Baula, Mikhail Sam
The said
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS
Manalo v CA
Facts:
Troadio Manalo died intestate survived by his wife and
children. He left several real properties located in Manila and
in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name
and style Manalo's Machine Shop. The private respondents
filed a petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of
Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late
father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their
brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. After the
publication of the order, the date of hearing, it declared the
whole world in default. Then the petitioners opposed the
petition on the ground that there was absence of earnest efforts
toward compromise among members of the same family being
it an special proceeding . RTC ruled in favor of respondents.
CA affirmed
Issue:
W/N the case is ordinary or special civil proceeding?
Ruling:
It is a special civil proc. The court held that is a fundamental
rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought
in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be
controlling A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of
Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of
Estatein SP. PROC belies herein petitioners' claim that the
same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action.
petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a
petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such
as the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14,
1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time
of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his
residence within he country are foundation facts upon which all
the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate
rest. The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-
63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy
whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact. Thus family code does not apply.
Mallion v Alcantara
Facts:
Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial court seeking a
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha
Alcantara on the ground of psychological incapacity. RTC
denied, CA affirmed. Thereafter, the petitioner filed again a
petition declaration of nullity alleging that his marriage with
respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license. Respondent now
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. RTC
granted the motion.
Issue:
W/N there’s a res judicata?
Ruling:
Yes. The petitioner having expressly and impliedly concealed
the validity of their marriage celebration, is now deemed to
have waived any defects therein. The Court finds then that the
present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of lack of marriage license is barred. The petition is
denied for lack of merit.
Selga v Brar
Facts:
Entierro died intestate and left behind a parcel of land, his wife
Basilia and children executed executed a Deed of Sale with
Declaration of Heirship. In said Deed, Basilia, et al., declared
themselves to be Francisco’s only heirs who inherited the
subject property; and at the same time, sold the subject
property to petitioners, spouses Selga. Seven years later,
respondent Complaint for Annulment of Sale with Damages
against petitioners. She claimed that she was one of the
legitimate children of Francisco and Basilia, and that she had
been preterited and illegally deprived of her rightful share and
interests in the subject property as one of Francisco’s legal
heirs. RTC declared the annulment of deed of sale and
adjudicating Brar as one of the heirs. Unsatisfied, she appealed
to CA but she withdrew her appeal. Thereafter, resp informed
pet that she will exercise her right of redemption. However, pet
contend that RTC’s decision did not contain any right of
redemption.
Issue:
W/N Brar’s right of redemption is barred by res judicata?
Ruling:
Yes. The court held that all the requisites of res judicata is
present in this case. Since the decision in Civil Case No. 276
was silent on the issue of legal redemption, it can be inferred
therefrom that the court did not see it fit to grant the same.
Plaintiff should have moved for the reconsideration thereof or
should have appealed to the Court of Appeals raising this
particular issue. It did not do so. Thus, the decision had become
final and executory. The court also stress that res judicata, in
the concept of bar by prior judgment, renders the judgment or
final order conclusive between the parties and their privies, not
just with respect to a matter directly adjudged, but also any
other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto.
Flores v Lindo
Facts:
Respondent obtained a loan from pet. To secure the loan, the
former executed Deed of Real Estate mortgage. Resp defaulted
on her obligation, this prompted the pet to file a complaint for
foreclosure of the mortgage with damages. RTC ruled that
petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure as the Deed
was without consent and authority of Edna’s husband.
Accordingly, the mortgage is void pursuant to Article 96 of the
Family Code. The RTC, however, ruled that petitioner may still
recover the loan through a personal action against Edna, but
that it had no jurisdiction over the said personal action which
should be filed where plaintiff or defendant resides. Petitioner
filed a complaint for sum of money and damages. The RTC
ruled that res judicata will not apply to rights, claims or
demands which, though growing out of the same subject
matter, constitute separate or distinct causes of action. CA
reversed.
It noted that petitioner allowed the earlier decision of the RTC
to become final and executory without asking the courts for an
alternative relief. The Court of Appeals stated that petitioner
merely relied on the declarations of these courts that he could
file a separate personal action and thus failed to observe the
rules and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing
petitioner’s avenue for recovery of the loan.
Issue:
W/N there’s a res judicata
Ruling:
None. In Chieng v. Santos, this Court ruled that a mortgage-
creditor may institute against the mortgage-debtor either a
personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the
mortgage. The Court ruled that the remedies are alternative and
not cumulative and held that the filing of a criminal action for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was in effect a collection
suit or a suit for the recovery of the mortgage-debt. In that case,
however, this Court pro hac vice, ruled that respondents could
still be held liable for the balance of the loan, applying the
principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another.
Manese v Sps Velasco
Facts:
The subject matter of the controversy is the alleged foreshore
land with an area of about 85,521 square meters, fronting
Tayabas Bay in Guisguis, Sariaya, Quezon. Respondent was
issued OCT through patent. Adjacent and contiguous to the
alleged foreshore land is the agricultural land owned by
petitioners. The petitioners filed a complaint asserting the
issuance of the homestead patent and the series of transfers
involving the same property were null and void.
Issue: W/N pet is a real party in interest in this case
Ruling:
No, It is admitted by both parties that the subject matter of
controversy is foreshore land, which is defined as that strip of
land that lies between the high and low water marks and is
alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tides. It is
that part of the land adjacent to the sea, which is alternately
covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of tides. In all actions
for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon, the Republic of the
Philippines is the real party in interest.
Tanjuatco vs Judge Gako
Facts:
Complainant’s father and her brother co-owned eight (8)
parcels of land located in Alumnus, Basak-San Nicolas, Cebu
City. They sold the property via "Contract to Buy and Sell".
Thereafter Vicente (father) died intestate. Vicente’s heirs filed
a a petition for the partition of his estate and it landed in the
RTC in which the respondent presides. The heirs filed a case
for rescission of "Contract to Buy and Sell" then the respondent
judge rescinded the contract. Petitioner now contends that
respondent judge erred in his decision because he proceeded
with the rescission case without impleading indispensable
parties.
Issue:
W/N respondent judge erred in not impleading proper parties
Ruling:
No. The court held that the respondent was correct in not
simply adding complainant and Carlos del Rosario as co-
plaintiffs of Vicente B. since the RTC had yet to acquire
jurisdiction over their persons. As a matter of fact, they filed a
motion to intervene but was rejected because it was filed after
the decision was promulgated. When a suit is brought by one
co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit
them but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights.
Thus, complainant and Carlos del Rosario stood to be benefited
by the suit filed by Pantaleon, as attorney-in-fact of Vicente B.,
as the two, as co-owners, are entitled to their pro-rata share in
the monetary award to be adjudged to Vicente B. Thus, there
was really no prejudice suffered by complainant or her brother,
Carlos, when respondent denied the faulty-filed motion for
intervention.
Soquillo vs Tortola
Facts:
Coloso Jr sold to Jamis a parcel of land then it was sold to the
respondent. Tortola took possession of the said property then
he moved to Bukidnon, he left a caretaker to the property. Then
Coloso applied for free patent and CENRO recommended the
grant. When the OCT was given to him, he sold it to the
petitioner. Now, the petitioner filed a case for illegal detainer
against respondents. When Tortola knew the case, he filed a pet
for nullity of the said sale raised for the first time the issue of
Tortola’s complaint allegedly not stating a cause of action for
having been filed in the latter’s name when the State was the
real party-in-interest.
Issue:
W/N Tortola is a real party in interest
Ruling:
The action filed by Tortola was not for reversion, but for the
declaration of nullity of a free patent and a certificate of title. In
an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the
complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land. In
Tortola’s complaint, he alleged prior ownership of the disputed
property and fraud exercised upon him by the heirs of Coloso,
Jr. to obtain a free patent and certificate of title covering the
same. The complaint was not for reversion but for the
declaration of nullity of the free patent and title. Hence, Tortola
was the real party-in-interest and the complaint was properly
filed in his name. On the other hand, a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title
would require allegations of the plaintiff ’s ownership of the
contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and
certificate of title as well as the defendant’s fraud or mistake,
as the case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents
of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a
case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but
from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of
title obtained therefor is consequently void ab initio. The real
party in interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a
pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in
question even before the grant of title to the defendant
Ang v Ang
Facts:
Resps obtained a loan from pet then he defaulted. Pet are from
LA and resps are from Bacolod. Pet executed their respective
Special Powers of Attorney6 in favor of Attorney Eldrige
Marvin B. Aceron (Atty. Aceron) for the purpose of filing an
action in court against the respondents. On September 15,
2006, Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed a
Complaint7 for collection of sum of money with the RTC of
Quezon City against the respondents.
RTC granted the petition argued held Attached to the complaint
is the Special Power of Attorney x x x which clearly states that
plaintiff Nancy Ang constituted Atty. Eldrige Marvin Aceron
as her duly appointed attorney-in-fact to prosecute her claim
against herein defendants. Considering that the address given
by Atty. Aceron is in Quezon City, hence, being the plaintiff,
venue of the action may lie where he resides as provided in
Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil ProcedureAtty.
Aceron, being merely a representative of the petitioners, is not
the real party in interest in the case below; accordingly, his
residence should not be considered in determining the proper
venue of the said complaint.
CA reversed. Held that t he case should have been filed in
Bacolod City where the defendants, herein petitioners, reside.
Since the case was filed in Quezon City, where the
representative of the plaintiffs resides, contrary to Sec. 2 of
Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the trial court should have
dismissed the case for improper venue
Issue
W/N atty aceron is a real party in interest and his residence can
be the proper venue
Ruling:
The petitioners’ complaint should have been filed in the RTC
of Bacolod City, the court of the place where the respondents
reside, and not in RTC of Quezon City. Aceron is not a real
party, hence his residence is immaterial to the venue of the
complaint. it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in
interest in the case below as he does not stand to be benefited
or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely appointed
by the petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for the limited
purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the
respondents. Such appointment, however, does not mean that
he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be
considered as a real party in interest.
Guizano v Veneracion
Facts:
The Santos siblings inherited 2 parcels of land from their
mother. Nicasio sold his part to Sps Guizano. While Lucia sold
her part to Reynaldo. Since the Santoses did not have any
documentary proof of ownership over the subject property,
Reynaldo had to rely on the Santoses’ representation that Lucia
inherited the land from her parents. Thereafter, Carmencita
discovered that the property sold to Reynaldo was actually part
of the property that had already been registered in Emmanuel’s
name . She thus placed the word "HOLD" on the subdivision
plan signed by the geodetic engineer. Reynaldo filed a
complaint against Carmencita and the Santos spouses, praying
that Carmencita, as owner or as the lawful attorney-in-fact of
her son Emmanuel, be ordered to reconvey the 656 sqm. parcel
of land in his favor. Carmencita claimed that the complaint was
without merit since the property subject of the sale between
Reynaldo and the Santos spouses is part of the property owned
and registered in the name of her son Emmanuel.
Issue:
W/N Carmencita is a real party in interest.
Ruling:
No. The court held that Carmencita is not a real party in
interest. It was shown in the Certificate of Title that Emmanuel
is the owner. Carmencita’s name does not appear anywhere on
the title. While Reynaldo alleged that Carmencita was the
owner of the property subject of dispute, with Emmanuel
acting as a mere nominal owner, a Torrens certificate is the
best evidence of ownership over registered land,23 and serves
as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of
the person whose name appears on the title.Absent any
evidence to the contrary, Emmanuel is the real party-in-interest
in any action that seeks to challenge ownership of the
registered property.1âwphi1 Reynaldo should thus have filed
his complaint for reconveyance against him.
Crisologo vs JEWM
Facts:
There are two cases, private respondents won in the second
case while petitiioners prevail in the first case. When the
decision attain finality, petitioners now move to execute the
decision. The subject lots were now in the name of JEWM.
JEWM now filed a third party claim, It prayed for writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent their properties to be
included in the public auction. Sps Crisologo questions the
authority of the said court to restrain the execution proceedings
in RTC-Br. 15. JEWM opposed it on the ground that Spouses
Crisologo were not parties in the case. RTC denied the
petitioners motion and granted the injunction of JEWM. CA
affirmed.
Issue:
W/N pet are real parties in interest
Ruling
Yes Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologo’s liens
were indeed annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 325675 and
325676. Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they stand
to be benefited or injured by any order relative to the
cancellation of annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In other
words, they are as indispensable as JEWM itself in the final
disposition of the case for cancellation, being one of the many
lien holders. As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo
should have been joined as defendants in the case pursuant to
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
Be it noted that the effect of their non-participation as
indispensable parties is to preclude the judgment, orders and
the proceedings from attaining finality. Time and again, the
Court has ruled that the absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even to those present. Consequently, the proceedings before
RTC-Br. were null and void including the assailed orders,
which may be "ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
head
Pacana vs Rovilla Water Supply
Facts:
Pet filed against resps for accounting and damages. The
petitioners claimed that their family has long been known in
the community to be engaged in the water supply business;
they operated the "Rovila Water Supply" Petitioners asserts
that Lilia allegedly posted security guards and barred the
members of the Pacaña family from operating their business.
She then claimed ownership over the family business through a
corporation named "Rovila Water Supply, Inc." The petitioners
filed the complaint in their own names although Rosalie was
authorized by Lourdes through a sworn declaration and special
power of attorney (SPA). Respondents further stated that they
would seek the dismissal of the complaint because the
petitioners are not the real parties in interest to prosecute the
case. RTC dismissed the resps petition and CA reversed and
held that the petitioners filed the complaint and the amended
complaint as attorneys-in-fact of their parents. As such, they
are not the real parties in interest and cannot bring an action in
their own names; thus, the complaint should be dismissed, The
petitioners contend Second, even if there is non-joinder and
misjoinder of parties or that the suit is not brought in the name
of the real party in interest, the remedy is not outright dismissal
of the complaint, but its amendment to include the real parties
in interest.
Issue: W/N CA is correct in dismissing the case based on the
ground the pet are not the real party in interest
Ruling:
No. The court held that at the inception of the present case,
both the spouses Pacaña were not impleaded as parties-
plaintiffs. The Court notes, however, that they are
indispensable parties to the case as the alleged owners of
Rovila Water Supply. Without their inclusion as parties, there
can be no final determination of the present case. They possess
such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would
necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed
without their presence. Their interest in the subject matter of
the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with
that of the other parties.
Banda vs Ermita
Facts: The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 378 dated October 25, 2004, issued by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo).
Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed on their
own behalf and on behalf of all their co-employees at the
National Printing Office (NPO).
Issue: W/N this is a case of class suit
Ruling:
No. The requisites of class suit is not satisfied in this case. The
court held that An action does not become a class suit merely
because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the
suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts,
and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action
should allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the
existence of a subject matter of common interest, and the
existence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged
class, in order that the court might be enabled to determine
whether the members of the class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the
number appearing on the record with the number in the class
and to determine whether claimants on record adequately
represent the class and the subject matter of general or common
interest.
Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees
who would be affected by the assailed Executive Order and
who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the
Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, who pointed out
that there were about 549 employees in the NPO.4 The 67
petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO
employees whom they claimed to represent. Subsequently, 32
of the original petitioners executed an Affidavit of Desistance,
while one signed a letter denying ever signing the petition,
ostensibly reducing the number of petitioners to 34. We note
that counsel for the petitioners challenged the validity of the
desistance or withdrawal of some of the petitioners and
insinuated that such desistance was due to pressure from people
"close to the seat of power." Still, even if we were to disregard
the affidavit of desistance filed by some of the petitioners, it is
highly doubtful that a sufficient, representative number of NPO
employees have instituted this purported class suit. A perusal
of the petition itself would show that of the 67 petitioners who
signed the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping,
only 20 petitioners were in fact mentioned in the jurat as
having duly subscribed the petition before the notary public. In
other words, only 20 petitioners effectively instituted the
present case.
Saligumba vs Palanog
Facts:
Pet filed pet for quieting of title with damages against the
defendants. spouses Palanogs alleged that they have been in
actual, open, adverse and continuous possession as owners for
more than 50 years of a parcel of land located in Solido, Nabas,
Aklan. The spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from
entering and residing on the subject premises and had
destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land. Spouses
Palanogs prayed that they be declared the true and rightful
owners of the land in question. At the hearing, only the counsel
for spouses Palanogs appeared. The trial court issued an order
resetting the hearing to 15 August 1984 and likewise directed
spouses Saligumbas to secure the services of another counsel
who should be ready on that date.4 The order sent to Eliseo
Saligumba, Sr. was returned to the court unserved with the
notation "Party–Deceased" while the order sent to defendant
Valeria Saligumba was returned with the notation "Party in
Manila." On the next hearings, only spouses Palanogs and
counsel appeared. Upon motion of the spouses Palanogs,
spouses Saligumbas were deemed to have waived the
presentation of their evidence. After 2 years, RTC rendered its
decision declaring spouses Palanogs the lawful owners of the
subject land and ordering spouses Saligumbas, their agents,
representatives and all persons acting in privity with them to
vacate the premises and restore possession to spouses Palanogs.
The trial court ruled that the non-substitution of the deceased
spouses did not have any legal significance
Ruling:
explicit that the duty of the court to order the legal
representative or heir to appear arises only "upon proper
notice." The notation "Party-Deceased" on the unserved notices
could not be the "proper notice" contemplated by the rule. As
the trial court could not be expected to know or take judicial
notice of the death of a party without the proper manifestation
from counsel, the trial court was well within its jurisdiction to
proceed as it did with the case.
In the present case for revival of judgment, the other petitioners
have not shown much interest in the case. Petitioners Eliseo
Saligumba, Jr. and Eduardo Saligumba were declared in default
for failure to file their answer. Petitioner Ernesto Saligumba
was out of the country working as a seaman. The decision was
affirmed
Regalado vs Regalado
Facts: The petitioner sought reconsideration and asked for
leniency in the application of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
asserted that he was authorized to sign the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of Hugo
Regalado by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney attached to
the complaint filed together with the motion for
reconsideration. CA denied his reconsideration and held that
authority of Jose Ramilo O. Regalado to represent the former in
this case had ceased effective said date. Elemental is the rule
that one of the causes of the termination of an agency is the
death of the principal. Apparently, when the instant petition
was filed on June 4, 2008, Jose Ramilo O. Regalado had no
more authority to sign the verification thereof in behalf of
deceased petitioner Hugo Regalado. In effect, the petition was
without proper verification. In the absence of verification, the
instant petition is deemed as an unsigned pleading, and, as
such, it is considered as a mere scrap of paper and does not
deserve the cognizance of this Court.
Issue: W/N CA is correct in dismissing the complaint
Ruling:
No. The action that led to the present controversy was one for
cancellation of title, which is a real action affecting as it does
title to or possession of real property. It is an action that
survives or is not extinguished upon the death of a party. The
heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs.
Sps Saraza v Fransisco
Facts:
Francisco and Fernando executed an agreement which provides
that Fernando was to sell his 100-sqm share in a lot in Makati
City (Makati property) to Francisco which at that time was still
registered in the name of one Emilia Serafico for a total
consideration of P3.2M.The amount of P1.2M was paid upon
the Agreement’s execution, while the balance of P2M was to
be paid on installments to the PNB, to cover a loan of Spouses
Saraza, Fernando’s parents, with the bank. A final deed of sale
conveying the property was to be executed by Fernando upon
full payment of the PNB loan. The respondent asked for the
petitioners’ issuance of a Special Power of Attorney that would
authorize him to receive from PNB
the owner’s duplicate copy of the 2nd property upon full
payment of the loan. The petitioners
denied the request. Sps Saraza caused the eviction of resp to
the property. This prompted the resp to institute a civil case for
specific performance, sum of money and damages with the
RTC of Imus. The pet now contends that RTC Imus is not a
proper venue since the property is located at Makati City.
Issue:
W/N RTC Imus is not a proper venue.
Ruling:
No. The court held that it is a proper venue since the action is a
case for specific performance, sum of money and damages
which is an action in personam because it sought Fernando’s
execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract which
he had previously made.A case for specific performance with
damages is a personal action which may be filed in a court
where any of the parties reside.
Phil Bank of Communications v Lim
Facts:
PBCom filed a complaint against respondents in the RTC of
Manila for the collection of a deficiency. Petitioner alleged
therein that respondents obtained a loan from it and executed a
continuing surety agreement in favor of petitioner for all loans,
credits, etc that were extended or may be extended in the future
to respondents. Petitioner granted a renewal of said loan upon
respondent’s request. It was expressly stipulated threrein that
the venue for any legal action that may arise out of said
promissory note shall be Makati City, “to the exclusion of all
other courts…” Respondents allegedly failed to pay said
obligation upon maturity. Thus, petitioner foreclosed the real
estate mortgage executed by respondents, leaving a deficiency
balance. Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of improper venue, invoking the stipulation contained
in the last paragraph of the promissory note with respect to the
restrictive/exclusive venue. The trial court denied said motion
asseverating that petitioner had separate causes of action
arising from the promissory note and the continuing surety
agreement. Thus, [under] Rule 4, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, x x x venue was properly laid
in Manila.
Issue:
W/N the action against the sureties is covered by the restriction
on venue stipulated in the PN. In enforcing a surety contract,
the “complementary-contracts-construed-together” doctrine
finds application. According to this principle, an accessory
contract must be read in its entirety and together with the
principal agreement[ This principle is used in construing
contractual stipulations in order to arrive at their true meaning;
certain stipulations cannot be segregated and then made to
control ncapable of standing by itself, the SA can be enforced
only in conjunction with the PN. The latter documents the debt
that is sought to be collected in the action against the sureties.
The circumstances that related to the issuance of the PN and
the SA are so intertwined that neither one could be separated
from the other. It makes no sense to argue that the parties to
the SA were not bound by the stipulations in the PN.
Paglaum v Union Bank
Facts:
Paglaum is he registered owner of three parcels of land in
Cebu. Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) extended to
HealthTech a credit line. Consequently, Paglaum executed
three Real Estate Mortgages on behalf of HealthTech and in
favor of Union Bank. The first REM contained a stipulation
that the venue of all suits should be in Makati City, with both
parties waiving any other venue. Meanwhile, other REM
executed on different dates stipulate that it should be in Cebu
City. Later, HealthTech entered into a Restructuring
Agreement with Union Bank wherein it was stipulated that the
venue for all actions should be commenced in Makati City,
with both parties waiving any other venue. Health tech failed to
fulfill its obligation then it filed a complaint in RTC Makati
City
Issue:
W/N Makati City is the proper venue to assail the foreclosure
of the real estate mortgage.
Ruling:
No. The court held “At the outset, we must make clear that
under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the general rules on venue of actions shall not apply
where the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly
agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation
on the
venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties
from bringing a case in other venues.
The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is
exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely
an agreement on an additional
forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.” The
Restructuring Agreement was entered into by HealthTech and
Union Bank to modify the entire loan obligation. The
provisions of the Real Estate Mortgages and the later
Restructuring Agreement clearly reveal the intention of the
parties to implement a restrictive venue stipulation, which
applies not only to the principal obligation, but also to the
mortgages. The phrase waiving any other venue plainly shows
that the choice of Makati City as the venue for actions arising
out of or in connection with the Restructuring Agreement and
the Collateral, with the Real Estate Mortgages being explicitly
defined as such, is exclusive.
Ochoa v China Bank
Facts:
Petitioners insist that it was error for the CA to rule that the
stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is binding only on
petitioners’ complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and
Damages filed before the RTC Parañaque, but not on
respondent bank’s Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of
Mortgage, which was filed with the same court.
Issue:
W/N the stipulated exclusive venue is only binding to
Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages
Ruling:
No. The court held The case at bar involves petitioners’
mortgaged real property located in Parañaque City over which
respondent bank was granted a special power to foreclose
extra-judicially. Thus, by express provision of Section 2, the
sale can only be made in Parañaque City.
The exclusive venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the
parties6 and sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court, cannot be made to apply to the Petition for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure filed by respondent bank because the provisions of
Rule 4 pertain to venue of actions, which an extrajudicial
foreclosure is not. Act 3135 shall govern.
GSIS vs Fernando
Facts:
Caballero was an owner of two buildings situated in Cotobato.
Then the respondents secured a loan with GSIS in the amount
of P20,000.00, as evidenced by a promissory note and likewise
executed a real estate mortgage on the same date, mortgaging
the afore-stated property as security. Respondent defaulted on
the said loan and the mortgage was foreclosed. petitioner wrote
a letter to Fernando, informing him of the consolidation of title
in its favor, and requesting payment of monthly rental in view
of Fernando’s continued occupancy of the subject property.
