2nd Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty.
Rucel Cayetano) by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio & Solis ®
REMOTE CAUSE  thru that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking
1. GABETO VS. ARANETA
 FACTS:  In 1918, Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata
with a view to go to a cockpit. When the driver of the carromata had
started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta,
stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he
himself had called this carromata first. The driver, Julio Pagnaya,
replied that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta. Pagnaya
pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of
Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing to the
looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the
material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth;
and it became necessary for the driver to get out in order to find the
bridle.
While he was thus engaged, the horse became disturbed and moved
forward, in doing which he pulled one of the wheels of the carromata
up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. After going a few
meters further the side of the carromata struck a police telephone
box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk, upon which the box
came down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an extent
that he set out at full speed up the street.
Meanwhile one of the passengers, Ilano, had alighted but the other,
Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway
horse had proceeded up the street Gayetano jumped or fell from the
rig, and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died.
ISSUE: W/N the proximate cause of the accident was the stopping of
the horse by Araneta. NO.
RATIO: The stopping of the rig by Araneta was too remote from the
accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or
proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post
at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily
responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot
be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of
the horse thereafter. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old,
and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be
easily broken. According to the witnesses for the defendant, it was
Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the
horse's mouth; and that after alighting, led the horse over to the curb,
and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was
slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from control,
started to go away as previously stated.
2. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. REMOQUILLO
G.R. No. L-8328.  May 18, 1956
“Media Agua” A canopy over a window is called media agua. In
ancestral Filipino houses, the traditional media agua is a scallop-
bordered cloth; in a bahay kubo, it’s a nipa push-out or awning. In
modern houses, it could be as simple as a ledge shading the window
FACTS: On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house
of his stepbrother Antonio Peñaloza, located on Rodriguez Lanuza
Street, Manila, to repair a “media agua” said to be in a leaking
condition. The “media agua” was just below the window of the third
story. Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from his son
“The plans of the diligent leads to profit as surely as haste leads to poverty” –Proverbs 21:5
portion. He turned around and in so doing the lower end of the iron
sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric
Company which strung parallel to the edge of the “media agua” and 2
1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution.
His widow and children fled suit to recover damages from the
company. After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in their
favor. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the
judgment. Pertinent decision is hereby quoted, to viz,
“The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary
wire stretched between poles on the street and carrying a charge of
3,600 volts. It was installed there some two years before Peñaloza’s
house was constructed. The record shows that during the
construction of said house a similar incident took place, although
fortunately with much less tragic consequences. A piece of wood
which a carpenter was holding happened to come in contact with the
same wire, producing some sparks. The owner of the house forthwith
complained to Defendant about the danger which the wire presented,
and as a result Defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the
house by means of a brace, but left the other end where it was.
“..the distance from the electric wire to the edge of the ‘media agua’
on which the deceased was making repairs was only 30 inches or 2
1/2 feet. Regulations of the City of Manila required that ‘all wires be
kept three feet from the building.’ Appellant contends that in
applying said regulations to the case at bar the reckoning should not
be from the edge of the ‘media agua’ but from the side of the house
and that, thus measured, the distance was almost 7 feet, or more
then the minimum prescribed. This contention is manifestly
groundless, for not only is a ‘media agua’ an integral part of the
building to which it is attached but to exclude it in measuring the
distance would defeat the purpose of the regulation. Appellant points
out, nevertheless, that even assuming that the distance, within the
meaning of the city regulations, should be measured from the edge of
the ‘media agua’, the fact that in the case of the house involved
herein such distance was actually less than 3 feet was due to the fault
of the owner of said house, because the city authorities gave him a
permit to construct a ‘media agua’ only one meter or 39 1/2 inches
wide, but instead he built one having a width of 65 3/4 inches, 17 3/8
inches more than the width permitted by the authorities, thereby
reducing the distance to the electric wire to less than the prescribed
minimum of 3 feet.
“It is a fact that the owner of the house exceeded the limit fixed in
the permit given to him by the city authorities for the construction of
the ‘media agua’, and that if he had not done so Appellants wire
would have been 11 3/8 (inches) more than the required distance of
three feet from the edge of the ‘media agua’. It is also a fact,
however, that after the ‘media agua’ was constructed the owner was
given a final permit of occupancy of the house.
“The wire was an exposed, high tension wire carrying a load of 3,600
volts. There was, according to Appellant, no insulation that could
have rendered it safe, first, because there is no insulation material in
commercial use for such kind of wire; and secondly, because the only
insulation material that may be effective is still in the experimental
stage of development and, anyway, its costs would be prohibitive… ”
The theory followed by the appellate court in finding for the Plaintiff
is that it was the company that was at fault and was guilty of
negligence because although the electric wire in question had been
installed long before the construction of the house and in accordance
with the ordinance fixing a minimum of 3 feet, mere compliance with
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2nd Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano)
the regulations does not satisfy the requirement of due diligence nor
avoid the need for adopting such other precautionary measures as
may be warranted that negligence cannot be determined by a simple
matter of inches that all that the city did was to prescribe certain
minimum conditions and that just because the ordinance required
that primary electric wires should be not less than 3 feet from any
house, the obligation of due diligence is not fulfilled by placing such
wires at a distance of 3 feet and one inch, regardless of other factors.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY IS LIABLE
FOR THE DEATH OF MAGNO
RULING : NO. SC RULED IN FAVOR OF THE COMPANY
The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence and
in some measure by the too close proximity of the “media agua” or
rather its edge to the electric wire of the company by reason of the
violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent
approval of said illegal construction of the “media agua”.
We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or
as lacking in due diligence. Although the city ordinance called for a
distance of 3 feet of its wires from any building, there was actually a
distance of 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches of the wires from the side of the
house of Peñaloza. Even considering said regulation distance of 3 feet
as referring not to the side of a building, but to any projecting part
thereof, such as a “media agua”, had the house owner followed the
terms of the permit given him by the city for the construction of his
“media agua”, namely, one meter or 39 3/8 inches wide, the distance
from the wires to the edge of said “media agua” would have been 3
feet and 11 3/8 inches. In fixing said one meter width for the “media
agua” the city authorities must have wanted to preserve the distance
of at least 3 feet between the wires and any portion of a building.
Unfortunately, however, the house owner disregarding the permit,
exceeded the one meter fixed by the same by 17 3/8 inches and
leaving only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the “Media agua” as
illegally constructed and the electric wires. And added to this
violation of the permit by the house owner, was its approval by the
city through its agent, possibly an inspector. Surely we cannot lay
these serious violations of a city ordinance and permit at the door of
the Company, guiltless of breach of any ordinance or regulation.
The Company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any
illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and
said construction, and after finding that said distance of 3 feet had
been reduced, to change the stringing or installation of its wires so as
to preserve said distance. It would be much easier for the City, or
rather it is its duty, to be ever on the alert and to see to it that its
ordinances are strictly followed by house owners and to condemn or
disapprove all illegal constructions.
Of course, in the present case, the violation of the permit for the
construction of the “media agua” was not the direct cause of the
accident. It merely contributed to it. Had said “media agua” been only
one meter wide as allowed by the permit, Magno standing on it,
would instinctively have stayed closer to or hugged the side of the
house in order to keep a safe margin between the edge of the “media
agua” and the yawning 2-story distance or height from the ground,
and possibly if not probably avoided the fatal contact between the
lower end of the iron sheet and the wires.
Consequently, we may not hold said company as guilty of negligence
or wanting in due diligence in failing to insulate said wires. As to their
proximity to the house it is to be supposed that distance of 3 feet was
considered sufficiently safe by the technical men of the city such as its
electrician or engineer. Of course, a greater distance of say 6 feet or
“The plans of the diligent leads to profit as surely as haste leads to poverty” –Proverbs 21:5
by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio & Solis ®
12 feet would have increased the margin of safety but other factors
had to be considered such as that the wires could not be strung or the
posts supporting them could not be located too far toward the middle
of the street. Thus, the real cause of the accident or death was the
reckless or negligent act of Magno himself.
