Fuhse - The Meaning Structure of Social Networks

The Meaning Structure of Social Networks∗
JAN A. FUHSE
Universität Stuttgart
This essay proposes to view networks as sociocultural structures. Following authors

from Leopold von Wiese and Norbert Elias to Gary Alan Fine and Harrison White,
networks are configurations of social relationships interwoven with meaning. Social
relationships as the basic building blocks of networks are conceived of as dynamic
structures of reciprocal (but not necessarily symmetric) expectations between al-
ter and ego. Through their transactions, alter and ego construct an idiosyncratic
“relationship culture” comprising symbols, narratives, and relational identities. The
coupling of social relationships to networks, too, is heavily laden with meaning. The
symbolic construction of persons is one instance of this coupling. Another instance is
the application of social categories (like race or gender), which both map and struc-
ture social networks. The conclusion offers an agenda for research on this “meaning
structure of social networks.”
In research on social networks, the structure of relationships is depicted as the

decisive variable leading to diverse phenomena like status attainment, intellectual
creativity, or collective action. Network research thereby usually pays little attention
to the expectations, symbols, schemata, and cultural practices embodied in interper-
sonal structures: the meaning structure of social networks. This essay argues for the
importance of this cultural level in sociological analysis, and it offers a theoretical
sketch for the interplay of structure and meaning in networks and of its method-
ological implications. Its focus lies on mechanisms of this interplay in networks,
systematizing theoretical arguments, and empirical evidence. This sketch draws heav-
ily on the relational sociology of Harrison White and others, while relating it to
the categories and methods of empirical research. It incorporates insights from di-
verse research traditions such as systems theory, social psychological research on
relationships, symbolic interactionism, and social anthropology. The main argument
runs against a purely structural understanding of networks. But I also argue against
individualist accounts, which depict social structure as the aggregate of actors’ in-
dependent actions, and against views of culture as independent of its grounding in
social structure.
The first section discusses the role of meaning in network analysis on a theoreti-
cal and methodological level. It is argued that social structure is substantively com-
posed of cultural constructs such as expectations, identities, and categories. Therefore,
∗ Address correspondence to: Jan A. Fuhse, Institute for Cultural and Technological Research, Univer-
sität Stuttgart, Geschwister-Scholl-Straße 24, 70174 Stuttgart, Germany. Tel.: +49-711-685-82955; Fax:
+49-711-685-82813; E-mail: jan@fuhse.net. This paper was presented at the 2007 Sunbelt Conference on
Corfu. Research on the topic was facilitated by a Feodor-Lynen fellowship of the Alexander von Humboldt
foundation at the Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy at Columbia University. I am
indebted to Ron Breiger, Frederic Godart, Joscha Legewie, Dean Lusher, John Levi Martin, Sophie
Mützel, Matthias Thiemann, Harrison White, Anna Zamora, and the late Chuck Tilly (who even in bad
medical times never failed to give good advice to his students and colleagues) for helpful comments and
suggestions.
Sociological Theory 27:1 March 2009

C American Sociological Association. 1430 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20005
52 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
network research has to deal with the interplay of structure and meaning. In the
next section, I present a historical overview of how culture was incorporated into the
different strands of network research. Three subsequent sections deal with different
aspects of meaning in networks in more detail: social relationships are depicted as
intersubjective constructs of expectations and cultural forms; network structure, it is
argued, is based on the coupling of relationships in identities; and forms of meaning
diffused through relationships make for a “network culture.” The conclusion offers
a list of research questions on the interplay of structure and meaning in networks.
LEVELS OF NETWORK RESEARCH

Research on social networks deals with at least four interrelated levels. The first level
is the empirically observed network of social relationships as an analytical construct.
On this level, researchers often deal with 1s and 0s, for observed and nonobserved
dyadic relationships between actors. The 1s and 0s are, of course, rough abstractions
of a complex social reality: a relationship is observed to exist or not to exist—
depending on operational definitions of relationships. What a relationship actually
is, or whether the relationships observed differ fundamentally, has to be bracketed for
analytical purposes. This highly abstracted view on social structures has allowed for a
wide array of very fruitful research, examining the overall structure of relationships,
or individual variance in the composition of ego-centered networks. It is useful,
though, to look behind the abstractions and assumptions of this analytical picture
of networks—at what the picture is designed to depict.
The analytical construct of a social network is usually based on observations
of two other levels of social networks: transactions and expectations between ac-
tors. Transactions are analyzed, for example, in trade networks (Erikson and Bear-
man 2006) or through recording conversation in meetings (Gibson 2005). Transac-
tion or communication processes have a distinctly supra-personal quality (Luhmann
1984:191ff; Tilly 2002:48f; White 1995a:1037). Transactions take place between peo-
ple (or corporate actors), and they are shaped more by structural and situational
constraints than by preexistent intentions (Gibson 2000). Everything that happens in
networks can be subsumed under this notion of “transactions,” be it verbal exchange,
or nonverbal cues. Analyzing transactions is probably the most reliable method for
detecting network structures. For an analysis of transactions, the nature of the rele-
vant transactions has to be specified: Are they cooperative or conflicting, is exchange
mutual, equal, even, unbalanced, or uni-directional?
While transactions are what happen in networks, the third level is why these trans-
actions occur. This is the level of interpersonal (or interactor) expectations that
evolve in and guide transactions. Trade transactions, for example, are either the
consequence of contracts (themselves the result of negotiations) or of previous expe-
rience that particular goods can be sold (for a certain price) at a particular location
(or similar ones). Thus, in trade, transactions are guided by expectations. The same
holds in personal relationships, as in any other network ties. Relatively stable patterns
of transactions only emerge through the concurrent establishment of a structure of
expectations on the behavior of actors in the network. These expectations are part
of the meaning structure of a network, since they are inherently based on meaning.
They make sense of previous transactions by establishing definitions of “what is go-
ing on” (Goffman 1974). And they lead to further transactions, prescribing conflict,
cooperation, or obedience between parties. This meaning structure of a network con-
sists of definitions of ties as a particular type of tie (love, friendship, competition,
THE MEANING STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS 53
conflict, etc.) and of the construction of identities of the actors involved (as related
to other actors) (Somers 1994; Wood 1982; Yeung 2005). Often, these expectations
result from complex negotiations of relationships and of identities (McLean 1998).
The meaning structure of a network is a fuzzy social reality that has been lit-
tle theorized. One key problem is that it features two interrelated levels: first, the
interpersonally established expectations and cultural forms; and second, the level of
individual perception and expectations. Following Max Weber and Alfred Schütz, ac-
tion theorists and phenomenologists have focused on the second level. For Weber,
any action is directed by the subjective meaning of the action (1922:1ff). Accordingly,
the causes for transactions would have to be traced on the individual level. Another
line of theorizing has stressed the interpersonal and shared nature of cultural forms
(Douglas 1986; Geertz 1973; Parsons 1951:326ff). For Niklas Luhmann, meaning is
always created and reproduced on the social level (1984:92ff). 1 Certainly, the two
levels exist and they interplay in complex ways (DiMaggio 1997). As will be argued,
both levels are important. Every network context produces its own culture of inter-
subjectively shared expectations. But actors also carry cultural forms “in their heads”
from context to context.
How can this meaning structure of social networks be analyzed? Individual con-
ceptions and expectations are most often the basis of network research. Network
generators, like the one developed by Claude Fischer, draw on individual accounts
of network ties (1982a:284ff). When analyzed on this level, the network is equated
with the aggregate of its subjective perceptions by the actors interviewed. These
subjective accounts in interviews often show remarkable differences in the under-
standing of categories (Bearman and Parigi 2004; Fischer 1982b) and are, of course,
influenced by the interview situation (Sudman et al. 1996:55ff). The social level of
network culture is more difficult to analyze—it cannot be tapped in interviews. In
order to grasp intersubjectively constructed relationship definitions and relational
identities, one has to analyze the content of transactions. This can be done through
the analysis of documents or of speech acts (Gibson 2005; McLean 1998; Mützel
2002). While quantification of relationship and identity definitions is possible, it
takes a lot of effort and usually requires extensive qualitative exploration.
The fourth level of network research concerns the order principles underlying the
structuring of expectations and transactions. These order principles may be op-
portunity structures like residence, and foci, which enable people to meet (Gould
1995:153ff; Feld 1981; Festinger et al. 1950). Or they may be categories (like gen-
der, age, and ethnic descent) and relationship models (like love, kinship, and friend-
ship), which make for a structuring of ties and networks (McLean 1998; Rytina
and Morgan 1982). Thus, the order principles constitute a heterogeneous category
with very different mechanisms of imprint on networks. While opportunity struc-
tures affect transactions directly, by making certain transactions likely and others
unlikely, categories and relationship models are applied and incorporated into the
meaning structure of social networks (Yeung 2005). Categories and relationships,
1 Of course, some of these socially negotiated cultural forms persist on a level above the interpersonal
networks. They constitute an almost “objective” culture because they are extraordinarily stable, and they
are used in a number of very different contexts. Categories like gender or race form part of these quasi-
objective cultural forms, as do the “semantics” analyzed by Luhmann. However, even these cultural
forms rely on social contexts (the state, mass-media, etc.) for their diffusion and reproduction (Hannerz
1992:46ff). And of course, they can change over time or acquire a different meaning in different network
contexts. More will be said about the interplay between different levels of culture later, using the example
of gender (see “Network Culture”).
4. order principles
work through: opportunity categories &