Petitioner scheduled the property for bidding then CMTC won
and , it was awarded the subject property. Respondents filed
with the RTC Cotabato a Complaintagainst CMTC, the GSIS
and its responsible officers, and the Register of Deeds of
Kidapawan, Cotabato. The GSIS alleged that Fernando lost his
right of redemption. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and
granted its counterclaim and directed Fernando to pay
petitioner the rentals. CA however dismissed the counterclaim.
Issue:
W/N the counterclaim is permissive or compulsory?
Ruling:
Permissive, therefore petitioners must pay docket fees for the
court to acquire jurisdiction. that petitioner’s counterclaim for
the recovery of the amount representing rentals collected by
Fernando from the CMTC is permissive. The evidence needed
by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award, deed of
absolute sale and TCT is different from that required to
establish petitioner’s claim for the recovery of rentals. On the
issue on whether the GSIS as a government institutions is
exempted from fees, , the Supreme Court now has the sole
authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts. Legal fees therefore do not only
constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but
also comprise an essential element of the Court’s fiscal
independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees
granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled
corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce
the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is
constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed
fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.”
Calibre Trading vs Bayer Phils
Facts:
The petitioner filed an action for damages accusing Bayerphils
maliciously breaching the distributorship agreement by
manipulating Calibre’s accounts, withholding discounts and
rebates due it, charging unwarranted penalties, refusing to
supply goods, and favoring the new distributors/dealers to drive
it out of business. Then the respondent answered with a
counterclaim and denied its alleged wanton appointment of
other distributors, reasoning that it could not be faulted for a
difference in treatment between a paying dealer and a non-
paying one. It maintained that Calibre filed the damage suit to
avoid paying its overdue accounts. Considering that those
purchased on credit remained unpaid, Bayerphil had to refuse
to further supply Calibre with its products. RTC favored
petitioner dismissing the counterclaim on the ground that it was
permissive then respondents must pay docket fees then CA
reversed the decision held that the counterclaim is compulsory.
Issue:
W/N the counterclaim can be outrightly dismissed because of
non payment of docket fees?
Ruling:
No. Court held that Bayerphil has never evaded payment of
the docket fees on the honest belief that its counterclaim was
compulsory. It is settled that although the payment of the
prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-
payment x x x should not result in the automatic dismissal of
the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable
prescriptive period. The trial court should have instead directed
Bayerphil to pay the required docket fees within a reasonable
time.
Sps Mendiola vs CA
Facts:
Shell Corp entered into an agreement for the distribution of
Shell petroleum products by Pacific Management owned by
Petitioners. To secure its obligations, petitioners executed REM
in favor of shell covering their property in Paranaque.
Petitioners failed to satisfy their obligations, impelling Shell to
foreclose its REM. It was now foreclosed and Shell filed with
RTC Manila a deficiency case. In his answer with
counterclaim, Ramon asserted that the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage had been devoid of basis in fact
and in law; and that the foreclosure and the filing of the action
were made in bad faith, with malice, fraudulently and in gross
and wanton violation of his rights. The petitioner now filed
with RTC Makati the annulment of foreclosure proceedings.
Shell move for the dismissal of the case asserting that that the
Makati case was already barred by petitioners’ failure to raise
its cause of action as a compulsory counterclaim in the Manila
case.
Issue:
W/N the Makati case is barred by res judicata
Ruling:
Yes. The Makati case should have been earlier disallowed to
proceed on the ground of litis pendentia, or, once the decision
in the Manila case became final, should have been dismissed
on the ground of being barred by res judicata. Ramon averred a
compulsory counterclaim asserting that the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage had been devoid of basis in fact
and in law; and that the foreclosure and the filing of the action
had been made in bad faith, with malice, fraudulently and in
gross and wanton violation of his rights. His pleading thereby
showed that the cause of action he later pleaded in the Makati
case - that of annulment of the foreclosure sale - was identical
to the compulsory counterclaim he had set up in the Manila
case.
The four tests are affirmatively met as far as the Makati case
was concerned. The Makati case had the logical relation to the
Manila case because both arose out of the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted to secure the
payment of petitioners’ credit purchases under the
distributorship agreement with Shell. Specifically, the right of
Shell to demand the deficiency was predicated on the validity
of the extrajudicial foreclosure, such that there would not have
been a deficiency to be claimed in the Manila case had Shell
not validly foreclosed the mortgage. As earlier shown,
Ramon’s cause of action for annulment of the extrajudicial
foreclosure was a true compulsory counterclaim in the Manila
case. Thus, the Makati RTC could not have missed the logical
relation between the two actions.
Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. vs. Paras
Facts:
Respondent Paras boarded a bus on his way home to Manila
from Bicol owned and operated by Inland Trailways, Inc. then ,
it was bumped at the rear by another bus owned and operated
by Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. This caused injury to the
respondent, Paras filed a complaint for damages based on
breach of contract of carriage against Inland. Upon leave of
court, Inland filed a third-party complaint against Philtranco.
Issue:
W/N third party complaint against Philtranco is proper.
Ruling:
Yes. The court held that it satisfied the requirements of third
party complaints. The claim that the third-party complaint
asserts against the third-party defendant must be predicated on
substantive law. Here, the substantive law on which the right of
Inland to seek such other relief through its third-party
complaint rested were Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the
Civil Code.
Soriente v Estate of Concepcion
Facts:
Respondents file an unlawful detainer case against petitioners.
They contend that they are the lawful owner of the property in
which the petitioners are in possession. Petitioners are in
possession by mere tolerance of the respondents. It appears
from the records that Soriente as a defendant in the lower court,
did not file a separate Answer, but affixed her signature to the
Answer filed by defendant Alfredo Caballero in another
ejectment case. . Hence, respondent, through counsel, filed a
Motion to Render Judgment under the Summary Rules of Civil
Procedure. The trial court dismissed the Motion to Render
Judgment and held that the two cases are similar, the only
substantial difference being the time when defendants occupied
the subject property allegedly through the tolerance of Arsenio
Concepcion. The trial court believed that in signing the Answer
filed in Civil Case No. 17974, Soriente intended to adopt the
same as her own. The trial court rendered a Decision holding
that respondent established by preponderance of evidence that
she was entitled to the relief prayed for. RTC affirmed
Issue:
W/N the non appearance of Soriente in the civil case filed by
the respondent equates to a default?
Ruling:
Yes. Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, if a sole defendant shall fail to appear in the
preliminary conference, the plaintiff shall be entitled to
judgment in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule, that is, the
court shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the Complaint and limited to what is prayed for
therein. However, [t]his Rule (Sec. 7) shall not apply where
one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of
action, who had pleaded a common defense, shall appear at the
preliminary conference. Petitioner claims that the preceding
provision applies to her as a defendant, since the ejectment
cases were consolidated by the trial court, and she and
Caballero filed the same Answer to the Complaint; hence, the
trial court should not have rendered judgment against her when
she failed to appear in the preliminary conference. The Court
holds that the italicized provision above does not apply in the
case of petitioner, since she and Caballero were not co-
defendants in the same case. The ejectment case filed against
petitioner was distinct from that of Caballero, even if the trial
court consolidated the cases and, in the interest of justice,
considered the Answer filed by Caballero in Civil Case No.
17974 as the Answer also of petitioner since she affixed her
signature thereto. Considering that petitioner was sued in a
separate case for ejectment from that of Caballero and Sadol,
petitioners failure to appear in the preliminary conference
entitled respondent to the rendition of judgment by the trial
court on the ejectment case filed against petitioner, docketed as
Civil Case No. 17973, in accordance with Section 7 of the 1991
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
Heirs of Retuya v CA
Facts:
Severo and Maxima died intestate with no child, survived by
their siblings. , Severo and Maxima’s siblings and their
nephews and nieces, herein petitioners, filed with the RTC of
Mandaue City, an action for judicial partition of the properties
left by the spouses. Respondents Heirs of Eulogio filed their
Answer5 claiming that Severo had already sold the subject
lands to their father Eulogio by virtue of a notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale. Thus, petitioners have no right to ask for the
partition of the subject properties, as respondents heirs are the
owners of the same. RTC declared the Heirs of Eulogio Retuya
as owners of the 1/16 share of Severo Retuya to the ½ of the
subject properties representing the shares of the late Severo
Retuya, which he inherited from his deceased father, Esteban
Retuya and which he sold to Eulogio Retuya. Petitioners filed
with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the RTC
Order dated October 23, 2001, amending the decision dated
August 9, 2001, claiming that the questioned Order was a
patent nullity for want of jurisdiction and utter lack of due
process. CA dismissed the case 28 on the ground that it was
made to appear in the Petition for Annulment of Judgment that
Quintin Retuya, one of the petitioners, had signed the
certification against forum shopping on March 18, 2003, when
he had already died on July 29, 1996. Petitioners file a MR ,
contending that there was substantial compliance with the rule
on certification against forum shopping when majority of the
principal parties were able to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping.
Issue:
W/N the CA is correct in dismissing the case even if there is
substantial compliance?
Ruling:
Yes. The court held it cannot apply the same rule to petitioners.
First, petitioners’ counsel failed to explain why a dead
person/party was able to sign the certification against non-
forum shopping. The issue is not the parties’ substantial
compliance, but the dishonesty committed by the parties and/or
their counsel when they made it appear that one of the listed
parties signed the certification when in fact he died long before
the petition was filed. Under Circular No. 28-91 of the
Supreme Court and Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the
attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping
requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the
same. The liberal interpretation of the rules cannot be accorded
to parties who commit dishonesty and falsehood in court.
In Re: Reconstitution of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
303168 and Issuance of Owner's Duplicate Certificates of
Titles in Lieu of Those Lost
Facts:
Lim filed in the RTC his petition for judicial reconstitution of
TCT No. 303168 and TCT No. 303169 of the Registry of
Deeds for Quezon City. That the TCTs are kept in the custody
of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City had been lost or
destroyed as a consequence of the fire that had burned certain
portions of the Quezon City Hall. The trial had begun then the
RTC received a report from LRA shows that Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and 303169, covering Lot 7,
Block 586 and Lot 5, Block 585 respectively, both of the
subdivision plan Psd-38199 are also applied for reconstitution
of titles under Administrative Reconstitution Proceedings. RTC
dismissed the case for forum shopping.
Issue:
W/N there is forum shopping?
Ruling:
No. The court held that Lim was not guilty of forum shopping,
because the factual bases of his application for the
administrative reconstitution of the TCTs and of his petition for
their judicial reconstitution, and the reliefs thereby sought were
not identical. When he applied for the administrative
reconstitution in the LRA on July 21, 1988,11 he still had his
co-owner’s duplicate copies of the TCTs in his possession, but
by the time the LRA resolved his application on November 3,
1998, allowing the relief prayed for,12 his co-owner’s
duplicate copies of the TCTs had meanwhile been destroyed by
fire on February 24, 1998. Thus, the intervening loss of the
owner’s duplicate copies that left the favorable ruling of the
LRA no longer implementable gave rise to his need to apply
for judicial reconstitution in the RTC. His resort to judicial
reconstitution was not because his earlier resort to
administrative reconstitution had been denied (in fact, the LRA
had resolved in his favor),17 but because the intervening loss to
fire of the only permissible basis for administrative
reconstitution of the TCTs mandated his resort to the RTC. A
violation of the rule against forum-shopping other than a
willful and deliberate forum shopping did not authorize the
RTC to dismiss the proceeding without motion and hearing.
Specifically, the submission of a false certification of non-
forum shopping did not automatically warrant the dismissal of
the proceeding, even if it might have constituted contempt of
court.
SMSS v Samma Corp
Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for certification on election in the
DOLE. It claimed that: (1) it was a local chapter of the LIKHA
Federation, a legitimate labor organization registered with the
DOLE; (2) it sought to represent all the rank-and-file
employees of respondent Samma Corporation; (3) there was no
other legitimate labor organization representing these rank-and-
file employees; (4) respondent was not a party to any collective
bargaining agreement and (5) no certification or consent
election had been conducted within the employer unit for the
last 12 months prior to the filing of the petition. Respondent
move for the dismissal of the case because of the failure of the
petitioner tot attach certificate of non-forum shopping .
Med-arbiter dismissed the petition for certification and Acting
Secretary Manuel G. Imson, treating the motion for
reconsideration as an appeal, rendered a decision reversing the
order of the med-arbiter. CA reversed the decision of the
Acting Secretary.
Issue:
W/N certificate of non-forum shopping is a requirement in a a
petition for certification on election
Ruling:
No. The requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping
refers to complaints, counter-claims, cross-claims, petitions or
applications where contending parties litigate their respective
positions regarding the claim for relief of the complainant,
claimant, petitioner or applicant. A certification proceeding,
even though initiated by a "petition," is not a litigation but an
investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding character.
Such proceedings are not predicated upon an allegation of
misconduct requiring relief, but, rather, are merely of an
inquisitorial nature. The Board's functions are not judicial in
nature, but are merely of an investigative character. The object
of the proceedings is not the decision of any alleged
commission of wrongs nor asserted deprivation of rights but is
merely the determination of proper bargaining units and the
ascertainment of the will and choice of the employees in
respect of the selection of a bargaining representative
Brown- Araneta v Araneta
Facts:
Respondent Juan and Petitioner Michelle were married and
then de facto separated. Then respondent filed a petition for
custody of his children against the petitioner with RTC Makati.
After failing to file an answer, petitioner filed a motion to
admit an answer contended that only upon learning of the
issuance of the provisional order of visitation rights that she
gathered enough courage to come out to present her side.
Subsequently,Michelle initiated a PETITION FOR
TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER
with theMuntinlupa RTC, which granted the same. Juan filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia and arguing
that this constitutes forum shopping, which the RTC only
partially granted. CA affirmed.
Issue:
W/N Michelle committed forum shopping?
Ruling:
Yes. The court held that there is forum shopping in this case
since the first case is under litis pendentia. There is identity of
the parties, The rights asserted and reliefs prayed for are based
on the same facts, and the evil sought to be avoided by the rule
against forum shopping is present in this case.
Metrobank v Abad Santos
Facts:
Respondent De Koning obtained a loan from Metrobank. To
secure the payment of this loan, De Koning executed a real
estate mortgage (REM) in favor of Metrobank dated July 22,
1996 over a condominium unit and all its improvements which
is located at Makati City. De Koning failed to satisfy his
obligation, due to this failure Metrobank foreclosed the REM.
When the redemption period lapsed without De Koning
redeeming the property, Metrobank filed with the RTC Makati
an ex parte petition for a writ of possession over the foreclosed
property. De Koning filed a motion to dismiss contending that
Metrobank’s petition violated Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court which requires the attachment of a certification against
forum shopping to a complaint or other initiatory pleading. The
RTC agreed with De Koning and dismissed the case, CA
affirmed.
Issue:
W/N a certification of non forum shopping is needed upon
filing of writ of possession
Ruling:
No. The certification against forum shopping is required only
in a complaint or other initiatory pleading. The ex parte petition
for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the respondent
is not an initiatory pleading. Although the private respondent
denominated its pleading as a petition, it is, nonetheless, a
motion. What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other
pleading is not its form or the title given by the party executing
it, but rather its purpose. The office of a motion is not to initiate
new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter
arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed.
A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined
to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to
some question that is collateral to the main object of the action
and is connected with and dependent upon the principal
remedy. An application for a writ of possession is a mere
incident in the registration proceeding. Hence, although it was
denominated as a “petition,” it was in substance merely a
motion.
Monasterio-Pe v Tong
Facts:
This is an ejectment suit by respondent Jose Juan Tong (Tong)
through his representative Jose Y. Ong (Ong) against herein
petitioners Anita Monasterio-Pe (Anita) and the spouses
Romulo Tan and Editha Pe-Tan (Spouses Tan). Tong alleged
that he is the owner of the disputed property in which the
petitioners occupying without any valid contract and only by
tolerance of Tong. MTCC ruled in favor of respondents which
RTC affirmed in toto. Petitioners now contend that the RTC
erred in holding that the law authorizes an attorney-in-fact to
execute the required certificate against forum shopping in
behalf of his or her principal. Petitioners argue that Tong
himself, as the principal, and not Ong, should have executed
the certificate against forum shopping.
Issue:
W/N the forum shopping is invalid because only the attorney in
fact of Tong signed it
Ruling:
No. It is valid. The settled rule is that the execution of the
certification against forum shopping by the attorney-in-fact is
not a violation of the requirement that the parties must
personally sign the same—the attorney-in-fact, who has
authority to file, and who actually filed the complaint as the
representative of the plaintiff, is a party to the ejectment suit.
Such circumstance constitutes reasonable cause to allow the
attorney-in-fact to personally sign the Certificate of Non-
Forum Shopping. Indeed, the settled rule is that the execution
of the certification against forum shopping by the attorney-in-
fact is not a violation of the requirement that the parties must
personally sign the same. The attorney-in-fact, who has
authority to file, and who actually filed the complaint as the
representative of the plaintiff, is a party to the ejectment suit.
Cosco Phils v Kemper Insurance Co.
Facts:
Respondent is a foreign insurance company not registered to do
business here in PH. While petitioner is domestic shipping
company organized in accordance with Philippine laws. ,
respondent insured the shipment of imported frozen boneless
beef (owned by Genosi, Inc.), which was loaded at a port in
Brisbane, Australia, for shipment to Genosi, Inc.. However,
upon arrival at the Manila port, a portion of the shipment was
rejected by Genosi, Inc. by reason of spoilage arising from the
alleged temperature fluctuations of petitioner’s reefer
containers. Genosi, Inc. filed a claim against both petitioner
shipping company and respondent Kemper Insurance
Company. Respondent paid the obligations thereafter,
petitioners defaulted on paying the said amount. Respondent
filed a Complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages4 against
petitioner before the trial court. During the pre-trial
proceedings, respondent’s counsel proffered and marked its
exhibits, while petitioner’s counsel manifested that he would
mark his client’s exhibits on the next scheduled pre-trial.
However, on November 8, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss,6 contending that the same was filed by one Atty.
Rodolfo A. Lat, who failed to show his authority to sue and
sign the corresponding certification against forum shopping. It
argued that Atty. Lat’s act of signing the certification against
forum shopping was a clear violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of
the 1997 Rules of Court. RTC granted the motion to dismiss.
Issue:
W/N Atty. Lat was properly authorized by respondent to sign
the certification against forum shopping on its behalf.
Ruling:
No. The Court have consistently held that the certification
against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties.
If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition,
the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized.
16 With respect to a corporation, the certification against forum
shopping may be signed for and on its behalf, by a specifically
authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts
required to be disclosed in such document. Since Atty Lat did
not present any authorization from the board that he has
authority to sign the affidavit of forum shopping, he is deemed
to not have that authority. As a rule, The lack of certification
against forum shopping is generally not curable by mere
amendment of the complaint, but shall be a cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice. The same rule applies
to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on
behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that
said signatory is authorized to file the complaint on behalf of
the corporation
Heirs of Mesina vs Heirs of Fian
Facts:
The late spouses Faustino and Genoveva Mesina (spouses
Mesina), during their lifetime, bought from the spouses
Domingo Fian Sr. and Maria Fian (spouses Fian) two parcels of
land on installment. Upon the death of Sps Fian, refused to
acknowledge the payments for the lots and denied that their
late parents sold the property to the spouses Mesina.
Notwithstanding repeated demands, the Heirs of Fian refused
to vacate the lots and to turn possession over to the heirs of the
spouses Mesina. Heirs of Mesina action for quieting of title and
damages before the (RTC) Baybay, Leyte against the Heirs of
Fian. RTC dismissed the case based on the ground that the
pleadings are not verified, CA affirmed.
Issue:
W/N CA can dismiss the case based on unverified pleadings
Ruling:
No. The Court held that verification, like in most cases
required by the rules of procedure, is a formal requirement, not
jurisdictional. It is mainly intended to secure an assurance that
matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are true and
correct and not of mere speculation. Thus, when circumstances
so warrant, as in the case at hand, “the court may simply order
the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive
strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice
may thereby be served.
Mid Pasig Land Dev Corp vs Tablante
Facts:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a piece of land situated in
Pasig City. Petitioner epresented by its Chairman and President
entered into an agreement with the respondent whereby the
former would lease to the latter an area. At the date of the
expiration of lease agreement, Tablante assigned all his rights
and interests under the said agreement to respondents Laurie
M. Litam and/or Rockland Construction Company, Inc.
(Rockland) under a Deed of Assignment. Respondent MC
Home Depot, Inc. constructed improvements on the land and
subdivided the area into fifty-nine (59) commercial stalls,
which it leased to various entities. Upon the expiration of the
lease on March 6, 2000, petitioner demanded that respondents
vacate the land. Respondent Rockland filed a case for Specific
Performance with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 266,
Pasig City, on January 11, 2001, compelling petitioner to
execute a new lease contract for another three (3) years.
Consequently, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 8788 for
unlawful detainer against herein respondents. MTC dismissed
the case, RTC and CA affirmed.
Issue:
W/N that verification and certification against non-forum
shopping was signed by a certain Antonio A. Merelos as
General Manager of the petitioner-corporation without
attaching therewith a Corporate Secretary’s certificate or board
resolution that he is authorized to sign for and on behalf of the
petitioner.
Ruling:
Petition granted.
Ledda v BPI
Facts:
Respondent BPI filed a collection of sum of money against
Ledda for failure of the latter to pay its obligations arising from
its credit card. RTC rendered decision in favor of BPI ordered
to pay Ledda. Ledda now argues that he document containing
the Terms and Conditions governing the use of the BPI credit
card is an actionable document contemplated in Section 7, Rule
8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. CA affirmed the court.
Issue:
Is BPI’s petition is predicated on an actionable document?
Ruling:
No. The court held that the complaint is an action for collection
of sum of money arising from Ledda’s default in her credit card
obligation with BPI. BPI’s cause of action is primarily based
on Ledda’s (1) acceptance of the BPI credit card, (2) usage of
the BPI credit card to purchase goods, avail services and secure
cash advances, and (3) non-payment of the amount due for
such credit card transactions, despite demands. In other words,
BPI’s cause of action is not based only on the document
containing the Terms and Conditions accompanying the
issuance of the BPI credit card in favor of Ledda. Therefore,
the document containing the Terms and Conditions governing
the use of the BPI credit card is not an actionable document
contemplated in Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. As such, it is not required by the Rules to be set
forth in and attached to the complaint.
Titan Construction Corp v David
Facts:
Manuel and Martha David were married, they acquire a
property in White Plains, QC. Thereafter, the spouses separated
de facto and no longer communicated with each other.
Sometime in 1995, David discovered that Martha sold their
property to the petitioner and now he went to court filing a
complaint for annulment of the said transaction. He aver that
Martha sold their conjugal property without his consent
therefore it is void. In response, petitioner argued that he is
buyer in good faith because it relied on a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) dated January 4, 1995 signed by Manuel which
authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of the
spouses. Titan thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
RTC annulled the deed of sale and CA affirmed both held that
the property was indeed a conjugal property.
Issue:
W/N the failure of Manuel to specifically deny the genuineness
of the SPA he is deemed to have admitted the veracity of said
document, in accordance with Rule 8, Sections 7 and 8,36 of
the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
No. It is true that the reply filed by Manuel alleging that the
special power of attorney is a forgery was not made under oath.
However, the complaint, which was verified by Manuel under
oath, alleged that the sale of the subject property executed by
his wife, Martha, in favor of Titan was without his knowledge,
consent, and approval, express or implied; and that there is
nothing on the face of the deed of sale that would show that he
gave his consent thereto. e.1avvph!1 While it is true that the
SPA was notarized, it is no less true that there were defects in
the notarization which mitigate against a finding that the SPA
was either genuine or duly executed. Curiously, the details of
Manuel’s Community Tax Certificate are conspicuously
absent, yet Martha’s are complete. The absence of Manuel’s
data supports his claim that he did not execute the same and
that his signature thereon is a forgery. Moreover, we have
Manuel’s positive testimony that he never signed the SPA, in
addition to the expert testimony that the signature appearing on
the SPA was not Manuel’s true signature.
