amended. With the enactment of Executive Order No. 546 on July 23, 1979
implementing P.D. No.1, the Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau were abolished
and their functions were transferred to the National Telecommunications Commission (Sec. 19(d), Executive Order
No. 546). Section 15 of said Executive Order spells out the functions of the National Telecommunications
Commission as follows:

Sec. 15. Functions of the Commission.-The Commission shall exercise the following functions:

a. Issue Certificate of Public Convenience for the operation of communications utilities and services,
radio communications petitions systems, wire or wireless telephone or telegraph system, radio and
television broadcasting system and other similar public utilities;

b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular operators of public service
communications; and determine and prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the operation of such
public utility facilities and services except in cases where charges or rates are established by
international bodies or associations of which the Philippines is a participating member or by bodies
recognized by the Philippine Government as the proper arbiter of such charges or rates;

c. Grant permits for the use of radio frequencies for wireless telephone and telegraph systems and
radio communication systems including amateur radio stations and radio and television broadcasting
systems;

d. Sub-allocate series of frequencies of bands allocated by the International Telecommunications

Union to the specific services;

e. Establish and prescribe rules, regulations, standards, specifications in all cases related to the
issued Certificate of Public Convenience and administer and enforce the same;

f. Coordinate and cooperate with government agencies and other entities concerned with any aspect
involving communications with a view to continuously improve the communications service in the
country;

g. Promulgate such rules and regulations, as public safety and interest may require, to encourage a
larger and more effective use of communications, radio and television broadcasting facilities, and to
maintain effective competition among private entities in these activities whenever the Commission
finds it reasonably feasible;

h. Supervise and inspect the operation of radio stations and telecommunications facilities;

i. Undertake the examination and licensing of radio operators;

j. Undertake, whenever necessary, the registration of radio transmitters and transceivers; and
 k. Perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law.

It is clear from the aforequoted provision that the exemption enjoyed by radio companies from the jurisdiction of the
Public Service Commission and the Board of Communications no longer exists because of the changes effected by
the Reorganization Law and implementing executive orders. The petitioner's claim that its franchise cannot be
affected by Executive Order No. 546 on the ground that it has long been in operation since 1957 cannot be
sustained.

A franchise started out as a "royal privilege or (a) branch of the King's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a
subject." This definition was given by Finch, adopted by Blackstone, and accepted by every authority since (State v.
Twin Village Water Co., 98 Me 214, 56 A 763 (1903)). Today, a franchise, being merely a privilege emanating from
the sovereign power of the state and owing its existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by
virtue of its police power through its administrative agencies. We ruled in Pangasinan transportation Co., Inc. v.
Public Service Commission (70 Phil. 221) that:

... statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the State of its
police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage,
but likewise to those already established and in operation ...

Executive Order No. 546, being an implementing measure of P.D. No. I insofar as it amends the Public Service Law
(CA No. 146, as amended) is applicable to the petitioner who must be bound by its provisions. The petitioner cannot
install and operate radio telephone services on the basis of its legislative franchise alone.

The position of the petitioner that by the mere grant of its franchise under RA No. 2036 it can operate a radio
communications system anywhere within the Philippines is erroneous. Section 1 of said statute reads:

Section 1. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and to the provisions, not inconsistent
herewith, of Act Numbered Three thousand eight hundred and forty-six, entitled.' An Act providing for
the regulation of radio stations and radio communications in the Philippine Islands, and for other
purposes;' Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-six, known as the Public Service Act,
and their amendments, and other applicable laws, there is hereby granted to the Radio
Communications of the Philippines, its successors or assigns, the right and privilege of constructing,
installing, establishing and operating in the Philippines, at such places as the said corporation may
select and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications may approve, radio stations for the
reception and transmission of wireless messages on radiotelegraphy and/or radiotelephone,
including both coastal and marine telecommunications, each station to consist of two radio
apparatus comprising of a receiving and sending radio apparatus. (Emphasis supplied).

Section 4(a) of the same Act further provides that:

Sec. 4(a). This franchise shall not take effect nor shall any powers thereunder be exercised by the
grantee until the Secretary of Public works and Communications shall have allotted to the grantee
the frequencies and wave lengths to be used, and issued to the grantee a license for such case.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in the words of R.A. No. 2036 itself, approval of the then Secretary of Public Works and Communications was
a precondition before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas where it desires to operate. It has been
repeated time and again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do
except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. (Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals, 51 SCRA 381).

