Criminal Law FULL TEXT

G.R. No.
81563 December 19, 1989
AMADO C. ARIAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
G.R. No. 82512 December 19, 1989
CRESENCIO D. DATA, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
Paredes Law Office for petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The facts of this case are stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino which
follows this majority opinion. The dissent substantially reiterates the draft report prepared by Justice
Griño-Aquino as a working basis for the Court's deliberations when the case was being discussed
and for the subsequent votes of concurrence or dissent on the action proposed by the report.
There is no dispute over the events which transpired. The division of the Court is on the conclusions
to be drawn from those events and the facts insofar as the two petitioners are concerned. The
majority is of the view that Messrs. Arias and Data should be acquitted on grounds of reasonable
doubt. The Court feels that the quantum of evidence needed to convict petitioners Arias and Data
beyond reasonable doubt, as co-conspirators in the conspiracy to cause undue injury to the
Government through the irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds, has not been
satisfied.
In acquitting the petitioners, the Court agrees with the Solicitor-General who, in 80 pages of his
1
consolidated manifestation and motion, recommended that Messrs. Arias and Data be acquitted of
the crime charged, with costs de oficio. Earlier, Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Eleuterio F.
Guerrero had also recommended the dropping of Arias from the information before it was filed.
There is no question about the need to ferret out and convict public officers whose acts have made
the bidding out and construction of public works and highways synonymous with graft or criminal
inefficiency in the public eye. However, the remedy is not to indict and jail every person who may
have ordered the project, who signed a document incident to its construction, or who had a hand
somewhere in its implementation. The careless use of the conspiracy theory may sweep into jail
even innocent persons who may have been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds who
engineered the defraudation.
Under the Sandiganbayan's decision in this case, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission
chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from
disbursements which they have approved. The department head or chief auditor would be guilty of
conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon
or affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be premised on a more knowing, personal, and
deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy.
The records show that the six accused persons were convicted in connection with the overpricing of
land purchased by the Bureau of Public Works for the Mangahan Floodway Project. The project was
intended to ease the perennial floods in Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila.
The accused were prosecuted because 19,004 square meters of "riceland" in Rosario, Pasig which
had been assessed at P5.00 a square meter in 1973 were sold as residential land" in 1978 for
P80.00 a square meter. The land for the floodway was acquired through negotiated purchase,
We agree with the Solicitor-General that the assessor's tax valuation of P5.00 per square meter of
land in Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila is completely unrealistic and arbitrary as the basis for
conviction.
Herein lies the first error of the trial court.
It must be stressed that the petitioners are not charged with conspiracy in the falsification of public
documents or preparation of spurious supporting papers. The charge is causing undue injury to the
Government and giving a private party unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or inexcusable negligence.
The alleged undue injury in a nutshell is the Government purchase of land in Pasig, Rizal for P80.00
a square meter instead of the P5.00 value per square meter appearing in the tax declarations and
fixed by the municipal assessor, not by the landowner.
The Sandiganbayan, without any clear factual basis for doing so has assumed that the P5.00 per
square meter value fixed by the assessor in the tax declarations was the correct market value of the
Mangahan property and if the Government purchased the land for P80.00 a square meter, it follows
that it must have suffered undue injury.
The Solicitor General explains why this conclusion is erroneous:
1. No undue injury was caused to the Government
a. The P80.00 per square rneter acquisition cost is just fair and
reasonable.
It bears stress that the Agleham property was acquired through negotiated purchase.
It was, therefor, nothing more than an ordinary contract of sale where the purchase
price had to be arrived at by agreement between the parties and could never be left
to the discretion of one of the contracting parties (Article 1473, New Civil Code). For
it is the essence of a contract of sale that there must be a meeting of the minds
between the seller and the buyer upon the thing which is the object of the contract
and upon the price (Article 1475, New Civil Code). Necessarily, the parties have to
negotiate the reasonableness of the price, taking into consideration such other
factors as location, potentials, surroundings and capabilities. After taking the
foregoing premises into consideration, the parties have, thus, arrived at the amount
of P80.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable price for the Agleham
property.
It bears stress that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that the true
and fair market value in 1978 of the Agleham property was indeed P5.00 per square
meter only as stated by the assessor in the tax declaration (Exhibit W). On the
contrary, the prosecution's principal witness Pedro Ocol, the Assistant Municipal
Assessor of Pasig, admitted that the purchase price of P80.00 per square meter paid
for the Agleham property as stated in the Deed of Sale (Exhibit G) is reasonable (tsn,
August 19,1983, p. 20) and fair (Ibid, p. 76); that 'the value of lands within the town of
Pasig ranges from P80.00 to P500.00' (Ibid, p. 21); that the Agleham property is
"around 300 meters" from Ortigas Avenue, "adjacent to the existing Leongson
[Liamson] Subdivision ... and near Eastland Garment Building" (Ibid, pp. 12-13); that
said property is surrounded by factories, commercial establishments and residential
subdivisions (Ibid, pp. 73-74); that the P5.00 per square meter assessed valuation of
the Agleham property appearing on the tax declaration (Exhibit W) was based on
actual use only (lbid, pp. 26-27), it being the uniform rate for all ricefields in Pasig
irrespective of their locations (Ibid, pp. 72-74) and did not take into account the
existence of many factories and subdivisions in the area (Ibid., pp. 25-27, 72-74),
and that the assessed value is different from and always lower than the actual
market value (Ibid, pp. 22-23). (At pp. 256-259, Rollo)
A negotiated purchase may usually entail a higher buying price than one arrived at in the course of
expropriation proceedings.
In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay (149 SCRA 305, 310 [1987]) we struck down the
martial law decree that pegged just compensation in eminent domain cases to the assessed value
stated by a landowner in his tax declaration or fixed by the municipal assessor, whichever is lower.
Other factors must be considered. These factors must be determined by a court of justice and not by
municipal employees.
In the instant case, the assessor's low evaluation, in the fixing of which the landowner had no
participation, was used for a purpose infinitely more weighty than mere expropriation of land. It forms
the basis for a criminal conviction.
The Court is not prepared to say that P80.00 to P500.00 a square meter for land in Pasig in 1978
would be a fair evaluation. The value must be determined in eminent domain proceedings by a
competent court. We are certain, however, that it cannot be P5.00 a square meter. Hence, the
decision, insofar as it says that the "correct" valuation is P5.00 per square meter and on that basis
convicted that petitioners of causing undue injury, damage, and prejudice to the Government
because of gross overpricing, is grounded on shaky foundations.
There can be no overpricing for purposes of a criminal conviction where no proof adduced during
orderly proceedings has been presented and accepted.
The Court's decision, however, is based on a more basic reason. Herein lies the principal error of the
respondent court.
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems-
dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain
incompetence is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally
examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the
motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing, his signature as the final approving
authority.
There appears to be no question from the records that documents used in the negotiated sale were
falsified. A key tax declaration had a typewritten number instead of being machine-numbered. The
registration stampmark was antedated and the land reclassified as residential instead of ricefield.
But were the petitioners guilty of conspiracy in the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing
undue in injury and damage to the Government?
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received
procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office
could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be
asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent 'on their
subordinates and on the good faith of those prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily
expected to call the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was
present at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served and
otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher's accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency.
There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any
executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of
papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of document , letters and supporting paper that
routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more
appalling.
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to
sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction.
Was petitioner Arias part of the planning, preparation, and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to
defraud the government?
Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the purchase of the property
started in 1977. The deed of sale was executed on April 20, 1978. Title was transferred to the
Republic on June 8, 1978. In other words, the transaction had already been consummated before
his arrival. The pre-audit, incident to payment of the purchase, was conducted in the first week of
October, 1978. Arias points out that apart from his signature linking him to the signature on the
voucher, there is no evidence transaction. On the contrary, the other co-accused testified they did
not know him personally and none approached him to follow up the payment.
Should the big amount of P1,520,320.00 have caused him to investigate . gate the smallest detains
of the transaction?
Yes, if the land was really worth only P5.00 a square meter. However, if land in Pasig was already
worth P80.00 a square meter at the time, no warning bell of intuition would have sounded an inner
alarm. Land along Ortigas Avenue on the way to Pasig is now worth P20,000.00 to P30,000.00
a square meter. The falsification of the tax declaration by changing "riceland" to "residential' was
done before Arias was assigned to Pasig besides, there is no such thing as "riceland" in inner Metro
Manila. Some lots in outlying or easily flooded areas may still be planted to rice or kangkong but this
is only until the place is dedicated to its real purpose which is commercial, industrial, or residential. If
the Sandiganbayan is going to send somebody to jail for six years, the decision should be based on
firmer foundation.
The Sandiganbayan asked why Arias kept the documents from October, 1978 to June 23, 1982.
Arias explained that the rules of the Commission on Audit require auditors to keep these d
documents and under no circumstance to relinquish custody to other persons. Arias was auditor of
the Bureau of Public Works in Pasig up to September 1, 1981. The seven months delay in the formal
turnover of custody to the new auditor was explained by prosecution witness Julito Pesayco, who
succeeded him as auditor and who took over the custody of records in that office.
The main reason for the judgment of conviction, for the finding of undue injury and damage to the
Government is the alleged gross overprice for the land purchased for the floodway project.
Assuming that P80.00 is indeed exorbitant, petitioner Arias cites his testimony as follows:
Q In conducting the pre-audit, did you determine the reasonableness

of the price of the property?
A In this case, the price has been stated, the transaction had been
consummated and the corresponding Transfer Certificate of little had
been issued and transferred to the government of the Philippines.
The auditors have no more leeway to return the papers and then
question the purchase price.
Q Is it not a procedure in your office that before payment is given by

the government to private individuals there should be a pre-audit of
the papers and the corresponding checks issued to the vendor?
A Correct, Your Honor, but it depends on the kind of transaction there

is.
Q Yes, but in this particular case, the papers were transferred to the
government without paying the price Did you not consider that rather
odd or unusual? (TSN, page 17, April 27,1987).
A No, Your Honor.
Q Why not?
A Because in the Deed of Sale as being noted there, there is a

condition that no payments will be made unless the corresponding
title in the payment of the Republic is committed is made.
Q In this case you said that the title is already in the name of the
government?
A Yes, Your Honor. The only thing we do is to determine whether

there is an appropriation set aside to cover the said specification. As
of the price it is under the sole authority of the proper officer making
the sale.
Q My point is this. Did you not consider it unusual for a piece of

property to be bought by the government; the sale was
consummated; the title was issued in favor of the government without
the price being paid first to the seller?
A No, Your Honor. In all cases usually, payments made by the

government comes later than the transfer.
Q That is usual procedure utilized in road right of way transaction?
A Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, p. 18, April 27,1987).

Q And of course as auditor, 'watch-dog' of the government there is
also that function you are also called upon by going over the
papers . . . (TSN, page 22, April 27,1987). I ... vouchers called upon
to determine whether there is any irregularity as at all in this particular
transaction, is it not?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q And that was in fact the reason why you scrutinized also, not only
the tax declaration but also the certification by Mr. Jose and Mr.
Cruz?
A As what do you mean of the certification, ma'am?
Q Certification of Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz in relation to PD No. 296, A

They are not required documents that an auditor must see. (TSN,
page 23, April 27,1987).
and continuing:
A ... The questioning of the purchase price is now beyond the

authority of the auditor because it is inasmuch as the amount
involved is beyond his counter-signing authority. (TSN, page 35, April
27, 1987). (At pp. 15-16, Petition. Underlinings supplied by petitioner)
The Solicitor General summarizes the participation of petitioner Data as follows:
As regards petitioner Data's alleged participation, the evidence on record shows that
as the then District Engineer of the Pasig Engineering District he created a
committee, headed by Engr. Priscillo Fernando with Ricardo Asuncion, Alfonso
Mendoza, Ladislao Cruz, Pedro Hucom and Carlos Jose, all employees of the district
office, as members, specifically to handle the Mangahan Floodway Project, gather
and verify documents, conduct surveys, negotiate with the owners for the sale of
their lots, process claims and prepare the necessary documents; he did not take any
direct and active part in the acquisition of land for the Mangahan floodway; it was the
committee which determined the authenticity of the documents presented to them for
processing and on the basis thereof prepared the corresponding deed of sale;
thereafter, the committee submitted the deed of sale together with the supporting
documents to petitioner Data for signing; on the basis of the supporting certified
documents which appeared regular and complete on their face, petitioner Data, as
head of the office and the signing authority at that level, merely signed but did not
approve the deed of sale (Exhibit G) as the approval thereof was the prerogative of
the Secretary of Public Works; he thereafter transmitted the signed deed of sale with
its supporting documents to Director Anolin of the Bureau of Public Works who in
turn recommended approval thereof by the Secretary of Public Works; the deed of
sale was approved by the Asst. Secretary of Public Works after a review and re-
examination thereof at that level; after the approval of the deed of sale by the higher
authorities the covering voucher for payment thereof was prepared which petitioner
Data signed; petitioner Data did not know Gutierrez and had never met her during
the processing and payment of her claims (tsn, February 26, 1987, pp. 10-14, 16-24,
31-32). (At pp. 267-268, Rollo.)
On the alleged conspiracy, the Solicitor General argues:
It is respectfully submitted that the prosecution likewise has not shown any positive
and convincing evidence of conspiracy between the petitioners and their co-accused.
There was no direct finding of conspiracy. Respondent Court's inference on the
alleged existence of conspiracy merely upon the purported 'pre-assigned roles (of
the accused) in the commission of the (alleged) illegal acts in question is not
supported by any evidence on record. Nowhere in the seventy- eight (78) page
Decision was there any specific allusion to some or even one instance which would
link either petitioner Arias or Data to their co-accused in the planning, preparation
and/or perpetration, if any, of the purported fraud and falsifications alleged in the
information That petitioners Data and Arias happened to be officials of the Pasig
District Engineering Office who signed the deed of sale and passed on pre-audit the
general voucher covering the subject sale, respectively, does hot raise any
presumption or inference, that they were part of the alleged plan to defraud the
Government, as indeed there was none. It should be remembered that, as
aboveshown, there was no undue injury caused to the Government as the negotiated
purchase of the Agleham property was made at the fair and reasonable price of
P80.00 per square meter.
That there were erasures and superimpositions of the words and figures of the
purchase price in the deed of sale from P1,546,240.00 to P1,520,320.00 does not
prove conspiracy. It may be noted that there was a reduction in the affected area
from the estimated 19,328 square meters to 19,004 square meters as approved by
the Land Registration Commission, which resulted in the corresponding reduction in
the purchase price from P1,546,240.00 to Pl,520,320.00. The erasures in the deed of
sale were simple corrections that even benefited the Government.
Moreover, contrary to the respondent Court's suspicion, there was nothing irregular
in the use of the unapproved survey plan/technical description in the deed of sale
because the approval of the survey plan/ technical description was not a prerequisite
to the approval of the deed of sale. What is important is that before any payment is
made by the Government under the deed of sale the title of the seller must have
already been cancelled and another one issued to the Government incorporating
therein the technical description as approved by the Land Registration Commission,
as what obtained in the instant case. (At pp. 273-275, Rollo)
We agree with the counsel for the People. There is no adequate evidence to establish the guilt of the
petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, beyond reasonable doubt. The inadequate
evidence on record is not sufficient to sustain a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as it convicts and sentences
petitioners Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioners Arias and Data
are acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 155574 : November 20, 2006]
TIMOTEO A. GARCIA, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

which seeks to set aside and nullify the Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan dated 6 May
2002 which convicted petitioner Timoteo A. Garcia of 56 counts of violation of Section
3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act," in Criminal Cases Nos. 24042 to 24098 (except 24078), and its
Resolution2 dated 2 October 2002 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The instant case stemmed from the Complaint of Maria Lourdes Miranda against
petitioner, then Regional Director, Land Transportation Office (LTO), Region X, Gilbert
G. Nabo and Nery Tagupa, employees of the same office, for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act for their alleged frequent borrowing of motor vehicles from
Oro Asian Automotive Center Corporation (Company). Finding probable cause for
violation thereof, Graft Investigation Officer II Gay Maggie F. Balajadia-Violan
recommended that petitioner, Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery Tagupa be indicted for violation
of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.
On 14 August 1997, 57 Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against

petitioner, Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery Tagupa for violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended. The Information in Criminal Case No. 24042 reads:
That on or about the period covering January 9, 1993 to January 10, 1993 or sometime
prior thereto, in Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, TIMOTEO A. GARCIA, GILBERT G. NABO and NERY
TAGUPA, being then public officers or employees of the Land Transportation Office
(LTO), Cagayan de Oro City, taking advantage of their respective official positions, and
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and with intent to gain
personal use or benefit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously borrow
One (1) unit Asian Automotive Center's Service Vehicle - Fiera Blue KBK-732, in good
running condition, spare tire, tools from Oro Asian Automotive Corporation, which is
engaged in the business of vehicle assembly and dealership in Cagayan de Oro City,
knowing that said corporation regularly transacts with the accused's LTO Office for the
registration of its motor vehicles, in the reporting of its engine and chassis numbers as
well as the submission of its vehicle dealer's report and other similar transactions which
require the prior approval and/or intervention of the said accused Regional Director and
employees and/or their said LTO office in Cagayan de Oro City, to the damage and
prejudice of and undue injury to said Oro Asian Automotive Corporation, including
complainant Maria Lourdes Miranda.3
The fifty-six other Informations are similarly worded except for the alleged dates of
commission of the offense, and the types/descriptions of the vehicles allegedly
borrowed by them. The pertinent data in the other informations are as follows:
CASE DATE OF COMMISSION TYPE/DESCRIPTION OF

NUMBER VEHICLE
24043 January 16, 1993 to One (1) unit FIERA BLUE

January 17, 1993
24044 January 23, 1993 to One (1) unit FIERA BLUE KBK-732, service
January 24, 1993 vehicle of Asian Automotive Center, in good
running condition with tools, spare tire
24045 February 6, 1993 to One (1) unit FIERA BLUE KBK-732, in good
February 7, 1993 running condition with tools
24046 February 13, 1993 to One (1) unit FIERA BLUE KBK-732, in good
February 14, 1993 running condition
24047 March 13, 1993 to One (1) unit TOYOTA TAMARAW yellow, KBN-
March 14, 1993 156, in good running condition, with tools and
spare tire
24048 Morning of March 20, One (1) unit TOYOTA HSPUR YELLOW KBN-
1993 to afternoon of 156, with spare tools, in good condition
March 20, 1993
24049 Morning of March 27, One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, yellow in
1993 to afternoon of color, KBN-156, in good condition, with spare
March 27, 1993 tire, with jack and tire wrench
24050 April 24, 1993 to April One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, Yellow in
25, 1993 color, KBN-156, in good condition, with spare
tire, jack and tire wrench
24051 April 25, 1993 and have One (1) unit AERO D VAN KBN-865, maroon in
been returned after use color Asian Automotive Center's Vehicle, in
good running condition, with spare tire, tools,
jack and tire wrench
24052 May 15, 1993 to May One (1) unit TOYOTA Fierra, yellow in color,
16, 1993 engine no. 4k-0907126, chassis no. CMCI-
109247-C, in good condition, jack, spare tire,
tire wrench
24053 May 29, 1993 to May One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156,
30, 1993 yellow in color, in good running condition, w/
spare tire, jack and tire wrench
24054 June 5, 1993 to June 6, One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156,
1993 yellow in color, in good running condition, w/
24055 June 19, 1993 to June One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156,
24056 June 26, 1993 to One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156,
morning of June 26, yellow in color, in good running condition, w/
1993 spare tire, jack and tire wrench
24057 July 17, 1993 to July One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156,
24058 July 31, 1993 to August One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156,
24059 July 24, 1993 to July One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156,
24060 August 7, 1993 to One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156,
August 8, 1993 yellow in color, in good running condition, w/
24063 September 4, 1993 to One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-375, white
September 5, 1993 in color, with engine no. C190-484232,
Chassis no. SMM90-6787-C, in good running
condition upholstered seats
24064 Morning of September One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-375, white
11, 1993 to evening of in color, in good running condition,
September 11, 1993 upholstered seats, jack, tire wrench, spare tire
24065 September 18, 1993 to One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-375, in
September 19, 1993 good running condition, upholstered seats,
side view mirrors, rear view mirror, jack w/
handle, tire wrench, seats
24066 September 25, 1993 to One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-375, good
September 26, 1993 running condition, upholstered seats, side view
mirrors, rear view mirror, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench, seats
24067 October 23, 1993 to One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-375, good
October 24, 1993 running condition, upholstered seats, side view
wrench, seats
24068 October 30, 1993 to One (1) unit ISUZU, NNJ-917, white in color,
October 31, 1993 in good running condition, side view mirror,
jack w/ tire wrench
24069 November 6, 1993 to One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-375, good
November 7, 1993 running condition, upholstered seats, side view
wrench, seats
24070 November 13, 1993 to One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-375, good
November 14, 1993 running condition, upholstered seats, side view
wrench, seats
24071 November 27, 1993 to One (1) unit AERO D-II HSPUR, KBP-375,
November 28, 1993 good running condition, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench, spare tire
24072 December 4, 1993 to One (1) unit AERO D-II HSPUR, KBP-375,
December 5, 1993 good running condition, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench, spare tire
24073 December 11, 1993 to One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color,
December 12, 1993 KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
handle, tire wrench in good running condition
24074 December 18, 1993 to One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color,
December 19, 1993 KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
24075 January 8, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color,
January 9, 1994 KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
24076 Morning of January 15, One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color,
1994 to late afternoon KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
of January 15, 1994 handle, tire wrench in good running condition.
24077 January 29, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-375, white
January 30, 1994 in color, w/o plate number
24078 Withdrawn per Court Resolution dated July 3, 1998, p. 103 Crim. Case # 24042
24079 February 5, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-
February 6, 1994 375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/ handle,
tire wrench in good running condition
24080 February 12, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D-II HSPUR, KBP-375, in good
February 13, 1994 running condition, jack w/ handle, tire wrench,
spare tire
24081 February 26, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-
February 27, 1994 375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/ handle,
24082 March 4, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-
March 5, 1994 375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/ handle,
March 13, 1994 375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/ handle,
March 20, 1994 375, full in dash instrumentation, in good running
condition, with jack, tire wrench, spare tire.
24085 April 9, 1994 to April One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-
10, 1994 375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/ handle,
24086 April 30, 1994 to May One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-
24087 May 7, 1994 to May 8, One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-
1994 375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/ handle,
24088 May 14, 1994 to May One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-
24089 May 21, 1994 to May One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-
24090 June 4, 1994 to June One (1) unit AERO D-II HSPUR, KBP-375, in good
5, 1994 running condition, jack w/ handle, tire wrench,
spare tire
spare tire
spare tire
24093 July 2, 1994 to July 3, One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-
1994 375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/ handle,
24094 July 23, 1994 to July One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-
24095 August 25, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D VAN with engine no. C190-
August 28, 1994 542416, chassis no. SMM90-8370-C, full in dash
instrumentation, maroon in color with plate no.
KBN-865, in good condition
24096 Morning of September One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-
3, 1994 to afternoon 375, full in dash instrumentation, jack, tire
of September 3, 1994 wrench, in good running condition
24097 September 17, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-
to September 18, 375, full in dash instrumentation, in good running
1994 condition
24098 November 26, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-
November 27, 1994 375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/ handle,
tire wrench in good running condition4
On 22 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued orders for the arrest of the three
accused5 and for the holding of their departure from the country.6 On 6 October 1997,
petitioner posted a consolidated surety bond for his provisional liberty.7
In a resolution dated 3 July 1998, the withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case
No. 24078 was granted.8
On 17 August 1998, when arraigned, petitioner and accused Tagupa, assisted by

counsel de parte, pleaded "not guilty" to the charges.9 Accused Nabo remains at large.
On 15 October 1998, pre-trial was concluded.10 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The evidence of the prosecution, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, are as follows:
ESTANISLAO BARRETE YUNGAO (hereinafter, "Yungao") declared that he was employed

as the driver and liaison officer of the Oro Asian Automotive Center Corporation
(hereinafter, "the Company"), an establishment engaged in the assembly of motor
vehicles, during the period covering the years 1991 to 1995. As such, Yungao had to
officially report to the Land Transportation Office ("LTO") of Cagayan de Oro City all the
engine and chassis numbers prior to the assembly of any motor vehicle. In the process,
the Company had to secure from the LTO a Conduct Permit after a motor vehicle has
been completely assembled, for purposes of carrying out the necessary road testing of
the vehicle concerned. After the said road testing and prior to its eventual
sale/disposition, the vehicle has to be first properly registered with the LTO. Accused
Garcia, in his capacity as the Director of the LTO of Cagayan de Oro City, during all
times relevant to the instant cases, was the approving authority on the aforesaid
reportorial requirements and the signatory of the said Conduct Permits.
By reason thereof, Yungao knew accused Garcia since January of 1991. Yungao would
always personally talk to accused Garcia regarding the issuance of the required Conduct
Permit for any newly assembled vehicle. Yungao would secure from accused Garcia as
many as 30 to 40 of such permits in a year.
In the process, accused Garcia would regularly summon Yungao to his office to tell him
to inform either Aurora or Alonzo Chiong, the owners of the Company, that he (accused
Garcia) would borrow a motor vehicle for purposes of visiting his farm. When Yungao
could not be contacted, accused Garcia would personally call up the Company and talk
to the owners thereof to borrow the vehicle. Accused Garcia confided to Yungao that he
could not utilize the assigned government vehicle for his own personal use during
Saturdays and Sundays. It was for this reason that he had to borrow vehicles from the
Chiongs to enable him to visit his farm.
Yungao maintained that accused Garcia had been regularly borrowing motor vehicles
from the Chiongs during the period covering January of 1993 up to and until November
of 1994. Accused Garcia would always ask his representative to take the Company's
vehicle on a Saturday morning. However, Yungao never reported for work on
Saturdays; thus, he was not the one who actually released the borrowed motor vehicles
to the representative of accused Garcia. Nonetheless, Yungao would be aware of the
fact that accused Garcia borrowed the vehicles requested because, for every such
instance, a corresponding delivery receipt is issued, which is placed on top of his table
for him to place in the Company's record files on the following working day. The
numerous delivery receipts would show and indicate the actual number of times
accused Garcia had borrowed vehicles from the Company.
Finally, Yungao identified the affidavit which he executed in connection with the subject
cases.
On cross-examination, Yungao testified that it was his duty to keep the permits relating
to the road testing of the motor vehicles assembled by the Company. These permits
were secured by him from accused Garcia before the vehicles were eventually put on
display or presented to potential buyers. Although there was a Regulation Officer at the
LTO before whom the request for the issuance of a Conduct Permit is to be presented,
Yungao was often told to go straight up to the room of accused Garcia so that the latter
could personally sign the said permit. It was only when accused Garcia is absent or is
not in office that the papers submitted to the LTO were attended to by his assistant.
Yungao testified that accused Garcia would always make his request to borrow the
Company's motor vehicle verbally and on a Friday. However, Yungao admitted that he
was not very familiar with the signature of accused Garcia, and that the latter's
signature did not appear in any of the delivery receipts.
During all these years, Yungao could only recall one (1) instance when accused Garcia
failed to approve the Company's request, and this was a request for an extension of the
usual "5-day road test" period granted to the Company. Nonetheless, the Company
found the said disapproval to be acceptable and proper.
On questions propounded by the Court, Yungao testified that the names and signatures
of the persons who actually received the Company's vehicles were reflected on the
faces of the delivery receipts. However, Yungao does not recognize the signatures
appearing on the said delivery receipts, including those purportedly of accused Tagupa,
because Yungao was not present when the vehicles were taken.
The prosecution had intended to present another witness in the person of Ms. Ma.
Lourdes V. Miranda (hereinafter, "Miranda"), who was present at the time Yungao
testified. Prior to her presentation, however, the parties agreed to enter into
stipulations and admissions. Thus, it was stipulated that Miranda was the mother of a
child named Jane, who was run over and killed in a vehicular accident; that the driver
of the ill-fated motor vehicle was accused Nabo; that Miranda, thereafter, successfully
traced the said vehicle and eventually discovered the existence of numerous delivery
receipts in the files and possession of the Company; and that said discovery led to the
institution of the subject criminal cases against herein accused. As a result of such
admissions and stipulations, the proposed testimony of Miranda was, thereafter,
dispensed with.
AURORA J. CHIONG (hereinafter, "Chiong") declared that she is the Vice-President and
General Manager of the Company, a business establishment engaged in the assembly of
motor vehicles. In the process, the Company has to submit a Dealer's Report to the
LTO prior to the assembly of a motor vehicle. After the assembly is completed, the
Company has to secure a permit from the LTO for purposes of conducting the necessary
road testing of the newly assembled motor vehicle.
In 1993, accused Garcia was the Regional Director of the LTO in Cagayan de Oro City.
He was the officer who approves the needed Conduction Permit of newly assembled
motor vehicles. He was also the LTO officer who approves and signs the Company's
annual LTO Accreditation Certificate.
Chiong recounted that accused Garcia has a farm, and that he would need a vehicle to
transport water thereto. For this purpose, he would, on a weekly basis, borrow from the
Company a motor vehicle, either by asking from Chiong directly through telephone calls
or through Yungao, her Liaison Officer. Everytime accused Garcia would borrow a motor
vehicle, the Company would issue a delivery receipt for such purpose, which has to be
signed by the person whom accused Garcia would send to pick up the motor vehicle.
Chiong was usually the company officer who signed the delivery receipt for the release
of the borrowed motor vehicle to the representative of accused Garcia. When she was
not in office, she would authorize her personnel to place [their] initials on top of her
name. On several occasions, Chiong had seen accused Nabo affixing his signature on
the delivery receipt before taking out the borrowed motor vehicles. Chiong was very
sure that the driver who picked up the motor vehicle from the Company was the
personnel of accused Garcia because the latter would always call her up first before
sending his representative to get a vehicle. Chiong was likewise very familiar with the
voice of accused Garcia because she had been dealing with him for a long period of
time already, and all the while she had always maintained a cordial relationship with
him.
On questions propounded by the Court, Chiong testified that accused Garcia would ask
his driver to get a vehicle on a Saturday at around 6:30 o'clock in the morning. He
would return it in the late afternoon of the same day. There was only one instance
when accused Garcia returned the motor vehicle on the day after, and this was the time
when the said vehicle had figured in a vehicular accident which resulted in the death of
a certain Jane, the daughter of Miranda. Chiong was not the complainant in the said
vehicular accident case because she could not afford to offend or antagonize accused
Garcia, and she had always considered the lending of motor vehicles to accused Garcia
as a public relation thing.
Chiong clarified that the subject motor vehicles occasionally borrowed by accused
Garcia were all company service cars and not newly assembled vehicles. Finally, she
testified that she gets irritated whenever accused Garcia would ask for a vehicle at a
time when she herself would also need it. However, under the circumstances, she had
to give in to his request.11
For the defense, petitioner took the witness stand, while accused Tagupa did not
present any evidence.
Petitioner testified that he was the Regional Director of the 10th Regional Office of the
LTO from August, 1987 to December, 1994. He downright denied borrowing any motor
vehicle from the Company arguing that his signatures never appeared in the Delivery
Receipts12 submitted by the prosecution.13 He admitted, though, that the Company has
been continually transacting business with his office properly and officially, and has not,
even for a single instance, violated any rules with respect to assembly of motor
vehicles, and that there was no reason for the owners of the Company to harbor any ill-
feelings against him.14 He further admitted that he had known Atty. Aurora Chiong,
Vice-President and General Manager of the Company, even before he became Regional
Director when he was still the Chief of the Operations Division.15 He added that
employees of the LTO are used to borrowing vehicles from their friends and that this
practice has been going on prior to his being Regional Director. He claimed he
repeatedly warned his subordinates about the illegality of the same but they merely
turned a deaf ear.16 Lastly, he said his driver, accused Nabo, had, on several occasions,
driven motor vehicles and visited him at his farm, and that he rode with him in going
home without allegedly knowing that the vehicles driven by Nabo were merely
borrowed from his (Nabo) friends.17
On 6 May 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed decision convicting

petitioner of fifty-six counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. Accused Tagupa was acquitted, while the cases against accused Nabo, who
remained at large, were archived. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused TIMOTEO A GARCIA GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of fifty-six (56) counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to: (i) in each case, suffer an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1)
month, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) month, as maximum; (ii) suffer
all accessory penalties consequent thereto; and (iii) pay the costs.
With respect to accused NERY TAGUPA, by reason of the total lack of any evidence
against him, he is hereby ACQUITED.
As for accused Gilbert G. Nabo, considering that he remained at large and jurisdiction
over his person had yet to be acquired, let the case as against him be achieved.18
Petitioner is now before us assigning as errors the following:
1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF SECTION

3(B) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 WERE PRESENT IN CRIM. CASES NOS. 24042 TO
24098 (EXCEPT 24078) AND IN FINDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY OF FIFTY
SIX (56) COUNTS OF VIOLATION THEREOF;
2. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT OF FIFTY SIX (56) COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(B) OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 ON THE BASIS OF FATALLY DEFECTIVE INFORMATIONS
WHEREIN THE FACTS CHARGED NEVER CONSTITUTED AN OFFENSE;
3. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT OF FIFTY SIX (56) COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(B) OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE WHICH IS INSUFFICIENT TO
CONVICT (EVEN FOR A SINGLE COUNT);
4. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED AND IN THE PROCESS VIOLATED THE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER WHEN IT SUPPLIED
THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION WITH ASSUMPTIONS
WHICH WERE NOT AT ALL SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
5. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED WHEN IT OBSERVED DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF

JUSTICE BY ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER'S CO-ACCUSED TAGUPA AND CONVICTING
THE HEREIN PETITIONER WHEN THE SAME REASONING SHOULD HAVE LED ALSO TO
THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PETITIONER.
In any criminal prosecution, it is necessary that every essential ingredient of the crime
charged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent.19 To be convicted of
violation of Section 3(b)20 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, the prosecution has
the burden of proving the following elements: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2)
who requested or received a gift, a present, a share a percentage, or a benefit (3) on
behalf of the offender or any other person; (4) in connection with a contract or
transaction with the government; (5) in which the public officer, in an official capacity
under the law, has the right to intervene.21
Petitioner maintains that not all the elements of Section 3(b) have been established by
the prosecution. Petitioner focuses primarily on the fourth element. He argues that the
prosecution failed to show the specific transactions of the Company with the LTO of
Cagayan de Oro that petitioner approved and/or intervened in so that he could borrow
from, or be lent by, the Company a vehicle. Inasmuch as he was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of fifty-six counts of violation of Section 3(b) for allegedly borrowing the
Company's vehicle fifty-six times, the Sandiganbayan, he stresses, should have at least
pointed out what these transactions were. This, petitioner claims, the Sandiganbayan
failed to show with certainty in its decision. Petitioner adds that the prosecution did not
even attempt to introduce evidence to show what contract or transaction was pending
before the LTO over which petitioner had the right to intervene being the Regional
Director when, at the period stated in all the fifty-six informations, he borrowed a
vehicle.
We agree with petitioner that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the existence of
the fourth element. Ï‚Î·Î±Ã±rÎ¿blÎµÅ¡ Î½Î¹râ€ Ï…Î±l lÎ±Ï‰ lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
It is very clear from Section 3(b) that the requesting or receiving of any gift, present,
share, percentage, or benefit must be in connection with "a contract or
transaction"22 wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under
the law. In the case at bar, the prosecution did not specify what transactions the
Company had with the LTO that petitioner intervened in when he allegedly borrowed
the vehicles from the Company. It is insufficient that petitioner admitted that the
Company has continually transacted with his office. What is required is that the
transaction involved should at least be described with particularity and proven. To
establish the existence of the fourth element, the relation of the fact of requesting
and/or receiving, and that of the transaction involved must be clearly shown. This, the
prosecution failed to do. The prosecution's allegation that the Company regularly
transacts with petitioner's LTO Office for the registration of its motor vehicles, in the
reporting of its engine and chassis numbers, as well as the submission of its vehicle
dealer's report, and other similar transactions, will not suffice. This general statement
failed to show the link between the 56 alleged borrowings with their corresponding
transactions.
Failing to prove one of the other elements of the crime charged, we find no need to
discuss the presence or absence of the elements.
The next question to be resolved is: Can petitioner be convicted of any other crime
(i.e., Direct Bribery or Indirect Bribery) charged in the informations?cralawlibrary
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 21023 of the Revised Penal Code consists
of the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received
directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift,
present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or
any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which it is his
official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions
as a public officer.24 Thus, the acts constituting direct bribery are: (1) by agreeing to
perform, or by performing, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present an act
constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties; (2) by
accepting a gift in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a
crime, in connection with the performance of his official duty; or (3) by agreeing to
refrain, or by refraining, from doing something which is his official duty to do, in
consideration of any gift or promise.25
In the case under consideration, there is utter lack of evidence adduced by the
prosecution showing that petitioner committed any of the three acts constituting direct
bribery. The two prosecution witnesses did not mention anything about petitioner
asking for something in exchange for his performance of, or abstaining to perform, an
act in connection with his official duty. In fact, Atty. Aurora Chiong, Vice-President and
General Manager of the Company, testified that the Company complied with all the
requirements of the LTO without asking for any intervention from petitioner or from
anybody else from said office.26 From the evidence on record, petitioner cannot likewise
be convicted of Direct Bribery.
Can petitioner be found guilty of Indirect Bribery? cralawlibrary
Indirect bribery is committed by a public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by
reason of his office. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article
21127 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned must have accepted
the gift or material consideration. In the case at bar, was the prosecution able to show
that petitioner indeed accepted a gift from the Company? The alleged borrowing of a
vehicle by petitioner from the Company can be considered as the gift in contemplation
of the law. To prove that petitioner borrowed a vehicle from the Company for 56 times,
the prosecution adduced in evidence 56 delivery receipts28 allegedly signed by
petitioner's representative whom the latter would send to pick up the vehicle.
The prosecution was not able to show with moral certainty that petitioner truly
borrowed and received the vehicles subject matter of the 56 informations. The
prosecution claims that petitioner received the vehicles via his representatives to whom
the vehicles were released. The prosecution relies heavily on the delivery receipts. We,
however, find that the delivery receipts do not sufficiently prove that petitioner received
the vehicles considering that his signatures do not appear therein. In addition, the
prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner's representatives who picked up the
vehicles. The acquittal of one of the accused (Nery Tagupa) who allegedly received the
vehicles from the Company further strengthens this argument. If the identity of the
person who allegedly picked up the vehicle on behalf of the petitioner is uncertain,
there can also be no certainty that it was petitioner who received the vehicles in the
end.
Factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court except where: (1)
the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures;
(2) the inference made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; (3) there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and
(5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted by
evidence on record.29 In the case before us, we are constrained to apply the exception
rather than the rule. We find that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that petitioners
actually received the vehicles through his representatives is grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise, and conjectures, and not supported by evidence on record. The
certainty of petitioner's receipt of the vehicle for his alleged personal use was not
substantiated.
WHEREFORE, all the above considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 24042 to 24077 and 24079 to 24098
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For insufficiency of evidence, the petitioner is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the informations. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 75160 March 18, 1988
LEONOR FORMILLEZA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
K.V. Faylona & Associates for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a Petition for review of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan.
The records of the case disclose that petitioner Leonor Formilleza has been with the government
service for around 20 years. She was the personnel supervisor of the regional office of the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) in Tacloban City, Leyte since October 1, 1982. Her duties include the
processing of the appointment papers of employees.
On the other hand, a certain Mrs. Estrella Mutia was an employee of the NIA from February, 1978 up
to March, 1985. Her appointment was coterminous with a project of the NIA. On December 31, 1983,
her appointment wag terminated. This notwithstanding, she continued working for the NIA pursuant
to the verbal instructions of the regional director of the Administration.
Mrs. Mutia testified that she took steps to obtain either a permanent or at the least a renewed
appointment; that when she approached the regional director about the matter she was advised to
see the petitioner who was to determine the employees to be appointed or promoted; and that the
petitioner refused to attend to her appointment papers unless the latter were given some money.
On February 27, 1984, Mrs. Mutia reported her problem to the Philippine Constabulary (PC)
authorities in the province. The PC officials told her that steps were to be taken to entrap the
petitioner. The entrapment equipment consisted of marked paper money bills worth P100.00. The
PC officials concerned were colleagues of the husband of Mrs. Mutia in the PC.
The first attempt to entrap the petitioner was on February 28, 1984. The plan did not materialize as
the petitioner did not show up at the designated rendezvous at the NIA building canteen.
The second attempt was on February 29,1984, this time with results. That morning, the petitioner
and Mrs. Mutia met in their service bus on their way to work. The two women supposedly agreed to
meet at the canteen later that morning at 9:00 o'clock. Thereafter, Mrs. Mutia notified the PC
authorities who were to arrange the entrapment. The PC soldiers involved in the arrangement were
Identified as Sergeants Eddie Bonjoc, Efren Abanes and Ignacio Labong.
Everyone who was to participate in the entrapment was ready. Mrs. Mutia went to see the petitioner
in her office after which the two of them proceeded to the canteen. Some of their officemates — Mrs.
Florida Sevilla and a certain Mrs. Dimaano — joined them in the canteen. They occupied two
squareshaped tables joined together. The petitioner sat at the head of the table with Mrs. Mutia
seated at her left, Mrs. Dimaano at her (the petitioner's) right and Mrs. Sevilla at the right of Mrs.
Dimaano. Sergeants Bonjoc and Labong sat at another table while Sergeant Abanes was alone in
still another table. The latter brought along a camera in order to take photographs of the entrapment.
The marked money was folded altogether.
Mrs. Mutia maintains that after they had finished taking their snacks, she handed the marked money
bills under the table with her right hand to the petitioner who received the same with her left hand. At
that moment, Sergeant Bonjoc approached the petitioner and held her hand holding the money bills.
Sergeant Abanes brought out his camera and took photo. graphs of the sequence of events. He was
able to take seven photographs. 1
The petitioner was arrested by the soldiers despite her objections to the entrapment. She was
brought to the PC crime laboratory in the locality where she was found positive for ultra-violet
powder. In the presence of the corporate counsel of the NW the petitioner denied accepting any
bribe money from Mrs. Mutia.
The case was brought to the Sandiganbayan where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9634.
Arraigned on January 1 0, 1985, the petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and went to trial on May
13, 1985.
In the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution argued that the entrapment arranged
by the PC operatives was n because the petitioner was asking money from Mrs. Mutia in
consideration for having the appointment papers of the latter facilitated. On the other hand, the
petitioner maintains her innocence — that there was no entrapment; the scenario was but a scheme
set up by Mrs. Mutia and her husband's colleagues in the PC. The petitioner denies having accepted
the supposed bribe money.
The Sandiganbayan relying on the theory of the prosecution observed in a decision promulgated on
July 14, 1986, as follows —
2
Upon consideration of the evidence. We find the p petitions version credible.
Two days before the entrapment, Mrs. Mutia complained to the PC authorities about
the inaction of the on her appointment papers due to her failure to give Mm money.
She executed a sworn statement to that effect, ... It was the PC who planned the
entrapment and supplied the marked money. Sgt. Efren Abanes who dusted the
money bills with fluoresence powder and who was a member of the entrapment
team, witnessed the delivery and receipt of the money by the accused and the
complainant and he saw how the folded money was handed by Mrs. Mutia with her
right hand underneath the table and received by the with her left hand. That was also
how Mrs. Mutia described the manner she delivered the money to the accused — the
money bills were rolled winch she handed to with her right hand underneath the
table. Although Sgt. Abanes had a camera with him to photograph the entrapment,
he could not prematurely expose the camera to allow a shot of the actual giving of
the money lest the notice his presence and intention and thereby thwart the
operation. But after the money had been delivered and received, he immediately took
out his camera and snapped pictures, one of them depicting the accused held by
Sgt. Bonjoc and Labong on the left hand ..., and another showing the accused also
held on the left hand by one of the PC men, and the complainant, Mrs. Mutia,
drinking from a glass ...
The fact that Mrs. Mutia's husband is a PC -An himself does not detract from the
credibility of Sgt. Abanes who took part in the Sgt. Abanes entrapment, took pictures,
and testified about the incident in court. Sets. Abanes Bonjoc and Labong were not
the only public authorities privy to the operation. Capt. Pedro Pates was the one to
whom Mrs. Mutia reported the accused demand for money; it was he who broached
the Idea of entrapping the accused; and it was Mador Fernando Pace who supplied
the money and caused it to be marked with powder. It is inconceivable that an these
commissioned and non-commissioned officers had lent themselves to take part in an
unholy cabal of falsely incriminating a female government employee on the mere
urging of one of their associates.
Just as unreasonable is the insinuation that Mrs. Mutia had inveigled the accused to
the canteen and resorted to the insidious machination of planting money in her hand
in a simulated entrapment simply because she thought the accused was not helping
her in her application for appointment to a regular item.
Mrs. Florida Sevilla's presence on the same table with the complainant and the
accused may be conceded. But her testimony that she did not see anything that took
place between the complainant and the accused before the PC operative pounced
upon the accused, and the latter angrily asked the complainant what she was trying
to do to her, does not improve the cause of the defense. As portrayed by the
accused, she was at the head of the rectangular table with the complainant at her
left: Mrs. Dimaano at her right, and Mrs. Sevilla next to Mrs. Dimaano. Since the
money, according to the complainant and Sgt. Abanes was handed to and received
by the accused underneath the table, it is not surprising that Mrs. Sevilla who was
two seats away from the accused did not see it. 3
The respondent court ruled that the crime committed by the petitioner was not Direct Bribery as
defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code cited in the Information but Indirect Bribery as
defined under Article 211 of the same code. Citing the case of People v. Abesamis, the respondent
4
court was of the opinion that she could be convicted for Indirect Bribery under the Information for
Direct Bribery to which she pleaded and entered into trial inasmuch as it is the allegation of facts
rather than the denomination of the offense by the provincial fiscal that determines the crime
charged.
Thus, the respondent court found the petitioner guilty of Indirect Bribery and sentenced her to four
months of arresto mayor, suspension from public office, profession or calling, including the right of
suffrage, and public censure.
On August 23, 1986, the petitioner elevated the case to this Court by way of the instant Petition for
Review. The thrust of the Petition is that the conclusions reached by the Sandiganbayan are not
supported by the evidence. Moreover, the petitioner disputes the applicability and/or correctness of
the ruling of this Court in People v. Abesamis relied upon by the respondent court.
As instructed by this Court, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its Comment on the Petition.
In opposing the Petition, the Solicitor General maintains that only questions of law may be raised in
the instant case and the respondent court did not commit any error of law. The Solicitor General also
stresses therein that the findings of fact made by the Sandiganbayan are supported by the evidence
on record and deserve full faith and credit. The Solicitor General adds that the question of credibility
is addressed mainly to the trier of facts, in this case, the Sandiganbayan.
The parties submitted subsequent pleadings in support of their stand. Thereafter, the case was
deemed submitted for decision.
We find merit in the Petition.
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, governs the procedure through which cases originating
from the Sandiganbayan are elevated to this Court. Under Section 7 thereof, the decisions and final
5
orders of the Sandiganbayan are subject to review on certiorari by the Supreme Court in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court has ruled that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 45, subject to certain rare exceptions. Simply stated, one
6
way through which a decision or final order of the Sandiganbayan can be elevated to the Supreme
7
Court is a Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 and, as a general rule, only questions of law may be
raised therein. The Solicitor General cites the case of Peñaverde v. Sandiganbayan in support of
8
this view.
Going now to the question of law raised in the instant Petition, We believe that the ruling in People v.
Abesamis, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, is authority for the view that the allegation of
facts, not the denomination of the offense by the prosecutor, determines the crime charged. Anent
the argument on the correctness of the ruling, the petitioner had not succeeded in showing any
cogent basis for reversing or modifying the same.
The remaining argument that the judgment of conviction is not supported by the evidence raises a
question of fact inasmuch as the resolution of the issue would require this Court to sort out and re-
examine the evidence presented in the trial. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Peñaverde v.
Sandiganbayan, the Solicitor General moves for the denial of the Petition. The Solicitor General
adds that the credibility of witnesses is a matter better left to the appreciation of the trial court, in this
case, the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition of this character.
The general rule admits exceptions, one of which is when the findings of fact made by the trial court
overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case. This observation was made by this court in Peñaverde v. Sandiganbayan, cited by the Solicitor
General, to wit —
With respect to the allegation that there was error on the part of respondent
Sandiganbayan in concluding that petitioners conspired in the commission of the
offense, suffice it to say that the basis of its finding was the credibility of witnesses.
Pursuant to Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, in relation to Section 2, Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are entitled to
great respect and only questions of laws (sic) may be raised to the Supreme Court.
Besides, well settled is the rule that the findings of (the) trial court on credibility of
witnesses will not be disturbed unless much findings overlook certain facts of
substance and value which, if considered might affect (the) results of (the) case. 9
We believe that the exception to the general rule calls for application in this case.
The fundamental axiom underlying a criminal prosecution is that before the accused may be
convicted of any crime, his guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, if there are
substantial facts which were overlooked by the trial court but which could alter the results of the case
in favor of the accused, then such facts should be carefully taken into account by the reviewing
tribunal.
In the case before Us, there are substantial facts and circumstances Which appear to be favorable
to the accused but which were not carefully considered by the Sandiganbayan. The failure to do so
is most unfortunate considering that the Sandiganbayan is the first and last recourse of the accused
before her case reaches the Supreme Court where findings of fact are generally conclusive and
binding.
The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is 10
that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration. There must
be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same
as his own property from then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the
same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance or act to show such
acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime of indirect bribery has been
committed. To hold otherwise will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by
simply putting within their physical custody some gift, money or other property.
Did the petitioner accept the supposed bribe money?
The Sandiganbayan noted that the photographs of the entrapment show that the petitioner was
accosted by the PC soldiers after she accepted the marked money. Against the evidence of the pro
petition that the money was handed to petitioner by Mrs. Mutia under the table is the assertion of
petitioner that it was when she stood up that Mrs. Mutia suddenly placed something in her hand
which she did not know to be money and when she saw that it was money she threw it away. An 11
examination of the seven photographs that were allegedly taken immediately after the passing of the
money shows that the petitioner was standing up when the PC agents apprehended her. This
corroborates petitioner's story. There was no picture showing petitioner to be seated which should
be her position immediately after the money was handed to her under the table, which should be the
case according to the version of the prosecution. None of the photographs show the petitioner in
12
the process of appropriating or keeping the money after it was handed to her. Two of the seven
photographs that were taken outside the canteen appear to be of no relevance to the operation.
As the petitioner was admittedly handed the money, this explains why she was positive for ultra-
violet powder. It is possible that she intended to keep the supposed bribe money or may have had
no intention to accept the same. These possibilities exist but We are not certain.
However, what is revealing is that Mrs. Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaano were present around the table in
the canteen with the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia when the latter allegedly handed the money to the
petitioner. There were other persons in the premises like the PC agents whose Identities petitioner
possibly did not know. Under the circumstances and in such a public place it is not probable that
petitioner would have the nerve to accept bribe money from Mrs. Mutia even under the table. If the
petitioner knew and was prepared to accept the money from Mrs. Mutia at the canteen, the petitioner
would not have invited her officemate Mrs. Sevilla to join them. Mrs. Sevilla stated she did not see
the alleged passing of the money. She could not have seen the money as it was passed on under
the table or when, as petitioner said it was quickly placed in her hand when she stood up. What Mrs.
Sevilla is sure of is that when they were about to leave the canteen, two (2) men approached
petitioner, one of whom took pictures, and the petitioner shouted at Mrs. Mutia, "What are you trying
to do to me?" The reaction of petitioner is far from one with a guilty conscience.
13
Moral certainty, not absolute certainty, is needed to support a judgment of conviction, Moral certainty
is a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon a
given matter. Without this standard of certainty, it may not be said that the guilt of the accused in a
14
criminal proceeding has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

With all these circumstances taken into account altogether, We are left at a loss as to the guilt of the
accused. Overlooked by the Sandiganbayan, these facts and circumstances make out a good case
for the petitioner.
Accordingly, the Court holds that the guilt of the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 9634 has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. She is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
9634 is hereby SET ASIDE. The petitioner Leonor Formilleza is hereby ACQUITTED on the basis of
reasonable doubt. We make no pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 125160. June 20, 2000.]
NICANOR E. ESTRELLA, Petitioner, v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the Decision 1 of the

Sandiganbayan dated June 3, 1996, in Criminal Case No. 12960, convicting petitioner
Nicanor E. Estrella of the crime of malversation of public funds as defined and penalized
under Article 217(4) of the Revised Penal Code. chanrobles.com.ph : red
On July 1, 1975, petitioner was appointed as Municipal Cashier 2 in the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, with a bond in the amount of P28,000.00.
3 Per Audit Assignment Order No. LGAD 86-1 dated January 28, 1986 issued by the
Commission on Audit (COA), Regional Office XII, he was audited of his cash and
accounts for the period from March 18 to 24, 1986 only. 4 For reasons unknown, the
cash and accounts of the petitioner were not audited for the period from July 1, 1975,
the date of his appointment, up to March 17, 1986. 5
Based on the official receipts for the period from February 7, 1986 to March 18, 1986
submitted by the petitioner during the audit examination 6 , petitioner apparently had
daily collections amounting to P247,753.28. 7 Under office rules, petitioner was
supposed to turn over the collections to Municipal Treasurer Jose B. Galvez, but he
failed to do so since Galvez was then on leave of absence. As a recourse, petitioner
should have deposited his collections with the depository bank of the municipality but
he likewise neglected to do. 8
During the audit examination, petitioner produced the following: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Cash on hand P46,756.00 9
Payrolls/vouchers 65,539.83 10
Cash advances 65,182.95 11
Fully paid payrolls/vouchers 68,692.91 12
Voucher No. 61 3,977.28 13
——————
TOTAL P250,148.97
The audit team credited the amount of P250,148.97 against his cash collections
amounting to P247,753.28, hence, petitioner incurred no shortage. The remaining
amount of P2,395.69 14 was carried over and deducted from his total cash advance.
Furthermore, the audit examination disclosed that from March 31, 1979 to December 3,
1985, petitioner made a total cash advance of P220,804.25. 15 The cash advance of
P14,025.00 16 given to the driver of Municipal Treasurer Galvez was included in
petitioner’s accountability because it was the latter who granted it. Likewise, the
amount of P15,000.00 17 used to pay the salaries of the municipal employees, which
petitioner borrowed from Mrs. Leonarda Panceras, in-charge of the Special Educational
Fund, was also charged to his cash advances. All in all, petitioner received cash
advances totalling P249,829.25.
Of the P249,829.25, petitioner was able to liquidate on November 20, 1985 the amount
of P29,083.57 18 only. The amount of P2,395.69 resulting from the liquidation of
petitioner’s cash collections was added to P29,083.57, thus, petitioner’s accountability
was reduced to P218,349.99. 19
Consolidated and presented in tabulated form, petitioner’s accountability appears as

follows:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ACCOUNTABILITY CASH CASH
COLLECTIONS ADVANCES
P247,753.28 P220,804.25
14,025.00
15,000.00
TOTAL P247,753.28 P249,829.25
ACCOUNTABILITY
CREDITS TO
ACCOUNTABILITY
a. Fully paid payroll/vouchers 68,692.91
b. Voucher No. 61 3,977.28
Cash Items and Cash on
Hand Produced during the
Examination
a. Payroll/vouchers 65,539.83
b. Cash advances 65,182.95

c. Cash on hand 46,756.00
Liquidation under 12,085.39
OR No. 5975542 9,500.00
7,498.18
TOTAL CREDIT TO 250,148.97 29,083.57
ACCOUNTABILITY
SHORTAGE 0 220,749.68
Less P2,395.69 20 and 2,395.69
TOTAL SHORTAGE 0 P218,349.99 21
Petitioner admitted the accuracy of these different amounts when he certified them to
be correct and signed the Report of Cash Examination, List of Cash Items Payroll and
Vouchers and the List of Allowed Cash Advances.
Thereafter, the audit team from the Commission on Audit submitted its audit report to
the Regional Director, Commission on Audit, Regional Office XII.
On April 11, 1986, State Auditor Binangon served a letter of demand 22 on the accused
who acknowledged receipt thereof, setting forth the findings of the audit team
particularly the shortage and demanded from the petitioner immediate production of
the missing funds and a written explanation within 72 hours why the shortage occurred.
In the said letter, petitioner was officially informed of his shortage in the amount of
P222,327.24 which was stated in the original Report of Cash Examination 23 but which
was adjusted in the amended Report of Cash Examination 24 dated June 11, 1986 by
crediting him the amount of P2,395.69 25 , thereby reducing his accountability to
P218,349.99.
After establishing the amount of the shortage as reflected in Exhibit "D", the OIC
Municipal Treasurer submitted his progress report demonstrating further restitution of
petitioner’s disallowed cash advances and vouchers in the amount of P14,406.00 and
P12,303.00 or a total of P26,709.00, 26 thereby further reducing his liability to
P191,640.99. While petitioner admitted his accountability to be only P64,538.95, he
doubted the accuracy of the said amount for the reason that in his perception, his
liability was allegedly between P30,000.00 and P40,000.00 only. 27 Resultantly,
petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds in the Information filed with
respondent Sandiganbayan, allegedly committed as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That on or about March 18, 1986, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
municipality of Isulan, Province of Sultan Kudarat, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being
then the Municipal Cashier in the above-stated municipality, and as such is accountable
and responsible for public funds entrusted to him by reason of his position, with grave
abuse of confidence and taking advantage of his public position as such, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, embezzle and take away from
said public funds the total amount of Two Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred
Forty-nine Pesos and 99/100 (P218,349.99), Philippine Currency, which is
misappropriated and converted to his own personal use, to the damage and prejudice
of the government in the aforestated amount.
Contrary to law. 28
Duly arraigned on January 13, 1989, petitioner Nicanor E. Estrella pleaded "Not Guilty"
to the charge. 29 After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner filed a "motion to
be allowed to file a demurrer to evidence" which was opposed by the prosecution.
Respondent court denied the said motion. On May 20, 1995, petitioner again filed a
"motion and/or manifestation" for the dismissal of the case for lack of merit. When the
incident was heard, petitioner’s counsel admitted in open court that the motion and/or
manifestation was "in the nature of a demurrer to evidence", hence, pursuant to Sec.
15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, petitioner effectively waived his right to present
evidence and submitted the case for decision based on the evidence presented by the
prosecution. The Sandiganbayan rendered its decision convicting petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which reads: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Nicanor E. Estrella guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crime of malversation penalized under Par. 4, Article 217, Revised Penal
Code.
There being no modifying circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the Court imposes on the accused the indeterminate penalty from TWELVE (12) YEARS,
FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of reclusion temporal as minimum to
EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as
maximum, the fine equal to TWO HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
FORTY NINE PESOS AND NINETY-NINE CENTAVOS (P218,349.99), the amount
malversed, and perpetual special disqualification. 30
Hence, this petition. chanrobles virtuallawlibrary:red
Petitioner states five (5) assigned errors, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I. The Sandiganbayan gravely erred in not holding that the Cash Examination Report
dated March 18, 1986 (Exhibit B for the prosecution) on the basis of which petitioner
was said to have allegedly incurred shortage in the amount of P218,349.99 is palpably
wrong therefore invoking reasonable doubt accused should be freed of criminal
culpability.
II. The Sandiganbayan gravely erred in not clearly and unequivocably holding to
prevent double billing or double payment that there are two (2) distinct kinds or classes
of money accountability petitioner has to clear or liquidate, namely: 1) Cash collections,
from market fees, stall rentals, real estate tax collections, etc. and, 2) Cash Advances,
for salaries of municipal employees, gasoline, maintenance of the municipality, etc. in
the amount of P247,753.28 and P249,829.25 respectively.
III. The Sandiganbayan erred in not holding that the collections in the total amount of
P247,753.28 has been fully liquidated or turned over to the municipal coffers of Isulan
as evidenced by the prosecution’s own Exhibits D-6-B to D-6-S, Liquidation Receipts
issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Isulan, in favor of the Municipal Cashier.
IV. The Sandiganbayan erred in not holding that in carrying over and reflecting the
collections still as a liability in the Cash Examination Report (Exhibit B) and charging
against it paid payrolls, vouchers is totally wrong since this would result in double
billing or double entry.
V. The Sandiganbayan erred in not charging against Cash Advances all paid payrolls,
vouchers, cash on hand and as a consequence clear petitioner of such advances.
Otherwise stated, the basic issue is this: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation.
Petitioner vigorously opposes the Report of Cash Examination disclosing that he is still
liable for cash collections, averring it is intrinsically wrong. According to him, the audit
team erred in crediting paid payrolls/vouchers, cash on hand or allowed cash item
against his accountability for cash collections considering that his cash collections were
already liquidated. His basis was the prosecution’s own evidence, the 18 receipts 31
amounting to P235,070.99 issued by the Municipal Treasurer for the liquidation of his
daily collections.
As shown in the Report of Cash Examination, there are two kinds of money obligations
that petitioner has with the Municipal Government of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. They are
cash collections and cash advances. A cardinal principle in accounting is that fully paid
payrolls and vouchers should be credited to cash advances. 32
In the case at bar, the audit team admitted that they credited the fully paid
vouchers/payrolls in the amount of P68,692.91 and voucher No. 61 in the amount of
P3,977.28 or a total of P72,670.19 against petitioner’s cash collections as evidenced by
the Report of Cash Examination 33 , duly signed 34 by petitioner. Likewise, the amount
of P177,478.78 representing the cash on hand and allowed cash items, produced by
petitioner during the audit examination were added to P72,670.19 by the audit team to
fully liquidate petitioner’s cash collections. It is apparent therefore that petitioner
incurred no shortage in his cash collections.
However, from the testimony of the lone prosecution witness, State Auditor Binangon,
it appeared that petitioner was able to liquidate his money obligation only during the
time of the audit examination. To quote her testimony: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"PJ Garchitorena
If Galvez received that amount from the accused why are we going to hold the accused
responsible for that amount?
A Your Honor these liquidations were only submitted at the time of the audit, so the
issuance of the receipts were only made at the time of the audit but the dating
correspond to the daily liquidation by Mr. Estrella.
Q Are you saying that Mr. Galvez did not receive the sum?
A Only at the time of the audit.
Q Why? Your audit was in March while the receipt was February?
A Because Mr. Galvez was on leave. He only turned over these including the cash on
hand at the time of the liquidation.
Q In other words are you saying that Mr. Galvez was not there so he could not receive
the money?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q When Mr. Galvez reported for work Mr. Estrella turned over the money?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is that wrong? To whom did you expect Mr. Estrella to turnover the money he has if
Mr. Galvez was not there?
Who is Mr. Galvez by the way?
A The Municipal Treasurer.
Q To whom does the cashier turn over his collection?
A To the Municipal Treasurer.
Q If the Municipal Treasurer is not there what will the cashier do with the money he
has?
A He is supposed to deposit the money because he is authorized to deposit also.
Q He did not deposit the money?
A No, your Honor." 35
On the other hand, petitioner contends that it was his practice to remit his collections to
the Municipal Treasurer every other day or daily. Due to the trust he reposed on the
Treasurer he did not ask receipt for every remittance that he made. Petitioner further
contends that he opted to rest his case in a Demurrer to Evidence considering that
during the Pre-trial of the said case, he adverted to the prosecution’s evidence,
particularly, Exhibits "D-6-B" to "D-6-S", as evidencing the liquidation of his cash
collections. 36
After a careful scrutiny of Exhibits "D-6-B" to "D-6-S", it appeared that the testimony of
the lone prosecution witness was more credible than that of petitioner’s declaration.
The receipts representing the liquidation for cash collections supported the testimony of
the prosecution witness. Said receipts were not chronologically issued as demonstrated
in the following:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Receipt No. Date Issued Exhibit No.
5573641 February 8, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-B"
5976423 February 8, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-C"
5976424 February 8, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-D"
5852401 February 12, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-E"
5852411 February 17, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-F"
5852404 February 18, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-G"
5852417 February 19, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-H"
5852413 February 28, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-I"
5852405 February 28, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-J’
5852406 February 28, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-K"
5852410 February 28, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-L"
5852414 March 17, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-M"
5852402 February 17, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-N"
5852403 March 19, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-O"
5852415 March 19, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-P"
5852409 February 20, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-Q"
5852412 February 28, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-R"
5852416 March 18, 1986 Exhibits "D-6-S"
As shown in the above mentioned list, Receipt No. 5852402 was issued on February 17,
1986 while Receipt No. 5852403 was issued on March 19, 1986. The irregularity in the
issuance of the receipts evidencing remittances of cash collections arose when
succeeding numbers of Receipt No. 5852403 were issued ahead of the same. If it is
true that petitioner really made remittances of his cash collections at the end of the
day, the irregularity would not have happened. It was for this reason that Municipal
Treasurer Jose S. Galvez of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat was also prosecuted before the
respondent court for violation of PD 1445, Section 89. 37
As stated earlier and based on the Report of Cash Examination, the fully paid payrolls
and vouchers were credited to petitioner’s accountability for cash collection. The
prosecution witness, as member of the audit team, explained their procedure or reason
in this manner, thus: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
PJ GARCHITORENA
Madam, I am not asking you what he did. He does not govern your rendition of his
account. You obey the rules and you follow the regulations for your preparation of the
account, is that not so?
A Yes, your Honor. chanrobles.com.ph:red
Q Now, collections cannot be disposed of by the cashier?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Collections are supposed to be turn over to the treasurer?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q As a matter of fact that is what he did in Exhibit D-6, from February 8 to March 18 he
turned over a total of P247,753.28, is that not so?
A Yes, your Honor, but . . .
Q Don’t say but . . . Therefore, your crediting of payrolls and other vouchers against
collection is incorrect. Precisely, Mr. Estrella in his Report, in his liquidation, in his
turnover, Exhibit D-6 gives you the exact amount of his collection — P247,753.28 and
you should have closed the account of collections with his turnover under Exhibit D-6.
Mr. Estrella knows what the law is; Mr. Estrella follows the law with respect to his
collection and he turned them over and liquidated them accordingly. You, however,
decided to apply against collections, something totally inappropriate. You applied
payrolls and other disbursements and that is why your report is in confusion.
Would you like to say something?
A Yes, your Honor, because when he liquidated his collection that was already attached
to his liquidation. So, if he remove the paid payrolls, and vouchers, the same he would
be incurring cash shortage out of his collection.
Q He will not because he turned over to you P247,753.28, Exhibit D-6 is a complete
liquidation of that amount.
A Your Honor, may I say something. The liquidation was receipted based on the total
but then the amount he turned over to the treasurer, there was already deduction
corresponding to the vouchers attached. So the Treasurer added the cash plus the paid
payrolls and other vouchers equals the total collections. So, that is how it was
presented during the audit. 38
Q He returned to you the cash but you did not recognize it as a returned amount. All of
these receipts represent cash turned over by the accused to the treasurer?
A (no answer)
Q These amounts represented by receipts?
A Yes, sir.
Q And these are receipts representing cash?
A Supposed to be your Honor.
Q You have doubts?
A I have no doubts, you Honor, because I have see, during the liquidation that when he
turned over the collections it is not the cash as reflected there. There was part cash and
part vouchers.
Q Why did the treasurer issue the receipts?
A He acted as if he was the one disbursing already with the collections.
Q So, why did you not just follow . . . If this is a liquidation then there was a turnover.
As it is right now everybody is confused wondering what happened.
So, he liquidated his collections, cash and according to you with vouchers. But if turned
over this amount then he must have gotten the rest of the money somewhere else
because this is supposed to . . .
A Yes, sir.
Q So, you followed this mode of liquidation and wind up . . . (interrupted)
A You Honor, that is supposed to be a violation but if we did not consider that we will
be going back even to the previous audit because that is already the practice . . .
Q How did you determine that the disbursement under that cash advance were properly
chargeable to that account?
A We only considered the documents, if they are fully documented.
Q Why did you decide that this should be charged against cash advances?
A Our rule there if ever, we had disallowed those supporting documents to be part of
his liquidation in his collection, and applied that as cash advances, the same he will be
incurring cash shortage from his collection because he has nothing . . . 39
In short, the audit team merely followed the procedure initiated by the petitioner. The
petitioner included the fully paid payrolls and vouchers in liquidating his cash
collections. In the same way, the Municipal Treasurer receipted the liquidation based on
the sum total of cash and the paid payrolls and vouchers. If we are to conform with the
opinion of the petitioner to the effect that the fully paid payrolls and vouchers totalling
P72,670.19 should be credited to his cash advances, it would simply mean that the
same amount should likewise be deducted from his cash collections. In the same way
that if we are to credit the amount of P177,478.78 40 from his cash advances, the
amount of P175,083.09 should be deducted from his collections, hence, petitioner’s
shortage would still be the same. As pointed out by the respondent court, and we
quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"If, as contended, the turn over or liquidation of the daily collections of P247,753.28
was applied to the accused’s accountability for cash advances, then his accountability
for daily collections would remain outstanding while his accountability for cash advances
would be reduced pro tanto by the same amount of P247,753.28. Consequently,
whether one or the other was done. the result would be the same." 41
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code holds liable for malversation a public officer who
shall appropriate public funds or property for which he is accountable, or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit
any other person to take such public funds or property. Furthermore, the failure of a
public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence
that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses.
The elements of malversation of public funds are (a) the offender is a public officer, (b)
he had custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office,
(c) these funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable,
and (d) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. 42 Anent the last
element, we have held that to justify conviction for malversation of public funds, the
prosecution has only to prove that the accused received public funds or property and
that he could not account for them or did not have them in his possession and could not
give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of the same. 43 An accountable public
officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of
misappropriation and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts which
he has not been able to explain satisfactorily. 44
Petitioner was not able to produce the missing amount of P191,640.99; and neither was
he able to explain his failure to produce that amount. Aside from petitioner’s feeble
attempt to shift the blame to the audit team, nothing in the records of this case
supports his allegation that the audit team had committed an error in the Report of
Cash Examination. 45
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of respondent Sandiganbayan is