When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the “media agua”
just below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his
age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a
tinsmith or carpenter and had training and experience for the job. So,
he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the
danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the instant care, his
training and experience failed him, and forgetting where he was
standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands and at arms
length, evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and
discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the
motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution.
In support of its theory and holding that Defendant-Appellant was
liable for damages the Court of Appeals cites the case of Astudillo vs.
Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil., 427. We do not think the case is exactly
applicable. There, the premises involved was that elevated portion or
top of the walls of Intramuros, Manila, just above the Sta. Lucia Gate.
In the words of the Court, it was “a public place where persons come
to stroll, to rest and to enjoy themselves”. The electric company was
clearly negligent in placing its wires so near the place that without
much difficulty or exertion, a person by stretching his hand out could
touch them. A boy named Astudillo, placing one foot on a projection,
reached out and actually grasped the electric wire and was
electrocuted. The person electrocuted in said case was a boy who was
in no position to realize the danger.
In the present case, however, the wires were well high over the street
where there was no possible danger to pedestrians. The only possible
danger was to persons standing on the “media agua”, but a “media
agua” can hardly be considered a public place where persons usually
gather. Moreover, a person standing on the “media agua” could not
have reached the wires with his hands alone. It was necessary as was
done by Magno to hold something long enough to reach the wire.
Furthermore, Magno was not a boy or a person immature but the
father of a family, supposedly a tinsmith trained and experienced in
the repair of galvanized iron roofs and “media agua”.
Moreover, in that very case of Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., supra,
the court said that although it is a well- established rule that the
liability of electric companies for damages or personal injuries is
governed by the rules of negligence, nevertheless such companies
are not insurers of the safety of the public.
But even assuming for a moment that under the facts of the present
case the Defendant electric company could be considered negligent in
installing its electric wires so close to the house and “media agua” in
question, and in failing to properly insulate those wires (although
according to the unrefuted claim of said company it was impossible to
make the insulation of that kind of wire), nevertheless to hold the
Defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such supposed
negligence of the company must have been the proximate and
principal cause of the accident, because if the act of Magno in turning
around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet with his hands was the
proximate and principal cause of the electrocution, then his heirs may
not recover.
It is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution
was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the
reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging
the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as
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2nd Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano)
looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its
contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter’s length of 6 feet.
For a better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate
cause with respect to injuries, we find the following citation helpful:
“A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if
there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury
a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act
or condition is the proximate cause.” (45 C.J. pp. 931-332.).
We realize that the stringing of wires of such high voltage (3,600
volts), uninsulated and so close to houses is a constant source of
danger, even death, especially to persons who having occasion to be
near said wires, do not adopt the necessary precautions. But may be,
the City of Manila authorities and the electric company could get
together and devise means of minimizing this danger to the public.
Since these high voltage wires cannot be properly insulated and at
reasonable cost, they might perhaps be strung only up to the
outskirts of the city where there are few houses and few pedestrians
and there step-down to a voltage where the wires carrying the same
to the city could be properly insulated for the better protection of the
public.
PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE
3. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC. vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and SPOUSES ESTEBAN
FACTS: Private respondent spouses filed an action for damages
against petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they sustained when their jeep ran
over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation
allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground
conduit system. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio
Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered
because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or
signs.
PLDT, in its answer, that the entity which should be held responsible
is L.R. Barte and Company (Barte, for short), an independent
contractor which undertook the construction of the manhole and the
conduit system. Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint
against Barte alleging that, under the terms of their agreement, PLDT
should in no manner be answerable for any accident or injuries
arising from the negligence or carelessness of Barte or any of its
employees.  In answer thereto, Barte claimed that it was not aware
nor was it notified of the accident involving respondent spouses and
that it had complied with the terms of its contract with PLDT by
installing the necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity
of the work site, with barricades at both ends of the excavation and
with red lights at night along the excavated area to warn the traveling
public of the presence of excavations.  assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the
ISSUE: Whether or not the accident which befell private respondents
was due to the lack of diligence of petitioner PLDT.
“The plans of the diligent leads to profit as surely as haste leads to poverty” –Proverbs 21:5
by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio & Solis ®
RULING: NO. The accident was not imputable to the negligence on
the part of PLDT.
First.  Respondents’ jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson
Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the
ACCIDENT MOUND. Exhibit B shows, through the tiremarks, that the
ACCIDENT MOUND was hit by the jeep swerving from the left that is,
swerving from the inside lane. What caused the swerving is not
disclosed; but, as the cause of the accident, defendant cannot be
made liable for the damages suffered by respondents. The accident
was not due to the absence of warning signs, but to the unexplained
abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside lane.
Second. That respondents’ jeep was on the inside lane before it
swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated
by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDENT
MOUND. Exhibit B-1 shows that the ditches on Lacson Street north of
the ACCIDENT MOUND had already been covered, but not in such a
way as to allow the outer lane to be freely and conveniently passable
to vehicles. The situation could have been worse to the south of the
ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason no picture of the ACCIDENT
MOUND facing south was taken.
Third. Respondents’ jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as
the husband claimed. At that speed, he could have braked the vehicle
the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeep would not
have climbed the ACCIDENT MOUND several feet as indicated by the
tiremarks in Exhibit B. The jeep must have been running quite fast. If
the jeep had been braked at 25 kilometers an hour, respondents
would not have been thrown against the windshield and they would
not have suffered their injuries.
Fourth. If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running
quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to
swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the ACCIDENT
MOUND, then plaintiff-husband had not exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he
should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular
lights which should have made him see the ACCIDENT MOUND in
time. If he was running on the outside lane at 25 kilometers an hour,
even on dim lights, his failure to see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time to
brake the car was negligence on his part. The ACCIDENT MOUND was
relatively big and visible, being 2 to 3 feet high and 1-1/2 feet wide. If
he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time, he would not have
seen any warning sign either. He knew of the existence and location
of the ACCIDENT MOUND, having seen it many previous times. With
ordinary precaution, he should have driven his jeep on the night of
the accident so as to avoid hitting the ACCIDENT MOUND. 29
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent
Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of
his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident,
as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to
recover damages.  The perils of the road were known to, hence
appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising
reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could
have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even
part of petitioner.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented
the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn
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2nd Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano)
the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private
respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was
not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep
of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden
swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident
mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty,
such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation,
constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said
omitted act would have prevented the injury. 31 It is basic that private
respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own
failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It
is both a societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a
reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Furthermore,
respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity
to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to
petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that
street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and
location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed
him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the
consequences of his imprudence.
Moreover, we also sustain the findings of respondent Court of
Appeals in its original decision that there was insufficient evidence to
prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. We have for consideration
only the self-serving testimony of respondent Antonio Esteban and
the unverified photograph of merely a portion of the scene of the
accident. The absence of a police report of the incident and the non-
submission of a medical report from the hospital where private
respondents were allegedly treated have not even been satisfactorily
explained. A person claiming damages for the negligence of another
has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence
causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
affirmatively established by competent evidence. 33 Whosoever relies
on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first
instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise
his action must fail.
RES IPSA LOQUITOR
4. AFRICA VS. CALTEX
FACTS: In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the
Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolostreet and Rizal
Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank
truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the
receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted.
The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including
the personal properties and effects inside them.
Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex
(Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the
station and the second (Mateo Boquiren) as its agent in charge of
operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as
the cause of the fire.
 The CFI and CA found that the petitioners failed to prove negligence
of the respondents, and that there was due care in the premises and
with respect to the supervision of their employees.
Issue: Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the
fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume
negligence on the part of the respondents.
“The plans of the diligent leads to profit as surely as haste leads to poverty” –Proverbs 21:5
by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio & Solis ®
Held: Yes. 
Res ipsa loquitur literally means “the thing or transaction speaks for
itself.” For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur  to apply, the following
requisites should be present:
(a) the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone’s negligence;
(b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of
the defendant or defendants; and
(c) the possibility of contributing conduct which would make the
plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
In the case at bar, the gasoline station, with all its appliances,
equipment and employees, was under the control of respondents. A
fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire
started were respondents and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference
that the incident happened because of want of care. The negligence
of the employees was the proximate cause of the fire, which in the
ordinary course of things does not happen. Therefore, the petitioners
are entitled to the award for damages.