structures relationship models
3. meaning structure
emergence & reproduction
definitions of identities
2. transactions expectations guide
& relationships
- subjective / social
transactions meaning
are analyzed through: interviews, document /

conversation analysis
1. analytical picture
of a network
Figure 1. Integrated Model of Network Research
of course, are themselves forms of meaning. Opportunity structures, however, are

more structural, but often not devoid of meaning. For example, people may move
to a specific neighborhood because they expect to meet certain people there. Simi-
larly, bars or sports are almost always connected to specific lifestyles and thus bear
a specific meaning for the people who attend them, and for the transactions that
take place there. Actual networks are affected by both types of order principles.
Opportunity structure enables (or prevents) contact in the first place. But categories
and relationship models order contacts into patterns of structural equivalence (Lor-
rain and White 1971). A singles dance venue, for example, provides opportunities
of contact as a focus of activity (Beattie et al. 2005). But only the application of
the gender category will usually make sure that male–female dyads emerge on the
dance-floor.
The role of these four levels of network research is sketched in Figure 1. The
assumed causal starting points are the order principles (level 4), which make for
a structuring of the transactions (2) and the meaning structure of social networks
(3). This occurs through the application of categories and relationship models, and
through the setting of opportunity structures for transactions. Transactions and the
meaning structure, together, constitute the network as a real social structure (as
opposed to its analytical image; level 1). They are intricately tied to each other:
the definitions of identities and relationships emerge in the course of transactions.
The expectations embodied in these definitions in turn guide future transactions. To
be more precise: Every transaction is laden with meaning. And the meaning structure
of a network exists only as embodied in transactions. Thus, the two levels are only
analytically distinct.
Of course, there is feedback from the network level to the order principles: cate-
gories and relationship models are reproduced and even modified in the interplay of
transactions and meaning structure. For example, the nature of the gender category
might change as a result of the ongoing negotiations in everyday life (Ridgeway and
Smith-Lovin 1999). Or members of a subculture might have an enhanced probability
of meeting each other (opportunity structure) if they move into specific neighbor-
hoods.
Transactions and meaning—as the “real” structure of a network—are mapped in