AFFIRMED in toto. chanrobles virtuallawlibrary:red
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 103501-03 February 17, 1997
LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 103507 February 17, 1997
ADOLFO M. PERALTA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
Through their separate petitions for review, Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta (Tabuena and
1
Peralta, for short) appeal the Sandiganbayan decision dated October 12, 1990, as well as the
2
Resolution dated December 20. 1991 denying reconsideration, convicting them of malversation
3
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Tabuena and Peralta were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt Of having malversed the total amount of P55 Million of the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) funds during their incumbency as General Manager and Acting Finance
Services Manager, respectively, of MIAA, and were thus meted the following sentence:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 11758, accused Luis A. Tabuena is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
pay a fine of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00), the amount
malversed. He shall also reimburse the Manila International Airport Authority the sum
of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00).
In addition, he shall suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from public
office,
(2) In Criminal Case No. 11759, accused Luis A. Tabuena is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as minimum, and twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and
to pay a fine of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00), the amount
malversed. He shall also reimburse the Manila International Airport Authority the sum
of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00).
In addition, he shall suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from public

office.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 11760, accused Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are
each sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum and twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum and for each of them to pay separately a fine of FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) the amount malversed. They shall also reimburse
jointly and severally the Manila International Airport Authority the sum of FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00).
In addition, they shall both suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from
public office.
A co-accused of Tabuena and Peralta was Gerardo G. Dabao, then Assistant General
Manager of MIAA, has remained at large.
There were three (3) criminal cases filed (nos. 11758, 11759 and 11760) since the total amount of
P55 Million was taken on three (3) separate dates of January, 1986. Tabuena appears as the
principal accused — he being charged in all three (3) cases. The amended informations in criminal
case nos. 11758, 11759 and 11760 respectively read:
That on or about the 16th day of January, 1986, and for sometime subsequent
thereto, in the City of Pasay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Luis A. Tabuena and Gerardo G. Dabao, both public officers, being
then the General Manager and Assistant General Manager, respectively, of the
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), and accountable for public funds
belonging to the MIAA, they being the only ones authorized to make withdrawals
against the cash accounts of MIAA pursuant to its board resolutions, conspiring,
confederating and confabulating with each other, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to defraud the government, take and
misappropriate the amount of TWENTY FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00)
from MIAA funds by applying for the issuance of a manager's check for said amount
in the name of accused Luis A. Tabuena chargeable against MIAA's Savings
Account No. 274-500-354-3 in the PNB Extension Office at the Manila International
Airport in Pasay City, purportedly as partial payment to the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), the mechanics of which said accused Tabuena
would personally take care of, when both accused well knew that there was no
outstanding obligation of MIAA in favor of PNCC, and after the issuance of the
above-mentioned manager's check, accused Luis A. Tabuena encashed the same
and thereafter both accused misappropriated and converted the proceeds thereof to
their personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
xxx xxx xxx
thereto, in the City of Pasay. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Luis A. Tabuena and Gerardo G. Dabao, both public officers, being
then the General Manager and Assistant General Manager, respectively, of the
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), and accountable for public funds
belonging to the MIAA, they being the only ones authorized to make withdrawals
against the cash accounts of MIAA pursuant to its board resolutions, conspiring,
confederating and confabulating with each other, did then and there wilfully,
misappropriate the amount of TWENTY FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00)
from MIAA funds by applying for the issuance of a manager.s check for said amount
in the name of accused Luis A. Tabuena chargeable against MIAA's Savings
Account No. 274-500-354-3 in the PNB Extension Office at the Manila International
Airport in Pasay City, purportedly as partial payment to the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), the mechanics of which said accused Tabuena
would personally take care of, when both accused well knew that there was no
outstanding obligation of MIAA in favor of PNCC, and after the issuance of the
above-mentioned manager's check, accused Luis A. Tabuena encashed the same
and thereafter both accused misappropriated and converted the proceeds thereof to
their personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
xxx xxx xxx
thereto, in the City of Pasay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta, both public officers, being
then the General Manager and Acting Manager, Financial Services Department,
respectively, of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), and accountable for
public funds belonging to the MIAA, they being the only ones authorized to make
withdrawals against the cash accounts of MIAA pursuant to its board resolutions,
conspiring, confederating and confabulating with each other, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to defraud the government, take and
misappropriate the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) from MIAA
funds by applying for the issuance of a manager's check for said amount in the name
of accused Luis A. Tabuena chargeable against MIAA's Savings Account No. 274-
500- 354-3 in the PNB Extension Office at the Manila International Airport in Pasay
City, purportedly as partial payment to the Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC), the mechanics of which said accused Tabuena would
personally take care of, when both accused well knew that there was no outstanding
obligation of MIAA in favor of PNCC, and after the issuance of the above-mentioned
manager's check, accused Luis A. Tabuena encashed the same and thereafter both
accused misappropriated and converted the proceeds thereof to their personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Gathered from the documentary and testimonial evidence are the following essential antecedents:
Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president's office
and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which
Tabuena replied, "Yes, sir, I will do it." About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-
Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986
(hereinafter referred to as MARCOS Memorandum) reiterating in black and white such verbal
instruction, to wit:
Office of the President

of the Philippines
Malacanang
January 8, 1986
MEMO TO: The General Manager
Manila International Airport Authority
You are hereby directed to pay immediately the Philippine National Construction
Corporation, thru this Office, the sum of FIFTY FIVE MILLION (P55,000,000.00)
PESOS in cash as partial payment of MIAA's account with said Company mentioned
in a Memorandum of Minister Roberto Ongpin to this Office dated January 7, 1985
and duly approved by this Office on February 4, 1985.
Your immediate compliance is appreciated.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND
MARCOS. 4
The January 7, 1985 memorandum of then Minister of Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin
referred to in the MARCOS Memorandum, reads in full:
MEMORANDUM
For: The President
From: Minister Roberto V. Ongpin
Date: 7 January 1985
Subject: Approval of Supplemental Contracts and

Request for Partial Deferment of Repayment of
PNCC's Advances for MIA Development Project
May I request your approval of the attached recommendations of Minister Jesus S.

Hipolito for eight (8) supplemental contracts pertaining to the MIA Development
Project (MIADP) between the Bureau of Air Transport (BAT) and Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly CDCP, as follows:
1. Supplemental Contract No. 12

Package Contract No. 2 P11,106,600.95

5,758,961.52

Package Contract No. 2 4,586,610.80

1,699,862.69

Package Contract No. 2 233,561.22


Package Contract No. II 16,617,655.49
(xerox copies only; original memo was submitted to the Office of the
President on May 28, 1984)
In this connection, please be informed that Philippine National Construction

Corporation (PNCC), formerly CDCP, has accomplishment billings on the MIA
Development Project aggregating P98.4 million, inclusive of accomplishments for the
aforecited contracts. In accordance with contract provisions, outstanding advances
totalling P93.9 million are to be deducted from said billings which will leave a net
amount due to PNCC of only P4.5 million.
At the same time, PNCC has potential escalation claims amounting to P99 million in
the following stages of approval/evaluation:
— Approved by Price Escalation Committee

(PEC) but pended for lack of funds P1.9 million
— Endorsed by project consultants and

currently being evaluated by PEC 30.7 million
— Submitted by PNCC directly to PEC

and currently under evaluation 66.5 million
——————
Total P99.1 million
There has been no funding allocation for any of the above escalation claims due to
budgetary constraints.
The MIA Project has been completed and operational as far back as 1982 and yet
residual amounts due to PNCC have not been paid, resulting in undue burden to
PNCC due to additional cost of money to service its obligations for this contract.
To allow PNCC to collect partially its billings, and in consideration of its pending
escalation billings, may we request for His Excellency's approval for a deferment of
the repayment of PNCC's advances to the extent of P30 million corresponding to
about 30% of P99.1 million in escalation claims of PNCC, of which P32.5 million has
been officially recognized by MIADP consultants but could not be paid due to lack of
funding.
Our proposal will allow BAT to pay PNCC the amount of P34.5 million out of existing
MIA Project funds. This amount represents the excess of the gross billings of PNCC
of P98.4 million over the undeferred portion of the repayment of advances of P63.9
million.
(Sgd.)
ROBE
RTO V.
ONGPI
N
Ministe
r 5
In obedience to President Marcos' verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of
Dabao and Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3)
withdrawals.
The first withdrawal was made on January 10, 1986 for P25 Million, following a letter of even date
signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA — the depository
branch of MIAA funds, to issue a manager's check for said amount payable to Tabuena. The check
was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier of the PNB Villamor
branch counted the money after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in cash were
then placed in peerless boxes and duffle bags, loaded on a PNB armored car and delivered on the
same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez located at Aguado Street fronting Malacanang. Mrs.
Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money received
Similar circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25
Million, made on January 16, 1986.
The third and last withdrawal was made on January 31, 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena's
co-signatory to the letter- request for a manager's check for this amount. Peralta accompanied
Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested him to do the counting of the P5 Million.
After the counting, the money was placed in two (2) peerless boxes which were loaded in the trunk
of Tabuena's car. Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez' office at
Aguado Street. It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all
the amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt, dated January 30, 1986, reads:
Malacanang
Manila
January 30, 198
RECEIVED FROM LOUIE TABUENA THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF FIFTY FIVE

MILLION PESOS (P55,000,000.00) as of the following dates:
Jan. 10 — P 25,000,000.00
Jan. 16 — 25,000,000.00
Jan. 30 — 5,000,000.00
(Sgd.) Fe Roa-Gimenez
The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves, "out of
the ordinary" and "not based on the normal procedure". Not only were there no vouchers prepared to
support the disbursement, the P55 Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC receipt for the P55
Million was presented. Defense witness Francis Monera, then Senior Assistant Vice President and
Corporate Comptroller of PNCC, even affirmed in court that there were no payments made to PNCC
by MIAA for the months of January to June of 1986.
The position of the prosecution was that there were no outstanding obligations in favor of PNCC at
the time of the disbursement of the P55 Million. On the other hand, the defense of Tabuena and
Peralta, in short, was that they acted in good faith. Tabuena claimed that he was merely complying
with the MARCOS Memorandum which ordered him to forward immediately to the Office of the
President P55 Million in cash as partial payment of MIAA's obligations to PNCC, and that he
(Tabuena) was of the belief that MIAA indeed had liabilities to PNCC. Peralta for his part shared the
same belief and so he heeded the request of Tabuena, his superior, for him (Peralta) to help in the
release of P5 Million.
With the rejection by the Sandiganbayan of their claim of good faith which ultimately led to their
conviction, Tabuena and Peralta now set forth a total of ten (10) errors committed by the
6
Sandiganbayan for this Court's consideration. It appears, however, that at the core of their plea that
we acquit them are the following:
1) the Sandiganbayan convicted them of a crime not charged in the amended informations, and
2) they acted in good faith.
Anent the first proposition, Tabuena and Peralta stress that they were being charged with intentional
malversation, as the amended informations commonly allege that:
. . . accused . . . conspiring, confederating and other, then and there wilfully,

misappropriated the amount of . . . .
But it would appear that they were convicted of malversation by negligence. In this
connection, the Court's attention is directed to p. 17 of the December 20, 1991 Resolution
(denying Tabuena's and Peralta's motion for reconsideration) wherein the Sandiganbayan
said:
xxx xxx xxx
On the contrary, what the evidence shows is that accused Tabuena delivered the
P55 Million to people who were not entitled thereto, either as representatives of
MIAA or of the PNCC.
It proves that Tabuena had deliberately consented or permitted

through negligence or abandonment, some other person to take such public funds.
Having done so, Tabuena, by his own narration, has categorically demonstrated that
he is guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of P55 Million of public funds.
(Emphasis supplied.)
To support their theory that such variance is a reversible flaw, Tabuena and Peralta argue
that:
1) While malversation may be committed intentionally or by negligence, both modes cannot be

committed at the same time.
2) The Sandiganbayan was without jurisdiction to convict them of malversation of negligence where
the amended informations charged them with intentional malversation. 7
3) Their conviction of a crime different from that charged violated their constitutional right to be
informed of the accusation. 8
We do not agree with Tabuena and Peralta on this point. Illuminative and controlling is "Cabello v.
Sandiganbayan" where the Court passed upon similar protestations raised by therein accused-
9
petitioner Cabello whose conviction for the same crime of malversation was affirmed, in this wise:
. . . even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a
case of malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional
malversation, under the circumstances of this case his conviction under the first
mode of misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation is committed either
intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a
modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the
mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is
proper. . . .
In Samson vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., we held that an accused charged with willful
or intentional falsification can validly be convicted of falsification through negligence,
thus:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held
in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor. G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1995, but a
distinct crime in our Penal Code, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it
may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an
information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory
that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the
present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence
submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification
which made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not act with
criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure
himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In
other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which
turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when
there is a variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the
cases decided by this Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover; Section 5, Rule 116, of the Rules of Court does not require that all the
essential elements of the offense charged in the information be proved, it being
sufficient that some of said essential elements or ingredients thereof be established
to constitute the crime proved. . . .
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with
imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the
evidence submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him.
Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be
incongruous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a
charge of criminal intent is incompatible with the concept of negligence.
Subsequently, we ruled in People vs. Consigna, et. al., that the aforestated rationale

and arguments also apply to the felony of malversation, that is, that an accused
charged with willful malversation, in an information containing allegations similar to
those involved in the present case, can be validly convicted of the same offense of
malversation through negligence where the evidence sustains the latter mode of
perpetrating the offense.
Going now to the defense of good faith, it is settled that this is a valid defense in a prosecution for
malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused. Thus, in the two (2)
vintage, but significantmalversation cases of "US v. Catolico" and "US v. Elvina," the Court
10 11
stressed that:
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute,
be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or
to consequences as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is actus non
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea — a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of is innocent.
The rule was reiterated in "People v. Pacana," although this case involved falsification of
12
public documents and estafa:
Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting.
American jurisprudence echoes the same principle. It adheres to the view that criminal intent
in embezzlement is not based on technical mistakes as to the legal effect of a transaction
honestly entered into, and there can be no embezzlement if the mind of the person doing the
act is innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose. The accused may thus always introduce
13
evidence to show he acted in good faith and that he had no intention to convert. And this, to
14
our mind, Tabuena and Peralta had meritoriously shown.
In so far as Tabuena is concerned, with the due presentation in evidence of the MARCOS
Memorandum we are swayed to give credit to his claim of having caused the disbursement of the
P55 Million solely by reason of such memorandum. From this premise flows the following reasons
and/or considerations that would buttress his innocence of the crime of malversation.
First. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS
Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with
the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was
undeniably Tabuena's superior — the former being then the President of the Republic who
unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. In other 15
words, Marcos had a say in matters involving inter-government agency affairs and transactions,
such as for instance, directing payment of liability of one entity to another and the manner in which it
should be carried out. And as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the highest official
of the land no less, good faith should be read on Tabuena's compliance, without hesitation nor any
question, with the MARCOS Memorandum. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying
circumstance of "Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose." The subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too,
16
is the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS Memorandum, as it has for its purpose
partial payment of the liability of one government agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC). However, the
unlawfulness of the MARCOS Memorandum was being argued, on the observation, for instance,
that the Ongpin Memo referred to in the presidential directive reveals a liability of only about P34.5
Million. The Sandiganbayan in this connection said:
Exhibits "2" and "2-a" (pages 1 and 2 of the memorandum of Min. Ongpin to the
President dated January 7, 1985) were mainly:
a.) for the approval of eight Supplemental Contracts; and
b.) a request for partial deferment of payment by PNCC for advances made for the
MIAA Development Project, while at the same time recognizing some of the PNCC's
escalation billings which would result in making payable to PNCC the amount of
P34.5 million out of existing MIAA Project funds.
Thus:
"xxx xxx xxx
To allow PNCC to collect partially its billings, and in consideration of

ifs pending escalation billings, may we request for His Excellency's
approval for a deferment of repayment of PNCC's advances to the
extent of P30 million corresponding to about 30% of P99.1 million in
escalation claims of PNCC, of which P32.6 million has been officially
recognized by MIADP consultants but could not be paid due to lack of
funding.
Our proposal will allow BAT to pay PNCC the amount of P34.5 million
out of existing MIA Project funds. This amount represents the excess
of the gross billings of PNCC of P98.4 million over the undeferred
portion of the repayment of advances of P63.9 million."
While Min. Ongpin may have, therefore recognized the escalation claims of the
PNCC to MIAA to the extent of P99.1 million (Exhibit 2a), a substantial portion
thereof was still in the stages of evaluation and approval, with only P32.6 million
having been officially recognized by the MIADP consultants.
If any payments were, therefore, due under this memo for Min. Ongpin (upon which
President Marcos' Memo was based) they would only be for a sum of up to P34.5
million.
17
xxx xxx xxx
V. Pres. Marcos' order to Tabuena dated January 8, 1986 baseless.
Not only was Pres. Marcos' Memo (Exhibit "1") for Tabuena to pay
P55 million irrelevant, but it was actually baseless.
This is easy to see.
Exhibit "1" purports to refer itself to the Ongpin Memorandum (Exhibit

"2", "2-a"); Exhibit "1", however, speaks of P55 million to be paid to
the PNCC while Exhibit "2" authorized only P34.5 million. The order
to withdraw the amount of P55 million exceeded the approved
payment of P34.5 million by P20.5 million. Min. Ongpin's Memo of
January 7, 1985 could not therefore serve as a basis for the
President's order to withdraw P55 million. 18
Granting this to be true, it will not nevertheless affect Tabuena's goad faith so as to make
him criminally liable. What is more significant to consider is that the MARCOS Memorandum
is patently legal (for on its face it directs payment of an outstanding liability) and that
Tabuena acted under the honest belief that the P55 million was a due and demandable debt
and that it was just a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC. This belief is supported by defense
witness Francis Monera who, on direct examination, testified that:
ATTY ANDRES
Q Can you please show us in this Exhibit "7" and "7-a" where it is
indicated the receivables from MIA as of December 31, 1985?
A As of December 31, 1985, the receivables from MIA is shown on

page 2, marked as Exhibit "7-a", sir, P102,475.392.35
xxx xxx xxx 19
ATTY. ANDRES
Q Can you tell us, Mr. Witness, what these obligations represent?
WITNESS
A These obligations represent receivables on the basis of our billings

to MIA as contract-owner of the project that the Philippine National
Construction Corporation constructed. These are billings for
escalation mostly, sir.
Q What do you mean by escalation?
A Escalation is the component of our revenue billings to the contract-

owner that are supposed to take care of price increases, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 20
ATTY ANDRES
Q When you said these are accounts receivable, do I understand

from you that these are due and demandable?
A Yes, sir. 21
Thus, even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its
illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact
committed in good faith. Such is the ruling in "Nassif v. People" the facts of which, in brief,
22 23
are as follows:
Accused was charged with falsification of commercial document. A mere employee
of R.J. Campos, he inserted in the commercial document alleged to have been
falsified the word "sold" by order of his principal. Had he known or suspected that his
principal was committing an improper act of falsification, he would be liable either as
a co-principal or as an accomplice. However, there being no malice on his part, he
was exempted from criminal liability as he was a mere employee following the orders
of his principal.
24
Second. There is no denying that the disbursement, which Tabuena admitted as "out of the
ordinary", did not comply with certain auditing rules and regulations such as those pointed out by the
Sandiganbayan, to wit:
a) [except for salaries and wages and for commutation of leaves] all disbursements above P1,000.00
should be made by check (Basic Guidelines for Internal Control dated January 31, 1977 issued by
COA)
b) payment of all claims against the government had to be supported with complete documentation
(Sec. 4, P.D. 1445, "State Auditing Code of the Philippines). In this connection, the Sandiganbayan
observed that:
There were no vouchers to authorize the disbursements in question. There were no

bills to support the disbursement. There were no certifications as to the availability of
funds for an unquestionably staggering sum of P55 Million. 25
c) failure to protest (Sec. 106, P.D. 1445)
But this deviation was inevitable under the circumstances Tabuena was in. He did not have
the luxury of time to observe all auditing procedures of disbursement considering the fact
that the MARCOS Memorandum enjoined his "immediate compliance" with the directive that
he forward to the President's Office the P55 Million in cash. Be that as it may, Tabuena
surely cannot escape responsibility for such omission. But since he was acting in good faith,
his liability should only be administrative or civil in nature, and not criminal. This follows the
decision in "Villacorta v. People" where the Court, in acquitting therein accused municipal
26
treasurer of Pandan, Catanduanes of malversation after finding that he incurred a shortage

in his cash accountability by reason of his payment in good faith to certain government
personnel of their legitimate wages leave allowances, etc., held that:
Nor can negligence approximating malice or fraud be attributed to petitioner. If he

made wrong payments, they were in Good faith mainly to government personnel,
some of them working at the provincial auditor's and the provincial treasurer's offices
And if those payments ran counter to auditing rules and regulations, they did not
amount to a criminal offense and he should only be held administratively or civilly
liable.
Likewise controlling is "US v. Elvina" where it was held that payments in good faith do not
27
amount to criminal appropriation, although they were made with insufficient vouchers or
improper evidence. In fact, the Dissenting Opinion's reference to certain provisions in the
revised Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances — apparently made to underscore
Tabuena's personal accountability, as agency head, for MIAA funds — would all the more
support the view that Tabuena is vulnerable to civil sanctions only Sections 29.2 and 295
expressly and solely speak of "civilly liable," describe the kind of sanction imposable on a
superior officer who performs his duties with "bad faith, malice or gross negligence"' and on
a subordinate officer or employee who commits "willful or negligent acts . . . which are
contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acted under order or
instructions of his superiors."
Third. The Sandiganbayan made the finding that Tabuena had already converted and
misappropriated the P55 Million when he delivered the same to Mrs. Gimenez and not to the PNCC,
proceeding from the following definitions/concepts of "conversion":
"Conversion", as necessary element of offense of embezzlement, being the

fraudulent "appropriation to one's own use' of another's property which does not
necessarily mean to one's personal advantage but every attempt by one person to
dispose of the goods of another without right as if they were his own is conversion to
his own use." (Terry v. Water Improvement Dist. No. 5 of Tulsa County, 64 p, 2d 904,
906, 179 Okl. 106)
— At p. 207, Words
and Phrases,
Permanent Edition 9A.
Conversion is any interference subversive of the right of the owner of personal

property to enjoy and control it. The gist of conversion is the usurpation of the owner
's right of property, and not the actual damages inflicted. Honesty of purpose is not a
defense. (Ferrera v. Parks, 23 p. 883, 885 19 Or. 141)
— At
page
168, id.
xxx xxx xxx
The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of

another's property as if it were one's own. They presuppose that the thing has been
devoted to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To appropriate to one's
own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage but every attempt
to dispose of the property of another without right.
— People vs. Webber,

57 O.G.
p. 2933, 2937
By placing them at the disposal of private persons without due authorization or legal
justification, he became as guilty of malversation as if he had personally taken them
and converted them to his own use.
— People vs. Luntao,

50 O.G.
p. 1182, 1183 28
We do not agree. It must be stressed that the MARCOS Memorandum directed Tabuena "to
pay immediately the Philippine National Construction Corporation, thru this office the sum of
FIFTY FIVE MILLION. . .", and that was what Tabuena precisely did when he delivered the
money to Mrs. Gimenez. Such delivery, no doubt, is in effect delivery to the Office of the
President inasmuch as Mrs. Gimenez was Marcos' secretary then. Furthermore, Tabuena
had reasonable ground to believe that the President was entitled to receive the P55 Million
since he was certainly aware that Marcos, as Chief Executive, exercised supervision and
control over government agencies. And the good faith of Tabuena in having delivered the
money to the President's office (thru Mrs. Gimenez), in strict compliance with the MARCOS
Memorandum, was not at all affected even if it later turned out that PNCC never received the
money. Thus, it has been said that:
Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of
malversation.
xxx xxx xxx
Not every unauthorized payment of public funds is malversation. There is

malversation only if the public officer who has custody of public funds should
appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through
abandonment or negligence shall permit any other person to take such public funds.
Where the payment of public funds has been made in good faith, and there is
reasonable ground to believe that the public officer to whom the fund had been paid
was entitled thereto, he is deemed to have acted in good faith, there is no criminal
intent, and the payment, if it turns out that it is unauthorized, renders him only civilly
but not criminally liable.
29
Fourth. Even assuming that the real and sole purpose behind the MARCOS Memorandum was to
siphon-out public money for the personal benefit of those then in power, still, no criminal liability can
be imputed to Tabuena. There is no showing that Tabuena had anything to do whatsoever with the
execution of the MARCOS Memorandum. Nor is there proof that he profited from the felonious
scheme. In short, no conspiracy was established between Tabuena and the real embezzler/s of the
P5 Million. In the cases of "US v. Acebedo" and "Ang v. Sandiganbayan", both also involving the
30 31
crime of malversation, the accused therein were acquitted after the Court arrived at a similar finding
of non-proof of conspiracy. In "Acebedo", therein accused, as municipal president of Palo, Leyte,
was prosecuted for and found guilty by the lower court of malversation after being unable to turn
over certain amounts to the then justice of the peace. It appeared, however, that said amounts were
actually collected by his secretary Crisanto Urbina. The Court reversed Acebedo's conviction after
finding that the sums were converted by his secretary Urbina without the knowledge and
participation of Acebedo. The Court said, which we herein adopt:
No conspiracy between the appellant and his secretary has been shown in this case,
nor did such conspiracy appear in the case against Urbina. No guilty knowledge of
the theft committed by the secretary was shown on the part of the appellant in this
case, nor does it appear that he in any way participated in the fruits of the crime. If
the secretary stole the money in question without the knowledge or consent of the
appellant and without negligence on his part, then certainly the latter can not be
convicted of embezzling the same money or any part thereof. 32
In "Ang", accused-petitioner, as MWSS bill collector, allowed part of his collection to be

converted into checks drawn in the name of one Marshall Lu, a non-customer of MWSS, but
the checks were subsequently dishonored. Ang was acquitted by this Court after giving
credence to his assertion that the conversion of his collections into checks were thru the
machinations of one Lazaro Guinto, another MWSS collector more senior to him. And we
also adopt the Court's observation therein, that:
The petitioner's alleged negligence in allowing the senior collector to convert cash
collections into checks may be proof of poor judgment or too trusting a nature insofar
as a superior officer is concerned but there must be stronger evidence to show fraud,
malice, or other indicia of deliberateness in the conspiracy cooked up with Marshall
Lu. The prosecution failed to show that the petitioner was privy to the conspirational
scheme. Much less is there any proof that he profited from the questioned acts. Any
suspicions of conspiracy, no matter how sincerely and strongly felt by the MWSS,
must be converted into evidence before conviction beyond reasonable doubt may be
imposed. 33
The principles underlying all that has been said above in exculpation of Tabuena equally
apply to Peralta in relation to the P5 Million for which he is being held accountable, i.e., he
acted in good faith when he, upon the directive of Tabuena, helped facilitate the withdrawal
of P5 Million of the P55 Million of the MIAA funds.
This is not a sheer case of blind and misguided obedience, but obedience in good faith of a duly
executed order. Indeed, compliance to a patently lawful order is rectitude far better than
contumacious disobedience. In the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the
President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries
with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently
lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor
for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Obedientia est legis essentia.
Besides, the case could not be detached from the realities then prevailing As aptly observed by Mr
Justice Cruz in his dissenting opinion:
We reject history in arbitrarily assuming that the people were free during the era and
that the Judiciary was independent and fearless. We know it was not: even the
Supreme Court at that time was not free. This is an undeniable fact that we can not
just blink away. Insisting on the contrary would only make our sincerity suspect and
even provoke scorn for what can only be described as our incredible credulity. 34
But what appears to be a more compelling reason for their acquittal is the violation of the accused's
basic constitutional right to due process. "Respect for the Constitution", to borrow once again Mr.
Justice Cruz's words, "is more important than securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights
of the accused." While going over the records, we were struck by the way the Sandiganbayan
35
actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. Tabuena
and Peralta may not have raised this as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for us to
consider such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal
throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such
errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject of
assignments of error or not. 36
Simply consider the volume of questions hurled by the Sandiganbayan. At the taking of the
testimony of Francis Monera. then Senior Assistant Vice President and Corporate Comptroller of
PNCC, Atty. Andres asked sixteen (16) questions on direct examination. Prosecutor Viernes only
asked six (6) questions on cross-examination in the course of which the court interjected a total
of twenty-seven (27) questions (more than four times Prosecutor Viernes' questions and even more
than the combined total of direct and cross-examination questions asked by the counsels) After the
defense opted not to conduct any re-direct examination, the court further asked a total of ten (10)
questions. The trend intensified during Tabuena's turn on the witness stand. Questions from the
37
court after Tabuena's cross-examination totalled sixty-seven (67). This is more than five times
38
Prosecutor Viernes' questions on cross-examination (14), and more than double the total of direct
examination and cross-examination questions which is thirty-one (31) [17 direct examination
questions by Atty. Andres plus 14 cross-examination questions by Prosecutor Viernes]. In Peralta's
case, the Justices, after his cross-examination, propounded a total of forty-one (41) questions.
39
But more importantly, we note that the questions of the court were in the nature of cross
examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation. (The insinuating type was
40
best exemplified in one question addressed to Peralta, which will be underscored.) Thus we beg to
quote in length from the transcripts pertaining to witness Monera, Tabuena and Peralta. (Questions
from the Court are marked with asterisks and italicized for emphasis.)
(MONERA)
(As a background, what was elicited from his direct examination is that the PNCC had receivables
from MIAA totalling P102,475,392.35, and although such receivables were largely billings for
escalation, they were nonetheless all due and demandable. What follows are the cross-examination
of Prosecutor Viernes and the court questions).
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY PROS. VIERNES
Q You admit that as shown by these Exhibits "7" and "7- a", the items
here represent mostly escalation billings. Were those escalation
billings properly transmitted to MIA authorities?
A I don't have the documents right now to show that they were
transmitted, but I have a letter by our President, Mr. Olaguer, dated
July 6, 1988, following up for payment of the balance of our
receivables from MIA, sir.
*AJ AMORES
*Q This matter of escalation costs, is it not a matter for a conference

between the MIA and the PNCC for the determination as to the
correct amount?
A I agree, your Honor. As far as we are concerned, our billings are

what we deemed are valid receivables And, in fact, we have been
following up for payment.
*Q This determination of the escalation costs was it accepted as the

correct figure by MIA ?
A I don't have any document as to the acceptance by MIA your

Honor, but our company was able to get a document or a letter by
Minister Ongpin to President Marcos, dated January 7, 1985, with a
marginal note or approval by former President Marcos.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Basically, the letter of Mr. Ongpin is to what effect?

