PANGASINAN VS.

ALMAZORA
1. This case concerns a parcel of land located at Brgy. Sto. Domingo, Biñan, Laguna.
a. It was registered in the name of Aquilina Martinez(Aquilina) under Transfer Certificate of Title(TCT) No. T-
18729 by the Register of Deeds of Laguna on July 29, 1939.
b. In 1945, Aquilina and her grandmother Leoncia rebuild their house located at Tondo,Manila by borrowing
money from Conrado.
c. In return, Leoncia entrusted to Conrado the owner’s ducplicate copy of the property in Laguna, and Conrado
and his family remained in the said property.
2. Aquilina died in 1949 and the title of the said property was transferred to Aurora. In 1972, Conrado also passed
away.
2. In 1994, Aurora learned from the widow of Conrado that the title of the property in Laguna was long transferred
to Conrado and that it has been sold by conrado to Fullway Development Corporation by the heirs of the same.
4. Aurora was shocked by the news and on October 1995, she sent an demand letter to the heirs of Conrado
demanding the delivery of the payment they received for the sale of the  property, but it was unheeded.
3. On May 1996, Aurora and her husband filed a complaint for damages against Cristina and the heirs of Conrado
before the RTC.
a. They said that the duplicate copy of the TCT was given to Conrado for safekeeping.
b. However, they admitted that Conrado has been using the property since 1912 with the consent of Aquilina
and Leoncia
c. Aurora asserted that she had repeatedly asked Conrado and then Cristina but she was ignored and that
the said property was sold to Fullway without her authorization.
6. On June 1996, respondents filed their answer with compulsory counterclaim. They said that
a. the subject property was properly transferred to Conrado.
b. They also raised the defense that the complaint stated no cause of action and was barred by prescription.
7. RTC then ruled that the complaint stated a cause of action.

Respondents filed a certiorari before the Court of Appeals but was denied.

4. In RTC’s June 29, 2004 Decision, the complaint was dismissed.

a. It explained that Aurora was guilty of laches because for many years she slept on her right over the
questioned property and
b. failed to exhaust all means, legal or administrative to retrieve what was rightfully hers at the earliest possible
time.
c. RTC further determined that the title was transferred to Conrado’s name on June 1965 by virtue of a
document denominated as “Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Registered Land” dated January
1949 and signed by Aurora and her husband.
 
9. Aurora appealed to the Court of Appeals. Her children substituted her after her death.
5. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal of the petitioners.
a. It held that it took Aurora more than 50 years to act on Conrado’s withholding the title of the said property
and petitioners were barred by laches as Aurora should have been impervious in asserting her
ownership and made judicial demands to return the title and the property.
b. The CA further explained that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained through fraud or
mistake giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code was 10 years, pursuant to
Article 1144. This 10-year prescriptive period began from the time the land was registered on June 17,
1965. Accordingly, Aurora had only until June 17, 1975 within which to file her action. However, Aurora
commenced the suit only on May 12, 1996.
 Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners are barred by laches from revering the subject property.
2. Whether or not petitioners petition had already prescribed.

Ruling:

PETITIONERS ARE BARRED BY LACHES

The four (4) elements of laches, as first prescribed by this Court in Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho are as follows:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which
complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
 defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which
he bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to
be barred
APPLICATION:
First, Aurora and her family entrusted to Conrado the owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title of the subject
property in 1945. In their complaint, petitioners even admitted that Conrado’s family had been staying in the subject
property since 1912. Second, it took five decades, from 1945 to 1996, before Aurora and petitioners decided to enforce
their right thereon. Third, respondents who lived all their lives in the disputed property apparently were not aware that
Aurora would one day come out and claim ownership thereon. Fourth, there was no question that respondents would be
prejudiced in the event that the suit would be allowed to prosper.
The law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.

THE ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED

On the basis of prescription of actions, the pending petition must also be denied. Petitioners argue that
prescription shall not lie against their action because a registered land under Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529 cannot be
acquired through prescription.

Two kinds of prescription in the Civil Code

1. Acquisitve prescription - also known as adverse possession and usucapcion.
2. Exctintive prescription - rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined in paragraph 2, Article 1106 and
Article 1139.
In a plethora of cases, the Court has held that Section 47 of P.D. No. 529 covers acquisitive prescription. A registered
land therein can never be acquired by adverse possession.

In the case at bench, however, it was extinctive prescription, and not acquisitive prescription, which barred the action of
petitioners. petitioners failed to institute their suit within the prescriptive period under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.