RES IPSA LOQUITOR
5. F.F. CRUZ and CO. vs. CA
FACTS: The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner in Caloocan
City was situated adjacent to the residence of private respondents.
Sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first
approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a
firewall be constructed between the shop and private respondents'
residence. The request was repeated several times but they fell on
deaf ears. In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in
petitioner's shop. Petitioner's employees, who slept in the shop
premises, tried to put out the fire, but their efforts proved futile. The
fire spread to private respondents' house. Both the shop and the
house were razed to the ground. The cause of the conflagration was
never discovered.
On January 23, 1975, private respondents filed an action for damages
against petitioner.
ISSUE: W/N is petitioner is liable for the loss of property of the
respondent by reason of fire. YES!
HELD: Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have its management or control use proper care,
it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
The facts of the case call for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor, considering that in the normal course of operations of a
furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood
chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery
may be found thereon.
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It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of
petitioner or its employees was not merely presumed. The Court of
Appeals found that petitioner failed to construct a firewall between
its shop and the residence of private respondents as required by a
city ordinance; that the fire could have been caused by a heated
motor or a lit cigarette; that gasoline and alcohol were used and
stored in the shop; and that workers sometimes smoked inside the
shop.
Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner's
failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances
would suffice to support a finding of negligence.
In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found
guilty of negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall between
its property and private respondents' residence which sufficiently
complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply
with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by
the Court as an act of negligence.
6. D.M. CONSUNJI VS CA
FACTS: At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a
construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva investigated the tragedy and filed a report.
Investigation disclosed that, while victim Jose A. Juego together with
Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo were performing their work as
carpenters at the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D,
Renaissance Tower Building, on board a platform made of channel
beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid
plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and
hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which
was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the platform, got
loose causing the whole platform assembly and the victim to fall
down to the basement of the elevator core of the building thereby
crushing the victim of death, saving his two (2) companions who
luckily jumped out for safety. The falling of the platform was due to
the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to
the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a
safety lock.
Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed with the RTC a complaint for
damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The
employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment
of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. RTC rendered a
decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the decision of the RTC
Petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanueva’s testimony
that the cause of the fall of the platform was the loosening of the bolt
from the chain block. It is claimed that such portion of the testimony
is mere opinion.
RULING: Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face
of the application of res ipsa loquitur. The effect of the doctrine is to
warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator
was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was
negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie
negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence.
“The plans of the diligent leads to profit as surely as haste leads to poverty” –Proverbs 21:5
by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio & Solis ®
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while
the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give
rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence
on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which
means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one
jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the
facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to
raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence
on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged
with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which
caused the injury complained of was under the control or
management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in
the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not
happen if those who had its control or management used proper
care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated,
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the
defendant’s want of care.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that
the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the
injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such
knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in
general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the
doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence
of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically
accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a
bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause,
reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause,
for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of
the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur
doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it
proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in
which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the
defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and
direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power.
Accordingly, some court add to the three prerequisites for the
application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further
requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must
appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of
knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be
charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for
explanation of the accident.23
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in
the case at bar:
There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14th
floor of a building to the basement while he was working with
appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death. The
construction site is within the exclusive control and management of
appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a
carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of the
situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would
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2nd Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano)
occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant
or its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a
position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a
rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not
readily available, provided the following requisites are present:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency
which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must
not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the
basement while performing work in a construction site unless
someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application
of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the
construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources
that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and
management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also
present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the
appellee’s deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also
present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa
loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of
appellant’s negligence arises. x x x.24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the
application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the presumption or
inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it
exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondent’s
husband."
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the
doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendant’s negligence is presumed
or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a
prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to
defendant to explain. The presumption or inference may be
rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate
circumstances disputable presumption, such as that of due care or
innocence, may outweigh the inference. It is not for the defendant
to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or
inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care,
comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of
the doctrine has been established.
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE: RES IPSA LOQUITOR
7. G.R. No. 157906             November 2, 2006
JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI vs. SPS. CARDAÑA
FACTS: On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaña was walking along the
perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary School when a branch
of a caimito tree located within the school premises fell on her,
causing her instantaneous death. Thus, her parents - Dominador and
Rosalita Cardaña - filed a case for damages against petitioner. The
Cardañas alleged in their complaint that even as early as December
15, 1992, a resident of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on the
possible danger the tree posed to passersby. Lerios even pointed to
the petitioner the tree that stood near the principal’s office. The
Cardañas averred that petitioner’s gross negligence and lack of
foresight caused the death of their daughter. Respondents insist that
petitioner knew that the tree was dead and rotting, yet, she did not
“The plans of the diligent leads to profit as surely as haste leads to poverty” –Proverbs 21:5
by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio & Solis ®
exercise reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent
person would have done in the same situation.
Petitioner denied the accusation and said that at that time Lerios had
only offered to buy the tree. She also denied knowing that the tree
was dead and rotting. To prove her point, she presented witnesses
who attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other
teachers during a meeting on December 15, 1992 and assigned
Remedios Palaña to negotiate the sale. Petitioner asserts that she was
not negligent about the disposal of the tree since she had assigned
her next-in-rank, Palaña, to see to its disposal; that despite her
physical inspection of the school grounds, she did not observe any
indication that the tree was already rotten nor did any of her 15
teachers inform her that the tree was already rotten; 7 and that moral
damages should not be granted against her since there was no fraud
nor bad faith on her part.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of
Jasmin Cardaña.
RULING: YES. The fact that respondents’ daughter, Jasmin, died as a
result of the dead and rotting tree within the school’s premises shows
that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and
calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of
such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident
must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive management or control of the person charged with the
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured.14
The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a
presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the
dead and rotting tree which caused the death of respondents’
daughter was a result of petitioner’s negligence, being in charge of
the school.
In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,15 this Court held:
…As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to
the law of negligence which recognizes thatprima facie negligence
may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
specific proof of negligence.
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the
mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to
an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on
defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which
means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one
jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the
facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to
raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on
the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with
negligence.
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2nd Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano)
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused
the injury complained of was under the control or management of
the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was
such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those
who had its control or management used proper care, there is
sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in
the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose
from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that
petitioner’s negligence is presumed once respondents established the
requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once respondents made out
a prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to
explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome
by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable
presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh
the inference.
Was petitioner’s explanation as to why she failed to have the tree
removed immediately sufficient to exculpate her?
As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the
maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within
the school and its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state
of the tree calls for an explanation on her part as to why she failed to
be vigilant.
Petitioner contends she was unaware of the state of the dead and
rotting tree. She argues that she could not see the immediate danger
posed by the tree by its mere sighting even as she and the other
teachers conducted ground inspections. She further argues that, even
if she should have been aware of the danger, she exercised her duty
by assigning the disposition of the tree to another teacher.
We find petitioner’s explanation wanting. As school principal,
petitioner is expected to oversee the safety of the school’s
premises. The fact that she failed to see the immediate danger posed
by the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the
responsibility demanded by her position.
Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to
another teacher, she exercises supervision over her assignee. The
record shows that more than a month had lapsed from the time
petitioner gave instruction to her assistant Palaña on December 15,
1992, to the time the incident occurred on February 1, 1993. Clearly,
she failed to check seasonably if the danger posed by the rotting tree
had been removed. Thus, we cannot accept her defense of lack of
negligence.
8. CASTILEX VS. VASQUEZ
FACTS: On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning,
Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around
FuenteOsmea Rotunda.  to the presumption  juristantum of negligence on the part of the
He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a
rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also
only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time.  overtime work at the petitioners office, which was located in
Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant
Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux
“The plans of the diligent leads to profit as surely as haste leads to poverty” –Proverbs 21:5
by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio & Solis ®
Pick-up. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company
car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña
rotunda, he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in
proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad
collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad
stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands
Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital.
On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital. It
was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible
Party wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional
fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.
