BERNARDA CH.
Respondents, on the other hand,
OSMEÑA, petitioner, vs.
NICASIO CH. OSMEÑA, JOSE
CH. OSMEÑA, TOMAS CH.
OSMEÑA, HEIRS OF
FRANCISCO CH. OSMEÑA
AND SIXTA CH.
OSMEÑA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J p:
This is a petition for review
on certiorari 1 of the April 14, 2005
decision 2 and March 2, 2006 resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
72407.
The parties to this case are descendants
of spouses Quintin Chiong Osmeña and Chiong
Tan Sy. Petitioner is the couple's daughter while
respondents Nicasio and Jose Osmeña are their
grandchildren. The dispute revolves around two
parcels of land, Lots 4 3 and 5, 4 and the
ancestral house standing on Lot 4.
Before her death, Chiong Tan Sy
executed a last will and testament in which she
enumerated her properties. The ancestral house
subject of the instant case was specifically
mentioned in the said document; however, the
litigated lots were not. The titles to the lots were
in the name of respondents' father, Ignacio,
petitioner's elder brother. Upon his demise,
respondents transferred title to their own names.
Petitioner asserts that she is a co-owner
of the three litigated properties. She argues that
the two lots were her mother's properties and
were part of the inheritance that she and her
siblings received upon Chiong Tan Sy's death.
She claims that the lots were placed in the name
of her brother Ignacio merely because their
mother, a Chinese national, was prohibited by
law to own land in the Philippines.
With regard to the house, it is petitioner's
position that ownership of her share in the
ancestral home was transferred to her brother
under the guise of a simulated contract to defeat
any claims by her estranged husband. As proof of
her co-ownership of the house, petitioner
maintains that she has never been charged rent by
her brother for her continued residence in the
same. EcIaTA
predicate their claim to the disputed properties on
the transfer certificates of title covering the lots
issued in their father's name and a deed of sale
dated April 26, 1982 signed by petitioner herself,
covering her share in the ancestral house. Both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals (CA)
recognized the validity of said documents and
rendered judgment in favor of respondents. The
trial court enjoined petitioner from utilizing the
litigated land for her orchid business and ordered
her to leave the house immediately. The CA
modified the decision by declaring petitioner a
co-owner of the litigated ancestral house to the
extent of the shares she inherited from two of her
siblings.
The core issue for our resolution is
whether the CA erred in giving credence to the
deed of sale dated April 26, 1982 and in holding
that respondents are the owners of the disputed
lots.
This Court is not bound to weigh all over
again the evidence adduced by the parties,
particularly where the findings of both the trial
court and the appellate court coincide. 5 The
resolution of factual issues is a function of the
trial court whose findings on these matters are, as
a general rule, binding on this Court, more so
where these have been affirmed by the CA. 6
We have thoroughly reviewed the
records of this case and agree that the deed of
sale dated April 26, 1982 is a legal and binding
document. The testimonies of the witnesses to the
document attest to the parties freely signing the
document and the occurrence of the transaction
in a clear and definite manner. Moreover, it is a
notarized document which renders it a prima
facie evidence of the facts contained therein. 7 In
the absence of documents or testimonies from
disinterested persons proving petitioner's claim of
a fictitious sale, there is no basis to set aside the
deed of sale.
In petitions for review on certiorari, the
jurisdiction of this Court is limited to the review
and revision of errors of law allegedly committed
by the appellate court inasmuch as the latter's
findings of fact are deemed conclusive. 8 Given
that the facts of this case, as gleaned from the
records, fully support the decision of the trial
court and the CA, we see no valid reason to
overturn the findings of the courts below and
 therefore sustain the judgment of the appellate
court.
Assuming arguendo that the litigated lots
were actually the properties of Chiong Tan Sy
and that the same were only put in the name of
respondents' father because he was the only
Filipino citizen in the family at the time the
properties were purchased, this Court will not
consent to any violation of the constitutional
prohibition on foreign ownership of
land. 9 Moreover, by signing the deed of sale
dated April 26, 1982 (where petitioner
transferred her share in the ancestral house to
respondents' father), petitioner would have been a
party to the alleged simulated document. This
Court has oft repeated that he who comes to court
must come with clean hands. Considering that the
right over the litigated properties claimed by
petitioner stems allegedly from illegal acts, no
affirmative relief of any kind is available. This
Court leaves the parties where they have placed
themselves.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner. ACcEHI
SO ORDERED.
Bernabe vs. Alejo
GR No. 140500, January 21, 2002
FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly
fathered a son with his secretary Carolina
Alejo and was named Adrian Bernabe who
was born on September 18, 1981. After
Ernesto Bernabe and Rosalina (legal wife)
died, the sole surviving heir left was
Ernestina. Carolina, in behalf of his son
Adrian, filed a complaint that Adrian be
declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of
Fiscal Bernabe and be given a share of his
father’s estate.
Trial court’s ruling: Under the new law, an
action for the recognition of an illegitimate
child must be brought within the lifetime of
the alleged parent to give the latter an
opportunity to either affirm or deny the
child’s filiation.
CA ruling: The rights of Adrian are
governed under Article 285 of the Civil Code
which allows an action for recognition to be
filed within 4 years after the child has
attained the age of majority and that
subsequent enactment of the Family Code
did not take away his right.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may
be declared an acknowledged illegitimate
son.
HELD:
The Family Code makes no distinction on
whether the former was still a minor when
the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is
given by the new code a chance to dispute
the claim, considering that “illegitimate
children” are usually begotten and raised in
secrecy and without the legitimate family
being aware of their existence.
Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the
acknowledgment of natural children are
utilized to establish the filiation of spurious
children. Hence, the petition wad denied and
assailed decision was affirmed. ROMMEL
JACINTO DANTES
SILVERIO, petitioner,vs.REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Facts:
On November 26, 2002, petitioner
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for
the change of his first name and sex in his
birth certificate in RTC Manila. His name was
registered as “Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” in
his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex
was registered as “male.” He further alleged that he is
a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but
feels, thinks and acts as a female” and that he had
always identified himself with girls since childhood.
His attempts to transform himself to a “woman”
culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent
sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in
fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have
his name in his birth certificate changed from
“Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his sex from
“male” to “female.”
Judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the
petition and ordering the Civil Registrar to change
the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of
petitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first
name from “Rommel Jacinto” to MELY and
petitioner’s gender from “Male” to
FEMALE.The Court of Appeals rendered a decision
in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s
decision lacked legal basis.
Issue:
Whether or not the entries on the Birth Certificate of
the petitioner can be changed.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit. Person’s First Name Cannot
Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment.
The State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of identification.
A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions
for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides
that “No person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority.”
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The
Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment. The determination of a person’s sex
appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and
the court must look to the statutes. In this connection,
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that “No entry
in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.” For these reasons, while
petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body
and appearance through the intervention of modern
surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to
sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is
no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As
to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground
of Equity. The trial court opined that its grant of the
petition was in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. It believed that allowing the
petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to
anyone. This is wrong.
The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the
commonly recognized parameters of social
convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed
an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed
solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
G.R. No. L-20089      December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following
their mutual promise of love decided to get married
on September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed
marriage, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be that
day to postpone their wedding because his mother
opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not appear and was
not heard from again.
Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to
answer and was declared in default. Judgement was
rendered ordering the defendant to pay
plaintiff  P2.000 as actual damages P25,000 as moral
and exemplary damages, P2,500 as attorney’s fees.
Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable
settlement was given chance but failed, thereby
rendered judgment hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is
an actionable wrong in this case.
Held:
Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not
an actionable wrong. But formally set a wedding and
go through all the necessary preparations and
publicity and only to walk out of it when matrimony
is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is
palpable and unjustifiable to good customs which
holds liability in accordance with Art. 21 on the New
Civil Code.
When a breach of promise to marry is actionable
under the same, moral and exemplary damages may
not be awarded when it is proven that the defendanr
clearly  acted in wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner.
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petit
ioner, vs. HON. COURT OF AP
PEALS and ARACELI
SANTOS, respondents.
Facts:
Apolonio Trajanco courted Araceli Santos. Since he
promised her marriage, she consented to his pleas for
carnal knowledge. As a result, she conceived a child,
and due to her condition, she had to resign from her
work. Because she was unable to support herself
andthe baby, and the Apolonio refused to marry her,
she instituted an action for damages, compelling the
defendant to recognize the unborn child, pay her
monthly support, plus P100,000 in moral and
exemplary damages.
Issue: Whether or not the acts of petitioner constitute
seduction as contemplated in Art. 21.
Held:
No, it is not. Seduction is more than mere sexual
intercourse or a breach of promise to marry. It
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement
superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of
the seducer to which the woman has yielded. In this
case, for 1 whole year, the woman maintained
intimate sexual relations with the defendant, and such
conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly here there is voluntariness and mutual
passion, for had the plaintiff been deceived, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces for a
year.
SATURNINO SELANOVA, com
plaint, vs. ALEJANDRO
E. MENDOZA, City Judge
Mandaue City, respondent.
Facts:
Saturino Selanova charged
Judge Alejandro  Mendoza with gross ignorance of
the law for preparing and ratifying a
document  (November 21, 1972) extrajudicially
liquidating the conjugal partnership of the
complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza.
The conditions of the liquidation were  case to show that subsequent approval of the court
1.  Either spouse would withdraw the complaint for
adultery or concubinage which each had filed against
the other and
2. Waiver of the right to prosecute each other for
whatever acts of infidelity either one would commit
against the other
In his judgment, respondent relied on Par. 4, Art 191
of the old Civil Code that states:
“the husband and wife may agree upon the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval.”
While the judge claimed that he asked the CFI of
Negros (where the couple resided) for judicial
approval, the Judicial Consultant confirmed that there
was no affirmation from the same court. He still
ratified the document.
Issue:
WON the extrajudicial dissolution of
the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is
void.
Held:
Yes, it is void.
Precedents (Quintana vs. Lerma, De Luna vs.
Linatoc, De La Rosa vs. Barruga)
Under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, the following shall
be void:
1. Any contract for personal separation between
husband and wife;
2. Every extrajudicial agreement during marriage, for
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or
of the absolute community property between husband
and wife.
Moreover, while adultery and concubinage are
private crimes, they are crimes punishable by the
RPC, and a contract legalizing their commission is
“contrary to law, morals and public order”, and as a
consequence not judicially recognizable.
Decision:
Respondent  severely censured. 
Dicta:
A. Respondent Judge claimed that prohibition of the
extrajudicial liquidation of the conjugal partnership
during the marriage made article 191 of the Civil
Code nugatory. He cited Lacson vs. San Jose-Lacson
can render the marriage dissolved.
The SC argued that the judicial sanction should be
secured before the separation.
 B. Disciplinary action had been taken against
notaries who authenticated agreements for the
personal separation of spouses wherein either spouse
was permitted to commit acts of infidelity.
For instance, in Panganiban vs. Borromeo, the notary
was rebuked for authorizing a document that
permitted both spouses to take in concubines without
opposition from either spouse.
 In Biton vs. Momongon, a document entitled “Legal
Separation” was executed by a notary. The husband
and wife were separated mutually and voluntarily,
renouncing their rights and obligations in the process,
and given the authorization to remarry while not
being witnesses against one another. The lawyer was
also rebuked.
In In re Santiago, a lawyer/ respondent prepared a
document that gave a married couple
the authorization to marry again while giving them
assurance of renouncement of rights one would have
against the other. He was suspended from practice.
C. The judge was truly unaware of the legal
prohibition in contracts for the personal separation of
spouses.
SYLVIA LICHAUCO DE LEO
N, petitioner, vs. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
MACARIA DE LEON AND
JOSE
VICENTE DE LEON, responden
ts.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for
petitioner.
De Jesus & Associates for Macaria de Leon.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for Jose
Vicente de Leon.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
06649 dated June 30, 1987 affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in SP
Proc. No. 8492 dated December 29, 1983; and its
resolution dated November 24, 1987 denying the
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On October 18, 1969, private respondent Jose
Vicente De Leon and petitioner
Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were united in wedlock
before the Municipal Mayor of Binangonan, Rizal.
On August 28, 1971, a child named Susana
L. De Leon was born from this union.
Sometime in October, 1972, a de facto separation
between the spouses occurred due to irreconcilable
marital differences, with Sylvia leaving the conjugal
home. Sometime in March, 1973, Sylvia went to the
United States where she obtained American
citizenship. prcd
On November 23, 1973, Sylvia filed with the
Superior Court of California, County of San
Francisco, a petition for dissolution of marriage
against Jose Vicente. In the said divorce proceedings,
Sylvia also filed claims for support and
distribution of properties. It appears, however, that
since Jose Vicente was then a Philippine resident and
did not have any assets in the United States, Sylvia
chose to hold in abeyance the divorce proceedings,
and in the meantime, concentrated her efforts to
obtain some sort of property settlements with Jose
Vicente in the Philippines.