A The subject matter is approval of the supplementary contract and
request for partial deferment of payment for MIA Development
Project, your Honor.
*Q It has nothing to do with the implementation of the escalation

costs?
A The details show that most of the accounts refer to our escalations,
your Honor.
*Q Does that indicate the computation for escalations were already

billed or you do not have any proof of that
A Our subsidiary ledger was based on billings to MIA and this letter of
Minister Ongpin appears to have confirmed our billings to MIA, your
Honor.
*AJ AMORES
*Q Were there partial payments made by MIA an these escalation

billings?
A Based on records available as of today, the P102 million was

reduced to about P56.7 million, if my recollection is correct, your
Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Were the payments made before or after February 1986, since Mr.
Olaguer is a new entrant to your company?
WITNESS
A The payments were made after December 31, 1985 but I think the
payments were made before the entry of our President, your Honor.
Actually, the payment was in the form of: assignments to State
Investment of about P23 million; and then there was P17.8 million
application against advances made or formerly given; and there were
payments to PNCC of about P2.6 million and there was a payment for
application on withholding and contractual stock of about P1 million;
that summed up to P44.4 million all in all. And you deduct that from
the P102 million, the remaining balance would be about P57 million.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q What you are saying is that, for all the payments made on this
P102 million, only P2 million had been payments in cash ?
A Yes, your Honor.

*Q The rest had been adjustments of accounts, assignments of
accounts, or offsetting of accounts?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q This is as of December 31, 1985?
A The P102 million was as of December 31, 1985, your Honor, but
the balances is as of August 1987.
*Q We are talking now about the P44 million, more or less, by which
the basic account has been reduced. These reductions, whether by
adjustment or assignment or actual delivery of cash, were made after
December 31, 1985?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And your records indicate when these adjustments and payments

were made?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ AMORES
*Q You said there were partial payments before of these escalation

billings. Do we get it from you that there was an admission of these
escalation costs as computed by you by MIA, since there was already
partial payments?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q How were these payments made before February 1986, in case or

check, if there were payments made?
A The P44 million payments was in the form of assignments, your

Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q The question of the Court is, before December 31, 1985, were
there any liquidations made by MIA against these escalation billings?
A I have not reviewed the details of the record, your Honor. But the
ledger card indicates that there were collections on page 2 of the
Exhibit earlier presented. It will indicate that there were collections
shown by credits indicated on the credit side of the ledger.
*AJ AMORES
*Q Your ledger does not indicate the manner of giving credit to the
MIA with respect to the escalation billings. Was the payment in cash
or just credit of some sort before December 31, 1985?
A Before December 31, 1985, the reference of the ledger are official
receipts and I suppose these were payments in cash, your Honor.
*Q Do you know how the manner of this payment in cash was made
by MIA?
A I do not know, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q But your records will indicate that?
A The records will indicate that, your Honor.
*Q Except that you were not asked to bring them?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q At all events, we are talking of settlement or partial liquidation prior

to December 31, 1985?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Subsequent thereto, we are talking merely of about P44 million?
A Yes, your Honor, as subsequent settlements.
*Q After December 31, 1985?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And they have liquidated that, as you described it, by way of

assignments, adjustments, by offsets and by P2 million of cash
payment?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ AMORES
*Q Your standard operating procedure before December 31, 1985 in

connection with or in case of cash payment, was the payment in cash
or check?
A I would venture to say it was by check, your Honor.

*Q Which is the safest way to do it?
A Yes, your Honor.
"PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q And the business way?
A Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS VIERNES
Q You mentioned earlier about the letter of former Minister Ongpin to

the former President Marcos, did you say that letter concurs with the
escalation billings reflected in Exhibits "7" and "7-a"?
WITNESS
A The Company or the management is of the opinion that this letter, a

copy of which we were able to get, is a confirmation of the
acceptance of our billings, sir.
Q This letter of Minister Ongpin is dated January 7, 1985, whereas

the entries of escalation billings as appearing in Exhibit "7" are dated
June 30, 1985, would you still insist that the letter of January 1985
confirms the escalation billings as of June 1985?
A The entries started June 30 in the ledger card. And as of December

31, 1985, it stood at P102 million after payments were made as
shown on the credit side of the ledger. I suppose hat the earlier
amount, before the payment was made, was bigger and therefore I
would venture to say that the letter of January 7, 1985 contains an
amount that is part of the original contract account. What are
indicated in the ledger are escalation billings.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q We are talking about the letter of Minister Ongpin?
A The letter of Minister Ongpin refers to escalation billings, sir.
*Q As of what date?
A The letter is dated January 7, 1985, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS. VIERNES
Q In accordance with this letter marked Exhibit "7" and "7-a", there
were credits made in favor of MIA in July and November until
December 1985. These were properly credited to the account of
MIA?
WITNESS
A Yes, sir.
Q In 1986. from your records as appearing in Exhibit "7-a", there

were no payments made to PNCC by MIA for the months of January
to June 1986?
A Yes, sir.
Q And neither was the amount of P22 million remitted to PNCC by

MIA?
A Yes, sir.
PROS VIERNES
That will be all, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Redirect?
ATTY ANDRES
No redirect, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Questions from the Court.
*AJ AMORES
*Q From your records, for the month of January 1986, there was no
payment of this escalation account by MIA?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor. But on page 2 of Exhibit "7" there appears an

assignment of P23 million, that was on September 25, 1986.
*Q But that is already under the present administration?
A After February 1986, your Honor.
*Q But before February, in January 1986, there was no payment

whatsoever by MIA to PNCC?
A Per record there is none appearing, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q The earliest payment, whether by delivery of cash equivalent or of

adjustment of account, or by assignment, or by offsets, when did these payments begin?
A Per ledger card, there were payments in 1985, prior to December

31, 1985, your Honor.
*Q After December 31, 1985?
A There appears also P23 million as credit, that is a form of

settlement, your Honor.
*Q This is as of September 25?
A Yes, your Honor. There were subsequent settlements P23 million is

just part of the P44 million.
*Q And what you are saying is that, PNCC passed the account to
State Investment. In other words, State Investment bought the credit
of MIA?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And the amount of credit or receivables sold by PNCC to State

Investment is P23 million?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Is there a payback agreement?
A I have a copy of the assignment to State Investment but I have not

yet reviewed the same, your Honor.
*AJ AMORES
*Q As of now, is this obligation of MIA, now NAIA, paid to PNCC?
A There is still a balance of receivables from MIA as evidenced by a

collection letter by our President dated July 6, 1988, your Honor. The
amount indicated in the letter is P55 million.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Any clarifications you would like to make Mr. Estebal?
ATTY ESTEBAL
None, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Mr. Viernes?
PROS VIERNES
No more, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
The witness is excused. Thank you very much Mr. Monera. . . . 41
(TABUENA)
(In his direct examination, he testified that he caused the preparation of the checks totalling P55
Million pursuant to the MARCOS Memorandum and that he thereafter delivered said amount in cash
on the three (3) dates as alleged in the information to Marcos' private secretary Mrs. Jimenez at her
office at Aguado Street, who thereafter issued a receipt. Tabuena also denied having used the
money for his own personal use.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY PROS. VIERNES
Q The amount of P55 million as covered by the three (3) checks Mr.
Tabuena, were delivered on how many occasions?
A Three times, sir.
Q And so, on the first two deliveries, you did not ask for a receipt from
Mrs. Gimenez?
A Yes, sir.
Q It was only on January 30, 1986 that this receipt Exhibit "3" was
issued by Mrs. Gimenez?
A Yes, sir.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q So January 30 is the date of the last delivery?

A I remember it was on the 31st of January, your Honor What
happened is that, I did not notice the date placed by Mrs. Gimenez.
Q Are you telling us that this Exhibit "3" was incorrectly dated
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Because the third delivery was on January 31st and yet the
receipt was dated January 30?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q When was Exhibit "3" delivered actually by Mrs. Gimenez?
A January 31st, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS VIERNES
Q You did not go to Malacañang on January 30, 1986?
A Yes, sir, I did not.
Q Do you know at whose instance this Exhibit "3" was prepared?
A I asked for it, sir.
Q You asked for it on January 31, 1986 when you made the last
delivery?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you see this Exhibit "3" prepared in the Office of Mrs.
Gimenez?
A Yes, sir.
Q This receipt was typewritten in Malacañang stationery. Did you see

who typed this receipt?
A No, sir. What happened is that, she went to her room and when she
came out she gave me that receipt.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Q What you are saying is, you do not know who typed that receipt?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Are you making an assumption that she typed that receipt?
A Yes, your Honor, because she knows how to type.
*Q Your assumption is that she typed it herself?
A Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Proceed.
PROS. VIERNES
Q This receipt was prepared on January 31, although it is dated

January 30?
A Yes, sir, because I was there on January 31st.
Q In what particular place did Mrs. Gimenez sign this Exhibit "3"?
A In her office at Aguado, sir.
Q Did you actually see Mrs. Gimenez signing this receipt Exhibit "3"?
A No, sir, I did not. She was inside her room.
Q So, she was in her room and when she came out of the room, she
handed this receipt to you already typed and signed?
A Yes, sir.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q So, how did you know this was the signature of Mrs. Gimenez?
WITNESS
A Because I know her signature, your Honor. I have been receiving

letters from her also and when she requests for something from me.
Her writing is familiar to me.
So, when the Presiding Justice asked you as to how you knew that
this was the signature of Mrs. Gimenez and you answered that you
saw Mrs. Gimenez signed it, you were not exactly truthful?
A What I mean is, I did not see her sign because she went to her
room and when she came out, she gave me that receipt, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
That is why you have to wait for the question to be finished and listen
to it carefully. Because when I asked you, you said you saw her
signed it. Be careful Mr. Tabuena.
WITNESS
Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS VIERNES
Was there another person inside the office of Mrs. Gimenez when
she gave you this receipt Exhibit "3"?
A Nobody, sir.
Q I noticed in this receipt that the last delivery of the sum of P55
million was made on January 30. Do we understand from you that
this date January 30 is erroneous?
A Yes, sir, that January 30 is erroneous. I noticed it only afterwards.

This should be January 31st, sir.
PROS VIERNES
PJ GARCHITORENA
Redirect?
ATTY. ANDRES
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q Why did you not ask for a receipt on the first and second
deliveries?
A Because I know that the delivery was not complete yet, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q So you know that the total amount to be delivered was P55

million')
A Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Response by Mr. Peralta to the testimony of Mr. Tabuena.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
We are adopting the testimony of Mr. Tabuena and we will also

present the accused, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
"Q From whom did you receive the President's memorandum marked
Exhibit "1"? Or more precisely, who handed you this memorandum?
A Mrs. Fe Roa Gimenez, your Honor.
Q Did you ask Mrs, Fe Gimenez for what purpose the money was
being asked?
A The money was in payment for the debt of the MIA Authority to
PNCC, your Honor.
*Q If it was for the payment of such obligation why was there no

voucher prepared to cover such payment? In other words, why was
the delivery of the money not covered by any voucher?
A The instruction to me was to give it to the Office of the President,

your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Be that as it may, why was there no voucher to cover this

particular disbursement?
A I was just told to bring it to the Office of the President, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO

*Q Was that normal procedure for you to pay in cash to the Office of
the President for obligations of the MIAA in payment of its obligation
to another entity?
WITNESS
A No, your Honor, I was just following the Order to me of the

President.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q So the Order was out of the ordinary?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
Did you file any written protest with the manner with which such
payment was being ordered?
A No, your Honor.
*Q Why not?
A Because with that instruction of the President to me, I followed,

your Honor.
*Q Before receiving this memorandum Exhibit "1", did the former

President Marcos discuss this maitter with you?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q When was that?
A He called me up earlier, a week before that, that he wants to me

pay what I owe the PNCC directly to his office in cash, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q By "I OWE ", you mean the MIAA?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q And what did you say in this discussion you had with him?
A I just said, "Yes, sir, I will do it/"

*Q Were you the one who asked for a memorandum to be signed by
him?
A No, your Honor.
*Q After receiving that verbal instruction for you to pay MIAA's

obligation with PNCC, did you not on your own accord already
prepare the necessary papers and documents for the payment of that
obligation?
A He told me verbally in the telephone that the Order for the payment
of that obligation is forthcoming, your Honor. I will receive it.
*Q Is this the first time you received such a memorandum from the
President?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And was that the last time also that you received such a
memorandum?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Did you not inquire, if not from the President, at least from Mrs.
Gimenez why this procedure has to be followed instead of the regular
procedure?
A No, sir.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q Why did you not ask?
A I was just ordered to do this thing, your Honor.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q You said there was an "I OWE YOU"?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Where is that "I OWE YOU" now?
A All I know is that we owe PNCC the amount of P99.1 million, your
Honor. MIAA owes PNCC that amount.
*Q Was this payment covered by receipt from the PNCC?
A It was not covered, your Honor.

*Q So the obligation of MIAA to PNCC was not, for the record,
cancelled by virtue of that payment?
A Based on the order to me by the former President Marcos ordering

me to pay that amount to his office and then the mechanics will come
after, your Honor.
*Q Is the PNCC a private corporation or government entity?
A I think it is partly government, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q That is the former CDCP?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q Why were you not made to pay directly, to the PNCC considering
that you are the Manager of MIA at that time and the PNCC is a
separate corporation, not an adjunct of Malacañang?
WITNESS
A I was just basing it from the Order of Malacanang to pay PNCC

through the Office of the President, your Honor.
*Q Do you know the President or Chairman of the Board of PNCC?
A Yes, your Honor.
"Q How was the obligation of MIAA to PNCC incurred. Was it through
the President or Chairman of the Board?
A PNCC was the one that constructed the MIA, your Honor.
*Q Was the obligation incurred through the President or Chairman of

the Board or President of the PNCC? In other words, who signed the
contract between PNCC and MIAA?
A Actually, we inherited this obligation, your Honor. The one who

signed for this was the former Director of BAT which is General
Singzon. Then when the MIA Authority was formed, all the obligations
of BAT were transferred to MIAA. So the accountabilities of BAT were
transferred to MIAA and we are the ones that are going to pay, your
Honor.
*Q Why did you agree to pay to Malacañang when your obligation

was with the PNCC?
A I was ordered by the President to do that, your Honor.
*Q You agreed to the order of the President notwithstanding the fact

that this was not the regular course or Malacañang was not the
creditor?
A I saw nothing wrong with that because that is coming, from the
President, your Honor.
*Q The amount was not a joke, amounting to P55 million, and you
agreed to deliver money in this amount through a mere receipt from
the private secretary?
A I was ordered by the President, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q There is no question and it can be a matter of judicial knowledge

that you have been with the MIA for sometime?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Prior to 1986?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Can you tell us when you became the Manager of MIA?
A I became Manager of MIA way back, late 1968, your Honor.
*Q Long before the MIA was constituted as an independent

authority?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q And by 1986, you have been running the MIA for 18 years?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And prior to your Joining the MIA, did you ever work for the
government?
A No, your Honor.
*Q So, is it correct for us to say that your joining the MIA in 1968 as
its Manager was your first employment ,with the government?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q While you were Manager of MIA, did you have other subsequent
concurrent positions in the government also?
A I was also the Chairman of the Games and Amusement Board,

your Honor.
*Q But you were not the executive or operating officer of the Games
and Amusement Board?
A I was, your Honor.
*Q As Chairman you were running the Games and Amusement

Board?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q What else, what other government positions did you occupy that
time?
A I was also Commissioner of the Game Fowl Commission, your

Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q That is the cockfighting?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Here, you were just a member of the Board?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q So you were not running the commission?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Any other entity?
A No more, your Honor.
*Q As far as you can recall, besides being the Manager of the MIA
and later the MIAA for approximately 18 years, you also ran the
Games and Amusement Board as its executive officer?
A Yes, your Honor.

*Q And you were a commissioner only of the Came Fowl
Commission?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Who was running the commission at that time?
A I forgot his name, but he retired already, your Honor.
*Q All of us who joined the government, sooner or later, meet with our
Resident COA representative?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q And one of our unfortunate experience (sic) is when the COA

Representative comes to us and says: "Chairman or Manager, this
cannot be". And we learn later on that COA has reasons for its
procedure and we learn to adopt to them?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q As a matter of fact, sometimes we consider it inefficient,

sometimes we consider it foolish, but we know there is reason in this
apparent madness of the COA and so we comply?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And more than anything else the COA is ever anxious for proper
documentation and proper supporting papers?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Sometimes, regardless of the amount?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Now, you have P55 million which you were ordered to deliver in
cash, not to the creditor of the particular credit, and to be delivered in
armored cars to be acknowledged only by a receipt of a personal
secretary. After almost 18 years in the government service and
having had that much time in dealing with COA people, did it not
occur to you to call a COA representative and say, "What will I do
here?"
A I did not, your Honor.

*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Did you not think that at least out of prudence, you should have
asked the COA for some guidance on this matter so that you will do it
properly?
WITNESS
A What I was going to do is, after those things I was going to tell that
delivery ordered by the President to the COA, your Honor.
*Q That is true, but what happened here is that you and Mr. Dabao or
you and Mr. Peralta signed requests for issuance of Manager's
checks and you were accommodated by the PNB Office at Nichols
without any internal documentation to justify your request for
Manager's checks?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Of course we had no intimation at that time that Mr. Marcos will

win the elections but even then, the Daily Express, which was
considered to be a newspaper friendly to the Marcoses at that time,
would occasionally come with so-called expose, is that not so?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And worst, you had the so-called mosquito press that would
always come out with the real or imagined scandal in the government
and place it in the headline, do you recall that?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Under these circumstances, did you not entertain some apprehension

that some disloyal employees might leak you out and banner
headline it in some mosquito publications like the Malaya at that
time?
WITNESS
A No, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
I bring this up because we are trying to find out different areas of fear.
We are in the government and we in the government fear the COA
and we also fear the press. We might get dragged into press releases
on the most innocent thing. You believe that?
A Yes, your Honor.

*Q And usually our best defense is that these activities are properly
documented?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In this particular instance, your witnesses have told us about three

(3) different trips from Nichols to Aguado usually late in the day
almost in movie style fashion. I mean, the money being loaded in the
trunk of your official car and then you had a back-up truck following
your car?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Is that not quite a fearful experience to you ?
A I did not think of that at that time, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
"Q You did not think it fearful to be driving along Roxas Boulevard
with P25 million in the trunk of your car?
WITNESS
A We have security at that time your Honor.
ATTY. ANDRES
Your Honor, the P25 million was in the armored car; only P5 million
was in the trunk of his car.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Thank you for the correction. Even P1 million only. How much more
with P5 million inside the trunk of your car, was that not a nervous
experience?
A As I have said, your Honor, I never thought of that.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Thank you very much, Mr. Tabuena. You are excused. . . . 42
(PERALTA)
(He testified on direct examination that he co-signed with Tabuena a memorandum request for the
issuance of the Manager's Check for P5 Million upon order of Tabuena and that he [Peralta] was
aware that MIAA had an existing obligation with PNCC in the amount of around P27 Million. He
affirmed having accompanied Tabuena at the PNB Villamor Branch to withdraw the P5 Million, but
denied having misappropriated for his own benefit said amount or any portion thereof.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY PROS VIERNES
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court why was it necessary for
you to co-sign with Mr. Tabuena the request for issuance of
Manager's check in the amount of P5 million?
A At that time I was the Acting Financial Services Manager of MIAA,

sir, and all withdrawals of funds should have my signature because I
was one of the signatories at that time.
Q As Acting Financial Services Manager of MIAA, you always co-sign

with Mr. Tabuena in similar requests for the issuance of Manager's
checks by the PNB?
A That is the only occasion I signed, sir.
Q Did you say you were ordered by Mr. Tabuena to sign the request?
A Yes, sir, and I think the order is part of the exhibits and based on
that order, I co-signed in the request for the issuance of Manager's
check in favor of Mr. Luis Tabuena.
PROS VIERNES
Q Was there a separate written order for you to co-sign with Mr.
Tabuena?
WITNESS
A Yes, sir, an order was given to me by Mr. Tabuena.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Was that marked in evidence?
WITNESS
Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
What exhibit?
WITNESS
I have here a copy, your Honor. This was the order and it was
marked as exhibit "N".
PROS VIERNES
It was marked as Exhibit "M", your Honor.
Q How did you know there was an existing liability of MIAA in favor of
PNCC at that time?
A Because prior to this memorandum of Mr. Tabuena, we prepared

the financial statement of MIAA as of December 31, 1985 and it came
to my attention that there was an existing liability of around
P27,999,000.00, your Honor.
Q When was that Financial Statement prepared?
A I prepared it around January 22 or 24, something like that, of 1986,

sir.
Q Is it your usual practice to prepare the Financial Statement after the

end of the year within three (3) weeks after the end of the year?
A Yes, sir, it was a normal procedure for the MIAA to prepare the
Financial Statement on or before the 4th Friday of the month because
there will be a Board of Directors Meeting and the Financial
Statement of the prior month will be presented and discussed during
the meeting.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q This matter of preparing Financial Statement was not an annual

activity but a monthly activity?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q This Financial Statement you prepared in January of 1986

recapitulated the financial condition as of the end of the year?
A Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS VIERNES
Q You made mention of a request for Escalation Clause by former

Minister Ongpin. Did you personally see that request?
A When this order coming from Mr. Tabuena was shown to me, I was
shown a copy, sir. I have no file because I just read it.
Q It was Mr. Tabuena who showed you the letter of Minister Ongpin?
A Yes, sir.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
And that will be Exhibit?
ATTY. ANDRES
Exhibit "2" and "2-A", your Honor.
PROS VIERNES
Q You also stated that you were with Mr. Tabuena when you
withdrew the amount of P5 million from the PNB Extension Office at
Villamor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why was it necessary for you to go with him on that occasion?
A Mr. Tabuena requested me to do the counting by million, sir. So

what I did was to bundle count the P5 million and it was placed in two
(2) peerless boxes.
Q Did you actually participate in the counting of the money by

bundles?
A Yes, sir.
Q Bundles of how much per bundle?
A If I remember right, the bundles consisted of P100s and P50s, sir.
Q No P20s and P10s?
A Yes, sir, I think it was only P100s and P50s.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q If there were other denominations, you can not recall?
A Yes, your Honor.
PROS VIERNES
Q In how many boxes were those bills placed?
A The P5 million were placed in two (2) peerless boxes,
Q And you also went with Mr. Tabuena to Aguado?

A No, sir, I was left behind at Nichols. After it was placed at the trunk
of the car of Mr. Tabuena, I was left behind and I went back to my
office at MIA.
Q But the fact is that, this P5 million was withdrawn at passed 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon?
A I started counting it I think at around 4:30, sir. It was after office

hours. But then I was there at around 4:00 o'clock and we started
counting at around 4:30 p.m. because they have to place it in a room,
which is the office of the Manager at that time.
Q And Mr. Tabuena left for Malacañang after 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of that date?
A Yes, sir. After we have counted the money, it was placed in the
peerless boxes and Mr. Tabuena left for Malacanang.
PROS VIERNES
Q And you yourself, returned to your office at MIA?
WITNESS
A Yes, sir.
Q Until what time do you hold office at the MIA?
A Usually I over-stayed for one (1) or two (2) hours just to finish the
paper works in the office, sir.
Q So, even if it was already after 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, you
still went back to your office at MIA?
A Yes, sir.
PROS VIERNES
PJ GARCHITORENA
Redirect?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q Did you not consider it as odd that your obligation with the PNCC
had to be paid in cash?
WITNESS
A Based on the order of President Marcos that we should pay in

cash, it was not based on the normal procedure, your Honor.
*Q And, as Acting Financial Services Manager, you were aware that

all disbursements should be covered by vouchers?
A Yes, your Honor, the payments should be covered by vouchers.

But then, inasmuch as what we did was to prepare a request to the
PNB, then this can be covered by Journal Voucher also.
*Q Was such payment of P5 million covered by a Journal Voucher?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Did you present that Journal Voucher here in Court?
A We have a copy, your Honor.
*Q Do you have a copy or an excerpt of that Journal Voucher

presented in Court to show that payment?
A We have a copy of the Journal Voucher, your Honor.
*Q Was this payment of P5 million ever recorded in a cashbook or

other accounting books of MIAA ?
A The payment of P5 million was recorded in a Journal Voucher, your

Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In other words, the recording was made directly to the Journal?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q There are no other separate documents as part of the application

for Manager's Check?
A Yes, your Honor, there was none.

*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q After the payment was made, did your office receive any receipt
from PNCC?
A I was shown a receipt by Mr. Tabuena, the receipt given by Mrs. Fe

Roa Gimenez, your Honor. Inasmuch as the payment should be
made through the Office of the president, I accepted the receipt given
by Mrs. Fe Gimenez to Mr. Tabuena.
*Q After receiving that receipt, did you prepare the necessary

supporting documents, vouchers, and use that receipt as a
supporting document to the voucher?
A Your Honor, a Journal Voucher was prepared for that.
*Q How about a disbursement voucher?
A Inasmuch as this was a request for Manager's check, no

disbursement voucher was prepared, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q Since the payment was made on January 31, I986, and that was
very close to the election held in that year, did you not entertain any
doubt that the amounts were being used for some other purpose?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Justice, we are objecting to the

question on the ground that it is improper.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
I will withdraw the question.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
What is the ground for impropriety?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
This is not covered in the direct examination, and secondly, I don't

think there was any basis, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Considering the withdrawal of the question, just make the objection

on record.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q As a Certified Public Accountant and Financial Manager of the

MIAA, did you not consider it proper that a check be issued only after
it is covered by a disbursement voucher duly approved by the proper
authorities ?
A Your Honor, what we did was to send a request for a Manager's

check to the PNB based on the request of Mr. Tabuena and the order
of Mr. Tabuena was based on the Order of President Marcos.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In your capacity as Financial Services Manager of the MIAA, did

you not think it proper to have this transaction covered by a
disbursement voucher?
WITNESS
A Based on my experience, payments out of cash can be made

through cash vouchers, or even though Journal Vouchers, or even
through credit memo, your Honor.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q This was an obligation of the MIAA to the PNCC. Why did you
allow a disbursement by means of check in favor of Mr. Luis
Tabuena, your own manager?
A We based the payment on the order of Mr. Tabuena because that

was the order of President Marcos to pay PNCC through the Office of
the President and it should be paid in cash, your Honor.
*Q You are supposed to pay only on legal orders. Did you consider
that legal?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Justice, the question calls for a
conclusion of the witness.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Considering that tire witness is an expert, witness may answer.
WITNESS
A The order of president Marcos was legal at that time because the
order was to pay PNCC the amount of P5 million through the Office of
the President and it should be paid in cash, your Honor. And at that
time, I know for a fact also that there was an existing P.D. wherein
the President of the Republic of the Philippines can transfer funds
from one office to another and the PNCC is a quasi government entity
at that time.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q Are you saying that this transaction was made on the basis of that
P.D. which you referred to?
A I am not aware of the motive of the President, but then since he is

the President of the Philippines, his order was to pay the PNCC
through the Office of the President, your Honor.
*Q As Financial Manager, why did you allow a payment in cash when

ordinarily payment of an obligation of MIAA is supposed to be paid in
check?
A I caused the payment through the name of Mr. Tabuena because

that was the order of Mr. Tabuena and also he received an order
coming from the President of the Philippines at that time, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Mr. Peralta, are not Journal Vouchers merely entries in the

Journals to correct certain statements of accounts earlier made in the
same journal?
In other words, really what you are telling us is that, a Journal

Voucher is to explain a transaction was otherwise not recorded.
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Therefore, when you said that a Journal Voucher here is proper,

you are saying it is proper only because of the exceptional nature of
the transactions?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In other words, as an Accountant, you would not normally

authorize such a movement of money unless it is properly
documented?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Presiding Justice, I think the

question is misleading because what the witness stated is. . .
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Be careful in your objection because the witness understands the
language you are speaking, and therefore, you might be coaching
him.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
No, your Honor. I am also an accountant that is why I could say that. .
.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Please be simple in your objection.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
The question is misleading on the ground that what the witness

stated earlier is that the Journal Voucher in this particular case was
supported, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Overruled, may answer.
WITNESS
A The transaction was fully documented since we have the order of

the General Manager at that time and the order of President Marcos,
your Honor.
*Q Are you saying the Order of the General Manager is an adequate

basis for the movement of money?
A Yes, your Honor, because at that time we have also a recorded

liability of P27 million.
*Q we are not talking of whether or not there was a liability. What we

are saying is, is the order of the General Manager by itself adequate
with no other supporting papers, to justify the movement of funds?
A Yes, your Honor. The order of Mr. Luis Tabuena was based on our
existing liability of P27,931,000.00, inasmuch as we have that liability
and I was shown the order of President Marcos to pay P5 million
through the Office of the President, I considered the order of Mr. Luis
Tabuena, the order of President Marcos and also the existing liability
of P27 million sufficient to pay the amount of P5 million. Inasmuch as
there is also an escalation clause of P99.1 million, the payment of P5
million is fully covered by those existing documents.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
You keep flooding us with details we are not asking for. We are not
asking you whether or not there was valid obligation. We are not
asking you about the escalation clause. We are asking you whether
or not this particular order of Mr. Tabuena is an adequate basis to
justify the movement of funds?
WITNESS
When we pay, your Honor, we always look for the necessary

documents and at that time I know for a fact that there was this
existing liability.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
When we ask questions and when we answer them, we must listen to

the question being asked and not to whatever you wanted to say. I
know you are trying to protect yourself. We are aware of your
statement that there are all of these memoranda.
*Q By your disbursement of such amount, you are saying that the

order of Mr. Tabuena by itself is adequate?
WITNESS
A As far as I am concerned, your Honor, inasmuch as we have a

liability and I was shown the Order of President Marcos to pay PNCC
through his office, I feel that the order of the General Manager, the
order of President Marcos, and also the memorandum of Minister
Ongpin are sufficient to cause the payment of P5 million.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q This Presidential Decree which authorizes the President to

transfer funds from one department to another, is this not the one that
refers to the realignment of funds insofar as the Appropriation Act is
concerned?
WITNESS
A Because at that time, your Honor, I have knowledge that the

President is authorized through a Presidential Decree to transfer
government funds from one office to another.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Under the Appropriation Act. Are payments of debts of the MIAA

covered by the Appropriation Act?
A I think the liability was duly recorded and appropriations to pay the
amount is. . . . (interrupted)
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Tell me honestly, is your answer responsive to the question or are

you just throwing words at us in the hope that we will forget what the
question is?
A No, your Honor.
*Q Are you telling us that the debts incurred by MIAA ate covered by
the Appropriations Act so that the payment of this debt would be in
the same level as the realignment of funds authorized the President?
Or are you telling as you did not read the Decree?
A I was aware of that Decree, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Mr. Estebal, will you include in your memorandum what are the
Decrees authorizing this movement of funds?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q It is true that President Marcos was the President, but he was not
an officer of the MIAA, was he?
A No, your Honor.
*Q In fact, for purposes of internal control, you have different officers

and different officials in any company either government or private,
which are supposed to check and balance each other, is it not?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q So that when disbursements of funds are made, they are made by

authority of not only one person alone so that nobody will restrain
him?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q These checks and balances exist in an entity so that no one

person can dispose of funds in any way he likes?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And in fact, the purpose for having two (2) signatories to

documents and negotiable documents is for the same purpose?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In other words, the co-signatories counter check each other?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In your case, you would be the counter check for Mr. Tabuena?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In the other words, even if Mr. Tabuena is the Manager, you as

Financial Services Manager and as counter signatory are in a
position to tell Mr. Tabuena, "I am sorry, you are my superior but this
disbursement is not proper and, therefore, I will not sign it"., if in your
opinion the disbursement is not proper?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Therefore, as a co-signatory, you expected to exercise your

judgment as to the propriety of a particular transactions?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And this is something you know by the nature of your position and
because you are a Certified Public Accountant?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q You admit that the payment of P5 million and P50 million were
unusual in the manner with which they were disposed?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Did you submit a written protest to the manner in which such

amount was being disposed of?
A A written protest was not made, your Honor, but I called the
attention of Mr. Tabuena that since this payment was upon the order
of President Marcos, then I think as President he can do things which
are not ordinary.
*Q If you did not prepare a written protest, did you at least prepare a
memorandum for the record that this was an extra-ordinary
transaction?
A I called the attention of Mr. Tabuena that this was an extra-ordinary
transaction and no written note, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Thank you very much Mr. Peralta, you are excused. . . . 43
This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying
his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he
presides. But not only should his examination be limited to asking "clarificatory" questions, the
44 45
right should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as
much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial. Here, these
46
limitations were not observed. Hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the Sandiganbayan
had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in proving the
case against Tabuena and Peralta when the Justices cross-examined the witnesses, their cross-
examinations supplementing those made by Prosecutor Viernes and far exceeding the latter's
questions in length. The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of due process was
certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual
role of magistrate and advocate. In this connection, the observation made in the Dissenting Opinion
to the effect that the majority of this Court was "unduly disturbed" with the number of court questions
alone, is quite inaccurate. A substantial portion of the TSN was incorporated in the majority opinion
not to focus on "numbers" alone, but more importantly to show that the court questions were in the
interest of the prosecution and which thus depart from that common standard of fairness and
impartiality. In fact, it is very difficult to be, upon review of the records, confronted with "numbers"
without necessarily realizing the partiality of the Court. In "US v. De Sisto" (2 Cir., 1961, 289 F 2d
833), for example, a new trial was required because the trial judge, as in this case, indulged in
extensive questioning of defendant and his witnesses, and the reviewing court also had to amplify on
"numbers" to bolster this. It was pointed out in the "De Sisto" case that the judge asked 3,115
questions of all witnesses, the prosecutor asked but 1,381, defense counsel 3,330. The judge's
questions to the defendant De Sisto totalled 306, the prosecutor's 347, and the defense counsel's,
201. After referring to these figures, the court stated:
. . . It is indeed an impressive proportion, but no such mathematical computation is of

itself determinative. However, taking all this in conjunction with the long and vigorous
examination of the defendant himself by the judge, and the repeated belittling by the
judge of defendant's efforts to establish the time that Fine left the pier, we fear that in
its zeal for arriving at the facts the court here conveyed to the jury too strong an
impression of the court's belief in the defendant's probable guilt to permit the jury
freely to perform its own function of independent determination of the facts. . . .
The majority believes that the interference by the Sandiganbayan Justices was just too
excessive that it cannot be justified under the norm applied to a jury trial, or even under the
standard employed in a non-jury trial where the judge is admittedly given more leeway in
propounding questions to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence. At the risk
of being repetitious, we will amplify on this via some specific examples. Based on the
evidence on record, and on the admission of Tabuena himself, the P55 million was delivered
to the President's Office thru Mrs. Gimenez, in obedience to the Presidential directive. One
Sandiganbayan Justice, however, hurled the following questions to Peralta:
AJ DEL ROSARIO
Q: Since the payment was made on January 31, 1986, and that was
very close to the election held in that year, did you not entertain any
doubt that the amounts were being used for some other purposes?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Justice, We are objecting to the

question on the ground that it is improper.
AJ DEL ROSARIO
I will withdraw the question.
PJ GARCHITORENA
What is the ground for impropriety?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
This is not covered in the direct examination, and secondly, I don't

think there was any basis, Your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Considering the withdrawal of the question, just make the objection

on record.
Nothing from the preceding questions of counsels or of the court would serve as basis for
this question. How then, can this be considered even relevant? What is the connection
between the payment made to the President's office and the then forthcoming presidential
"snap election"? In another instance, consider the following questions of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena:
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Mr. Peralta, are not Journal Vouchers merely entries in the