the analytical picture of a network (1). This “picture,” of course, can consist of
network matrices or of their graphic representation. The means of acquiring these
network data are interviews and the analysis of documents or conversation. Since
levels 2 and 3 are mapped in level 1, the actual analysis always draws a (statistical)
connection between the order principles (4) and this analytical picture of the network
(1). A network theory, however, has to deal with the mechanisms linking levels 1,
2, and 3 in more detail. In this essay, I want to focus on the role of the third
level—the meaning structure of social networks—and on the connections to the
other levels. What are the components of the meaning structure of networks? How
are these shaped by categories and relationship models? And how are transactions
interwoven with meaning in a network? These questions will be addressed directly
in the section “The Meaning of Social Relationships to Network Culture.” Before
that, the incorporation of issues of culture and meaning into the network research
tradition is sketched historically.
INCORPORATING CULTURE
The original network research from the 1950s well into the 1980s was little con-
cerned with cultural forms. The British anthropologists J. A. Barnes and Elizabeth
Bott invented the network concept to look behind apparent self-description of so-
cieties as structured by categories. Thus the original 1954 article of J. A. Barnes
described a Norwegian island parish as much less characterized by class divisions,
than by a relatively homogeneous mesh of personal relations. In a similar vein, Eliz-
abeth Bott showed that the gender division of labor in British families depended
on the structure of their wider social networks (1957). On the other hand, Philip
and Iona Mayer showed in their work that different lifestyles of urban migrants
in South Africa were rooted in a different organization of social relations (1961).
Around 1970, J. Clyde Mitchell called for an inclusion of aspects of meaning in
social anthropology, especially with regard to norms and the subjective meaning of
social relationships (1969:20ff, 1973:26ff). But only in the 1990s, Ulf Hannerz (1992)
and Thomas Schweizer (1996) wedded their social anthropological works with a
systematic concern for cultural aspects.
A similar process of incorporation of the level of meaning into network research
took place in North-America-centered sociological network research. Early socio-
metric and network research was mainly concerned with methodical refinement. The
crucial “breakthrough” was accomplished at Harvard in the 1970s, when Harrison
White and his colleagues developed the blockmodel technique (Breiger 2004:510ff;
Scott 2000:33ff). Blockmodeling maps networks into partitions of nodes with similar
connections to other nodes. This similarity of nodes in their connections is termed
“structural equivalence” (Lorrain and White 1971). Structurally equivalent actors do
not need to be connected to each other. For example, the analysis of the network
of artists in Cologne, Germany, revealed patterns of elite groups, young ambitious
groups in the semi-periphery, and of peripheral followers that were not connected
much to each other (Anheier et al. 1995). Blockmodeling originated in studies of kin-
ship (Boyd 1969; Lorrain 1975:107ff). In kinship, categories like “father,” “mother,”
“uncle,” etc. designate structurally equivalent positions in networks. Blockmodels,
now, do not start from these categories. Rather, they start with network data and
construe categories of structurally similar actors on the sole basis of data on their
connections to each other (Boorman and White 1976; White et al. 1976).
The role of meaning in these analyses is ambiguous. On the one hand, it is assumed
that networks are ordered by role categories like “father” or “follower.” Hence, the
aim of blockmodels is to identify the cultural order of a network, as incorporated
in categories of similar actors. But blockmodeling starts from an “anti-categorical
imperative”: it does not regard socially diffused categories as real, but rather looks
for underlying patterns in network structure (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994:1414).
In a way, this is in line with Barnes’s intention to question self-descriptions of social
structure as divided into classes, and to identify social structure empirically with the
network concept (1954). Blockmodeling tries to map the categorical order of social
networks, but it does so by ignoring preexisting categories and self-descriptions.
On the other hand, an important starting point for the blockmodel technique is
types of tie: “fathers” are typically connected to “mothers” through the tie “mar-
riage,” and to their children through “parenthood.” In their analysis of the network
of monks in a monastery, Harrison White, Scott Boorman, and Ronald Breiger dis-
tinguish between eight types of tie between the monks, from “like” and “esteem” to
“antagonism,” “disesteem,” and “blame” (1976:749ff). Thus, blockmodeling derives
categories of actors from network data based on the symbolic differentiation of dif-
ferent types of tie. Usually, this symbolic differentiation comes from self-reports in
interviews—the subjective meaning of social relationships. The idea is to arrive at an
empirically valid phenomenology of social networks by starting from self-descriptions
of ties and processing these in quantitative network analysis. Only rarely have these
categories of self-descriptions been subject to empirical inquiry, which showed that
standard typologies like “friendship” or “love” or even “discuss important mat-
ters” can mean very different things in different contexts (Bearman and Parigi 2004;
Fischer 1982b; Yeung 2005).
American network analysis has followed different intermingling roads from the
1970s watershed of blockmodeling. In 1992, Steven Brint has stressed the under-
lying assumptions about the role of culture in blockmodel analysis. In a similar
vein, Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin have argued for an increased attention
to the symbolic construction of categories and to the subjective meaning of actors
(1994). Harrison White’s own theoretical statement Identity and Control describes
networks as “phenomenological realities” and as “networks of meaning” (1992a:65,
67), composed of “stories” and “identities.” His special interest lies with the role of
language in organizing social networks (1992a:133ff, 1995b:714ff, 1997:57ff). While
White’s Identity and Control shows some theoretical continuities with his earlier work
on blockmodeling it pushes further to regarding culture and meaning as levels of
research in their own right, rather than merely underlying the network matrices of
blockmodels (Brint 1992; White 1992b). Other researchers have pursued this line
to analyzing networks of categories, instead of actors, through blockmodel analysis
(Martin 2000; Mohr 1994). According to John Mohr, the aim of this research is to
identify patterns of culture (1998). It is concerned with cultural networks between
linguistic terms, no longer directly with social networks of individuals or collec-
tive actors. Whether cultural and social networks show similar structural properties
remains to be seen.
In contrast to these studies, Peter Bearman has followed the “anti-categorical
imperative” and argued that social networks need not be structured by socially
known or diffused categories (1997). Rather, Bearman’s analysis of the network
of bride exchange among island Aborigines yields the picture of a “generalized
exchange” between blocks that did not correspond to any culturally denominable
categories. This is a strong statement for a classical structuralist research program
that questions rather than incorporates categories and self-descriptions. In this vein,
much of social network analysis still remains committed to a structuralist conception
of networks, for example, in the prominent works of Ronald Burt (1992), John
Padgett and Christopher Ansell (1993), or the physical network research by Duncan
Watts and others. These works (and many others) do not consider questions of
meaning in networks, or they infer “the meaning” of relational patterns simply from
the network structure, without addressing the level of meaning in empirical research.
Recently, Mark Granovetter reflected that “it seemed very important [for network
analysis] to abstract away from normative frameworks” and ideas, but that this led
to “the failure . . . to sufficiently appreciate and explicitly analyze the important role
of larger cultural and political forces” (2007:4).
Thus, we find within American network analysis a bifurcation between a more
structuralist understanding of networks, and one that treats culture as an important
aspect of social structure (Breiger 2004:518ff). The second position postulates that
social networks are not only inextricably tied to the level of meaning, but inher-
ently cultural: “social networks are seen not merely as locations for, or conduits of,
cultural formations, but rather as composed of culturally constituted processes of
communicative interaction” (Mische 2003:258). A number of authors have picked
up Harrison White’s view that social networks consist of dyadic stories between
identities (DiMaggio 1992; Emirbayer 1997; Ikegami 2005; Somers 1994; Tilly 2002).
In their incorporation of forms of meaning, these researchers have mainly drawn
on three strands in the sociology of culture. As exemplified by Margaret Somers,
narrative analysis is the main source for the analysis of stories in social relationships
(1994). A second strand is Ann Swidler’s theory of culture as tool-kit that is used
creatively by actors (1986; DiMaggio 1997). But the most important influence was
probably Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social structure as patterns of symbolic practice
(1980; Breiger 2000; Sewell 1992).
Interestingly, a number of similar attempts to wed the cultural and the structural
seem not to have had an impact on American network analysis. One early example
is the work of Norbert Elias, who conceives of social structures as “configurations”
with both structural and cultural aspects (1970). Another example is the work of
symbolic interactionists who argue that symbolic meaning evolves and is reproduced
in social interaction. But authors such as Tamotsu Shibutani (1955) and Herbert
Blumer (1969) have used the group rather than the network concept. However, their
perspective is easily reconcilable with social network analysis, as Robert Stebbins,
Gary Alan Fine, and Sherryl Kleinman have pointed out. They propose that social
networks should be seen as “subjective constructs” based on social relationships
as dyadic “definitions of the situation” (Fine and Kleinman 1983:97ff; Stebbins
1969:11). In addition, a more refined look at the processes in dyadic relationships
could benefit from social psychological and sociological work on social relationships
(Clark and Reis 1988; Duck 1988; McCall et al. 1970).
Diverse theoretical strands have viewed social networks as fused with meaning,
and have called for an incorporation of cultural aspects in the analysis of social
networks. Before discussing this incorporation in more detail, let me briefly address
the question: What difference does it make? I do this by briefly discussing the role of
meaning in networks in two recent studies that tackle the problem very differently:
Ronald Burt’s “The Gender of Social Capital” (1998) and King-To Yeung’s “What
Does Love Mean?” (2005). Burt’s study starts from the observation that his notion of
“structural holes” seems to have less explanatory power for the professional success
of women than for men among managers in a large American company (1998:13ff).
He goes on to identify a different pathway of success for women by looking specif-