After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the
accident, a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was
subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. The present action
for damages was commenced by the parents of the deceased
Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex
Industrial Corporation. In the same action, Cebu Doctors Hospital
intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given
to Romeo So Vasquez.
ISSUE: Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the
death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial
employee of a company-issued vehicle.
HELD: No.The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the
time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge
petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle
unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course
or scope of his employment.
Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the
latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not
liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during
the period of permissive use, even where the employer
contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by
the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is
some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employees
personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he
has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally
kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and
the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of
the vehicle during the return trip.
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our
jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not
on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. 
Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his
employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise
employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting
in his employers business or within the scope of his assigned task.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some
Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldies
Restaurant in FuenteOsmea, Cebu City, which is about seven
kilometers away from petitioners place of business. A witness for
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2nd Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano)
the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that
FuenteOsmea is a lively place even at dawn because Goldies
Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were drinking
thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the
place.
At the Goldies Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a
chat with friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that
the incident in question occurred. That same witness for the private
respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular accident,
ABAD was with a woman in his car, who then shouted: Daddy,
Daddy.  This woman could not have been ABADs daughter, for ABAD
was only 29 years old at the time.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his
own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his
duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then
about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working
hours. ABADs working day had ended; his overtime work had
already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner
put it, was known as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug
pushers and addicts, had no connection to petitioners business;
neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using
his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe
benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within
the scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had
no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and
equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the
consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the
plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee
was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort
complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may
find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee.
VIOLATION OF TRAFFIC RULES
9. US VS. MARIANO CRAME
FACTS: In 1914, between 11 and 12 o'clock, the accused, Mariano
Crame, a duly-licensed chauffeur, was driving an automobile with
Thomas M. Bill and Indalecio Rabonsa, an apprentice to the accused
who, at the time of the accident, was sitting at his side on the front
seat. The automobile was passing from Santa Ana to Manila and, at
the time of the accident, was going in a northwesterly direction. At
the same time there were two automobile on the way from Manila to
Santa Ana, one belonging to Mr. Stuart, driven by himself, and the
other a machine without passengers driven by a chauffeur by the
name of Miranda. The automobile driven by Stuart was a modern
Cadillac with high-powered electric lights. The accused states that this
fact added to the other fact that he was near the Damas Bridge at the
time, induced him to reduce the speed of the automobile at that
point so that he was, at the time of the accident, going only about 10
miles an hour. He asserts that he suddenly saw the form of a man in
front of his automobile and that, on seeing him, he altered the course
of the machine as much as possible in order to avoid a collision; but
that he was unable to do so, the right side of the machine hitting the
“The plans of the diligent leads to profit as surely as haste leads to poverty” –Proverbs 21:5
by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio & Solis ®
man and knocking him to the ground. He asserted that at the time it
struck the man, the machine was almost at a standstill, it coming to a
complete stop within about 6 feet of where the injured man lay.
Crame, Rabonsa, and Bill placed the injured man, Coombs (a soldier),
in the automobile and carried him to the hospital. Afterwards they
went to the police station at Paco and gave an account of the
accident.
Unfortunately, Coombs received a heavy blow in the lower part of the
back of the head which caused ecchymosis and coagulation of blood.
He is described by the physician who examined and treated him as an
incurable and hopeless imbecile.
ISSUE: W/N, the accused is liable for the injuries suffered by Coombs.
YES
HELD: The fact that the accused did not see the soldier until the
machine was very close to him is strong evidence of inattention to
duty. The street at the place where the accident occurred is wide and
unobstructed. There is no building on either side of the street. There
is no place from which a person desiring to cross the street can dart
out so suddenly and unexpectedly as to give a chauffeur no
opportunity to protect him. The street at the point where the
accident occurred was well lighted by electric light placed on both
sides of the street. Under such circumstance there is no reason why
the accused did not see that soldier long before he had reached the
position in the street where he was struck down.
Also, the accused intimates in his testimony that a carromata was
approaching him just before the accident occurred and that it
obscured his vision to such an extent that he did not see that soldier
until the very moment of meeting the carromata. This story is not
corroborated by any other witness in the case. No one else speaks of
the presence there of a carromata and no one offers this as a person
why the soldier was not seen in time to avoid the accident. Moreover,
if the soldier were crossing the street the carromata would have
obscured him for a moment only and there would have been
abundant time to observe him before he reached the carromata and
after he had passed it. Besides, it is the duty of automobile drivers in
meeting a moving vehicle on the public streets and highways to use
due care and diligence to see to it that person who may be crossing
behind the moving vehicle are not run down by their automobiles.
There is nothing in this story of the accused which, if true, relieves
from the charge of negligence under the other facts and
circumstances disclosed by the evidence. It is to be noted, also that
counsel for the accused lays no stress on this portion of his story and
does not make it the basis of an argument in his behalf.
Moreover, it appears clearly established by the evidence that the
accused was driving on the right-hand side of the street when the
accident happened. According to the law of the road and the custom
of the country he should have been on the left-hand side of the
street. According to the evidence there was abundant room for him
to drive upon what may properly be called the left-hand side of the
street and still be free from danger or risk. Instead of that he chose to
take what appears from the evidence to have been almost the
extreme right-hand side of the street.
There is no evidence in the case which shows negligence on the part
of the injured soldier. The mere fact that he was run down by an
automobile does not signify that he was negligent. At the time he was
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2nd Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano)
struck he was, speaking from the direction in which the accused was
driving the automobile at the time, on the right-hand side of the
street where he had a right to be and where the law fully protested
him from vehicles traveling in the direction in which tested him from
vehicles traveling in the direction in which the accused was driving at
the time of the injury. The rule which requires travelers to look out
for trains at railroad crossings by stopping, looking and listening
before they pass over the tracks does not fix the measure of care
which a pedestrian attempting to cross a street must use in looking
out for automobiles.
We regard it as clear from the record that the accused was driving
much faster than he claims he was or else he was negligent in not
watching the street for foot passengers, or in the handing of hid
automobile. It is a matter of common knowledge that an automobile
being driven at 10 miles an hour can be stopped if, necessity requires
it, within 10 or 15 feet at the most. That rate of speed is extremely
low for an automobile and , with such a sped, it can be stopped
almost instantly. If, therefore, the accused was going at the rate of 10
miles an hour only and saw the soldiers 20 feet ahead of him, he
could, without difficulty, have stopped the automobile and avoided
the accident. As a necessary consequence, the accused was either
driving at a rate of speed much higher than that stated or else he was
negligent in not stopping his car. Furthermore, if he did not see that
soldier until too late to stop, the burden is on him to show why he did
not. There is no competent evidence to show that the soldier was
drunk at the time of the accident; but, even if he was drunk, it is of
little consequence in the decision of this case, it not having been
shown that such drunkenness contributed to the accident. Whatever
his condition he could easily have been seen by the automobile driver
if he had been vigilant, as he should have been, in passing over the
streets of a city and especially in passing a place where many used by
people on foot. It is not shown that the soldier's drunkenness, if he
was in that state, any degree contributed to the accident or that the
accident would have been avoided if he had been sober.
10. BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY (BLTB) &
ARMANDO PON, vs. IAC
FACTS: The collision between Bus No. 1046 of BLTB driven by
Armando Pon and Bus No. 404 of Superlines driven by Ruben Dasco
took place at the highway traversing Barangay Isabong, Tayabas,
Quezon in the afternoon of August 11, 1978. The collision resulted in
the death of Aniceto Rosales, Francisco Pamfilo and Romeo Neri and
in several injuries to Nena Rosales (wife of Anecito) and Baylon Sales,
all passengers of the BLTB Bus No. 1046.
As BLTB Bus No. 1046 was negotiating the bend of the highway, it
tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car just as Bus No. 404 of Superlines
was coming from the opposite direction. Seeing thus, Armando Pon
(driver of the BLTB Bus) made a belated attempt to slacken the speed
of his bus and tried to return to his proper lane. It was an
unsuccessful try as the two (2) buses collided with each other.
as BLTB Bus No. 1046 was negotiating the bend of the highway, it
tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car just as Bus No. 404 of Superlines
was coming from the opposite direction. Seeing thus, Armando Pon
(driver of the BLTB Bus) made a belated attempt to slacken the speed
of his bus and tried to return to his proper lane. It was an
unsuccessful try as the two (2) buses collided with each other.