Thus, on March 16, 1977, Sylvia succeeded in
entering into a Letter-Agreement with her mother-in-
law, private respondent Macaria De Leon, which We
quote in full, as follows (pp. 40-42, Rollo):
"
March 16, 1977
"Mrs. Macaria Madrigal de Leon
12 Jacaranda, North Forbes Park
Makati, Metro Manila
Dear Doña Macaria:
This letter represents a contractual
undertaking among (A) the
undersigned (B) your son, Mr. Jose
Vicente de Leon, represented by
you, and (C) yourself in your
personal capacity.
You hereby bind yourself jointly
and severally to answer for the
undertakings of Joe Vincent under
this contract.
In consideration for a peaceful and
amicable termination of relations
between the undersigned and her
lawfully wedded husband, Jose
Vicente de Leon, your son, the
following are agreed upon:
Obligations of Jose
Vicente de Leon and /or yourself
in a joint and several capacity:
1. To deliver with clear title free
from all liens and encumbrances
and subject to no claims in any
form whatsoever the following
properties to Sylvia Lichauco-
de Leon hereinafter referred to as
the wife:
A. Suite 11-C, Avalon
Condominium, Ortigas
Ave., corner Xavier St.,
Mandaluyong, Rizal,
Philippines.
B. Apartment 702, Wack
Wack Condominium,
 Mandaluyong, Rizal,
Philippines.
C. The rights to
assignment of 2 Ayala lots
in Alabang, Rizal (Corner
lots, 801 sq. meters each).
(Fully paid).
D. 2470 Wexford Ave.,
South San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. (Lot 18
Block 22 Westborough
Unit No. 2). (Fully paid).
E. 1) The sum of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000)
 2) $30,000
 3) $5,000
2. To give monthly support
payable six (6) months in advance
every year to any designated
assignee of the wife for the care
and
upbringing of Susana Lichauco de  legal issue should arise relating to
Leon which is hereby pegged at the
exchange rate of 7.60 to the dollar
subject to adjustments in the
event of monetary exchange
fluctuations. Subsequent increase
on actual need upon negotiation.
3. To respect the custody of said
minor daughter as pertaining
exclusively to the wife except as
herein provided.
Obligations of the wife:
1. To agree to a judicial
separation of property in
accordance with Philippine law
and in this connection to do all that
may be necessary to secure said
separation of property including
her approval in writing of a joint
petition or consent decree.
2. To amend her complaint in the
United States before the
Federal Court of California, U.S.A.
entitled
"Sylvia Lichauco de Leon vs.
Jose V. de Leon" in a manner
compatible with the
objectives of this herein
agreement. It is the stated
objective of this agreement that
said divorce proceedings will
continue.
3. All the properties herein
described for assignment to the
wife must be assigned to
Sylvia Lichauco de Leon upon the
decree of the Court of First
Instance in the Joint Petition for
Separation of Property; except for
the P100,000, $30,000 and $5,000
which will be paid immediately.
4. This contract is intended to be
applicable both in the
Republic of the Philippines and in
the United States of America. It is
agreed that this will constitute an
actionable document in both
jurisdictions and the parties herein
waive their right to object to the
use of this document in the event a
the validity of this document. In
the event of a dispute, this letter is
subject to interpretation under the
laws of California, U.S.A.
5. To allow her daughter to spend
two to three months each year with
the father upon mutual
convenience.
Very truly
yours,
(Sgd.)
Sylvia de L
eon
t/SYLVIA
L. DE LEO
N.
CONFORME:
s/t/MACARIA M. DE LEON
with my marital consent:
s/t JUAN L. DE LEON"
On the same date, Macaria made cash payments to
Sylvia in the amount of P100,000 and US $35,000.00
or P280,000.00, in compliance with her obligations
as stipulated in the aforestated Letter-Agreement.
On March 30, 1977, Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed
before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal a joint
petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their
conjugal partnership, the main part of which reads as
follows (pp. 37-38, Rollo):
"5. For the best
interest of each of them
and of their minor child, petitioners
have agreed to dissolve their
conjugal partnership and to
partition the assets thereof, under
the following terms and conditions
— this document, a pleading being
intended by them to embody and
evidence their agreement:
xxx xxx xxx
"(c) The following properties shall
be adjudicated to petitioner
Sylvia Lichauco De Leon. These
properties will be free of any and
all liens and encumbrances, with
clear title and subject to no claims
by third parties. Petitioner Jose
Vicente De Leon fully assumes all
responsibility and liability in the
event these properties shall not be
as described in the previous
sentence:
Sedan (1972 model)
Suite 11-C, Avalon
Condominium,
Ortigas Ave., corner
Xavier St.,
Mandaluyong, Rizal,
Philippines.
Apt. 702, Wack-Wack
Condominium,
Mandaluyong, Rizal,
Philippines
The rights to
assignment of 2 Ayala lots
in Alabang Rizal (corner
lots, 801 sq. meters each)
(Fully paid)
2470 Wexford Ave., South
San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. (Lot 18, Block 22
Westborough Unit 2)
(Fully paid)
The sum of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos
(100,000.00)
$30,000.00 at current
exchange rate
$5,000.00 at current
exchange rate"
After ex-parte hearings, the trial court issued an
Order dated February 19, 1980 approving the
petition, the dispositive portion of which reads (p.
143, Rollo):
"WHEREFORE, it is hereby
declared that the conjugal
partner}hip of the Spouses is
DISSOLVED henceforth, without
prejudice to the terms of their
agreement that each spouse shall
own, dispose of, possess,
administer and enjoy his or her
separate estate, without the
consent of the other, and all
earnings from any profession,
business or industries shall
likewise belong to each spouse."
On March 17, 1980, Sylvia moved for the
execution of the above-mentioned order. However,
Jose Vicente moved for a reconsideration of the order
alleging that Sylvia made a verbal reformation of the
petition as there was no such agreement for the
payment of P4,500.00 monthly support to commence
from the alleged date of separation in April, 1973 and
that there was no notice given to him that Sylvia
would attempt verbal reformation of the agreement
contained in the joint petition.
While the said motion for reconsideration was
pending resolution, on April 20, 1980, Macaria filed
with the trial court a motion for leave to intervene
alleging that she is the owner of the properties
involved in the case. The motion was granted. On
October 29, 1980, Macaria, assisted by her husband
Juan De Leon, filed her complaint in intervention.
She assailed the validity and legality of the Letter-
Agreement which had for its purpose, according to
her, the termination of marital relationship between
Sylvia and Jose Vicente. However, before any
hearing could be had, the judicial reorganization took
place and the case was transferred to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig. On December 29, 1983, the
trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads (pp. 35-36, Rollo):
"WHEREFORE, judgment
hereby rendered on the complaint
in intervention in favor of the
intervenor, declaring null and void
the letter agreement dated March
16, 1977 (Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2'), and
ordering petitioner
Sylvia Lichauco De Leon to
restore to intervenor the
amount of P380,000.00 plus legal
interest from date of complaint,
and to pay intervenor the
amount of P100,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees, and to pay the
costs of suit.
"Judgment is likewise rendered
affirming the
order of the Court dated February
19, 1980 declaring the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Jose
Vicente De Leon and
Sylvia Lichauco De Leon DISSOL
VED; and adjudicating to
each of them his or her share of the
properties and assets of said
conjugal partnership in accordance
with the agreement embodied in
paragraph 5 of the petition, except
insofar as the adjudication to
petitioner Sylvia L. De Leon of the
properties belonging to and owned
by Intervenor Macaria De Leon is
concerned.
"Henceforth, (a) each spouse shall
own, dispose of, possess,
administer and enjoy his or her
separate estate, present and future
without the consent of the other;
(b) all earnings from any
profession, business or industry
shall likewise belong to
each of them separately; (c) the
minor child Susana De Leon shall
stay with petitioner
Sylvia Lichauco De Leon for two
to three months every year - the
transportation both ways of the
child for the trip to the Philippines
to be at the expense of the
petitioner Jose Vicente De Leon;
and (d) petitioner Jose
Vicente De Leon shall give
petitioner
is Sylvia Lichauco De Leon the
sum of P4,500.00 as monthly
support for the minor child Susana
to commence from February 19,
1980.
Sylvia appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals raising the following
errors:
1) The trial court erred in finding that the cause or
consideration of the Letter-Agreement is the
termination of marital relations;
2) The trial court failed to appreciate testimonial and
documentary evidence proving that
Macaria de Leon's claims of threat, intimidation and
mistake are baseless; and
3) The trial court erred in finding that
Sylvia Lichauco de Leon committed breach of the
Letter-Agreement; and further, failed to appreciate
evidence proving Macaria de Leon's material breach
thereof.
The respondent court affirmed the decision in toto.
The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence,
the present petition.
The only basis by which Sylvia may lay claim to the
properties which are the subject matter of the Letter-
Agreement, is the Letter-Agreement itself. The main
issue, therefore, is whether or not the Letter-
Agreement is valid.
The third paragraph of the Letter-
Agreement, supra, reads:
"In consideration for a peaceful
and amicable
termination of relations between
the undersigned and her lawfully
wedded husband, Jose
Vicente De Leon, your son, the
following are agreed upon:"
(emphasis supplied).
It is readily apparent that the use of the word
"relations" is ambiguous, perforce, it is subject to
interpretation. There being a doubt as to the
meaning of this word taken by itself, a
consideration of the general scope and purpose of the
instrument in which it occurs (see Germann and
Co. v. Donaldson, Sim and Co., 1 Phil. 63) and
Article 1374 of the Civil Code which provides that
the various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones proceedings between her son Jose
that sense which may result from all of them taken Vicente and his wife petitioner
jointly, is necessary. Sylvia. The last
sentence of paragraph 2 under
Sylvia insists that the consideration for her "Obligations of the Wife"
execution of the Letter-Agreement was the unequivocally states: "It is the
termination of property relations with her husband. stated objective of this agreement
Indeed, Sylvia and Jose Vicente subsequently filed a that said divorce proceedings (in
joint petition for judicial approval of the the United States) will continue."
dissolution of their conjugal partnership, sanctioned There is merit in concluding that
by Article 191 of the Civil Code.On the other hand, the consideration by which
Macaria and Jose Vicente assert that the Intervenor executed Exhibit 'E' to
consideration was the termination of marital 'E-2' was to secure freedom for her
relationship. son petitioner Jose
We sustain the observations and conclusion made by Vicente De Leon, especially if
the trial court, to wit (pp. 44-46, Rollo): Exhibit 'R' — Intervenor, which is
(sic) agreement signed by
"On page two of the letter petitioner Sylvia to consent to and
agreement (Exhibit 'E'), the parties pardon Jose Vicente De Leon for
contemplated not only to agree to a adultery and concubinage (among
judicial others) would be considered. In the
separation of property of the light, therefore, of the foregoing
spouses but likewise to continue circumstances, this Court finds
with divorce proceedings credible the
(paragraphs 1 and 2, testimony of intervenor as follows:
Obligations of the Wife, Exhibit
'E-1'). If taken with the apparently "Q. Will you please go
ambiguous provisions in Exhibit over the Exhibit 'E'
'E' regarding to 'E-2' —
termination of 'relations', the intervenor
parties clearly contemplated not consisting of three
only the termination of property pages and inform
relationship but us whether or not
likewise of marital relationship in this is the
its entirety. Furthermore, it would letter of March 16,
be safe to assume that the parties 1977 which you
in Exhibit 'E' not having specified just referred to?
the particular relationship which "A. Yes, this is the letter.
they wanted to peacefully and
amicably terminate had intended "Q. Why did you affix
to terminate all kinds of relations, your signature to
both marital and property. While this Exh. 'E' —
there could be inherent benefits to intervenor (sic)?
a termination of conjugal property
"A. Because at that time
relationship between the spouses,
the court could not clearly when I signed it I
want to buy peace
perceive the underlying benefit for
the intervenor insofar as for myself and for
the whole family.
termination of property
relationship between petitioners is "Q. From whom did you
concerned, unless the underlying want to buy peace
consideration for intervenor is the and/or what
termination of marital kind of peace?
relationship by divorce
 "A. I wanted to buy peace contrary to law, morals,
from good customs, public order
Sylvia Lichauco w or public policy;
hom I knew was
xxx xxx xxx
kind of 'matapang;'
so I want peace for '(7) Those
me and primarily expressly prohibited or
for the peaceful declared void by law.
and amicable
termination of mar 'These contracts
ital relationship cannot be ratified. Neither
between my son, can the right to set up the
Joe Vincent and defense of illegality be
Sylvia." waived.'