Palma v. Galvez
BPI v. Sps Santiago
Home Dev’t Mutual Fund v Sps See
Facts:
Respondent Sps were the highest bidder of extrajudicial
foreclosure of a sale of a property that was mortgaged to
petitioner. They pay the bid prive to the sheriff however sheriff
did not remit the amount to petitioner. Petitioner refused to
surrender the Certificate of Title to respondent Sps because it
had yet to receive the respondent-spouses’ payment from
Sheriff who failed to remit the same despite repeated demands.
This prompted the filing the case of specific performance by
respondent Sps the payment made by respondent-spouses to
Pag-ibig’s authorized agent should be deemed as payment to
Pag-ibig.It was prayed that Sheriff be ordered to remit the
amount to Pag-ibig and that the latter be ordered to release the
title to the auctioned property to respondent-spouses. When the
case was called for pre-trial conference, they came up with a
compromise agreement providing that sheriff will pay the
amount that he should be remitting with petitioner. RTC
approved the compromise agreement and ordered that
petitioner deliver the documents of ownership to respondents.
Petitioner filed a certiorari with CA but CA dismissed it and
affirm the RTC decision. Petitioner contends that certiorari was
the proper remedy because the trial court rendered decision
without trial.
Issue:
W/N certiorari was the proper remedy
Ruling:
No. Certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of
last recourse.”36 It is proper only when appeal is not available
to the aggrieved party.37 In the case at bar, the February 21,
2002 Decision of the trial court was appealable under Rule 41
of the Rules of Court because it completely disposed of
respondent-spouses’ case against Pag-ibig..
As to Pag-ibig’s argument that the February 21, 2002 Decision
of the RTC is null and void for having been issued without a
trial, it is a mere afterthought which deserves scant
consideration The Court notes that Pag-ibig did not object to
the absence of a trial when it sought a reconsideration of the
February 21, 2002 Decision. Under the Omnibus Motion Rule
embodied in Section 8 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, all
available objections that are not included in a party’s motion
shall be deemed waived.
Aqualab Phils v Heirs of Pagobo
Facts:
Respondents owned subject lands as it were covered by
homestead patents. Thereafter the subject lands were sold
toTarcela de Espina then the latter sold it to Rene Espina then
to Anthony Gaw Kache and finally acquired by petitioner
Aqualab. Respondents, alleging that Aqualab disturbed their
peaceful possession, filed a complaint Partition, Declaration of
Nullity of Documents, Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
Titles, Reconveyance with Right of Legal Redemption,
Damages and Attorney's Fees against petitioner. Petitioner filed
a motion to dismiss contending that prescription of the cause of
action has already been set in. RTC granted the motion,
however CA reversed the said ruling held that the sale of
subject lots to Tarcela de Espina was void, thus making the
subsequent conveyances ineffective and no titles were validly
transferred. Moreover, it ruled that Aqualab is not an innocent
purchaser for value, and held that respondents, as heirs of the
homestead grantee, never lost their valid title to the subject
lots. Petitioners went to court asserting that CA erred in
reversing RTC’s decision.
Issue:
W/N prescription has set in, w/n petitioners are innocent
purchaser for value
Ruling:
No. In filing a motion to dismiss, the movant hypothetically
admits the truth of the material and relevant facts alleged and
pleaded in the complaint. While the records show that
respondents did not have in their names the certificate of titles
over subject lots, the factual assertion of open, peaceful, public,
and adverse possession is hypothetically admitted by Aqualab.
It is, thus, clear that by filing its motion to dismiss, Aqualab
hypothetically admitted the veracity of respondents' continuous
possession of subject lots until 1991 when Aqualab disturbed
such possession. Aqualab likewise hypothetically admitted the
fraudulent and illegal conveyances of subject lots.
From the foregoing premises, the trial court erred in finding
prescription. Prescription, as a ground for a motion to dismiss,
is adequate when the complaint, on its face, shows that the
action has already prescribed. Such is not the case in this
instance. Respondents have duly averred continuous possession
until 1991 when such was allegedly disturbed by Aqualab.
Being in possession of the subject lots'hypothetically admitted
by Aqualab respondents' right to reconveyance or annulment of
title has not prescribed or is not time-barred.
Palmiano-Salvador v Angeles
Facts:
Respondent is the owner of the subject property. It was
occupied by Geliga as a lessee with a lease contract.
Subsequently, petitioner alleged that she bought the subject
property from Geliga who represent himself as the owner of the
property.Petitioner remained in possession up to the present.
This prompted the respondent to file an ejectment suit against
petitioner. MeTC grant the said petition. Petitioner appealed in
RTC asserting that DIAZ, who filed the complaint for
ejectment, had no authority whatsoever from respondent at the
time of filing of the suit. RTC and CA dismissed the petition.
Petitioner now appealed with the court saying that CA failed to
address the issue regarding that Diaz, had no authority
whatsoever from respondent at the time of filing of the suit
therefore, the court did not gain jurisdiction over the
respondent.
Issue:
W/N the court had jurisdiction over the respondent
Ruling:
No. Note that the complaint before the MeTC was filed in the
name of respondent, but it was Diaz who executed the
verification and certification, alleging therein that he was
respondent’s attorney-in-fact. There was, however, no copy of
any document attached to the complaint to prove Diaz’s
allegation regarding the authority supposedly granted to him.
The Court categorically stated that “[i]f a complaint is filed for
and in behalf of the plaintiff [by one] who is not authorized to
do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized
complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court
should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no
jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.
Rasdas v Estenor
Facts:
Respondent filed a Complaint For Recovery Of Ownership
And Possession With Damages against petitioners. Respondent
alleged that he was the owner of the subject property which
was in possession of petitioner. RTC ruled in favor of
petitioners however CA reversed RTC’s decision and ordered
that petitioners should vacate the property. The decision
became final and executory, thereafter, a Writ of Execution and
Writ of Demolition was issued against petitioners, who were
ordered to demolish their houses, structures, and improvements
on the property. Petitioners filed a complaint for just
compensation and preliminary injunction with temporary
restraining order with the same RTC branch who ruled the
prior case. Petitioners asserted therein that they were the lawful
owners of the subject property, although they ultimately
conceded the efficacy of the CA’s decision as final and
executory. Still, they alleged that they were entitled to just
compensation relating to the value of the houses they had built
as builders in good faith. They claimed that the CA decision
did not declare them as builders in bad faith, and thus, they
were entitled to be reimbursed of the value of their houses
before these could be demolished. Respondents then filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata which was
initially denied by RTC. However, before trial proper could
begin, respondent filed a motion for preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defense of res judicata. RTC then acted on its
motion then ordered the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.
Petitioners now contend that RTC that since respondents’
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata had already
been denied, the consequent preliminary hearing on the special
defenses which precluded the dismissal of the complaint was
null and void as provided by the Rules of Court.
Issue:
W/N RTC erred in conducting the preliminary hearing then the
dismissal of the case
Ruling:
No. The court held that although Sec 6 Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court “[i]f no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the
grounds for dismissal provided for in [Rule 16] may be pleaded
as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of
the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a
motion to dismiss had been filed”. Thus, the strict application
of Section 6, Rule 16 in this case should cause us to rule that
the RTC erred in conducting the preliminary hearing. However,
there is an exceptional justification for us to overlook this
procedural error and nonetheless affirm the dismissal of the
complaint. The complaint in question is so evidently barred by
res judicata, it would violate the primordial objective of
procedural law to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding should the Court
allow this prohibited complaint from festering in our judicial
system.
Pacana-Contreras v Rovilla Water Supply
Facts:
Pet filed against resps for accounting and damages.
Thepetitioners claimed that their family has long been known
in the community to be engaged in the water supply business;
they operated the "Rovila Water Supply" Petitioners asserts
that Lilia allegedly posted security guards and barred the
members of the Pacaña family from operating their business.
She then claimed ownership over the family business through a
corporation named "Rovila Water Supply, Inc." The
respondents filed an answer and motion to dismiss because the
petitioners are not the real parties in interest to prosecute the
case. The pre-trial pushed through as scheduled and the RTC
directed the respondents to put into writing their earlier
manifestation. The RTC issued a pre-trial order where one of
the issues submitted was whether the complaint should be
dismissed for failure to comply withthe Rules of Court which
requires that every action must be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest. RTC denied the motion held that the
motion to dismiss was not filed in time thus the grounds were
deemed waived. CA reversed held that the motion to dismiss
was filed after the period to file an answer has lapsed is of no
moment and that the ground of lack of cause of action may be
raised in a motion to dismiss at anytime.

Issue:
W/N the grounds for dismissal are deemed waived
Ruling:
Yes. The rules are clear and require no interpretation. Pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss
based on the grounds invoked by the respondents may be
waived if not raised in a motion to dismiss or alleged in their
answer. On the other hand, “the pre-trial is primarily intended
to make certain that all issues necessary to the disposition of a
case are properly raised. The purpose is to obviate the element
of surprise, hence, the parties are expected to disclose at the
pre-trial conference all issues of law and fact which they intend
to raise at the trial, except such as may involve privileged or
impeaching matter.” The issues submitted during the pre-trial
are thus the issues that would govern the trial proper. The
dismissal of the case based on the grounds invoked by the
respondents are specifically covered by Rule 16 and Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court which set a period when they should be
raised; otherwise, they are deemed waived.
Polanco v Cruz
Facts:
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
for allegedly destroying her palay crops. While admitting that
petitioners own the agricultural land she tilled, respondent
claimed she was a lawful tenant thereof and had been in actual
possession when petitioners maliciously filled so with soil and
palay husk. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss however RTC
did not grant the motion ruling that it has jurisdiction over the
case ecause the allegations in the Complaint made a claim for
damages, and not an agrarian dispute which should be referred
to DARAB. Petitioners simultaneously filed an Answer to the
complaint and a Motion for Reconsideration. However, RTC
denied the motion for lack of merit and subsequently RTC
dismissed the case due to respondent’s failure to prosecute. CA
reversed the said decision and ruled that the previous acts of
respondent do not manifest lack of interest to prosecute the
case, that no substantial prejudice would be caused to
petitioners and that strict application of the rule on dismissal is
unjustified considering the absence of pattern or scheme to
delay the disposition of the case on the part of respondent; and
that justice would be better served if the case is remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings and final disposition.
Petitioner went to the court asserting that CA erred and asserts
that the respondents failure to comply with the rules due to
“heavy pressures of work” is unjustifiable thus would result to
the dismissal of the case.
Issue:
W/N CA erred in reversing RTC’s decision
Ruling:
No. It must be stressed that even if the plaintiff fails to
promptly move for pre-trial without any justifiable cause for
such delay, the extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint
might not be warranted if no substantial prejudice would be
caused to the defendant, and there are special and compelling
reasons which would make the strict application of the rule
clearly unjustified. Accordingly, the ends of justice and
fairness would best be served if the parties are given the full
opportunity to litigate their claims and the real issues involved
in the case are threshed out in a full-blown trial This is not to
say that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with.
However, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand
flexibility in their application. Indeed, on several occasions, the
Court relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to
afford the parties opportunity to fully ventilate the merits of
their cases. This is in line with the time-honored principle that
cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance
to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural
imperfection should thus not serve as basis of decisions
Finally, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC or the new Guidelines To Be
Observed By Trial Court Judges And Clerks Of Court In The
Conduct Of Pre-Trial And Use Of Deposition-Discovery
Measures aims to abbreviate court proceedings, ensure prompt
disposition of cases and decongest court dockets, and to further
implement the pre-trial guidelines laid down in Administrative
Circular No. 3-99 states that: “Within five (5) days from date
of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte
that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails
to file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC
shall issue a notice of pre-trial.” As such, the clerk of court of
Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos should issue
a notice of pre-trial to the parties and set the case for pre-trial.
Espritu v Lazaro
Facts:
Petitioners filed complaint for recovery of personal property
with damages and preliminary attachment against respondents.
They demanded to freeze the time deposit account of the
deceased and pray that respondents be ordered to pay them
their three-fourths share in the time deposit accounts. RTC
granted the preliminary attachement while respondents file
motion to dismiss but eventually denied by the RTC. The
respondents filed the respective answers. 11 months after the
receipt of answers by the petitioner, RTC ordered the dismissal
of the case due to petitioners’ failure to prosecute for an
unreasonable length of time. The court noted that despite the
lapse of time since respondents filed a cautionary answer,
petitioners failed to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial in
violation of Sec 1 Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. CA affirmed.
Issue:
W/N CA erred in affirming RTC’s decision and not setting
aside technicalities to allow the case to go on its merits.
Ruling:
No. Section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon
the plaintiff the duty to set the case for pre-trial after the last
pleading is served and filed. Under Section 3 of Rule 17,
failure to comply with the said duty makes the case susceptible
to dismissal for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length
of time or failure to comply with the rules. In any case,
petitioners should not have waited for the court to act on the
motion to file a supplemental answer or for the defendants to
file a supplemental answer. As previously stated, the rule
clearly states that the case must be set for pre-trial after the last
pleading is served and filed. Since respondents already filed a
cautionary answer and the case was already ripe for pre-trial.
PNB v Sps Perez
Facts:
Sps Perez obtained a credit line from PNB and was secured by
chattel and real estate mortgages. Thereafter, respondent failed
to satisfy their obligation which prompted petitioner to institute
an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. Spouses Perez filed
an Amended Complaint for Release or Discharge of Mortgaged
Properties, Breach of Contract, Declaration of Correct Amount
of Obligation, Injunction, Damages, Annulment of Sheriff’s
Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale, with a Prayer for the Issuance of
a Preliminary Mandatory Injunctive Writ. RTC denied the their
case and affirmed by CA ruling that appearance at the pre-trial
is mandatory. Respondents should have known that pre-trial in
civil actions has been peremptorily required these many years.
It is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic
issues between the parties and paves the way for a less
cluttered trial and resolution of the case. However, CA reversed
its own decision ruling that the higher interest of substantial
justice should prevail and not mere technicality.The case was
remanded to RTC and it ordered the case set for hearing. PNB,
however, failed to receive a copy of the aforementioned order
and was, thus, unable to attend the hearing then RTC allowed
the respondents to present evidence ex parte. RTC. RTC
decided in favor of respondents. CA reversed RTC’s decision
ruled that the sending of a notice of pre-trial is mandatory and
that the Order issued by the trial court cannot be considered as
such.
Issues:
W/N a pre-trial notice is mandatory and, as a consequence,
whether the lack of notice of pre-trial voids a subsequently
issued decision.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court unequivocally
requires that “[t]he notice of pre-trial shall be served on
counsel, or on the party who has no counsel.” It is elementary
in statutory construction that the word “shall” denotes the
mandatory character of the rule. It pointed out that the absence
of the notice of pre-trial constitutes a violation of a person’s
constitutional right to due process. Further, the Court ruled that
all subsequent orders, including the default judgment, are null
and void and without effect Thus, sending a notice of pre-trial
stating the date, time and place of pre-trial is mandatory. Its
absence will render the pre-trial and subsequent proceedings
void. This must be so as part of a party’s right to due process.
In the case at bar, The said order does not mention anything
about a pre-trial to be conducted by the trial court. The order
issued by the trial court merely spoke of a “hearing on March
8, 2006” and required PNB “to prepare and complete x x x a
statement of account”. Thus, all orders issued after the failure
of notification are null and void.
Perkin-Elmer v Dakila Trading
Facts:
Petitioner is a corporation registered under the laws of
Singapore and engaged in in the business of selling and leasing
out laboratory instrumentation and process control
instrumentation, and trading of laboratory chemicals and
supplies. Respondent entered into Distribution Agreement with
petitioner By virtue of the said agreement, PEIA appointed the
respondent as the sole distributor of its products in the
Philippines. The respondent was likewise granted the right to
purchase and sell the products of PEIA subject to the terms and
conditions set forth in the Distribution Agreement. However,
PEIA unilaterally terminated the Distribution Agreement,
prompting respondent to file before the RTC o a Complaint6
for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for
Issuance of a Writ of Attachment against PEIA. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the complain on the grounds that it lacks
cause of action and wrongful service of summons. RTC denied
its motion to dismiss. Petitioner subsequently filed with the
RTC a Special Appearance and Motion to Dismiss
respondent’s Amended Complaint based on the following
grounds: (1) the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner; (2) the respondent failed to state a
cause of action against the petitioner because it is not the real
party-in-interest. RTC denied the motion and held that
summons were validly served because the action is quasi in
rem being that the petitioner has a personal property (shares of
stocks) here in the Philippines, it does relate to a property of
the [petitioner], to which the latter has a claim interest (sic), or
an actual or contingent lien, which will make it fall under one
of the requisite for extraterritorial service under the Rules of
Court. Thus, it could be gainfully said that the summons had
been validly served for RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the
petitioner. CA affirmed.
Issue:
W/N service of summons were properly summoned
Ruling:
No. Respondent’s allegation in its Amended Complaint that
petitioner had personal property within the Philippines in the
form of shares of stock in PEIP does not convert the case from
an action in personam to one quasi in rem, so as to qualify said
case under the fourth instance mentioned in Section 15, Rule
14 (i.e., when the non-resident defendant’s property has been
attached within the Philippines), wherein ex-traterritorial
service of summons upon the petitioner would have been valid.
It is worthy to note that what is required under the aforesaid
provision of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not a mere
allegation of the existence of personal property belonging to
the non-resident defendant within the Philippines but, more
precisely, that the non-resident defendant’s personal property
located within the Philippines must have been actually
attached.
As a rule, even if the service of summons upon the defendant
or respondent in a civil case is defective, the court can still
acquire jurisdiction over his person when he voluntary appears
in court or submits himself to its authority. Nonetheless,
voluntary appearance, as a mode of acquiring jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, is likewise inapplicable in this
case. It is settled that a party who makes a special appearance
in court for the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of said
court, based on the invalidity of the service of summons,
cannot be considered to have voluntarily submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court.36 In the present case, petitioner
has been consistent in all its pleadings in assailing the service
of summons upon it and the jurisdiction of the RTC over its
person. Thus, the petitioner cannot be declared in estoppel
when it filed an Answer ad cautelam with compulsory
counterclaim before the RTC while the instant Petition was still
pending before this Court. The petitioner was in a situation
wherein it had no other choice but to file an Answer; otherwise,
the RTC would have already declared that petitioner had
waived its right to file responsive pleadings.37 Neither can the
compulsory counterclaim contained in petitioner’s Answer ad
cautelam be considered as voluntary appearance of petitioner
before the RTC.
PNB v Aznar
Facts:
Petitioner PNB contributed an amount of 212K for the
rehabilitation of RISCO, a corporation which headed by
respondents. The amount was used to purchase three parcels of
land and named after the corporation e amount contributed by
plaintiffs constituted as liens and encumbrances on the
aforementioned properties as annotated in the titles of said lots.
Such annotation was made pursuant to the Minutes of the
Special Meeting of the Board of Directors of RISCO.
Thereafter, a notice of attachment and writ of execution were
issued in favor of petitioner resulting to the acquisition of the
property by the petitioner. This prompted the respondents to
file the instant complaint seeking the quieting of their supposed
title to the subject properties, declaratory relief, cancellation of
TCT and reconveyance with temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs alleged that the subsequent
annotations on the titles are subject to the prior annotation of
their liens and encumbrances. Plaintiffs further contended that
the subsequent writs and processes annotated on the titles are
all null and void for want of valid service upon RISCO and on
them, as stockholders. Petitioner countered that plaintiffs have
no right of action for quieting of title since the order of the
court directing the issuance of titles to PNB had already
become final and executory and further asserted that plaintiffs,
as mere stockholders of RISCO do not have any legal or
equitable right over the properties of the corporation. RTC
ruled in favor of respondents and CA affirmed.
Issue:
W/N respondents have right to file a complaint
Ruling:
No, Indeed, we find that Aznar, et al., have no right to ask for
the quieting of title of the properties at issue because they have
no legal and/or equitable rights over the properties that are
derived from the previous registered owner which is RISCO,
the pertinent provision of the law is Section 2 of the
Corporation Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68), which states that
“[a] corporation is an artificial being created by operation of
law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes
and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its
existence.” As a consequence thereof, a corporation has a
personality separate and distinct from those of its stockholders
and other corporations to which it may be connected and As a
consequence thereof, a corporation has a personality separate
and distinct from those of its stockholders and other
corporations to which it may be connected.
Heirs of Medrano v De Vera
Facts:
This case concerns a parcel of land owned by Flaviana.
Flaviana died leaving her property to her half sisters. By virtue
of a private instruments, the said half-sisters sold the land to
Frnasisca Medrano. When the half-sisters died, some of the
children affirmed the private instruments but some did not.
This prompted Medrano to file a complaint. Thereafter,
respondent De Vera filed an answer presented himself as the
real party-in-interest on the ground that some of the named
defendants had executed a Deed of Renunciation of Rights in
his favor. Medrano argued that the respondent had no
personality in this case and pray for the default of original
respondents. RTC declared original respondents as default and
let the petitioner present evidence ex parte. RTC treated De
vera’s complaint as an independent claim. De Vera filed a
motion for reconsideration and the court held that De Vera had
no legal personality to file a motion for reconsideration because
he did not file a pleading-in-intervention. CA reversed RTC’s
decision ruling that RTC should have exercised its authority to
order the substitution of the original defendants instead of
requiring De Vera to file a pleading-in-intervention. This is
allowed under Rule 3, Section 19 of the Rules of Court. Since a
transferee pendente lite is a proper party42 to the case, the
court can order his outright substitution for the original
defendants.
Issue:
W/N De Vera could participate in the case without filing a
motion to intervene
Ruling:
Yes. De Vera is a transferee pendente lite of the named
defendants (by virtue of the Deed of Renunciation of Rights
that was executed in his favor during the pendency of Civil
Case). His rights were derived from the named defendants and,
as transferee pendente lite, he would be bound by any judgment
against his transferors under the rules of res judicata. Thus, De
Vera’s interest cannot be considered and tried separately from
the interest of the named defendants. What the trial court
should have done is to treat De Vera (as transferee pendente
lite) as having been joined as a party-defendant, and to try the
case on the basis of the answer De Vera had filed and with De
Vera’s participation. As transferee pendente lite, De Vera may
be allowed to join the original defendants under Rule 3, Section
19 Rules of Court.
There may be no need for the transferee pendente lite to be
substituted or joined in the case because, in legal
contemplation, he is not really denied protection as his interest
is one and the same as his transferors, who are already parties
to the case. In the instant case, the circumstances demanded
that the trial court had already admitted De Vera’s answer
when it declared the original defendants in default. As there
was a transferee pendente lite whose answer had already been
admitted, the trial court should have tried the case on the basis
of that answer, based on Rule 9, Section 3 Rules of Court.
Board of regents of MSU v Osop
Facts:
Respondent is a former Chancellor of MSU. Several years after
his retirement, he was appointed as assistant prof in the college
of engineering with a term of office, unless revoked or
amended by competent authority. However, Muslim served a
letter to Osop telling him that since the prof that he substituted
returned, his services will not be needed and instructed Ramos
to distribute Prof Osop’s teaching load. The dean of
engineering Ramos told Muslim that Osop’s teaching load is
very important that no professor can handle. While Muslim
reiterated his earlier letter. This prompted Osop to file a
complaint with RTC. Muslim and Ramos filed a motion to
dismiss before RTC citing the following grounds: (1) lack of
cause of action due to non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies and non-inclusion of indispensable parties; (2)
appointment in a temporary character; (3) presumption of
regularity; and (4) forum shopping. RTC granted the motion
dismissing the case. CA reversed the said decision ruling that
the case is within the jurisdiction of RTC since there was a
denial of due process on the part of Osop, he does not need to
exhaust admin remedies. The case was remanded to RTC and
Osop filed an amended complaint impleading MSU as a
defendant. Muslim and Ramos filed an answer to the amended
complaint while OSG represented MSU requested that they be
furnished with the copy of the amended complaint. MSU failed
to file answer within the given period, Osop filed a Motion to
Declare Defendant MSU in Default, which denied by RTC.
RTC now issued a summary judgement in favor of Osop. RTC
issued a motion for execution. Subsequently, MSU filed a
motion to intervene with CA. CA denied.
Issue:
W/N it is proper for petitioners to file motion to intervene with
CA
Ruling:
No. While undoubtedly, MSU has a legal interest in the
outcome of the case, it may not avail itself of the remedy of
intervention in the present case simply because MSU is not a
third party in the proceedings herein. In Osop’s Amended
Complaint before the RTC, MSU was already impleaded as
one of the defendants in Civil Case MSU came under the
jurisdiction of the RTC when it was served with summons. It
participated in Civil Case, where it was represented by Atty.