The records of the case do not show any grant of authority from the then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications before the petitioner installed the questioned radio telephone services in San Jose, Mindoro in
1971. The same is true as regards the radio telephone services opened in Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Catarman,
Samar in 1983. No certificate of public convenience and necessity appears to have been secured by the petitioner
from the public respondent when such certificate,was required by the applicable public utility regulations (See
executive Order No. 546, sec. 15, supra.; Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. City of Davao, 15 SCRA 75;
Olongapo Electric Light and Power Corp. v. National Power Corporation, et al., G.R. No. L-24912, promulgated April
9, 1987.)

It was well within the powers of the public respondent to authorize the installation by the private respondent network
of radio communications systems in Catarman, Samar and San Jose, Mindoro. Under the circumstances of this
case, the mere fact that the petitioner possesses a franchise to put up and operate a radio communications system
in certain areas is not an insuperable obstacle to the public respondent's issuing the proper certificate to an
applicant desiring to extend the same services to those areas. The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot
be exclusive in nature nor can a franchise be granted except that it must be subject to amendment, alteration, or
even repeal by the legislature when the common good so requires. (Art. XII, sec. 11 of the 1986 Constitution). There
is an express provision in the petitioner's franchise which provides compliance with the above mandate R.A. 2036,
sec. 15).

In view of the foregoing, we find no reason to disturb the public respondent's findings of fact, and conclusions of law
insofar as the private respondent was authorized to operate in Catarman, Samar and San Jose, Mindoro. As a rule,
the Commission's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive upon this Court. We may
modify or ignore them only when it clearly appears that there is no evidence to support reasonably such a
conclusion. (Halili v. Daplas, 14 SCRA 14). The petitioner has not shown why the private respondent should be
denied the authority to operate its services in Samar and Mindoro. It has not overcome the presumption that when
the public respondent disturbed the petitioner's monopoly in certain areas, it was doing so pursuant to public interest
and the common good.

WHEREFORE, the challenged order of the public respondent dated August 22, 1984 is hereby AFFIRMED. The
petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 

vs.
HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third
Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A.
CLOUSE, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

R.M. Blanco for private respondents.

PUNO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision  of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch
1

69, in Special Proceeding No. RTC-140-I, entitled, "In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minor named Solomon
Joseph Alcala", raising a pure question of law.

The sole issue for determination concerns the right of private respondents spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A.
Clouse who are aliens to adopt under Philippine Law.

There is no controversy as to the facts.

On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, private
respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on March 12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing on April 18,
1990. The said Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Zambales and City of
Olongapo for three (3) consecutive weeks.

The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States
of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a
naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially
capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.

Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been
under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery
Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son.

Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably
recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.

Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law and
that the adoption will redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor, respondent judge rendered a decision on
June 20, 1990, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for adoption filed by Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and
Evelyn A. Clouse and decrees that the said minor be considered as their child by adoption. To this
effect, the Court gives the minor the rights and duties as the legitimate child of the petitioners.
Henceforth, he shall be known as SOLOMON ALCALA CLOUSE.
 The Court dissolves parental authority bestowed upon his natural parents and vests parental
authority to the herein petitioners and makes him their legal heir. Pursuant to Article 36 of P.D. 603
as amended, the decree of adoption shall be effective as of the date when the petition was filed. In
accordance with Article 53 of the same decree, let this decree of adoption be recorded in the
corresponding government agency, particularly the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Merida,
Leyte where the minor was born. The said office of the Local Civil Registrar is hereby directed to
issue an amended certificate of live birth to the minor adopted by the petitioners.

Let copies of this decision be furnished (sic) the petitioners, DSWD, Zambales Branch, Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Merida, Leyte.

SO ORDERED. 2

Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to us for relief, contending:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF ALVIN AND
EVELYN CLOUSE, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE
LAW.

We rule for petitioner.

Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the
Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.

Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to
adopt, viz.:

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala
under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen
but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his
relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses
Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A.
Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States in 1988.

Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article
184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the
petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint
adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with
Article 184.3

The historical evolution of this provision is clear. Presidential Decree 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code),
provides that husband and wife "may" jointly adopt.  Executive Order No. 91 issued on December 17, 1986
4

amended said provision of P.D. 603. It demands that both husband and wife "shall" jointly adopt if one of them is an
alien.  It was so crafted to protect Filipino children who are put up for adoption. The Family Code reiterated the rule
5

by requiring that husband and wife "must" jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned before. Under the said new
law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.  This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
6
authority over the child, which is the ideal situation.  As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
7

child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. 8

In a distinctly similar case, we held:

As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for
both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both
spouses were of the same nationality.

The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof expresses the necessity
for a joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances —

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the parental authority, can aptly find
governance.

Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the
other, jointly parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code. 9

Article 185 is all too clear and categorical and there is no room for its interpretation. There is only room for
application.10

We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption and every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote that objective.  Adoption is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and
11

enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life.  It is not the bureaucratic technicalities but the interest
12

of the child that should be the principal criterion in adoption cases.  Executive Order 209 likewise upholds that the
13

interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be the paramount consideration. These considerations
notwithstanding, the records of the case do not evince any fact as would justify us in allowing the adoption of the
minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, by private respondents who are aliens.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the lower court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners, 
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET
AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which
they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the
Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision.  Specifically, they ask the following questions:
1

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be
made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2

In the Comment   required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an
3

advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that
publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject
decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply   refuting these
4

arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder
in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that
issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not
have to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however,
the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court.  5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

 ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the
instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers
to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day
period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate
concurrence in the original decision,   is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its
6

publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it
was "otherwise provided. "

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is
that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with
but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes
that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to
remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the
government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It
surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to
all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to
one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by
the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published,
including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not
merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case
studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances
are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential
decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and
in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential
decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration.   The evident
7

purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the Official
Gazette   and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently
8

informed.   One reserved his vote   and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without
9 10

indicating where it should be made.   It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a
11

clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its
erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the
function of communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The
Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has
not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it
impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and
apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the
publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after
fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law
pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law
could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as
required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is
untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the
acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our
country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating
from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates
and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This
they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from
their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985

PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S.
FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA,
MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA;

LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children LINDA,
ROMEO, ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ;

SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE,
ESTELA, JULITA SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;

LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDNA,
GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;

DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDITHA,
ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR. all surnamed LANUZA;

EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE,
LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed ISLA, petitioners, 
vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First
Instance of Manila, respondents.

Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners.

Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, dated December 16,
1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex),
who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result
of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation
of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the
protection of the lives of its men working underground. Portion of the complaint reads:

xxx xxx xxx

9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with gross and reckless
negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the required precautions for the due
protection of the lives of its men working underground at the time, and in utter violation of the laws
and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the Government pursuant thereto, allowed great
amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which
seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore and rock below it, thereby exerting
tremendous pressure on the working spaces at its 4300 level, with the result that, on the said date,
at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, with the collapse of all underground supports due to such
enormous pressure, approximately 500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud and water,
accompanied by surface boulders, blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and filled in, in a
matter of approximately five (5) minutes, the underground workings, ripped timber supports and
carried off materials, machines and equipment which blocked all avenues of exit, thereby trapping
within its tunnels of all its men above referred to, including those named in the next preceding
paragraph, represented by the plaintiffs herein;
 10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on the said
date, five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22 were rescued within the next 7
days; and the rest, 21 in number, including those referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove, were left
mercilessly to their fate, notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great many of them were still
alive, entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to defendant PHILEX's
decision to abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its bounden legal and moral duties in
the premises;

xxx xxx xxx

13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations duly promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the Special Committee above referred to, in their
Report of investigation, pages 7-13, Annex 'B' hereof, but also failed completely to provide its men
working underground the necessary security for the protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact
that it had vast financial resources, it having made, during the year 1966 alone, a total operating
income of P 38,220,254.00, or net earnings, after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its llth Annual
Report for the year ended December 31, 1966, and with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00
as of December 31, 1966;

xxx xxx xxx

(pp. 42-44, rec.)

A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of petitioners based
on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended
by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an
opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, particularly:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.

Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.

(b) Art. 1173—The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and
2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.

Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages
which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.

Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.

After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27, 1968 dismissing
the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said order, respondent Judge, on September 23, 1968, reconsidered
and set aside his order of June 27, 1968 and allowed Philex to file an answer to the complaint. Philex moved to
reconsider the aforesaid order which was opposed by petitioners.

On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in accordance
with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction
over damage or compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective
of whether or not the employer was negligent, adding that if the employer's negligence results in work-connected
deaths or injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay additional
compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in the Act.

Petitioners thus filed the present petition.

In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:

 I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS- PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT

FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN
CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER
THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.

In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over the cause of action since
the complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages, particularly Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201
and 2231, and not on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. They point out that the complaint alleges
gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take the necessary security for the protection of the
lives of its employees working underground. They also assert that since Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in
the court a quo, the allegations in their complaint including those contained in the annexes are deemed admitted.