ically at the relations to superiors, and introduces the concept of “borrowed social
capital,” which seems to account for the gender differences. Burt’s solution to the ini-
tial puzzle claims that women act as an outsider group in the manager networks and
therefore have to “borrow” social capital from powerful insiders (their superiors).
Thus, he assumes that gender has a specific meaning in these networks. But since he
relies solely on relational data, he cannot tackle this level of meaning directly.
King-To Yeung’s study similarly starts from a structural problem, namely, that
the communes that reported more “loving relationships” in Benjamin Zablocki’s
study of urban communes of the 1970s turned out to be less stable—they collapsed
more often than those with less “loving relationships” (2005:399ff). Like Burt, Yeung
proposes that the answer to the riddle is to be found on the level of meaning in
the networks studied—in this case, the meaning of reporting a “loving relationship.”
But in contrast to Burt, Yeung is able to study this level of meaning by relating
the different self-descriptions of relationships in communes with more and with less
loving relationships. Using the Galois lattice technique, he finds that the communes
with more loving relationships (at least 60% of all relationships) lack a clear-cut
structure of meaning for relating to each other—mainly because “love” seems to
have become a catch-all term in these communes incapable of discriminating between
relationships that are more or less intimate, and more or less reliable (2005:402ff).
Ronald Burt’s study represents the more common way of addressing questions
of meaning in network research—the meaning of categories and relationships is in-
ferred from the pure relational data, rather than actually tackled in quantitative or
qualitative research. King-To Yeung’s work, in contrast, is an example of the more
desirable pathway: to incorporate the level of meaning into our research strategies
and empirical analyses. The subsequent sections aim at providing a theoretical frame-
work for this incorporation of meaning, by drawing on the diverse theoretical and
empirical works already done in this direction. The next section stresses the cultural
nature of social relationships as the basic building blocks of social networks. Then
the focus lies on the interweaving social relationships in a network, and—in the last
section—on the socially shared culture in a network. I conclude with some research
questions on the interplay of cultural and structural aspects in networks.
THE MEANING OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Social networks consist of dyadic ties between individual and/or collective actors,
and their interweaving in a network structure. But what a tie is, and how it evolves,
is rarely discussed in network research. The usual approach is exemplified by Paul
Holland and Samuel Leinhardt:
For our purposes, relations are taken as givens. That is, we are not particularly
interested in investigating the substantive meaning of relations. We are satis-
fied to assume that their meaning and their significance are empirically based.
(1977:387)
In this section, I want to look behind this analytical approach of taking relations
as givens. Sociology and social psychology features numerous works on the nature of
and processes in social relationships. The obvious starting point is Georg Simmel’s
Formal Sociology. Simmel views dyadic relationships as the basic “forms” of society.
These forms can be filled with different meaning, according to the thoughts and
sentiments of the people involved. But a lot of social dynamics result from the forms
themselves (1908:17ff, 100ff). According to Simmel, it is primarily the interaction
between people, rather than their psychic processes, which determines how individuals
are tied to each other. However, his discussion of social forms such as subordination,
conflict, or the “tertium gaudens” is not quite clear about whether these forms are
ideal types of structure, or whether they follow available cultural models for relating.
A more precise definition of a social relationship can be found in Max Weber’s
work:
A social “relationship” is the behavior of multiple actors insofar as it is oriented

(in its meaning) towards the behavior of the others. A social relationship thus
consists precisely in the probability that social action is predictable (no matter
whence this probability). (1922:13) 2
Weber defines social relationships as the probability of specific actions between

people. In the first part of the definition he relates it to the subjective orientation of
actors toward one another’s actions. According to Weber and most of the theory of
action that follows (Giddens 1984), social structures exist in the minds of the people
involved, as the subjective meaning of social relationships. These are depicted as
structures of meaning, which make certain actions probable and others improbable.
By stressing the subjective level, Weber argued against a Hegelian tradition, which
viewed culture as something objective that exists above and beyond its diffusion
and reproduction in social processes. I argue that the primary nature of meaning is
neither subjective nor objective, but rather intersubjective—it only exists as incor-
porated in specific social structures between people. The subjective construction of
meaning—the categories, symbols, and schemes we use to make sense of this world
and to communicate with others—is highly determined by our social environments.
Accordingly, a relationship consists of interpersonally negotiated expectations and
other interpersonally established forms of meaning between two people. 3
In contrast to Weber, his contemporary Leopold von Wiese views social relation-
ships as processes, rather than relatively stable structures (1924:17). Relationships
consist in dynamics of coming closer or of increasing distance between people. But
he, too, locates them on the level of subjective meaning (1924:8f, 34). In their ef-
fort to incorporate the network concept into symbolic interactionism, Gary Alan
Fine and Sherryl Kleinman similarly conceive of the social dyad as a dynamic en-
tity based on the individuals’ perception of the relationship (1983:100). Are these
two conceptions of social relationships as structure or process antithetical and ir-
reconcilable? A possible synthesis depicts social relationships as entities that are
both structure and process: they are systems (Ruesch and Bateson 1949). Following
Talcott Parsons’s and Niklas Luhmann’s concept of “double contingency of action,”
people build up expectations about each others’ actions and each others’ expecta-
tions concerning one’s own actions in the course of interaction (Luhmann 1984:148ff;
2 Own translation. The original quote is as follows: “Soziale »Beziehung« soll ein seinem Sinngehalt
nach aufeinander gegenseitig eingestelltes und dadurch orientiertes Sichverhalten mehrerer heißen. Die
soziale Beziehung besteht also durchaus und ganz ausschließlich: in der Chance, dass in einer (sinnhaft)
anggebbaren Art sozial gehandelt wird, einerlei zunächst: worauf diese Chance beruht” (1921:13).
3 Of course, the intersubjective meaning in and of relationships is almost always construed by drawing on
available social framings for constructing the meaning of social relationships, be they “love,” “friendship,”
or categorical identities like “gender.” I will discuss these later. The important point here is that the
meaning of a relationship is not purely subjective or cognitive, but negotiated intersubjectively.
Parsons 1968:167ff). These interpersonally negotiated expectations are relatively sta-

ble constraints for action in any single situation. But through the process of mutual
attuning of expectations, social relationships change over time. They form dynamic
systems, both structure and process. Through this process, relationships bridge the
fundamental uncertainty between alter and ego (Berger 1988).
Social relationships as dynamic systems of interpersonal expectations are obviously
laden with meaning. But the term “expectations” probably leads to a too narrow
conception of cultural features in social relationships. As early as 1942, Howard L.
Becker and Ruth Hill Useem note in their Sociological Analysis of the Dyad:
Symphysis of interaction and participation in joint experiences result in concepts,

ideas, habits, and shared memories which to the members are symbolic of the
pair. These limited meanings tend to establish norms of action and reaction and
to have directive influence on the behavior of the pair when they are together
and when they are separated. (Becker and Useem 1942:16f)
In transactions between two people, a relationship culture evolves, with “concepts,