Fontanilla, counsel for Muslim and Ramos, who was deputized
by the OSG as counsel for MSU. MSU adopted the Answer to
the Amended Complaint of its co-defendants, Muslim and
Ramos, and also joined Muslim and Ramos in subsequent
pleadings filed before the RTC in Civil Case. Evidently, the
rights and interests of MSU were duly presented before the
RTC.
MSU, on its part, neither filed an appeal nor a Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals to challenge the adverse
RTC Orders. MSU sat on its rights. Despite receiving on
September 2, 200367 a copy of the RTC Order dated August
21, 2003 (denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC
Order filed by MSU, together with Muslim and Ramos) in
Civil Case MSU did not act until it filed its Motion for
Intervention CA, after an interval of 16 months. Evidently, it
was already way beyond the reglementary period for MSU to
file an appeal (15 days) or a Petition for Certiorari (60 days).
The RTC Orders had already become final and executory as to
MSU. It cannot now circumvent the finality of the RTC Orders
by seeking to intervene in CA nd thereby, to unduly benefit
from the timely action taken by Muslim, who alone, filed the
Petition in CA.
Malvar v Kraft Foods
Facts:
Petitioner was an employee of respondent, she filed an illegal
dismissal with the legal assistance from The Law Firm of
Dasal, Llasos and Associates. LA found that she was illegally
dismissed which affirmed by RTC. CA affirmed the decision
with modification of reducing the amount of moral and
exemplary damages. After the decision became final and
executory Malvar moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution.5 The Executive Labor Arbiter then referred the case
to the Research and Computation Unit (RCU) of the NLRC for
the computation of the monetary awards under the judgment.
However LA found RCU’s computation lack legal basis and
reduced the said award. NLRC reversed adopting RCU’s
computation. With these confusions, it prompted the petitioner
and respondent to enter into compromise agreement without
the knowledge of petitioner’s counsel. Subsequently, petitioner
terminated the services of her counsel and moved for the
dismissal of the pending case. before the Court could act on
Malvar’s Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case, the Court
received a so-called Motion for Intervention to Protect
Attorney’s Rights from The Law Firm of Dasal, Llasos and
Associate it contends that with the compromise agreement
entered by petitioner and respondents and Malvar’s
unceremonious and without any justifiable reason terminated
its legal service and required it to withdraw from the case, it
defrauded them and deprived to collect their duly legal fees.
According to their contract, the counsel is entitled to a
contingency fee of 10% on the award. Petitioner contends that
there was no truth to the Intervenor’s claim to defraud it of its
professional fees; that the Intervenor lacked the legal capacity
to intervene because it had ceased to exist after Atty. Marwil N.
Llasos resigned from the Intervenor and Atty. Richard B. Dasal
became barred from private practice upon his appointment as
head of the Legal Department of the Small Business Guarantee
and Finance Corporation, a government subsidiary; and that
Atty. Llasos and Atty. Dasal had personally handled her case.
Issue:
W/N the motion to intervene is proper
Ruling:
Yes. On considerations of equity and fairness, the Court
disapproves of the tendencies of clients compromising their
cases behind the backs of their attorneys for the purpose of
unreasonably reducing or completely setting to naught the
stipulated contingent fees. The Court adds, however, that the
Intervenor is not left without a remedy, for the payment of its
adequate and reasonable compensation could not be annulled
by the settlement of the litigation without its participation and
conformity. It remains entitled to the compensation, and its
right is safeguarded by the Court because its members are
officers of the Court who are as entitled to judicial protection
against injustice or imposition of fraud committed by the client
as much as the client is against their abuses as her counsel.
The basis of the intervention is the written agreement on
contingent fees contained in the engagement executed on
between Malvar and the Intervenor which stipulated that the
Intervenor would “collect ten percent (10%) of the amount of
award. Malvar should accept that the practice of law was not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigations in court but
embraced also the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incidental to the cases or litigations as well as the management
of such actions and proceedings on behalf of the clients. Here,
Malvar not only downplayed the worth of the Intervenor’s legal
service to her but also attempted to camouflage her intent to
defraud her lawyer by offering excuses that were not only
inconsistent with her actions but, most importantly, fell short of
being justifiable.
Pacana-Contreras v Rovilla Water Supply
Facts:
Petitioners filed a case for accounting and damages against the
respondents. According to the former, their family operated a
water supply business named Rovilla Water Supply and
respondent Lilia who was a former trusted employee hid
business records and burned and ransacked the family files.
Lilia also allegedly posted security guards and barred the
members of the Pacaña family from operating their business.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
petition lacked cause of action. RTC denied the motion to
dismiss because it was not timely filed. CA reversed held that
the ground of lack of cause of action may be raised in a motion
to dismiss at anytime.
Issue:
W/N motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action
may be filed anytime?
Ruling:
No. Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which states that defenses
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived, except for the following
grounds: 1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter; 2) litis pendencia; 3) res judicata; and 4) prescription.
Therefore, the grounds not falling under these four exceptions
may be considered as waived in the event that they are not
timely invoked. As the respondents’ motion to dismiss was
based on the grounds which should be timely invoked, material
to the resolution of this case is the period within which they
were raised. Both the RTC and the CA found that the motion to
dismiss was only filed after the filing of the answer and after
the pre-trial had been concluded. Because there was no motion
to dismiss before the filing of the answer, the respondents
should then have at least raised these grounds as affirmative
defenses in their answer. Failure to state a cause of action and
lack of cause of action are really different from each other. On
the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the
insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal
under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of
cause [of] action refers to a situation where the evidence does
not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading. The Court
cannot uphold the dismissal of the present case based on the
grounds invoked by the respondents which they have waived
for failure to invoke them within the period prescribed by the
Rules. The Court cannot also dismiss the case based on "lack of
cause of action" as this would require at least a preponderance
of evidence which is yet to be appreciated by the trial court.
Sales v Sabino
Facts:
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner,
the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident which
ultimately caused the death of respondent’s son, Elbert.
Subsequently, respondent notified petitioner that he will take
deposition of Corral before RTC Pasig. the deposition on oral
examination of orral was taken before the Clerk of Court of
Pasig, in the presence and with the active participation of
petitioner’s counsel who even lengthily cross-examined the
deponent and was marked Exhibits “DD” and “EE”. Petitioner
opposed the admission of the said deposition on the ground that
jurisdictional requirement under sec 4 Rule 23 Rules of Court
are not satisfied. RTC admitted respondent’s exhibits “DD”
and “EE”. CA affirmed.
Issue:
W/N the requirements of Rules of Court are satisfied, W/N the
petitioner in cross-examining the deponent during the taking of
his deposition waived any and all objections in connection
therewith.
Ruling:
Yes. While depositions may be used as evidence in court
proceedings, they are generally not meant to be a substitute for
the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness.
However, depositions may be used without the deponent being
called to the witness stand by the proponent, provided the
existence of certain conditions is first satisfactorily established.
Five (5) exceptions for the admissibility of a deposition are
listed in Section 4, Rule 23, of the Rules of Court. Among
these is when the witness is out of the Philippines. The trial
court had determined that deponent Bueneres Corral was
abroad when the offer of his deposition was made. This factual
finding of absence or unavailability of witness to testify
deserves respect, having been adequately substantiated
Lest it be overlooked, Section 29, Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court, no less, lends support to the conclusion just made. In
gist, it provides that, while errors and irregularities in
depositions as to notice, qualifications of the officer conducting
the deposition, and manner of taking the deposition are deemed
waived if not objected to before or during the taking of the
deposition, objections to the competency of a witness or the
competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony may be
made for the first time at the trial and need not be made at the
time of the taking of the deposition, unless they could be
obviated at that point.
Afulugencia vs Metrobank
Facts:
Petitioner Sps filed a complaint for for nullification of
mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other
documents, with damages, against respondent Bank .
Subsequently, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to require
Metrobank’s officers to appear and testify as the petitioners’
initial witnesses. Respondent filed an opposition contending
that being a litigated motion, the failure of petitioners to set a
date and time for the hearing renders the Motion ineffective
and pro forma; that pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules,
Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse parties –
may not be compelled to appear and testify in court for the
petitioners since they were not initially served with written
interrogatories. RTC denied the petitioner’s motion. CA
affirmed. Petitioners now assert that the questioned Motion is
not a litigated motion, since it seeks not a relief, but the
issuance of process. They insist that a motion which is subject
to notice and hearing under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 is an
application for relief other than a pleading; since no relief is
sought but just the process of subpoena, the hearing and notice
requirements may be done away with. Petitioners add that the
Rules should have been liberally construed in their favor, and
that Metrobank’s filing of its Opposition be considered to have
cured whatever defect the Motion suffered from.
Issue:
W/N petitioners must first serve written interrogatories to
respondent bank’s officers before they can be subpoenaed
Ruling:
Yes. On the procedural issue, it is quite clear that Metrobank
was notified of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces
Tecum Ad Testificandum; in fact, it filed a timely Opposition
thereto. The technical defect of lack of notice of hearing was
thus cured by the filing of the Opposition. Nonetheless, Sec 6
of Rule 25 of the rules provides unless thereafter allowed by
the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of
justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may not
be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open
court, or to give a deposition pending appeal. One of the
purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and
needless delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the
conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not
serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand
will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it
later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its
witness.
In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s
officers to the witness stand as their initial and main witnesses,
and to present documents in Metrobank’s possession as part of
their principal documentary evidence. This is improper.
Petitioners may not be allowed, at the incipient phase of the
presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to present
Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse parties as
well, based on the principle that corporations act only through
their officers and duly authorized agents as their main
witnesses.
Air Philippines Corp v Pennswell Inc.
Facts:
Respondent was organized to engage in the business of
manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and
special lubricants. They delivered and sold products to
petitioner and the petitioner failed to pay its obligations. It
prompted respondent to file a complaint for sum of money
against petitioner. Petitioner contended that its refusal to pay
was not without valid and justifiable reasons and they alleged
that they were defrauded by respondent for its previous sale of
four items, covered by Purchase Order No. 6626. Said items
were misrepresented by respondent as belonging to a new line,
but were in truth and in fact, identical with products petitioner
had previously purchased from respondent. During the
pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel10
respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients and
chemical components of the following products. RTC granted
the said petition. However, respondent sought reconsideration
arguing that these information constitute trade secrets therefore
it is confidential which respondent cannot be forced to divulge.
RTC reversed its own decision and dismissed the motion of
petitioner. CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Petitioners now go to
Court contending that it has a right to obtain the chemical
composition and ingredients of respondent’s products to
conduct a comparative analysis of its products. Petitioner
assails the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the
matters are trade secrets which are protected by law and
beyond public scrutiny. Relying on Section 1, Rule 27 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner argues that the use of modes of
discovery operates with desirable flexibility under the
discretionary control of the trial court. Furthermore, petitioner
posits that its request is not done in bad faith or in any manner
as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress respondent.
Issue:
W/N the subject information may be obtained through Sec 1
Rule 27 Rules of Court
Ruling:
No. A more than cursory glance at the above text would show
that the production or inspection of documents or things as a
mode of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court may be
availed of by any party upon a showing of good cause therefor
before the court in which an action is pending. Rule 27 sets a
unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things that
may be produced and inspected should not be privileged.26
The documents must not be privileged against disclosure. Such
a condition is in addition to the requisite that the items be
specifically described, and must constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action and which are in
the party’s possession, custody or control. Section 24 of Rule
130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged
communication .There are, however, other privileged matters
that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the
following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the
source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to
disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information
contained in tax census returns; and (d) bank deposits.
That trade secrets are of a privileged nature is beyond quibble.
The protection that this jurisdiction affords to trade secrets is
evident in our laws Jurisprudence has consistently
acknowledged the private character of trade secrets. There is a
privilege not to disclose one’s trade secrets.
However, the rule on privileged matters are not absolute there
can be cases where the trial court may compel disclosure to
serve substantive justice. Trade secrets should receive greater
protection from discovery, because they derive economic value
from being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by
the public.52 To the mind of this Court, petitioner was not able
to show a compelling reason for us to lift the veil of
confidentiality which shields respondent’s trade secrets.
Eagleridge Dev’t Corp v Cameron Granville 3 Asset Mgt
Inc.
Facts:
Petitioner was a defendant in a collection suit filed by Export
and Industry Bank (EIB). By virtue of deed of assignment, EIB
transferred EDC’s loan obligations to respondent Cameron.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for production of the Loan
Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA). Respondent contends
that there was no “good cause” for the production of LSPA and
that the same is allegedly irrelevant to the case a quo.
Petitioners filed a reply arguing that the production of LSPA is
for “good cause”. They claimed that pursuant to Article 1634
of the New Civil Code13 on assignment of credit, the
obligation subject of the case a quo is a credit in litigation,
which may be extinguished by reimbursing the assignee of the
price paid therefor, the judicial costs incurred and the interest
of the price from the day on which the same was paid. As
petitioners’ alleged loan obligations may be reimbursed up to
the extent of the amount paid by Cameron in the acquisition
thereof, it becomes necessary to verify the amount of the
consideration from the LSPA, considering that the Deed of
Assignment was silent on this matter. RTC denied the motion
ruled that there was a failure to show “good cause” by the
petitioners. CA affirmed. Now, the petitioner went to court
alleging that the production of the LSPA—which would inform
them of the consideration for the assignment of their loan
obligation—is relevant to the disposition of the case.
Issue:
W/N the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying the
production and/or inspection of the LSPA.
Ruling:
Yes. Generally, the scope of discovery is to be liberally
construed so as to provide the litigants with information
essential to the fair and amicable settlement or expeditious trial
of the case. All the parties are required to lay their cards on the
table so that justice can be rendered on the merits of the case.
Although the grant of a motion for production of document is
admittedly discretionary on the part of the trial court judge,
nevertheless, it cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably denied
because to do so would bar access to relevant evidence that
may be used by a party-litigant and hence, impair his
fundamental right to due process.
As respondent Cameron’s claim against the petitioners relies
entirely on the validity of the Deed of Assignment, it is
incumbent upon respondent Cameron to allow petitioners to
inspect all documents relevant to the Deed, especially those
documents which, by express terms, were referred to and
identified in the Deed itself. The LSPA, which pertains to the
same subject matter—the transfer of the credit to respondent is
manifestly useful to petitioners’ defense. In this light, the
relevance of the LSPA sought by petitioners is readily
apparent. Fair play demands that petitioners must be given the
chance to examine the LSPA. Discretionary acts will be
reviewed where the lower court or tribunal has acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, where an interlocutory order does
not conform to the essential requirements of law and may
reasonably cause material injury throughout subsequent
proceedings for which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate,
or where there is a clear or serious abuse of discretion. The
exercise of discretion pertaining to discovery will be set aside
where there is abuse, or the trial court’s disposition of matters
of discovery was improvident and affected adversely the
substantial rights of a party. After all, the discretion conferred
upon trial courts is a sound discretion which should be
exercised with due regard to the rights of the parties and the
demands of equity and justice. Besides, we find no great
practical difficulty, and respondent did not allege any, in
presenting the document for inspection and copying of the
petitioners.
Ruling:
No. Thus, while respondent judicially admitted in her Answer
that she only paid P2 million and that she still owed petitioners
P200,000.00, respondent claimed later and, in fact, submitted
an evidence to show that she already paid the whole amount of
her unpaid obligation. It is noteworthy that when respondent
presented the evidence of payment, petitioners did not object
thereto. When the receipt was formally offered as evidence,
petitioners did not manifest their objection to the admissibility
of said document on the ground that payment was not an issue.
Apparently, petitioners only denied receipt of said payment and
assailed the authority of Losloso to receive payment. Since
there was an implied consent on the part of petitioners to try
the issue of payment, even if no motion was filed and no
amendment of the pleading has been ordered, the RTC cannot
be faulted for admitting respondent’s testimonial and
documentary evidence to prove payment.
Trial
Republic v Sandiganbayan
Demurrer to Evidence
Gonzales v Bugaay
Facts:
The deceased Spouses Ayad has five children: Enrico,
Encarnacion, Consolacion, Maximiano and Mariano.
Encarnacion died and is survived by her children, the
petitioners in this case. . Consolacion, meanwhile, was married
to the late Imigdio Bugaay and their children are respondents
herein. In their amended complaint,for Partition and
Annulment of Documents with Damages the respondents,
petitioners alleged, inter alia, that the only surviving children of
the Spouses Ayad are Enrico and Consolacion, and that during
the Spouses Ayad's lifetime, they owned several agricultural as
well as residential properties. Petitioners averred thatEnrico
executed fraudulent documents covering all the properties
owned by the Spouses Ayad in favor of Consolacion and
respondents, completely disregarding their rights. Thus, they
prayed, among others, for the partition of the Spouses Ayad's
estate, the nullification of the documents executed by Enrico,
and the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well
as attorney's fees. RTC rendered a decision awarding pro
indiviso share to each of the children of Sps Ayad. It likewise
declared the documents and muniments of title executed by
Enrico in their names, as null and void. Subsequently
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial
from the said Decision. ,udge Angeles granted respondents'
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial for the specific
"purpose of receiving and offering for admission the
documents referred to by the respondents. However, instead of
presenting the documents adverted to, consisting of the
documents sought to be annulled, respondents demurred to
petitioners' evidence which the RTC denied. Thus respondents
elevated this case to CA which reversed the RTC decision
granting the demurrer then dismissing the case. Petitioner
argued before the court whether the CA's dismissal of the
Amended Complaint was in accordance with law, rules of
procedure and jurisprudence.
Issue:
W/N it is proper to file a demurrer to evidence even after a
Decision had been rendered
Ruling:
No. A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented after the
plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in
an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to
make out a case or sustain the issue. The evidence
contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to
the merits of the case." Being considered a motion to dismiss,
thus, a demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the
court renders its judgment. In this case, respondents demurred
to petitioners' evidence after the RTC promulgated its
Decision. As respondents never complied with the directive but
instead filed a demurrer to evidence, their motion should be
deemed abandoned. Consequently, the RTC's original Decision
stands
Judgements and Final Orders
Shimizu Phils Contractors v. Magsalin
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint of breach of contract against
Magsalin. Petitioner alleged that Magsalin, doing business as
“Karen’s Trading”, ,” had breached their subcontract
agreement for the supply, delivery, installation, and finishing of
parquet tiles for certain floors in the petitioner’s Makati City
condominium project called “The Regency at Salcedo.” It also
filed complaint for damages against FGU Insurance as
respondent’s surety. FGU Insurance filed a third-party
complaint which RTC admitted. . FGU Insurance filed a
motion to cancel the hearing on the ground that the third-party
defendants had not yet filed their answer. The motion was
granted. The petitioner now argues before us that FGU
Insurance, which is the plaintiff in the third-party complaint,
had failed to exert efforts to serve summons on the Garcias. It
suggests that a motion to serve summons by publication should
have been filed for this purpose. With these procedural events,
RTC issued an order of dismissal on the ground that petitioner
failed to prosecute the case. CA affirmed. Petitioner now
contends before the court that CA erred because they were not
given a legal explanation on why the case was dismissed thus it
violate their due process.
Issue:
W/N the dismissal of the petitioner’s complaint based on
“failure to prosecute” is without grounds thus violates their due
process
Ruling:
Yes. A trial court should always specify the reasons for a
complaint’s dismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing court
can readily determine the prima facie justification for the
dismissal The dismissal of the case is not supported by the facts
of the case. Elementary due process demands that the parties to
a litigation be given information on how the case was decided,
as well as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that
led to the conclusions of the court. Where the reasons are
absent, a decision (such as the dismissal order) has absolutely
nothing to support it and is thus a nullityNone of foregoing
facts square with the grounds specified by Section 3, Rule 17
of the Rules of Court for the motu proprio dismissal of a case
for failure to prosecute. These grounds are as follows:
(a) Failure of the plaintiff, without justifiable reasons, to
appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief;
(b) Failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time;
(c) Failure of the plaintiff to comply with the Rules of Court;
or
(d) Failure of the plaintiff to obey any order of the court.
In the court’s view, the developments in the present case do not
satisfy the stringent standards set in law and jurisprudence for a
non prosequitur. The fundamental test for non prosequitur is
whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable
with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with
reasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the
part of the plaintiff to prosecute.
While it is discretionary on the trial court to dismiss cases,
dismissals of actions should be made with care. Neither facts,
law or jurisprudence supports the RTC’s finding of failure to
prosecute on the part of the petitioner.
Pacific Rehaus v Export & Industry Bank
Facts:
Tomas Tan, a stockholder and director of CST Enterprises ),
filed a derivative suit for the Declaration of Unenforceability of
Promissory Notes and Mortgage, Nullity of Secretary’s
Certificate, Injunction, Damages with Prayer for the Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against PBB. He alleged that before he went abroad, he turned
over to respondent Chua, , titles to lands owned by, and
registered in the name of, CST. Subsequently, respondent
informed him that CST’s properties had been fraudulently used
as collateral for loans allegedly taken out in CST’s name, but
without proper authority from CST stockholders and/or the
Board of Directors. Tan discovered that a certain lawyer had
issued Secretary’s certificate and using this Secretary’s
Certificate, Chua took out loans with PBB in the amount of
91.1 million pesos and used CST properties as collateral.
Respondent Chua signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua,
who signed both as the representative of CST as well as in his
personal capacity. Respondent did not deny that he signed as a
co-maker in the loan thus PBB filed a motion for partial
summary judgement which the RTC granted and held that
Chua is solidarily liable to pay the amount indicated in the
promissory note. Thereafter, RTC denied the notice of appeal
of Chua on the ground that respondent Chua could not file a
notice of appeal. Instead, he should have filed a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. However, since
the period for filing a certiorari petition had already lapsed
without respondent filing any petition, the partial summary
judgment had become final and executory. CA reversed the
RTC decision when it held that the partial judgment had
become final and executory when respondent Chua failed to
avail of the proper remedy of certiorari within the 60 day
reglementary period under Rule 65. Since a partial summary
judgment does not finally dispose of the action, it is merely an
interlocutory, not a final, order. Thus, it could not attain
finality. Thus PBB went to the court arguing that CA erred in
reversing the RTC decision.
Issue:
W/N certiorari is the right remedy, W/N interlocutory order can
attain finality
Ruling:
No, the partial summary judgment rendered by the trial court
being merely interlocutory and not ‘a final judgment’, it is
puerile to discuss whether the same became final and executory
due to the alleged failure to appeal said judgment within the
supposed period of appeal. A partial summary judgment “is not
a final or appealable judgment.”
The differences between a “final judgment” and an
“interlocutory order” are well-established. final judgment or
order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing
more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an
adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or
a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for
instance, of res judicata or prescription. Conversely, an order
that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the
Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other,
but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by
the Court, is “interlocutory”, e.g., an order denying a motion to
dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules
Post Judgement Remedies
Neypes v. CA
Facts:
Petitioner filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles
of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary
injunction before the RTC. On February 12, 1998 RTC
dismissed the case on the ground that the action had already
prescribed. Then petitioners having received the copy only on
March 3, they filed on the 15th day a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another
order dismissing the motion for reconsideration3 which
petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later they filed
notice of appeal. RTC denied the notice of appeal held that it
was filed late. CA affirmed held that the 15-day period to
appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the
day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their
complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the
“final order” appealable under the Rules. Petitioners now argue
before the court that they should be given a fresh period upon
filing the notice of appeal.
Issue:
When will be the reckoning date to start the period for appeal?
Does the petitioners filed the notice of appeal on time?
Ruling:
The court held that the reckoning period will be the petitioner’s
view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules,
that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an
order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final
order as it was what ended the issues raised there.
Yes. Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from
notice of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the
trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period
(March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but
instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to
the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-
day appeal period.15 It ruled that petitioners, having filed their
MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal
upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners,
however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a
fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the “final order” or the
order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
However, this Court has on occasion advised the lower courts
to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal
and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free
from the constraint of technicalities. To standardize the appeal
periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical
to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Petitioners here filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998.
Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal
period of 15 days, as already discussed
NPC v. Lahoo
Facts:
NAPOCOR is a government entity with the mandate to
undertake the development of hydroelectric generation of
power and the production of electricity from nuclear,
geothermal and other sources, as well as the transmission of
electric power on a nationwide basis. Petitioner intended to
acquire right of way at Samaar for its project. petitioner filed
two complaints before the RTC seeking to acquire right of way
over the property of the respondents. Respondents
acknowledge the petitioner’s right but prayed for payment of
just compensation. RTC issued two orders to place petitioner in
possession of the premises upon deposit with the PNB of the
amount of P8,000,000.00, as provisional value. Petitioners filed
a motion to reduce such compensation. Thus, on September 15,
1997 RTC issued a new order of just compensation. Petitioner
filed Motions for Reconsideration in both cases, which the
RTC denied in an Order dated October 14, 1997. Petitioner
filed Notices of Appeal, which were dismissed by the trial
court in an Order dated December 10, 1997, for being filed out
of time. The petitioner appealed the decision to CA which the
court denied and affirmed RTC’s decision. The petitioners
argue before the court that it is contrary to the mere technicality
doctrine.
Issue:
W/N the dismissal of the appeal contravenes mere technicality
doctrine.
Ruling:
No. Although the dismissal of the petition by the CA was based
on the failure to timely file the petition, such dismissal was not
merely based on technicality, but on petitioner’s failure to
perfect its appeal on time with the RTC, the failure to perfect
an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere
technicality—it raises a jurisdictional problem, as it deprives
the appellate court of its jurisdiction over the appeal; After a
decision is declared final and executory, vested rights are
acquired by the winning party. Moreover, the “fresh period”
rule cannot be given a retroactive effect to actions that have
already become final and executory. Since the decision became
final on 1997 and Neypes Doctrine took effect only on 2005,
Neypes is inapplicable to the present case, although procedural
laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage; there being no
vested rights in the rules of procedure, said retroactive
application of procedural rule does not extend to actions that
have already become final and executory, like the Order of the
trial court in the instant case.
Petitioner should have timely appealed the assailed RTC Order
under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. In this case,
petitioner received on September 25, 1997 a copy of the Order
of the trial court dated September 15, 1997 fixing the amount
of just compensation on the respondents’ properties. On
October 2, 1997, or on the seventh day from receipt of the
Order dated September 15, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion in an Order dated
October 14, 1997, which was received by petitioner’s counsel
on October 15, 1997. Therefore, petitioner had the remaining
period of eight days, or until October 23, 1997, within which to
appeal. Perforce, the filing of the Notice of Appeal on October
30, 1997 was already late
Pates v. COMELEC
This were the following material dates:
February 1, 2008—The COMELEC First Division issued its
Resolution (assailed in the petition);
February 4, 2008—The counsel for petitioner) received a copy
of the February 1, 2008 Resolution
February 8, 2008—The petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration (MR) of the February 1, 2008 Resolution (4
days from receipt of the February 1, 2008 Resolution);
d. September 18, 2008—The COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution denying the petitioner’s MR (also assailed in the
petition);
e. September 22, 2008—The petitioner received the
COMELEC en banc Resolution of September 18, 2008.
Under this chronology, the last day for the filing of a petition
for certiorari, i.e., 30 days from notice of the final COMELEC
Resolution, fell on a Saturday (October 18, 2008), as the
petitioner only had the remaining period of 26 days to file his
petition, after using up 4 days in preparing and filing his
Motion for Reconsideration. Effectively, the last day for filing
was October 20, 2008—the following Monday or the first
working day after October 18, 2008. The petitioner filed his
petition with us on October 22, 2008 or two days late; Hence
RTC dismissed the case. The petitioner now filed MR
contending that under “fresh rule” the petition was seasonable
filed. He claims that, historically, the fresh period rule was the
prevailing rule in filing petitions for certiorari
Issue:
W/N “fresh rule” is applicable in this case
Ruling:
As a matter of law, Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution
provides that unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or
by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may
be brought to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof Thus, as a matter
of law, our ruling of November 11, 2008 to dismiss the petition
for late filing cannot but be correct. This ruling is not without
its precedent; we have previously ordered a similar dismissal in
previous cases. However, there have been some instances
wherein this Court allowed a relaxation in the application of
the rules, but this flexibility was “never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.”
A liberal interpretation and application of the rules of
procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. As emphasized above,
exceptional circumstances or compelling reasons may have
existed in the past when we either suspended the operation of
the Rules or exempted a particular case from their application.9
But, these instances were the exceptions rather than the rule,
and we invariably took this course of action only upon a
meritorious plea for the liberal construction of the Rules of
Court based on attendant exceptional circumstances.
Thus, every plea for a liberal construction of the Rules must at
least be accompanied by an explanation of why the party-
litigant failed to comply with the rules and by a justification for
the requested liberal construction.—Under this unique nature
of the exceptions, a party asking for the suspension of the
Rules of Court comes to us with the heavy burden of proving
that he deserves to be accorded exceptional treatment. The
rules and by a justification for the requested liberal
construction. Significantly, the petitioner presented no
exceptional circumstance or any compelling reason to warrant
the non-application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his petition. He
failed to explain why his filing was late. Other than his appeal
to history, uniformity, and convenience, he did not explain why
we should adopt and apply the fresh period rule to an election
case.
De Grano v. Lacaba
Facts:
Respondent claims that he is the lawful owner of two lots
located in Batangas and each parcel of land is covered by a
separate tax declaration in the name of respondent. Respondent
filed a complaint for forcible entry with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction against
petitioner. Respondent alleged that, sometime, petitioner, by
means of force, intimidation, strategy and threats, and with the
help of his men, destroyed the perimeter fence built by
respondent. . Respondent averred that petitioner effectively
disrupted respondent’s peaceful possession and occupation of
the property by clearing the land of plants, bushes and trees and
demolishing the house owned by the his caretakers. MCTC
dismissed the petition ruling that respondent’s claim, that he
was in actual possession of the property through the possession
of his caretakers and the other spouses he allowed to occupy
the property, was belied by his own statement. RTC affirmed
which was received by respondent on November 21, 2000 and
on December 14, 2000, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration. CA granted the appeal and reversed RTC
decision. Petitioners contend that the appeal was belatedly
filed.
Material dates:
March 28, 2001 – RTC denied the MR
October 23, 2001- amended its decision changing “defendant”
to “plaintiff”
November 27,2001 – filing of the appeal
Issue:
W/N CA erred in taking cognizance of the late petition
Ruling:
Yes. The CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for
review that was filed way beyond the reglementary period.
Rules of procedure may be relaxed in the interest of substantial
justice and in order to give a litigant the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his complaint. Respondent proffered no
explanation for the delay as, in fact, he did not acknowledge
that he filed his petition for review with the CA beyond the
prescriptive period. When a judgment is amended, the date of
the amendment should be considered the date of the decision in
the computation of the period for perfecting the appeal; This
rule presupposes that the amendment consists of a material
alteration of such substance and proportion that would, in
effect, give rise to an entirely new judgment; when the
amendment merely consists of the correction of a clerical error,
no new judgment arises, the period for filing the appeal should
still be counted from the receipt of the original judgment.—
Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corp v. CA
Facts:
Sps Pelaez were employees of petitioner. As salesman, Paul
was required by the Corporation to post a bond to answer for
any amount which he might fail to turnover to the Corporation.
He complied by executing a mortgage bond over his family's
house and lot in favor of the Corporation. Upon Paul’s default
to remit the sales proceeds, petitioner initiated the extrajudicial
foreclosure. To stop the extrajudicial sale, Paul and Roceli filed
a Complaint against the Corporation. On September 14, 2000
RTC issued a restraining order in favor of spouses. Upon
motion of the spouses Pelaez, the RTC amended its Decision in
its February 7, 2001. On February 20, 2001, petitioners
received their copy of the February 7, 2001 Order and on
March 6, 2001, they filed a Notice of Appeal of the September
14, 2000 Decision and the February 7, 2001 Order of the RTC.
RTC dismissed the notice of appeal of petitioners. Petitioners
then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The CA found
that the September 14, 2000 Decision of the RTC had become
final and executory. It found no cogent reason to disturb the
RTC's Decision and its subsequent amendment as embodied in
the February 7, 2001 Order. The petitioners argue before the
court that the September 14, 2000 decision did not became
final and executory since there is an amended decision.
Issue:
W/N CA erred in ruling that the September 14, 2000 Decision
of the RTC had become final and executory
Ruling:
Yes. In the present case, the matter of the release of the
mortgaged property is material and intertwined with the issue
of the amount of overage as well as the issue on the amount of
damages.[10] It is difficult to separate these matters because a
determination of the correct amount of overage would require
the examination and computation of the entire account of
deliveries and payments. Necessarily, upon re-examination of
the subject account during an appeal, the possibility of finding
a shortage instead of an overage is present. And dependent on
the result of the re-examination of the entire account is the
determination of the correctness of either the foreclosure or
release of the mortgaged property. It follows that the ruling on
the amount of damages and attorney's fees, if any, may also be
affected by a re-examination of the entire account. As the
disposition of some inter-related issues in the original RTC
Decision were materially amended by the February 7, 2001
RTC Order, these two issuances must be taken in conjunction
with each other. Together, these two issuances form one
integrated amended decision.[11] Hence, an appeal from the
February 7, 2001 RTC Order must be deemed to be an appeal
from the whole integrated amended Decision.
Petitioners received their copy of the February 7, 2001 Order
on February 20, 2001. They timely filed a notice of appeal on
March 6, 2001, or after 14 days. The appeal was duly
perfected.
Palma v. Galvez
Facts:
Petitioner filed with RTC an action for damages against the
respondents alleging that the defendants committed
professional fault, negligence and omission for having removed
her right ovary against her will, and losing the same and the
tissues extracted from her during the surgery; and that although
the specimens were subsequently found, petitioner was
doubtful and uncertain that the same was hers as the label
therein pertained that of somebody else. , private respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss6 on the ground that the RTC had not
acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not properly served
with summons since she was temporarily out of the country.
RTC dismissed the case. Petitioner filed a certiorari before the
court. Private respondent also claims that the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 is a wrong remedy thus the petition
should be dismissed.
Issue:
W/N petition for certiorari is proper
Ruling:
Yes. Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
states that an appeal may be taken only from a final order that
completely disposes of the case; that no appeal may be taken
from (a) an order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration; (b) an order denying a petition for relief or any
similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (c) an
interlocutory order; (d) an order disallowing or dismissing an
appeal; (e) an order denying a motion to set aside a judgment
by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud,
mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) an
order of execution; (g) a judgment or final order for or against
one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while
the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal
therefrom; or (h) an order dismissing an action without
prejudice. In all the above instances where the judgment or
final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. In
this case, the RTC Order granting the motion to dismiss filed
by private respondent is a final order because it terminates the
proceedings against her, but it falls within exception (g) of the
Rule since the case involves several defendants, and the
complaint for damages against these defendants is still
pending.12 Since there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in law, the remedy of a special civil action for
certiorari is proper as there is a need to promptly relieve the
aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the acts of an
inferior court or tribunal.
Macasalang v. Zamora
Facts:
The respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
petitioners, alleging that “the [petitioner] sold to [respondents]
a residential land located in Danao City” and that “the
[petitioner] requested to be allowed to live in the house” with a
“promise to vacate as soon as she would be able to find a new
residence.” They further alleged that despite their demand after
a year, the petitioner failed or refused to vacate the premises.
MTCC declared the petitioner default and allowed the
respondents to present their case. MTCC rendered decision in
favor of respondents. Petitioners appealed to RTC which the
RTC granted and found that the complaint for failed to state a
cause of action thus plaintiffs’ Motion for Execution of
Judgment of the lower court is rendered moot by this judgment.
The respondents appealed to the CA, assailing the RTC’s
decision for “disregarding the allegations in the complaint” in
determining the existence or non-existence of a cause of action.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision and reinstated
the MTCC’s decision in favor of the respondents. The
petitioners argue before the court that RTC in the exercise of its
Appellate Jurisdiction is not limited to the assigned errors in
the Memorandum or brief filed before it, it can decide the case
based on the entire records of the case, as provided for in Rule
40, Sec.
Issue:
W/N RTC may rule upon an issue not raised in an appeal
Ruling:
Yes. The CA might have been correct had the appeal been a
first appeal from the RTC to the CA or another proper superior
court, in which instance Section 8 of Rule 51, which applies to
appeals from the RTC to the CA, imposes the express
limitation of the review to only those specified in the
assignment of errors or closely related to or dependent on an
assigned error and properly argued in the appellant’s brief. But
the petitioner’s appeal herein, being taken from the decision of
the MTCC to the RTC, was governed by a different rule,
specifically Section 18 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which
provides that “the judgment or final order shall be appealable
to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the
same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in
the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may
be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial
Court.” As such, the RTC, in exercising appellate jurisdiction,
was not limited to the errors assigned in the petitioner’s appeal
memorandum, but could decide on the basis of the entire record
of the proceedings had in the trial court and such memoranda
and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by
the RTC. The difference between the procedures for deciding
on review is traceable to Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129. As a result, the RTC presently decides all appeals from the
MTC based on the entire record of the proceedings had in the
court of origin and such memoranda or briefs as are filed in the
RTC.
Cruz v MIAA
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract against
MIAA, she alleged
alleged that she executed a Contract of Leasewith MIAA over
aproperty situated at Pasay City, in order to establish a
commercial arcade for sublease to other businesses. She
averred that MIAA failed to inform her that part of the leased
premises is subject to an easement of public use since the same
was adjacent to the Parañaque River. As a result, she was not
able to profit because of his tenant’s refusal to pay. MIAA filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and
improper venue. RTC dismissed the case ruling that Cruz
committed forum shopping. On appeal, CA affirmed with
modification held that there was an improper venue. Petitioner
now go to court contending that CA may only resolve errors
assigned by the appellant and, conversely, cannot rule on a
distinct issue raised by the appellee. In this accord, she argues
that in ruling on the issue of improper venue, the CA
practically allowed MIAA to pursue a lost appeal, although the
latter did not file a notice of appeal within the proper
reglementary period nor pay the prescribed docket fees.
Issue:
W/N the CA erred in dismissing Cruz’s appeal on the basis of
improper venue.
Ruling:
Yes. Jurisprudence dictates that the appellee’s role in the
appeal process is confined only to the task of refuting the
assigned errors interposed by the appellant. Since the appellee
is not the party who instituted the appeal and accordingly has
not complied with the procedure prescribed therefor, he merely
assumes a defensive stance and his interest solely relegated to
the affirmance of the judgment appealed from. In the case at
bar, the Court finds that the CA committed a reversible error in
sustaining the dismissal of the Pasig case on the ground of
improper venue because the same was not an error raised by
Cruz who was the appellant before it. Pursuant to the above-
mentioned principles, the CA cannot take cognizance of
MIAA’s position that the venue was improperly laid since,
being the appellee, MIAA’s participation was confined to the
refutation of the appellant’s assignment of errors. CA should
not have taken this ground into consideration when it
appreciated the case before it. By acting otherwise, it therefore
committed a reversible error, which thereby warrants the
reversal of its Decision.
Gonzales v Pe
Facts:
Respondent was engaged in the business of construction
materials, and had been transacting business with petitioner.
Respondent agreed to supply cement for the construction
projects of petitioner Spouses Rodriguez. Petitioner gave a
blank LBP check to guarantee the payment of 15,698 bags of
Portland cement valued at P1,507,008.00, issued by
respondent. However, a year later, respondent filled up blank
LBP Check No. 6563066, by placing P2,062,000.00 and June
30, 1999, corresponding to the amount and date. Subsequently,
petitioners filed a complaint against Pe complaint alleged that
they entrusted blank LBP Check No. 6563066 to respondent so
as to facilitate the approval of the pre-payment application of
petitioner Nestor Rodriguez with the DPWH and that after
payment of the said amount, respondent would return the LBP
check. According to them, after having paid respondent the
amount of P2,306,500.00, which is P139,160.00 more than the
amount of P2,167,340.00 (representing the value for 23,360
bags of cement taken for the Kalibo project), they were cleared
of any liability. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners declaring that
they are fully paid and hence they are no longer liable to
respondent. Respondent filed a notice of appeal to CA.
petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to Dismiss
Appeal, and for Issuance of Writ of Execution, stating that
respondent’s appeal should be dismissed as the same was not
perfected due to non-payment of docket and other lawful fees
as required under Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. CA
dismissed petitioner’s motion and reversed the RTC decision.
Petitioners now go to court arguing that since respondent failed
to pay the docket and other legal fees at the time he filed the
Notice of Appeal, his appeal was deemed not perfected in
contemplation of the law.
Issue:
W/N the appeal was perfected
Ruling:
No. The Court explained that the procedural requirement under
Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment of
the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is
both mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an
appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. The full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must
be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment
or final order appealed from. The requirement of paying the
full amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed
period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. The
payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such
payment, the appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does
not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and
executory.
Land Bank v. CA
Facts:
Private respondent Elizabeth is the owner of 15 ha land in
Nueva Ecija. Ten hectares of the land were expropriated by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Presidential
Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228. Not satisfied with
the valuation, Elizabeth, through her attorney-in-fact filed a
complaint against petitioner before RTC acting as Special
Agrarian Court (SAC). SAC adopted the DAR’s valuation.
Elizabeth’s MR was denied, she elevated the case before CA
using rule 41 or ordinary appeal. Landbank filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that an ordinary appeal is the wrong
remedy, the proper mode being by way of a petition for review,
citing Section 60 of Republic Act No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Hence, Land Bank
concluded that the appellate court had no jurisdiction over the
case, the SAC decision having attained finality. CA denied the
motion, Land Bank argues the same contention before the
Court.
Issue:
W/N an ordinary appeal is not the proper remedy
Ruling:
Yes. The proper mode of appeal from decisions of Regional
Trial Courts sitting as SACs is by petition for review under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court and not through an ordinary
appeal under Rule 41. Sec 60 of RA 6657 clearly statesthat the
said mode of appeal (petition for review) should be adopted.
What is indisputable is that Section 60 expressly regards a
petition for review as the proper way of appealing decisions of
agrarian courts. So far, there is no rule prescribed by this Court
expressly disallowing the said procedure. The adoption of a
petition for review as the mode of appeal is justified in order to
“hasten” the resolution of cases involving issues on just
compensation of expropriated lands under RA 6657. “The
reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for review when
appealing cases decided by the Special Agrarian Courts in
eminent domain case is the need for absolute dispatch in the
determination of just compensation. Just compensation means
not only paying the correct amount but also paying for the land
within a reasonable time from its acquisition. Although appeal
is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been held,
time and again, that the right thereto is not a natural right or a
part of due process but is merely a statutory privilege. Thus, the
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional
and failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal
will render the judgment final and executory. Once a decision
attains finality, it becomes the law of the case irrespective of
whether the decision is erroneous or not and no court—not
even the Supreme Court—has the power to revise, review,
change or alter the same.
Barangay Sangalang v. Barangay Manggahan
Facts:
This is a barangay jurisdiction dispute between petitioner and
respondent both situated in Batangas. Petitioner claims the lots
to be within their territorial jurisdiction, whereas respondent
maintains that they are within their territorial boundary. The
case was lodged with Sangguniang Bayan which ruled in favor
of petitioner. Respondent appealed before RTC which reverses
SB’s decision. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to CA
which was denied on the ground that petitioner had availed
itself of the wrong remedy in filing a notice of appeal instead
of filing a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court because RTC rendered the decision in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. Petitioner now go to court asserting that
CA erred in applying strict procedural rules.
Issue:
W/N CA erred in dismissing the case
Ruling:
Yes. this Court finds that the CA was correct in holding that
petitioner had availed itself of the wrong remedy. In the case at
bar, it is clear that when the case was appealed to the RTC, the
latter took cognizance of the case in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, not its original jurisdiction. Hence, any further
appeal from the RTC Decision must conform to the provisions
of the Rule 42 of Rules of Court. Thus, notwithstanding
petitioner’s wrong mode of appeal, the CA should not have so
easily dismissed the petition, considering that the parties
involved are local government units and that what is involved
is the determination of their respective territorial jurisdictions.
the CA’s strict reliance on the requirements under Section 13
of Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure relating to subject
index and page references in an appellant’s brief is, to stress,
putting a premium on technicalities. While the purpose of
Section 13, Rule 44, is to present to the appellate court in the
most helpful light, the factual and legal antecedents of a case
on appeal,28 said rule should not be strictly applied
considering that petitioner’s brief before the CA contained only
9 pages, the records of the case consisted only of a few
documents and pleadings, and there was no testimonial
evidence.
Esteves v. Sarmiento
Facts:
, petitioner and private respondent both ran for the position of
municipal mayor in Aurora. Thereafter, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed private respondent as the duly-elected
Mayor of Casiguran. Petitioner filed an election protest before
RTC Baler. RTC then issued a precautionary protection order
directing the Municipal Treasurer and Election Officer of
Casiguran to take immediate steps to safeguard the integrity of
all the ballot boxes. Subsequently, RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of private respondent’s
counter-protest on the ground of non-payment of filing fee. It
prompted the private respondent to file a petition for
prohibition before COMELEC seeking to nullify the RTC
Order dated 8 September 2007 denying private respondent’s
motion to dismiss. The Comelec division issued TRO against
RTC. Thereafter, petitioner filed before this Court a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for
issuance of a temporary restraining order against Comelec
decision. Petitioner asserts that : (1) the COMELEC (Second
Division) has no jurisdiction to entertain special relief cases
like petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus and (2)
the challenged resolution did not comply with the
constitutional requirement that it must be decided by a majority
vote of all the members.
Issue:
W/N certiorari will prosper
Ruling:
No. Under the aforequoted constitutional provisions, the
requirement that an aggrieved party must first file a motion for
reconsideration of a resolution of the Division to the
COMELEC en banc is mandatory and jurisdictional in
invoking the power of review of the Supreme Court. Failure to
abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for
dismissal of the petition. The power of review of the Supreme
Court of the rulings of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) is limited only to the final decision or resolution
of the Commission on Elections. COMELEC) en banc and not
the final resolution of its Division.
Metrobank v. CA
Facts:
A check was drawn against Metrobank was deposited with
respondent United Overseas Bank (UOB). The check was then
forwarded for through the PCHC, and, on the same date,
Metrobank cleared the check. Because UOB refused to accept
the return and to reimburse Metrobank the amount it paid on
the check, the latter filed a complaint before the PCHC
Arbitration Committee, contending in the main that UOB had
the duty to examine the deposited check for any material
alteration. However, Metrobank informed UOB that it was
returning the check on account of material alteration.
Metrobank moved for several postponements, thus UOB
moved for the dismissal of the case which the Arbitration
Committee granted. Metrobank filed MR which was denied,
during the filing of third MR, it received communication from
the PCHC Executive Secretary informing it that the proper
remedy following Section 13 of PCHC Rules was for it to file a
notice of appeal with the PCHC and a petition for review with
RTC. Metrobank then filed a petition for review before RTC.
RTC dismissed that case ruled that it had no jurisdiction over
the petition, the same having been filed out of time. CA
affirmed.
Issue:
W/N petition for review before RTC is proper.
Ruling:
No, petitioner had several judicial remedies available at its
disposal after the Arbitration Committee denied its Motion for
Reconsideration. It may petition the proper RTC to issue an
order vacating the award on the grounds provided for under
Section24 of the Arbitration Law. Petitioner likewise has the
option to file a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court with the Court of Appeals on questions of fact, of law,
or mixed questions of fact and law. Lastly, petitioner may file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on
the ground that the Arbitrator Committee acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Since this case
involves acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, the
petition should be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals. . Clearly, it erred in the procedure it chose for judicial
review of the arbitral award. In the instant case, petitioner and
respondent have agreed that the PCHC Rules would govern in
case of controversy. However, since the PCHC Rules came
about only as a result of an agreement between and among
member banks of PCHC and not by law, it cannot confer
jurisdiction to the RTC. Thus, the portion of the PCHC Rules
granting jurisdiction to the RTC to review arbitral awards, only
on questions of law, cannot be given effect.
JP Latex Technology Inc v. Balloons Granger Inc
Facts:
respondent Granger filed a complaint for rescission and
damages against petitioner JP Latex Technology, Inc., a
domestic corporation primarily engaged in the manufacture of
latex and balloons. Respondent alleged that Ogino,
representing himself as the president of petitioner corporation,
entered into a contract for the sale of respondent Granger’s
machinery consisting of equipment for the amount of
US$1,230,000.00 and other non-cash considerations.