In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see the distinction
between the claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the claims for damages based
on gross negligence of Philex under the Civil Code. They point out that workmen's compensation refers to liability
for compensation for loss resulting from injury, disability or death of the working man through industrial accident or
disease, without regard to the fault or negligence of the employer, while the claim for damages under the Civil Code
which petitioners pursued in the regular court, refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence
resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.

On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under the provisions of
Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which read:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.—The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury ...

SEC. 46. Jurisdiction.— The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, ...

Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it was held that "all claims of
workmen against their employer for damages due to accident suffered in the course of employment shall be
investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission," subject to appeal to the Supreme
Court.

Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not remove the case from the exclusive
character of recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act; because Section 4-A of the Act provides an
additional compensation in case the employer fails to comply with the requirements of safety as imposed by law to
prevent accidents. In fact, it points out that Philex voluntarily paid the compensation due the petitioners and all the
payments have been accepted in behalf of the deceased miners, except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted
that they are entitled to a greater amount of damages under the Civil Code.

In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, then Atty. Edgardo Angara, now President
of the University of the Philippines, Justice Manuel Lazaro, as corporate counsel and Assistant General Manager of
the GSIS Legal Affairs Department, and Commissioner on Elections, formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan
Bacungan, appeared as amici curiae and thereafter, submitted their respective memoranda.

The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976, is:

Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under
the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is to say, whether his or
his heirs' action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the
Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they have a right of selection or choice of action between
availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts
under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by
virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees or whether they may avail
cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured employee or worker, or the
heirs in case of his death, may initiate a complaint to recover damages (not compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act) with the regular court on the basis of negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code
provisions. Atty. Angara believes otherwise. He submits that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected
injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, while Atty.
Bacungan's position is that the action is selective. He opines that the heirs of the employee in case of his death
have a right of choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to sue
in the regular court under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the latter.
Atty. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Atty. Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the remedy provided
for under the Act, they are no longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by
filing an action for higher damages in the regular court, and vice versa.

On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex. In the resolution of September 7, 1978,
WE dismissed the petition only insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected, it appearing that there are other
petitioners in this case.

WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case,

It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's Compensation
Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five
thousand (P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to
entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died
from accident arising out of and in the course of their employments. The complaint instead alleges gross and
reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence
of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule that in
ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for
damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint
(Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100).

In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual relationship. The
alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute
a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for damages. The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of
breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith, read:

Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good
faith is able shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the
obligation was constituted.

In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.

Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of damages, as assessed by the court.

The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in giving
damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of compensation distinct from the
existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being made as compensation and not as damages (99
C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his
family. Hence, an employer is liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery
under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36).

In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income,
as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due
to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to one as
a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained
injury either in his person, property or relative rights, through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).

The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation between the
defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. While under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee that the death or injury is
work-connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has the burden to prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs.
GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).
The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation Commission then, now
Employees Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact that unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's
Compensation Act did not contain any provision for an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages. What the
Act provided was merely the right of the heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in the amount of six
thousand (P6,000.00) pesos plus burial expenses of two hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses when
incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of only 50% if the
complaint alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety appliances or to take other
precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at bar, the
amount sought to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act
and which cannot be granted by the Commission.

Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to an employee who
suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his employer but caused by factors
outside the industrial plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the liability of the employer, depends on breach of
contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation Act was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or
workmen. It is a social legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident
causing his death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379).

WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of
selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation
Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the
employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively
of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition
for damages in the regular courts.

In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured
worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation
Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both
courses of action simultaneously.

In Pacaña WE said:

In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma, involving the application of Section 6 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue third- party tortfeasors in the
regular courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, again speaking for the Court, pointed out that the injured
worker has the choice of remedies but cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and
thus balanced the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen's Compensation Act as
against an ordinary action.

As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for damages against the
respondents (defendants below), because he has elected to seek compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Law, and his claim (case No. 44549 of the Compensation Commission)
was being processed at the time he filed this action in the Court of First Instance. It is argued for
petitioner that as the damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much more extensive than the
amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act, they should not be deemed
incompatible. As already indicated, the injured laborer was initially free to choose either to recover
from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary
civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller
indemnity obtainable by the first course is balanced by the claimant's being relieved of the burden of
proving the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury, and of
having to establish the extent of the damage suffered; issues that are apt to be troublesome to
establish satisfactorily. Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is precluded
from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation
Commission. Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted, if the employer Franklin Baker
Company recovers, by derivative action against the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the
compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner, the excess accrues to the latter.

Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), applies to third-party tortfeasor, said
rule should likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor.

Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the petition has been dismissed in the
resolution of September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by Philex and the said heirs.

With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the
court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza,
Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of
the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino
Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments (pp. 106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted by
herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121-122, rec.) in the lower
court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation Act before they
learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which established the criminal
negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then
Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only (p. 76, rec.).

WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such
may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact
that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving
compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by
Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission
which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a
mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded
to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower
court, the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may
be decreed in their favor.

Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the instant case. The Court
merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article
11 and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of the
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as
implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950.

To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:

Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people should be the concern of the State (Art. II).

Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women, and minors, and shall
regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and
in agriculture. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. XIV).

The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare, and
security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property
ownership and profits "establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services in, the field of education, health,
housing, employment, welfare and social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of
living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution); "... afford protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations
between workers and employers ..., and assure the rights of workers to ... just and humane conditions of
work" (Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).

The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of the 1973
Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of the New Labor Code, thus:

Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.—The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
(emphasis supplied).

The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the New Civil Code
cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor Code. Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act (before it was amended by R.A. No. 772 on June 20, 1952), predecessor of Article
173 of the New Labor Code, has been superseded by the aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a
subsequent law, which took effect on August 30, 1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of social justice
enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against their employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code
seems to diminish the rights of the workers and therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of the
Constitution and the liberal provisions of the New Civil Code.

The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution are statements
of legal principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. Mr. Justice Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia
State Board of Education vs. Barnette, with characteristic eloquence, enunciated:

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
 vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections (319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed. 1638, emphasis
supplied).

In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code, both the New Labor Code
and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the workers and employees.

Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, promulgated
on May 1, 1974, but which took effect six months thereafter, provides that "all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in
favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor Code).

Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. "

More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all labor legislation and
all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer."

Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act provided:

Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (emphasis
supplied).

Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same may stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries
received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment; and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section
shall be presumed to include such agreement.

Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, was amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:

Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury.

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply to injuries received outside
the Island through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the
employment. Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the
Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more
favorable to them (As amended by section 5 of Republic Act No. 772).

Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable provisions of the New Civil
Code, because said Article 173 provides:

Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance
Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the
employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of
benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered
Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty- six, as
amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered
Forty-eight hundred Sixty-four, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the
System during the period of such payment for the same disability or death, and conversely
(emphasis supplied).

As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A. No. 610, as amended, R.A. No.
4864, as amended, and all other laws whose benefits are administered by the System (referring to the GSIS or
SSS).

Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not
even remotely, much less expressly, repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore quoted.
It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence, is not barred by
Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered
by the System provided for by the New Labor Code, which defines the "System" as referring to the Government
Service Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code).

Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the law of the land.

Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.

The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera ruled:

Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation
placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law
since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect" (65 SCRA 270, 272-273 [1975]).

WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs.
Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).

The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before and after it was amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the right of recovery in favor of the deceased, ailing or injured
employee to the compensation provided for therein. Said Section 5 was not accorded controlling application by the
Supreme Court in the 1970 case of Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an
injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's
Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for greater damages; but he cannot
pursue both courses of action simultaneously. Said Pacana case penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied Article
1711 of the Civil Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act, reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of
Valencia vs. Manila Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958 case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma
(104 Phil. 582), both penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said Pacana case was concurred in by Justices J.B.L. Reyes,
Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Villamor.

Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of the first paragraph of
Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even refer, neither expressly nor
impliedly, to the Civil Code as Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did, with greater reason said Article
173 must be subject to the same interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacana, Valencia and Esguerra
aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice
guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the American Federal Constitution,
nor in the various state constitutions of the American Union. Consequently, the restrictive nature of the American
decisions on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the range and compass of OUR interpretation of our
own laws, especially Article 1711 of the New Civil Code, vis-a-vis Article 173 of the New Labor Code, in relation to
Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then, and now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies of Article II of the 1973 Constitution.

The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer. The right to life is
guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. To relieve the employer from liability for the
death of his workers arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide safety devices for the protection of
his employees or workers against the dangers which are inherent in underground mining, is to deprive the deceased
worker and his heirs of the right to recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to
his family without due process of law. The dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross or
wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety measures for the
protection of the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is un-
Christian.

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the
provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the
mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.

The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.

It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.