ideas, habits, and shared memories,” but also expectations (“norms of action and
reaction”). In a similar vein, social psychologists George McCall (1970:15f, 24) and
Julia Wood (1982) have insisted that social relationships are the culture that evolves
between two people. Empirical research demonstrates that in friendships and in love
relationships, a particular universe of symbolic forms emerges, with special idioms,
shared memories, and symbols of the relationship (Baxter 1987; Bell and Healey
1992; Hopper et al. 1981). So, when network researchers mark a relationship as
existing (1) or nonexisting (0), they really reduce this complex set of expectations
and other cultural forms to one byte of information. Whether this is analytically
sound has to be questioned with regard to the measurement of relationships and to
the specific research question.
The relationship culture comprises a relational definition of the situation (Mc-
Call 1970:11). This definition of what the relationship is about lies at the core of
the relationship. For example, when a relationship is defined (in the course of its
dyadic transactions) as “love,” this entails very different expectations than a rela-
tionship definition of “friendship,” “enmity,” or “extra-marital affair.” These are
“cultural blueprints” for the organization of a relationship, implying very different
interpersonal expectations (Bell and Healey 1992:308f). Such relationship models are
routinely adopted, tested, changed, or slightly modified in personal relationships.
They are culturally available “frames” for the definition of dyadic relationships,
providing answers to the question: “What is going on here?” (Goffman 1974:10f).
Viviana Zelizer describes this categorizing of relationships into culturally available
frames as “relational work” (2005:33ff). But these frames do not entirely prescribe
what is going on in a relationship—relationships can switch frames, they can modify
them, or explore the scope of any given frame. For example, “friendship” seems
to be a residual category for a wide range of relationship types (Fischer 1982b).
“Love,” in contrast, seems to imply a much more rigid set of expectations (Cancian
1987). Relationships can juggle these different framings to a certain extent—for
example, in flirting—and this is usually when a relationship can switch from “friend-
ship” to “love” (the opposite direction seems more problematic). While these cultural
frames generally provide widely available and accessible blueprints for interpersonal
expectations, they can also mean different things in different network settings (Yeung
2005). In order to explore the meaning structure of social networks, we need to have
a closer look at these relational frames, and at the processes by which they are
adopted, switched, and modified in personal relationships.
It is in these personal relationships that we develop our attitudes and our under-
standing of ourselves (Berger and Kellner 1964; Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954). Sym-
bolic interactionism argues that our subjective meaning and our “self” is developed
in our relationship with significant others (Cooley 1902:168ff; Mead 1934:135ff). This
assertion has been confirmed in empirical research (Yeung and Martin 2003). In gen-
eral, close intimate relationships seem to be much more important for our attitudes
and for the formation of our identities (Jamieson 1998). The more intimate a rela-
tionship, the more elaborated and idiosyncratic its culture, and the stronger its impact
on our worldview and our understanding of ourselves. “Secondary” or relatively “su-
perficial” encounters—for example, with the cashier at the local supermarket—seem
to be much more routinized and prescribed by the “cultural blueprints” for inter-
personal behavior than, say, a close friendship that has gone through a considerable
amount of negotiation and attuning.
Even social psychologists have noted that this meaning of a relationship (and the
formation of identities related to it) evolves in the course of transactions within the
relationship (Duck 1990:25; Wood 1982; Wood and Duck 2006). Relationships un-
fold and develop in transaction. To admire or secretly love somebody is not enough
to develop a love relationship—“love” has to be communicated and agreed upon
between alter and ego. The subjective meaning is less important than the inter-
subjective meaning communicated in relationships. Culture evolves in transactions,
and shapes these by providing expectations for future transactions. This is the in-
terplay of transactions (level 2) and the network culture (level 3) as depicted in
Figure 1.
In the terms of Harrison White, Margaret Somers, and Charles Tilly, social re-
lationships consist of “stories” relating “identities” (Somers 1994; Tilly 2002:8ff,
26ff; White 1992a:166ff, 196ff). The term “story” refers to the historic nature of
relationships—they evolve over time in the course of transactions, by building up,
modifying, and discarding interpersonal expectations. But it also refers to a narra-
tive approach: personal relationships are shaped by the self-descriptions as narrated
within the relationships and to others (Bochner et al. 2000; Somers 1994; Swidler
2001). These stories work on the intersubjective rather than the subjective level—even
though a subjective understanding obviously has to be involved.
The concept of identity is a more complicated one (White 1992a:312ff, 1993:48ff).
On the subjective level, it refers to an understanding of what I am in relation to
others (Taylor 1989:27). As has been argued above, this understanding of ourselves
develops in our relationships to significant others. On the social level, identity is
the “face” of actors visible to others. In this sense, identity is a social construction
that evolves in transactions with others (McCall and Simmons 1966). For example,
actors may engage in impression management in order to convey a certain image
to others—but they may also fail in their impression management (Goffman 1959).
In the academic field, whether a researcher is regarded as a star professor or an
outsider is the result of communication within the academic discourse, and not
necessarily based on innate qualities of the researcher (Collins 1998). As King-To
Yeung and John Levi Martin have shown, the two levels of identity—the subjective
and the social one—are strongly intertwined (2003). Identity processes are, therefore,
an important site for the coupling of psychic and social processes.
In the framework of Talcott Parsons, the interaction between alter and ego (and
the uncertainty inherent in it) leads to the adoption of roles (1961:41ff). Roles are
bundles of expectations directed to incumbents of positions, or even to specific in-