(Deposition dated "But marriage is not a mere
September 6, 1983 contract but a sacred social
— institution. Thus, Art.
Macaria de Leon, 52 of the Civil Code provides:
p. 6-7)
'Art. 52. Marriage
"This Court, therefore, finds and is not a mere contract but
holds that the cause or an inviolable social
consideration for the intervenor institution. Its nature,
Macaria De Leon in having consequences and
executed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2' was incidents are governed by
the termination of the marital law and not subject to
relationship between her son Jose stipulations . . .'
Vicente De Leon and
Sylvia Lichauco de Leon. "From the foregoing
provisions of the New Civil Code,
"Article 1306 of the New this court is of the considered
Civil Code provides: opinion and so holds that
'Art. 1306. The contracting intervenor's undertaking under
parties may establish such Exhibit 'E" premised on the
stipulations, clauses, termination of marital relationship
terms, and conditions as is not only contrary to Filipino
they may be deem morals and public policy. As such,
convenient, provided they any agreement or obligations based
are not contrary to law, on such unlawful consideration and
morals, good customs, which is contrary to public policy
public order or public should be deemed null and void."
policy.' (emphasis supplied)

'If the stipulation Additionally, Article 191 of the Civil

is contrary to law, morals Code contemplates properties belonging to the
or public policy, the spouses and not those belonging to a third party, who,
contract is void and in the case at bar, is Macaria. In the petition for the
inexistent from the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, it was made
beginning. to appear that the said properties are conjugal in
nature. However, Macaria was able to prove that the
"Art. 1409. The following questioned properties are owned by her. Neither
contracts are inexistent and void Sylvia nor Jose Vicente adduced any contrary
from the beginning: evidence.
'(1) Those whose Granting, in gratia argumenti, that the
cause, object or purpose is consideration of the Letter-Agreement was the
termination of property relations, We agree with the support of her claim, intervenor
respondent court that (pp. 46-47, Rollo): testified as follows:
". . . the agreement nevertheless is 'Q. Will you please inform
void because it contravenes the us how did
following provisions of the Civil Sylvia Lichauco di
Code: sturb or threaten
your son or
'Art. 221. The following yourself?
shall be void and of no
effect: 'A. Despite the fact that
Sylvia Lichauco v
'(1) Any contract for oluntarily left my
personal separation son Joe Vincent
between husband and wife; and abandoned
'(2) Every extra-judicial him, she
agreement, during unashamedly
marriage, for the nagged Joe and me
dissolution of the conjugal to get money and
partnership of gains when her demands
or of the absolute were not met she
community of property resorted to threats
between husband and like, she
wife;" threatened to bring
Joe to court for
Besides, the Letter-Agreement shows on its face that support. Sylvia
it was prepared by Sylvia, and in this regard, the threatened to
ambiguity in a contract is to be taken contra scandalize our
proferentem, i.e., construed against the party who family by these
caused the ambiguity and could have also avoided it baseless suits; in
by the exercise of a little more care. Thus, Article fact she caused the
1377 of the Civil Code provides: "The service of summon
interpretation of obscure words of stipulations in a s to Joe when he
contract shall not favor the party who caused the went to the United
obscurity" (see Equitable Banking Corp. vs. IAC, States.'
G.R. No. 74451, May 25, 1988, 161 SCRA 518). (Intervenor's
Sylvia alleges further that since the nullity of the deposition dated
Letter-Agreement proceeds from the unlawful Sept. 6, 1983, p.8).
consideration solely of Macaria, applying the pari "On the other hand, petitioner
delicto rule, it is clear that she cannot recover what Sylvia claims that it was intervenor
she has given by reason of the Letter-Agreement nor and petitioner Jose Vicente who
ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised her. initiated the move to convince her
On her part, Macaria raises the to agree to a dissolution of their
defenses of intimidation and mistake which led her to conjugal partnership due to the
execute the Letter-Agreement. In resolving this issue, alleged extra-marital
the trial court said (pp. 148-151, Rollo): activities of petitioner Jose
"In her second cause of action, Vicente de Leon. She testified as
intervenor claims that her follows:
signing of Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2' was 'Q. Now in her testimony,
due to a fear of an unpeaceful and Macaria
troublesome separation of her son Madrigal de Leon 
with petitioner also said that you
Sylvia Lichauco de Leon. In threatened her by
demanding money
 and nagged her 'R' — intervenor, which was not
until she agreed to controverted by petitioner Sylvia.
the letter A reading of Exhibit 'R' would
agreement of Marc show that petitioner Sylvia would
h 1977, what can consent to and pardon petitioner
you say about Jose Vicente, son of intervenor, for
that? possible crimes of adultery and/or
concubinage, with a string
  attached; that is, the transfer of the
'A. I think with all the properties subject herein to her.
people sitting There appears some truth to the
around with Atty. apprehensions of intervenor for in
Quisumbing, Atty. petitioner Sylvia's testimony she
Chuidian, my confirms the worry of intervenor as
father-in-law, my follows: ". . . being at that time
sister-in-law and I, Jose (De Leon) was already
you know, it can remarried and had a child. That
be shown that this since she (intervenor) found out
was a friendly that, she was worried about what
amicable might be, you know, involved in
settlement that any future matters. She just want
they were much me out of the picture." The
really interested in aforesaid fear of intervenor was
settling down as I further corroborated by her witness
was. I think there Concepcion Tagudin who testified
were certain as follows:
reasons that they 'Q. Now, you mentioned
wanted to get done that you were
or planned, being present when Mrs.
at that time Jose Macaria De Leon s
was already igned this Exhibit
remarried and had 'E-2,' will you
a child. That since inform us whether
she then found out there was anything
that since she was unusual which you
worried about noticed when Mrs.
what might be, Macaria
you know, M. De Leon signe
involved in any d this Exhibit 'E-
future matters. She 2'?
just wanted to do
what she could. 'A. Mrs. Macaria
She just want me M. De Leon was
out of the picture. in a
So in no way, it state of tension
cannot be said that and anger. She
I nagged and was so mad that
threatened her.' she remarked:
(TSN dated 'Puñetang Sylvia
December 8, 1983, ito bakit ba niya
p. 137-138) ako ginugulo.
Ipakukulong daw
"In resolving this issue, niya si Joe Vincent
this Court leans heavily on Exhibit kung hindi ko
 pipirmahan ito.  Now you mentioned Atty.
Sana matapos na Norberto
itong problemang Quisumbing,
ito pagkapirmang would you be able
ito,' sabi niya.' to tell us in what
(Deposition — capacity he was
Concepcion present in that
Tagudin, Oct. 21, negotiation?
1983, pp. 10-11)
'Atty. Chuidian:
"In her third cause of action,
 He was counsel for Doña
intervenor claims mistake or error
in having signed Exhibits '1' to 'E- Macaria and for
Joe Vincent, the
2' alleging in her testimony as
follows: spouse of Sylvia.'
(Deposition of V.
'Q. Before you were told Chuidian,
such by your December 16,
lawyers what if 1983, p. 8).
any were your
"The New Civil
basis to believe
that Sylvia would Code provides:
no longer have 'Art. 1330. A
inheritance rights contract where consent is
from your son, Joe given through mistake,
Vincent? violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud is
'A. Well, that was what
Sylvia told me. voidable.'
That she will 'Art. 1331. In
eliminate any order that mistake may
inheritance rights invalidate consent, it
from me or my son should refer to the
Joe Vincent's substance of the thing
properties if I sign which is the object of the
the document contract, or to those
amicably . . . conditions which have
(Intervenor's principally moved one or
deposition — both parties to enter into a
Sept. 6, 1983, pp. contract . . .'
9-10).
"The preponderance of evidence
"On the other hand, petitioner leans in favor of intervenor who
Sylvia claims that intervenor could even utilized the statement of the
not have been mistaken in her divorce lawyer of petitioner Sylvia
having signed the document as she (Mr. Penrod) in support of the fact
was under advice of counsel during that intervenor was mistaken in
the time that Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2' having signed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2'
was negotiated. To support such because when she signed said
claims by Exhibits she believed that fact that
Sylvia Lichauco De Leon, the petitioner Sylvia would eliminate
deposition testimony of Atty. her inheritance rights and there is
Vicente Chuidian was presented no showing that said intervenor
before this Court: was properly advised by any
American lawyer on the fact
'Atty. Herbosa:
whether petitioner Sylvia, being an
 American citizen, could rightfully
do the same. Transcending,
however, the issue of whether there
was mistake of fact on the
part of intervenor or not,
this Court could not see a valid
cause or consideration in
favor of intervenor
Macaria De Leon having signed
Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2.' For even if
petitioner Sylvia had confirmed
Mr. Penrod's statement during the
divorce proceedings in the United
States that she would undertake to
eliminate her hereditary rights in
the event of the property
settlement, under Philippine laws,
such contract would likewise be
voidable, for under Art.
1347 of the New Civil Code 'no
contract may be entered into upon
future inheritance.'"
We do not subscribe to the aforestated view of the
trial court. Article 1335 of the Civil Code provides:
"xxx xxx xxx
"There is intimidation when
one of the contracting parties is
compelled by a reasonable and
well grounded fear of an imminent
and grave evil upon his person or
property, or upon the person or
property of his spouse, descendants
or ascendants, to give his consent.
"To determine the degree of the
intimidation, the age, sex and
condition of the person shall be
borne in mind.
"A threat to enforce one's claim
through competent authority, if the
claim is just or legal, does not
vitiate consent."
In order that intimidation may vitiate consent and
render the contract invalid, the following
requisites must concur: (1) that the intimidation
must be the determining cause of the contract, or
must have caused the consent to be given; (2)
that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3)
that the threat be real and serious, there being an
evident disproportion between the evil and the
resistance which all men can offer, leading to the
choice of the contract as the lesser evil; and (4)
that it produces a reasonable and well-grounded
fear from the fact that the person from whom it
comes has the necessary means or ability to
inflict the threatened injury. Applying the
foregoing to the present case, the
claim of Macaria that Sylvia threatened her to
bring Jose Vicente to court for support, to
scandalize their family by baseless suits and that
Sylvia would pardon Jose Vicente for possible
crimes of adultery and/or concubinage subject to
the transfer of certain properties to her, is
obviously not the intimidation referred to by law.
With respect to mistake as a vice of consent,
neither is Macaria's alleged mistake in having
signed the Letter-Agreement because of her
belief that Sylvia will thereby eliminate
inheritance rights from her and Jose Vicente, the
mistake referred to in Article 1331 of the Civil
Code,supra. It does not appear that the condition
that Sylvia "will eliminate her inheritance rights"
principally moved Macaria to enter into the
contract. Rather, such condition was but an
incident of the consideration thereof which, as
discussed earlier, is the termination of marital
relations.
In the ultimate analysis, therefore, both parties acted
in violation of the laws. However, the pari
delicto rule, expressed in the maxims "Ex dolo malo
non oritur actio" and "In pari delicto potior est
conditio defendentis," which refuses remedy to either
party to an illegal agreement and leaves them where
they are, does not apply in this case. Contrary to the
ruling of the respondent Court that (pp. 47-48,
Rollo):
". . . [C]onsequently, intervenor
appellees' obligation under the said
agreement having been annulled,
the contracting parties shall restore
to each other that things which
have been subject matter of the
contract, their fruits and the price
or its interest, except as provided
by law (Art. 1398, Civil Code)."
Article 1414 of the Civil Code,which is an exception
to the pari delicto rule, is the proper law to be
applied. It provides:
"When money is paid or property
delivered for an illegal purpose, the
contract may be repudiated by
one of the parties before the
purpose has been accomplished, or
before any damage has been
 caused to a third person. In such
case, the courts may, if the public
interest will thus be subserved,
allow the party repudiating the
contract to recover the money or
property."
Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before
the purpose has been accomplished and to adhere to
the pari delicto rule in this case is to put a premium
to the circumvention of the laws, positive relief
should be granted to Macaria. Justice would be
served by allowing her to be placed in the position in
which she was before the transaction was entered
into.
With the conclusions thus reached, We find it
unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised. cdrep
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated June 30, 1987 and
its resolution dated November 24, 1987 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80965,
[June 6, 1990], 264 PHIL 711-727)
JORGE DOMALAGAN, plaintif
f-appellee, vs.
CARLOS BOLIFER, defendant-
appellant.
Nature of the Case: Recover of the defendant the sum
of P516, together with damages estimated in the sum
of P350 and interest, and costs.
Doctrine: If the parties to an action, during the trial of
the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of
oral evidence to support contracts like the one in
question and permit the contract to be proved, by
evidence other than a writing, it will be just as
binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to
writing.