“The plans of the diligent leads to profit as surely as haste leads to poverty” –Proverbs 21:5
by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio & Solis ®
Defendants BLTB and Superlines, together with their drivers Pon and
Dasco, denied liability by claiming that they exercised due care and
diligence and shifted the fault, against each other
Nena Vda. de Rosales and Baylon Sales and the surviving heirs of the
deceased Francisco Pamfilo, Aniceto Rosales and Romeo Neri
instituted separate cases against BLTB and Superlines together with
their respective drivers. Criminal cases against the drivers of the two
buses were filed as well.
Defendants BLTB and Superlines, together with their drivers Pon and
Dasco, denied liability by claiming that they exercised due care and
diligence and shifted the fault, against each other.
The lower court exonerated defendants Superlines and its driver
Dasco from liability and attributed sole responsibility to defendants
BLTB and its driver Pon.
ISSUE: Whether or not BLTB and Pon are liable
RULING: YES. The court anchored petitioners' liability both on culpa
contractual and culpa aquiliana, to wit:
The proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of three
and injuries to two of the passengers of BLTB was the negligence of
the driver of the BLTB bus, who recklessly operated and drove said
bus by overtaking a Ford Fiera car as he was negotiating the
ascending bend of the highway which was divided into two lanes by
a continuous yellow strip. The driver of the BLTB bus admitted in
his cross-examination that the continuous yellow line on the
ascending bend of the highway signifies a no-overtaking zone. It is
no surprise then that the driver of the Superlines bus was
exonerated by the lower court. He had a valid reason to
presuppose that no one would overtake in such a dangerous
situation. These facts show that patient imprudence of the BLTB
driver.
It is well settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the
purpose of overtaking another vehicle in ordinary situation has the
duty to see that the road is clear and not to proceed if he can not
do so in safety.
... Before attempting to pass the vehicle ahead, the rear driver
must see that the road is clear and if there is no sufficient room for
a safe passage, or the driver ahead does not turn out so as to
afford opportunity to pass, or if, after attempting to pass, the driver
of the overtaking vehicle finds that he cannot make the passage in
safety, the latter must slacken his speed so as to avoid the danger
of a collision, even bringing his car to a stop if necessary.
The above rule becomes more particularly applicable in this case
when the overtaking took place on an ascending curved highway
divided into two lanes by a continuous yellow line. Appellant Pon
should have remembered that:
When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve there is
special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the
driver has not the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon
having time to turn to the right if a car is approaching from the
opposite direction comes into view.
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2nd Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano)
Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
In failing to observe these simple precautions, BLTB's driver
undoubtedly failed to act with the diligence demanded by the
circumstances.
Conclusively therefore in consideration of the foregoing findings of
the respondent appellate court it is settled that the proximate cause
of the collision resulting in the death of three and injuries to two of
the passengers of BLTB was the sole negligence of the driver of the
BLTB Bus, who recklessly operated and drove said bus in a lane where
overtaking is not allowed by Traffic Rules and Regulations.
VIOLATION OF TRAFFIC RULES
11. G.R. No. 162987 May 21, 2009
SOFIA M. GUILLANG vs. RODOLFO BEDANIA and RODOLFO DE SILVA
FACTS: On 25 October 1994, at about 5:45 in the afternoon,
petitioner Genaro was driving his brand new Toyota Corolla GLI sedan
along Emilio Aguinaldo Highway (highway) in Cavite. Petitioners had
all just left from Golden City, Dasmarinas, Cavite, and were on their
way to Manila. At the other side of the highway, respondent Bedania
was driving a ten-wheeler Isuzu cargo truck towards Tagaytay
City. The truck was owned by respondent de Silva.
Along the highway and the road leading to the Orchard Golf Course,
Bedania negotiated a U-turn. When the truck entered the opposite
lane of the highway, Genaros car hit the right portion of the
truck. The truck dragged Genaros car some five meters to the right of
the road.
As a consequence, all the passengers of the car were rushed to the De
La Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite for
treatment. Because of severe injuries, Antero was later transferred to
the Philippine General Hospital. However, on 3 November 1994,
Antero died due to the injuries he sustained from the collision. The
car was a total wreck while the truck sustained minor damage.
Petitioners instituted a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict
against respondents Bedania and de Silva.
The trial court held Bedania and de Silva, as Bedanias employer, liable
because the proximate cause of the collision was the sudden U-turn
executed by Bedania without any signal lights. According to the trial
court, there is a presumption that a person driving a motor vehicle
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation. In this case, the trial court found that the Traffic
Accident Investigation Report (report), corroborated by the
testimonies of the witnesses, showed that the truck committed a
traffic violation by executing a U-turn without signal lights. The trial
court also declared that Bedania violated Sections 45(b), 48, and 54of
Republic Act No. 4136 when he executed the sudden U-turn. The trial
court added that Bedania violated another traffic rule when he
abandoned the victims after the collision. The trial court concluded
that Bedania was grossly negligent in his driving and held him liable
for damages.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
decision and held Genaro liable because the proximate cause of the
collision was Genaros failure to stop the car despite seeing that
Bedania was making a U-turn. The Court of Appeals relied on the
testimony of Police Traffic Investigator Videna that the car was
“The plans of the diligent leads to profit as surely as haste leads to poverty” –Proverbs 21:5
by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio & Solis ®
running at a fast speed and overtook another vehicle just before the
collision occurred.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bedania and de Silva and their respective
employers are liable for the damages suffered by petitioners. 
RULING: YES. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relations between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict. To sustain a claim based on quasi-
delict, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by
the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c) connection
of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and
the damage incurred by the plaintiff.[24]
There is no dispute that petitioners suffered damages because of the
collision. However, the issues on negligence and proximate cause are
disputed.
On the Presumption of Negligence and Proximate Cause
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of
the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. In Picart v. Smith, we held that the test of
negligence is whether the defendant in doing the alleged negligent
act used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person
would have used in the same situation.
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Genaro was negligent is
not supported by the evidence on record. In ruling that Genaro was
negligent, the Court of Appeals gave weight and credence to Police
Traffic Investigator Videna’s testimony. However, we find that
Videna’s testimony was inconsistent with the police records and
report that he made on the day of the collision. First, Videna testified
that the car was running fast and overtook another vehicle that
already gave way to the truck. But this was not indicated in either the
report or the police records. Moreover, if the car was speeding, there
should have been skid marks on the road when Genaro stepped on
the brakes to avoid the collision. But the sketch of the accident
showed no skid marks made by the car. Second, Videna testified that
the petitioners came from a drinking spree because he was able to
smell liquor. But in the report, Videna indicated that the condition of
Genaro was normal. Videna did not indicate in the report that Genaro
had been drinking liquor or that Genaro was obviously drunk. Third,
Videna testified that when he arrived at the scene, Bedania was inside
his truck. This contradicts the police records where Videna stated that
after the collision Bedania escaped and abandoned the victims. The
police records also showed that Bedania was arrested by the police at
his barracks in Anabu, Imus, Cavite and was turned over to the police
only on 26 October 1994.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the
contrary, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
In this case, the report showed that the truck, while making the U-
turn, failed to signal, a violation of traffic rules. The police records
also stated that, after the collision, Bedania escaped and abandoned
the petitioners and his truck. This is another violation of a traffic
regulation. Therefore, the presumption arises that Bedania was
negligent at the time of the mishap.
The evidence presented in this case also does not support the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the truck had already
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2nd Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano)
executed the U-turn before the impact occurred. If the truck had fully
made the U-turn, it should have been hit on its rear. If the truck had
already negotiated even half of the turn and is almost on the other
side of the highway, then the truck should have been hit in the middle
portion of the trailer or cargo compartment. But the evidence clearly
shows, and the Court of Appeals even declared, that the car hit the
trucks gas tank, located at the trucks right middle portion, which
disproves the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the truck had
already executed the U-turn when it was hit by the car.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals said that the point of impact was on
the lane where the car was cruising. Therefore, the car had every
right to be on that road and the car had the right of way over the
truck that was making a U-turn. Clearly, the truck encroached upon
the cars lane when it suddenly made the U-turn.