dividuals. In interaction, people continuously “take” culturally and institutionally
given roles, such as “husband,” “wife,” “client,” and “friend.” Or they “make roles”
by modifying the expectations they encounter, for example, in a marriage (Turner
1962). Roles are thus tied to relationship frames, but they are also subject to nego-
tiations within the relationship. In everyday life, people are subject to expectations
from different roles (as father, teacher, club member, etc.). In the last 30 years, the
role concept has been displaced in sociology by the broader and fuzzier identity con-
cept. But it is useful as a reminder of the formal and culturally given expectations
connected to relational identities—and it has a long tradition in network research
(DiMaggio 1992).
While identity seems to be the broader, more encompassing concept for the social
“face” of a person, roles are the specific expectations that come with positions and
with the adoption of relational frames. As such, roles make for the coupling of
processes in different social relationships. This leads to the next topic—the structure
of networks. It was the aim of this section to show that social relationships are
culturally patterned, and that they very much depend on the social construction of
meaning in expectations, relational frames, stories, identities, and roles. But how do
relationships connect to form a network?
NETWORK STRUCTURE
Social networks are not the mere sum of social relationships—they are the structure
of interrelating ties. Numerous measures of network structure can only be applied
on this level of intersecting ties. In principle, it is conceivable to have singular
relationships following cultural patterns, and social networks as the mere structure
of these culturally formed ties. I want to advance the argument that even the structure
of networks is based on meaning. Whereas the cultural nature of dyadic relationships
is well documented, the meaning level of network structure has rarely been observed.
I will argue at the triadic level as the most basic example of network structure. If
dyads can be shown to mesh into triads on the level of meaning, this should hold
for larger structures, too.
Let me consider a rather simple example: Mark Granovetter’s theory of the
strength of weak ties is based on the idea—taken from balance theory—that strong
relationships are transitive (1973:1362ff; Cartwright and Harary 1956). If A and B
have a strong relationship and B and C similarly, chances are high that A and C will
develop a strong relationship, too. This coupling of relationships is a basic mecha-
nism underlying the formation of network structures and thus leads beyond the level
of singular relationships. While the assumption of transitivity of strong ties may be
reasonable in most cases, it does not hold under all circumstances. For example, A
may be B’s spouse and B and C are having an affair (let me consider both the mar-
riage and the affair as “strong ties”). It is likely that the two relationships influence
each other. But it is unlikely that A and C form a strong relationship. B will usually
try to conceal his affair with C from A. If A and C meet eventually their relationship
will likely be one of rivalry, rather than of friendship. One might argue that triads
of married couples and lovers are instable constellations. But that depends on the
possibility to separate the two dyads factually and on the level of meaning. Another
example is patronage: if A and C are clients of B in a mafia network it does not
follow that A and C even know each other (Eisenstadt and Roninger 1980). Rather,
they find themselves in structurally equivalent positions toward B (as do A and C
in the first example of the married couple and the lover, at least in some respects).
In these two cases, the actual network structures result from the cultural patter-
ing of relationships between role categories. Culture inhibits friendship between the
lover and the husband (or wife), and it does not always suggest friendship between
clients of a patron. Friendship, in contrast, is a relationship type leaning toward
transitivity (Adams and Allan 1998). It is the central assumption of the blockmodel
technique that network structure is shaped by the types of tie between actors, and by
role categories (see “Incorporating Culture” above). Friendship, patronage, marriage,
and extramarital affairs are cultural blueprints that entail specific expectations for
interpersonal conduct between alter and ego. But these relational frames also include
expectations about behavior toward others, be it the wife, the lover, or the fellow
client.
These role categories and the relational frames to which they are connected thus
make for a coupling of transactions in relationships based on meaning. It is achieved
through the application of culturally available role patterns. This application and
coupling of role categories has been little researched empirically. One instance that
has been treated in some depth is the family (Dunn 1988; de Singly 1996). Here,
obviously, the “father,” “mother,” and “child” categories are related in culturally
standardized ways—and this relation between categories makes for a cultural struc-
turing of the family as a network. An important basic of this coupling is language,
which relates the various categories. As Harrison White stresses: language evolves in
networks, and organizes them on the symbolic level (1992a:133ff, 1995b:706ff). The
more important it is to observe the relationships between linguistic terms empirically
(Mohr 1994, 1998).
I have presented role categories and relational frames as the first mechanism link-
ing social relationships to networks. In the following, I will briefly discuss three more
mechanisms—but this list is not necessarily exhaustive. As a second mechanism, mul-
tiple dyadic relationships can be activated simultaneously. This often happens in “foci
of activity,” such as classes in school, playgrounds for children, clubs, workplaces,
etc. (Feld 1981; Morrell et al. 2005). Such simultaneous activation of ties is very
important in groups like gangs, friendship cliques, or families (Fine and Kleinman
1983:98f). Through the repeated transactions, the group emerges as a symbolic iden-
tity toward which expectations are directed (Fuchs 2001:211ff; Fahse 2006). Similar
mechanisms work at foci of activity to which meaning is attributed out of previous
encounters at the focus. Thus, even though the simultaneous activation of network
ties primarily works at the level of transactions (level 2), the repeated simultaneous
activation in groups or at foci only happens because of intersubjective expectations
(level 3).
The last two mechanisms are directly located on the level of meaning. The third
mechanism is the symbolic construction of individual identities of network nodes
(White 1992a:196ff, 1995a). For example, A and B can communicate their opinions
about and commitments to a common acquaintance C. Or A and B can agree that
B phones C in order to arrange for a meeting of all three. All this is not possible
because C exists, but because of the social identity “C” with a name, with attributed
qualities, with a social position, and particular expectations (Fuchs 2001:251ff). One
aspect of this symbolic construction of social identities is the application of role
categories as discussed above.
The fourth and final mechanism lies on the level of subjective meaning. I have
claimed above that relationships develop a particular “culture” (see the section “The
Meaning of Social Relationships”). This culture has an impact on the inner psychic
processes of alter and ego. Through dyadic transactions, people gather information
and form attitudes, values, and beliefs. Now, if A learns from B about an object X,
this information can also enter the transactions between A and C. The same applies
to attitudes, values, and beliefs. This diffusion of cultural forms is the basic mecha-
nism of Kathleen Carley’s “constructural model” of network dynamics (1986, 1991).
Because of this mechanism, people in tightly knit networks form similar beliefs and
attitudes and have the same information at their avail—even if ties are not activated
simultaneously (Erickson 1988). In practice, though, these various mechanisms do
not operate separately. They often together make for the cultural pattering of a par-
ticular network, for example, for the social control and relative cultural homogeneity
in communities (Elias 1973).
To summarize: network ties are connected on the level of meaning by the definition
of roles and identities in a network. An additional mechanism is the simultaneous ac-
tivation of relationships in groups or around foci. But this mechanism is not cultural
in the proper sense, even though symbolic identities and expectations of groups and
foci play a role. The last mechanism discussed was the diffusion of cultural forms in
networks. This “network culture” will be discussed in the subsequent section.
NETWORK CULTURE
The culture of a relationship and the pattern of roles and identities are the first
two components of the meaning structure of a network. The third component is the
culture of symbols, schemes, and scripts diffused in a particular network. As symbolic
interactionists have argued, all meaning is specific to channels of interaction and
has to be diffused through these (Shibutani 1955). Harrison White has called this
the “domain of a network” (1995a:1038f; Mische and White 1998:702ff). Domains
encompass:
the perceived array of such signals—story sets, symbols, idioms, registers, gram-
matical patternings, and accompanying corporeal markers—that characterize a
particular specialized field of interaction. (Mische and White 1998:702)
The first application of this theoretical argument is the network-specific nature