According to petitioners, the owner's duplicate certificate of title was given to Conrado for safekeeping in 1945. Allegedly,
Conrado employed fraud and bad faith when he drafted the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Registered
Land on January 9, 1949, and transferred the title of the land to his name with the issuance of TCT No. 35282 on June 17,
1965; and because of the purported fraud committed by Conrado against petitioners, an implied constructive trust was
created by operation of law, with Conrado as trustee and Aurora as cestui que trust.

Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a
trustee of an implied trust for the beneFit of the real owner of the property. Prescriptive period of implied trust is 10 years
pursuant to Article 1144.

The prescriptive period to enforce the constructive trust shall be counted from the alleged fraudulent registration or
date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.

The ten-year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not
in possession of the property.
APPLICATON:
In this case, the ten-year prescriptive period is squarely applicable because Conrado and his family, not petitioners, were
in possession of the property. The subject property was registered in the name of Conrado on June 17, 1965, and this
should be the starting point of the ten-year period. Petitioners, thus, had until June 17, 1975 to enforce the implied trust
and assert their claim over the land. As properly held by the CA, petitioners belatedly instituted their judicial claim over the
land on May 9, 1996. Indeed, with the lapse of the prescriptive period to file an action, petitioners could no longer seek
relief from the courts.

SIDENOTE:
Petitioners failed to prove clear and convincing evidence of fraud.
SUPAPO VS. DE JESUS
1. The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de
Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under them (collectively, the respondents)
a. The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land
b. The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot.
c. They also did not employ an overseer but they made sure to visit at least twice a year.
d. During one of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the subject lot. The houses were built
without their knowledge and permission. They later learned that the Spouses de Jesus occupied one
house while Macario occupied the other one.
e. The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of the subject lot by
bringing the dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa;
2. The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case against the respondents for violation of Presidential Decree No.
772 or the Anti-Squatting Law
a. was convicted by the RTC
3. The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA.
a. While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as "An
Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772," which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case.
4. Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents' civil liability,
praying that the latter vacate the subject lot. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion and issued the
writ of execution.
5. The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the Anti- Squatting Law does not mean that people now have
unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not own, and that it was not intended to compromise the
property rights of legitimate landowners.19 In cases of violation of their property rights, the CA noted that
recourse may be had in court by filing the proper action for recovery of possession— accion publiciana
Issue:
1. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction
1. Whether the cause of action has prescribed
2. Whether the complaint is not barred by res judicata

RULING:
THE MeTC PROPERLY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independent
of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from
the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between
the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it
is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the
issue of possession.

Assessed value:
1. of greater than 20k and > 50k in manila the jurisdiction belongs to RTC.
2. Of less than 20k and less than 50 k in manila, the MeTC has jurisdiction.
- In this case the assessed value is 39,980php located in metro manila.
Thus, MeTC has jurisdiction.

THE CAUSE OF ACTION HAS NOT PRESCRIBED

In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a
registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496

Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. — No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
In Bishop v. CA, we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens Title were aware of the other persons'
occupation of the property, regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the
return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all
Even if the defendant attacks the Torrens Title because of a purported sale or transfer of the property, we still rule in favor
of the holder of the Torrens Title if the defendant cannot adduce, in addition to the deed of sale, a duly- registered
certificate of title proving the alleged transfer or sale.

THE ACTION IS NOT BARRED PY PRIOR JUDGEMENT

As a last-ditch effort to save their case, the respondents invoke res judicata. First, there is no identity of
parties. The criminal complaint, although initiated by the Spouses Supapo, was prosecuted in the name of the people of
the Philippines. The accion publiciana, on the other hand, was filed by and in the name of the Spouses Supapo. Second,
there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the prosecution of a crime under the Anti- Squatting
Law while the accion publiciana is an action to recover possession of the subject property. And third, there is no
identity of causes of action . The people of the Philippines filed the criminal case to protect and preserve governmental
interests by prosecuting persons who violated the statute. The Spouses Supapo filed the accion publiciana to protect their
proprietary interests over the subject property and recover its possession.

our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of determining who between the parties has a better right to possession.
This adjudication is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the
parties or even third persons to file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership.
FELICIDAD CABRERA et al vs. CA, VIRGILIA ORAIS