Facts: Plaintiff alleged that, in the month of
November, 1909, he and the defendant entered into a
contract by virtue of the terms of which he was to pay
to the defendant the sum of P500 upon the marriage
of his son Cipriano Domalagan with the daughter of
the defendant, Bonifacia Bolifer;
He completed his obligation under said contract by
paying to the defendant the said sum of P500,
together with the further sum of P16 "as hansel or
token of future marriage," that, notwithstanding said
agreement, the said Bonifacia Bolifer, in the month
of August, 1910, was joined in lawful wedlock to
Laureano Sisi.
He demanded of the defendant the return of the said
sum of P516 together with the interest and damages;
that the damages which he suffered resulted from the
fact that he, in order to raise said sum of P500, was
obliged to sell certain real property belonging to him,
located in the Province of Bohol, at a great sacrifice.
Defendant presented a general denial. He also alleged
that the facts stated in the complaint do not constitute
a cause of action.
CFI: rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant in said sum of P516 together
with the interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the
17th of December, 1910.
Issue: WON the verbal contract entered into by the
plaintiff and the defendant in regard to the delivery of
the money by reason of a prospective marriage is
valid and effective
Ruling: YES
The appellant contends that a contract, such as the
one relied upon by the plaintiff, in order to be valid,
must be reduced to writing. We have examined the
record in vain to find that the defendant during the
trial of the cause objected to any proof or any part
thereof, presented by the plaintiff, which showed or
tended to show the existence of the alleged contract.
That part of said section 335 which the appellant
relies upon for relief provides:
"In the following cases an agreement hereafter made
shall be unenforceable by action unless the same, or
some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing,
and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent;
evidence, therefore, of the agreement can not be
received without the writing or secondary evidence of
its contents:
"1.** * "2.** *
"3. An agreement made upon the consideration of
marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry."
Said section (335) does not render oral contracts
invalid. A contract may be valid and yet, by virtue of
said section, the parties will be unable to prove it.
Said section provides that the contract shall not be
enforced by an action unless the same is evidenced
by some note or memorandum. Said section simply
provides the method by which the contracts
mentioned therein may be proved. It does not declare
that said contracts are invalid, which have not been
reduced to writing, except perhaps those mentioned
in paragraph 5 of said section (335). A contract may
be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not
clothed with the necessary form. If it is not made in
conformity with said section of course it cannot be
proved, if proper objection is made. But a failure to
except to evidence presented in order to prove the
contract, because it does not conform to the statute, is
a waiver of the provisions of the law.
If the parties to an action, during the trial of the
cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral
evidence to support contracts like the one in question
and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence
other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon
the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.
GASHEM
SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, 
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS 
and MARILOU T.
GONZALES, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges at Dagupan City. He was
an Iranian exchange student and was 29 years old.
Respondent was a former waitress on a luncheonette,
and was 22 years old. Petitioner was allegedly
the lover of the respondent, and was said to promise
marriage to the latter, which convinced her to live
with him in his apartment. It was even alleged that
the petitioner went to the house of the respondent to
inform her family about the marriage on the end of
the semester. However, the marriage did not
materialize, with several beatings and maltreatment
experienced by the respondent from the petitioner.
The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the
decision was held in favor of the respondent.
However, the petitioner claimed that the judgment of
the RTC was an error, for the claims of the
respondent are not true, and that he did not know
about the custom of the Filipinos; his acts were in
accordance of his custom. The decision of the RTC
was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence,
the petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent could
claim payment for the damages incurred by the
petitioner.
RULING:
Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law.
However, since the respondent was proved to have a
good moral character, and that she had just let her
virginity be taken away by the petitioner since the
latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could
ask for payment for damages. Furthermore, since she
let her lover, the petitioner, “deflowered” her since
she believed that his promise to marry was true, and
not due to her carnal desire, then she could have her
claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the father of
the respondent had already looked for pigs and
chicken for the marriage reception and the sponsors
for the marriage, and then damages were caused by
the petitioner against the respondents, which
qualified the claims of the respondent against the
petitioner.
G.R. No. 11263             November 2, 1916
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and
Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were
married on January 7, 1915 and had a
residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila.
They stayed together for a month before
petitioner returned to her parent’s home.
Goitia filed a complaint against respondent
for support outside the conjugal home. It
was alleged that respondent demanded her to
perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform
such acts and demanded her husband other
than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since
Goitia kept on refusing, respondent
maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting
injuries upon her lops, face and different
body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of
respondent and stated that Goitia could not
compel her husband to support her except in
the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a
judicial decree granting her separation or
divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion
for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel
her husband to support her outside the
conjugal home.
HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband to
support his wife is created merely in the act
of marriage. The law provides that the
husband, who is obliged to support the wife,
may fulfill the obligation either by paying her
a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his
own home at his option. However, this
option given by law is not absolute. The law
will not permit the husband to evade or
terminate his obligation to support his wife if
the wife is driven away from the conjugal
home because of his wrongful acts. In the
case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the
conjugal abode because of the lewd designs
and physical assault of the husband, she can
therefore claim support from the husband for
separate maintenance even outside the
conjugal home.
JOSE
C. SERMONIA, petitioner, vs. H
ON. COURT OF APPEALS,
Eleventh Division, HON.
DEOGRACIAS FELIZARDO,
Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151,
and JOSEPH
SINSAY, respondents.
FACTS:
On 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was
charged with bigamy before the RTC of Pasig, Br.
151, for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes
Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage
to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting.
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the
ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has been
extinguished by prescription.
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge
denied the motion to quash. On 27 October 1992, he
likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of
denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the
Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. In the assailed decision of 21 January
1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal
liability for bigamy has been obliterated by
prescription. He avers that since the second marriage
contract was duly registered with the Office of the
Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration
makes it a matter of public record and thus
constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended
party therefore is considered to have had constructive
notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence,
prescription commenced to run on the day the
marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the
corresponding information for bigamy should have
been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the
prescriptive period does not begin from the
commission of the crime but from the time of
discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.
ISSUE:Whether or not the prosecution of Jose C.
Sermonia for bigamy has already prescribed.
HELD:
No. The non-application to the crime of bigamy of
the principle of constructive notice is not contrary to
the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be
construed liberally in favor of the accused. To
compute the prescriptive period for the offense of
bigamy from registration thereof would amount to
almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability
therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous
marriage may be said to be open and made of public
record by its registration, the offender however is not
truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority
and those concerned the existence of his previous
subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that
he is still a married person. He likewise conceals
from his legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage.
And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in
a place where he is not known to be still a married
person. And such a place may be anywhere, under
which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous
marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take
time. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive
period for the crime of bigamy should be counted
only from the day on which the said crime was
discovered by the offended party, the authorities or
their agency.
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, comp
lainant, vs. SOLEDAD
S. ESCRITOR, respondent.
Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC
of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio,
a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty
five years and had a son with him as well.
Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered
into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said
RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is
permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society.
They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness’ under the approval of their
congregation. Such a declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple
to legalize their union.
Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize
respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent
for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion.
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated
as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution.
As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and
sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in
enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or
symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to
outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the
State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest
only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an
unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction
between public and secular morality and religious
morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of
the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres
the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room
for accommodation of religious exercises as required
by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that
the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has
to further demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is
not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an
exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of
religion.
Ty vs CA
GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with
Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March 1977
in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in
August 1977. Both weddings were declared null and
void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent
of the parties. Even before the decree nullifying the
marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein
petitioner on April 1979 and had their church
wedding in Makati on April 1982. The decree was
only issued in August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes
filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with
petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a
judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage
with Anna must first be secured before a subsequent
marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC
found that the provisions of the Family Code cannot
be retroactively applied to the present case for doing
so would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner
and of her children.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded
to Ofelia Ty.
HELD:
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no
damages should be awarded to the wife who sought
damages against the husband for filing a baseless
complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, social humiliation and
alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact, that
petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent
held valid and subsisting. She is likewise suing to
maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her
petition for damages would result to a situation where
the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or
common funds. To do so, would make the
application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine
laws do not comprehend an action for damages
between husband and wife merely because of breach
of a marital obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between
Ty and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting and the
award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and
maintained as monthly support to their 2 children for
as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally
entitled thereto.
Silverio v. Republic
G.R. No. 174689, 22 October 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner was born and registered as male. He
admitted that he is a male transsexual, that is,
“anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
“female” and that he had always identified himself
with girls since childhood. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment,
breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery.
From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in
fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have
his name in his birth certificate changed from
Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to
female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of
the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the
OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the
Republic.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to
change his name and sex in his birth certificate.
RULING:
Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person
can change his name or surname without judicial
authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical
Error Law which does not sanction a change of first
name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a
person can legally change his given name, he must
present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling
reason justifying such change. In addition, he must
show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true
and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a
result of using his true and official name. Article 412
of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein, including
those corresponding to his first name and sex, were
all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article
413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters
pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.
However, there is no such special law in the
Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth
certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person
is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining
the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no
law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the time of
his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable.
For these reasons, while petitioner may have
succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil
registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis
for his petition for the correction or change of the
entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner
seeks involve questions of public policy to be
addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
Hence, petition is denied.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676,       September 12, 2008
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial
Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name
from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and
her gender from female to male. It appearing that
Jennifer Cagandahan is
sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which
is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons
possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer
Cagandahan grew up with secondary male
characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan
presented in court the medical certificate evidencing
that she is suffering
from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of
the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in
addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is
female but because her body secretes male hormones,
her female organs did not develop normally, thus has
organs of both male and female.” The lower court
decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor
General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking
that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court because the said petition did not
implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as
appearing in her birth certificate be changed.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the
Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls
for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright
denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the availale
evidence presented in court including the fact that
private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as
to the statement made by the doctor that
Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of
male hormones (androgen), which is
preponderant biological support for considering him
as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give
respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out.
That is, the Supreme Court respects the
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the
ordinary person. The Court added that a change of
name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons
and the consequences that will follow.
Obergefell v. Hodges Case Brief
Statement of the Facts:
Four states, Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and
Tennessee, have laws that define marriage as a union
of one man and one woman.  Fourteen same-sex
couples and two men whose same-sex partners were
deceased (collectively, “petitioners”) filed lawsuits
against those state laws, claiming that the denial of
petitioners’ ability to marry, or have their marriage in
other states recognized, violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Procedural History:
 Petitioners filed their lawsuits in the federal
district courts in their home states.  Each district
court ruled in favor of the petitioners.  The four
states appealed.
 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
consolidated all of the cases.  It reversed the
judgments of the district courts, holding that a
state has no obligation to license same-sex
marriages, or to recognize a same-sex marriage
performed in another state.
 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issues and Holdings:
1. Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a
state to license a marriage between two people
of the same sex?  Yes.
2. Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a
state to recognize a same-sex marriage licensed
and performed in another state that allows
same-sex marriage?  Yes.
Judgment:
The judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals is
reversed.
Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:
The Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to
license same-sex marriages, and to recognize same-
sex marriages licensed and performed in other states.
Reasoning:
 History Shows that Same-Sex Marriage
Must Be Permitted
The fact that same-sex couples desire to participate in
the institution of marriage shows their deep respect
for the institution.  Thus, opponents of same-sex
marriage are wrong to claim that allowing same-sex
couples to marry demeans the institution.
Also, though the institution of marriage has been
around for centuries, its history has been
characterized by change.  Arranged marriages, the
law of coverture, and other antiquated notions of
marriage have given way to more modern
conceptions of the institution.  Such evolution has not
weakened, but rather strengthened, the institution.  In
fact, the acceptance of same-sex couples over the last
several decades shows that public attitudes shift over
time.
 Same-Sex Marriage is a Right Under
the Due Process Clause
Requiring states to license same-sex marriage is
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process clause.  The right to marry, including for
same-sex couples, is fundamental under
the Constitution for four reasons:  (i) individual
autonomy dictates our personal choice on who to
marry; (ii) we have a right to enjoy intimate
association; (iii) it protects children and families,
because children suffer if they are raised by
unmarried parents; (iv) marriage is a keystone to our
nation’s social order.
 Same-Sex Marriage is a Right Under
Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection also requires that all states license same-
sex marriage.  Burdening the liberty of same-sex
couples, but not that of opposite-sex couples, shows
that current laws are inherently unequal.
 Waiting for Further Legislative Action is
Untenable
The desire to wait for political/legislative action
would be unwise in this case because it would
amount to allowing further discrimination against
same-sex couples.  The Court sees immediate harm
being inflicted upon the petitioners due to the laws at
issue in the case.  Therefore, it would be improper to
wait any longer to remedy that harm, particularly
when the laws at issue infringe upon the petitioners’
fundamental right to marry.