The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New Labor Code subvert the
rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining employees. Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act and Article 173 of the New Labor Code are retrogressive; because they are a throwback to the
obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's
Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964), which has been discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due to the
Industrial Revolution that generated the machines and other mechanical devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's
cotton gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for production and transportation which are dangerous to
life, limb and health. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of live-and-let-live is now superdesed by the
benign Christian shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. Those who profess to be Christians should not adhere to
Cain's selfish affirmation that he is not his brother's keeper. In this our civilization, each one of us is our brother's
keeper. No man is an island. To assert otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837 case of Prisley
vs. Fowler (3 MN 1,150 reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent, The Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the era of
economic royalists and robber barons of America. Only ruthless, unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries
continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. The Prisley rule humiliates man and debases him; because
the decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant" and utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for
"employer." It robs man of his inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. To stress this affront to human dignity, WE
only have to restate the quotation from Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of the master and the servant never can
imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected
to do himself." This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked the American Civil War which generated so much
hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864.

"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man's
survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."

It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate.

That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "No judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. "

Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain instances, the
court, in the language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of
the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may
apply Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations.

But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding fathers of the American Constitution
foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the
ambiguities in the American Constitution and the statutes.

'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified but denies that the power of
the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist, Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937
ed.). Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is even independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs.
American Sash Company, 1949 335 US 538).

Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same view. Chief Justice Marshall
pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs.
Madison I Cranch 127 1803), which was re-stated by Chief Justice Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is
what the judge says it is (Address on May 3, 1907, quoted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9,
1937). This was reiterated by Justice Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower.
He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. " (The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 113).
In the language of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial legislation is the restraint of the judge"
(U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S. 1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view is also entertained by Justice Frankfurter and
Justice Robert Jackson. In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts breathe life, feeble or strong, into the inert
pages of the Constitution and all statute books."

It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act or Article
173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury caused by the nature of the work, without any fault
on the part of the employers. It is correctly termed no fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
as amended, or Article 173 of the New Labor Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned
by his fault or culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for the protection of the
life, limb and health of the workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to pay
compensation benefits to the employee whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even if the employer has
faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the
employee.

The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the epigrammatic language of Mr. Justice Cardozo, "the
law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip
was fatal" (Wood vs. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88; Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo
warned that: "Sometimes the conservatism of judges has threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its
efficacy. ... Precedents established in those items exert an unhappy influence even now" (citing Pound, Common
Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law Review 383, 387).

Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted, although with a cautionary
undertone: "that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially they are confined from molar to
molecular motions" (Southern Pacific Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204 1917). And in the subsequent case of
Springer vs. Government (277 US 188, 210-212, 72 L.ed. 845, 852- 853), Justice Holmes pronounced:

The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even
the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme
to the other. x x x. When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they
must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on.

To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would be free from it is
to legislate yet it is what the judges do whenever they determine which of two competing principles
of policy shall prevail.

xxx xxx xxx

It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do
not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into waterlight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.

True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate, but grudgingly concede that in
certain cases judges do legislate. They criticize the assumption by the courts of such law-making power as
dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial tyranny. They include Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Justice Black,
Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice David Brewer, Ronald Dworkin, Rolf Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl
Harold Levy. But said Justices, jurists or legal commentators, who either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-
between gaps of the law, or decry the exercise of such power, have not pointed to examples of the exercise by the
courts of such law-making authority in the interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases that gave rise
to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such judicial legislation has not protected public interest or individual
welfare, particularly the lowly workers or the underprivileged.

On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory enactments expanding
the scope of such provisions to protect human rights. Foremost among them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda
vs. Arizona (384 US 436 1964), Gideon vs. Wainright (372 US 335), Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which
guaranteed the accused under custodial investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed
of such rights as even as it protects him against the use of force or intimidation to extort confession from him. These
rights are not found in the American Bill of Rights. These rights are now institutionalized in Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution. Only the peace-and-order adherents were critical of the activism of the American Supreme
Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren.

Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy provision was developed by American
judicial decisions, not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs.
Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 261-268). And these judicial decisions have been re-stated in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. In both
provisions, the second offense is the same as the first offense if the second offense is an attempt to commit the first
or frustration thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense.

The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They were also developed by judicial
decisions in the United States and in the Philippines even before people vs. Ylagan (58 Phil. 851-853).

Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson (163 US 537) as securing to
the Negroes equal but separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked in the case of Brown vs. Maryland Board of
Education (349 US 294), holding that the equal protection clause means that the Negroes are entitled to attend the
same schools attended by the whites-equal facilities in the same school-which was extended to public parks and
public buses.

De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing principle.

Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. Pomar (46 Phil. 440) by a
conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to working women-according primacy to
property rights over human rights. The case of People vs. Pomar is no longer the rule.
As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937, 949), Justice Holmes had
been railing against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due process to protect property rights
as against human rights or social justice for the working man. The law fixing maximum hours of labor was
invalidated. Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-
79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the American Supreme Court upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the form of
guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors, working hours not exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity leave
for women employees.