1. Daniel, Albertana, and Felicidad Teokemian co-owned a parcel of land of 11.1 ha in Davao Oriental inherited from
their father -
2. January 16, 1950, a deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of Andres Orais over 7.7320 ha of said land -
1. names of all 3 Teokemians were stated but only signed by Daniela and Albertana
1. January 26, 1950, the parcel of land was surveyed in the name of Virgilia Orais, daughter of Andres Orais -
1. lot was denominated Lot No. 2239 and Orais was issued a free patent then an OCT covering the entire 11.1
hectares.
3. July 27, 1972, Albertana executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to Elano Cabrera, husband of Felicidad, 1/2
portion of Lot 2239 (55.5k sqm) -
1. supposedly Felicidad’s portion of the land who did not sign in the first deed of sale
2. signed by Albertana and not by Felicidad since, supposedly, whole Lot 2239 was adjudicated to Albertana by
cadastral court in June 8, 1965 as evidenced by a Certification of an officer-in-charge in RTC Davao Oriental
3. Felicidad and Elano Cabrera immediately took possession thereafter
4. In 1974 and 1978, Virgilia Orais' brothers, Rodolfo and Jimmy confronted Cabreras for their alleged illegal occupation
of their sisters land, but no action was filed in court
5. February 11, 1988, Orais filed an action for 'Quieting of Title” against Cabreras -
1. Cabreras took possession of land thru a deed of sale even though Cabreras knew that Lot 2239 was already
registered under Orais name
2. prayed that the deed of sale from Felicidad to Elano, and the tax declaration issued to Elano be nullified
6. Cabreras’ defense:
1. said portion pertained to Felicidad’s share in the first place; Elano an innocent purchaser for value; Felicidad
never signed the deed of sale to Orais so the sale of her portion was invalid; Orais committed fraud in including
Felicidad’s share in the application for free patent
2. Orais guilty of laches - knowledge of Elano’s purchase acquired in 1972, while action was filed only in 1988;
3. thus Orais is only holding the portion in an implied trust in favor of Elano; thus portion should be segregated
and delivered to Elano, including the fruits therefrom from 1950 to 1972
7. RTC - favor of Cabreras
1. Orais barred by laches
2. tax declarations not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, but they become strong evidence of ownership
acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property
8. CA - favor of Orais -
1. Orais not barred by laches - current action actually for reconveyance -
1. the sale to Elano was invalid since deed of sale was effected by Albertana, not Felicidad, and the sold
area was a specific portion instead of simply an ideal share of the co-owned property
2. Orais found out in 1974, action filed in 1988 - only 14 years had passed

ISSUE: whether or not Orais is barred by laches notwithstanding they being the registered owners

HELD:
YES

FIRST PLACE, ORAIS OCT IRREGULAR

- OCT was acquired thru fraud - Orais knew that Felicidad did not sign and therefore the her 1/3 portion was not sold,
but still she applied for a patent and an OCT for the entire property
- Orias could not have validly acquired title over the portion no sold to her. It must be remembered that registration
does not vest title, it is merely evidence of such title over a particular property.
- The defense of indefeasibility of the Torrens Title does not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with
notice of a flaw in his title. The principle of indefeasibility of title is unavailing where there was fraud that attended the
issuance of the free patents and titles.

CABRERA’s PRAYER FOR RECONVEYANCE NOT BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION

- action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in 10 years; but since it is actually in possession of
Cabrera, the right to this action is imprescriptible since it is not in the nature of an action to quiet title
- Reason of imprescriptibility: actual possessor may wait until his possession is disturbed before he may take
steps to vindicate his claim
- it being generally imprescriptible, the prescription may only start when (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts
of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust, (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made
known to the cestui que trust, and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear and positive
- there is no proof of the existence of the above requirements; if at all, the repudiation was only made when the
1988 action of quieting of title was instituted by Orais, thus Cabrera’s right to reconveyance has yet prescribed

ORAIS BARRED BY LACHES

- On the other hand, Orais action for reconveyance (quieting of title) was only instituted in 1988, 30 years from the
issuance of the OCT, when the Cabreras had all the while taken actual possession of their portion, tilling it, and
constructing an irrigation system thereon.
- This must surely constitute such tardiness on the part of Orais constituting the basis for laches.
- Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
- The defense of laches is an equitable one and does not concern itself with the character of the defendant's title, but
only with whether or not by reason of plaintiff's long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from
asserting his claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to defendant.
- Laches is not concerned merely with lapse of time, unlike prescription. While the latter deals with the fact of delay,
laches deals with the effect of unreasonable delay.
- Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, the reason upon which the rule is based is not alone the lapse of time during which the
neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the changes of condition which may have arisen during the period in
which there has been neglect. In other words, where a court finds that the position of the parties has to change, that
equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening rights of third persons may be
destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the consequences of
his own neglect.