The Court of Appeals also concluded that Bedania made the U-turn at
an intersection. Again, this is not supported by the evidence on
record. The police sketch does not indicate an intersection and only
shows that there was a road leading to the Orchard Golf Course near
the place of the collision. Furthermore, U-turns are generally not
advisable particularly on major streets. Contrary to Videnas
testimony, it is not normal for a truck to make a U-turn on a
highway. We agree with the trial court that if Bedania wanted to
change direction, he should seek an intersection where it is safer to
maneuver the truck. Bedania should have also turned on his signal
lights and made sure that the highway was clear of vehicles from the
opposite direction before executing the U-turn.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that it was not yet dark when the
collision occurred is also not supported by the evidence on
record. The report stated that the daylight condition at the time of
the collision was darkness.
Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the sheer size of
the truck does not make it improbable for the truck to execute a
sudden U-turn. The trial courts decision did not state that the truck
was traveling at a fast speed when it made the U-turn. The trial court
said the truck made a sudden U-turn, meaning the U-turn was made
unexpectedly and with no warning, as shown by the fact that the
trucks signal lights were not turned on.
Clearly, Bedanias negligence was the proximate cause of the collision
which claimed the life of Antero and injured the
petitioners. Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of
Bedania for if the U-turn was executed with the proper precaution,
the mishap in all probability would not have happened. The sudden
U-turn of the truck without signal lights posed a serious risk to
oncoming motorists. Bedania failed to prevent or minimize that
risk. The trucks sudden U-turn triggered a series of events that led to
the collision and, ultimately, to the death of Antero and the injuries of
petitioners.
We agree with the trial court that de Silva, as Bedanias employer, is
also liable for the damages suffered by petitioners. De Silva failed to
prove that he exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of his employees.
12. BERNARDO VS. LEGASPI
NEGLIGENCE; AUTOMOBILES; COLLISION TROUGH MUTUAL
NEGLIGENCE. — Where two automobiles, going in opposite
“The plans of the diligent leads to profit as surely as haste leads to poverty” –Proverbs 21:5
by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio & Solis ®
directions, collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from the
evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were
equally negligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence
as determining causes thereof, neither can recover of the other for
the damages suffered.
FACTS: This is an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by
Juan Bernardo’s automobile by reason of Legaspi’s negligence in
causing a collision between his automobile and that of Bernardo.
The cross-complaint filed by Legaspi praying for damages against the
plaintiff was dismissed on the ground that the injuries sustained by
defendant’s automobile in the collision referred to, as well as those to
plaintiff’s machine, were caused by the negligence of the plaintiff in
handling his automobile. 
The court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the
defendant were negligent in handling their automobiles and that said
negligence was of such a character and extent on the part of both as
to prevent either from recovering. 
ISSUE: Whether drivers who are equally negligent and both
contributed to the occurrence may recover damages.
HELD: No.Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own
carelessness contributes to the principal occurrence, that is, to the
accident, as one of the determining causes thereof, he cannot
recover. This is equally true of the defendant; and as both of them, by
their negligent acts, contributed to the determining cause of the
accident, neither can recover. 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
13. RAKES v ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY
FACTS: The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the
employment of the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails
from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in
Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work.
The defendant has proved that there were two immediately following
one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each
weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two
crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or
guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to the testimony
of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its
sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front,
hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the
track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails
slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was
afterwards amputated at about the knee. 
ISSUE: Whether there is contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff. YES!
RULING:  Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the
accident, to what extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be
given it. In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
FIRST. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued
his work; and
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SECOND.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car
instead of along the boards, either before or behind it.  cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after
noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature
as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe
American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not
only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were
expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the
company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general
prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by
the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the
prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this
contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of
the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being
made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff
in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury
as a proximate, although not as its primary cause. 
Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the
event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and
those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or
the failure to replace it. This produced the event giving occasion for
damages — that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron
rails.  455), commenting on the decision of March 7, 1902 of the Civil
Thus, while Atlantic was negligent in failing to repair the bed of the
track, Rakes was guilty of contributory negligence in walking at the
side instead of being in front or behind. The amount of damages
should be reduced.
14. TAYLOR VS MANILA ELECTRIC AND RAILROAD COMPANY
FACTS: MERALCO is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of
a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. Its
power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the
Pasig River within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor.
The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge,
impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.
David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries
complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer,
more mature than the average boy of his age, and having
considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel
Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del
Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a
miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his
quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and
perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in
machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's
premises.
Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps
scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and
appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two
long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of
electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting
charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive
power. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps.
“The plans of the diligent leads to profit as surely as haste leads to poverty” –Proverbs 21:5
by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio & Solis ®
Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was
filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the
explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three.
essie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents
of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a
slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and
David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule,
one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the
necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for
his wounds.
ON CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
RULING: According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the
Civil Code, fault or negligence is a source of obligation when between
such negligence and the injury there exists the relation of cause and
effect; but if the injury produced should not be the result of acts or
omissions of a third party, the latter has no obligation to repair the
same, although such acts or omission were imprudent or unlawful,
and much less when it is shown that the immediate cause of the
injury was the negligence of the injured party himself.
To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under
that title in his Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil (1902 Anuario, p.
Code, fault or negligence gives rise to an obligation when between
it and the damage there exists the relation of cause and effect; but
if the damage caused does not arise from the acts or omissions of a
third person, there is no obligation to make good upon the latter,
even though such acts or omissions be imprudent or illegal, and
much less so when it is shown that the immediate cause of the
damage has been the recklessness of the injured party himself.
And again —
In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the
burden thereof is upon the plaintiff, it is apparent that it is duty of
him who shall claim damages to establish their existence. The
decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July, and September 27,
1898, have especially supported the principle, the first setting
forth in detail the necessary points of the proof, which are two:
An act or omission on the part of the person who is to be charged
with the liability, and the production of the damage by said act or
omission.
This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of
cause or effect between the act or omission and the damage; the
latter must be the direct result of one of the first two. As the
decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that the damages
result immediately and directly from an act performed culpably
and wrongfully; "necessarily presupposing a legal ground for
imputability." (Decision of October 29, 1887.)
Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who
alleges it. (Scavoela, Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6, pp.
551-552.)
(Cf. decisions of supreme court of Spain of June 12, 1900, and June
23, 1900.)
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Finally we think the doctrine in this jurisdiction applicable to the case
at bar was definitely settled in this court in the maturely considered
case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (supra), wherein we
held that while "There are many cases (personal injury cases) was
exonerated," on the ground that "the negligence of the plaintiff was
the immediate cause of the casualty" (decisions of the 15th of
January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of March, 1902, stated in
Alcubilla's Index of that year); none of the cases decided by the
supreme court of Spain "define the effect to be given the negligence
of its causes, though not the principal one, and we are left to seek the
theory of the civil law in the practice of other countries;" and in such
cases we declared that law in this jurisdiction to require the
application of "the principle of proportional damages," but expressly
and definitely denied the right of recovery when the acts of the
injured party were the immediate causes of the accident.
The doctrine as laid down in that case is as follows:
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the
injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident.
The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the accident
and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could
have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering
into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt.
For instance, the cause of the accident under review was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This
produces the event giving occasion for damages—that is, the
sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event,
the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not
contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came
to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly
through his act or omission of duty, that would have been one of
the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he
would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not
recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes
only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the
defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less
a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the
immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which resulted in
plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the contents
of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence,
as one of its determining factors, he can not recover."