The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on political questions have
been evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial decisions (Marbury vs. Madison, supra Coleman
vs. Miller, 307 US 433, 83 L. ed. 1385; Springer vs. Government, 277 US 210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).

It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial legislation, penned a separate concurring
opinion in the case of Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirming the doctrine of political question as beyond the ambit of
judicial review. There is nothing in both the American and Philippine Constitutions expressly providing that the
power of the courts is limited by the principle of separation of powers and the doctrine on political questions. There
are numerous cases in Philippine jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of powers and political
questions and invoking American precedents.

Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme
Court the power to review the validity or constitutionality of any legislative enactment or executive act.

WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND
THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF
DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM
PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG, petitioners-appellants, 

vs.
HON. WENCESLAO ORTEGA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII, and
VICENTE G. ACABAN, respondents-appellees.

Sy Santos, Del Rosario and Associates for petitioners-appellants.

Tagalo, Gozar and Associates for respondents-appellees.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

The only issue in this petition for certiorari to review the orders dated March 4, 1972 and March 27, 1972,
respectively, of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 75138, is whether or not a banking
institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by
invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.  *

On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against Bautista Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development Corporation and Marino
Bautista for the collection of a sum of money. Upon motion of the plaintiff the trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to answer within the
reglementary period, and authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or Deputy Clerk to receive the plaintiff's evidence. On January 20, 1970 judgment by default
was rendered against the defendants.

To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the defendant B & B Forest
Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation. Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by
the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. In reply, the bank'
cashier invited the attention of the Deputy Sheriff to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 which, it was alleged,
prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a motion to cite Tan
Kim Liong for contempt of court.

In an order dated March 4, 1972 the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion. However, Tan Kim Liong was ordered
"to inform the Court within five days from receipt of this order whether or not there is a deposit in the China Banking
Corporation of defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact
and not allow any withdrawal until further order from this Court." Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned
down by order of March 27, 1972. In the same order he was directed "to comply with the order of this Court dated
March 4, 1972 within ten (10) days from the receipt of copy of this order, otherwise his arrest and confinement will
be ordered by the Court." Resisting the two orders, the China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim Liong instituted the
instant petition.

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 relied upon by the petitioners reads:

Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court
in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any
person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits.

Sec. 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not more
than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the
court.

The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall within any of the four
(4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be
criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development
Corporation. Specifically referring to this case, the position of the petitioners is that the bank deposit of judgment
debtor B & B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it
in view of the aforequoted provisions of law.

We do not view the situation in that light. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit
of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform
the court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking
Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not
allow any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the discussion of the conference committee report on
Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became Republic Act 1405, that it was not the intention of
the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. Thus:

Mr. MARCOS. Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the Committee on
Ways and Means to clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax case. He is being held liable
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this the
deposit of this individual is attached by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Mr. RAMOS. The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced sentence declaring the
liability of such person. But where the primary aim is to determine whether he has a bank deposit in
order to bring about a proper assessment by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such inquiry is not
authorized by this proposed law.

Mr. MARCOS. But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the attachment or
garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us assume, for instance, that there is a preliminary
attachment which is for garnishment or for holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain
individual, but such attachment or garnishment will bring out into the open the value of such deposit.
Is that prohibited by this amendment or by this law?

Mr. RAMOS. It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry is limited, or rather, the inquiry is made
only for the purpose of satisfying a tax liability already declared for the protection of the right in favor
of the government; but when the object is merely to inquire whether he has a deposit or not for
purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by the law.

Mr. MARCOS. And it protects the depositor, does it not?

Mr. RAMOS. Yes, it protects the depositor.

Mr. MARCOS. The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the amount of the
deposit.

Mr. RAMOS. Into the very nature of such deposit.

Mr. MARCOS. So I come to my original question. Therefore, preliminary garnishment or attachment

of the deposit is not allowed?

Mr. RAMOS. No, without judicial authorization.

Mr. MARCOS. I am glad that is clarified. So that the established rule of procedure as well as the
substantive law on the matter is amended?

Mr. RAMOS. Yes. That is the effect.

Mr. MARCOS. I see. Suppose there has been a decision, definitely establishing the liability of an
individual for taxation purposes and this judgment is sought to be executed ... in the execution of that
judgment, does this bill, or this proposed law, if approved, allow the investigation or scrutiny of the
bank deposit in order to execute the judgment?