Finally, because all states must license same-sex
marriage as a fundamental right, it naturally follows
that states must also recognize same-sex marriages
licensed in other states.
Anaya vs. Palaroan
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married
in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for annulment of
the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent
was obtained through force and intimidation. The
complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of
the marriage and granting Aurora’s counterclaim.
While the amount of counterclaim was being
negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that several
months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital
relationship with a close relative of his. According to
her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital
secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She
prayed for the annulment of her marriage with
Fernando on such ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by
her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of
marriage.
HELD:
The concealment of a husband’s pre-marital
relationship with another woman was not one of
those enumerated that would constitute fraud as
ground for annulment and it is further excluded by
the last paragraph providing that “no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity” shall give
ground for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the
case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore
would not warrant an annulment of marriage.
BOLOS V. BOLOS  rather than to the word “marriages.” Such that
634 SCRA 429, [October 20, 2010]
DOCTRINE:
 Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained
in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which the Court
promulgated on 15 March 2003, extends only to
those marriages entered into during the effectivity of
the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for
the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36
of the Family Code. After trial on the merits, the
RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy of
said decision was received by respondent Danilo and
he thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for
Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section
20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the order
declaring its decision declaring the marriage null and
void as final and executory and granting the Motion
for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in
conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition
forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the
orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared
psychologically capacitated to render the essential
marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be
declared guilty of abandoning him, the family
home and their children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set
aside the assailed orders of the RTC declaring the
nullity of marriage as final and executory.
The appellate court stated that the requirement of a
motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this
case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was
solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family
Code took effect.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also
applicable to marriages solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code. According to
petitioner, the phrase “under the Family Code” in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions”
petitions filed after the effectivity of the Family Code
are governed by the A.M. No. even if the marriage
was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his
Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not
applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was
solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its
effectivity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable
to the case at bench.
HELD:
No, it does not.
RATIO:
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court
promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its
scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only
to those marriages entered into during the effectivity
of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code.8 The Court finds
Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation
that the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather
than to the word “marriages.”
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in
setting aside the RTC decision which denied due
course to respondent’s appeal and denying
petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration.
CHERYLL
SANTOS LEUS, petitioner, vs. S
T. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE  conduct unbecoming of an employee. She averred
WESTGROVE and/or SR. EDNA
QUIAMBAO, OSB, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J p:
Cheryll Santos Leus (petitioner) was hired
by St. Scholastica's College Westgrove (SSCW), a On June 2, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the
Catholic educational institution, as a non-teaching
personnel, engaged in pre-marital sexual relations,
got pregnant out of wedlock, married the father of her
child, and was dismissed by SSCW, in that order.
The question that has to be resolved is whether the
petitioner's conduct constitutes a ground for her
dismissal.
Before this Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision 1 dated September 24, 2008 and
Resolution 2 dated March 2, 2009 issued by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100188,
which affirmed the Resolutions dated February 28,
2007 3 and May 21, 2007 4 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No.
049222-06.
The Facts
SSCW is a catholic and sectarian educational
institution in Silang, Cavite. In May 2001, SSCW
hired the petitioner as an Assistant to SSCW's
Director of the Lay Apostolate and Community
Outreach Directorate.
Sometime in 2003, the petitioner and her
boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When
SSCW learned of the petitioner's pregnancy, Sr. Edna
Quiambao (Sr. Quiambao), SSCW's Directress,
advised her to file a resignation letter effective June
1, 2003. In response, the petitioner informed Sr.
Quiambao that she would not resign from her
employment just because she got pregnant without
the benefit of marriage. 5 EcHIDT
On May 28, 2003, Sr. Quiambao formally
directed the petitioner to explain in writing why she
should not be dismissed for engaging in pre-marital
sexual relations and getting pregnant as a result
thereof, which amounts to serious misconduct and
conduct unbecoming of an employee of a Catholic
school. 6
In a letter 7 dated May 31, 2003, the
petitioner explained that her pregnancy out of
wedlock does not amount to serious misconduct or
that she is unaware of any school policy stating that
being pregnant out of wedlock is considered as a
serious misconduct and, thus, a ground for dismissal.
Further, the petitioner requested a copy of SSCW's
policy and guidelines so that she may better respond
to the charge against her.
petitioner that, pending the promulgation of a
"Support Staff Handbook," SSCW follows the 1992
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992
MRPS) on the causes for termination of
employments; that Section 94 (e) of the 1992 MRPS
cites "disgraceful or immoral conduct" as a ground
for dismissal in addition to the just causes for
termination of employment provided under Article
282 of the Labor Code. 8
On June 4, 2003, the petitioner, through
counsel, sent Sr. Quiambao a letter, 9 which, in part,
reads:
To us, pre-marital sex
between two consenting adults
without legal impediment to marry
each other who later on married
each other does not fall within the
contemplation of "disgraceful or
immoral conduct" and "serious
misconduct" of the Manual
of Regulations for Private Schools
and the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
Your argument that what
happened to our client would set a
bad example to the students and
other employees of your school is
speculative and is more imaginary
than real. To dismiss her on that
sole ground constitutes grave abuse
of management prerogatives.
Considering her
untarnished service for two years,
dismissing her with her present
condition would also mean
depriving her to be more secure in
terms of financial capacity to
sustain maternal needs. 10
In a letter 11 dated June 6, 2003, SSCW,
through counsel, maintained that pre-marital sexual
relations, even if between two consenting adults
without legal impediment to marry, is considered a
disgraceful and immoral conduct or a serious
misconduct, which are grounds for the termination of
employment under the 1992 MRPS and the Labor
Code. That SSCW, as a Catholic institution of
learning, has the right to uphold the teaching of the
Catholic Church and expect its employees to abide by
the same. They further asserted that the petitioner's
indiscretion is further aggravated by the fact that she
is the Assistant to the Director of the Lay Apostolate
and Community Outreach Directorate, a position of
responsibility that the students look up to as role
model. The petitioner was again directed to submit a
written explanation on why she should not be
dismissed.
On June 9, 2003, the petitioner informed Sr.
Quiambao that she adopts her counsel's letter dated
June 4, 2003 as her written explanation. 12
Consequently, in her letter 13 dated June 11,
2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the petitioner that her
employment with SSCW is terminated on the ground
of serious misconduct. She stressed that pre-marital
sexual relations between two consenting adults with
no impediment to marry, even if they subsequently
married, amounts to immoral conduct. She further
pointed out that SSCW finds unacceptable the
scandal brought about by the petitioner's pregnancy
out of wedlock as it ran counter to the moral
principles that SSCW stands for and teaches its
students.
Thereupon, the petitioner filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC in Quezon City against SSCW
and Sr. Quiambao (respondents). In her position
paper, 14 the petitioner claimed that SSCW gravely
abused its management prerogative as there was no
just cause for her dismissal. She maintained that her
pregnancy out of wedlock cannot be considered as
serious misconduct since the same is a purely private
affair and not connected in any way with her duties
as an employee of SSCW. Further, the petitioner
averred that she and her boyfriend eventually got
married even prior to her dismissal.
For their part, SSCW claimed that there was
just cause to terminate the petitioner's employment
with SSCW and that the same is a valid exercise of
SSCW's management prerogative. They maintained
that engaging in pre-marital sex, and getting pregnant
as a result thereof, amounts to a disgraceful or
immoral conduct, which is a ground for the dismissal
of an employee under the 1992 MRPS. IDETCA
They pointed out that SSCW is a Catholic
educational institution, which caters exclusively to
young girls; that SSCW would lose its credibility if it
would maintain employees who do not live up to the
values and teachings it inculcates to its students.
SSCW further asserted that the petitioner, being an
employee of a Catholic educational institution,
should have strived to maintain the honor, dignity
and reputation of SSCW as a Catholic school. 15
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
 On February 28, 2006, the Labor Arbiter
(LA) rendered a Decision, 16 in NLRC Case No. 6-
17657-03-C which dismissed the complaint filed by
the petitioner. The LA found that there was a valid
ground for the petitioner's dismissal; that her
pregnancy out of wedlock is considered as a
"disgraceful and immoral conduct." The LA pointed
out that, as an employee of a Catholic educational
institution, the petitioner is expected to live up to the
Catholic values taught by SSCW to its students.
Likewise, the LA opined that:
Further, a deep analysis of
the facts would lead us to disagree
with the complainant that she was
dismissed simply because she
violate[d] a Catholic [teaching]. It
should not be taken in isolation but
rather it should be analyzed in the
light of the surrounding
circumstances as a whole. We must
also take into [consideration] the
nature of her work and the nature
of her employer-school. For us, it
is not just an ordinary violation. It
was committed by the complainant
in an environment where her strict
adherence to the same is called for
and where the reputation of the
school is at stake. . . . . 17
The LA further held that teachers and school
employees, both in their official and personal
conduct, must display exemplary behavior and act in
a manner that is beyond reproach.
The petitioner appealed to the NLRC,
insisting that there was no valid ground for the
termination of her employment. She maintained that
her pregnancy out of wedlock cannot be considered
as "serious misconduct" under Article 282 of
the Labor Code since the same was not of such a
grave and aggravated character. She asserted that
SSCW did not present any evidence to establish that
her pregnancy out of wedlock indeed eroded the
moral principles that it teaches its students. 18
The Ruling of the NLRC
On February 28, 2007, the NLRC issued a
Resolution, 19 which affirmed the LA Decision dated
February 28, 2006. The NLRC pointed out that the
termination of the employment of the personnel of
private schools is governed by the 1992 MRPS; that
Section 94 (e) thereof cites "disgraceful or immoral
conduct" as a just cause for dismissal, in addition to
the grounds for termination of employment provided
for under Article 282 of the Labor Code. The NLRC
held that the petitioner's pregnancy out of wedlock is
a "disgraceful or immoral conduct" within the
contemplation of Section 94 (e) of the 1992
MRPS and, thus, SSCW had a valid reason to
terminate her employment.
The petitioner sought reconsideration 20 of
the Resolution dated February 28, 2007 but it was
denied by the NLRC in its Resolution 21 dated May
21, 2007.
Unperturbed, the petitioner filed a
petition 22 for certiorari with the CA, alleging that
the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that
there was a valid ground for her dismissal. She
maintained that pregnancy out of wedlock cannot be
considered as a disgraceful or immoral conduct; that
SSCW failed to prove that its students were indeed
gravely scandalized by her pregnancy out of
wedlock. She likewise asserted that the NLRC erred
in applying Section 94 (e) of the 1992 MRPS.
The Ruling of the CA
On September 24, 2008, the CA rendered the
herein assailed Decision, 23 which denied the
petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner. The CA
held that it is the provisions of the 1992 MRPS and
not the Labor Code which governs the termination of
employment of teaching and non-teaching personnel
of private schools, explaining that:
It is a principle of statutory
construction that where there are
two statutes that apply to a
particular case, that which was
specially intended for the said case
must prevail. Petitioner was
employed by respondent private
Catholic institution which
undeniably follows the precepts or
norms of conduct set forth by the
Catholic Church. Accordingly, the
Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools followed by it must
prevail over the Labor Code, a
general statute. The Manual
constitutes the private schools'
Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 232 or the
Education Act of 1982. . . . . 24
The CA further held that the petitioner's
dismissal was a valid exercise of SSCW's
management prerogative to discipline and impose
penalties on erring employees pursuant to its policies,
rules and regulations. The CA upheld the NLRC's
conclusion that the petitioner's pregnancy out of
wedlock is considered as a "disgraceful and immoral
conduct" and, thus, a ground for dismissal under
Section 94 (e) of the 1992 MRPS. The CA likewise
opined that the petitioner's pregnancy out of wedlock
is scandalous per se given the work environment and
social milieu that she was in, viz.:
Under Section 94 (e) of the
[MRPS], and even under Article
282 (serious misconduct) of
the Labor Code,"disgraceful and
immoral conduct" is a basis for
termination of employment.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner contends that
her pre-marital sexual relations
with her boyfriend and her
pregnancy prior to marriage was
not disgraceful or immoral conduct
sufficient for her dismissal because
she was not a member of the
school's faculty and there is no
evidence that her pregnancy
scandalized the school
community. ADCETI
We are not persuaded.
Petitioner's pregnancy prior to
marriage is scandalous in itself
given the work environment and
social milieu she was in.
Respondent school for young
ladies precisely seeks to prevent its
students from situations like this,
inculcating in them strict moral
values and standards. Being part of
the institution, petitioner's private
and public life could not be
separated. Her admitted pre-marital
sexual relations was a violation of
private respondent's prescribed
standards of conduct that views
pre-marital sex as immoral because
sex between a man and a woman
must only take place within the
bounds of marriage.