of attitudes (Erickson 1988). Kathleen Carley has built her constructural model
of network dynamics on this assumption (1986, 1991). According to Carley, the
stability of groups and of cleavages between groups depends on the distribution and
the diffusion of information in the networks within and between groups.
Out of the frequent cooperative transactions within these groups, there usually
arises an identity of the group in opposition to other groups. The emergence of such
an identity can make a group of boys from one neighborhood into a gang with
a name, symbols, and frequent fights with gangs from other neighborhoods (Klein
1995; Sánchez Jankowski 1991). As Charles Horton Cooley put it 100 years ago, the
repeated interaction in primary groups results in “the fusion of individualities in a
common whole, so that one’s very self, for many purposes at least, is the common
life and purpose of the group,” in the “sympathy and mutual identification for
which “we” is the natural expression” (1909:23). This collective identity in groups
with increased cooperative interaction does not remain on the psychic level. Rather,
it crystallizes to a symbolic form, which is embodied in group transactions and
coordinates these. For example, in gangs, the collective identity is marked with a
name and with other symbols, such as specific clothing. And it allows for collective
action, that is, acting coordinately in the name of the collective. Gangs are one
example for this, social movements are another (Gould 1995:12ff; Pizzorno 1994:24ff,
138ff; Tilly 2002:78ff). The emergence of large-scale collective identities like class
consciousness or ethnic identities in part similarly relies on increased cooperative
transactions within such collectivities. However, there are more complex mechanisms
at work that cannot be dealt with here exhaustively.
The general mechanism seems to be that frequent cooperative contact leads to a
mutual identification and allows for the adoption of a collective identity. Norbert
Elias and John Scotson have shown in their study of an English worker suburb
that increased interaction can lead to the separation of an “established” group from
less frequently interacting “outsiders” and also to the symbolic elevation of the
established group (1965). The symbolic boundary between the inside and the outside
reinforces the structural separation of interaction into groups. In this interplay of
categories and network structure, social inequality arises and reproduces (Tilly 1998).
Social structure can be seen as a formation of social groups vying for material
resources and symbolic power, based on their internal connectivity (Bourdieu 1985;
Lamont and Fournier 1992).
On the other hand, it is not very useful to understand social structure in terms
of distinct and perfectly bounded groups. At least in modernity, we do not live in
separate social worlds, but in complex interwoven structures. Social anthropology
and sociology adopted the network concept precisely for a better understanding of
complex and interwoven social structures:
Network analysts try not to impose prior assumptions about the “groupiness”
of the world. They suspect that few social structures are, in fact, sociometri-
cally bounded. Hence they avoid treating discrete groups and categories as the
fundamendal building blocks of large-scale social systems. (Wellman 1983:168)
Tightly bounded groups with a homogeneous culture are the exception, rather
than the rule in modernity. Instead, we witness a conglomerate of different netdoms
with overlaps, fluid boundaries, and hybrid cultures in between (Mol and Law 1994;
Urry 2000:30ff). Cultural forms are rooted in social structure, but they are seldom
anchored in distinct groups. Rather, they diffuse in interrelated network contexts,
through networks of everyday exchange and through other communication channels
like the mass media and state-administered education systems (Hannerz 1992).
The assumption that cultural forms are rooted in network structure seems to be
hardly problematic, and probably does not call for deeper empirical investigation.
However, we still lack understanding of why certain forms of meaning are diffused
in specific networks, and others not. That is: How are universes of discourse kept
separate in communication networks? For instance, particular forms of knowledge
may circulate between workers in an office, but not to their wives and children.
While this may seem the natural result of the obvious symbolic division between
work and private life, empirical work should reveal how such symbolic boundaries
effect the diffusion of cultural forms.
A more complicated case is gender. Numerous researchers have argued that there
are gender-specific cultural forms (Bernard 1981; Gilligan 1984; Tannen 1990). But
men and women do not inhibit separate networks that could reproduce these gender-
specific perspectives. Rather, they occupy roughly “structurally equivalent” positions
in the personal networks of contemporary societies (Moore 1990; Ridgeway and
Smith-Lovin 1999:194ff; Smith-Lovin and McPherson 1993). While the overall gender
composition of personal networks does not differ markedly, men’s and women’s
personal networks are structured in different ways: women typically have more kin
in their networks, men have more friends and work colleagues. Even more marked
is the tendency to form friendships with members of the same sex.
We need to have a closer look at how gender-specific cultural forms are diffused
in friendship ties, but not in kinship or colleague ties. And we need to develop
an understanding of how the gender category structures network ties and their
content. For example, kinship categories like “aunt” and “uncle” or “niece” and
“nephew” are almost always divided into a male and a female category. How do
the expectations tied to these kinship categories differ by gender—and how are
these differences institutionalized in everyday interaction (Berger and Luckmann
1966:51ff)? Furthermore, the research of Peter Bearman and Paolo Parigi shows that
men and women talk about different things in their close personal ties (2004:541ff).
Again, this suggests that we need to look behind the broad categories used in our
standardized research, at what is actually going on in personal relationships. The
case of gender demonstrates that structurally equivalent positions in a network form
the basis for different perspectives and symbolic repertoires. The consolidation and
reproduction of such differences is an important field of research.
Gender is only one instance of a category ordering networks not into groups,
but into structurally equivalent positions. Other examples are: slaves, clients in a
patronage network, lower strata in feudal hierarchies. One important characteristic
of these categories is that they usually do not exhibit a collective identity. They lack
the interaction enabling a group identity and collective action. In this vein, Karl
Marx argued that the allotment farmers in 19th-century France were not able to
organize as a “class” because of the missing interaction between them (1852:198).
Women in early capitalism found themselves in a similar situation, stuck not to the
allotted patch of land like the French farmer, but to the household of the husband or
the father. As Simone de Beauvoir put it: women do not form a “class” because they
lack the interaction in comparison to industrial workers (1949:19f). The history of
the women’s movement shows that it was quite difficult to develop a collective female
identity out of this situation of structural equivalence without forming a group. But
as social structure becomes more complex and as the personal situation of many
women changes, so also do personal networks and the symbolic forms embodied
in them. In Western countries, the gender category does not order social structure
today to the same extent as 150 years ago.
Referring back to the discussion in the section “Levels of Network Research,”
the gender category is an example of an order principle that is inscribed in the
meaning structure of social networks. It patterns social relations, most importantly
(but not only) intimate relationships (Jamieson 1998; Ridgeway and Correll 2004).
One empirical case of this has been briefly discussed above with Ronald Burt’s
discussion of the gendered mechanisms of professional success of managers (1998).
It would seem that gender as a category is relatively independent of its application in
particular social structures. But the meaning of gender and its potency for structuring
relations and networks is clearly subject to change over time and also to variation in
different social contexts (Bott 1957; Connell 1995). We can hypothesize an interplay
between the meanings of gender as diffused and reproduced on the macro-level of
socio-cultural structures like the mass-media (in novels or on television) or the state
on the one hand, and as “done” in micro-interactions and the meso-structures of
networks.
Gender is not independent of its intersubjective construction in social relations.

If intimate relations become more egalitarian (for example, as a consequence of the
currently growing independence of women on the labor market, or of a lesser im-
portance of physical power in the late Roman society) (Elias 1986) this should be
consequential for the social construction of gender. On the other hand, if the mass
media or education systems import gender models from more egalitarian societies
(as is currently done in many developing countries) this will clearly have an impact
on the inscription of gender in social relations. Thus we could formulate a “mor-
phogenetic cycle” (Archer 1988) with macro-processes of diffusion and evolution of
cultural forms (mainly in the mass media) and their application, reproduction, and
modification in interpersonal networks influencing each other. This also entails that
particular networks can develop their “own versions” of gender (and other cultural
forms), by drawing on the available cultural repertoire and modifying it in the course
of their transactions. But even on the macro-level, categories like gender are only
quasi-objective—they always rely on the channels of communication processes, be it
social networks or the mass media.
Network culture, then, is a more complex compound than group culture. The
idea of a group culture stresses the emergence and diffusion of cultural forms in
densely knit and relatively homogeneous network populations, in a gang, in a so-
cial movement, or even in a wider subculture (Fine and Kleinman 1979; Shibutani
1955). But the group concept supposes perfectly bounded social units, whereas the
network concept stresses the interwoven nature of social contexts. Consequently, cul-
tural forms diffuse across networks and make for a fluid topology of intersecting
netdoms. Apart from shared cultural forms, networks also incorporate different per-
spectives from actors with structurally similar (or equivalent) positions. Leaders have
a different perspective, and are confronted with different expectations, than followers.
Similarly, actors at bridges between network contexts show a distinct view on the
social world, and so do actors in cliques or even isolates. Ann Mische has demon-
strated this by looking at movement leaders who acquire different styles of leadership
depending on their structural position (2008). The concept “network culture,” then,
not only subsumes the evolution and diffusion of cultural forms in networks, but also
the role structure that makes a network a social structure rather than an amorphous
mass. A network, then, integrates different cultures of structurally equivalent posi-
tions within that network, and the expectations and symbolic relationships between
these categorical identities (Boorman and White 1976).
CONCLUSION: STUDYING THE MEANING STRUCTURE