Mr. RAMOS. To satisfy a judgment which has become executory.

Mr. MARCOS. Yes, but, as I said before, suppose the tax liability is P1,000,000 and the deposit is
half a million, will this bill allow scrutiny into the deposit in order that the judgment may be executed?

Mr. RAMOS. Merely to determine the amount of such money to satisfy that obligation to the
Government, but not to determine whether a deposit has been made in evasion of taxes.

xxx xxx xxx

 Mr. MACAPAGAL. But let us suppose that in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of a sum of
money the plaintiff wishes to attach the properties of the defendant to insure the satisfaction of the
judgment. Once the judgment is rendered, does the gentleman mean that the plaintiff cannot attach
the bank deposit of the defendant?

Mr. RAMOS. That was the question raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan to which I replied that
outside the very purpose of this law it could be reached by attachment.

Mr. MACAPAGAL. Therefore, in such ordinary civil cases it can be attached?

Mr. RAMOS. That is so.

(Vol. II, Congressional Record, House of Representatives, No. 12, pp. 3839-3840, July 27, 1955).

It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of
Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does
not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case,
and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard
to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts,
even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a
bank.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the lower court dated March 4 and 27, 1972, respectively, are hereby affirmed, with
costs against the petitioners-appellants.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last
regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of
the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to
approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November
13,
1995.  At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law.
1

The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's opposition. On December 6, 1995, the
COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall
election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP
Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary
hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to
explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without
COMELEC approval. 2

In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election an January
13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent,
to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor General's manifestation maintaining an opinion
adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner
thereafter filed a reply.3

Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that
the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set
by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof,
petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK
election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no
recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.

The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election
only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or
one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.

[Emphasis added]

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment.  The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to
4

recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates
the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his
term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK
election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of
public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No.
7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local
election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall
provision of the Local Government Code.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an
effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.  An5

interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as
otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,
meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. 6

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the
Constitution.  Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b)
7

thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to
"enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . . ."

Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a
case, the Court made the following admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its
purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that
killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth". . .
8

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must
be read according to its spirit and intent.

Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating
additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding
the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the
local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement in the said election who
certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more
in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an
election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the
electorate.

Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the
Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months
away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997.  9

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The temporary restraining
order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made
permanent.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees, 

vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee.

Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.

ANTONIO, J.:p

Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years
imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in  People v.
Mapa.1

The complaint filed against the accused reads:

That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality of
Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German
Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary
permit or license to possess the same.

At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial was
accordingly held.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition
described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the
Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander,
and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.

Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His appointment from
Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:

Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an effective
agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the province of
Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal
cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby
appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or as
soon as you have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those
generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in this
province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be clearly understood
that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered sufficient ground for the automatic
cancellation of your appointment and immediate separation from the service. In accordance with the
decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the
right to bear a firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of
your duties.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking your oath
of office and filing the original thereof with us.

FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:

 Kind: — ROHM-Revolver

Make: — German

SN: — 64

Cal:— .22

On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential
Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives
and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection
with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal
protection while in the performance of his duties.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent
and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to
acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang  and People vs. Lucero.  The trial
2 3

court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent
and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively,
with authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its
decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the
ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and
abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the
accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.

Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa,
supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused because it was
shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had
an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and
in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that
while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of
the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer"
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that
under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a
necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader.
In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the
judgment of conviction on the following ground:

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to
... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next
section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers,
sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in
the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant
governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and
public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative
Code.)

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. ...
.

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and
Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down
by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing the
aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis
of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of
the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he accordingly
recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this
is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a
way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was
found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine
was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws,
where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential
Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated
in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite
of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be
punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the
Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's
effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this
ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case
of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision
in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to
resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision  of 1

the Court of Appeals  in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional
2

Trial Court of La Trinidad,  Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to
3

Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and
Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church  in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was
4

born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a
father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a
very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from
her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and
their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically
incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have
their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from
the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to
perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle
their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29,
1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
 4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and
Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist
of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1."
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was
denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation
of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect
application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the
most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied  heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
5

marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it
sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize
the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of

mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in
the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding
the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions
thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals  this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
6

incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
7

antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each
other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not
psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it

is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for
each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure
to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative,
homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the
beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law
and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial
courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
Cruz,  Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
9

Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno,   a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
10

occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the
fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,   recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
11

marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code   echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
12

inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,   nevertheless such root cause must be
13

identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified
psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need
not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by
the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.  14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given
to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes
even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of
Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.