Finally, petitioner's
dismissal is a valid exercise of the
employer-school's management
prerogative to discipline and
impose penalties on erring
employees pursuant to its policies,
rules and
regulations. . . . . 25 (Citations
omitted)
The petitioner moved for
reconsideration 26 but it was denied by the CA in its
Resolution 27 dated March 2, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issues
Essentially, the issues set forth by the
petitioner for this Court's decision are the
following: first, whether the CA committed reversible
error in ruling that it is the 1992 MRPS and not
the Labor Code that governs the termination of
employment of teaching and non-teaching personnel
of private schools; and second, whether the
petitioner's pregnancy out of wedlock constitutes a
valid ground to terminate her employment.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court grants the petition.
First Issue: Applicability of the 1992 MRPS
The petitioner contends that the CA, in ruling
that there was a valid ground to dismiss her, erred in
applying Section 94 of the 1992 MRPS. Essentially,
she claims that the 1992 MRPS was issued by the
Secretary of Education as the revised implementing
rules and regulations of Batas Pambansa Bilang
232 (BP 232) or the "Education Act of 1982." That
there is no provision in BP 232, which provides for
the grounds for the termination of employment of
teaching and non-teaching personnel of private
schools. Thus, Section 94 of the 1992 MRPS, which
provides for the causes of terminating an
employment, is invalid as it "widened the scope and
coverage" of BP 232. ADEacC
The Court does not agree.
The Court notes that the argument against the
validity of the 1992 MRPS, specifically Section 94
thereof, is raised by the petitioner for the first time in
the instant petition for review. Nowhere in the
proceedings before the LA, the NLRC or the CA did
the petitioner assail the validity of the provisions of
the 1992 MRPS.
"It is well established that issues raised for
the first time on appeal and not raised in the
proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel.
Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not
brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to
be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the
alleged facts and arguments belatedly raised would
amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair
play, justice, and due process." 28
In any case, even if the Court were to
disregard the petitioner's belated claim of the
invalidity of the 1992 MRPS, the Court still finds the
same untenable.
The 1992 MRPS, the regulation in force at
the time of the instant controversy, was issued by the
Secretary of Education pursuant to BP 232. Section
70 29 of BP 232 vests the Secretary of Education
with the authority to issue rules and regulations to
implement the provisions of BP 232. Concomitantly,
Section 57 30 specifically empowers the Department
of Education to promulgate rules and regulations
necessary for the administration, supervision and
regulation of the educational system in accordance
with the declared policy of BP 232.
The qualifications of teaching and non-
teaching personnel of private schools, as well as the
causes for the termination of their employment, are
an integral aspect of the educational system of private
schools. Indubitably, ensuring that the teaching and
non-teaching personnel of private schools are not
only qualified, but competent and efficient as well
goes hand in hand with the declared objective of BP
232 — establishing and maintaining relevant quality
education. 31 It is thus within the authority of the
Secretary of Education to issue a rule, which provides
for the dismissal of teaching and non-teaching
personnel of private schools based on their
incompetence, inefficiency, or some other
disqualification.
Moreover, Section 69 of BP 232 specifically
authorizes the Secretary of Education to "prescribe
and impose such administrative sanction as he may
deem reasonable and appropriate in the implementing
rules and regulations" for the "[g]ross inefficiency of
the teaching or non-teaching personnel" of private
schools. 32 Accordingly, contrary to the petitioner's
claim, the Court sees no reason to invalidate the
provisions of the 1992 MRPS, specifically Section 94
thereof.
Second Issue: Validity of the Petitioner's
Dismissal
The validity of the petitioner's dismissal
hinges on the determination of whether pregnancy
out of wedlock by an employee of a catholic
educational institution is a cause for the termination
of her employment.
In resolving the foregoing question, the Court
will assess the matter from a strictly neutral and
secular point of view — the relationship between
SSCW as employer and the petitioner as an
employee, the causes provided for by law in the
termination of such relationship, and the evidence on
record. The ground cited for the petitioner's
dismissal, i.e., pre-marital sexual relations and,
consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, will be
assessed as to whether the same constitutes a valid
ground for dismissal pursuant to Section 94 (e) of
the 1992 MRPS.
The standard of review in a Rule 45
petition from the CA decision in
labor cases.
In a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, such as the instant petition, where
the CA's disposition in a labor case is sought to be
calibrated, the Court's review is quite limited. In
ruling for legal correctness, the Court has to view the
CA decision in the same context that the petition
for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; the
Court has to examine the CA decision from the prism
of whether it correctly determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC
decision before it, not on the basis of whether the
NLRC decision on the merits of the case was
correct. 33
The phrase "grave abuse of discretion" is
well-defined in the Court's jurisprudence. It exists
where an act of a court or tribunal is performed with
a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 34 The
determination of the presence or absence of grave
abuse of discretion does not include an inquiry into
the correctness of the evaluation of evidence, which
was the basis of the labor agency in reaching its
conclusion. 35
Nevertheless, while a certiorari proceeding
does not strictly include an inquiry as to the
correctness of the evaluation of evidence (that was
the basis of the labor tribunals in determining their
conclusion), the incorrectness of its evidentiary
evaluation should not result in negating the
requirement of substantial evidence. Indeed, when
there is a showing that the findings or conclusions,
drawn from the same pieces of evidence, were
arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the
evidence on record, they may be reviewed by the
courts. In particular, the CA can grant the petition
for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed
decision or resolution, made a factual finding not
supported by substantial evidence. A decision that is
not supported by substantial evidence is definitely a
decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 36
The labor tribunals' respective
conclusions that the petitioner's
pregnancy is a "disgraceful or
immoral conduct" were arrived at
arbitrarily.
The CA and the labor tribunals affirmed the
validity of the petitioner's dismissal pursuant to
Section 94 (e) of the 1992 MRPS, which provides
that:
Sec. 94. Causes of
Terminating Employment. — In
addition to the just causes
enumerated in the Labor Code, the
employment of school personnel,
including faculty, may be
terminated for any of the following
causes:
xxx xxx xxx
e. Disgraceful or immoral conduct;
xxx xxx xxx
The labor tribunals concluded that the
petitioner's pregnancy out of wedlock, per se, is
"disgraceful and immoral" considering that she is
employed in a Catholic educational institution. In
arriving at such conclusion, the labor tribunals
merely assessed the fact of the petitioner's
pregnancy vis-à-vis the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the same. IDCHTE
However, the Court finds no substantial
evidence to support the aforementioned conclusion
arrived at by the labor tribunals. The fact of the
petitioner's pregnancy out of wedlock, without more,
is not enough to characterize the petitioner's conduct
as disgraceful or immoral. There must be substantial
evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual relations
and, consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, are
indeed considered disgraceful or immoral.
The totality of the circumstances
surrounding the conduct alleged to
be disgraceful or immoral must be
assessed against the prevailing
norms of conduct.
In Chua-Qua v. Clave, 37 the Court stressed
that to constitute immorality, the circumstances of
each particular case must be holistically considered
and evaluated in light of the prevailing norms of
conduct and applicable laws. 38 Otherwise stated, it
is not the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the conduct per se that determines whether the same
is disgraceful or immoral, but the conduct that is
generally accepted by society as respectable or moral.
If the conduct does not conform to what society
generally views as respectable or moral, then the
conduct is considered as disgraceful or immoral.
Tersely put, substantial evidence must be presented,
which would establish that a particular conduct,
viewed in light of the prevailing norms of conduct, is
considered disgraceful or immoral.
Thus, the determination of whether a conduct
is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step
process: first, a consideration of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second,
an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis the
prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society
generally considers moral and respectable.
That the petitioner was employed by a
Catholic educational institution per se does not
absolutely determine whether her pregnancy out of
wedlock is disgraceful or immoral. There is still a
necessity to determine whether the petitioner's
pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful
or immoral in accordance with the prevailing norms
of conduct.
Public and secular morality should
determine the prevailing norms of
conduct, not religious morality.
However, determining what the prevailing
norms of conduct are considered disgraceful or
immoral is not an easy task. An individual's
perception of what is moral or respectable is a
confluence of a myriad of influences, such as
religion, family, social status, and a cacophony of
others. In this regard, the Court's ratiocination
in Estrada v. Escritor 39 is instructive.
In Estrada, an administrative case against a
court interpreter charged with disgraceful and
immoral conduct, the Court stressed that in
determining whether a particular conduct can be
considered as disgraceful and immoral, the
distinction between public and secular morality on
the one hand, and religious morality, on the other,
should be kept in mind. 40 That the distinction
between public and secular morality and religious
morality is important because the jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular
morality. 41 The Court further explained that:
The morality referred to
in the law is public and
necessarily secular, not
religious . . . . "Religious teachings
as expressed in public debate may
influence the civil public order but
public moral disputes may be
resolved only on grounds
articulable in secular
terms." Otherwise, if government
relies upon religious beliefs in
formulating public policies and
morals, the resulting policies and
morals would require conformity
to what some might regard as
religious programs or agenda.
The non-believers would therefore
be compelled to conform to a
standard of conduct buttressed by a
religious belief, i.e., to a deepest roots, but it must have
"compelled religion," anathema to
religious freedom. Likewise, if
government based its actions upon
religious beliefs, it would tacitly
approve or endorse that belief and
thereby also tacitly disapprove
contrary religious or non-religious
views that would not support the
policy. As a result, government
will not provide full religious
freedom for all its citizens, or even
make it appear that those whose
beliefs are disapproved are second-
class citizens. Expansive religious
freedom therefore requires that
government be neutral in matters
of religion; governmental reliance
upon religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.
In other words,
government action, including its
proscription of immorality as
expressed in criminal law like
concubinage, must have a
secular purpose. That is, the
government proscribes this
conduct because it is
"detrimental (or dangerous) to
those conditions upon which
depend the existence and
progress of human society" and
not because the conduct is
proscribed by the beliefs of one
religion or the other. Although
admittedly, moral judgments based
on religion might have a
compelling influence on those
engaged in public deliberations
over what actions would be
considered a moral disapprobation
punishable by law. After all, they
might also be adherents of a
religion and thus have religious
opinions and moral codes with a
compelling influence on them; the
human mind endeavors to regulate
the temporal and spiritual
institutions of society in a uniform
manner, harmonizing earth with
heaven. Succinctly put, a law
could be religious or Kantian or
Aquinian or utilitarian in its
an articulable and discernible
secular purpose and justification
to pass scrutiny of the religion
clauses. . . . 42 (Citations omitted
and emphases ours)
Accordingly, when the law speaks of
immoral or, necessarily, disgraceful conduct, it
pertains to public and secular morality; it refers to
those conducts which are proscribed because they
are detrimental to conditions upon which depend
the existence and progress of human society. Thus,
in Anonymous v. Radam, 43 an administrative case
involving a court utility worker likewise charged with
disgraceful and immoral conduct, applying the
doctrines laid down in Estrada, the Court held
that: IScaAE
For a particular conduct
to constitute "disgraceful and
immoral" behavior under civil
service laws, it must be regulated
on account of the concerns of
public and secular morality. It
cannot be judged based on
personal bias, specifically those
colored by particular mores. Nor
should it be grounded on
"cultural" values not
convincingly demonstrated to
have been recognized in the
realm of public policy expressed irrespective of
in the Constitution and the laws. dogmatic origins.
At the same time, the
constitutionally guaranteed rights (2) if the father of the
child born out of
(such as the right to privacy)
should be observed to the extent wedlock is
himself married
that they protect behavior that may
be frowned upon by the majority. to a woman other
than the mother,
Under these tests, two then there is a
things may be concluded from the cause for
fact that an unmarried woman administrative
gives birth out of wedlock: sanction against
either the father
(1) if the father of the or the mother. In
child is himself such a case, the
unmarried, the "disgraceful and
woman is not immoral
ordinarily conduct" consists
administratively of having
liable for extramarital
disgraceful and relations with a
immoral conduct. married person.