Journals to correct certain statements of accounts earlier made in the
same journal?
x x x x x x x x x
*Q In other words, really what you are telling us is that, a Journal

Voucher is to explain a transaction was otherwise not recorded.
x x x x x x x x x
*Q Therefore, when you said that a Journal Voucher here is proper,

you are saying it is proper only because of the exceptional nature of
the transactions?
x x x x x x x x x
*Q In other words, as an Accountant, you would not normally

authorize such a movement of money unless it is properly
documented?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Presiding Justice, I think the

question is misleading because what the witness stated is . . .
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Be careful in your objection because the witness understands the

language you are speaking, and therefore, you might be coaching
him.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
No, your Honor. I am also an accountant that is why I could say

that . . .
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Please be simple in your objection.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
The question is misleading on the ground that what the witness

stated earlier is that the Journal Voucher in this particular case was
supported, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Overruled may answer.
WITNESS
A The transaction was fully documented since we have the order of

the General Manager at that time and the order of President Marcos,
your Honor.
*Q Are you saying the Order of the General Manager is an adequate

basis for the movement of money?
*Q We are not talking of whether or not there was a liability. What we

are saying is, is the order of the General Manager by itself adequate
with no other supporting papers, to justify the movement of funds?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
You keep flooding us with details we are not asking for. We are not
asking you whether or not there was valid obligation. We are not
asking you about the escalation clause. We are asking you whether
or not this particular order of Mr. Tabuena is an adequate basis to
justify the movement of funds?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
When we ask questions and when we answer them, we must listen to

the question being asked and not to whatever you wanted to say. I
know you are trying to protect yourself. We are aware of your
statement that there are all of these memoranda.
*Q By your disbursement of such amount, you are saying that the

order of Mr. Tabuena by itself is adequate?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q This Presidential Decree which authorizes the President to

transfer funds from one department to another, is this not the one that
refers to the realignment of funds insofar as the Appropriation Act is
concerned?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Under the Appropriation Act. Are payments of debts of the MIAA

covered by the Appropriation Act?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Tell me honestly, is your answer responsive to the question or are

you just throwing words at us in the hope that we will forget what the
question is?
xxx xxx xxx
*Q Are you telling us that the debts incurred by MIAA are covered by
the Appropriations Act so that the payment of this debt would be in
the same level as the realignment of funds authorized the President?
Or are you telling as you did not read the Decree?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Mr. Estebal, will you include in your memorandum what are the
Decrees authorizing this movement of funds?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q It is true that President Marcos was the President, but he was not
an officer of the MIAA, was he?
*Q In fact, for purposes of internal control, you have different in

officers and different officials in any company either government or
private, which are supposed to check and balance each other, is it
not?
*Q So that when disbursements of funds are made, they are made by

authority of not only one person alone so that nobody will restrain
him?
*Q These checks and balances exist in an entity so that no one

person can dispose of funds in any way he likes?
*Q And in fact, the purpose for having two (2) signatories to

documents and negotiable documents is for the same purpose?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In other words, the co-signatories counter check each other?
*Q In your case, you would be the counter check for Mr. Tabuena?
*Q In other words, even if Mr. Tabuena is the Manager, you as

Financial Services Manager and as counter signatory are in a
position to tell Mr. Tabuena, "I am sorry, you are my superior but this
disbursement is not proper and, therefore, I will not sign it.", if in your
opinion the disbursement is not proper?
*Q Therefore, as co-signatory, you are expected to exercise your

judgment as to the propriety of a particular transaction ?
*Q And this is something you know by the nature of your position and
because you are a Certified Public Accountant? 47
How can these questions be considered clarificatory when they clearly border more on
cross-examination questions? Thus, the Dissenting Opinion's focus on the distinction
between the two kinds of trial to justify the Sandiganbayan's active participation in the
examination of petitioners Tabuena and Peralta and witness Monera, with due respect,
appears insignificant to this case. Let it, therefore, be emphasized anew that:
A trial judge should not participate in the examination of witnesses as to create the
impression that he is allied with the prosecution. 48
We doubt not that the sole motive of the learned judge was to ascertain the truth of
the transaction, but it is never proper for a judge to discharge the duties of a
prosecuting attorney. However anxious a judge may be for the enforcement of the
law, he should always remember that he is as much judge in behalf of the defendant
accused of crime, and whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of the
state, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of society. 49
Ordinarily it is not good practice for the presiding judge himself to examine witnesses
at length. The circumstances may be such in a given case as to justify the court in so
doing. . . . This court, however, has more than once said that the examination of
witnesses is the more appropriate function of counsel, and the instances are rare and
the conditions exceptional which will justify the presiding judge in conducting an
extensive examination. It is always embarrassing for counsel to object to what he
may deem improper questions by the court. Then, in conducting a lengthy
examination, it would be almost impossible for the judge to preserve a judicial
attitude. While he is not a mere figurehead or umpire in a trial, and it is his duty to
see that justice is done, he will usually not find it necessary to conduct such
examinations. The extent to which this shall be done must largely be a matter of
discretion, to be determined by the circumstances of each particular case, but in so
doing he must not forget the function of the judge and assume that of an
advocate. . .
50
While it is true that the manner in which a witness shall be examined is largely in the
discretion of the trial judge, it must be understood that we have not adopted in this
country the practice of making the presiding judge the chief inquisitor. It is better to
observe our time-honored custom of orderly judicial procedure, even at the expense
of occasional delays. . . . The judge is an important figure in the trial of a cause, and
while he has the right, and it is often his duty, to question witnesses to the end that
justice shall prevail, we can conceive of no other reason, for him to take the trial of
the cause out of the hands of counsel. 51
The examination of witnesses is the more appropriate function of counsel, and it is

believed the instances are rare and the conditions exceptional in a high degree which
will justify the presiding judge in entering upon and conducting an extended
examination of a witness, and that the exercise of a sound discretion will seldom
deem such action necessary or advisable. 52
He [the judge] may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition, and
prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, but he should bear
in mind that his undue interference, impatience, or participation in, the examination of
witnesses, or a severe attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially those who
are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of a trial, may tend to prevent
the proper presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in respect
thereto.
53
The impartiality of the judge — his avoidance of the appearance of becoming the
advocate of either one side or the other of the pending controversy is a fundamental
and essential rule of special importance in criminal cases. . . 54
Our courts, while never unmindful of their primary duty to administer justice, without
fear or favor, and to dispose of these cases speedily and in as inexpensive a manner
as is possible for the court and the parties, should refrain from showing any
semblance of one-sided or more or less partial attitude in order not to create any
false impression in the minds of the litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the bounden
duty of all to strive for the preservation of the people's faith in our courts.
55
Time and again this Court has declared that due process requires no less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Bolstering this requirement, we have added that
the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give
added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled
to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of due process. 56
We are well aware of the fear entertained by some that this decision may set a dangerous precedent
in that those guilty of enriching themselves at the expense of the public would be able to escape
criminal liability by the mere expedient of invoking "good faith". It must never be forgotten, however,
that we render justice on a case to case basis, always in consideration of the evidence that is
presented. Thus, where the evidence warrants an acquittal, as in this case, we are mandated not
only by the dictates of law but likewise of conscience to grant the same. On the other hand, it does
not follow that all those similarly accused will necessarily be acquitted upon reliance on this case as
a precedent. For the decision in this case to be a precedent, the peculiar circumstances and the
evidence that led to the petitioner's acquittal must also be present in subsequent cases.
Furthermore, as between a mere apprehension of a "dangerous precedent" and an actual violation

of constitutionally enshrined rights, it is definitely the latter that merits our immediate attention. For
the most dangerous precedent arises when we allow ourselves to be carried away by such fears so
that it becomes lawful to sacrifice the rights of an accused to calm the fearful. In our eagerness to
bring to justice the malefactors of the Marcos regime, we must not succumb to the temptation to
commit the greatest injustice of visiting the sins of the wrongdoers upon an innocent.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, herein petitioners Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta
are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation as defined and penalized under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan Decision of October 12, 1990 and the Resolution
dated December 20, 1991 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN
SAMSON and defendant-appellant.
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, offended party-appellee,

vs.
HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, defendants-appellants. *
Norberto J. Quisumbing for appellant Sendaydiego.
Donato & Rillera for appellant Samson.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.
AQUINO, J.:
In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in 1969
Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y
Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit,
the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle
from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.
The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend "ARTICLE
OR SERVICE" the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be signed
by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's representative.
The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is a
certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein that the creditor vouches that the expenses
"were actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not signed
presumably because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works projects.
Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It is
signed by the provincial engineer.
Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and funds
being available therefore." This is signed by the provincial treasurer.
Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February 28,
1969, reads:
I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same may be paid in the amount
of sixteen thought seven hundred twenty-seven and 52/100 (P16,727.52) in cash or
in check, provided there is sufficient fund cover the payment.
This is signed by the auditor.

Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the
provincial engineer's certification "was paid in the amount and on the date shown below and is
chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. ... ." It may be noted that the provincial treasurer signs
two part of the voucher.
Following paragraph 5, and as referred to therein, is the receipt of the signed by the creditor. As
accomplished in Exhibit K, the receipt reads (it was signed according to the prosecution by Juan
Samson, a point which is disputed by him):
Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L P. Sendaydiego, Province of

Pangasinan the sum of seven hundred twenty-seven pesos & 52/100 (16,727.52) in
full payment of the above stated account, which I hereby certify to be correct. Paid by
Check No. .................................
CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.) JUAN SAMSON
According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the six vouchers below the
stamped words: "Presented to Prov. Treasurer. By Juan Samson."
Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K). — This Provincial voucher, dated February 28, 1969, evidences the
payment of PI 6,727.52 to the Carried Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan City for lumber and
hardware materials supposedly used in the repair of the bridge in Barrio Libertad at the Umingan-
Tayug road in Pangasinan along the Nueva Ecija boundary (Exh. K). The voucher makes reference
to invoice No. 3327 and other supporting papers.
The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following intances:
(a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad (P. 1; Exh. Z).
(b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the Carried Construction Supply Co The
alleged official receipt No. 3025 of the company dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is forged.
(c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in Exhibit K were never delivered by the company to
the provincial government
(d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and in the supporting requisition and issue voucher
(RIV) No. 2206 dated January 29, 1969 (Exh. A), covering the same lumber and hardware ma the
signatures of the following office were forged: Salvador F. Oropilla senior civil engineer; Rodolfo P.
Mencias, supervising civil engineer Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting provincial engineer, and Ricardo
B. Probincias, chief of equipment of the governor's office. These four office denied that their
signatures in the two vouchers, Exhibits A and B, are their genuine signatures.
(e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on Exhibits A and B, containing the words "Approved: For
and By Authority of the Governor (signed) Ricardo B. Primicias, Chief of Equipment", is not the
imprint of the genuine rubber stamp used in Primicias office.
(f) That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried Construction Supply Co. dated February 18, 1969,
containing a description and the prices of the lumber and hardware material (Exh. B), is fake
because, according to Ambrosio Jabanes, the company's assistant manager, the company's invoice
No. 3327 was issued to the Mountain Agricultural College (Exh. II-1). Oropilla denied that his alleged
signature on Exhibit B is his signature.
(g) That three other documents, supporting the provincial voucher (Exh. K), were also forged. Those
documents are the taxpayer's cate dated February 10, 1969 (Exh. C) stating that no tax is due on
the goods sold in the fake invoice No. 3327 and the two certificates as to the samples of lumber
allegedly purchased from the Carried Construction Supply Co., (Exh. D and E). Narciso P. Martinez,
a district forester, denied that his signatures in Exhibits D and E are his signatures.
(h) That Angelo C. Manuel the checker of the provincial auditor's office, denied that his signature on
the left margin is his signature (Exh. A-10).
The forged character of provincial voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K) is incontrovertible.
Other five forged voucher. — Five other provincial vouchers evidencing supposed payments of
certain amounts to the Carried Construction Supply Co. for lumber and hardware materials
supposingly used in the repair of other bridges were also falsified. These five vouchers are the
following:
(1) Voucher No. 11995 dated April 29, 1969 evidencing the payment of P14,571.81
for number and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of Bayaoas bridge at
the Urbiztondo-Pasibi Road (Exh. O).
(2) Voucher No. 11869 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P5,187.28 'or
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Panganiban bridge
at the UminganTayug Road (Exh. P)
(3) Voucher No. 11870 dated April 28, 1969 evidencing the payment of P6,290.60 for
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Cabatuan bridge at
the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. Q).
(4) Voucher No. 11871 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P9,769.64 for
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Casabar bridge at
the Binalonan-San Manuel Road (Exh. R).
(5) Voucher No. 11872 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the Payment of P4,501.38 for
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Baracbac bridge at
the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. S).
As in the case of voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Oropilla, Mencias, and Primicias declared that their
signatures in the said five vouchers are not their genuine signatures. Samson, who hand-carried the
said vouchers for processing, did not turn over to the provincial auditor's office the papers supporting
the said vouchers after the vouchers had been pre-audited. Hence, those supporting papers could
not be presented in evidence.
Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant manager of the Carried Construction Supply Co., testified
that the lumber and hardware materials mentioned in the five vouchers were never delivered by his
company to the provincial government. The charge invoices mentioned in the said vouchers were
cancelled invoices issued to the Mountain Agricultural College. The projected repairs of the bridges
were fictitious.
The company's cashier testified that the company never received the payments for the lumber and
hardware materials. The receipts evidencing payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4 are fake official
receipts. The cashier produced in court the genuine official receipts (Exh. LL to LL-7) bearing the
serial numbers of the fake receipts. The genuine receipts do not refer to transactions with the
provincial government.
Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. He used to be an employee of
the pro treasurer's office. He resigned and worked with several firms doing business with the
provincial government. In 1969 he was the collector of the Carried Construction Supply Co. He
represented that firm in its dealings with the offices of the governor, provincial auditor, provincial
engineer and provincial treasurer. He was personally known to those provincial officials and the
employees of their offices (21-22 Sendaydiego's brief).
The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were hand-carried by
Samson. He delivered the papers to Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the provincial engineer's
office, for recording and for her signature (Ekh. DD).
Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. Marcelo Crusade, a
laborer in that office who performed the chore of recording the vouchers and payrolls, recorded
Vouchers Nos. 11869, 11871 and 11872 (Exh. P, R and S). Crusadas initials appear on the upper
lefthand corner of the said vouchers with the date 4/17/69.
Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that he presented them to the
provincial t r's office. Crusade said that after Samson had presented the said papers to him, Samson
brought them to Ricardo Baraan, the book-keeper of the provincial treasurer's office for processing
and for the latter's signature (Exh. WW).
From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial auditor's office. He asked
Virginia Cruz, a clerk to record the same (Exh. CC).
Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled the voucher
After Rosete had initialled the vouchers, Samson went to the provincial treasurer's office where the
amounts covered by the voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash (instead of by check) as
representative of the Carried Construction Supply Co. (Exh. EE). He received the payments on
March 31 and April 29 and 28 (four payments on that date) as shown on the face of the vouchers.
The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six vouchers are admittedly
authentic. Sendaydiego signed the vouchers ahead of Rosete, his assistant. Sendaydiego's defense
is that he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures therein of the provincial office
concerned were genuine because the voucher had been pre-audited and approved by the auditor.
Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the six vouchers showing that he
received from Sendaydiego the amounts covered thereby as representative of the lumber and
hardware firm (Exh. OO to TT) and that he presented the vouchers to the provincial s treasurer 's
office (Exh. 6-12 — Samson). Sendaydiego testified that Samson's signatures are genuine.
In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged with
malversation through falsification in three docketed as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving provincial voucher No. 10724 dated February
28, 1969 in the sum of P16,7Z7.52 (Exh. X), L-33252.
2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving provincial vouchers Nos. 11869, 11870, 11871
dated April 15 (two dates) 28 and 15, 1969 for the respective amounts of P5,187.28,
P6,290.60, P9,769-64 and P4,501.38 (four vouchers, Exh. P, Q, R and S), now L-
33253.
3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving provincial voucher No. 11955 dated April 29,
1969 in the sum of P14,571.81 (Exh. O), now L-33254.
After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samnson guilty
of malversation through falsification of public or official documents imposing each of the following
penalties:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 23349, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten
months and twenty-one-days, as minimum, to eighteen years, two months and
twenty-one days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a fine of P16,727.52 and to
indemnify solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of
P29,748.90 and to indemnify solidarily the provincial government of Pangasinan in
the same amount; and
(3) In Criminal Case No. 23351, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten
months and twenty-one days, as minimum, to eighteen year two months and twenty-
one days of reclusion temporal as maximum , and a fine of P14,571.81 and to
indemnify solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount.
Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court.
Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed. Death
extinguished his criminal liability remained. The resolution of July 8, 1977 dismissing Sendaydiego's
appeal read s follows:
The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of his appeal or before the
judgment of conviction rendered against him by the lower court became final and
executory extinguished his criminal liability meaning his obligation to serve the
personal or imprisonment penalties and his liability to pay the fines or pecuniary
penalties (Art. 89[1], Revised Penal Code; 1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., 565).
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived

Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes
of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the
total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec.
1, Rule 111 of the Rules of court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and
distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa
vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may
be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975;
67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly
disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230;
Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money
claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making
applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code (Note: The
lower court had issued an order of attachment against him on January 13, 1970 for
the sum of P36,487 and in the brief for said appellant, there is no specific assignment
of error affecting the civil liability fixed by the trial court.) and, for that purpose, his
counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration
and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is
concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court). According to Sendaydiego's
brief, he had a wife and ten children named Arturo, Licerio, Jr., Prospero, Regulo,
Eduardo, Cesar, Nola, Aida, Wilfredo and Manolo (deceased).
The title of this case should be amended to show its civil aspect by adding thereto
the following. Province of Pangasinan vs. Heirs of Licerio P. Sendaydiego.
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is
the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable for which his estate would be liable.
Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate. — In view of Sendaydiego's death, it is not
necessary to resolve his first two assignments of error, wherein he assails the imposition of reclusion
perpetua as a cruel and unusual penalty and wherein it is argued that there is no complex crime of
malversation through falsification committed by negligence.
In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court erred in allowing private
prosecutors Millora and Urbiztondo to prosecute the case thereby allegledly subjecting the accused
to proceedings marked by undue publicity, pre-judgment, bias and political self-interest.
Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board actually handled the prosecution of
the case from the preliminary investigation, which started on June 5, 1969, up to the termination of
the trial on July 29, 1970.
At the commencement of the preliminary investigation, the counsel for the accused auditor inquired
whether Atty. Millora was authorized by the provincial board to act as private prosecutor in
representation of the province of Pangasinan, the offended party. Atty. Millora replied that there was
a board resolution designating him as a private prosecutor.
The acting provincial commander, who filed the complaints manifested to the trial court that he had
authorized Atty. Millora to act as private prosecutor (4-8 tsn June 5, 1969).
Another defense counsel filed a written motion to inhibit Millora and the others as private
prosecutors. The lower court denied the motion in its order of June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record of
Criminal Case No. 23350).
After the termination of the p investigation conducted by the lower court, the provincial fiscal of
Pangasinan and the city final of Dagupan City filed three informations against the accused all dated
November 4, 1969.
At the commencement of the trial on February 23, 1970 the city fiscal, an assistant provincial fiscal
and Atty. Millora, the private prosecutor, appeared for the prosecution. The city fiscal moved "that
the private prosecutor (Millora) be authorized to conduct the examination subject to our (the fiscal's)
control and supervision". The trial court granted the motion (7 tsn).
At the hearing on April 23, 1970 the same city fiscal moved that Atty. Urbiztondo be authorized to
examine the prosecution witnesses under his supervision and control The trial court granted the
motion (155 tsn).
The record shows that at every hearing the provincial fiscal, the city fiscal or an assistant fiscal were
present together with the private prosecutor.
Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the rule
that the criminal action should be "prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal" and that
"the provincial fiscal shall represent the province" in any court (Sec.4, Rule 110, Rules of Court; sec.
1683, Revised Administrative Code).
The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that the imposition of reclusion perpetua "could have
been the result of the undue publicity, prejudgment, bias and political interest which attended the
proceedings ", is not well-founded. The trial court's decision dispels any doubt as to its impartiality.
The evidence in the three cases is mainly documentary. The unassailable probative value of the
documents involved rather than bias and prejudice, was the decisive factor on which the trial court
anchored the judgment of conviction.
Moreover, as already adverted to, Sendaydiego's death had rendered moot the issue as to the
propriety of the imposition of reclusion perpetua. And, as will be shown later, reclusion
perpetua cannot be imposed in these cases because the crimes committed were not complex.
The other seven assigmments of error made by Sendaydiego's counsel refer to the trial court's
conclusion that Sendaydiego and Samson are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation
through falsification or, specifically, that the provincial treasurer, in signing the six vouchers, evinced
"malice or fraud and that there must have been connivance between" the two.
Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Donato N. Rosete, the assistant
provincial treasurer, testified that, contrary to the usual procedure, he affixed his initial to paragraph
3 of the vouchers after Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to that unusual procedure
because the interested party, Samson who hand-carried the vouchers, approached Rosete after he
(Samson) had conferred with the provincial treasurer and Samson told Rosete to initial the voucher
because it was areglado na (already settled) since the treasurer had already signed the voucher (54
tsn July 3, 1969).
Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute appellant Sendaydiego's contention that the trial court erred
in finding that he signed the questioned vouchers before Rosete had placed his initial in them. After
the treasurer had signed the voucher, Rosete's duty to initial it was only ministerial (75 tsn July 3,
1969).
The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified that he indicated in the vouchers that the amounts
covered thereby should be paid in cash. That indication was made by means of the symbol "A-1-1"
placed at the bottom of the vouchers under the column "Account Number". The bookkeeper was in.
instructed by Samson to place that symbol Samson told him that he (Samson) had an understanding
with Treausrer Sendaydiego that the payment should be made in cas. There were instances when
the treasurer insisted on payment by check to creditors other than Juan Samson.
The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the provincial treasurer where the
cashier was summoned to make the cash payments (11-12 ton July 9, 1969; p. 11, Exh. EE). As
noted by the trial court, it was unusual that the payments should be made in the treasurer's office
when that was a ministerial chore of the cashier.
The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no power of attorney from the
Carried Construction Supply Co. authorizing him to receive the payments. The space in the
vouchers for the signature of the witness, who should be present when the payments were received,
was blank. The treasurer did not bother to have a witness to attest to the payments or to require the
exhibition of Samson's residence certificate.
Another apt observation of the trial court is that the forged character of the six vouchers would have
been unmasked by the supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., if the payments had
been made by means of checks. The company on receiving the checks would have returned them to
the treasurer because it knew that there was no reason to make any payments at all. The trial court
said that the cash payments prove Sendaydiego's collusion with Samson.
Sendaydiego's counsel assails the lower court's finding that there was a conspiracy between the
provincial and Samson as shown by the fact that the amounts covered by the vouchers were paid to
Samson by the cashier in the treasurer's inner office. That point was testified to by Rosete, the
assistant provincial treasurer.
The cashier, Napoleon Ulanday, would have been the beet witness on how and where the payments
were made. However, Ulanday died before the preliminary investigation was started. On May 27,
1969, after the anomalies were unearthed, he wrote a letter to the provincial , stating that he paid to
Samson the amounts covered by five vouchers in the of Salazar K. Misal and Josefina E. Pulido
(Exh. 13).
Rosete was in a position to state that the cash payments were made to Samson in the treasurers
inner office because his table was near the main door of the treasurers office or was about fifteen
meters away (18 tsn). Rosete always knew when the cashier went to the treasurers office because
the cashier was oned by means of a buzzer (long buzz), and when the cashier came out of the
treasurer's office, he would be holding the voucher (12-13 tsn).
Sendaydiego's counsel that no gross negligence can be imputed to the treasurer (malversation is a
crime which can be committed by means of dolo or culpa and the penalty in either case is the same).
This argument does not deserve serious consideration because the facts proven by the prosecution
show that he had a tieup with Samson and that he acted maliciously in signing the six questioned
vouchers.
The last contention put forward for Sendaydiego is that, because the trial court acquitted the auditor,
then the treasurer's exoneration follows as a matter of course. We see no merit in that contention
because the evidence for the prosecution against Sendaydiego is not the same as its evidence
against the auditor. For that reason the auditor was charged only as an accomplice, whereas, the
treasurer was charged as a principal. The auditor based his defense on the undeniable fact that the
treasurer had approved the six vouchers "for pre-audit and payment" before they were passed upon
by the auditor. In short, the auditor was misled by the treasurer's certification which the auditor
apparently assumed to have been made in good faith when in truth it was made in bad faith.
We are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary and oral evidence and an
unprejudiced consideration of the arguments of Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal liability was
established beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the civil liability fo his estate for the amounts
malversed was duly substantial.
Samson's appeal. — Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He contends that the trial court erred
in disregarding the expert testimony that his signatures on the vouchers are not his signature; in
finding that he forged the vouchers and received the proceeds thereof, and in relying on
circumstantial evidence as proof of conspiracy.
As a preliminary issue, Samson argues that Judge Eloy B. Bello should have inhibited himself "in
fairness to the accused, in the interest of justice, and as a gesture of delivadeza" because he had
conducted the preliminary investigation.
Our searching study of the recrod fails to sustain Samson's insinuation that he was prejudiced by the
fact that Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, was the one who tried the case and
convicted him. Judge Bello tried the case fairly. His conduct of the trial does not show that he had
already prejudged their guilt.
Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of court, in allowing a Court of First Instance to conduct a
preliminary investigation, does not disqualify it from trying the case after it had found probable cause
and after the fiscal, as directed by the Court, had filed the corresponding information. The rule
assumes that the Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, could impartially try the case
on the merits.
We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and narrow-minded insomuch that they
would invariably be iron-bound by their findings at the preliminary investigation.
The case of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, who conducts a preliminary investigation and
then tries the case on the merits, is similar to a situation where an inferior court conducts a
preliminary investigation of a grave or less grave offense falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance and tghe inferior court. In such a case, the inferior court after terminating
the preliminary investigation is not obligated (por delivadeza) to remand the case to the Court of First
Instance for trial. The inferior court has the option to try the case on the merits (People vs. Palmon,
86 Phil. 350; Natividad vs. Robles, 87 Phil. 834; People vsw. Colicio, 88 Phil. 196). The assumption
is that the inferior court can try the case without any ingrained bias or undue prejudice.
Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant Colonel Jose G. Fernandez, retired chief of the
Constabulary crime laboratory, a handwriting expert, that his signatures on the vouchers are not his
signatures.
Fernandez found that the questioned signatures and the alleged genuine signatures (exemplars) of
Samson have fundamental differences. The expert concluded that the questioned signatures and the
exemplar signatures of Samson were not written by one and the same person (Exh. 20).
After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analysing the evidence and contentions
of the parties, we find that the expert is correct in declaring that (as admitted by the trial court) there
are radical differences between the questioned and authentic signatures.
But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did not forge the questioned signatures or in
implying that Samson had no hand in the writing thereof.
The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature. His supposed genuine signatures found in his
residence certificates, income tax returns and the genuine office receipt of the Carried Construction
Supply Co. are "in an arcade form or rounded form of writing". The surname Samson is encircled.
On the other hand, the questioned signatures used in Samson's transactions with the provincial
government are in angular form; his surname is not encircled, and the questioned signatures
terminate in angular and horizontal strokes.
Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers evidenced fictitious
transactions, he used therein his fake signature, or the signature which is different from his signature
in genuine documents. He used his forged signatures in the six fake official receipts of the Carried
Construction Supply Co., stating that the amounts covered by the six vouchers were received by him
(Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4). the expert admitted that a person may have two forms of signature (186 tsn
July 16, 1970).
Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest intention of denying the same as and
when necessary (Mehta, Identification of Handwriting and Cross Examination of Experts, pp. 4th Ed.,
1970, p. 224; Harrison, Suspect Documents 418-419).
Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in the six vouchers were
Samson's signatures (94-99 tsn July 31, 1969).
Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared that the questioned signatures of Samson in the
vouchers were written by only one person (264-265 tsn July 16, 1970).
The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or collector of the supposed
creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., hand-carried the vouchers in question to the offices of the
provincial engineer, treasurer and auditor and then back to the treasurer's office for payment. He
actually received the cash payments. Under those circumstances, Samson is presumed to be the
forger of the vouchers.
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it (uttered
it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of
the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely
connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of
committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in
the forgery. (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil., 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49
Phil. 28; People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document
and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846,
March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs.Caragao, L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993).
Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions with the provincial government
and another form of signatures of his valid transactions or papers shows the deviousness of the
falsifications perpetrated in these cases. (Note that Sendaydiego signed the certification in the first
voucher, Exhibit K, stating that proceeds thereof were paid to
Samson but Sendaydiego did not sign the same certification in the other five forged vouchers,
Exhibits O, P, Q, R and S).
As to the question of conspiracy, the statement of Samson's on page 19 of his brief, that "the trial
court made absolutely no finding of any supposed conspiracy' between Samson and Sendaydiego,
is not correct.
We have already noted that the trial court explicitly stated that the circumstance that Sendaydiego
signed the six vouchers ahead of his assistant shows that there was "malice or fraud" on the part of
Sendaydiego and that there was conivance between Samson and Sendaydiego when the proceeds
of the vouchers were paid to Samson in Sendaydiego's inner office, instead of in the cashier's office
(p. 23, 26, Decision, Appendix to Samson's brief). The trial court said that the fact that Sendaydiego
allowed payment in cash shows "his collission with Samson (Ibid, p. 26).
Samson's contention that the trial court merely conjectured that he had received the proceeds of the
vouchers is not well taken. The trial court's finding on that point is based on very strong
circumstantial evidence (assuming that it was not proven that Samson signed the vouchers).
Samson vehemently argues that there is no evidence that the total sum of P57,048. 23 paid under
the six vouchers "was really misappropriated". He asserts that the six vouchers are genuine
(although he contends that his signatures thereon are forgeries) and that there is no proof that the
amounts covered thereby were not paid for the construction materials shown in the six vouchers
were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
These contentions appear to be untenable in thelight of the declaration of Jabanes, the assistant
manager of Carried Construction Supply Co., the alleged supplier, that the materials shown in the six
vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
And Leticia Sevilleja (wife of the provincial engineer), who was employed as cashier of the carried
Construction Supply Co., denied that Samson turned over to the company the proceeds of the six
vouchers which he was supposed to have collected for the company from Sendaydiego. The six
vouchers appear to be fake principally because they evidence fictitious sales of construction
materials.
Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that there was no malversation after
Sendaydiego admtte that Samson acknowledged in the six vouchers that he received from
Treasurer Sendaydiego the total sum of P57,048.23.
The assertion of Samson's counsel on pgae 29 of his brief, that the finding as to his guilt is based on
a shaky foundation or is predicated on circumstances which wre not proven, is not correct.
Recapitulations. — In resume, it appears that the provincial treasurer wants to base his exculpation
on his belief that in the six vouchers the signatures of Samson and the officials in the provincial
engineer's office appeared to be genuine and on the fact that the auditor had approved the
vouchers. The tresurer claimed that he acted in good faith in approving the payments of the
proceeds of the vouchers to Samson as the representative of the supplier, Carried Construction Co.
On the other hand, Samson, by impugning his signatures in the vouchers, denied that he received
the said amounts from the cashier of the treasurer's office.
These conflicting versions of the treasurer and Samson have to be resolved in the light of the
inexpugnable fact that Samson had hand-carried the voucehrs and followed up their processing in
the offices of the provicial government the construction materials described in the six vouchers and
denied having received from Samson the prices of the alleged sales.
The result is the Samson's denial of his signatures in the six vouchers and in the six receipts (Exh.
K-6 and KK to KK-4) and the provicial treasurer's pretension of having acted in good faith or having
committed an honest mistake have to be disbelieved.
The unavoidable conclusion is that Sendaydiego and Samson were in cahoots to defraud the
provincial government and to camouflage the defraudation by means of the six vouchers which have
some genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically
fake.
Penalties. — The trial court and the assumed that three complex crimes of malversation through
falsification of public documents were committed in this case. That assumption is wrong.
The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate crimes of falsification and
malversation were committed. These are not cases where the execution of a single act constitutes
two grave or less grave felonies or where the falsification was used as a means to commit
malversation.
In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It is settled that if the
falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and
malversation are separate offenses (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354; People vs. Villanueva, 58 Phil. 671;
People vs. Geralde 52 Phil. 1000; People vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43).
In the Regis case, supra where the modus operandi is similar to the instant cases, the municipal

treasurer made it appear in two official payrolls dated April .30 and May 2, 1931 that some persons
worked as laborers in a certain street project at Pinamungahan, Cebu. In that way, the two amounts
covered by the payrolls, P473.70 and P271.60, were appropriated and taken from the municipal
funds. As a matter of fact, no such work was done in the said street project and the persons
mentioned in both payrolls had not performed any labor.
It was held in the Regis case, that the falsification and malversation did not constitute a complex
crime because the falsifications were not necessary means for the co on of the malversations. Each
falsification and each malversation constituted independent offenses which must be punished
separately.
The municipal treasurer was convicted of two falsifications and two malversations. Four distinct
penalties were imposed.
In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the money forming part of the road and
bridge could have malversed or misappropriated it without falsifiying any voucher. The falsification
was used as a device to prevent detection of the malversation.
The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single
criminal impulse.
Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification of six vouchers constitutes six
separate or distinct offenses (People vs. Madrigal-Gonzales, 117 Phil. 956).
And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher constitutes a separate crimes of

malversation were committed. Appellant Samson is a co-principal in each of the said twelve
offenses.
As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was in possession
of the forged vouchers and he used them in order to receive public monies from the provincial
treasurer.
He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he conspired with the provincial
treasurer in committing those offenses. The trial court correctly ruled that a private person conspiring
with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation (People
vs. Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294; U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. Dato and Lustre, 37 Phil. 359; U.S.
vs. Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4; People vs. Caluag, 94 Phil. 457).
Note that a different rule prevails with respect to a stranger taking part in the commission of parricide
or qualified theft. In such cases, the stranger is not guilty of parricide or qualfied theft but only of
murder or homicide, as the case may be, and simple theft, by reason of paragraph 3, article 62 of
the Revised Penal Code (People vs. Patricio, 46 Phil. 245).
Falsification of a public document committed by a private person is punished in article 172(1) of the
Revised Penal Code by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not
more than P5,000.
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28 and P4,501.38, respectively covered by vouchers Nos.
11869 and 11872 (Exh. P and S), the penalty provided in paragraph 2 of article of the Revised Penal
Code is prision mayor minimum and medium.
For the malversation of the sums of P6,290.60 andP9,769.64, respectively covered by vouchers
Nos. 1187 and11871 (Exh. Q and R) the penalty provided in paragraph 3 of article 217 is prision
mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum.
For the malversation of the sums of P16,727.52 and 10995 (Exh. K and O), the penalty provided in
paragraph 4 of article 217 is reclusion temporal medium and maximum.
In each of the malversation cases, a fine equal to the amount malversed should be added to the
imprisonment penalty.
In the twelve cases the penalty should be imposed in the medium peiod since there are no modifying
circumstances (Arts. 64[1] and 685, Revised Penal Code). Samson is entitled to an indeterminate
sentence.
WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six
crimes of malversation.
In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the following penalties:
For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prison correccional minimum, as minimum, to four (4)
years of prision correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three thousand pesos.
For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the amount of
P16,727.52, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case NO.
23349, L-33252).
For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the sum of
P14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No.
23351, L-33254).
For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher No. 11870 (Exh. Q), Samson is
sentenced to an indertiminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P6,290.60, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to eight (8) of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,187.28, and to
For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P4,501.38, and
to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold limit provided for in article 70 of
the Revised Penal Code should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677), meaning that the
maximum penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12)
years to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-
one (51) years (see People vs. Peñas, 68 Phil. 533).
The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years (Penultimate par. of art.
70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and 69 Phil.
58).
The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in
the sum of P57,048.23.
Samson and the said estate are sojidarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal
Code). Samson should pay one-half of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 217874
OPHELIA HERNAN, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,, Respondent
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Resolution dated February 2, 2015 and Decision dated November 13,
1 2
2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division which affirmed, with modification, the Decision dated June
28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Baguio City convicting petitioner of the crime
of malversation of public funds in Criminal Case No. 15722-R.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In October 1982, petitioner Ophelia Hernan joined the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC), Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) in Baguio City wherein she served
as an accounting clerk. In September 1984, she was promoted to the position of Supervising Fiscal
Clerk by virtue of which she was designated as cashier, disbursement and collection officer. As 3
such, petitioner received cash and other collections from customers and clients for the payment of
telegraphic transfers, toll foes, and special message fees. The collections she received were
deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baguio City
Branch. 4
On December 17, 1996, Maria Imelda Lopez, an auditor of the Commission on