According to respondent Granger, it made several written and
verbal demands for the full payment of the purchase price to no
avail. RTC rendered decision in favor of Granger. Respondent
Granger moved for the execution pending appeal of the RTC
decision. Pending the motion, petitioner filed MR over the said
decision. RTC granted the respondent’s motion of execution
pending appeal on the ground that the equipment under
litigation were deteriorating and that petitioner might not have
sufficient funds to pay for the damages, thereby leaving
respondents with an empty judgment. Petitioner filed certiorari
before CA assailing that RTC had seriously erred and gravely
abused his discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in arbitrarily and unreasonably issuing
the Order issuing execution pending appeal. CA denied.
Petitioner filed for TRO before the court raising the same
ground.
Issue:
W/N the writ of execution pending appeal is proper
Ruling:
No. According to Sec 2 Rule 39 Discretionary execution may
only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order
after due hearing.” It is clear from the caption of the provision
that discretionary execution is allowed only when the period to
appeal has commenced but before the trial court loses
jurisdiction over the case. The period to appeal where a motion
for reconsideration has been filed as in the instant case
commences only upon the receipt of a copy of the order
disposing of the motion for reconsideration. The pendency of a
motion for reconsideration, therefore, prevents the running of
the period to appeal. In the instant case, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision. The records of
the case show that the motion had not been acted upon by the
RTC before it ruled on the motion for execution “pending
appeal.” That being the case, the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration has prevented the period to appeal from even
commencing. The period within which a party may move for
an execution pending appeal of the trial court’s decision has
not yet also started.
Geologistics Inc v. Gateway Electronics Corp
Facts:
Petitioner, a freight corporation, filed action for the recovery of
sum of money against respondent before RTC prayed for a
judgment award in the amount of P4,769,954.32, representing
the fees, including interest owed by respondent Gateway for
petitioner's services as customs broker and freight forwarder.
RTC subsequently issued a writ of preliminary attachment on
the properties of respondent Gateway, prompting the latter to
move for its dissolution. RTC rendered decision in favor of
petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion for execution pending
appeal on the ground of ‘good reasons’ : : (1) respondent
Gateway was guilty of fraud in contracting its obligations to
petitioner; (2) the appeal was interposed to delay the case; (3)
respondent Gateway had ceased operations and was in
imminent danger of insolvency; and (4) the counter-bond
posted by respondent Gateway could be the subject of
execution. RTC granted the motion. Respondent filed certiorari
before CA asserting that the ground for motion for execution
pending appeal is not sufficient to grant such. CA reversed and
annulled RTC’s decision.
Issue:
W/N the petitioner has ‘good reasons’ to warrant the issuance
of writ of execution pending appeal
Ruling:
No. The grounds cited by the RTC in allowing the
discretionary execution of its decision cannot be considered
"good reasons." The alleged admission by respondent Gateway
of its liability is more apparent than real because the issue of
liability is precisely the reason the case was elevated on appeal.
The exact amount of respondent Gateway's liability to
petitioner remains under dispute even if, as claimed by
petitioner, the evidence on record indicates that respondent
Gateway's obligation is almost a certainty. Precisely the appeal
process must be allowed to take its course all the way to the
finality of judgment to determine once and for all the incidents
of the suit. Another factor that militates against petitioner's
claim that any judgment in its favor may become illusory if
execution pending appeal is not allowed is the fact that
petitioner is considered a secured creditor on account of the
counterbond posted by respondent surety. The said
counterbond, posted as it was to discharge the attachment in
favor of petitioner, serves as security for the payment of any
judgment that petitioner may recover in the instant action.33
Following its argument that respondent Gateway's obligation to
petitioner is almost a certainty, petitioner will not find it hard to
recover its monetary claim once final judgment is rendered in
its favor because petitioner can certainly garnish the
counterbond.
Top Management Corp v Fajardo
Sps Topacio v. Banco Filipino
Facts:
Petitioners obtained a loan from respondent bank, to secure the
loan the petitioners executed REM over their property in
Bulacan. They failed to pay then respondents file a Petition for
Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, pursuant to Act No.
3135. The Sheriff conducted public auction where the
respondent was the highest bidder. The respondent filed a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession over the
mortgaged property before RTC. The writ of possession was
not implemented7 because the petitioners, filed with the RTC,
a petition to set aside the auction sale and the writ of
possession. However, more than 2 years after filing the answer,
then Presiding Judge Capulong issued an Order dismissing the
respondent’s petition for the issuance of a writ of possession on
the ground of “failure to prosecute”. After 6 years, respondent
filed a Motion to Clarify the Order. RTC made a clarification
that the Order of Dismissal of December 16, 1986 refers to the
dismissal of the “main case for issuance of a writ of
possession.” However, then presiding judge Leachon set aside
the order and granted the prayer for issuance of writ of
possession. RTC denied petitioner’s MR which CA affirmed.
Petitioners argued before the court that the writ of possession
issued on February 16, 1984 may no longer be enforced by a
mere motion but by a separate action, considering that more
than five years had elapsed from its issuance. The petitioners
also argue that Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies
to the present case since a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession is neither a special proceeding nor a land
registration case.
Issue:
W/N the issuance of writ of possession is proper
Ruling:
Yes. We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in
support of the above assignment, except in so far as it supports
his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has
become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period
of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the
judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision
in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be
enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but
within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision
of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to
special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so
because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a
judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his
failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as
provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against
the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to
establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is
sought to beestablished. After the ownership has been proved
and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to
enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse
or losing party had been in possession of the land and the
winning party desires to oust him therefrom.”
Ting v. Heirs of Diego Lirio
Facts:
Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10,
1982 directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the
corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title
in favor of the spouses Lirio. On 1997, petitioner filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for
registration of title to the same lot. Respondents opposed on the
said registration calling attention to the December 10, 1976
decision which had become final and executory on January 29,
1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of petitioner’s
application on the ground of res judicata. Petitioner argued
before the court that although the decision in LRC No. N-983
had become final and executory on January 29, 1977, no decree
of registration has been issued by the LRA; it was only on 2003
that the “extinct” decision belatedly surfaced as basis of
respondents’ motion to dismiss the caseand as no action for
revival of the said decision was filed by respondents after the
lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period, “the cause of action in
the dormant judgment passed into extinction thus cannot be a
basis of res judicata.
Issue:
W/N the case is not barred by res judicata by reason of the
lapse of ten—year prescriptive period.
Ruling:
No. In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of
a private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the
court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the
case may be, and ordering its registration in his name
constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world. It
becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period
is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration. On
the ground that it was an extinct decision, authority for this
theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that
judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after
five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.)
This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not
applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration
case. This is so because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the
adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within
a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings
the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel
of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has
been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further
proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except
when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the
land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Central Surety and Insurance Company v. Planters Product Inc.
Facts:
Olson entered entered into a dealership agreement with
respondent whereby he agreed to purchase, in cash or credit,
fertilizers and agricultural chemicals from respondent for
resale. To secure Olson’s faithful compliance of his
obligations, Vista Insurance and petitioner executed a surety
undertaking in favor of respondent. Olson failed to pay
respondent prompting the latter to claim form petitioner and
Vista insurance. Respondent filed a complaint for sum of
money before RTC. On 1991, RTC found petitioner liable to
respondent. Petitioner appealed to CA however dismissed. On
1993, respondent filed a motion for execution which the RTC
granted. Although it was not implemented. In the CA,
petitioner filed a “Very Urgent Motion to Set Aside the CA
Resolution of December 7, 1992 and to Re-Open Appeal with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order
then it also filed certiorari before the Court assailing CA’s
decision. On 1999, respondent filed another motion for
issuance of writ of execution. Petitioner went to CA arguing
that the motion is not proper because motion is only proper 5
years after the decision became final. CA dismissed.
Issue:
W/N a motion which was filed 6 years after the decision
became final is not permissible.
Ruling:
No. Under Rule 39, Section 6,15 the rule is that a final
judgment may be executed by mere motion within five years
from the date of entry of judgment. However, the rule is not
absolute and admits one notable exception and that is when the
delay in enforcing the judgment is caused by the party assailing
the filing of the motion. Based on the attendant facts, the
present case falls within the exception. Petitioner triggered the
series of delays in the execution of the RTC’s final decision by
filing numerous motions and appeals in the appellate courts,
even causing the CA’s issuance of the TRO enjoining the
enforcement of said decision. It cannot now debunk the filing
of the motion just so it can delay once more the payment of its
obligation to respondent. It is obvious that petitioner is merely
resorting to dilatory maneuvers to skirt its legal obligation. that
the purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for
enforcing a judgment or action is to prevent a party from
sleeping on his rights. Far from sleeping on its rights,
respondent pursued its claim by persistently seeking the
execution of the RTC’s final judgment of November 6, 1991. It
would be unjust to frustrate respondent’s effort to collect
payment from petitioner on sheer technicality. While strict
compliance to the rules of procedure is desired, liberal
interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement
of the rules will not serve the ends of justice.
Raymundo v. Galen Realty and Mining Corporation
Facts:
Respondent filed an action for reconveyance and damages
against petitioner. The subject of the case was a property
owned by petitioner which was sold by the latter to respondent
then sold by the respondent to Tensorex. RTC ruled that the
transaction between petitioner and respondent was an equitable
mortgage to satisfy the loan of Galen to Raymundo. On appeal
CA modified and nullified the deed of sale between
Raymundo and Tensorex and ordered Raymundo to reconvey
the property upon Galen’s payment of its loan and if
reconveyance is not feasible, Raymundo and Tensorex should
solidarily pay Galen. Galen moved for the execution of CA’s
decision should order Raymundo and Tensorex to solidarily
pay the following: (1) the current fair market value of the
property less Galen’s mortgage debt of P3,865,000.00 with
legal interest; and (2) the award of damages and costs of suit.
Raymundo. Tensorex opposed the writ arguing that CA
decision provided for two alternatives not only the option given
in the writ of execution. However, RTC granted Galen’s
motion and moved for the auction sale. Raymundo filed a
Manifestation objecting to the auction sale and expressing his
willingness to reconvey the property upon payment in full by
Galen of its indebtedness. Galen opposed claiming that
reconveyance is not feasible. Raymundo now filed certiorari
before the court contending that the writ changed the tenor of
the final and executory CA decision as his obligation under
said decision is to reconvey the property upon Galen’s payment
of its obligation.
Issue:
W/N the writ changed the tenor of CA decision
Ruling:
Yes. The manner of execution of a final judgment is not a
matter of “choice”. It does not revolve upon the pleasure or
discretion of a party as to how a judgment should be satisfied,
unless the judgment expressly provides for such discretion.
Foremost rule in execution of judgments is that “a writ of
execution must conform strictly to every essential particular of
the judgment promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the
judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of
the judgment sought to be executed.” In this case, The RTC
ruled in favor of Galen, finding that the transaction between
them is an equitable mortgage, which was affirmed by the CA.
Both the RTC and the CA, in the dispositive portions of their
respective decisions, ordered Raymundo to “reconvey the
subject property to [Galen] upon [Galen’s] payment to
Raymundo plus legal interest complaint, until it is fully paid,
or if reconveyance is no longer feasible, for x x x Raymundo
and Tensorex to solidarily pay [Galen] the fair market value of
the subject property by expert appraisal. It is only when
reconveyance is no longer feasible that Raymundo and
Tensorex should pay Galen the fair market value of the
property . The existence of subsequent encumbrances on the
property is also not a sufficient ground to insist on the payment
of its fair market value. To begin with, it was Galen which
sought the return of the property by filing the civil case.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by Raymundo, whatever
transactions Tensorex entered into is subject to the notice of lis
pendens which serves as a constructive notice to purchasers or
other persons subsequently dealing with the same property.
Buado v. CA
Facts:
The case stemmed on a RTC decision ordering Erlinda to pay
damages and was affirmed by CA and SC. Thereafter, RTC
issued writ of execution. Finding Erlinda Nicol’s personal
properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy
Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on execution.
After the public auction, an affidavit of third-party claim from
one Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff
prompting petitioners to put up a sheriff’s indemnity bond.
Almost a year later on 2 February 1994, Romulo Nicol (respondent),
the husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of
certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against
petitioners and the deputy sheriff. Respondent, as plaintiff therein,
alleged that the defendants, now petitioners, connived and directly
levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting the
personal properties of Erlinda Nicol. Respondent averred that there
was no proper publication and posting of the notice of sale. RTC
dismissed the petition of respondent, CA reversed.
Issue:
W/N the husband of the judgment debtor may file an
independent action to protect the conjugal property subject to
execution
Ruling:
—Apart from the remedy of terceria available to a third-party
claimant or to a stranger to the foreclosure suit against the sheriff or
officer effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title
and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, a third-party claimant
may also resort to an independent separate action, the object of
which is the recovery of ownership or possession of the property
seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful
seizure and detention of the property. If a separate action is the
recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a which the
judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing a
claim in the court that issued the writ.forum of competent
jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the action in which
the judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing
a claim in the court that issued the writ.
A third-party claim must be filed by a person other than the judgment
debtor or his agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may
file a third-party claim. This leads us to the question: Is the husband,
who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property is being
executed on account of the other spouse being the judgment obligor,
considered a “stranger?” In determining whether the husband is a
stranger to the suit, the character of the property must be taken into
account.
Esguerra v. Holcim Phils Inc.
Facts:
Therein respondent Esguerra filed an action to annul the Free
Patent in the name of de Guzman. Esguerra claimed that he
was the owner of a lot located at Bulacan. Esguerra learned that
the said parcel of land was being offered for sale by de
Guzman Holcim Phils Inc. Esguerra also demanded that the
portion of his property, which has been encroached upon and
included in de Guzman’s Free Patent, be excluded. He later
amended his complaint to implead Hi-Cement as a co-
defendant since the latter was hauling marble from the subject
land. He also prayed that Hi-Cement be ordered to desist from
hauling marble, to account for the marble already hauled and to
pay him. RTC dismissed the complaint but on appeal, CA
reversed the decision ruled in favor of Esguerra which the
Court affirmed. Thereafter, heirs of Esguerra filed a motion
manifesting that the Decision yet to be executed. RTC granted
the motion, however , de Guzman and HOLCIM were not
examined. Rather, the petitioners presented Engineer Louie
Balicanta who testified that upon an examination of the
topographical maps covering the land of the deceased Esguerra,
the estimated volume of limestone hauled or quarried
therefrom covering the years 1990 to 2003 was 3,535,020.471
cubic meters. RTC found that HOLCIM quarried an amount of
91, 872,576 and ordered the latter to pay Esguerra the same.
HOLCIM filed a motion for reconsideration.26 It alleged that it
did not owe any amount of royalty to the petitioners for the
extracted limestone from the subject land. RTC denied the MR
however reversed through petition for certiorari before CA.
Petitioners argue before the Court that: 1.) argue that the CA
gravely erred when it did not dismiss HOLCIM’s petition for
certiorari on the ground of improper remedy 2.) that HOLCIM
is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC in
conducting a hearing on the exact amount of royalty that
HOLCIM must pay the petitioners
Issue:
W/N petition for certiorari is improper remedy, W/N
petitioners are estopped
Ruling:
No. In all the above instances where the judgment or final
order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Section 1(f), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is explicit that no
appeal may be taken from an order of execution and a party
who challenges such order may file a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.63 An order of
execution, when issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may be the subject
of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
No. At the execution stage, the only thing left for the trial court
to do is to implement the final and executory judgment; and the
dispositive portion of the decision controls the execution of
judgment. The final judgment of this Court cannot be altered or
modified, except for clerical errors, misprisions or omissions.
Indeed, the final judgment does not direct HOLCIM nor its
predecessor Hi-Cement to pay a certain amount to Esguerra
and his heirs. What was required from HOLCIM to do was
merely to account for the payments it made to de Guzman.
Sections 36 and 37 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court are
resorted to only when the judgment remains unsatisfied, and
there is a need for the judgment obligor to appear and be
examined concerning his property and income for their
application to the unsatisfied amount in the judgment. In the
instant case, the decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 40140 as
affirmed by the Court calls on HOLCIM to simply make an
accounting of the royalty paid to de Guzman. Unfortunately,
the trial court, instead of facilitating the accounting of
payments made by HOLCIM to de Guzman, proceeded to
adduce evidence on the amount of limestone extracted from the
disputed area and imposed the monetary liability on HOLCIM.
Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. CIR
Fact:
Believing that it made an overpayment of the BPRT, petitioner
filed with the BIR Large Taxpayers Assessment and
Investigation Division an administrative claim for refund or
issuance of its tax credit certificate in the total amount of PHP
22,562,851.17. Alleging the inaction of the BIR, petitioners
brought the case before CTA. the CTA Second Division found
that petitioner indeed paid the total amount of PHP
67,688,553.51 representing the 15% BPRT on its RBU profits
amounting to PHP 451,257,023.29 for 2002 and prior taxable
years. However, the court a quo did not grant the refund on the
ground that petitioner violated the 15-day period mandated
under Section III paragraph (2) of RMO No. 1-2000. Further,
the CTA Second Division relied on Mirant (Philippines)
Operations Corporation (formerly Southern Energy Asia-
Pacific Operations [Phils.], Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue9 (Mirant) where the CTA En Banc ruled that before
the benefits of the tax treaty may be extended to a foreign
corporation wishing to avail itself thereof, the latter should first
invoke the provisions of the tax treaty and prove that they
indeed apply to the corporation. CTA En Banc affirmed.
Issue:
W/N CTA’s reliance to Mirant ruling is proper
Ruling:
No. By virtue of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, we are bound to
extend to a branch in the Philippines, remitting to its head
office in Germany, the benefit of a preferential rate equivalent
to 10% BPRT. The CTA ruled that prior application for a tax
treaty relief is mandatory, and noncompliance with this
prerequisite is fatal to the taxpayer’s availment of the
preferential tax rate. However, this Court’s minute resolution
on Mirant is not a binding precedent. With respect to the same
subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties,
it constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or another
subject matter (even with the same parties and issues) is
involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent.
Besides, there are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions
between a minute resolution and a decision. The constitutional
requirement under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution that the facts and the law on which the
judgment is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly
applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions. A minute
resolution is signed only by the clerk of court by authority of
the justices, unlike a decision. It does not require the
certification of the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions,
minute resolutions are not published in the Philippine Reports.
Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a
decision. Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or
principles of law which constitute binding precedent in a
decision duly signed by the members of the Court and certified
by the Chief Justice. Even if we had affirmed the CTA in
Mirant, the doctrine laid down in that Decision cannot bind this
Court in cases of a similar nature. There are differences in
parties, taxes, taxable periods, and treaties involved; more
importantly, the disposition of that case was made only through
a minute resolution.
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
Lim v. Sps Lazaro
Facts:
Lim. filed a complaint5 for sum of money with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment before the RTC
against Sps Lazaro for the sum of 2.1M representing the
dishonored checks issued by the latter for its due debt. RTC
granted the preliminary attachment. It three (3) parcels of land
situated in Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) were levied upon. Thereafter, the parties entered into
compromise agreement whereby Sps. Lazaro agreed to pay
Lim, Jr. the amount of P2,351,064.80 on an installment basis.
Subsequently, Sps. Lazaro filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking
to lift the writ of preliminary attachment annotated on the
subject TCTs, which the RTC granted held that considering the
case had already been considered closed and terminated by the
rendition of the January 5, 2007 Amended Decision on the
basis of the September 22, 2006 compromise agreement, the
writ of preliminary attachment should be lifted and quashed..
Petitioner now questions the lifting of the writ.
Issue:
W/N the lifting of writ was proper
Ruling:
NO. Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within which an
attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a
final judgment, jurisprudence dictates that the said lien
continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had under
execution issued on the judgment or until the judgment is
satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the same
manner provided by law. Records indicate that while the
parties have entered into a compromise agreement which had
already been approved by the RTC in its January 5, 2007
Amended Decision, the obligations thereunder have yet to be
fully complied with — particularly, the payment of the total
compromise amount of P2,351,064.80. Hence, given that the
foregoing debt remains unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaro’s
properties should have continued to subsist. The court
pronounce in line of cases that a writ of attachment is not
extinguished by the execution of a compromise agreement
between the parties. Lest it be misunderstood, the lien or
security obtained by an attachment even before judgment, is in
the nature of a vested interest which affords specific security
for the satisfaction of the debt put in suit.30 Verily, the lifting
of the attachment lien would be tantamount to an abdication of
Lim, Jr.’s rights over Sps. Lazaro’s properties which the Court,
absent any justifiable ground therefor, cannot allow.
Lukang v. Pagbilao Dev Corp
Facts:
Arseno had two wives: Mercedes and Leoncia. On both wives,
he had 13 children all in all. The Spouses had several
properties, when Arsenio died, his 13 children and Marcedes
executed Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate,8in which they
agreed to adjudicate and transfer among themselves the rights,
interest and ownership of the four (4) parcels of land. There
were several issuance of certificate of titles to the heirs. While
the dispute over the properties between the heirs is still
pending, Respondent purchased 6 properties which were the
subject of the dispute. Pedro, the son of deceased, filed an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction with ex-parte
prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) against
Respondent. RTC granted but CA reversed on the ground that
Pedro’s right over the said properties was not clear as it was
contingent on the outcome or result of the cases pending before
the RTC; that it was not a present right but a contingent or
future right which was not covered by injunction; and that there
was no paramount necessity because there would be no great
and irreparable injury.
Issue:
W/N CA erred in reversing RTC decision
Ruling:
Yes, a TRO is proper in this case. Thus, a writ of preliminary
injunction may be issued upon the concurrence of the following
essential requisites, to wit: (a) the invasion of right sought to be
protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the
complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.36 While a clear showing of the right is necessary, its
existence need not be conclusively established. Hence, to be
entitled to the writ, it is sufficient that the complainant shows
that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in
his complaint. The well-entrenched rule is that the grant or
denial of the writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the
sound discretion of the court. The trial court is given a wide
latitude in this regard. Thus, in the absence of a manifest abuse,
such discretion must not be interfered with. In the present case,
the Court finds the RTC grant of injunction to be in order. It is
to be emphasized that the deeds of sale between the vendors of
the six parcels of land and the Pagbilao Development
Corporation were executed on 1993. The Affidavit of Adverse
Claim and the Notice of Lis Pendens ver the six properties
were all inscribed 1989. There is no question, therefore, that
when the respondent bought the properties from the vendors, it
had full knowledge that there were questions involving
ownership of the parcels of land it bought. Convinced, the RTC
made a preliminary determination that their right should be
protected by a writ of preliminary injunction. Their claimed
ownership and actual possession were then being violated by
PDC which had started entering the premises and preparing the
property for the construction of a power plant for liquefied
natural gas. Unless legally stopped, such act would indeed
cause irreparable damage to the petitioner and other claimants.
As claimed co-owners, the petitioner and the other heirs have
the right to remain in possession of the subject properties
pendente lite. The legal or practical remedy of PDC, who
gambled its lot in purchasing the properties despite the
annotations, is to await the final outcome of the cases or to
amicably settle its problems with all the co-owners, co-heirs or
claimants.
Buyco v. Baraquia
Facts:
Respondent filed a complaint before RTC against petitioner for
the establishment of a permanent right of way, injunction and
damages with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order, to enjoin the Buycos from closing off a private road
within their property which he had been using. RTC granted
the preliminary injunction. However by decision on Feb 2014,
RTC court dismissed respondent’s complaint for failure to
establish the concurrence of the essential requisites for the
establishment of an easement of right of way and lifted the
preliminary injunction. Thereafter respondent later filed with
the trial court a motion to cite petitioner and his brother
Gonzalo in contempt, alleging that they had closed off the
subject road, thus violating the writ of preliminary injunction.