DEFENSES AGAINST CHARGE OF NEGLIGENCE: CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE
15. MEDARDO AG. CADIENTE vs. BITHUEL MACAS
FACTS: Eyewitness Palero testified that on July 19, 1994, at
about 4:00 p.m., at the intersection of Buhangin and San Vicente
Streets in Davao City, 15-year old high school student respondent
Macas, was standing on the shoulder of the road. She was about two
and a half meters away from the respondent when he was bumped
and run over by a Ford Fiera, driven by Cimafranca. Rosalinda and
another unidentified person immediately came to the respondent’s
rescue and told Cimafranca to take the victim to the
hospital. Cimafranca rushed the respondent to
the Davao Medical Center.
“The plans of the diligent leads to profit as surely as haste leads to poverty” –Proverbs 21:5
by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio & Solis ®
Dr. Hilario Diaz, the orthopedic surgeon who attended to the
respondent, had to amputate both legs up to the groins in order to
save his life. Cimafranca had since absconded and
disappeared. Records showed that the Ford Fiera was registered in
the name of herein petitioner, Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente. However,
Cadiente claimed that when the accident happened, he was no longer
the owner of the Ford Fiera. He alleged that he sold the vehicle to
Engr. Rogelio Jalipa and turned over the Certificate of Registration
and Official Receipt to Jalipa, with the understanding that the latter
would be the one to cause the transfer of the registration.
The victim’s father, Samuel Macas, filed a complaint for torts and
damages against Cimafranca and Cadiente.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the
victim, respondent Macas.
NO. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a
plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be
entitled to recover damages in full, but must proportionately bear the
consequences of his own negligence. The defendant is thus held liable
only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.
In this case, records show that when the accident happened, the
victim was standing on the shoulder, which was the uncemented
portion of the highway. As noted by the trial court, the shoulder was
intended for pedestrian use alone. Only stationary vehicles, such as
those loading or unloading passengers may use the shoulder. Running
vehicles are not supposed to pass through the said uncemented
portion of the highway. However, the Ford Fiera in this case, without
so much as slowing down, took off from the cemented part of the
highway, inexplicably swerved to the shoulder, and recklessly
bumped and ran over an innocent victim. The victim was just where
he should be when the unfortunate event transpired. Cimafranca, on
the other hand, had no rightful business driving as recklessly as she
did. The respondent cannot be expected to have foreseen that the
Ford Fiera, erstwhile speeding along the cemented part of the
highway would suddenly swerve to the shoulder, then bump and run
him over. Thus, we are unable to accept the petitioner’s contention
that the respondent was negligent.
2. Who is liable?
Cadiente is the one liable to respondent. This Court has recently
reiterated in PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. UCPB General Insurance
Co., Inc., that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had
already sold it to someone else, is primarily responsible to the public
for whatever damage or injury the vehicle may cause. We explained,
Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving
who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by
collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and
transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no
property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury
done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually
without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the
injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the
registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the
owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would
become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to
escape liability by disproving his ownership.
In the case of Villanueva v. Domingo, we said that the policy behind
vehicle registration is the easy identification of the owner who can be
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2nd Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano)
held responsible in case of accident, damage or injury caused by the
vehicle. This is so as not to inconvenience or prejudice a third party
injured by one whose identity cannot be secured. Therefore, since
the Ford Fiera was still registered in the petitioner’s name at the time
when the misfortune took place, the petitioner cannot escape liability
for the permanent injury it caused the respondent, who had since
stopped schooling and is now forced to face life with nary but two
remaining limbs.
16. Lapanday vs. Angala
FACTS: On 4 May 1993, a Datsun crewcabdriven by
ApolonioDeocampo (Deocampo) bumped into a 1958 Chevy pick-up
owned by Michael Raymond Angala (respondent) and driven by
BernulfoBorres (Borres).
Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (LADECO)
owned the crewcab which was assigned to its manager Manuel
Mendez (Mendez).
Deocampo was the driver and bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles
were running along Rafael Castillo St., Agdao, Davao City heading
north towards Lanang, Davao City. The left door, front left fender, and
part of the front bumper of the pick-up were damaged.
Respondent filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages, and Attorney’s
Fees against LADECO, its administrative officer Henry
Berenguel(Berenguel) and Deocampoalleging that his pick-up was
slowing down to about five to ten kilometers per hour (kph) and was
making a left turn preparatory to turning south when it was bumped
from behind by the crewcab which was running at around 60 to 70
kph.
The crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact.
Respondent alleged that he heard a screeching sound before the
impact. Respondent was seated beside the driver and was looking at
the speedometer when the accident took place. Respondent testified
that Borres made a signal because he noticed a blinking light while
looking at the speedometer.
Deocampo alleged that the pick-up and the crewcab he was driving
were both running at about 40 kph. The pick-up was running along
the outer lane. The pick-up was about 10 meters away when it made
a U-turn towards the left. Deocampo testified that he did not see any
signal from the pick-up. Deocampo alleged that he tried to avoid the
pick-up but he was unable to avoid the collision. Deocampo stated
that he did not apply the brakes because he knew the collision was
unavoidable. Deocampo admitted that he stepped on the brakes only
after the collision.
ISSUE: WON Deocampo is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Applies
Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear
chance applies.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of
“The plans of the diligent leads to profit as surely as haste leads to poverty” –Proverbs 21:5
by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio & Solis ®
the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with
the loss. In this case, Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the
collision.
Since Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of
the situation since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front
of him.Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the
vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to
avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running straight
ahead.Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving
very fast while following the pick-up. Deocampo was not only driving
fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes even upon
seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision.
Petitioners are Solidarily Liable
LADECO alleges that it should not be held jointly and severally liable
with Deocampo because it exercised due diligence in the supervision
and selection of its employees. Aside from this statement, LADECO
did not proffer any proof to show how it exercised due diligence in
the supervision and selection of its employees. LADECO did not show
its policy in hiring its drivers, or the manner in which it supervised its
drivers. LADECO failed to substantiate its allegation that it exercised
due diligence in the supervision and selection of its employees.
Hence, we hold LADECO solidarily liable with Deocampo.
ATTRACTIVE NUISSANCE
17. HIDALGO ENTERPRISES vs. GUILLERMO BALANDAN
FACTS: Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. "was the owner of an ice-
plant factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were
installed two tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes
of its engine. While the factory compound was surrounded with
fence, the tanks themselves were not provided with any kind of fence
or top covers. The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the
surface of the ground. Through the wide gate entrance, which is
continually open, motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said
commodity passed, and anyone could easily enter the said factory, as
he pleased. There was no guard assigned on the gate. At about noon
of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years
old, while playing with and in company of other boys of his age
entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one
of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the
tank, only to be fished out later, already a cadaver, having been died
of "asphyxia secondary to drowning."
ISSUE: W/N swimming pool or water tank is an attractive nuisance.
NO.
HELD: The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who
maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances
of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to
exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
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resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured
thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.
American Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance
doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as
well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial
feature other than the mere water and its location.
The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not
considered an attractive nuisance was lucidly explained by the Indiana
Appellate Court as follows:
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children.
Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this
danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently
presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property
creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the
work of nature without adding any new danger . . . (he) is not liable
because of having created an "attractive nuisance."
Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive
nuisance, the question whether the petitioner had taken reasonable a
precaution becomes immaterial. In the case bar, the tanks themselves
cannot fall under such doctrine thus the petitioners cannot be held
liable for Mario’s death.
18. AFIALDA VS HISOLE
FACTS: This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an
animal. The complaint alleges that the now deceased, Loreto Afialda,
was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their
carabaos at a fixed compensation; that while tending the animals he
was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of them and later died as a
consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his
own fault nor to force majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and
heir depending upon him for support.
Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil
Code, which reads:
The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable
for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape
from him or stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from
force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have
suffered it.
ISSUE: Whether the owner of the animal is liable when damage is
caused to its caretaker.
RULING: The lower court took the view that under the Civil Code, the
owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a
stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal
the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault
under article 1902 of the same code. Claiming that the lower court
was in error, counsel for plaintiff contends that the article 1905 does
not distinguish between damage caused to the caretaker and makes
the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at fault.
This opinion, however, appears to have been rendered in a case
where an animal caused injury to a stranger or third person. It is
“The plans of the diligent leads to profit as surely as haste leads to poverty” –Proverbs 21:5
by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio & Solis ®
therefore no authority for a case like the present where the person
injured was the caretaker of the animal. The distinction is important.