Audit (COA), conducted a cash examination of the accounts handled by petitioner as instructed by
her superior, Sherelyn Narag. As a result, Lopez came across deposit slips dated September 19,
1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of ₱11,300.00 and ₱81,348.20,
rcspectively. Upon close scrutiny, she noticed that said deposit slips did not bear a stamp of receipt
5
by the LBP nor was it machine validated. Suspicious about what she found, she and Narag verified
all the reports and other documents turned-over to them by petitioner. On the basis of said findings,
6
Narag sent a letter to the LBP to confirm the remittances made by petitioner. After adding all the
deposits made and upon checking with the teller's blotter, Nadelline Orallo, the resident auditor of
LBP, found that no deposits were made by petitioner for the account of DOTC on September 19,
1996 for the amount of ₱11,300.00 and November 29, 1996 for the amount of ₱81,340.20. 7
Thereafter, the LBP's officer-in-charge, Rebecca R. Sanchez, instructed the bank's teller, Catalina
Ngaosi, to conduct their own independent inquiry. It was discovered that on September 19, 1996, the
only deposit in favor of the DOTC was that made by its Ifugao office in the Lagawe branch of the
LBP. This prompted Lopez to write to petitioner informing her that the two (2) aforesaid remittances
8
were not acknowledged by the bank. The auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for the
₱81,348.20 remittance but not for the ₱11,300.00. Dissatisfied with petitioner's explanation as to the
whereabouts of the said remittance, Narag reported the matter to the COA Regional Director who, in
turn wrote to the LBP for confirmation. The LBP then denied receiving any ₱11,300.00 deposit on
September 19, 1996 from petitioner for the account of the DOTC. Thus, the COA demanded that
9
she pay the said amount. Petitioner, however, refused. Consequently, the COA filed a complaint for
malversation of public funds against petitioner with the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon which,
after due investigation, recommended her indictment for the loss of ₱11,300.00. Accordingly,
10
petitioner was charged before the RTC of Baguio City in an Information, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about September 16, 1996, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the above-named accused,
a public officer, being then the Disbursing Officer of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, Baguio City, and as such an accountable officer, entrusted with and responsible
for the amount of ₱1 1,300.00 which accused received and collected for the DOTC, and intended for
deposit under the account of DOTC with the Land Bank of the Philippines-Baguio City, by reason of
her position, while in the performance of her official functions, taking advantage of her position, did
then and there, wilfully, feloniously, and unlawfully misappropriate or consent, or through
abandonment or negligence, permit other persons to take such amount of ₱11,300.00 to the
damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 11
Upon arraignment on July 31, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Hence, trial
on the merits ensued.
To establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of two (2) COA auditors, namely,
Maria Lopez and Sherelyn Narag as well as three (3) LBP employees, namely, Rebecca Sanchez,
Catalina Ngaosi, and Nadelline Orallo. In response, the defense presented the lone testimony of
12
petitioner, which can be summarized as follows:
On September 19, 1996, petitioner and her supervisor, Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP Baguio
branch and personally deposited the exact amount of ₱11,300.00 with accomplished deposit slips in
six (6) copies. Since there were many clients who came ahead of her, she decided to go with her
13
usual arrangement of leaving the money with the teller and telling her that she would just come back
to retrieve the deposit slip. Thus, she handed the money to Teller No. 2, whom she identified as
Catalina Ngaosi. Upon her return at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, she retrieved four (4) copies
of the deposit slip from Ngaosi. She noticed that the same had no acknowledgment mark on it. Being
contented with the initials of the teller on the deposit slips, she returned to her office and kept them
in her vault. It was only during the cash count conducted by auditor Lopez when she found out that
the said amount was not remitted to the account of the LBP. When demand was made on her to
return the amount, she requested that she be allowed to pay only after investigation of a complaint of
Estafa that she would file with the National Bureau of Investigation against some personnel of the
bank, particularly Catalina Ngaosi. The complaint, however, was eventually dismissed.
14 15
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered convicting accused Ophelia
Hernan of Malversation and hereby sentences her, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
to suffer imprisonment from 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision mayor medium period, as
minimum, to 11 years, 6 months and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum period to reclusion
temporal maximum period, as maximum, and to pay a fine of ₱11,300.00.
Accused Ophelia Hernan is further sentenced to suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification.
Likewise, accused Ophelia Hernan is hereby ordered to pay back to the government the amount of
₱11,300.00 plus legal interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum to be computed from the date of
the filing of the Information up to the time the same is actually paid.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 16
Erroneously, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed her conviction but
modified the penalty imposed. Upon motion, however, the CA set aside its decision on the finding
that it has no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Instead, it is the Sandiganbayan which has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over petitioner occupying a position lower than Salary Grade
27. Petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Leticia Gutierrez Hayes-Allen, then appealed the case to the
17
Sandiganbayan. In a Decision dated November 13, 2009, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the RTC's
judgment of conviction but modified the penalty imposed, the dispositive opinion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modifications that the indeterminate penalty to be imposed on the accused should be from 6 years
and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months, and 21 days of prision mayor as
maximum, together with the accessory penalties under Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and
that interest of only 6% shall be imposed on the amount of ₱11,300.00 to be restored by the
accused.
SO ORDERED. 18
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 21, 2009 alleging that during the trial
before the RTC, her counsel was unable to elicit many facts which would show her innocence. Said
counsel principally failed to present certain witnesses and documents that would supposedly acquit
her from the crime charged. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied the motion in a Resolution dated
August 31, 2010 on the ground that evidence not formally offered before the court below cannot be
considered on appeal. 19
On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration became final and
executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments. On July 26, 2013, petitioner's
20
new counsel, Atty. Meshack Macwes, filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of
Court and with Prayer to Stay the Execution. In a Resolution dated December 4, 2013, however,
21 22
the Sandiganbayan denied the motion and directed the execution of the judgment of conviction. It
noted the absence of the following requisites for the reopening of a case: (1) the reopening must be
before finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or
upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to
prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should
be terminated within thirty (30) days from the issuance of the order. 23
Unfazed, petitioner filed on January 9, 2014 a Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of
Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment praying for a
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan' s recent Resolution, that the case be reopened for further
reception of evidence, and the recall of the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013. In a Resolution
24
dated February 2, 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the petition for lack of merit. According to the
said court, the motion is clearly a third motion for reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading
under the Rules of Court. Also, the grounds raised therein were merely a rehash of those raised in
the two previous motions. The claims that the accused could not contact her counsel on whom she
merely relied on for appropriate remedies to be filed on her behalf, and that she has additional
evidence to present, were already thoroughly discussed in the August 31, 2010 and December 4,
2013 Resolutions. Moreover, the cases relied upon by petitioner are not on point. 25
On May 14, 2015, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:
I.
THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE MOTION TO REOPEN WAS FILED OUT OF TIME CONSIDERING TI-IE EXTRAORDINARY
AND EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CASE.
II.

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE
EVIDENCE INTENDED TO BE PRESENTED BY PETITIONER SHOULD HER MOTTON FOR
REOPENING BE GRANTED, WAS PASSED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT.
III.

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PRONOUNCING THAT
THE MOTION TO REOPEN AND THE PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY
PETITIONER ARE CONSIDERED AS THE SECOND AND THIRD MOTIONS TO THE DENIAL OF
THE DECISION.
Petitioner posits that her counsel, Atty. Hayes-Allen, never received the August 31, 2010 Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan denying her Motion for Reconsideration. This is because notice thereof was
erroneously sent to said counsel's previous office at Poblacion, La Trinidad, Benguet, despite the
fact that it was specifically indicated in the Motion for Reconsideration that the new office is at the
Public Attorney's Office of Tayug, Pangasinan, following her counsel's appointment as public
attorney. Thus, since her counsel was not properly notified of the subject resolution, the entry of
judgment is premature. In support of her assertion, she cites Our ruling in People v.
26
Chavez, wherein We held that an entry of judgment without receipt of the resolution is premature.
27
Petitioner also claims that during trial, she could not obtain the necessary evidence for her defense
due to the fact that the odds were against her. Because of this, she asks the Court to relax the strict
application of the rules and consider remanding the case to the lower court for further reception of
evidence. In particular, petitioner seeks the reception of an affidavit of a certain John L. Ziganay, an
28
accountant at the Depaiiment of Science and Technology (DOST), who previously worked at the

DOTC and COA, as well as two (2) deposit slips. According to petitioner, these pieces of evidence
would show that the ₱11,300.00 deposited at the Lagawe branch of the LBP was actually the
deposit made by petitioner and not by a certain Lanie Cabacungan, as the prosecution suggests.
This is because the ₱11,300.00 deposit made by Cabacungan consists of two (2) different amounts,
which, if proper accounting procedure is followed, shall be recorded in the bank statement as two (2)
separate amounts and not their total sum of ₱11,300.00. Thus, the Sandiganbayan's denial of
29
petitioner's motion to reopen the case is capricious, despotic, and whimsical since the admission of
her additional evidence will prevent a miscarriage.
Finally, petitioner denies the Sandiganbayan's ruling that her motion to reopen and petition for
reconsideration are considered as a second and third motion for reconsideration, and are thus,
prohibited pleadings. This is because the additional evidence she seeks to introduce were not
available during the trial of her case.
The petition is devoid of merit.
At the outset, the Court notes that as pointed out by respondent Office of the Special Prosecutor,
petitioner's resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an improper
remedy. In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a cou1i
order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision
he intends to assail. It bears stressing that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of
30
only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. If the Order or Resolution sought to be assailed is in the nature of a final order, the remedy of
31
the aggrieved party would be to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to file a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. Petitioner, in the instant case, seeks to assail the Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated
32
December 4, 2013 and February 2, 2015 wherein said court denied her motion to reopen the
malversation case against her. Said resolutions are clearly final orders that dispose the proceedings
completely. The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is, therefore, improper.
Even if We assume the propriety of petitioner's chosen action, the Court still cannot grant the reliefs
she prays for, specifically: (1) the reversal of the Sandiganbayan's December 4, 2013 and February
2, 2015 Resolutions denying her motion to reopen and petition for reconsideration; (2) the reopening
of the case for further reception of evidence; and (3) the recall of the Entry of Judgment dated June
26, 2013. 33
First of all, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that since her counsel was not properly notified of
the August 31, 2010 Resolution as notice thereof was erroneously sent to her old office address, the
entry of judgment is premature. As the Court sees it, petitioner has no one but herself to blame.
Time and again, the Court has held that in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court
of a change of address, the service of the order or resolution of a court upon the parties must be
made at the last address of their counsel on record. It is the duty of the party and his counsel to
34
device a system for the receipt of mail intended for them, just as it is the duty of the counsel to
inform the court officially of a change in his address. If counsel moves to another address without
35
informing the court of that change, such omission or neglect is inexcusable and will not stay the
finality of the decision. The court cannot be expected to take judicial notice of the new address of a
lawyer who has moved or to ascertain on its own whether or not the counsel of record has been
changed and who the new counsel could possibly be or where he probably resides or holds office. 36
Here, it is undisputed that petitioner's counsel failed to inform the court of the change in her office
address from Poblacion, La Trinidad, Benguet, to the Public Attorney's Office in Tayug, Pangasinan.
The fact that said new address was indicated in petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration does not
suffice as "proper and adequate notice" to the court. As previously stated, courts cannot be expected
to take notice of every single time the counsel of a party changes address. Besides, it must be noted
that petitioner even expressly admitted having received the subject resolution "sometime in
September or October 2010." Easily, she could have informed her counsel of the same. As
37
respondent posits, it is not as if petitioner had no knowledge of the whereabouts of her counsel
considering that at the time of the filing of her Motion for Reconsideration, said counsel was already
with the PA0. Moreover, the Court cannot permit petitioner's reliance on the Chavez case because
38
there, petitioner did not receive the resolution of the Court of Appeals through no fault or negligence
on his paii. Here, however, petitioner's non-receipt of the subject resolution was mainly attributable
39
not only to her counsel's negligence but hers, as well. Thus, the Court deems it necessary to remind
litigants, who are represented by counsel, that they should not expect that all they need to do is sit
back, relax and await the outcome of their case. They should give the necessary assistance to their
counsel for what is at stake is their interest in the case. It is, therefore, their responsibility to check
the status of their case from time to time.40
To recall, petitioner, on December 21, 2009, filed her Motion for Reconsideration seeking a reversal
of the Sandiganbayan's November 13, 2009 Decision which affirmed the RTC's ruling convicting her
of the crime of malversation. In a Resolution dated August 31, 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Said resolution became final in the absence of any pleading
filed thereafter, and hence, was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on June 26, 2013.
Subsequently, on July 12, 2013, petitioner, through her new counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to
Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the Execution, which was denied
through the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated December 4, 2013. Undeterred, petitioner filed
41
her Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for
the Stay of Execution of Judgement on January 9, 2014 which was likewise denied in the
Sandiganbayan's February 2, 2015 Resolution.
It seems, therefore, that petitioner waited almost an entire three (3) year period from the denial of
her Motion for Reconsideration to act upon the malversation case against her through the filing of
her urgent motion to reopen. In fact, her filing of said motion may very well be prompted only by her
realization that the case has finally concluded by reason of the entry of judgment. Stated otherwise,
the Court is under the impression that had she not heard of the recording of the August 31, 2010
Resolution in the Book of Entries of Judgments on June 26, 2013, petitioner would not even have
inquired about the status of her case. As respondent puts it, the urgent motion to reopen appears to
have been filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of an appeal via a petition for review
on certiorari before the Court. On this inexcusable negligence alone, the Court finds sufficient basis
42
to deny the instant petition.
Second of all, petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan's denial of her motion to reopen the case is
capricious, despotic, and whimsical since the admission of her additional evidence will prevent a
miscarriage has no legal nor factual leg to stand on. Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence
provide for the following requirements for the reopening a case: (l) the reopening must be before the
finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon
motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a
miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be
terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order. 43
But as the Sandiganbayan ruled, the absence of the first requisite that the reopening must be before
the finality of a judgment of conviction already cripples the motion. The records of the case clearly
1âwphi1
reveal that the August 3l, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration had already become final and executory and, in fact, was already recorded in the
Entry Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013. Moreover, petitioner's supposed predicament about her
former counsel failing to present witnesses and documents should have been advanced before the
trial court. It is the trial court, and neither the Sandiganbayan nor the Court, which receives
44
evidence and rules over exhibits formally offered. Thus, it was, indeed, too late in the day to
45
advance additional allegations for petitioner had all the opportunity to do so in the lower court. An
appellate court will generally not disturb the trial court's assessment of factual matters except only
when it clearly overlooked certain facts or where the evidence fails to substantiate the lower court's
findings or when the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. 46
Ultimately, it bears stressing that the Court does not find that the Sandiganbayan acted in a
capricious, despotic, or whimsical manner when it denied petitioner's motion to reopen especially in
view of the fact that the rulings it seeks to refute are legally sound and appropriately based on the
evidences presented by the parties. On this score, the elements of malversation of public funds
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a public officer; (2)
that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) that
those funds or property were public funds or prope1iy for which he was accountable; and (4) that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them. This article establishes a presumption that when a public officer fails to
have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, it shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal
uses.47
As duly found by the trial court, and affinned by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner's defense that she,
together with her supervisor Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP and handed the subject ₱11,300.00
deposit to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as to where the money went failed to
overcome the presumption of law. For one, Paraiso was never presented to corroborate her version.
For another, when questioned about the subject deposit, not only did petitioner fail to make the same
readily available, she also could not satisfactorily explain its whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime of
malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had
received public funds, that she did not have them in her possession when demand therefor was
made, and that she could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so.48 Thus, even if it is assumed
that it was somebody else who misappropriated the said amount, petitioner may still be held liable
for malversation. The Comi quotes, with approval, the trial court's ruling, viz.:
Even if the claim of Hernan, i.e., that she actually left the amount of ₱11,300.00 and the
corresponding deposit slip with the Bank Teller Ngaosi and she came back to retrieve the
deposit slip later, is to be believed and then it came out that the said ₱11,300.00 was not
credited to the account of DOTC with the Land Bank and was in fact missing, still accused
Hernan should be convicted of malversation because in this latter situation she permits
through her inexcusable negligence another person to take the money. And this is still
malversation under Article 217. 49
Said ruling was, in fact, duly reiterated by the Sandiganbayan in its Decision, thus:
Shifting our gaze to the possibility that it was the bank teller Catalina Ngaosi who misappropriated
the amount and should therefore be held liable, as the accused would want to poltray, the Court
doubts the tenability of that position. As consistently ruled by jurisprudence, a public officer may be
held liable for malversation even if he does not use public property or funds under his custody for his
personal benefit, but consents to the taking thereof by another person, or, through abandonment or
negligence, permitted such taking. The accused, by her negligence, simply created the
opportunity for the misappropriation. Even her justification that her deposits which were not
machine-validated were nonetheless acknowledged by the bank cannot fortify her defense.
On the contrary, it all the more emphasizes her propensity for negligence each time that she
accepted deposit slips which were not machinevalidated, her only proof of receipt of her
deposits. 50
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan's finding that petitioner's motion
to reopen and petition for reconsideration are practically second and third motions for
reconsideration from its Decision dated November 13, 2009. Under the rules, the motions are
already prohibited pleadings under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court due to the fact that the
grounds raised in the petition for reconsideration are merely a rehash of those raised in the two (2)
previous motions filed before it. These grounds were already thoroughly discussed by the
Sandiganbayan in its subject resolutions. Hence, as duly noted by the Sandiganbayan, in the law of
pleading, courts are called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance, not to be misled by a
false or wrong name given to a pleading because the title thereof is not controlling and the court
should be guided by its averments. Thus, the fact that the pleadings filed by petitioner are
51
entitled Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay
Execution and Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the
Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment does not exempt them from the application of the rules on
prohibited pleadings.
Let it be remembered that the doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental
principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of
courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by
law. The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc
pro tune entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and
inequitable. None of the exceptions is present in this case.
52
Indeed, every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and
unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the
winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the
execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the "life of the law." To frustrate it by dilatory
schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the
courts. It is in the interest of justice that this Court should write finis to this litigation.
53
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that it is still necessary to reopen the instant case and
recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, not for further reception of
evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in order to modify the penalty imposed by said court.
The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable,
and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest
court of the land. When, however, circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering
54
its execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit en bane and give due regard to such
exceptional circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability. The same is in
line with Section 3(c), Rule II of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, which provides that cases
55
raising novel questions of law are acted upon by the Court en bane. To the Court, the recent
passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 entitled An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of
Property and Damage on which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal
Code Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815 Otherwise Known as the "Revised Penal Code" as
Amended which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is an
example of such exceptional circumstance. Section 40 of said Act provides:
SEC. 40. Article 217 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act. No. 1060, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially,
or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of pnswn correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved in the misappropriation or malversation docs not exceed Forty thousand pesos
(₱40,000.00).
xxxx
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of
the property embezzled.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, We have here a novel situation wherein the
judgment convicting the accused, petitioner herein, has already become final and executory and yet
the penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage of said law. Because of this,
not only must petitioner's sentence be modified respecting the settled rule on the retroactive
effectivity of laws, the sentencing being favorable to the accused, she may even apply for
56
probation, as long as she does not possess any ground for disqualification, in view of recent
57 58
legislation on probation, or R.A. No. 10707 entitled An Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 968,
otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976," As Amended. allowing an accused to apply for
probation in the event that she is sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of not more
than six (6) years when a judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed
or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty. 59
Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer as well as a possible
multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and recall
the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, which imposed the penalty of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and
twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum. Instead, since the amount involved herein is
₱11,300.00, which does not exceed ₱40,000.00, the new penalty that should be imposed is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which has a prison term of two (2) years, four (4)
months, and one (1) day, to six (6) years. The Court, however, takes note of the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender appreciated by the Sandiganbayan in favor of
petitioner. Hence, taking into consideration the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the
60
presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance, the range of the penalty that must be imposed as the
maximum term should be prision correccional medium to prision correccional maximum in its
minimum period, or from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to three (3) years, six (6)
months, and twenty (20) days, in accordance with Article 64 of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate
61
Sentence Law, the range of the minimum term that should be imposed upon petitioners is anywhere
within the period of arresto mayor, maximum to prision correccional minimum with a range of four (4)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years,
six (6) months, and twenty (20) days prision correccional, as maximum.
On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private counsels, and such other
officers of the law are hereby advised to similarly apply the provisions of RA No. 10951 whenever it
is, by reason of justice and equity, called for by the facts of each case. Hence, said recent legislation
shall find application in cases where the imposable penalties of the affected crimes such as theft,
qualified theft, estafa, robbery with force upon things, malicious mischief, malversation, and such
other crimes, the penalty of which is dependent upon the value of the object in consideration thereof,
have been reduced, as in the case at hand, taking into consideration the presence of existing
circumstances attending its commission. For as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent
legislation shall find application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time when the
judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has already begun. The accused,
in these applicable instances, shall be entitled to the benefits of the new law warranting him to serve
a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has already begun serving his previous sentence, and said
service already accomplishes the term of the modified sentence. In the latter case, moreover, the
Court, in the interest of justice and expediency, further directs the appropriate filing of an action
before the Court that seeks the reopening of the case rather than an original petition filed for a
similar purpose.
Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant amendatory law
imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct
the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so much the
findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.
Henceforth: (1) the Directors of the National Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for Women are
hereby ordered to determine if there are accused serving final sentences similarly situated as the
accused in this particular case and if there are, to coordinate and communicate with the Public
Attorney's Office and the latter, to represent and file the necessary pleading before this Court in
behalf of these convicted accused in light of this Court's pronouncement; (2) For those cases where
the accused are undergoing preventive imprisonment, either the cases against them are non-
bailable or cannot put up the bail in view of the penalties imposable under the old law, their
respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the necessary pleading before the proper courts,
whether undergoing trial in the RTC or undergoing appeal in the appellate courts and apply for bail,
for their provisional liberty; (3) For those cases where the accused are undergoing preventive
imprisonment pending trial or appeal, their respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the
necessary pleading if the accused have already served the minimum sentence of the crime charged
against them based on the penalties imposable under the new law, R.A. No. 10951, for their
immediate release in accordance with A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC or the Guidelines For Decongesting
Holding Jails By Enforcing The Rights Of Accused Persons To Bail And To Speedy Trial; 62 and (4)
Lastly, all courts, including appellate courts, are hereby ordered to give priority to those cases
covered by R.A. No. 10951 to avoid any prolonged imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated February

2, 2015 and Decision dated November 13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum term, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and
twenty (20) days prision correccional, as maximum term.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
dissemination to the First and Second Level courts, and also to the Presiding Justices of the
appellate courts, the Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, Public Attorney's Office,
Prosecutor General's Office, the Directors of the National Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for
Women, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information, guidance, and appropriate
action.
Likewise, let the Office of the President, the Senate of the Philippines, and the House of
Representatives, be furnished copies of this Decision for their information.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-58652 May 20, 1988
ALFREDO RODILLAS Y BONDOC, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Santiago R. Robinol for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition brought by Alfredo Rodillas y Bondoc asking for the reversal of a decision of the Sandiganbayan which found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner Thru Negligence (Art. 224, RPC). The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Alfredo Rodillas y

Bondoc GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of Evasion
through Negligence, as defined and penalized under Article 224 of the Revised Penal
Code, and there being no modifying circumstance to consider, hereby sentences him
to suffer the straight penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto
mayor, to suffer eight (8) years and one (1) day of temporary special disqualification
and to pay the costs of this action.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)
Petitioner Rodillas was charged with having committed the said crime in an information which reads
as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of March, 1980, in the City of Caloocan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, being then a
policeman duly appointed and qualified as such, hence a public officer, specially
charged with the duty of keeping under his custody and vigilance and of conducting
and delivery from the City Jail, Caloocan City to the Court of First Instance, Branch
XXXIV, Caloocan City and return, one Zenaida Sacris Andres, a detention prisoner
being tried for violation of Section 4, R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under Crim. Case No. C-12888, did then and there
with great carelessness and unjustifiable negligence, allow and permit said Zenaida
Sacris Andres to have snacks and enter the comfort room at the second floor of the
Genato Building, Rizal Avenue, Caloocan City after the hearing of said case, v,,ithout
first ascertaining for himself whether said comfort room is safe and without any
egress by which the said detention prisoner could escape, thereby enabling said
Zenaida Sacris Andres, to run away and escape thru the window inside the comfort
room, as in fact she did run away and escape from the custody of said accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p. 6)
The prosecution's evidence upon which the court based its finding of guilt is summarized as follows:
... accused herein is a Patrolman of the Integrated National Police Force of Caloocan
City and assigned with the jail section thereof. On March 27, 1980, when he reported
for work, he was directed by his superior, Corporal Victor Victoriano, officer-in-charge
in assigning police officers to escort prisoners, to escort Zenaida Sacris deadline
Andres, a detention prisoner, before the sala of Judge Bernardo Pardo of the Court
of First Instance, Br.XXXIV, located at the Genato Building, Caloocan City, to face
trial for an alleged Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as the policewoman
officer who was supposed to escort the said detainee was then sick. He and the
detainee proceeded to the court building and arrived thereat between 8:30 and 9:00
o'clock in the morning. while waiting for the arrival of the judge at the courtroom, Pat.
Orlando Andres, who happened to be in the court and a relative of the husband of
said detention prisoner Zenaida, approached the accused and requested the latter if
he could permit Zenaida to talk to her husband. The accused consented and Zenaida
Andres had a short talk with her husband. After a short while, the presiding judge
deferred the decision against her because of a new Presidential Decree revising
some provisions regarding violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After the court had already adjourned, the husband of Zenaida requested the
accused to allow them to have lunch as they were already very hungry. He
consented to the request and they proceeded to the canteen located at the
mezzanine floor of the court building (Exhibit 1). He took a seat beside Zenaida and
<äre||anº•1àw>
Pat. Andres while the relatives of said detainee were seated at a separate table.
While eating, the husband of Zenaida asked him if he could accompany his wife to
the comfort room as she was not feeling well and felt like defecating. The accused
accompanied Zenaida and a lady companion to the ladies' comfort room located at
the second floor of the building (Exibit 2). Zenaida and her lady companion entered
the comfort room, while he stood guard along the alley near the ladies' comfort room
facing the door thereof (Exhibit 5). Not long after, the lady companion of Zenaida
came out of the comfort room and told him that she was going to buy sanitary
napkins for Zenaida as the latter was then bleeding and had a menstruation and
could not go out of the comfort room.
After ten minutes elapsed without the lady companion of Zenaida coming back, the
accused became suspicious and entered the comfort room. To his surprise, he found
Zenaida no longer inside the comfort room. He noticed that the window of said
comfort room was not provided with window grills. He tried to peep out of the window
by stepping on the flush tank which is just about 3 feet from the window and noticed
that outside of the window there was a concrete eave extending down to the ground
floor of the building which he presumed that Zenaida might have used as a passage
in escaping (Exhibits 2-A, 3 and 4 to 4-C). He immediately went out to look for the
escapee inside the building with the help of Pat. Andres but they were not able to see
her. Pat. Andres advised him to go to Zenaida's house as she might be there, which
home is located at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Pat. Andres having told him that
the husband of the escapee is from Rizal, Nueva Ecija, the accused borrowed the
car of his brother-in-law and proceeded to said town. Upon arrival thereat, they
contacted the relatives of Zenaida and asked for information as to her whereabouts,
but they answered in the negative. They went back to Caloocan City and went again
directly to Bagong Barrio to the house of Zenaida, arriving thereat at around 8:00
o'clock in the evening. While at the residence of Zenaida, Cpl. Victoriano arrived and
the accused related to him about the escape of Zenaida. He formally reported the
matter of his superior officer at the City Jail Capt. Leonardo Zamora. The accused
declared further that as a jailer, he never had any training nor lecture by his superiors
regarding the manner of delivering prisoners. However, he admitted that he did not
inspect first the comfort room before he allowed Zenaida to enter because there were
many females going in and out of said comfort room, and that he did not promptly
report the escape earlier because they were then pressed for time to intercept
Zenaida at the highway. (Rollo, pp. 18-21).
The petitioner assigns the following errors:
WHETHER PETITIONER'S CONVICTION BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN BASED

ONLY ON HIS ADMISSIONS WITHOUT THE PROSECUTION HAVING
PRESENTED EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS NEGLIGENCE WILL LIE.
II
WHETHER THE ACTS OF PETITIONER COULD BE QUALIFIED AS DEFINITE