Respondent alleged that that the February 14, 2007 decision
had not yet become final and executory, hence, the writ of
preliminary injunction remained to be valid, efficacious and
obligatory, rendering petitioner’s act of closing the road on
March 1, 2007 an indirect contempt of court. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration of the RTC’s decision, contending that a
preliminary injunction, once quashed, ceases to exist, and that
he and his brother cannot be held guilty of indirect contempt by
mere motion. RTC granted the motion however it ruled that
they can be contempt by verified petition citing Lee v. CA
where it ruled annulling the grant of preliminary injunction in
favor of petitioners has not yet become final on 14 December
2000. In fact, such Decision has not yet become final and
executory even on the very date of this Decision, in view of
petitioners’ appeal with us under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The preliminary injunction, therefore, issued
by the trial court remains valid until the Decision of the Court
of Appeals annulling the same attains finality and violation
thereof constitutes contempt
Issue:
W/N lifting of a writ of preliminary injunction due to the
dismissal of the complaint is immediately executory, even if
the dismissal of the complaint is pending appeal
Ruling:
Yes. A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any
stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final
order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain
from a particular act or acts.8 It is merely a provisional remedy,
adjunct to the main case subject to the latter’s outcome. It is
well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction,
whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo
until the merits of the case can be heard. The present case
having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact
dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction is deemed lifted,
its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served, the
appeal therefrom notwithstanding. A dismissal, discontinuance
or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or
temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution
of the restraining order or temporary injunction,” regardless of
whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration of the
order dismissing the case or appeal therefrom has expired. The
rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken
from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal
does not suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies
that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the
dismissal of the action.
Lui Enterprise v. Zuellig Pharma
Facts:
Respondent is a lessee of a land owned by Lui. Respondent
received a letter from PBC claiming to be the new owner of
the leased property, the bank asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent
directly to it. Zuellig Pharma promptly informed Lui
Enterprises of the Philippine Bank of Communications’ claim
Lui Enterprises wrote to Zuellig Pharma and insisted on its
right to collect the leased property’s rent. Due to this
conflicting claims, Zuellig Pharma filed a case for interpleader
with RTC Makati. Zuellig Pharma alleged that it already
consigned in court P604,024.35 as rental payments. Lui file a
motion to dismiss on the ground that an earlier filed
nullification of deed of dation in payment case pending with
the Regional Trial Court of Davao barred the filing of the
interpleader case. In the nullification of deed of dation in
payment case, Lui Enterprises raised the issue of which
corporation had the better right over the rental payments.18 Lui
Enterprises argued that the same issue was involved in the
interpleader case. To support its argument, Lui Enterprises
cited a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC
Davao, ordering Lui Enterprises and the PBC “[to maintain]
status quo” with respect to the rent. RTC Makati dismissed
Lui’s motion on the ground that it was filed late and thus it
declare that Lui is on default. Thus, the Makati trial court heard
the interpleader case without Lui Enterprises’ participation.
Despite having declared in default, Lui still filed a motion that
the RTC Davao’s decision of issuing status quo be recognized
by RTC Makati and reiterated its reiterated its prayer for the
dismissal of the interpleader case to prevent the possibility of
conflicting rulings. RTC Makati dismissed the motion. On
appeal, CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:
 W/N annulment of deed of dation in payment pending in the
Regional Trial Court of Davao barred the subsequent filing of
the interpleader case in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
Ruling:
No. An interpleader complaint may be filed by a lessee against
those who have conflicting claims over the rent due for the
property leased. This remedy is for the lessee to protect him or
her from “double vexation in respect of one liability.” He or
she may file the interpleader case to extinguish his or her
obligation to pay rent, remove him or her from the adverse
claimants’ dispute, and compel the parties with conflicting
claims to litigate among themselves. In this case, there is no
litis pendentia since there is no identity of parties in the
nullification of deed of dation in payment case and the
interpleader case. Zuellig Pharma is not a party to the
nullification case filed in the Davao trial court. There is also no
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Lui
Enterprises filed the first case to nullify the deed of dation in
payment it executed in favor of the PBC. Zuellig Pharma
subsequently filed the interpleader case to consign in court the
rental payments and extinguish its obligation as lessee. The
interpleader case was necessary and was not instituted to harass
either Lui Enterprises or the Philippine Bank of
Communications. The Court also held that that a court can
issue a writ of preliminary injunction against a co-equal court.
The cited sentence was taken out of context. In Compania
General de Tabacos de Filipinas, this court held that the
Regional Trial Court of Agoo had no power to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction against the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.152 A court cannot enjoin the proceedings of a co-
equal court. . It was a mere order directing the Philippine Bank
of Communications to inform Zuellig Pharma to pay rent to
Lui Enterprises while the status quo order between Lui
Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications was
subsisting.
Republic v. Roque
Respondents filed a declaratory relief before RTC assailing the
constitutionality of RA 9372 otherwise known as “Human
Security Act” as it violates numerous provisions of the Bill of
Rights. Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings, averring
that certain petitions (SC petitions) raising the issue of RA
9372’s constitutionality have been lodged before the Court.
The said motion was granted. Then petitioners filed motion to
dismiss contending that private respondents failed to satisfy the
requisites for declaratory relief. . Likewise, they averred that
the constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been upheld by
the Court in the Southern Hemisphere cases. RTC denied the
petitioner’s motion and held that that the Court did not pass
upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private
respondents’ petition for declaratory relief was properly filed.
Issue:
W/N RTC erred in ruling that respondents satisfied the
requirements of declaratory relief
Ruling:
Yes. Case law states that the following are the requisites for an
action for declaratory relief: first, the subject matter of the
controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are
doubtful and require judicial construction; third, there must
have been no breach of the documents in question; fourth, there
must be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening
seeds” of one between persons whose interests are adverse;
fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
sixth, adequate relief is not available through other means or
other forms of action or proceeding. Based on a judicious
review of the records, the Court observes that while the first,
second,36 and third requirements appear to exist in this case,
the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements, however, remain
wanting. As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that
an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one
exists in this case. Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers
to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely
anticipatory. Corollary thereto, by “ripening seeds” it is meant,
not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that
a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated
the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of a
full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept describes a
state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable litigation
provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by
tranquilizing declaration. A perusal of private respondents’
petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed
to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate
danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Private
respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and
taxpayers and infractions which the government could
prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would
remain untrammelled. As their petition would disclose, private
respondents’ fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks
of certain government officials which were addressed to the
general public.
Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman
Facts:
Petitioner, owner of several racehorses, filed a complaint-
affiddavit against private respondents (Chairman and
Commissioners of Philracom) for violation of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act; malversation; violation of Republic Act
No. 6713. Respondent Ombudsman rendered a Decision
absolving respondents of charges of grave misconduct,
oppression, dishonesty, serious irregularities and violation of
laws. Petitioner filed a MR but was dismissed. Petitioner now
filed certiorari under R65 before CA contends that the Fabian
case applies only to a situation where the decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman is that of conviction. In case of exoneration,
petitioner asserts that under Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 or the Ombudsman Act, the decision is final, executory
and unappealable. Petitioner maintains that his only recourse to
reverse and nullify the same is by way of a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65. OSG comments on the case
arguing that the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed
by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
Supreme Court, applies in this case.
Issue:
W/N certiorari under R65 before CA is proper
Ruling:
Yes. It was clarified that there were two instances where a
decision from Ombudsman becomes final and unappealable:
(1) where the respondent is absolved of the charge; and (2) in
case of conviction, where the penalty imposed is public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one month salary. However, petitioner is not left
without any remedy. In Republic v. Francisco,14 we ruled that
decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies
which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to
judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon
proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When
such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly
misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary
conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual
findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be
reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no
jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. OSG’s contention
is not meritorious. Considering that a special civil action for
certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should
be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. In the same vein, while
petitioner employed the correct mode of review in this case,
i.e., a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, petitioner failed to show grave abuse of discretion
committed by the Office of the Ombudsman. Hence, the
petition must fail.
Republic v. Cantor
Facts:
Respondent and Jerry were married. They lived together as
husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in South Cotobato.
Sometime in 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought
about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach “sexual
climax” whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments;
and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the respondent’s
father. After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and
this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him. After 4
years, respondent filed before RTC a petition petition4 for her
husband’s declaration of presumptive death as she claimed that
she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. RTC
granted and declaring Jerry presumptively dead. OSG appealed
to CA through certiorari where CA dismissed.
Issue:
W/N certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or
final orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code
Ruling:
Yes. Although the Family Code was explicit that the court’s
judgment in summary proceedings, such as the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code, shall be immediately final and executory. With
the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no
longer subject to an appeal, the dispositions and conclusions
therein having become immutable and unalterable not only as
against the parties but even as against the courts. Modification
of the court’s ruling, no matter how erroneous is no longer
permissible. The final and executory nature of this summary
proceeding thus prohibits the resort to appeal. A losing party in
this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy.
While jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from
the trial court’s judgment, an aggrieved party may,
nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to question any abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired. The fact that a
decision has become final does not automatically negate the
original action of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus in connection with orders or processes issued by the
trial court. Certiorari may be availed of where a court has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, and where the ordinary remedy of appeal is not
available.
A.L Network Inc v. Mendejar
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint of sum of money under the Rules
on Small Claims Cases before MTCC. Petitioner claimed that it
was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment
therefor from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, it
contended that the payment of respondent is not sufficient.
MTCC ruled that respondent has indeed paid completely and
dismissed the claims of petitioner. Petitioner appealed through
certiorari with RTC however the latter dismissed the case
finding that the said petition was only filed to circumvent the
non-appealable nature of small claims cases as provided under
Section 2322 of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases.
Issue:
W/N RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court assailing the propriety of the MTCC
Decision in the subject small claims case
Ruling:
Yes. Considering the final nature of a small claims case
decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is
not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately
move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on
appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings
where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the
aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. Truly, an essential requisite for the
availability of the extraordinary remedies under the Rules is an
absence of an appeal nor any "plain, speedy and adequate
remedy" in the ordinary course of law, one which has been so
defined as a "remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial,
speedy and sufficient not merely a remedy which at some time
in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment x x x
complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which
will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of
that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal"
concerned. Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is
an original action29 designed to correct only errors of
jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is
therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that
jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in
turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an
evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its
discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily
disregarding evidence that is material to the controversy.
Galang v. Geronimo
Facts:
Petitioner was proclaimed winner for the mayoralty race in
Romblon. Private respondent, who is also a candidate, filed an
election protest case against petitioner before the RTC. The
following day, the court sheriff went to petitioner’s residence
to serve summons with a copy of the petition. The Sheriff’s
Return of Summons3 stated that the sheriff was able to serve
Summons on petitioner by leaving the same and the attached
copy of the protest with a certain Gerry Rojas, who was then at
petitioner’s residence. Petitioner appeared before the court with
an affirmative defense that the protest was filed out of time.
RTC rendered the service of Summons on petitioner on May
28, 2010 as valid and proceeded to the case ex parte. petitioner
filed an Omnibus Motion to: (1) Restore Protestee’s Standing
in Court; (2) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
June 24, 2010; and (3) Suspend Proceedings Pending
Resolution of Falsification Case Before the Law Department of
the COMELEC. However, on July 22, 2010, the trial court
issued the second assailed Order denying petitioner’s Omnibus
Motion. Petitioner, through certiorari, questioned the RTC
decision before the court. On the other hand, respondents
pointed out that the petition for certiorari should not be filed
with this Court but with the COMELEC.
Issue:
W/N certiorari before the court is proper.
Ruling:
No. In election cases involving an act or an omission of a
municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed
exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. According to Section 8, Rule 14 of the
2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests all appeal from
RTC and MTC decision regarding election cases shall be filed
exclusively with the Commission on Elections. Since it is the
COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an
appeal from the decision of the regional trial court in election
contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also
the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner
erred in invoking this Court’s power to issue said extraordinary
writ.
GSIS v. De Leon
Facts:
De Leon retired as Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) in 1992, after 44 years of service to the
government. He applied for retirement under R.A. No. 910,
invoking R.A. No. 3783, as amended by R.A. No. 4140, which
provides that chief state prosecutors hold the same rank as
judges. The application was granted by GSIS however on 2001,
he failed to receive his monthly pension. He wrote letter to
GSIS where the latter replied that he chose the wrong
retirement program thus he is not now entitle to a new program
as it will constitute to double retirement. De Leon filed
mandamus before CA praying that petitioner be compelled to
continue paying his monthly pension and to pay his unpaid
monthly benefits from 2001 which CA granted.
Issue:
W/N erred in issuing a writ of mandamus despite the absence
of any specific and clear right on the part of respondent, since
he could not even specify the benefits to which he is entitled
and the law under which he is making the claim.
Ruling:
No. The CA itself acknowledged that it would not indulge in
technicalities to resolve the case, but focus instead on the
substantive issues rather than on procedural questions.
Furthermore, courts have the discretion to relax the rules of
procedure in order to protect substantive rights and prevent
manifest injustice to a party. Rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Strict and rigid
application of rules which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than to promote substantial justice must
always be avoided. The inflexible rule in our jurisdiction is that
social legislation must be liberally construed in favor of the
beneficiaries. Retirement laws, in particular, are liberally
construed in favor of the retiree because their objective is to
provide for the retiree’s sustenance and, hopefully, even
comfort, when he no longer has the capability to earn a
livelihood.

Rodriguez v. CA
Facts:
Purita Landicho filed before CFI an Application for
Registration of a piece of land located in San Mateo, Rizal
(subject land). CFI granted the said application and ordered
LRA to issue OCT. Eventually, LRA issued TCT to Landicho.
Notably, ROD Santos issued to Landicho a TCT rather than an
OCT for the subject property; and although TCT No. 167681
stated that it was issued pursuant to Decree No. 1480, no other
detail regarding the decree and the original registration of the
subject property was filled out. The subject property was sold
several times. Landicho executed deed of sale over the subject
property in favor of Petitioner. Petitioner filed before CFI an
omnibus motion alleging that the decision which confirmed
Landicho’s title over the subject property has not been
executed. While the case was
pending, PCCAI filed a motion to intervene arguing that it was
an indispensable party in the case, having substantial legal
interest therein as the registered owner of the subject property.
RTC granted petitioner’s motion directing LRA to issue such
OCT. However, The LRA, upon receipt of a copy of the RTC
Order, filed a Manifestation informing the trial court that it
cannot comply with said Order since there were already two
existing titles covering the subject property and to issue a
decree of registration and OCT in Landicho’s name would only
further aggravate the problem of double titling. Thereafter,
PCCAI filed a certiorari before CA assailing the orders of RTC
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
PCCAI acknowledged that it is the ministerial duty of the RTC
to issue a writ of execution for a final and executory.
decision/order; however, PCCAI argued that when subsequent
facts and circumstances transpired which renders the execution
of the final and executory decision/order unjust or inequitable,
then the trial court should refrain from issuing a writ of
execution. CA granted the certiorari.
Issue:
W/N CA erred in granting the certiorari
Ruling:
No. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to
land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a
title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the
“mirador su casa,” to avoid the possibility of losing his land. A
Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the
ownership of the land referred to therein. A strong presumption
exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that they are
valid.26 In this case, PCCAI is the registered owner of the
subject property under TCT No. 482970, which could be traced
back to TCT No. 16781 issued to Landicho. As between
PCCAI and Rodriguez, the former is better entitled to the
protection of the Torrens system. PCCAI can rely on its TCT
No. 482970 until the same has been annulled and/or cancelled
Rimando v. Naguilan Emission Testing Center
Facts:
Respondent filed a petition for mandamus to compel the mayor
to issue business permit in favor of its business. the respondent
claimed that its business is being conducted on a parcel of land
which formerly belonged to the national government but later
on certified by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) as an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. The respondent had operated its business of
emission testing on the land from 2005 to 2007. On January 18,
2008, the respondent filed an application for the renewal of its
business permit and paid the corresponding fees therefor.
Petitioner refused to issue business permit unless respondent
executes a contract of lease with the Municipality. RTC denied
the petition however was reversed by CA ruling thatthat the
appeal was dismissible on the ground of mootness considering
that the period for which the business period was being sought
had already lapsed.
Issue:
W/N mandamus shall prosper
Ruling:
No. A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a
business permit since the exercise of the same is a delegated
police power hence, discretionary in nature. This was the
pronouncement of this Court in Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon.
Villaflor, 499 SCRA 434 (2006), where a determination was
made on the nature of the power of a mayor to grant business
permits under the Local Government Code
Mandamus
Pascual v. Robles
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari against the resolution of the
Court on December 4, 2009 which set aside its own decision on
the ground that herein petitioner, Rene B. Pascual failed to
implead herein respondent Jaime M. Robles, who is an
indispensable party to the present case. A petition for
declaration of heirship is filed by petitioner where they sought
to be declared as sole heirs of the late Sps Rodriguez. They
alleged they are the great grandchildren of Antonio. At the
initial hearing, there was no oppositor thus RTC rendered a
partial judgement declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as
heirs in the direct descending line of the late Antonio, Macario
and Delfin and appointing Henry as regular administrator of the
estate of the decedents Delfin, Macario and Antonio, and as
special administrator to the estate of Hermogenes. Thereafter,
six groups of oppositors entered into appearances. In his
opposition, Jaime Robles likewise prayed that he be appointed
regular administrator to the estates of Antonio and Hermogenes
and be allowed to sell a certain portion of land included in the
estate of Hermogenes. He was declared by the RTC as an heir
and next of kin of decedent Hermogenes and thus qualified to
be the administrator. CA denied. Robles now filed a certiorari
before this court.
Issue:
W/N certiorari is proper
Ruling:
No. First, petitioner has no personality to file the instant
petition. The requirement of personality is sanctioned by
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which essentially
provides that a person aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
may file a petition for certiorari. In a situation wherein the
order or decision being questioned underwent adversarial
proceedings before a trial court, the "person aggrieved"
referred to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the
special civil action of certiorari pertains to one who was a party
in the proceedings before the lower court. The correctness of
this interpretation can be gleaned from the fact that a special
civil action for certiorari may be dismissed motu proprio if the
party elevating the case failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of the questioned order or decision before the
lower court. Obviously, only one who was a party in the case
before the lower court can file a motion for reconsideration
since a stranger to the litigation would not have the legal
standing to interfere in the orders or decisions of the said court.
In relation to this, if a non-party in the proceedings before the
lower court has no standing to file a motion for reconsideration,
logic would lead us to the conclusion that he would likewise
have no standing to question the said order or decision before
the appellate court via certiorari. In the present case, petitioner
was never a party to the proceedings in the RTC and the CA.
In fact, he admits that he is a third party insofar as the instant
case is concerned. There is no dispute that it was only in
January 2005 that he acquired interest in a portion of the
properties subject of the estate proceedings when he bought a
real property located in San Fernando, Pampanga, which
belonged to the Rodriguez estate. Petitioner claims that he
filed the instant petition for certiorari only after learning of the
assailed Decision of the CA and the Order of the RTC on
March 13, 2008, implying that he could not have intervened
earlier. This, however, is not an excuse or justification to allow
petitioner to file the instant petition. To do so would put into
the hands of the litigants in a case the power to resurrect or to
introduce anew, with the assistance of intervenors, issues to a
litigation which have already been long settled on appeal.
Crisologo v. JEWM
Facts:
There are two cases, private respondents won in the second
case while petitiioners prevail in the first case. When the
decision attain finality, petitioners now move to execute the
decision. The subject lots were now in the name of JEWM.
JEWM now filed a third party claim, It prayed for writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent their properties to be included
in the public auction. Sps Crisologo questions the
authority of the said court to restrain the execution proceedings
in RTC-Br. 15. JEWM opposed it on the ground that Spouses
Crisologo were not parties in the case. RTC denied the
petitioners motion and granted the injunction of JEWM. CA
affirmed
Issue:
W/N CA erred in ruling that RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion participate.
Ruling:
No. This is not the first time Judge Omelio has rendered a
decision affecting third parties’ interests, without even
notifying the indispensable parties. In the first disputed case,
JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Register of Deeds,
Sheriff Medialdea, John & Jane Does and all persons acting
under their directions, Judge Omelio failed to cause the service
of proper summons upon the John and Jane Does impleaded in
the complaint. Even when Sps. Crisologo voluntarily appeared
in court to be recognized as the John and Jane Does, Judge
Omelio refused to acknowledge their appearance and ordered
the striking out of Sps. Crisologos' pleadings. For this reason,
the Investigating Justice recommended admonishing Judge
Omelio for failing to recognize the Sps.Crisologo as
indispensable parties in that case. Clearly, the cancellation of
the annotation of the sale without notifying the buyers, Sps.
Crisologo, is a violation of the latter’s right to due process.
Since this is the second time that Judge Omelio has issued an
order which fails to notify or summon the indispensable
parties, we find Judge Omelio guilty of gross ignorance of the
law, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar act
will merit a stiffer penalty in the future.
Sps Dacudao v. Gonzales
Facts:
Petitioners are resident of Bacaca, Davao, were among the
investors of Legacy group allegedly defrauded through the
Legacy Group’s “buy back agreement” that earned them check
payments that were dishonored. They initiated a number of
charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al.
in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City.
Subsequently, the respondent (secretary of DOJ) issued an
order directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial
Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward all cases already
filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the
DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Pursuant
to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded
by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City to the
Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ. Aggrieved,
petitioners went directly to the Court and filed petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent
Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO
No. 182. They claim that DO No. 182 violated their right to
due process, their right to the equal protection of the laws, and
their right to the speedy disposition of cases.
Issue:
W/N the action will prosper
Ruling:
No. Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy
of courts by coming directly to the Court with their petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein
any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct
filing of the petition. The Court must enjoin the observance of
the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the
policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The
strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from
having to deal with causes that are also well within the
competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the
Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential
tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court will
only act on such petitions only when absolutely necessary or
when serious and important reasons exist to justify an
exception to the policy. Section 4 of Rule 65 clearly defined
the hierarchy of courts to wit: The petition shall be filed in the
Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a
lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial
area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in
the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of
a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or
these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by
the Court of Appeals.
Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ direct
resort to the Court was permissible, the petition must still be
dismissed. For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper,
therefore, the following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it
must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or
officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Yet,
petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To
start with, they merely alleged that the Secretary of Justice had
acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction. Also, the petition
did not show that the Secretary of Justice was an officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead, the
Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any
judicial or quasi-judicial functions because his questioned
issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his subordinates’
efficiency and economy in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group. The
function involved was purely executive or administrative.
Preliminary investigation is not a quasi- judicial process
because it does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
Similarly, the petition could not be one for mandamus, which is
a remedy available only when “any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court.” The main objective of mandamus is to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent.
Since preliminary investigation is not a ministerial duty of DOJ
thus it cannot be subject to mandamus.
Cuyo v. People
Facts:
Petitioner file a complaint for illegal possession of firearms
against Alejo. Petitioner applied for search warrant to search
the house of Alejo, in the course of proceedings he mad
untruthful statements under oath. Consequently, Alejo filed a
complaint for perjury against petitioner. MTCC found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner filed a
MR which was denied by MTCC. When he received the order
on Oct 23, 2009. He subsequently filed a Motion for Probation
on 5 November 2009. the MTCC issued an Order denying
petitioner’s latter motion on the ground that it had been filed
beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days as
provided by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968. ,
petitioner moved for the reconsideration8 of the latter order,
asking for a liberal interpretation of the rules with regard to the
computation of the period for applying for probation which was
denied. Petitioner filed certiorari under R65 before RTC where
the latter denied and ruled that petitioner failed to implead
private complainant Alejo Cuyo in violation of Rule 65,
Section 5. This rule mandates that petitioner should join as
private respondent the person interested in sustaining the
proceedings of the court.
Issue:
W/N RTC erred in ruling that the failure to implead is a ground
for dismissal

Ruling:
Yes While it may be correct to say that petitioner failed to
comply with the rule cited above, itwould not be correct to
dismiss the petition based on this provision. Rule 3, Sec. 11
states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a
ground for the dismissal of an action. Thus, the trial court
should have ordered petitioner to add private complainant as a
respondent to the case. However his conviction was still
affirmed by the court.
HDMF v. Sps See
Facts:
Respondents are the winning bidders in in the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale of a property that was mortgaged to petitioner
HDMFor Pag-ibig Fund (Pag-ibig). They paid the bid price of
P272,000.00 in cash to respondent Sheriff Arimado. In turn,
respondent-spouses received a Certificate of Sale wherein
Sheriff Arimado acknowledged receipt of the purchase price.