TORRENS TITLE MAY BE DEFEATED BY LACHES

- Under the Land Registration Act, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession, this rule does not apply when the registered owner is guilty of
Laches.
- Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, while the defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and
his predecessor's long continued possession (37 years) the original owner's right to recover back the possession of
the property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the latter's long period of possession and by patentee's
inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.
- Accordingly, since the sale to Orais was only valid as to the 2/3 share of Daniel and Albertana, and they had allowed
Cabreras to possess and occupy an area equivalent to the 1/3 portion of Felicidad, a partial partition was been validly
effected; and Orais can no longer recover the same.

CONCLUSION
- Petition granted
Estrella TIONGCO v. John B. TIONGCO
1. Matilde, Jose, Vicente, and Felipe, all surnamed Tiongco, were born to Atanacio and Maria Luis Tiongco.
Together they were known as the Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco.
2. Dispute involves 3 parcels of land – lot 3244, 3246, 1404 all located in Iloilo.
a. 3244 and 1404 used to be covered by 2 OCTs each lot in the names of Matilde, Jose, Vicente and
Felipe - each has undivided share of ¼
b. 3246 – covered by OCT in the name of “HEIRS OF MARIA LUIS DE TIONGCO”
3. Kana silang upat kay namatay na. survived by their children. Kani si Estrella (petitioner) anak ni ni Jose. Nya bogo
kaayo kay ang respondent diri kay pamangkin ni Estrella. Anak sa iyang igsoon. Nya Jose pod ang name sa
pamangkin. ☹ Jose B. nalang ato i tawag niya.
4. Sometime in 1965 – Estrella built her house in 1404. Nangolekta pd og rentals sa tenants sa lots 3244 and 3246.
5. Estrella filed adverse claim over rights of her father sa disputed lots. – annotated sa 2 OCTs
6. 1983 – Jose B prohibited Estrella from collecting rentals sa tenants
7. December 1983, Jose B filed a suit for recovery of possession with preliminary injunction against several tenants
of Lots 3244 and 3246 wherein he obtained a judgment in his favor.
8. Jose B also filed a case for unlawful detainer against Estrella as she was staying on Lot 1404.
a. RTC ruled in Jose's favor, CA reversed the RTC's decision
a. Thus, Jose B never took possession of the properties.
9. Estrella inquired sa ROD, na shock sya kay Jose B already executed Affidavit of Adjudication nga sya ra kunoy
surviving heir. Tanan OCT na cancel, na transfer sa iyang name through TCT
10. Jose B’s gaming:
a. 3244 and 1404 – sold to Catalino; 3246- sold to Doronila
b. Catalino sold lots to Doronila. DORONILA SOLD LOTS BACK TO JOSE B. This happened like within a
week when TCT’s were transferred to Jose B. Pa libog libog ra.
11. Estrella filed complaint against Jose B, etc. praying for reconveyance.
a. Namakak sa Affidavit kay khibaw sya naa pay other heirs. – thus void ang affidavit! Void ang transfer!
Mere trustee si Jose B!
12. Jose B’s response: papa ni Estrella not an heir. Lol. Sya ra daw legitimate heir. Sya daw tigbayad og real prop
tax, nya mere tolerance ra daw tong gisugtan niya si Estrella mu collect og rentals.
13. RTC ruled in favor of Joe B. – prescription set in. 16 yrs lapsed after Jose B registered land.
14. CA – sustained RTC ruling. Reconveyance based on fraud is 4 yrs from discovery – such discovery is deemed to
have taken place from the issuance of the OCT/TCT.
a. On the other hand, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10
yrs from the date of issuance of the OCT/TCT. Constructive notice!
ISSUE: WON Estrella’s action for reconveyance is barred by prescription

HELD: NO!
An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten (10) years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
- However, there is an exception to this rule.

In the case of Heirs of Pomposa Saludares v. Court of Appeals, 27 the Court reiterating the ruling in Millena v. Court of
Appeals, 28 held that:
- there is but one instance when prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance, that is, when the plaintiff
is in possession of the land to be reconveyed – reconveyance when based on fraud, is imprescriptible as long as
the land has not passed to an innocent buyer for value. But in all those cases, the common factual backdrop
was that the registered owners were never in possession of the disputed property. The exception was based on
the theory that registration proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the
expense of another.
- Moreover - Court ruled that prescription of an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust does not
run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the disputed land because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right. His undisturbed
possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse
claim of a third party and its effect on his title.
- The Court held that where the plaintiff in an action for reconveyance remains in possession of the subject land, the
action for reconveyance becomes in effect an action to quiet title to property, which is not subject to prescription
- In effect, the action for reconveyance is an action to quiet the property title, which does not prescribe. (TAKE NOTE
MGA BABES!
- In such a situation, the right to quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance and annul any certificate of title
covering it, accrued only from the time the one in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own, and it is
only then that the statutory period of prescription commences to run against such possessor.