It may be a not-so- The sanctity of
ideal situation and marriage is
may cause constitutionally
complications for recognized and
both mother and likewise affirmed
child but it does by our statutes as a
not give cause for special contract of
administrative permanent union.
sanction. There is Accordingly,
no law which judicial employees
penalizes an have been
unmarried sanctioned for
mother under their dalliances
those with married
circumstances by persons or for their
reason of her own betrayals of
sexual conduct or the marital vow of
proscribes the fidelity.
consensual sexual
activity between In this case, it was not
two unmarried disputed that, like respondent, the
persons. Neither father of her child was unmarried.
does the situation Therefore, respondent cannot be
contravene any held liable for disgraceful and
fundamental immoral conduct simply because
state policy as she gave birth to the child
expressed in Christian Jeon out of
the Constitution, wedlock. 44 (Citations omitted and
a document that emphases ours)
accommodates
various belief Both Estrada and Radam are administrative
cases against employees in the civil service. The
systems
Court, however, sees no reason not to apply the
doctrines enunciated in Estrada and Radam in the
instant case. Estrada and Radam also required the
Court to delineate what conducts are considered
disgraceful and/or immoral as would constitute a
ground for dismissal. More importantly, as in the said
administrative cases, the instant case involves an
employee's security of tenure; this case likewise
concerns employment, which is not merely a specie
of property right, but also the means by which the
employee and those who depend on him live. 45
It bears stressing that the right of an
employee to security of tenure is protected by
the Constitution. Perfunctorily, a regular employee
may not be dismissed unless for cause provided
under the Labor Code and other relevant laws, in this
case, the 1992 MRPS. As stated above, when the law
refers to morality, it necessarily pertains to public and
secular morality and not religious morality. Thus, the
proscription against "disgraceful or immoral conduct"
under Section 94 (e) of the 1992 MRPS, which is
made as a cause for dismissal, must necessarily refer
to public and secular morality. Accordingly, in order
for a conduct to be considered as disgraceful or
immoral, it must be "'detrimental (or dangerous) to
those conditions upon which depend the existence
and progress of human society' and not because the
conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or
the other."
Thus, in Santos v. NLRC, 46 the Court
upheld the dismissal of a teacher who had an extra-
marital affair with his co-teacher, who is likewise
married, on the ground of disgraceful and immoral
conduct under Section 94 (e) of the 1992 MRPS. The
Court pointed out that extra-marital affair is
considered as a disgraceful and immoral conduct is
an affront to the sanctity of marriage, which is a basic
institution of society, viz.:
We cannot overemphasize
that having an extra-marital affair
is an afront to the sanctity of
marriage, which is a basic
institution of society. Even our
Family Code provides that husband
and wife must live together,
observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family.
Our laws, in implementing this
constitutional edict on marriage
and the family underscore their
permanence, inviolability and
solidarity. 47
The petitioner's pregnancy out of
wedlock is not a disgraceful or
immoral conduct since she and the
father of her child have no
impediment to marry each other.
In stark contrast to Santos, the Court does not
find any circumstance in this case which would lead
the Court to conclude that the petitioner committed a
disgraceful or immoral conduct. It bears stressing that
the petitioner and her boyfriend, at the time they
conceived a child, had no legal impediment to marry.
Indeed, even prior to her dismissal, the petitioner
married her boyfriend, the father of her child. As the
Court held in Radam, there is no law which penalizes
an unmarried mother by reason of her sexual conduct
or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between
two unmarried persons; that neither does such
situation contravene any fundamental state policy
enshrined in the Constitution. DTAESI
Admittedly, the petitioner is employed in an
educational institution where the teachings and
doctrines of the Catholic Church, including that on
pre-marital sexual relations, is strictly upheld and
taught to the students. That her indiscretion, which
resulted in her pregnancy out of wedlock, is
anathema to the doctrines of the Catholic Church.
However, viewed against the prevailing norms of
conduct, the petitioner's conduct cannot be
considered as disgraceful or immoral; such conduct is
not denounced by public and secular morality. It may
be an unusual arrangement, but it certainly is not
disgraceful or immoral within the contemplation of
the law.
To stress, pre-marital sexual relations
between two consenting adults who have no
impediment to marry each other, and, consequently,
conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a
purely public and secular view of morality, does not
amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under
Section 94 (e) of the 1992 MRPS.
Accordingly, the labor tribunals erred in
upholding the validity of the petitioner's dismissal.
The labor tribunals arbitrarily relied solely on the
circumstances surrounding the petitioner's pregnancy
and its supposed effect on SSCW and its students
without evaluating whether the petitioner's conduct is
indeed considered disgraceful or immoral in view of
the prevailing norms of conduct. In this regard, the
labor tribunals' respective haphazard evaluation of
the evidence amounts to grave abuse of discretion,
which the Court will rectify.
The labor tribunals' finding that the
petitioner's pregnancy out of wedlock despite the
absence of substantial evidence is not only arbitrary,
but a grave abuse of discretion, which should have
been set right by the CA.
There is no substantial evidence to
prove that the petitioner's pregnancy
out of wedlock caused grave scandal
to SSCW and its students.
SSCW claimed that the petitioner was
primarily dismissed because her pregnancy out of
wedlock caused grave scandal to SSCW and its
students. That the scandal brought about by the
petitioner's indiscretion prompted them to dismiss
her. The LA upheld the respondents' claim, stating
that:
In this particular case, an
"objective" and "rational
evaluation" of the facts and
circumstances obtaining in this
case would lead us to focus our
attention . . . on the impact of the
act committed by the
complainant. The act of the
complainant . . . eroded the moral
principles being taught and
projecte[d] by the respondent
[C]atholic school to their young
lady students. 48 (Emphasis in the
original)
On the other hand, the NLRC opined that:
In the instant case, when
the complainant-appellant was
already conceiving a child even
before she got married, such is
considered a shameful and
scandalous behavior, inimical to
public welfare and policy. It
eroded the moral doctrines
which the respondent Catholic
school, an exclusive school for
girls, is teaching the young girls.
Thus, when the respondent-
appellee school terminated
complainant-appellant's services,
it was a valid exercise of its
management prerogative.
Whether or not she was a teacher is
of no moment. There is no separate
set of rules for non-teaching
personnel. Respondents-appellees
uphold the teachings of the
Catholic Church on pre-marital sex
and that the complainant-appellant
as an employee of the school was
expected to abide by this basic
principle and to live up with the
standards of their purely Catholic
values. Her subsequent marriage
did not take away the fact that she
had engaged in pre-marital sex
which the respondent-appellee
school denounces as the same is
opposed to the teachings and
doctrines it
espouses. 49 (Emphasis ours)
Contrary to the labor tribunals' declarations,
the Court finds that SSCW failed to adduce
substantial evidence to prove that the petitioner's
indiscretion indeed caused grave scandal to SSCW
and its students. Other than the SSCW's bare
allegation, the records are bereft of any evidence that
would convincingly prove that the petitioner's
conduct indeed adversely affected SSCW's integrity
in teaching the moral doctrines, which it stands for.
The petitioner is only a non-teaching personnel; her
interaction with SSCW's students is very limited. It is
thus quite impossible that her pregnancy out of
wedlock caused such a grave scandal, as claimed by
SSCW, as to warrant her dismissal.
Settled is the rule that in termination cases,
the burden of proving that the dismissal of the
employees was for a valid and authorized cause rests
on the employer. It is incumbent upon the employer
to show by substantial evidence that the termination
of the employment of the employees was validly
made and failure to discharge that duty would mean
that the dismissal is not justified and therefore
illegal. 50 "Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other minds equally
reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise." 51
Indubitably, bare allegations do not amount
to substantial evidence. Considering that the
respondents failed to adduce substantial evidence to
prove their asserted cause for the petitioner's
dismissal, the labor tribunals should not have upheld
their allegations hook, line and sinker. The labor
tribunals' respective findings, which were arrived
at sans any substantial evidence, amounts to a grave
abuse of discretion, which the CA should have
rectified. "Security of tenure is a right which may not
be denied on mere speculation of any unclear and
nebulous basis." 52
The petitioner's dismissal is not a
valid exercise of SSCW's
management prerogative.
The CA belabored the management
prerogative of SSCW to discipline its employees. The
CA opined that the petitioner's dismissal is a valid
exercise of management prerogative to impose
penalties on erring employees pursuant to its policies,
rules and regulations.
The Court does not agree.
The Court has held that "management is free
to regulate, according to its own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment, including
hiring, work assignments, working methods, time,
place and manner of work, processes to be followed,
supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer
of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers
and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. The
exercise of management prerogative, however, is not
absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and
with due regard to the rights of labor." Management
cannot exercise its prerogative in a cruel, repressive,
or despotic manner. 53
SSCW, as employer, undeniably has the right
to discipline its employees and, if need be, dismiss
them if there is a valid cause to do so. However, as
already explained, there is no cause to dismiss the
petitioner. Her conduct is not considered by law as
disgraceful or immoral. Further, the respondents
themselves have admitted that SSCW, at the time of
the controversy, does not have any policy or rule
against an employee who engages in pre-marital
sexual relations and conceives a child as a result
thereof. There being no valid basis in law or even in
SSCW's policy and rules, SSCW's dismissal of the
petitioner is despotic and arbitrary and, thus, not a
valid exercise of management prerogative.
In sum, the Court finds that the petitioner
was illegally dismissed as there was no just cause for
the termination of her employment. SSCW failed to
adduce substantial evidence to establish that the
petitioner's conduct, i.e., engaging in pre-marital
sexual relations and conceiving a child out of
wedlock, assessed in light of the prevailing norms of
conduct, is considered disgraceful or immoral. The
labor tribunals gravely abused their discretion in
upholding the validity of the petitioner's dismissal as
the charge against the petitioner lay not on substantial
evidence, but on the bare allegations of SSCW. In
turn, the CA committed reversible error in upholding
the validity of the petitioner's dismissal, failing to
recognize that the labor tribunals gravely abused their
discretion in ruling for the respondents.
The petitioner is entitled to
separation pay, in lieu of actual
reinstatement, full backwages and
attorney's fees, but not to moral and
exemplary damages.
Having established that the petitioner was
illegally dismissed, the Court now determines the
reliefs that she is entitled to and their extent. Under
the law and prevailing jurisprudence, "an illegally
dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a
matter of right." 54 Aside from the instances
provided under Articles 283 55 and 284 56 of
the Labor Code,separation pay is, however, granted
when reinstatement is no longer feasible because of
strained relations between the employer and the
employee. In cases of illegal dismissal, the accepted
doctrine is that separation pay is available in lieu of
reinstatement when the latter recourse is no longer
practical or in the best interest of the parties. 57
In Divine Word High School v. NLRC, 58 the
Court ordered the employer Catholic school to pay
the illegally dismissed high school teacher separation
pay in lieu of actual reinstatement since her
continued presence as a teacher in the school "may
well be met with antipathy and antagonism by some
sectors in the school community." 59
In view of the particular circumstances of
this case, it would be more prudent to direct SSCW to
pay the petitioner separation pay in lieu of actual
reinstatement. The continued employment of the
petitioner with SSCW would only serve to intensify
the atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism between
the parties. Consequently, the Court awards
separation pay to the petitioner equivalent to one (1)
month pay for every year of service, with a fraction
of at least six (6) months considered as one (1) whole
year, from the time of her illegal dismissal up to the
finality of this judgment, as an alternative to
reinstatement.
Also, "employees who are illegally dismissed
are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent, computed from the time their actual
compensation was withheld from them up to the time
of their actual reinstatement but if reinstatement is no
longer possible, the backwages shall be computed
from the time of their illegal termination up to the
finality of the decision." 60 Accordingly, the
petitioner is entitled to an award of full backwages
from the time she was illegally dismissed up to the
finality of this decision.
Nevertheless, the petitioner is not entitled to
moral and exemplary damages. "A dismissed
employee is entitled to moral damages when the
dismissal is attended by bad faith or fraud or
constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a
manner contrary to good morals, good customs or
public policy. Exemplary damages may be awarded if
the dismissal is effected in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner." 61 HcSaTI
"Bad faith, under the law, does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of a known
duty through some motive or interest or ill will that
partakes of the nature of fraud." 62
"It must be noted that the burden of proving
bad faith rests on the one alleging it" 63 since basic is
the principle that good faith is presumed and he who
alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the
same. 64 "Allegations of bad faith and fraud must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence." 65
The records of this case are bereft of any
clear and convincing evidence showing that the
respondents acted in bad faith or in a wanton or
fraudulent manner in dismissing the petitioner. That
the petitioner was illegally dismissed is insufficient to
prove bad faith. A dismissal may be contrary to law
but by itself alone, it does not establish bad faith to
entitle the dismissed employee to moral damages.
The award of moral and exemplary damages cannot
be justified solely upon the premise that the employer
dismissed his employee without cause. 66
However, the petitioner is entitled to
attorney's fees in the amount of 10% of the total
monetary award pursuant to Article 111 67 of
the Labor Code."It is settled that where an employee
was forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to
protect his rights and interest, the award of attorney's
fees is legally and morally justifiable." 68
Finally, legal interest shall be imposed on the
monetary awards herein granted at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until fully paid. 69
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the
foregoing disquisitions, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision dated September 24, 2008 and
Resolution dated March 2, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100188 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The
respondent, St. Scholastica's College Westgrove, is
hereby declared guilty of illegal dismissal and is
hereby ORDERED to pay the petitioner, Cheryll
Santos Leus, the following: (a) separation pay in lieu
of actual reinstatement equivalent to one (1) month
pay for every year of service, with a fraction of at
least six (6) months considered as one (1) whole year
from the time of her dismissal up to the finality of
this Decision; (b) full backwages from the time of her
illegal dismissal up to the finality of this Decision;
and (c) attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the total monetary award. The monetary
awards herein granted shall earn legal interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
the finality of this Decision until fully paid. The case
is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the
computation of petitioner's monetary awards.