OF SOCIAL NETWORKS
I want to summarize the arguments advanced in this essay, and then briefly turn
to the methodological issue of how the meaning structure of social networks is to
be studied empirically. As the discussion so far has shown, the level of meaning
has often been ignored in network research (see the section “Levels of Network
Research”). Usually, the causal connection is made between principles of order (such
as gender, ethnic descent, age, etc.) and the empirical matrix of social relations.
On the theoretical plane, there are two levels of network research linking the order
principles to the empirical network: transactions and what I describe as the “meaning
structure of social networks.”
The meaning structure of social networks consists of interpersonal expectations.
These are embodied in dyadic relationships and cultural blueprints for these, in role
categories, and in social identities of actors. The third level of the meaning structure
is the “network culture” proper—the symbols, schemes, and scripts diffused in social
networks. These various aspects of meaning in networks interact closely with the
transactions, working as cultural corridors for the communication between actors.
Although they have been widely ignored in early network research, they have been
incorporated into the network tradition both on the theoretical and on the empirical
levels over the past 20 years.
As I have argued, these cultural features are not primarily located on the level
of subjective meaning. Inner processes of the actors involved, be they individuals,
corporates, or collectives, do play a role and have to correspond to the content of
transactions. But what is shared and communicated is more important, and this is the
primary source of regularity on the network level. Thus, social networks exist on the
level of social meaning, which crystallizes and evolves in the course of transactions.
Their culture is primarily “intersubjective” and manifestly inscribed in transactions.
The subjective meaning of the actors involved is shaped by symbols, scripts, and
schemata available in social networks. But this subjective meaning is not directly
observable, neither for the researcher, nor for the other actors in a network. Even
in quantitative or qualitative interviews, subjective meaning is not observed directly
but through the joint construction of meaning in the interview situation.
This takes me to the methodological issue of how the “meaning structure of so-
cial networks“ can be addressed in empirical research. Empirical network research
has been mainly concerned with the causality between order principles and network
structure. Empirical research on the meaning structure of social networks would have
to aim primarily at the mechanisms connecting these levels—in order to enhance our
knowledge of the interplay of order principles, transactions, and the symbolic struc-
ture. Traditionally, the level of meaning is observed in qualitative research aimed
at an “understanding” of cultural forms (Blumer 1969:21ff). Yet, recent research
shows that symbolic issues such as identity formation or the application of rela-
tional frames can be addressed with quantitative data in network research (McLean
1998; Mützel 2002; Yeung 2005). In order to do so, network data on ties have to
be supplemented with data on cultural forms in transactions and/or attributes of
actors. Methods for such a combination of relational data with attributes are cor-
respondence analysis, or Galois lattices, for example (Breiger 2000). However, it is
necessary to explore the processes of how meaning crystallizes and evolves and of
how it constrains transactions in networks. This task of empirical exploration is of-
ten better done with qualitative than with quantitative research (Hollstein and Straus
2006).
The theoretical position outlined in this essay implies a number of issues of such
research, both quantitative and qualitative, on the “culture of social networks.” An
eclectic list of topics includes the following questions.
1. How does meaning evolve in dyadic relationships? Research on this question

comes from social psychology, with the works of Steven Duck and others.
But sociologists such as Jean-Claude Kaufmann (1992) or Ann Swidler (2001),
too, have addressed the interplay of transactions and expectation structures in
personal relationships. While a lot of research focuses on the way personal
relationships are perceived by the people involved, we need thorough explo-
ration of transaction processes and of the evolution of intersubjective meaning
in dyads. Of course, this includes the question of how relationships and net-
works draw on available cultural forms (like “love,” “gender,” and “friendship”)
apply, and transform them—and how these altered forms may diffuse into the
macro-level of cultural construction in society.
2. How are identities formed in dyadic relationships? Margaret Somers sug-
gests that this can be observed through analysis of narratives (1994). Part
of this question, though, is an analysis of frames for personal relationships
(McLean 1998) and of the application (and modification) of categories in
dyadic transactions.
3. How are dyadic relationships linked to form a network? This question has
been discussed on the theoretical level above. But we lack empirical research
of the various ways of interlinkage, for instance, of the construction of social
identities on the network level.
4. How do categories work in networks? Blockmodeling assumes that networks
are ordered by underlying categories (see the section “Incorporating Culture”),
but the actual processes of application of categories such as gender or ethnic
descent in social networks has rarely been examined.
5. How does status crystallize in social networks, and what is the subjective
and intersubjective meaning of status? Status and networks have been treated
extensively on the purely quantitative level (Anheier et al. 1995; Erickson 1996;
Gould 2002; Padgett and Ansell 1993; Pappi 1973; Martin 2002). Exploration
on this topic with an emphasis on transactions and on meaning in social
networks, though, would have to focus more on the meaning of status and on
its interplay with relationships and network structure (Breiger 1995; Elias and
Scotson 1965; Gibson 2005).
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The Meaning Structure of Social Networks∗

This essay proposes to view networks as sociocultural structures. Following authors

In research on social networks, the structure of relationships is depicted as the

Sociological Theory 27:1 March 2009

LEVELS OF NETWORK RESEARCH

work through: opportunity categories &

are analyzed through: interviews, document /

Figure 1. Integrated Model of Network Research

of course, are themselves forms of meaning. Opportunity structures, however, are

Transactions and meaning—as the “real” structure of a network—are mapped in

He goes on to identify a different pathway of success for women by looking specif-

THE MEANING OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

A social “relationship” is the behavior of multiple actors insofar as it is oriented

Weber defines social relationships as the probability of specific actions between

Parsons 1968:167ff). These interpersonally negotiated expectations are relatively sta-

Symphysis of interaction and participation in joint experiences result in concepts,

In transactions between two people, a relationship culture evolves, with “concepts,

bundles of expectations directed to incumbents of positions, or even to specific in-

The first application of this theoretical argument is the network-specific nature

Gender is not independent of its intersubjective construction in social relations.

CONCLUSION: STUDYING THE MEANING STRUCTURE

1. How does meaning evolve in dyadic relationships? Research on this question

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