APPLICATION:
In this case, petitioner's possession was disturbed in 1983 when Jose B filed a case for recovery of possession.
CA ruled in favor of Estrella. Thus, Estrella never lost possession of the said properties, and as such, she is in a position
to file the complaint with the court a quo to protect her rights and clear whatever doubts has been cast on her title by the
issuance of TCTs in respondent Jose's name.
Jose B and his kasabwats are not buyers in good faith. Obvious kaayo.
Side note: exception sa mirror doctrine sa Torrens title
The exception is when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious
man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has some knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of
sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The
presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither
be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith and hence does not merit the protection of
the law. – note, while ga baligya baligya kunuhay sila, Jose was not in possession, so that must have put Catalino and
Doronila on guard.
 TAPARUC VS. VDA. DE MENDE
1. 1996 - Petitioners Taparuc filed a complain for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale, Cancellation of TCT No T-4767
and all subsequent documents and damages against Respomdents Carmelita vda. de Mende, Heirs of Evan B.
Mende, and ROD of Tagbiliran
2. The complaint of Taparuc alleges that:
a. Petitioner Tapuroc and all successor-in-interest of deceased co-owners Antonia Ebe are the co-owners, co-
heirs, and/or descendants of the original owners of a parcel of land situated in Tagbiliran, Bohol previously
covered by TCT 3444
b. 1992 - Petitioners decided to partition the subject property
i. discovered from the City Assessor’s Office that the title covering the land was already in the name of Evans
Mende
ii. by virtue of a DOS executed in favor of Mende by their PII in 1967
c. Said 1967 Deed is forged
i. PII did not sign said doc
ii. one of the alleged vendors already died in 1960
d. Prayed for the:
i. nullification of the 1967 DOS
ii. cancellation of the title issued pursuant thereto
iii. restoration of the previous title under their names
3. Respondent Mendes answered:
a. denied the material allegations of the Complaint
b. averred that the late Evans Mende bought the subject land from its previous owner in 1967
i. duly notarized by Atty. Yap
c. OCEN possession of the said land since the sale
d. paid taxes thereon
e. Petitioner’s cause of action had already prescribed
f. Their title is already indefeasible
4. RTC dismissed the complaint filed by Taparuc
a. evidences presented by Taparuc were insufficient to establish their claim that the 1967 DOS was forged
b. laches had already set in because of Petitioner’s inaction and neglect in questioning the forged character of the
1967 DOS after the lapse of more than 29 years from the time of execution
5. CA affirmed RTC decision and dismissed Petitioner Taparuc’s appeal
6. Hence, this Petition.
7. Petitioner Taparuc contends that CA committed reversible error when it dismissed the appeal despite sufficiency of
supporting evidence to warrant favorable judgment on the part of petitioners
ISSUES:
Whether or not the signatures of the petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest and Procopio Tapuroc were forged; and
if they were, is the declaration of nullity of the said 1967 DOS is proper
RULING:
NO.
1. The foregoing statement calls for a determination of the truth or falsehood of an alleged fact, a matter not for this
Court to resolve.
8. Petitioner Taparuc was not able to prove forgery in this case.

THE COURT DEFERS AND ACCORDS FINALITY TO THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURTS, MORE SO
WHEN SUCH FINDINGS ARE UNDISTURBED BY THE APPELLATE COURT
9. Well-settled is the rule that factual questions may not be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.
10. The Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts, more so when, as here, such findings are
undisturbed by the appellate court.
11. This factual determination, as a matter of long and sound appellate practice, deserves great weight and shall not be
disturbed on appeal, save only for the most compelling reasons, such as when that determination is clearly without
evidentiary support or when grave abuse of discretion has been committed.