Despite the expiration of the redemption period, Pag-ibig
refused to surrender its certificate of title to the respondent
because it had yet to receive the respondent-spouses’ payment
from Sheriff Arimado who failed to remit the same despite
repeated demands. It turned out that Sheriff Arimado withdrew
from the clerk of court the P272,000.00 paid by respondent-
spouses, on the pretense that he was going to deliver the same
to Pag-ibig. Considering the circumstances, respondent filed a
complaint for specific performance against petitioners. Pag-ibig
admitted the factual allegations of the complaint but
maintained that respondent-spouses had no cause of action
against it. Pag-ibig insisted that it has no duty to deliver the
certificate of title to respondent-spouses unless Pag-ibig
actually receives the bid price. RTC ruled in favor of
respondents. Pag ibig filed MR but dismissed, ibig received the
denial of its motion for reconsideration on March 22, 200223
but took no further action. Hence RTC issued motion for
execution. Pag-ibig filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 in order to annul and set aside Decision of the
trial court. CA denied held that petitioner’s remedy was to
appeal the February 21, 2002 Decision of the trial court and not
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. At the time the petition
was filed, the Decision of the trial court had already attained
finality. The CA then held that the remedy of certiorari was not
a substitute for a lost appeal.
Issue:
W/N certiorari shall prosper
Ruling:
No. “[C]ertiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of
last recourse.” It is proper only when appeal is not available to
the aggrieved party. In the case at bar, the February 21, 2002
Decision of the trial court was appealable under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court because it completely disposed of respondent-
spouses’ case against Pag-ibig. Pag-ibig does not explain why
it did not resort to an appeal and allowed the trial court’s
decision to attain finality. In fact, the February 21, 2002
Decision was already at the stage of execution when Pag-ibig
belatedly resorted to a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari. Clearly,
Pag-ibig lost its right to appeal and tried to remedy the situation
by resorting to certiorari. It is settled, however, that certiorari is
not a substitute for a lost appeal, “especially if the [party’s]
own negligence or error in [the] choice of remedy occasioned
such loss or lapse. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that a
Rule 65 certiorari could still be resorted to, Pag-ibig’s petition
would still have to be dismissed for having been filed beyond
the reglementary period of 60 days from notice of the denial of
the motion for reconsideration. This submission is beside the
point. Rule 65, Section 4 is very clear that the reglementary 60-
day period is counted “from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution” being assailed, or “from notice of the denial of the
motion [for reconsideration],” and not from receipt of the writ
of execution which seeks to enforce the assailed judgment,
order or resolution. The date of Pag-ibig’s receipt of the copy
of the writ of execution is therefore immaterial for purposes of
computing the timeliness of the filing of the petition for
certiorari.
Mid Lands Power v. CA
Facts:
Petitioner filed Complaint for injunction with urgent prayer for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against
respondent Power One Corp. The complainants argued that,
since the interests, rights, and obligations of respondents had
already been transferred, respondents must be restrained from
preventing them from performing their lawful and valid
obligations under the ESA and the Revised MOA. RTC issued
a 72-hour TRO against respondents. The branch sheriff
implemented the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
Pasig RTC, which allowed Mid-Islands Power and
MindoroTech to resume their operations at the power plant.
Consequently, respondent assailed the decision before CA via
certiorari They argued that the trial court did not have
territorial jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ, because the
acts sought to be enjoined had been committed in Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro however CA denied its appeal. On 9
December 2008, Power One filed a Motion for Extension of
time to file its Petition for Certiorari with the CA and prayed
for a 15-day extension and was granted by CA.
Issue:
W/N CA erred in granting the Motion for Extension
Ruling:
Yes. Supreme Court deleted the clause that allowed an
extension of the period to file a Rule 65 petition for compelling
reasons, hence, petitions for certiorari must now be filed
strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the
order denying a motion for reconsideration. that the reason
behind the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was to
prevent the use
or abuse of the remedy of petition for certiorari in order to
delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. We thus deleted
the clause that allowed an extension of the period to file a Rule
65 petition for compelling reasons. Instead, we deemed the 60-
day period to file as reasonable and sufficient time for a party
to mull over the case and to prepare a petition that asserts grave
abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was
specifically set and limited in order to avoid any unreasonable
delay in the dispensation of justice, a delay that could violate
the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of
their case. Consequently, we pronounced that when the CA
granted the motion for extension, it in effect disregarded and
modified, if not outrightly reversed, the Supreme Court En
Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. We then said that in
so doing, the appellate court arrogated unto itself “a power it
did not possess, a power that only this Court may exercise.

Quo Warranto
Sereno v. Republic
Facts;
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty
of the University of the Philippines-College of Law. While
being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006,
Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the
Republic in two international arbitrations known as the
PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the
Commissioner on Human Rights. On August 2010, Sereno was
appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief
Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the
applicants to submit documents, among which are “all previous
SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government
and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those from the
private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that
“applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary
requirements will not be interviewed or considered for
nomination.” On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to
the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of the
Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno.
The OSG, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction under
Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the
special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the
OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ
of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ
of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom.
Issue:
W/N the petition shall prosper
Ruling:
Yes. A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable
officials and SC has jurisdiction. The SC have concurrent
jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary
writs, including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s
original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there
are special and important reasons therefor, and in this case,
direct resort to SC is justified considering that the action is
directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is
likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching
implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its power of
judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an
impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a
judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on
speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on
impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle
actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto
proceedings are essentially judicial in character – it calls for the
exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power
to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This
constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor
of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government
including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court
through the Senate.
Eusebio v. Luis
Facts:
Respondents are the owner of parcel of lands located in Pasig.
Said parcel of land was taken by the City of Pasig sometime in
1980 and used as a municipal road now known as A. Sandoval
Avenue. Sanggunian of Pasig City passed Resolution
authorizing payments to respondents for said parcel of land.
However, the Appraisal Committee of the City of Pasig,
assessed the value of the land only at P150.00 per square meter.
respondents requested the Appraisal Committee to consider
P2,000.00 per square meter as the value of their land. Mayor
Eusebio refused to grant the request of respondents and said
City of Pasig cannot pay them more than the amount set by the
Appraisal Committee. Respondents filed a complaint for
reconveyance and damages before RTC. Respondents prayed
that the property be returned to them with payment of
reasonable rental for sixteen years of use at P500.00 per square
meter, or P793,000.00, with legal interest of 12% per annum.
RTC granted their complaint. CA affirmed.
Issue:
W/N RTC erred in awarding just compensation to the
respondents
Ruling:
No. Where private property is taken by the Government for
public use without first acquiring title thereto either through
expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover
the land or the value thereof does not prescribe.—Petitioners
must be disabused of their belief that respondents’ action for
recovery of their property, which had been taken for public use,
or to claim just compensation therefor is already barred by
prescription. the Court ruled that even if there are no
expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just
compensation, the trial court is still mandated to act in
accordance with the procedure provided for in Section 5, Rule
67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the
appointment of not more than three competent and
disinterested commissioners to ascertain and report to the court
the just compensation for the subject property. that “trial with
the aid of commissioners is a substantial right that may not be
done away with capriciously or for no reason at all.” It was also
emphasized therein that although ascertainment of just
compensation is a judicial prerogative, the commissioners’
findings may only be disregarded or substituted with the trial
court’s own estimation of the property’s value only if the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence
submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is
either grossly inadequate or excessive.
Marinduque Mining v. CA
Facts:
NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation against
Petitioner for the construction of KV Transmission Line
Project. NAPOCOR sought to expropriate 7,875 square meters
of petitioners’ property. Petitioners filed their answer8 with
counterclaim and alleged that the expropriation should cover
not only 7,875 square meters but the entire parcel of land.
Petitioners claimed that the expropriation would render the
remaining portion of their property valueless and unfit for
whatever purpose. In its decision, RTC fixed the fair market
value of the 7k sqm at 110/sqm and also directed the
commissioners to submit a report and determine the fair market
value of the “dangling area,” consisting of 58,484 square
meters, affected by the installation of NAPOCOR’s
transmission lines. NAPOCOR filed a motion for
reconsideration however was dismissed by RTC. NAPOCOR
again filed MR again dismissed for being moot and academic
because on 2 April 2002, NAPOCOR filed a Notice of Appeal
of the 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision. Petitioner
moved for the execution of the decision then RTC issued a
partial execution. RTC again denied NAPOCOR’s notice of
appeal. CA reversed on certiorari held that the trial court acted
whimsically and capriciously when it denied the notice of
appeal and declared the 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision
final and executory.
Issue:
W/N CA erred in holding RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion
Ruling:
NO. No record on appeal shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals
where the law or the Rules of Court so require. The reason for
multiple appeals in the same case is to enable the rest of the
case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is
resolved by the trial court and held to be final. In such a case,
the filing of a record on appeal becomes indispensable since
only a particular incident of the case is brought to the appellate
court for resolution with the rest of the proceedings remaining
within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Jurisprudence
recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in a complaint for
expropriation because there are two stages in every action for
expropriation. The first stage is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in
the context of the facts involved in the suit. The order of
expropriation may be appealed by any party by filing a record
on appeal. The second stage is concerned with the
determination by the court of the just compensation for the
property sought to be expropriated. A second and separate
appeal may be taken from this order fixing the just
compensation. In its 5 December 2001 Decision, the trial court
already determined NAPOCOR’s authority to exercise the
power of eminent domain and fixed the just compensation for
the property sought to be expropriated. NAPOCOR filed a
motion for reconsideration. But after the trial court denied the
motion, NAPOCOR did not appeal the decision anymore.
Then, in its 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision, the trial
court fixed the just compensation for the “dangling area.”
NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration and the trial
court denied the motion. NAPOCOR then filed a notice of
appeal. At this stage, the trial court had no more issues to
resolve and there was no reason why the original records of the
case must remain with the trial court. Therefore, there was no
need for NAPOCOR to file a record on appeal because the
original records could already be sent to the appellate court.
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Lee v. Dela Paz
Facts:
Danga executed a transfer of rights to respondent for the
consideration of 150K all his rights over a parcel of land of
agricultural. However, Danga previously transferred all his
rights over the same property to De los Reyes. Thereafter,
respondent filed a complaint for forcible entry against
petitioners she alleged in her Complaint that she became the
owner of the subject property by virtue of the Transfer of
Rights. Respondent avowed that sometime in June 2000,
petitioner and the other defendants in Civil Case No. 68-00
deprived her of possession of certain portions of her property.
Taking advantage of respondent’s absence due to her lingering
sickness, petitioner and his co-defendants unlawfully entered
said portions by means of stealth and strategy, and without
respondent’s knowledge and consent. MTCC dismissed the
complaint on the ground that respondent failed to prove prior
physical possession of the parcels of land in question. Prior
physical possession of the property by the plaintiff is an
indispensable requirement in the successful prosecution of a
forcible entry case. Respondent appealed before RTC. RTC
reversed MTCC’s decision and gave great weight and
consideration to the DENR Region IV Resolution dated 30
October 2000 in DENR 4 Case No. 5723. The RTC ordered
petitioner and his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 68-00 to
vacate the portions of respondent’s property that they were
occupying. CA affirmed.
Issue:
W/N forcible entry shall prosper
Ruling:
NO. This case stemmed from a forcible entry case filed by
respondent against petitioner. A forcible entry case is an
ejectment suit. In ejectment suits or ejectment proceedings, the
only issue involved is: who is entitled to physical or material
possession of the premises, that is, to possession de facto, not
possession de jure? Issues as to the right of possession or
ownership are not involved in the action; evidence thereon is
not admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the
issue of possession. In actions for forcible entry, two
allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire
jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical
possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he
was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided
for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely: force,
intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth. Absence alone of
prior physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible entry
case already warrants the dismissal of the complaint.
Union Bank v. Maunlad Homes
Facts:
Petitioner is the owner of a commercial complex located in
Malolos, Bulacan, known as the Maunlad Shopping Mall.
Sometime in 2002, petitioner, as a seller, and respondent, as a
buyer, entered into a contract to sell involving the commercial
complex. The contract set the purchase price at P151 million,
P2.4 million of which was to be paid by Maunlad Homes as
down payment payable on or before July 5, 2002, with the
balance to be amortized over the succeeding 180-month period.
However, respondent failed to pay its monthly amortization
and request the respondent to vacate the property however the
former refused. It prompt the petitioner to institute an
ejectment suit against respondent. MeTC dismissed the
complaint on the ground that Union Bank’s cause of action was
based on a breach of contract and that both parties are claiming
a better right to possess the property based on their respective
claims of ownership of the property. The MeTC ruled that the
appropriate action to resolve these conflicting claims was an
accion reivindicatoria, over which it had no jurisdiction. RTC
and CA affirmed. Maunlad Homes contested Union Bank’s
arguments, invoking the rulings of the lower courts. It
considered Union Bank’s action as based on the propriety of
the rescission of the contract, which, in turn, is based on a
determination of whether Maunlad Homes indeed failed to
comply with the terms of the contract; the propriety of the
rescission, however, is a question that is within the RTC’s
jurisdiction. Hence, Maunlad Homes contended that the
dismissal of the ejectment action was proper
Issue:
W/N a case of unlawful detainer shall prosper
Ruling:
Yes. In any case involving the question of jurisdiction, the
Court is guided by the settled doctrine that the jurisdiction of a
court is determined by the nature of the action pleaded by the
litigant through the allegations in his complaint. Unlawful
detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from
one who unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration
or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in
unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to
expiration or termination of the right to possess. Contrary to the
findings of the lower courts, all four requirements were alleged
in Union Bank’s Complaint. Union Bank alleged that Maunlad
Homes “maintained possession of the subject properties”
pursuant to the Contract to Sell. Maunlad Homes, however,
“failed to faithfully comply with the terms of payment,”
prompting Union Bank to “rescind the Contract to Sell in a
Notice of Rescission dated February 5, 2003[.]” When
Maunlad Homes “refused to turn over and vacate the subject
premises[,]” Union Bank sent another Demand Letter on
November 19, 2003 to Maunlad Homes requiring it (1) “[t]o
pay the equivalent rentals-in-arrears as of October 2003 in the
amount of P15,554,777.01 and monthly thereafter until the
premises are fully vacated and turned over” to Union Bank, and
(2) to vacate the property peacefully and turn over possession
to Union Bank.21 As the demand went unheeded, Union Bank
instituted an action for unlawful detainer before the MeTC on
February 19, 2004, within one year from the date of the last
demand. These allegations clearly demonstrate a cause of
action for unlawful detainer and vested the MeTC jurisdiction
over Union Bank’s action.
Delos Reyes v. Odones
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
respondents before MTC Camiling. He alleged that he is the
owner of a parcel of land in Camiling and that [respondents]
are staying on the said property with a house/improvements
therein, with the mere tolerance of [petitioner] only without
any contract whatsoever and for which there is an implied
understanding to vacate upon the demand. Petitioner verbally
demanded that respondents should vacate however the latter
refused. In their answer, respondents claimed that they were the
owner of the subject land having purchased the same by virtue
of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and denied that their
occupancy is by mere tolerance of petitioner. MTC ruled in
favor of petitioner. Respondents appealed to the RTC, arguing
that since the complaint failed to allege how respondents
entered the property or when they erected their houses thereon,
it is an improper action for unlawful detainer, and the MTC had
no jurisdiction over the same. RTC reversed MTC’s ruling and
held that the complaint failed failed to aver acts constitutive of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer since it did not state how
entry was effected or how and when the dispossession started.
Thus the remedy should either be accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria in the proper RTC. CA affirmed
Issue:
W/N unlawful detainer cannot prosper on the ground that
petitioner failed to aver state how entry was effected or how
and when the dispossession started
Ruling:
No. Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of
the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the
case, are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases,
the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to
bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in
nature. Contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA,
petitioner’s allegations in the complaint clearly makes out a
case for unlawful detainer, essential to confer jurisdiction over
the subject matter on the MTC. Petitioner alleges that she is the
owner of the lot, as shown by TCT No. 392430, issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Tarlac; that respondents are occupying the
lot by virtue of petitioner’s tolerance; and that petitioner sent a
letter to respondents on June 17, 2005, demanding that they
vacate the property, but they failed and refused to do so. The
complaint was filed on July 12, 2005, or within one year from
the time the last demand to vacate was made. The requirement
that the complaint should aver, as jurisdictional facts, when and
how entry into the property was made by the defendants
applies only when the issue is the timeliness of the filing of the
complaint before the MTC, and not when the jurisdiction of the
MTC is assailed because the case is one for accion publiciana
cognizable by the RTC. This is because, in forcible entry cases,
the prescriptive period is counted from the date of defendants’
actual entry into the property; whereas, in unlawful detainer
cases, it is counted from the date of the last demand to vacate.
Hence, to determine whether the case was filed on time, there
is a necessity to ascertain whether the complaint is one for
forcible entry or for unlawful detainer; and since the main
distinction between the two actions is when and how defendant
entered the property, the determinative facts should be alleged
in the complaint.
Sps Dela Cruz v. Sps Capco
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
respondents. They alleged that Teodora T. Concio (Teodora),
mother of petitioner Amelia, acquired ownership over a piece
of land by virtue of a Decision in a land registration case
rendered by the RTC Pasig. Teodora, out of neighborliness and
blood relationship, tolerated the spouses Capco’s occupation
thereof. Subsequently, the subject property was conveyed to
the spouses Dela Cruz. Intending to construct a house thereon
and utilize the space for their balut business. the spouses Dela
Cruz thus demanded that the spouses Capco vacate the
property. As the spouses Capco refused, the matter was brought
before the Barangay Lupon for conciliation wherein several
meetings were held but to no avail.7 Hence, the said
Complaint. In their Answer, the spouses Capco pointed out that
the Complaint is defective for failing to allege the exact metes
and bounds of the property. Moreover, spouses Capco asserted
that they have all the rights to occupy the subject property since
respondent Rufino Capco (Rufino) is an heir of its true owner.
MeTC granted the petition. It did not give credence to the
spouses Capco’s assertion that the Complaint did not properly
identify the property and instead found sufficient the
identification of the same through the technical description in
the TCT submitted by petitioners. MeTC looked into the Land
Registration case that decided by RTC and one-half of that
property was adjudicated in favor of Hermogenes Reyes, and
the other half was awarded to Teodora Tulad Concio
Notwithstanding the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the
Land Registration proceedings and the consequent issuance of
TCT No. 31873 in favor of Teodora Tulad Concio, [the
spouses Capco] remained in possession of the subject property
by reason of the tolerance extended to them by the Concios.
RTC affirmed in toto. However, CA reversed the rulings and
held that complaint merely alleged that the [spouses Capco’s]
possession of the property was by the tolerance of their
predecessors-in-interest and ‘out of neighborliness and blood
relationship.’ The evidence presented or adduced before the
[MeTC] does not show how the [spouses Capco] came into
possession. Moreover, the CA observed that while the spouses
Dela Cruz claimed that their property pertains to half of the
land previously belonging to Juan that was later adjudicated to
Teodora by virtue of the judgment in aforementioned land
registration case, it is not clear whether the portion occupied by
the spouses Capco lies therein or in the other half adjudicated
in favor of Hermogenes Reyes. In view of this, it opined that
there is a need to physically determine the exact boundaries of
the land
Issue:
W/N CA erred in reversing
Ruling:
Yes. The complaint satisfied all the requisite of unlawful
detainer, to wit: Here, the Complaint alleged that the spouses
Dela Cruz’ predecessor-in-interest, Teodora, is the registered
owner of the property per TCT No. 31873 and that she
tolerated the spouses Capco’s occupation of the lot. The
spouses Dela Cruz subsequently acquired the property through
conveyance and they extended the same tolerance to the
spouses Capco. The spouses Dela Cruz demanded for the
spouses Capco to vacate the property but to no avail; hence,
they sent the latter a formal demand letter which, per the
attached copy to the Complaint, is dated September 1, 2003.39
The Complaint was filed on October 6, 2003 or within one year
from the time the formal demand to vacate was made. “The
only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of
real property — possession de facto and not possession de
jure.”45 But “[w]here the parties to an ejectment case raise the
issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to
determine who between the parties has the better right to
possess the property. The spouses Dela Cruz were able to prove
by preponderance of evidence that they are the owners of the
lot. Their allegation that the subject property was adjudicated
to Teodora by virtue of a decision in a land registration case
and was later conveyed in their favor, is supported by (1) a
copy of the Decision in the said land registration case; (2) the
title of the land issued to Teodora (TCT No. 31873); and (3)
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Teodora
wherein the latter’s heirs agreed to convey the said property to
Amelia.
Optimum Development Bank v. Sps Jovellanos
Facts:
Respondents entered into contract to sell with Palmera Homes
for the purchase of a residential house and lot situated Villa
Alegria Subdivision. Pursuant to the contract, Sps. Jovellanos
took possession of the subject property upon a down payment,
undertaking to pay the remaining balance of the contract price
in equal monthly installments for a period of 10 years. Palmera
Homes assigned its all rights to petitioner. Thereafter,
respondents failed to pay its monthly obligations then
petitioner wrote a demand letter to vacate which respondents
refused. This prompt for the petitioner to file a case for
unlawful detainer. MeTC granted the petition and ordered
respondents to vacate the property. Respondents appealed
before RTC assailing the jurisdiction of the MeTC, claiming
that the case did not merely involve the issue of physical
possession but rather, questions arising from their rights under
a contract to sell which is a matter that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of
the RTC. RTC affirmed held that action does not involve the
rights of the respective parties under the contract but merely
the recovery of possession by Optimum of the subject property
after the spouses’ default. CA reversed held that the
controversy does not only involve the issue of possession but
also the validity of the cancellation of the Contract to Sell and
the determination of the rights of the parties thereunder as well
as the governing law, among others, RA 6552.
Issue:
W/N the CA erred in ruling that unlawful detainer is not proper
Ruling:
No. What is determinative of the nature of the action and the
court with jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, not the
defenses set up in an answer. Corollarily, the only issue to be
resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim
of ownership by any of the parties involved. In its complaint,
Optimum alleged that it was by virtue of the Contract to Sell
that Sps. Jovellanos were allowed to take possession of the
subject property. However, since the latter failed to pay the
stipulated monthly installments, notwithstanding several
written and verbal notices made upon them, it cancelled the
said contract. When Sps. Jovellanos refused to vacate the
subject property despite repeated demands, Optimum instituted
the present action for unlawful detainer. The Court disagrees
with CA. Metropolitan Trial Courts are conditionally vested
with authority to resolve the question of ownership raised as an
incident in an ejectment case where the determination is
essential to a complete adjudication of the issue of possession.
The authority granted to the MeTC to preliminarily resolve the
issue of ownership to determine the issue of possession
ultimately allows it to interpret and enforce the contract or
agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant. To deny the
MeTC jurisdiction over a complaint merely because the issue
of possession requires the interpretation of a contract will
effectively rule out unlawful detainer as a remedy. In the case
at bar, the unlawful detainer suit filed by Optimum against Sps.
Jovellanos for illegally withholding possession of the subject
property is similarly premised upon the cancellation or
termination of the Contract to Sell between them. Indeed, it
was well within the jurisdiction of the MeTC to consider the
terms of the parties’ agreement in order to ultimately determine
the factual bases of Optimum’s possessory claims over the
subject property.
Estate of Macadangdang v. Gaviola
Facts:
Petitioner filed a case for unlawful detainer against
respondents. They allege that respondentswere occupying, by
mere tolerance, portions of four parcels of land named with the
petitioner. MTCC ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, RTC
affirmed the MTCC decision and remanded the case to the
MTCC for execution of judgment in its Order. Respondents
filed a MR which was denied by RTC on the ground that it had
no longer had jurisdiction over the motion after the dismissal of
respondents’ appeal. On appeal, CA set aside RTC decision
and held remanded the case to RTC. Petitioners Petitioners
allege that the case stemmed from an unlawful detainer case
where the Rules on Summary Procedure apply. Petitioners
allege that under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a motion
for reconsideration is a prohibited

Issue:
W/N MR is allowed in RTC in an unlawful detainer case

Ruling:
Yes. Juris-diction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases falls on the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Since the case before the the
MTCC was an unlawful detainer case, it was governed by the
Rules on Summary Procedure. The purpose of the Rules on
Summary Procedure is to prevent undue delays in the
disposition of cases and to achieve this, the filing of certain
pleadings is prohibited, including the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. However, the motion for reconsideration that
petitioners allege to be a prohibited pleading was filed before
the RTC acting as an appellate court. The appeal before the
RTC is no longer covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
The Rules on Summary Procedure apply before the appeal to
the RTC. Hence, respondents’ motion for reconsideration filed
with the RTC is not a prohibited pleading.