For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the
person liable for "any damages it may cause," and this for the obvious
reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the
animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from
causing damage.
In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control
of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was
the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing
injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by
the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the
occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must
take the consequences.
In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, cited by Manresa in his
Commentaries (Vol. 12, p. 578), the death of an employee who was
bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take to his
establishment was by said tribunal declared to be "a veritable
accident of labor" which should come under the labor laws rather
than under article 1905 of the Civil Code. The present action,
however, is not brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
there being no allegation that, among other things, defendant's
business, whatever that might be, had a gross income of P20,000. As
already stated, defendant's liability is made to rest on article 1905 of
the Civil Code. but action under that article is not tenable for the
reasons already stated. On the other hand, if action is to be based on
article 1902 of the Civil Code, it is essential that there be fault or
negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the animal that
caused the damage. But the complaint contains no allegation on
those points.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
19. MR. AND MRS. AMADOR C. ONG vs. METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT
FACTS: Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming
pools at its Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are
invited and for which a nominal fee of P0.50 for adults and P0.20 for
children is charged. The main pool it between two small pools of oval
shape known as the "Wading pool" and the "Beginners Pool." There
are diving boards in the big pools and the depths of the water at
different parts are indicated by appropriate marks on the wall. The
care and supervision of the pools and the users thereof is entrusted
to a recreational section composed of Simeon Chongco as chief,
Armando Rule, a male nurse, and six lifeguards who had taken the
life-saving course given by the Philippine Red Cross at the YMCA in
Manila. For the safety of its patrons, defendant has provided the
pools with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, saving kit and a
resuscitator. There is also a sanitary inspector who is in charge of a
clinic established for the benefit of the patrons. Defendant has also
on display in a conspicuous place certain rules and regulations
governing the use of the pools, one of which prohibits the swimming
in the pool alone or without any attendant. Although defendant does
not maintain a full-time physician in the swimming pool compound, it
has however a nurse and a sanitary inspector ready to administer
injections or operate the oxygen resuscitator if the need should arise.
In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, at about 1:00 o'clock, Dominador
Ong, a 14-year old high school student and boy scout, and his
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2nd Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano)
brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went to defendant's swimming pools.
This was not the first time that the three brothers had gone to said
natatorium for they had already been there four or five times before.
They arrived at the natatorium at about 1:45 p.m. After paying the
requisite admission fee, they immediately went to one of the small
pools where the water was shallow. At about 4:35 p.m., Dominador
Ong told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in an
adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this, Ruben
and Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small
pool and so they did not see the latter when he left the pool to get a
bottle of coke. In that afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty in
the pool compound, namely, Manuel Abaño and Mario Villanueva.
The tour of duty of Abaño was from 8:00 to 12:00 in the morning and
from 2:00 to 6:00 in the afternoon, and of Villanueva from 7:30 to
11:30 a.m. and from 12:30 to 4:30 p.m. Between 4:00 to 5:00 that
afternoon, there were about twenty bathers inside the pool area and
Manuel Abaño was going around the pools to observe the bathers in
compliance with the instructions of his chief.
Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were in the pool area
informed a bather by the name of Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody
was swimming under water for quite a long time. Another boy
informed lifeguard Manuel Abaño of the same happening and Abaño
immediately jumped into the big swimming pool and retrieved the
apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong from the bottom. The
body was placed at the edge of the pool and Abaño immediately
applied manual artificial respiration. Soon after, male nurse Armando
Rule came to render assistance, followed by sanitary inspector
Iluminado Vicente who, after being called by phone from the clinic by
one of the security guards, boarded a jeep carrying with him the
resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon arriving he injected the boy
with camphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep in
order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines.
Meanwhile, Abaño continued the artificial manual respiration, and
when this failed to revive him, they applied the resuscitator until the
two oxygen tanks were exhausted. Not long thereafter, Dr. Ayuyao
arrived with another resuscitator, but the same became of no use
because he found the boy already dead. The doctor ordered that the
body be taken to the clinic.
ISSUE: Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed
to the negligence of defendant and/or its employees.
RULING: NO. There is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has
taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its
patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death. Thus, it has
been shown that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a
ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid
medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so
as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place
within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the
pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had
taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates of
proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their
chief and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a time on
duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and
a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator.
And there are security guards who are available always in case of
emergency.
The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was
retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the employees of appellee did
everything possible to bring him back to life. Thus, after he was
“The plans of the diligent leads to profit as surely as haste leads to poverty” –Proverbs 21:5
by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio & Solis ®
placed at the edge of the pool, lifeguard Abaño immediately gave him
manual artificial respiration. Soon thereafter, nurse Armando Rule
arrived, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who
brought with him an oxygen resuscitator. When they found that the
pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector immediately injected
him with camphorated oil. When the manual artificial respiration
proved ineffective they applied the oxygen resuscitator until its
contents were exhausted. And while all these efforts were being
made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao who however came late because
upon examining the body he found him to be already dead. All of the
foregoing shows that appellee has done what is humanly possible
under the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that
reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death.
Sensing that their former theory as regards the liability of appellee
may not be of much help, appellants now switch to the theory that
even if it be assumed that the deceased is partly to be blamed for the
unfortunate incident, still appellee may be held liable under the
doctrine of "last clear chance" for the reason that, having the last
opportunity to save the victim, it failed to do so.
We do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the
record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming
pool. The only thing the record discloses is that minor Ong informed
his elder brothers that he was going to the locker room to drink a
bottle of coke but that from that time on nobody knew what
happened to him until his lifeless body was retrieved. The doctrine of
last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does
not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it
appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence,
might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence. Or, "As the doctrine usually is stated,
a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the
negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the
accident."
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming
pool and it being apparent that he went there without any
companion in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as
regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Abano to
responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it
and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of
appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is
clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now
invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee..
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party
charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot
be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is
or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any
previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have
contributed to the injury. 
Before closing, we wish to quote the following observation of the trial
court, which we find supported by the evidence: "There is (also) a
strong suggestion coming from the expert evidence presented by
both parties that Dominador Ong might have dived where the water
was only 5.5 feet deep, and in so doing he might have hit or bumped
his forehead against the bottom of the pool, as a consequence of
which he was stunned, and which to his drowning. As a boy scout he
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2nd Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano) by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio & Solis ®
must have received instructions in swimming. He knew, or have in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, supra, which involved a similar
known that it was dangerous for him to dive in that part of the pool." state of facts.

20. Glan People’s Lumber vs. IAC
FACTS: Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, AgripinoRoranes, and
MaximoPatos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated
Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as it approached from the
South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City at
about 1:45 in the afternoon of July 4,1979.
Since said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and
his employer (and co-petitioner) George Lim, an inquiry into whether
or not the evidence supports the latter's additional defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of said driver is no longer
necessary and wig not be undertaken. The fact is that there is such
evidence in the record which has not been controverted.

At about that time, the cargo track, loaded with cement bags, GI
sheets, plywood, driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants, coming
from the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for Glan, South
Cotabato, had just crossed said bridge.

At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and the
jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while
Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt.

As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly
damaged while the left side of the jeep, including its fender and hood,
was extensively damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested
on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the
truck, while the truck stopped on its wheels on the road.

On November 27, 1979, the instant case for damages was filed by the
surviving spouse and children of the late Engineer Calibo who are
residents of Tagbilaran City against the driver and owners of the
cargo truck.

RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to establish preponderance of

evidence. CA reversed and found Zacarias negligent. Hence, this
present case.

ISSUE:

HELD: Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view
of each other's vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters.
Both vehicles were travelling at a speed of approximately thirty
kilometers per hour. 

The private respondents have admitted that the truck was already at
a full stop when the jeep plowed into it. And they have not seen fit to
deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also admitted the
truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters
away. 

From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the
jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear
chance to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of thirty
meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep
away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do
while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those
circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance,
not merely rely on a supposed right to expect, as the Appellate Court
would have it, the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.

The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a
defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied

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