PETITIONERS TAPARUC FAILED TO DISPUTE THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF THE 1967 DOS BY
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
12. In the case at bar, it appears undisputed that the assailed Deed of Sale is a public document, having been duly
notarized by a certain Atty. Rodolfo Yap.
a. Being a notarial instrument, the deed in question is a public document and as such enjoys the presumption of
regularity in its execution.
 b. To overthrow that presumption, sufficient, clear and convincing evidence is required , otherwise the
document should be upheld.
13. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed.
c. It must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence.
d. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging it. Here, the petitioners
failed to discharge their burden.
14. Upheld RTC’s findings that:
a. Taparuc, despite the opportunity given them by this Court, failed to present a handwriting expert to determine
whether there was indeed forgery in the execution of the subject Deed of Sale.
b. In the absence of the testimony of the handwriting expert, the allegations of forgery by the plaintiffs is self-serving.
BARE DENIAL OF PETITIONERS NOT SUFFICIENT
15. In the present case, all that the petitioners had to offer by way of evidence on the issue of forgery was their bare
denial that their predecessors-in-interest signed the subject Deed of Sale.
e. Such denial will not suffice to overcome the presumption of regularity of notarized documents.
16. However, even if it were true that the signature of Antonia Ebe is forged, it cannot brush aside the fact that all the
heirs of Antonia Ebe, signed in the Deed of Absolute Sale.
17. As earlier discussed their signatures cannot be said to have been forged as evidence presented to prove the same is
found to be insufficient.
18. Henceforth, all the rightful heirs who could question the subject sale are themselves signatories of the supposed
questionable transaction.
LACHES HAD ALREADY SET IN
19. Meanwhile, granting that Procopio Tapuroc’s signature found on Exh. C is indeed a forgery, he testified in open court
that he discovered the sale and the fact of Mende’s possession of the subject land in 1967 yet – and did not do
anything about it.
20. Not to be overlooked is the fact that the petitioners filed their complaint of declaration of nullity only after twenty-nine
(29) years from the execution of the alleged forged deed of sale.
21. title to the property had already been in the name of respondent Mendes since 1967.
22. The Mendes had been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject land, and had been religiously
paying the realty taxes due thereon.
23. These are hard facts that ought not to be disregarded.
24. We agree with the CA in ruling that laches had barred the petitioners
RESPONDENTS PRESENTED SUFFICIENT PROOF OF THEIR CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE PROPERTY
25. At the other end of the spectrum, the respondents presented sufficient proof of their claim of ownership over the
property in dispute
26. The respondent Mendes maintain that they:
f. had been in continuous, peaceful and open possession of the property since 1967, the year of the alleged sale,
or for more than thirty (30) years now.
g. No less than the petitioners themselves acknowledged this in their pleadings before this Court.
h. have been religiously paying the realty taxes due on the same property.
i. When TCT No. 3444 was lost, respondent Carmelita Vda. de Mende filed a petition for judicial reconstitution to
secure a second owner’s copy of the lost title.
j. Said petition went through the proper procedure and thereafter Carmelita was issued a second owner’s copy of
TCT No. 3444 which was later changed to TCT No. (8585) T-4767.
INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE
27. The Court, in a long line of cases, has uniformly held in favor of the registered owner who had been in possession of a
disputed property for a considerable period of time.
28. With the Mendes’ possession in this case having been in the concept of an owner and the land itself registered in their
names for more than thirty (30) years now, their title thereto had become indefeasible and their possession could no
longer be disturbed.
29. The petitioners’ failure to take the necessary steps to assert their alleged right for at least twenty-nine (29) years from
date of registration of title is fatal to their cause of action on the ground of laches.
TORRENS TITLE CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED
30. As a final note, we emphasize that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked.
31. The question on the validity of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, can be raised only in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose.
32. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, diminished, or cancelled in a
collateral proceeding.
33. The action for the declaration of nullity of deed of sale commenced by the petitioners in the RTC of Tagbilaran City is
not the direct proceeding required by law to attack a Torrens certificate of title.
CRESENCIANA RODRIGUEZ VS. RODRIGUEZ
1. Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment
2. 1983 - Juanito executed a “Huling Habilin at Testamento” in favor of his childred and live-in partner:
a. Apartment A - Benjamin Rodriguez, husband of Respondent Evangeline
b. Apartment B - Respondent Buenaventura
c. Apartment C - Respondent Belen
d. Apartment D & E - to his live-in partner, Petitioner Cresenciana Rodriguez
3. 1984 - However, Juanito executed a DOAS over the property in favor of Petitioner Cresenciana Rodriguez (the live-in
partner)