LAXITY AMOUNTING TO DELIBERATE NON-PERFORMANCE OF DUTY TO
SUSTAIN HIS CONVICTION. (Brief for the petitioner, p. 5)
In essence, the sole question to be resolved in the case at bar is whether, under the foregoing facts
and circumstances, the respondent Sandiganbayan committed a reversible error in holding the
petitioner guilty of infidelity in the custody of a prisoner through negligence penalized under Art. 224
of the Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner specifically alleges that his conviction by the Sandiganbayan was based merely on his
admissions without the prosecution presenting evidence to prove his negligence.
Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that "the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to
a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. The admissions and declarations in open court
of a person charged with a crime are admissible against him. (See U.S. v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578).
The records show that the elements of the crime for which the petitioner was convicted are present.
Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code states:
ART. 224. Evasion through negligence. If the evasion of the prisoner shall have
taken place through the negligence of the officer charged with the conveyance or
custody of the escaping prisoner, said officer shall suffer the penalties of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and
temporary special disqualification.
The elements of the crime under the abovementioned article are: a) that the offender is a public
officer; b) that he is charged with the conveyance or custody of a prisoner, either detention prisoner
or prisoner by final judgment; and c) that such prisoner escapes through his negligence (See Reyes,
L.B., Revised Penal Code, Book II, 1977 ed., p. 407).
There is no question that the petitioner is a public officer. Neither is there any dispute as to the fact
that he was charged with the custody of a prisoner who was being tried for a violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The only disputed issue is the petitioner's negligence resulting in the escape of detention prisoner
Zenaida Andres. The negligence referred to in the Revised Penal Code is such definite laxity as all
but amounts to a deliberate non-performance of duty on the part of the guard (Id., p. 408).
It is evident from the records that the petitioner acted negligently and beyond the scope of his
authority when he permitted his charge to create the situation which led to her escape. The petitioner
contends that human considerations compelled him to grant Zenaida Andres requests to take lunch
and to go to the comfort room to relieve herself.
As a police officer who was charged with the duty to return the prisoner directly to jail, the deviation
from his duty was clearly a violation of the regulations.
In the first place, it was improper for the petitioner to take lunch with the prisoner and her family
when he was supposed to bring his charge to the jail. He even allowed the prisoner and her husband
to talk to each other at the request of a co-officer.
It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to take necessary precautions to
assure the absence of any means of escape. A failure to undertake these precautions will make his
act one of definite laxity or negligence amounting to deliberate non-performance of duty. His
tolerance of arrangements whereby the prisoner and her companions could plan and make good her
escape should have aroused the suspicion of a person of ordinary prudence.
The request for lunch and the consequent delay was an opportunity for the prisoner to learn of a
plan or to carry out an earlier plan by which she could escape. The plan was in fact carried out with
the help of the lady who accompanied his prisoner inside the comfort room. The use of a toilet is one
of the most familiar and common place methods of escape. It is inconceivable that a police officer
should fall for this trick. The arrangement with a lady friend should have aroused the petitioner's
suspicion because the only pretext given by the petitioner was that she was going to answer the call
of nature. It was, therefore, unnecessary for her to be accompanied by anyone especially by
someone who was not urgently in need of a toilet if the purpose was merely to relieve herself.
Despite this, the petitioner allowed the two to enter the comfort room without first establishing for
himself that there was no window or door allowing the possibility of escape. He even allowed the
prisoner's companion to leave the premises with the excuse that the prisoner was having her
monthly period and that there was a need to buy sanitary napkins. And he patiently waited for more
than ten minutes for the companion to return. This was patent negligence and incredible naivette on
the part of the police officer.
Contrary to what the petitioner claims, the escape was not a confluence of facts and,circumstances
which were not foreseen and were not unnatural in the course of things. Not only should they have
been foreseen but they should have been guarded against.
Considering that the city jail was only a kilometer away and it was only 11:30 a.m., it would not have
been inhuman for the petitioner to deny the prisoner's request to first take lunch. Neither would it
have been inhuman if he cleared the toilet of female occupants and checked all possible exists first
and if he did not allow the lady companion to go with Zenaida Andres to the comfort room. These
human considerations, however, are immaterial because the fact remains that as a police officer, he
should have exercised utmost diligence in the performance of his duty.
The supposed confluence of facts does not alter his liability. That he was not trained in escorting
women prisoners is likewise unacceptable as there are no hard and fast rules of conduct under all
conceivable situations for police officers acting as guards. However, they are expected to use
prudence, diligence, and common sense. That Judge Pardo did not immediately pronounce
judgment so the petitioner could have immediately brought Zenaida back to jail is inconsequential. In
the first place, the escape would not have materialized had he immediately escorted her back to jail
after the hearing. That he cannot follow the prisoner inside the comfort room because it would create
a commotion, he being a male, is a lame excuse. There is nothing wrong in asking the ladies for
permission so he could check the comfort room first to insure that the prisoner cannot escape. The
fact that the building is made of concrete and the outside windows covered with grills should not
make a police officer complacent especially because well-planned escapes are not uncommon.
Escapes are, in fact, even presumed so much so that two (2) guards are usually assigned to a
prisoner. (Tsn, August 4, 1981, p. 40)
There appears to have been no genuine effort on the part of the petitioner to recapture the escapee.
Instead of promptly reporting the matter so that an alarm could immediately be sent out to all police
agencies and expert procedures followed, he allegedly tried to look for her in the latter's house in
Caloocan and failing in this, proceeded to Nueva Ecija. It was only later in the evening that he
formally reported the matter to his superior. This even gave the escapee greater opportunity to make
good her escape because the chances of her being recaptured became much less. Such action
requires concerted police effort, not a one-man job which petitioner should have been or was
probably aware of.
The petitioner further contends that he cannot be convicted because there was no connivance
between him and the prisoner. In support of his claim, he cites the case of Alberto v. dela Cruz, (98
SCRA 406). The citation, however, is erroneous. It creates the impression that for one to be held
liable under Art. 224, there must be a showing that he first connived with the prisoner. This was not
the ruling in said case. Conniving or consenting to evasion is a distinct crime under Art. 223 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner here is not being charged with conniving under Art. 223 but for evasion through
negligence under Art. 224 of the same Code. It is, therefore, not necessary that connivance be
proven to hold him liable for the crime of infidelity in the custody of prisoners.
We quote the Solicitor General that the Sandiganbayan's observation regarding escaped prisoners is
relevant and timely. The Court stated:
It is high time that the courts should take strict measures against law officers to
whom have been entrusted the custody and detention of prisoners, whether
detention prisoners or prisoners serving sentence. Laxity and negligence in the
performance of their duties resulting in the mysterious escapes of notorious criminals
have become common news items, involving as it does the suspicion that monetary
considerations may have entered into the arrangements which led to the successful
escape of such notorious criminals even from military custody. No quarters should be
extended to such kind of law officers who, deliberately or otherwise, fail to live up to
the standard required of their duties, thus directly contributing not only to the clogging
of judicial dockets but also to the inevitable deterioration of peace and order. (Brief
for Respondents, pp. 17-18)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 186739-960 April 17, 2013
LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal seeking to nullify the December 19, 2008 Decision 1 of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259, which convicted Leovegildo R.
Ruzol (Ruzol), then Mayor of General Nakar, Quezon, of Usurpation of Official Functions penalized
under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his term, he organized
a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly composed of civil society groups, public officials and
concerned stakeholders with the end in view of regulating and monitoring the transportation of
salvaged forest products within the vicinity of General Nakar. Among those present in the
organizational meeting were Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO)
Rogelio Delgado Sr. and Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, the OCD-DD of the Prelature of Infanta
Emeritus of the Catholic Church and Chairperson of TIPAN, an environmental non-government
organization that operates in the municipalities of General Nakar, Infanta and Real in Quezon
province. During the said assembly, the participants agreed that to regulate the salvaged forests
products, the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue a permit to transport after payment of
the corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer. 2
Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to transport salvaged
forest products were issued to various recipients, of which forty-three (43) bore the signature of
Ruzol while the remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178) were signed by his co-accused
Guillermo T. Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar. 3
On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221 Informations for violation of Art.
177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol and
Sabiduria, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259.
Except for the date of commission, the description of forest product, person given the permit, and
official receipt number, the said Informations uniformly read:
That, on (date of commission) or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in General Nakar, Quezon,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol
and Guillermo M. Sabiduria, both public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal
Administrator, respectively, of General Nakar, Quezon, taking advantage of their official position and
committing the offense in relation to their office, conspiring and confederating with each other did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, issue permit to transport (description of forest
product) to (person given the permit) under O.R. No. (official receipt number) under the pretense of
official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, to the damage and prejudice of the of the
government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The details for each Information are as follows:5
Criminal Date of Description of Forest Person Given the Official

Case Commission Product Permit Receipt
No. No.
0039 20 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft malaruhat/ David Villareal Jr. 1623446
marang
0040 16 Jan. 2004 600 board ft lawaan Pepito Aumentado 1623463
0041 15 Jan. 2004 100 pcs. malaruhat Francisco 1708352

(assorted sizes) Mendoza
0042 15 Jan. 2004 300 cubic m or 3,000 board Edmundo dela 1708353
ft good lumber Vega
0043 15 Jan. 2004 600 board ft good lumber David Villareal, Jr. 1708321
0044 15 Jan. 2004 1,050 board ft good lumber Romeo Sabiduria 1708322
0045 12 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft malaruhat Nestor Astejada 1625521
0046 09 Jan. 2004 4,000 board ft good lumber Naty Orozco 1623421
(assorted sizes)
0047 08 Jan. 2004 700 board ft lauan Winnie Aceboque 1623415
0048 05 Jan. 2004 500 board ft lauan Edmundo dela 1623041

Vega
0049 07 Jan. 2004 4 x 5 haligi Mercy Vargas 1623314
0050 06 Jan. 2004 good lumber Mario Pujeda 1623310
0051 21 Oct. 2002 1,000 board ft sliced Conchita Odi 0830825

lumber
0052 21 Oct. 2002 400 board ft sliced lumber Lita Crisostomo 0830826
0053 28 Oct. 2002 450 board ft marang Agosto Astoveza 0830829
lumber
0054 08 Jan. 2003 300 board ft sliced lumber Edna E. Moises 0943941
(assorted sizes)
0055 13 Jan. 2003 1,500 board ft sliced Dante Z. Medina 0943964

lumber (assorted sizes)
0056 16 Jan. 2003 400 board ft sliced lumber Johnny A. 0943975

(assorted sizes) Astoveza
0057 27 Jan. 2003 7 pcs sliced lumber & 1 Sonny Leynes 1181827
piece 18 roda
0058 14 Feb. 2003 2,000 pcs trophy (wood Flordeliza Espiritu 1182033
carvings)
0059 17 Feb. 2003 700 board ft sliced lumber Nestor Astejada 1181917
(assorted sizes)
0060 18 Feb. 2003 1,632 board ft hard wood, Arthur/ Lanie 1182207
kisame & sanipa Occeña
0061 20 Feb. 2004 126 pcs lumber Lamberto 1708810

Aumentado
0062 3 March 2003 450 board ft hard wood Nestor Astoveza 1182413
(assorted sizes)
0063 6 March 2003 160 pcs sliced lumber Remedios Orozco 1182366
(assorted sizes)
0064 10 March 1,500 board ft malaruhat Nestor Astejada 1181996

2003 (assorted sizes)
0065 11 March 900 board ft sliced lumber Fernando Calzado 1182233

0066 13 March 1,408 board ft hard wood Nestor Astejada 1182553

0067 20 March 90 pcs. sliced lumber Remy Orozco 1182157

0068 21 March 90 pcs. sliced lumber Rene Francia 1182168

0069 25 March 500 board ft lumber Thelma Ramia 1182179

0070 26 March 1 pc. 60 x 75 bed (narra) Roy Justo 1182246

2003 finished product
0071 14 April 2004 95 pcs. kalap (9 ft.); 6 pcs. Anita Solloza 3651059
post (10 ft.) & 500 pcs.
Anahaw
0072 08 April 2004 460 board ft lumber Remy Orozco 3651101

(assorted sizes)
0073 14 April 2004 69 pcs. sliced lumber Dindo America 3651101

(assorted sizes)
0074 23 April 2003 870 board ft hard lumber Amado Pradillada 3651268
(assorted sizes)
0075 24 April 2003 400 board ft lumber Romy Buendicho 3651237

(assorted sizes)
0076 24 April 2003 400 board ft rattan Emmanuel 3651324

Buendicho
0077 30 April 2004 1,000 board ft good lumber Mylene Moises 3651335-C
(assorted sizes)
0078 30 April 2004 500 board ft sliced lumber Carlito Vargas 3651336
(assorted sizes)
0079 08 May 2003 72 x 78 bed (narra); 3 pcs. Fely Justo 3651519

60 x 75 bed (ling manok)
& 1 pc. 48 x 75 ed (kuling
manok) finished product
0080 12 May 2003 294 board ft lumber Virgilio Cuerdo 3650927
0081 13 May 2003 43 pcs. sliced lumber Amando Lareza 3651783

(assorted sizes)
0082 14 May 2003 750 board ft good lumber Wilma Cuerdo 3651529
0083 15 May 2003 440 board ft lumber Marte Cuballes 3651532
0084 15 May 2003 214 pcs. 2x6x7 or 1,500 Anneliza Vargas 3651531
board ft finished product
0085 26 May 2003 57 pcs. sliced lumber Danny Sanchez 3651585

(assorted sizes)
0086 27 May 2003 400 board ft cut woods Emy Francia 3651394
0087 30 May 2003 300 board ft lumber Daisy Cuerdo 3650943
0088 30 May 2003 1,000 board ft lumber Lea Astoveza 3651161

(assorted sizes)
0089 05 June 2003 130 pcs. or 1,500 board ft Jose Noly Moises 3651809
lumber cut woods
0090 06 June 2003 300 board ft lumber Mercy Escaraga 3651169
0091 18 June 2003 800 board ft good lumber Dante Medena 3651749
0092 24 June 2003 28 pcs. good lumber Virgilio Cuerdo 1247102

(assorted sizes)
0093 25 June 2003 190 pcs. good lumber Dante Medina 1247205
(assorted sizes)
0094 02 July 2003 800 board ft. good lumber Dante Medina 1247221
0095 02 July 2003 105 pcs. fresh cut lumber Emmanuel Lusang 1247167
(assorted sizes)
0096 04 July 2003 Assorted sizes of good Alberto dela Cruz 1247172
Lumber
0097 07 July 2003 Bulukan woods Conchita Ligaya 1247175
0098 07 July 2003 6 pcs. Haligi Jane Bulagay 1247173

0099 11 July 2003 700 board ft. cut woods Dominador Aveno 1247452
0100 14 July 200 800 board ft. cut wood/ Dante Medina 1247180
lumber
0101 16 July 2003 600 board ft. cut lumber Rachelle Solana 1247182
0102 23 July 2003 1,200 board ft. hard lumber Necito Crisostomo 1247188
0103 23 July 2003 700 board ft. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1247129
0104 28 July 2003 959 board ft. cut lumber Necito Crisostomo 1247428
0105 29 July 2003 600 board ft. lumber Marilou Astejada 1247191
0106 01 Aug. 2003 1,000 board Malaruhat Ruel Ruzol 1247198
0107 05 Aug. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Virgilio Aumentado 1322853
0108 08 Aug. 2003 4.8 cubic ft. Amlang Rosa Turgo 1322862
woods
0109 12 Aug. 2003 788 Board ft. cut woods Maria Teresa 1322865
Adornado
0110 25 Aug. 2003 500 board ft. assorted Romy Buendicho 1322929
lumber
0111 28 Aug. 2003 2 sala sets Roy Justo 1322879
0112 29 Aug. 2003 456 pieces good lumber Marilou Astejada 1323056
(assorted sizes)
0113 03 Sept. 2003 5 cubic ft softwoods Rosa Turgo 1322834

(assorted sizes)
0114 05 Sept. 2003 1,000 board ft. good Agustin Vargas 1323064
0115 08 Sept. 2003 80 pcs. wood post Peter Banton 1323124
0116 09 Sept. 2003 1 forward load (soft wood) Efifania V. Astrega 1323023
0117 11 Sept. 2003 1 forward load (assorted Noling Multi 1323072
species) Purpose Corp.
0118 11 Sept. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Agustin Vargas 1323071
0119 12 Sept. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1323073
(assorted sizes)
0120 15 Sept. 2003 950 board ft. Malaruhat Edna Moises 1323128
0121 16 Sept. 2003 14 pcs. Panel door Roy Justo 1323041
0122 17 Sept. 2003 546 board ft. soft woods Mr. Marquez 1322951
0123 19 Sept. 2003 1,600 board ft. good Decembrano 1323085

lumber (assorted sizes) Sabiduria
0124 22 Sept. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber Jeffrey dela Vega 1323095
0125 22 Sept. 2003 1 Jeep load hard wood Federico Marquez 1323100
0126 25 Sept. 2003 750 board ft. Malaruhat/ Virgilio Villareal 1323252
Marang
0127 03 Oct. 2003 750 board ft. Malaruhat/ Virgilio Villareal 1323252
Marang
0128 02 Oct. 2003 60 pcs. good lumber Nestor Astorza 1482662

(assorted sizes)
0129 03 Oct. 2003 1,600 board ft. good Virgilio Villareal 1482666
0130 03 Oct. 2003 400 board ft. Malaruhat Amado Pradillada 1482815
(assorted sizes)
0131 03 Oct. 2003 1 full load (soft wood) Flordeliza Espiritu 1482867
0132 03 Oct. 2003 6,342 board ft sticks Joel Pacaiqui 1482716
0133 03 Oct. 2003 6,090 board ft sticks Joel Pacaiqui 1482717
0134 07 Oct. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber Mylene Moises 1482670
(assorted sizes)
0135 13 Oct. 2003 600 board ft. Lawaan Winnie Acebaque 1482734
(assorted sizes)
0136 13 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. Malaruhat Nestor Bautista 1482740
(assorted sizes)
0137 13 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. Lawaan Trinidad Guerero 1482774
(assorted sizes)
0138 16 Oct. 2003 700 board ft. Lawaan Federico Marquez 1482782
0139 17 Oct. 2003 4,602 board ft. good Nenita Juntreal 1482787
0140 20 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. Malaruhat Belen Ordinado 1482793
(assorted sizes)
0141 23 Oct. 2003 66 pcs. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1482847

(assorted sizes)
0142 25 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. good Dante Medina 1323277
lumber
0144 28 Oct. 2003 1,254 board ft. good Jonathan Supremo 1323281
0145 28 Oct. 2003 2,500 board ft. lumber Ramir Sanchez 1483001
(assorted sizes)
0146 28 Oct. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Rolando Franela 1323280
(assorted sizes)
0147 03 Nov. 2003 850 finished products Naty Orozco 1483020

(cabinet component,
balusters, door jambs)
0148 03 Nov. 2003 400 board ft. good lumber Elizabeth Junio 1483022
(assorted sizes) & 6
bundles of sticks
0149 10 Nov. 2003 1,770 board ft. good Dante Medina 1483032
0150 10 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1483033
0151 12 Nov. 2003 900 board ft. lumber Federico Marquez 1483041
(assorted sizes)
0152 12 Nov. 2003 Mini dump truck good Rizalito Francia 1483042
0153 14 Nov. 2003 500 components, 100 pcs Annie Gonzales 1483070
balusters (assorted sizes of
stringers, tassels)
0154 14 Nov. 2003 700 board ft. good lumber Winnie Aceboque 1323287
0155 17 Nov. 2003 1,600 board ft. Malaruhat Federico Marquez 1483072
0156 05 Nov. 2003 400 board ft. Tapil & 7 Belen Ordinado 1483023
pcs. 1x10x14
0157 05 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber Leonardo Aveno 1623003
(assorted sizes)
0158 05 Nov. 2003 150 board ft. good lumber Francisco 1483027
Mendoza
0159 07 Nov. 2003 433 bundles of semi-finished Naty Orozco 1483031

products
0160 08 Nov. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Armando 1483134

(assorted sizes) Pradillada
0161 25 Nov. 2003 30 pcs. sliced lumber Ariel Molina 1632059
0162 19 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. good Dante Medina 1623053
0163 20 Nov. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Maria Teresa 1323288
(assorted sizes) Adornado
0164 20 Nov. 2003 1,500 board ft. good Romeo Sabiduria 1483080
0165 21 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. Malaruhat Dante Medina 1623057
0166 25 Oct. 2003 2,000 board ft. lumber Federico Marquez 1322982
(assorted sizes)
0167 25 Nov. 2003 500 board ft. Malaruhat Federico Marquez 1483090
0168 25 Nov. 2003 70 bundles of Rattan Manuel Buendicho 1483095

(assorted sizes)
0169 28 Nov. 2003 6,542 board ft. finished Nenita Juntareal 1623019
products (cabinet and
components)
0170 01 Dec. 2003 400 board ft. Malaruhat Federico Marquez 1623061
0171 01 Dec. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1483123
0172 01 Dec. 2003 1,500 board ft. lumber Belen Ordinado 1623063
(assorted sizes)
0173 03 Dec. 2003 500 board ft. Laniti Rosa Turgo 1483125
0174 04 Dec. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber Dante Medina 1483127
0175 04 Dec. 2003 26 pcs. lumber (assorted Nenita Juntareal 1483128

sizes) & 2 bundles of sticks
0176 05 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1483131
0177 08 Dec. 2003 678 board ft. good lumber Elenor Rutaquio 1623082
(assorted sizes)
0178 08 Dec. 2003 200 board ft. lumber William Rutaquio 1623010
(assorted sizes)
0179 09 Dec. 2003 1,800 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1623090
0180 12 Dec. 2003 One jeep load of good Angelo Avellano 1623099
0181 12 Dec. 2003 One jeep load of good Angelo Avellano 1623099
0182 12 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1483147
0183 16 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. Malaruhat Jonathan Marcial 1623033
0185 16 Dec. 2003 1,000 board ft. Malaruhat Dante Medina 1482986
0186 18 Dec. 2003 100 board ft. lumber Aladin Aveno 1322992
0188 19 Dec. 2003 1,500 board ft. coco Felecita Marquez 1322998
lumber
0189 22 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. lumber Belen C. Ordinado 1623209
0190 29 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. Lawaan Winnie Aciboque 1623211
0191 29 Dec. 2003 300 board ft. lumber Yolanda 1623210

Crisostomo
0192 30 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. Lawaan Pepito Aumentado 1623215
0193 20 Nov. 2003 150 board ft. good lumber Francisco 1483086
(assorted sizes) Mendoza
0194 30 June 2003 450 board ft. fresh cut Mylene Moises 1247126
lumber
0195 13 July 2001 1 L-300 load of finished Evangeline Moises 9894843-Q

and semi-finished products
0196 02 July 2001 96 pcs. good lumber Rollie L. Velasco 9894996-Q

(assorted sizes)
0197 07 May 2004 1,500 board ft. babayahin Nemia Molina 200647
lumber
0198 19 April 2004 107 pcs. sliced lumber Carlo Gudmalin 1868050
(assorted sizes)
0199 5 March 2004 10 pcs. Deadwood Elizabeth Junio 1708899

(Bulakan)
0200 2 March 2004 600 board ft. Amalang Roda Turgo 1867608
wood
0201 1 March 2004 149 sliced lumber (assorted Necito Crisostomo 1708891
sizes)
0202 1 March 2004 80 bundles of rattan Manuel Buendicho 1708890
0203 23 Feb. 2004 30 pcs. sliced lumber Leonardo Aveno 1708863

(assorted sizes)
0204 13 Feb. 2004 50 pcs. sliced sliced lumber Federico Marquez 1708698
(assorted sizes)
0205 12 Feb. 2004 69 pcs. sliced sliced lumber Florencio Borreo 1708694
(assorted sizes)
0206 17 Feb. 2004 50 pcs. sliced sliced lumber Ronnie Astejada 1708774
(assorted sizes)
0207 04 Feb. 2004 600 board ft. sliced lumber Pepito Aumentado 1708486
(assorted sizes)
0208 1 March 2004 21 pcs. Lawaan (assorted Atan Marquez 1708878

sizes)
0209 4 Feb. 2004 563 board ft. sliced lumber Decembrano 1708487
(assorted sizes) Sabiduria
0210 06 Feb. 2004 80 pcs. Buukan (Ugat) Maila S. Orozco 1708547
0211 30 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft. good Pepito Aumentado 1708534
0212 29 Jan. 2004 950 board ft. good lumber Leonardo Moises 1708528
(assorted sizes)
0213 28 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft. good Pepito Aumentado 1708518
0214 28 Jan. 2004 5, 000 board ft. good Carmelita Lorenzo 1708521
0215 28 Jan. 2004 350 board ft. good lumber Amando Pradillada 1708368
(assorted sizes)
0216 23 Jan. 2004 800 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1708517
(assorted sizes)
0217 21 Jan. 2004 1,050 board ft. good Romeo Sabiduria 1708508
0218 06 April 2004 800 board ft. sliced lumber Mylene Moises 1868025
(assorted sizes)
0219 11 March 300 pieces or 1, 200 board Ernesto 1708975

2004 ft. sliced lumber (assorted Aumentado
sizes)
0220 02 Feb. 2004 7,000 board ft. good Carmelita Lorenzo 1708376
lumber
0221 08 Jan. 2004 600 board ft. Malaruhat Nestor Astejada 1623451
0222 10 Dec. 2003 300 pieces good lumber Francisco 1623096

Mendoza
0223 18 Nov. 2003 6,432 board ft. assorted Naty Orozco 1483048
species
0224 30 Oct. 2003 8,000 board ft. Malauban Ma. Teresa 1483019
Adornado
0226 21 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. Malaruhat Leonardo S. Aveno 1323271
(assorted sizes)
0227 21 Oct. 2003 10,875 board ft. lumber Annie Gonzales 1323273
(assorted sizes)
0228 20 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. sliced lumber Bernardo Gonzalvo 1482835
0229 17 Oct. 2003 6,090 board ft. lumber Naty Orozco 1482834
0230 17 Oct. 2003 16 pcs. panel door Roy Justo 1482743

(finished product)
0231 01 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. good lumber Analiza Vargas 1482710
(assorted sizes)
0232 01 Oct. 2003 700 board ft. Malaruhat Engr. Mercado 1482760
(assorted sizes)
0233 30 Sept. 2003 500 board ft. sliced lumber Mylene Moises 1482810
(assorted sizes)
0234 29 Sept. 2003 800 board ft. good lumber Wennie Acebuque 1482703
(assorted sizes)
0235 15 Sept. 2003 1,500 board ft. malaruhat Decembrano 1323076

lumber (assorted sizes) Sabiduria
0236 10 Sept. 2003 200 board ft. good lumber Junier Franquia 1323027
(assorted sizes)
0237 29 Aug. 2003 600 board ft. good lumber Annaliza Vargas 1322830
0238 07 Aug. 2003 2,000 board ft. lumber Abilardo dela Cruz 1247200
(assorted sizes)
0239 06 Aug. 2003 1,000 board ft. hardwood Jennifer Nudalo 1322802
0240 25 June 2003 600 board ft. good lumber Roy Justo 1247024
0241 26 May 2003 800 board ft. lumber Adelino Lareza 3651096
0242 26 May 2003 Assorted sizes good lumber Rollie Velasco 3651587
0243 23 May 2003 342 sliced lumber (assorted Dolores S. Gloria 3651499
sizes)
0244 20 May 2003 500 board ft. lumber Marylyn de Loreto/ 3651574
Melita Masilang
0245 02 May 2003 123 pieces sliced lumber Armando Lariza 3651656
(assorted sizes)
0246 17 Feb. 2003 70 pieces sliced lumber Efren Tena/ 1182204

(assorted sizes) Romeo
Serafines
0247 07 Feb. 2003 1 piece narra bed; 1 piece Roy D. Justo 1182060
narra panel door; 6 pcs.
Refrigerator stand & 1 pc.
Narra cabinet (finished
product)
0248 05 Dec. 2002 140 pcs. round poles Lamberto R. Ruzol 0943647
0249 20 Nov. 2002 500 board ft. lumber Luz Astoveza 0943618
(assorted sizes)
0250 30 Oct. 2002 1,200 board ft. sliced Arceli Fortunado 0830698
0251 04 Oct. 2002 500 board ft. Huling Roy Justo 0830646
Manok
0252 27 Sept. 2002 300 board ft. sliced lumber Roy Justo 0830625
(assorted sizes)
0253 24 Sept. 2002 1,000 board ft. sliced Inna L. 0830771

lumber (assorted sizes) Customerado
0254 23 Sept. 2002 1,000 board ft. sliced Normelita L. 0830610

lumber (assorted sizes) Curioso
0255 03 Sept. 2002 2,000 pcs. trophy (wood Floredeliza D. 686642

carvings) Espiritu
0256 7 March 2002 2,000 sets trophy (wood Floredeliza D. 090549

carvings) Espiritu
0257 03 Dec. 2001 10,000 sets trophy (wood Floredeliza D. 090769

carvings) Espiritu
0258 12 Sept. 2001 1,075 board ft of sticks & Lea A. Rivera 7786333
1,450 board ft. Bollilo
(assorted sizes)
0259 07 Oct. 2003 Assorted lumber Roy D. Justo 1482765
Considering that the facts are undisputed, the parties during Pre-Trial agreed to dispense with the
presentation of testimonial evidence and submit the case for decision based on the documentary
evidence and joint stipulation of facts contained in the Pre-Trial Order. Thereafter, the accused and
the prosecution submitted their respective memoranda. 6
Ruzol's Defense
As summarized by the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol professes his innocence based on following

arguments:
(1) As Chief Executive of the municipality of General Nakar, Quezon, he is authorized to

issue permits to transport forest products pursuant to RA 7160 which give the LGU not only
express powers but also those powers that are necessarily implied from the powers
expressly granted as well as those that are necessary, appropriate or incidental to the LGU’s
efficient and effective governance. The LGU is likewise given powers that are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare of the inhabitants. The general welfare clause provided in
Section 16, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I of R.A. 7160 is a massive grant of authority that
enables LGUs to perform or exercise just about any power that will benefit their local
constituencies.
(2) In addition to the foregoing, R.A. 7160 has devolved certain functions and responsibilities
of the DENR to the LGU. And the permits to transport were issued pursuant to the devolved
function to manage and control communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50)
square kilometers.
(3) The Permits to Transport were issued as an incident to the payment of Transport Fees
levied by the municipality for the use of local public roads for the transport of salvaged forest
products. Under (a) Section 5, Article X of the Constitution, (b) Section 129, Chapter I, Title
One Book II of R.A. 7160, and (c) Section 186, Article Five, Chapter 5, Tile One, Book II of
R.A. 7160, the municipality is granted the power to create its own sources of revenue and to
levy fees in accordance therewith.
(4) The only kind of document the DENR issues relating to log, timber or lumber is
denominated "Certificate of Timber Origin" or CTO for logs and "Certificate of Lumber Origin"
or CLO for lumber; hence, even if accused issued the Transport Permits on his side, a
person wanting to transport the said forest products would have to apply and obtain a CTO
or CLO from the DENR. The Transport Permits issued by the accused were never taken as a
substitute for the CTO or CLO, and this is the reason why said permits contain the
annotation "Subject to DENR rules, laws and regulations."
(5) There is no proof of conspiracy between the accused. The Transport Permits were issued
by accused Sabiduria in his capacity as Municipal Administrator and his mere issuance is not
enough to impute upon the accused Ruzol any transgression or wrongdoing that may have
been committed in the issuance thereof following the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan (180
SCRA 309).
(6) The DENR directly sanctioned and expressly authorized the issuance of the 221
Transport permits through the Provincial Environment and natural Resources officer Rogelio
Delgado Sr., in a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly.
(7) The accused cannot be convicted of Usurpation of Authority since they did not act "under
the pretense of official position," accused Ruzol having issued the permits in his capacity as
Mayor and there was no pretense or misrepresentation on his part that he was an officer of
DENR.7
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
After due consideration, the Sandiganbayan rendered on December 19, 2008 a Decision, acquitting
Sabiduria but finding Ruzol guilty as charged, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves these cases as follows:
1. Against the accused LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, judgment is hereby rendered finding him
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Two Hundred Twenty One (221) counts of the offense
of Usurpation of Official Functions as defined and penalized under Article 177 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer for each case a straight penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY.
However, in the service of his sentences, accused Ruzol shall be entitled to the benefit of the
three-fold rule as provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
2. On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused GUILLERMO M. SABIDURIA is

