On Sept.

29, 1915, at the muddy end of the Mississippi’s farthest reach into the Gulf of Mexico, 100
miles downriver from New Orleans, an unnamed hurricane made landfall. An anemometer recorded
wind gusts of 140 miles per hour there, at the town of Burrwood, La., where on easier days several
hundred members of the Army Corps of Engineers lived in orderly cottages and worked to keep the
shipping canal at the river’s mouth clear of sediment.

As the storm moved upriver, the barometer at Tulane University plummeted to 28.10 inches. The rain
gauge filled with 8.36 inches of precipitation in 21 hours. Even in a region accustomed to hurricanes,
these were extraordinary measurements. Isaac Cline, the chief meteorologist at the United States
Weather Bureau in New Orleans, reported that the storm was “the most intense hurricane of which we
have record in the history of the Mexican Gulf coast, and probably in the United States.”

On their own, these data reveal little about how the storm might have mattered to people, or how they
might have responded to it. These precise metrics of wind speed, rainfall, and barometric pressure do
not trace the shape of life in places that seem, repeatedly, to come under assault from the forces of
nature. We need different tools to gauge those times when coincidences of earth, wind, and water
upset the course of human events in ways so overwhelming that we name them with a word whose
basic meaning suggests that the entire universe is out of joint: disaster.

Consider that during the 1915 hurricane, across the state of Louisiana, 275 people died. Property
damage estimates ran to $12 million ($280 million in 2015 dollars). Upriver from Burrwood, only four
houses remained standing in the town called Empire. East of New Orleans, in St. Bernard Parish, the
settlement of Saint Malo was washed from the map entirely. A foot of water remained in parts of New
Orleans for five days.

Nonetheless, once the storm passed, many New Orleanians celebrated. “Storm proof!” a newspaper
proclaimed. The mayor quickly rejected outside offers of aid. Surveying the event a month later, the
New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board, the agency charged with protecting the city from floods,
concluded that its new drainage system had passed a defining test. “It is safe to say,” its report asserted,
“that no city anywhere in the world could have withstood these conditions with less damage and less
inconvenience than has New Orleans.” The report reasoned that the recent extreme occurrence of wind
and rain “renders more remote the probability of a repetition of any of these things in the early future.”

It was a curious logic in a city that had seen 92 hurricanes or tropical storms since its European colonial
founding in 1718. Despite this history, the Sewerage and Water Board believed that even if another big
storm came, New Orleans would be safe. The report’s authors reflected on the storm’s “lessons” this
way: “there is no reason why this city and its surrounding country should not continue, even more
successfully than heretofore, [its] developments in all directions.” The experience of the 1915 hurricane
affirmed the consensus among engineers and investors, city planners and politicians, home builders and
home buyers, that New Orleans should grow.

The city they created became one of the most celebrated places in the world. “Ain’t no city like the one
I’m from!” the women in the Original Pinettes Brass Band sang a century later. New Orleans’s admirers
lauded it as “The Land of Dreams,” “The Big Easy,” “The City that Care Forgot,” “America’s Most
Interesting City,” and “the soul of America.” With its jazz, Mardi Gras, and other iconic contributions to
world culture, more than any other place in America, New Orleans called to mind creativity,
cosmopolitanism, and love of life.
But today, New Orleans also calls to mind catastrophe. The city drowned when its levee system
collapsed on Aug. 29, 2005, killing hundreds of people, destroying thousands of homes, and
precipitating not only one of the most horrific moments in modern American history, but offering an
emblem for the idea of disaster itself: Katrina. The response to the 1915 storm thus
cast a century-long shadow, because the new neighborhoods developed after that storm experienced
the worst flooding in 2005.

More than any other single factor, including the race or class of its inhabitants, the age of a building best
predicted how it would fare in 2005. Tracing the outline of the Katrina flood reveals the shape of New
Orleans as it stood nine decades earlier: most houses built before 1915 did not flood, but most houses
built after the Sewerage and Water Board’s 1915 call for further growth did.

Usually, we imagine disasters as exceptions. We describe them as external attacks, ahistorical acts of
God, blows from without. That is why most accounts of Katrina begin when the levees broke and
conclude not long after.

But these stories offer a denuded sense of what happened, why, or what might have prevented the
catastrophe. Somebody had to build the levees before they could break.

I begin the story of Katrina in 1915 in order to pursue a different idea: that disasters come from within.
Disasters are less discrete events than they are contingent processes. Seemingly acute incidents, like the
largely forgotten 1915 hurricane, live on as the lessons they teach, the decisions they prompt, and the
accommodations they oblige. Their causes and consequences stretch across much longer periods of
time and space than we commonly imagine. Seeing disasters in history, and as history, demonstrates
that the places we live, and the disasters that imperil them, are at once artifacts of state policy, cultural
imagination, economic order, and environmental possibility.

And yet, if understanding history usually demands drawing connections between seemingly disparate
dots, trying to make sense of what happened in Louisiana after Aug. 29, 2005, also poses the opposite
problem, because the hurricane called Katrina did not cause many of the effects commonly attributed to
it.

After the storm passed, New Orleans police officers shot and killed unarmed citizens. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency gave flood victims trailers laced with formaldehyde. The New Orleans
City Council voted to demolish the city’s public housing apartments. The Louisiana State Legislature
voted to transform the city’s public school system into a confederacy of charter schools. Congress voted
to fund the largest housing recovery pro-
gram in United States history; the program appropriated money to homeowners but not to renters. New
Orleans police officers arrested musicians for leading jazz funerals without permits, while violent crime
plagued the city.

Louisiana State University shut down New Orleans’s public Charity Hospital, while rates of mental illness
surged. The Army Corps of Engineers encircled the city with a new levee system, while the wetlands
beyond the walls continued to erode and the city itself continued to sink. A decade after the storm, New
Orleans’s population had fallen from 484,674 to 390,711. Of
the people missing, the vast majority—nearly 92,000 people— were African American. We have come to
refer to this sequence of events as “Katrina,” but for none of these effects was the hurricane the
proximate cause. The flood line thus tells one important story, but it is not the only story that matters.
After the flood receded, policymakers reapportioned the challenges the water had posed. Legislators
designed recovery programs that favored white people over African American people, wealthy people
over poor people, and people who owned homes over people who rented them. These policies
reinforced existing inequalities. And they often undermined what the many Louisianians who opposed
them argued were essential facts of life: the bonds of family, the solidarity of community, notions of
political legitimacy, feelings of cultural belonging, and a sense of moral order.

The etymology of the word disaster refers to stars out of alignment; but if the changes in Louisiana after
Hurricane Katrina seemed to some to proceed with the force of destiny, it is well to remember, as
Shakespeare cautioned, “The fault . . . is not in our stars, But in ourselves, that we are underlings.”

Andy Horowitz is an assistant professor of Tulane University. This essay is adapted with permission from
his new book, “Katrina: A History, 1915-2015,” published by Harvard University Press.