a. the first TCT was cancelled and a new TCT No. 150431 was issued in the name of Cresenciana
4. The case arose when Cresenciana filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents Rodriguez children
alleging that:
a. she is the lawful and registered owner of the property
b. in 1984, she allowed respondent Rodrigued children to personally occupy units A, B & D out of kindness and
tolerance
c. however, without her knowledge, the Rodriguez children separately lease the units to Montano, Mel, and Soccoro
who, despite repeated demands, failed and refused to vacate the premises to pay the rentals thereof.
5. Respondents Rodriguez children answered that:
a. claimed ownership over the subject property by succession
b. while Cresenciana is the registered owner of the property, she is not the lawful owner thereof
c. 1984 DOAS was simulated and void
d. there is a pending civil case assailing the validity of the said sale
e. respondents maintain that Cresenciana exerted undue influence over their father, who at that time was seriously ill
f. Cresenciana had no cause of action against them for being a party to the August 23, 1990 Partition Agreement
wherein they recognized each other as co-owners and partitioned the property in accordance with the provision of
the last will and testament.
6. 2002 - MTC ruled in favor of the Rodriguez children and held that:
a. the DOAS was simulated
b. otherwise, Cresenciana would not have entered into the Partition Agreement which legally conferred upon each
heir exclusive ownership
7. RTC reversed the decision of MTC and held that:
a. Cresenciana’s certificate of title is a conclusive evidence of ownership of the land described therein
b. and that unless and until said title has been annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, such title is existing and
valid
c. This is true also with respect to the deed of sale.
d. The present action, which involves only the issue of physical or material possession, is not the proper action to
challenge it.
e. MTC erred when it relied on the Huling Habilin at Testamento which was not probated hence has no effect and no
right can be claimed therein
f. The Partition Agreement which was allegedly entered into pursuant to the Huling Habilin at Testamento should not
also be considered
8. CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MTC and held that:
a. MTC correctly received evidence on ownership since the question of possession could not be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership
b. the Huling Habilin at Testamento transmitted ownership of the specific apartments not only to the respondents but
also to the petitioner;
c. and pursuant thereto, the parties executed the Partition Agreement in accordance with the wishes of the testator
ISSUE:
1. Who has the better right of possession over the subject property
2. Whether or not a Certificate of Title can be subject to a collateral attack
RULING:
ISSUE NO. 1: CRESENCIANA HAS THE BETTER RIGHT OF POSSESSION
UNLAWFUL DETAINER
9. An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any land or building against or
from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied.
10.The sole issue to be resolved is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
premises or possession de facto.
11.Being a summary proceeding, the question of title is not involved and should be raised by the affected party in an
appropriate action in the proper court.
12.However, when the issue of ownership is raised the court is not ousted of its jurisdiction
13.Thus, all that the trial court can do is to make an initial determination of who is the owner of the property so that it can
resolve who is entitled to its possession absent other evidence to resolve ownership.
14.But this adjudication is only provisional and does not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title
to the property.
UNLAWFUL DETAINER IN THE CASE AT BAR
15.Petitioner's cause of action for unlawful detainer was based on her alleged ownership of land covered by TCT No.
150431 and that she merely tolerated respondents' stay thereat.
16.However, when respondents leased the apartments to other persons without her consent, their possession as well as
those persons claiming right under them became unlawful upon their refusal to vacate the premises and to pay the
rent.
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
17.Evidences presented by the parties:
1. Huling Habilin at Testamento executed by Juanito Rodriguez
2. Deed of Sale of the property executed by Juanito Rodriguez
3. TCT No. 150431
4. Partition Agreement executed by both parties
18.Based on the foregoing documentary evidence, we find that there is preponderance of evidence in favor of the
petitioner Cresencianca’s claim.
19.Respondents failed to prove their right of possession , as the Huling Habilin at Testamento and the Partition
Agreement have no legal effect since the will has not been probated.
a. Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated.
b. This cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy.
c. As the will was not probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto can not be given
effect.
d. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to said agreement becomes immaterial in the determination of the issue
of possession.
20. At the time the deed of sale was executed in favor of the petitioner, Juanito Rodriguez remained the owner thereof
since ownership would only pass to his heirs at the time of his death.
21.Thus, as owner of the property, he had the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime.
22. We are, thus, left with the deed of sale and the certificate of title over the property to consider.