ACQUITTED of all 221 charges. The cash bond posted by him for his provisional liberty may
now be withdrawn by said accused upon presentation of the original receipt evidencing
payment thereof subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. The hold
departure procedure issued by this Court dated 16 April 2008 is set aside and the Order
issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 29 April 2008 including the name of Sabiduria in
the Hold Departure List is ordered recalled and cancelled.
SO ORDERED.8
The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the postulate that the authority to issue transport permits
with respect to salvaged forest products lies with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and that such authority had not been devolved to the local government of
General Nakar.9 To the graft court, Ruzol’s issuance of the subject permits constitutes usurpation of
the official functions of the DENR.
The Issue
The critical issue having a determinative bearing on the guilt or innocence of Ruzol for usurpation
revolves around the validity of the subject permits to transport, which in turn resolves itself into the
question of whether the authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest
product is solely with the DENR, and no one else.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Subsidiary Issue:
Whether the Permits to Transport Issued by Ruzol Are Valid
In ruling that the DENR, and not the local government units (LGUs), has the authority to issue
transportation permits of salvaged forest products, the Sandiganbayan invoked Presidential Decree
No. 705 (PD 705), otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines and in relation
to Executive Order No. 192, Series of 1987 (EO 192), or the Reorganization Act of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources.
Section 5 of PD 705 provides:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Bureau. The Bureau of Forest Management shall have jurisdiction and
authority over all forest land, grazing lands, and all forest reservations including watershed
reservations presently administered by other government agencies or instrumentalities.
It shall be responsible for the protection, development, management, regeneration, and reforestation
of forest lands; the regulation and supervision of the operation of licensees, lessees and permittees
for the taking or use of forest products therefrom or the occupancy or use thereof; the
implementation of multiple use and sustained yield management in forest lands; the protection,
development and preservation of national parks, marine parks, game refuges and wildlife; the
implementation of measures and programs to prevent kaingin and managed occupancy of forest and
grazing lands; in collaboration with other bureaus, the effective, efficient and economic classification
of lands of the public domain; and the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and
wildlife laws, rules, and regulations.
The Bureau shall regulate the establishment and operation of sawmills, veneer and plywood mills
and other wood processing plants and conduct studies of domestic and world markets of forest
products. (Emphasis Ours.)
On the other hand, the pertinent provisions of EO 192 state:
SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as maybe provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing
of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos.
xxxx
SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the
following functions:
xxxx
(d) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposal lands, and
mineral resources and in the process of exercising such control the Department shall impose
appropriate payments, fees, charges, rentals and any such revenues for the exploration,
development, utilization or gathering of such resources.
xxxx
(j) Regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country’s
forest, land and mineral resources;
(k) Assume responsibility for the assessment, development, protection, conservation,

licensing and regulation as provided for by law, where applicable, of all natural resources;
the regulation and monitoring of service contractors, licensees, lessees, and permittees for
the extraction, exploration, development and utilization of natural resources products; the
implementation of programs and measures with the end in view of promoting close
collaboration between the government and the private sector; the effective and efficient
classification and sub-classification of lands of the public domain; and the enforcement of
natural resources laws, rules and regulations;
(l) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of co-production, joint
venture or production sharing agreements, licenses, permits, concessions, leases and such
other privileges and arrangement concerning the development, exploration and utilization of
the country’s natural resources and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our
natural resources; to cancel or cause to cancel such privileges and arrangement upon
failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulations, orders, and for all other causes
which are furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of the national
interests;
xxxx
(n) Implement measures for the regulation and supervision of the processing of forest
products, grading and inspection of lumber and other forest products and monitoring of the
movement of timber and other forest products. (Emphasis Ours.)
Invoked too is DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-78 (DAO 2000-78) which mandates that the
permittee should secure the necessary transport and other related documents before the retrieved
wood materials are sold to the buyers/users and/or wood processing plants. 10 DAO 2000-78 obliges
the entity or person concerned to secure a Wood Recovery Permit––a "permit issued by the DENR
to gather/retrieve and dispose abandoned logs, drifted logs, sunken logs, uprooted, and fire and
typhoon damaged tress, tree stumps, tops and branches." 11 It prescribes that the permittee shall only
be allowed to gather or recover logs or timber which had already been marked and inventoried by
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer.12 To the Sandiganbayan, this
mandatory requirement for Wood Recovery Permit illustrates that DENR is the sole agency vested
with the authority to regulate the transportation of salvaged forest products.
1âwphi1
The Sandiganbayan further reasoned that the "monitoring and regulating salvaged forest products"
is not one of the DENR’s functions which had been devolved upon LGUs. It cited Sec. 17 of
Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 which provides:
Section 17. Basic Services and Facilities. -

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers
and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the
functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this
Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other
functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective
provisions of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
xxxx
(2) For a Municipality:
xxxx
(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR,
implementation of community-based forestry projects which include integrated social forestry
programs and similar projects; management and control of communal forests with an area not
exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest
development projects. (Emphasis Ours.)
According to the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 17 of the LGC has limited the devolved functions of the
DENR to the LGUs to the following: (1) the implementation of community-based forestry products;
(2) management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square
kilometers; and (3) establishment of tree parks, greenbelts and similar forest development
projects.13 It also referred to DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992 (DAO 1992-30),
which enumerates the forest management functions, programs and projects of the DENR which had
been devolved to the LGUs, as follows:14
Section 3.1 Forest Management
a. Implementation of the following community-based forestry projects:
i. Integrated Social Forestry Projects, currently funded out of regular appropriations,

except at least one project per province that shall serve as research and training
laboratory, as identified by the DENR, and those areas located in protected areas
and critical watersheds;
ii. Establishment of new regular reforestation projects, except those areas located in
protected areas and critical watersheds;
iii. Completed family and community-based contract reforestation projects, subject to

policies and procedures prescribed by the DENR;
iv. Forest Land Management Agreements in accordance with DENR Administrative

Order No. 71, Series of 1990 and other guidelines that the DENR may adopt; and
v. Community Forestry Projects, subject to concurrence of financing institution(s), if

foreign assisted.
b. Management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square
kilometers or five thousand (5,000) hectares, as defined in Section 2, above. Provided, that
the concerned LGUs shall endeavor to convert said areas into community forestry projects;
c. Management, protection, rehabilitation and maintenance of small watershed areas which
are sources of local water supply as identified or to be identified by the DENR; and
d. Enforcement of forest laws in community-based forestry project areas, small watershed

areas and communal forests, as defined in Section 2 above, such as but not limited to:
i. Prevention of forest fire, illegal cutting and kaingin;
ii. Apprehension of violators of forest laws, rules and regulations;
iii. Confiscation of illegally extracted forest products on site;
iv. Imposition of appropriate penalties for illegal logging, smuggling of natural

resources products and of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn
farming and other unlawful activities; and
v. Confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances, equipment and other

implements used in the commission of offenses penalized under P.D. 705 as
amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987 and other forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Provided, that the implementation of the foregoing activities outside the devolved areas above
mentioned, shall remain with the DENR.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that since the authority relative to salvaged forest products was not
included in the above enumeration of devolved functions, the correlative authority to issue transport
permits remains with the DENR15 and, thus, cannot be exercised by the LGUs.
We disagree and refuse to subscribe to this postulate suggesting exclusivity. As shall be discussed
shortly, the LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991, ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations
and ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest products, provided that the parameters set
forth by law for their enactment have been faithfully complied with.
While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged with the mandate of
promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the environment and conservation of natural
resources, it is not the only government instrumentality clothed with such authority. While the law
has designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to protect the environment, it was not the
intention of the law to arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive prerogative of exercising this function.
Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance, the word "primary" can never be taken to be synonymous
with "sole" or "exclusive." In fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192 suggest that
the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall exercise such authority to the exclusion of all other
government instrumentalities, i.e., LGUs.
On the contrary, the claim of DENR’s supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the
principle of local autonomy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution 16 in relation to the general welfare
clause under Sec. 16 of the LGC of 1991, which provides:
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
(Emphasis Ours.)
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, municipal governments are clothed with authority to enact
such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon them by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide
for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals,
promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, and ensure the
protection of property in the municipality.17
As held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,18 the right of the people "to a balanced and healthful ecology
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment." In ensuring that this
duty is upheld and maintained, a local government unit may, if it deems necessary, promulgate
ordinances aimed at enhancing the right of the people to a balanced ecology and, accordingly,
provide adequate measures in the proper utility and conservation of natural resources within its
territorial jurisdiction. As can be deduced from Ruzol’s memoranda, as affirmed by the parties in their
Joint Stipulation of Facts, it was in the pursuit of this objective that the subject permits to transport
were issued by Ruzol––to regulate the salvaged forest products found within the municipality of
General Nakar and, hence, prevent abuse and occurrence of any untoward illegal logging in the
area.19
In the same vein, there is a clear merit to the view that the monitoring and regulation of salvaged
forest products through the issuance of appropriate permits is a shared responsibility which may be
done either by DENR or by the LGUs or by both. DAO 1992-30, in fact, says as much, thus: the
"LGUs shall share with the national government, particularly the DENR, the responsibility in the
sustainable management and development of the environment and natural resources within their
territorial jurisdiction."20 The significant role of the LGUs in environment protection is further echoed
in Joint Memorandum Circular No. 98-01(JMC 1998-01) or the Manual of Procedures for DENR-
DILG-LGU Partnership on Devolved and other Forest Management Functions, which was
promulgated jointly by the DILG and the DENR in 1998, and provides as follows:
Section 1. Basic Policies
Subject to the general policies on devolution as contained in RA 7160 and DENR Administrative
Order No. 30, Series of 1992, the following basic policies shall govern the implementation of DENR-
DILG-LGU partnership on devolved and other forest management functions:
1.1. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management, protection, proper use
and sustainable development of the country’s environment and natural resources.
1.2. The LGUs shall share with DENR the responsibility in the sustainable management and
development of the forest resources within their territorial jurisdiction. Toward this end, the
DENR and the LGUs shall endeavor to strengthen their collaboration and partnership in
forest management.
1.3. Comprehensive land use and forest land use plans are important tools in the holistic and
efficient management of forest resources. Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs
together with other government agencies shall undertake forest land use planning as an
integral activity of comprehensive land use planning to determine the optimum and balanced
use of natural resources to support local, regional and national growth and development.
1.4. To fully prepare the LGUs to undertake their shared responsibilities in the sustainable
management of forest land resources, the DENR, in coordination with DILG, shall enhance
the capacities of the LGUs in the various aspects of forest management. Initially, the DENR
shall coordinate, guide and train the LGUs in the management of the devolved functions. As
the LGUs’ capacity in forest management is enhanced, the primary tasks in the management
of devolved functions shall be performed by the LGUs and the role of the DENR becomes
assistive and coordinative.
1.5. To further the ends of local autonomy, the DENR in consultation with the LGUs shall
devolved [sic] additional functions and responsibilities to the local government units, or enter
into agreements with them for enlarged forest management and other ENR-related functions.
1.6. To seek advocacy, popular support and ultimately help achieve community
empowerment, DENR and DILG shall forge the partnership and cooperation of the LGUs and
other concerned sectors in seeking and strengthening the participation of local communities
for forest management including enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations.
(Emphasis Ours.)
To our mind, the requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest products is not a manifestation
of usurpation of DENR’s authority but rather an additional measure which was meant to complement
DENR’s duty to regulate and monitor forest resources within the LGU’s territorial jurisdiction.
This is consistent with the "canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against
another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them,
remembering that both laws deserve respect as the handiwork of coordinate branches of the
government."21 Hence, if there appears to be an apparent conflict between promulgated statutes,
rules or regulations issued by different government instrumentalities, the proper action is not to
immediately uphold one and annul the other, but rather give effect to both by harmonizing them if
possible.22 Accordingly, although the DENR requires a Wood Recovery Permit, an LGU is not
necessarily precluded from promulgating, pursuant to its power under the general welfare clause,
complementary orders, rules or ordinances to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged
forest products.
Notwithstanding, We still find that the Permits to Transport issued by Ruzol are invalid for his failure
to comply with the procedural requirements set forth by law for its enforcement.
Then and now, Ruzol insists that the Permit to Transport partakes the nature of transport fees levied
by the municipality for the use of public roads.23 In this regard, he argues that he has been conferred
by law the right to issue subject permits as an incident to the LGU’s power to create its own sources
of revenue pursuant to the following provisions of the LGC:
Section 153. Service Fees and Charges. – Local government units may impose and collect such
reasonable fees and charges for services rendered.
xxxx
Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. – Local government units may exercise
the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically
enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust,
excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That
the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not be enacted without any prior public
hearing conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis Ours.)
Ruzol further argued that the permits to transport were issued under his power and authority as
Municipal Mayor under Sec. 444 of the same law:
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions
upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance;
xxxx
vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine, forest, and other
resources of the municipality; provide efficient and effective property and supply management in the
municipality; and protect the funds, credits, rights and other properties of the municipality. (Emphasis
Ours.)
Ruzol is correct to a point. Nevertheless, We find that an enabling ordinance is necessary to confer
the subject permits with validity. As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or
charges under the LGC is exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan through the enactment of an
appropriate ordinance wherein the terms, conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed. 24 Needless
to say, one of the fundamental principles of local fiscal administration is that "local revenue is
generated only from sources expressly authorized by law or ordinance." 25
It is likewise expressly stated in Sec. 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC that the authority of the municipal
mayor to issue licenses and permits should be "pursuant to a law or ordinance." It is the
Sangguniang Bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, which is mandated by law to enact
ordinances against acts which endanger the environment, i.e., illegal logging, and smuggling of logs
and other natural resources.26
In this case, an examination of the pertinent provisions of General Nakar’s Revised Municipal
Revenue Code27 and Municipal Environment Code28 reveals that there is no provision unto which the
issuance of the permits to transport may be grounded. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance for the
regulation and transportation of salvaged products, the permits to transport issued by Ruzol are
infirm.
Ruzol’s insistence that his actions are pursuant to the LGU’s devolved function to "manage and
control communal forests" under Sec. 17 of the LGC and DAO 1992-30 29 is specious. Although We
recognize the LGU’s authority in the management and control of communal forests within its
territorial jurisdiction, We reiterate that this authority should be exercised and enforced in
accordance with the procedural parameters established by law for its effective and efficient
execution. As can be gleaned from the same Sec. 17 of the LGC, the LGU’s authority to manage
and control communal forests should be "pursuant to national policies and is subject to supervision,
control and review of DENR."
As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the term "communal forest" 30 has a well-defined and
technical meaning.31 Consequently, as an entity endowed with specialized competence and
knowledge on forest resources, the DENR cannot be discounted in the establishment of communal
forest. The DILG, on behalf of the LGUs, and the DENR promulgated JMC 1998-01 which outlined
the following procedure:
Section 8.4 Communal Forest
8.4.1 Existing Communal Forest
The devolution to and management of the communal forest by the city and municipal governments
shall be governed by the following general procedures:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, and the concerned LGU shall undertake the actual
identification and assessment of existing communal forests. The assessment shall determine
the suitability of the existing communal forests. If these are no longer suitable, then these
communal forests may be disestablished. The Approval for disestablishment shall be by the
RED upon recommendation of the DENR-LGU assessment Team through the PENRO and
the RTD for Forestry;
(b) Existing communal forest which are found and recommended by the DENR-LGU
Assessment Team as still suitable to achieve their purpose shall be maintained as such.
Thereafter, the Sangguniang Panglungsod or Sangguniang Bayan where the communal
forest is located shall pass resolution requesting the DENR Secretary for the turnover of said
communal forest to the city or municipality. Upon receipt of said resolution, the DENR
Secretary shall issue an Administrative Order officially transferring said communal forest to
the concerned LGU. The DENR RED shall effect the official transfer to the concerned LGU
within fifteen (15) days from the issuance of the administrative order;
(c) Within twelve months from the issuance of the Administrative Order and turnover of said
communal forest to the city or municipality, the LGU to which the communal forest was
transferred shall formulate and submit to the Provincial ENR Council for approval a
management plan governing the sustainable development of the communal forest.
For the purpose of formulating the communal forest management plan, DENR shall, in coordination
with the concerned LGU, undertake a forest resource inventory and determine the sustainable level
of forest resource utilization and provide the LGU technical assistance in all facets of forest
management planning to ensure sustainable development. The management plan should include
provision for replanting by the communities and the LGUs of the communal forests to ensure
sustainability.
8.4.2 Establishment of New Communal Forest
The establishment of new communal forests shall be governed by the following guidelines:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, together with the concerned city/municipal LGU shall jointly
identify potential communal forest areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned
city/municipality.
(b) Communal forests to be established shall be identified through a forest land use planning
to be undertaken jointly between the DENR and the concerned LGU. The ensuing forest land
use plan shall indicate, among others, the site and location of the communal forests within
the production forest categorized as such in the forest land use plan;
(c) Once the forest land use plan has been affirmed, the local chief executive shall initiate the
passage by the LGU’s sanggunian of a resolution requesting the DENR Secretary to issue
an Administrative Order declaring the identified area as a communal forest. The required
administrative order shall be issued within sixty (60) days after receipt of the resolution;
(d) Upon acceptance of the responsibility for the communal forest, the city/municipal LGU
shall formulate the management plan and submit the same to its ENR Council. The
management plan shall include provision for replanting by the communities and the LGUs of
the communal forests to ensure sustainability.
The communal forests of each municipality shall in no case exceed a total of 5,000 hectares.
(Emphasis Ours.)
It is clear, therefore, that before an area may be considered a communal forest, the following
requirements must be accomplished: (1) an identification of potential communal forest areas within
the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality; (2) a forest land use plan which shall
indicate, among other things, the site and location of the communal forests; (3) a request to the
DENR Secretary through a resolution passed by the Sangguniang Bayan concerned; and (4) an
administrative order issued by DENR Secretary declaring the identified area as a communal forest.
In the present case, the records are bereft of any showing that these requirements were complied
with. Thus, in the absence of an established communal forest within the Municipality of General
Nakar, there was no way that the subject permits to transport were issued as an incident to the
management and control of a communal forest.
This is not to say, however, that compliance with abovementioned statutory requirements for the
issuance of permits to transport foregoes the necessity of obtaining the Wood Recovery Permit from
the DENR. As earlier discussed, the permits to transport may be issued to complement, and not
substitute, the Wood Recovery Permit, and may be used only as an additional measure in the
regulation of salvaged forest products. To elucidate, a person seeking to transport salvaged forest
products still has to acquire a Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR as a prerequisite before
obtaining the corresponding permit to transport issued by the LGU.
Main Issue:
Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions
The foregoing notwithstanding, Ruzol cannot be held guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions as
defined and penalized under Art. 177 of the RPC, to wit:
Art. 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person who shall knowingly and falsely
represent himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the
Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense of official position,
shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do
so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. (Emphasis
Ours.)
As the aforementioned provision is formulated, there are two ways of committing this crime: first, by
knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any
department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or second, under
pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public
officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being
lawfully entitled to do so.32 The former constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority, while the latter
act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions. 33
In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official functions for issuing 221 permits
to transport salvaged forest products under the alleged "pretense of official position and without
being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources."34 The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the crime were
attendant in the present case because the authority to issue the subject permits belongs solely to the
DENR.35
We rule otherwise.
First, it is settled that an accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved
and that to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be
established by the prosecution.36 As held by this Court in People v. Sitco:37
The imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role in our criminal justice system, the
accused, during a criminal prosecution, having a stake interest of immense importance, both
because of the possibility that he may lose his freedom if convicted and because of the certainty that
his conviction will leave a permanent stain on his reputation and name. (Emphasis supplied.)
Citing Rabanal v. People,38 the Court further explained:
Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be deprived
of his life, liberty, or even property. Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the petitioner to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof
beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The constitutional presumption of
innocence requires courts to take "a more than casual consideration" of every circumstance of doubt
proving the innocence of petitioner. (Emphasis added.)
Verily, an accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his or her guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt and it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion,
so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty. 39 As
explained by this Court in People v. Berroya:40
The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt lies in the fact that "(i)n a criminal prosecution, the
State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands;
with unlimited means of command; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded
as public officers, and therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty
often in striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for
liberty if not for life. These inequalities of position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to
be no conviction when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt."
Indeed, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility
of error, produces absolute certainty; moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.41 However, contrary to the ruling of the
Sandiganbayan, We find that a careful scrutiny of the events surrounding this case failed to prove
that Ruzol is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of usurpation of official
functions of the DENR.
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecution’s theory that
the DENR is the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged
forest products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official functions that properly
belong to the DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the
authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that,
pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be
gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace the
Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject
permits under his authority as municipal mayor and independently of the official functions granted to
the DENR. The records are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false
pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the
Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.
Second, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in good faith.
It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano, 42 this Court enunciated that good faith is a
defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official functions. 43 The term "good faith" is
ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from
knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to
abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even though technicalities of law,
together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transaction
unconscientious."44 Good faith is actually a question of intention and although something internal, it
can be ascertained by relying not on one’s self-serving protestations of good faith but on evidence of
his conduct and outward acts.45
In dismissing Ruzol’s claim of good faith, the Sandiganbayan reasoned as follows:
If it is really true that Ruzol believed himself to be authorized under R.A. 7160 to issue the subject
permits, why did he have to secure the approval of the various NGOs, People’s Organizations and
religious organizations before issuing the said permits? He could very well have issued subject
permits even without the approval of these various organizations if he truly believed that he was
legally empowered to do so considering that the endorsement of these organizations is not required
by law. That Ruzol had to arm himself with their endorsement could only mean that he actually knew
that he had no legal basis for issuing the said permits; thus he had to look elsewhere for support and
back-up.46 (Emphasis Ours.)
We, however, cannot subscribe to this posture as there is neither legal basis nor established
doctrine to draw a conclusion that good faith is negated when an accused sought another person’s
approval. Neither is there any doctrine in law which provides that bad faith is present when one
seeks the opinion or affirmation of others.
Contrary to the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan, We find that the conduct of the public
consultation was not a badge of bad faith, but a sign supporting Ruzol’s good intentions to regulate
and monitor the movement of salvaged forest products to prevent abuse and occurrence of
untoward illegal logging. In fact, the records will bear that the requirement of permits to transport was
not Ruzol’s decision alone; it was, as earlier narrated, a result of the collective decision of the
participants during the Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly. As attested to by Bishop Julio Xavier
Labayen, it was the participants who agreed that the subject permits be issued by the Office of the
Mayor of General Nakar, through Ruzol, in the exercise of the latter’s authority as local chief
executive.47
The Sandiganbayan also posits the view that Ruzol’s good faith is negated by the fact that if he truly
believed he was authorized to issue the subject permits, Ruzol did not have to request the presence
and obtain the permission of PENRO Rogelio Delgado Sr. during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly. 48
The graft court’s above posture, however, does not commend itself for concurrence. If, indeed,
Ruzol willfully and deliberately intended to usurp the official functions of the DENR as averred by the
prosecution, he would not have asked the presence of a DENR official who has the authority and
credibility to publicly object against Ruzol’s allegedly intended usurpation. Thus, the presence of
PENRO Delgado during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly does not negate, but strengthens Ruzol’s claim
of good faith.
As a final note, We emphasize that the burden of protecting the environment is placed not on the
shoulders of DENR alone––each and every one of us, whether in an official or private capacity, has
his or her significant role to play. Indeed, protecting the environment is not only a responsibility but
also a right for which a citizen could and should freely exercise. Considering the rampant forest
denudation, environmental degradation and plaguing scarcity of natural resources, each of us is now
obligated to contribute and share in the responsibility of protecting and conserving our treasured
natural resources.
Ruzol chose to exercise this right and to share in this responsibility by exercising his authority as
municipal mayor––an act which was executed with the concurrence and cooperation of non-
governmental organizations, industry stakeholders, and the concerned citizens of General Nakar.
Admittedly, We consider his acts as invalid but it does necessarily mean that such mistakes
automatically demand Us to rule a conviction. This is in consonance with the settled principle that "all
reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime should be indulged in for the benefit
of the accused."49
Under our criminal judicial system, "evil intent must unite with the unlawful act for a crime to exist,"
as "there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting." 50 Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea.
In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Ruzol
possessed that "criminal mind" when he issued the subject permits. What is clear from the records is
that Ruzol, as municipal mayor, intended to regulate and monitor salvaged forest products within
General Nakar in order to avert the occurrence of illegal logging in the area. We find that to hold him
criminally liable for these seemingly noble intentions would be a step backward and would run
contrary to the standing advocacy of encouraging people to take a pro-active stance in the protection
of the environment and conservation of our natural resources.
Incidentally, considering the peculiar circumstances of the present case and considering further that
this case demands only the determination of Ruzol's guilt or innocence for usurpation of official
functions under the RPC, for which the issue on the validity of the subject Permits to Transport is
only subsidiary, We hereby resolve this case only for this purpose and only in this instance, pro hac
vice, and, in the interest of justice, rule in favor of Ruzol' s acquittal.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the December 19, 2008 Decision of the Sandiganbayan First
Division in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259, finding Leovegildo R. Ruzol guilty of
violating Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol is, thus, ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt of the crimes
as charged.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. P-03-1675. August 6, 2003
ELENA F. PACE, complainant, v. RENO M. LEONARDO, Clerk of

Court II, MCTC, Branch 5, Odiongan, Romblon, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In a complaint1 filed on May 28, 2002, complainant Elena F. Pace

charged respondent Reno M. Leonardo, Clerk of Court II, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 5, with
usurpation of judicial functions and gross ignorance of law.
Complainant was the offended party in Criminal Case No. OD-6516,

entitled People v. Raf Yap, for grave slander before said trial court.
According to her complaint, the accused, Raf Yap, after posting a
cash bond of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), managed to go
abroad. Upon his return nine years later, Yap pleaded guilty to the
offense of grave slander as charged. Consequently, on September
13, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment2 finding Yap guilty of
grave slander and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for four months. This decision was later modified on
September 27, 2001,3 to include an award of P23,000.00 as
damages in favor of complainant.
Thereafter, Yap approached respondent and verbally requested for

the release of his cash bond. Respondent, acting on the verbal
request but without an order from the court, released the cash bond
to Yap.4 Thus, the presiding judge, Judge Jessie F. Foja, issued an
Order5 on October 18, 2001 for the immediate arrest of Yap unless
he posted bail of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) again.
On same day that the order for his immediate arrest was issued,
Yap presented to the respondent a deposit slip in the amount
of P5,000.00 allegedly deposited in the courts bank account,
Account No. 1161-0000-58, with the Land Bank of the
Philippines.6 Respondent accepted this deposit slip as Yaps cash
bond, hence the court lifted the order for Yaps rearrest.7 cräläwvirtualibräry
In his Comment8 submitted to this Court on July 24, 2002,

respondent claimed that he did not release the cash bond on his
own and asserted that he was merely following the verbal directive
of the presiding judge, Judge Jessie F. Foja.9 Respondent averred
that on September 17, 2001, Raf Yap requested the release of the
amount of the cash bond he had earlier filed. Because there was no
Motion for the Withdrawal of the Cash Bond, respondent refused to
process the release of said cash bond. But Yap then went to Judge
Jessie F. Foja and begged for the release of the cash bond, pointing
out that he had already applied for probation and that the decision
of September 13, 2001 did not provide for any civil liability.
Respondent claimed that Judge Foja favorably acted upon Yaps
request and verbally ordered him to release Yaps bail bond.10 cräläwvirtualibräry
Respondent denied any irregularity surrounding the release of Yaps

cash bond. He claimed that the withdrawal slip11 dated September
17, 2001, executed for the release of the cash bond was duly signed
by Judge Foja and counter-signed by him as mandated by Supreme
Court Circular No. 50-95, which provides for the guidelines and
procedures in the manner of collections and deposits of fiduciary
funds.12
cräläwvirtualibräry
The respondent asserted that his acceptance of Yaps cash bond,

posted pursuant to the Order of October 18, 2001, was also in
accordance with said circular because the cash was deposited in the
courts account with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Odiongan
Branch, under Savings Account No. 1161-0000-58.13 cräläwvirtualibräry
In its memorandum14 dated November 7, 2002, the Office of the

Court Administrator (OCA) found the respondent liable for
usurpation of judicial function and gross ignorance of the law. The
OCA recommended that the respondent be ordered to pay a fine of
two thousand pesos (P2,000.00), with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.
By Resolution15 of this Court dated January 13, 2003, this case was
re-docketed as a regular administrative matter. The issue now
before us is whether the OCAs recommendation should be
sustained.
After a careful review of the records of this case, we are unable to

agree with the OCA. There is usurpation of judicial function when a
person who is not a judge attempts to perform an act the authority
for which the law has vested only upon a judge. Since the release of
fiduciary funds is not a purely judicial act, there is no ground to hold
the respondent liable for usurpation of judicial function.
As to the charge of ignorance of law, in connection with the

allegation that the respondent accepted a deposit slip as cash bond,
the OCAs findings are without basis. In this case, the official receipt,
O.R. No. 7032068,[16 issued on October 18, 2001 to Raf Yap clearly
shows that what respondent received was P5,000 cash and not a
deposit slip evidencing a previous deposit with the courts account
with the Land Bank of the Philippines. The deposit slip, in turn,
shows that on the same day that the cash bond of five thousand
pesos was received from Raf Yap, respondent deposited the amount
to the courts account with the Land Bank of the Philippines.
Respondents conduct, including his signature on the deposit slip, is
in accord with the authority stated in the 2002 Revised Manual for
Clerks of Court allowing the court officer to accept cash bond in
criminal cases.17 That the deposit slip bore the same date as O.R.
No. 7032068 supports respondents claim that he deposited
the P5,000 cash in the courts account with the Land Bank of the
Philippines.
Circular No. 50-95 requires the Clerk of Court to deposit with the
Land Bank of the Philippines within twenty-four (24) hours from
receipt all collections from bailbonds, rental deposits, and other
fiduciary collections. An official receipt or certificate of deposit
signed by the Clerk of Court with photographs of the accused should
be presented to the court for its approval of the bailbond.18 Clearly,
the respondent herein performed his duty in due course.
However, respondent is administratively liable for violation of

Supreme Court Circular No. 50-95 governing the release of fiduciary
funds. The cash bond forms part of the fiduciary fund and as such, it
is covered by said circular requiring a court order to accompany
every withdrawal slip. The circular further requires that the
presiding judge and the clerk of court must sign the withdrawal slip.
These requirements are mandatory because they serve to ensure
full accountability for the funds. As repeatedly emphasized by this
Court, the fiduciary fund is in the nature of a trust fund.
Consequently, amounts pertaining thereto could not be withdrawn
without authority of the proper court.19cräläwvirtualibräry
As a Clerk of Court, respondent performs a very delicate function.

He is the custodian of the courts funds and revenues, property and
premises.20 As such, he is liable for any loss, shortage, destruction,
or impairment of said funds and property. He is also entrusted with
the primary responsibility of correctly and effectively implementing
regulations regarding fiduciary funds. Safekeeping of funds and
collections is essential to an orderly administration of justice, and no
protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of the
Circular designed to promote full accountability for government
funds.21 The respondents act of releasing the bail bond upon a mere
verbal order allegedly of the presiding judge is a violation of Circular
No. 50-95 governing the deposits and withdrawals of fiduciary
funds. Even if such verbal order were true, respondent should have
reduced it into writing, so that the judge concerned could have
formally affixed his signature thereto.
It bears emphasizing that the behavior of everyone connected with

an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the
presiding judge to the lowest rank, is circumscribed with the heavy
burden of high degree of responsibility.22 Their conduct at all times
must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but
above all else, it must be in accordance with the law and the rules.
The respondent needs no reminder that as an important officer in
the dispensation of justice, one of his primary duties is to uphold
the law and implement the pertinent rules. He must be assiduous in
the performance of his duties because he performs delicate
administrative functions essential to the prompt and proper
administration of justice.23 He serves as an exemplar for other court
employees, whose duties and responsibilities must be strictly
performed. Branch Clerks of Court play a key role in the
complement of the court and cannot be permitted to slacken on
their jobs under one pretext or another. The Court will not
countenance any act or omission on the part of all those involved in
the administration of justice which would violate the norms of public
accountability.
Considering that the respondent relied on the verbal directive of

Judge Foja, and that the withdrawal slip bears the signature of the
presiding judge, pursuant to the mandate of Circular No. 50-95, this
Court finds the penalty recommended by the OCA needs
modification. The fine to be imposed on respondent should only be
in the amount of one thousand pesos.24 cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, respondent Reno M. Leonardo, Clerk of Court II,

MCTC, Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 5, is found liable for violation of
Supreme Court Circular No. 50-95 and is ORDERED to pay a FINE in
the amount of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

81563 December 19, 1989

G.R. No. 82512 December 19, 1989

Paredes Law Office for petitioner.

Herein lies the first error of the trial court.

The Solicitor General explains why this conclusion is erroneous:

1. No undue injury was caused to the Government

Q In conducting the pre-audit, did you determine the reasonableness

Q Is it not a procedure in your office that before payment is given by

A Correct, Your Honor, but it depends on the kind of transaction there

A No, Your Honor.

A Because in the Deed of Sale as being noted there, there is a

A Yes, Your Honor. The only thing we do is to determine whether

Q My point is this. Did you not consider it unusual for a piece of

A No, Your Honor. In all cases usually, payments made by the

Q That is usual procedure utilized in road right of way transaction?

A Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, p. 18, April 27,1987).

A As what do you mean of the certification, ma'am?

Q Certification of Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz in relation to PD No. 296, A

A ... The questioning of the purchase price is now beyond the

The Solicitor General summarizes the participation of petitioner Data as follows:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

On 14 August 1997, 57 Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against

CASE DATE OF COMMISSION TYPE/DESCRIPTION OF

24043 January 16, 1993 to One (1) unit FIERA BLUE

On 17 August 1998, when arraigned, petitioner and accused Tagupa, assisted by

On 15 October 1998, pre-trial was concluded.10 Thereafter, trial ensued.

The evidence of the prosecution, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, are as follows:

ESTANISLAO BARRETE YUNGAO (hereinafter, "Yungao") declared that he was employed

On 6 May 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed decision convicting

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused TIMOTEO A GARCIA GUILTY

Petitioner is now before us assigning as errors the following:

1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF SECTION

2. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND

3. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND

4. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED AND IN THE PROCESS VIOLATED THE

5. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED WHEN IT OBSERVED DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF

Can petitioner be found guilty of Indirect Bribery? cralawlibrary

K.V. Faylona & Associates for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

This is a Petition for review of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan.

Upon consideration of the evidence. We find the p petitions version credible.

We find merit in the Petition.

Did the petitioner accept the supposed bribe money?

criminal proceeding has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

NICANOR E. ESTRELLA, Petitioner, v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the Decision 1 of the

Cash on hand P46,756.00 9

Cash advances 65,182.95 11

Fully paid payrolls/vouchers 68,692.91 12

Voucher No. 61 3,977.28 13

Consolidated and presented in tabulated form, petitioner’s accountability appears as

ACCOUNTABILITY CASH CASH

TOTAL P247,753.28 P249,829.25

a. Fully paid payroll/vouchers 68,692.91

b. Voucher No. 61 3,977.28

Cash Items and Cash on

Hand Produced during the

b. Cash advances 65,182.95

Liquidation under 12,085.39

OR No. 5975542 9,500.00

TOTAL CREDIT TO 250,148.97 29,083.57

Less P2,395.69 20 and 2,395.69