ISSUE NO. 2 : NO

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IS A CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE AND SHALL NOT BE SUBJECT TO A COLLATERAL

ATTACH
23.We agree with the RTC that a certificate of title is a conclusive evidence of ownership of the land described therein;
24.The validity of which shall not be subject to a collateral attack, especially in an ejectment case which is
summary in nature.
25. The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack.
26.In Apostol v. CA:
a. Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with
law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted
for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the
power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.
27.It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless and until it has
been nulified by a court of competent jurisdiction.
28.As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of
ownership.
29. We emphasize, however, that our ruling on the issue of ownership is only provisional to determine who
between the parties has the better right of possession.
30.It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership, which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 01-1641.
31.Our ruling that petitioner has a better right of possession was arrived at on the basis of evidence without prejudice to
the eventual outcome of the annulment case, where the issue as to who has title to the property in question is fully
threshed out.
32.As the law now stands, in an ejectment suit, the question of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole
purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto.
TUAZON v SPS ISAGON

1. During their lifetime, spouses Melencio Diaz and Dolores Gulay (Dolores) owned Lot 103 in Sta. Rosa, Laguna
(499sq.m.)
15. They had three daughters named Maria, Paciencia, and Esperanza. Melencio and Maria predeceased Dolores.
16. On May 28, 1955, Dolores, Paciencia, and Esperanza adjudicated Lot 103 to Dolores through a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement. Maria's children who were still minors at that time were not included in the settlement.
17. On March 17, 1956, Dolores sold Lot 103 to Isabel Torres through a Bilihang Tuluyan (Deed of Absolute Sale).
18. Subsequently, Isabel Torres sold Lot 103 to Teresa Maria's children, namely Gloria, Angel, Felix, and Flaviano, all
surnamed Isagon, executed a Deed of Conformity.
a. In this instrument, they honored the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement executed by their grandmother and
aunts, subject to the condition that they would get one-sixth of Lot 103 as their share
19. Gloria, Felix, and Flaviano also sold their shares to Teresa. On the other hand, Angel mortgaged his share to
Teresa on October 20, 1975, through a Kasulatan ng Sanglaan. Angel Isagon thereafter refused and failed to
redeem the mortgaged property.
20. Teresa has been paying the real estate taxes due on Lot 103 since 1974 up to the present. Lot 103 is covered by
an undated and reconstituted TCT issued in Teresa's name.
21. Sometime in 1972, the Teresa's brother, Antonio Tuazon ( Antonio), allowed Spouses Isagon (respondents) to
build a small hut on a portion of Lot 103 without Teresa's knowledge.
22. Sps Isagon started to construct a house on the disputed property despite Teresa's protest.
23. For years, however, Teresa tolerated their possession and use of the contested area.
24. Teresa filed an unlawful detainer case against Sps Isagon.
25. MTC, RTC – ruled in favor of Teresa. Ordered Sps to vacate
26. CA reversed – Teresa mere mortgagee, no right to eject Sps. Dapat foreclosure daw g file. mortgage does not
transfer ownership!
27. Teresa’s petition before the SC:
a. she is the registered owner, not a mere mortgagee, of the property as shown by TCT No. (N.A.) RT-1925.
Section 51 of Presidential Decree No. 1929 expressly states that registration is the operative act that
conveys registered land. Thus, the TCT is the best proof of ownership.
b. the only issue in an unlawful detainer case is the physical possession of the property. As the registered
owner, she has the right to enjoy all the rights of an owner under the Civil Code, including actual
possession.
ISSUE: WON Teresa has a better right over the property
HELD
1. YES!
2. While the CA is correct that a mortgage does not transfer ownership, the indefeasibility of a Torrens title should
have been given primary consideration.
3. A person who possesses a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of ownership
including possession.
4. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack in an action for unlawful detainer. A collateral attack is
made when, in an action to obtain a different relief, the validity of a certificate of title is questioned respondents
alleged in their answer that the certificate of title issued in the name of Teresa was fraudulently obtained.
5. This defense constitutes a collateral attack on the title and should not therefore be entertained. To directly assail
the validity of TCT No. (N.A.) RT-1925, a direct action for reconveyance must be filed; respondents alleged in
their answer that the certificate of title issued in the name of Teresa was fraudulently obtained. This defense
constitutes a collateral attack on the title and should not therefore be entertained. To directly assail the validity of
TCT No. (N.A.) RT-1925, a direct action for reconveyance must be filed.

Side note sa unlawful detainer – pero kabalo nata ani so EZ nani

An action for unlawful detainer is summary in nature and cannot be delayed by a mere assertion of ownership as a
defense. When the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon that issue only if
needed to determine who between the parties has a better right to possess the property. Furthermore, the adjudication on
the issue of ownership is only provisional, and subject to a separate proceeding that the parties may initiate to settle the
issue of ownership.