SO ORDERED.
Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares, complainant,
versus Justice Onofre A. Villaluz (retired),
respondent.
Adm. Case No. 4431 June 19, 1997
Facts:
Complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares
is the presiding judge in Pasay City while respondent
Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of
Appeals, is a consult at the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission.
Judge Mijares is actually widowed by the death of
her first husband, Primitivo Mijares. She obtained a
decree declaring her husband presumptively dead,
after an absence of 16 years. Thus, she got married to
respondent in a civil wedding on January 7, 1994
before Judge Myrna Lim Verano.
They (complainant and respondent) knew each other
when the latter, who was at that time the Presiding
Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, was
trying a murder case involving the death of the son of
Mijares.
During their marriage, complainant judge discovered
that respondent was having an illicit affair
with another woman. Respondent denied such rather
he uttered harsh words to the complainant judge. As a
result, they lived separately and did not get in
touch with one another and the respondent did not
bother to apologize for what happened.
Through Judge Ramon Makasiar, complainant knew
that respondent married Lydia Geraldez.
Complainant then filed a complaint against
respondent for disbarment for the latter immorally
and bigamously entered into a second marriage while
having a subsisting marriage and distorted the truth
by stating his civil status as single.
In his defense, he contended that his marriage to the
complainant judge was a “sham marriage”; that he
voluntarily signed the marriage contract to help her in
the administrative case for immorality filed against
her by her legal researcher. Likewise, he maintained
that when he contracted his marriage with
complainant, he had a subsisting marriage with his
first wife because the decision declaring the
annulment of such marriage had not yet become final
and executory or published.
Judge Purisima the found respondent guilty
of deceit and grossly immoral conduct and later on
affirmed by the Court.
Issue:
a. Whether or not marriage of complainant and
respondent valid
b. Whether or not the marriage of complainant and
respondent was a sham marriage
Ruling:
a. Yes. It was a valid marriage. All the essential
and formal requisites of a valid marriage under
Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code were satisfied
and complied. Given the circumstance that he was
facing criminal case for bigamy and assuming for the
sake of argument that the judgment in civil case
declaring the annulment of marriage between
respondent and the first wife had not attained
complete finality, the marriage between complainant
and respondent is not void but only voidable.
b. As to the issue that it was a “sham” marriage is too
incredible to deserve serious consideration. Thus,
former Justice Onofre Villaluz is found guilty of
immoral conduct in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; he is hereby suspended
from practice of law for two years with the specific
warning.
Mariategui vs. CA
GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992
FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26,
1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime.
He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still
a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife
Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely
Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo.
Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina,
Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all
surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son
named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupo’s second
wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a
daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for
the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3
children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto
testified that his parents got married before a Justice
of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported
themselves as husband and wife, and were known in
the community to be such.
Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby
they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the
Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary
registration proceedings and a decree ordering the
registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the
third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of
the estate of their deceased father and annulment of
the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is
valid in the absence of a marriage license.
HELD:
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to
prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no evidence was
likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover,
the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists
does not invalidate the marriage, provided all
requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be
presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman,
deporting themselves as husband and wife, have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child
born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,
absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that
things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore
have successional rights.
Abbas vs Abbas
Facts: This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas,
petitioner, for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the ground of
absence of marriage license, as provided for in
Article 4 of the Family Code.
Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August
9, 1992. When they arrived in the Philippines on
December 1992, a ceremony was conducted between
them solemnized by Rev. Mario Dauz and witnessed
by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola.
Present also is Felicitas Goo, mother-in-law of Syed.
During the ceremony, he and Gloria signed a
document. Syed claim that he did not know the
nature of the ceremony until Gloria told him that it
was a marriage.
In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is
stated that Marriage License No 9969967, issued at
Carmona, Cavite was proven by the MCR being
issued to other couple.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and
Gloria is valid.
Ruling:
No. As the marriage of Syed and Gloria was
solemnized on January 9, 1993, the Family Code is
the applicable law, particularly Articles 3, 4 and 35
(3).
Article 3 provides the formal requisites of marriage.
Article 4 provides the effects of the absence of the
essential and formal requisites. And Article 35,
Paragraph 3 provides that those marriages which are
solemnized without a license are void from the
beginning in exception to those covered by the
preceding chapter.
Gloria failed to present actual marriage license or
copy relied on the marriage contract and testimonies
to prove the existence of the said license.
Thus, the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab
initio.
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN
BANGAYAN, JR. CASE DIGEST [G.R. No.
201061, July 3, 2013, CARPIO, J.]
TOPIC: Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage (Article 148)
DOCTRINE: Benjamin and Sally cohabitated
without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions, in accord with Article 148.
FACTS: Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic
relationship in 1979. Sally’s father was against the
relationship. Sally brought Benjamin to an office in
Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported
marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital
status, assured him that the marriage contract would
not be registered. Sally filed criminal actions for
bigamy and falsification of public documents against
Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as
evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial
court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was
bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a
valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court
for the partition of the properties he acquired with
Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family
Code, for his appointment as administrator of the
properties during the pendency of the case, and for
the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate
children. A total of 44 registered properties became
the subject of the partition before the trial court.
Aside from the seven properties enumerated by
Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties
in her answer.
The trial court ruled that the marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office because it could not be
registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage
with Azucena. The trial court ruled that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally are void for not having a marriage license
2. Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin
and Sally’s property relations
3. Whether bigamy was committed by the
petitioner
HELD:
1. YES.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio
and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35
of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a
license, except those covered by Article 34 where no
license is necessary, “shall be void from the
beginning.” In this case, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
license. It was duly established that no marriage
license was issued to them and that Marriage License
No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license
numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig
City for the month of February 1982. The case
clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35which made
their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying
the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and
void from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals
did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null
and void ab initio and non-existent.
2. YES.
The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which
states: Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling
under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. In the absence of proof
to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his
or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community of conjugal partnership existing
in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share
shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply
even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit
of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by
them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being
claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s
father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s
Answer to the petition before the trial court even
admitted that “Benjamin’s late father himself
conveyed a number of properties to his children and
their respective spouses which included Sally x x x.”
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule
that the decision of the CA is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by
TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The properties under
TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of
Benjamin with the descriptive title “married to
Sally.” The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 were registered in the name of Sally with the
descriptive title “married to Benjamin” while the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681
were registered in the name of Sally as a single
individual. We have ruled that the words “married to”
preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.
Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without
proof of actual contribution from either or both
spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article
148 of the Family Code.
3. NO.
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous
under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that
the first or former marriage shall not be null and void.
The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be
assumed as the one that is valid, there being no
evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of
invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage
contract. However, if the second marriage was void
not because of the existence of the first marriage but
for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of
bigamy was not committed. For bigamy to exist, the
second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage.In this case, there was
really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally
just signed a purported marriage contract without a
marriage license. The supposed marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived
together and represented themselves as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage.
CORPUZ V. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL 
G.R. No. 186571,   [11 August 2010]
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized
Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn
Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada
due to work and other professional commitments.
When he returned to the Philippines, he discovered
that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved
with another man. This brought about the filing of a
petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was
eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor,
Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree
took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in
love with another Filipina and wished to marry her.
He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to
register the Canadian divorce decree on his
marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However,
despite the registration, an official of National
Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former
marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until
there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian
divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view
of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently,
he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage
with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition
reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action
for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree
because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was
provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party
who can institute an action under the principle of
Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a
Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse
obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to
institute a petition for judicial recognition of a
foreign divorce decree?
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion –
i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens -
with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s
petition before the RTC. In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity
and conformity with the alien’s national law have
been duly proven according to our rules of evidence,
serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. A remand, at the same time,
will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s
presumptive evidence of aright by proving want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to
state, every precaution must be taken to ensure
conformity with our laws before a recognition is
made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall
have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as
provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, v. EDITHA
ALCANTARA, respondent.
G.R. No. 141528.        October 31, 2006.
Facts:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed
with the regional trial court seeking a declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was
dismissed in the Court of Appeals.
After such decision, petitioner filed another petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage with the
regional trial court alleging that his marriage with
respondent was null and void due to the fact that it
was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss
on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.
Issue:
Is the action of the husband tenable?
Ruling:
No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
pertains as “bar by prior judgment” or “estoppels by
verdict,” which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to
the prosecution of the second action upon the same
claim, demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of
the same rule, it pertains to res judicata in its concept
as “conclusiveness of judgment” or the rule of auter
action pendant which ordains that issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be
raised in any future case between the
same parties involving a different cause of action.
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly concealed
the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is
now deemed to have waived any defects therein. The
Court finds then that the present action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of lack of marriage license is barred. The petition is
denied for lack of merit.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
applellee, vs. EGAP MADSALI,
SAJIRON LAJIM and MARON
LAJIM, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00475, affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan, Puerto
Princesa City, Branch 50, finding accused Sajiron
Lajim and Maron Lajim 2 guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of abduction with
rape in Criminal Case No. 12281 and finding
accused Egap Madsali and Sajiron Lajim guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious
illegal detention in Criminal Case No. 12309.
In view of our decision in People v.
Cabalquinto, 3 the real name and identity of the
rape victim, as well as the members of her
immediate family, are withheld. In this regard,
the rape victim is herein referred to as AAA; her
mother, BBB; and her father, CCC.
In Criminal Case No. 12281, Sajiron
Lajim (Sajiron) and Maron Lajim (Maron) were
charged with the crime of abduction with rape in
an Information 4 dated March 17, 1995, which
reads:
That on or about the 1st
day of July, 1994, in Barangay
Malitub, Municipality of Bataraza,
Province of Palawan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating
together and helping one another
and by means of force, threat,
violence and intimidation, while
armed with a bladed weapon
known as "Badong", did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take and carry away
one AAA, a girl of 16 years of age,
against her will and consent and
brought to the forest and on the
occasion thereof the said accused
by means of force, threat, violence
and intimidation, and while armed
with a knife, accused Sahiron
Lajim, with lewd design, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge
with said AAA, against her will
and consent, to her damage and
prejudice. aSHAIC
That on the occasion of the
said Rape, accused Maron Lajim
helped Sahiron Lajim by acting as
look-out during the commission of
the said crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 12309, Egap
Madsali (Egap) and Sajiron Lajim (Sajiron) were
charged with the crime of serious illegal
detention in an Amended Information 5 dated
August 28, 1995, which reads:
That on or about the 2nd
day of July, 1994 in the morning
up to December 15, 1994, at
Barangay Malitub, Municipality of
Bataraza, Province of Palawan,
Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping one another,
with the use of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take and detain AAA,
an unmarried woman under 15
years of age in the house of Egap
Madsali thereby depriving said
AAA of her liberty all against her
will and as a result of that illegal
detention, said AAA was not able
to go home to her mother for a
period of more than five (5)
months.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon motion of the private prosecutor
and with the conformity of the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office, Criminal Case No. 12309
was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 12281,
pending before the RTC of Palawan, Puerto
Princesa City, Branch 50.
 Sajiron was arraigned on April 21, 1995
in Criminal Case No. 12281 and on September
21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 12309. He
pleaded not guilty to both charges. Egap was
arrested and, thereafter, arraigned on March 8,
1996. He pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No.
12309. Maron was arrested and, later, arraigned
on March 11, 1996. He pleaded not guilty in
Criminal Case No. 12281. A joint trial ensued.
However, in July 1996, Egap escaped while
under the custody of prison guards.
The evidence presented by the
prosecution are as follows:
On July 1, 1994, around 3:30 o'clock in
the afternoon, fifteen-year-old AAA and her aunt
Inon Dama were fetching water in a cave in
Barangay (Brgy.) Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan.
Suddenly, Sajiron arrived, running towards them
and carrying a badong (bolo). They tried to run
away, but Sajiron overtook them. He held the
hair of AAA and told her, "Sara, you go with me.
If you will not go with me, I will kill you." Inon
Dama came to AAA's rescue, but Sajiron tried to
hack her. Luckily, she was able to shield herself
with a plastic container. AAA was crying while
she held her aunt's hand. Sajiron then drew his
gun, which was tucked in his waist, pointed it at
Inon Dama and said, "If you will not go, I will
shoot you." Inon Dama went home and reported
the incident to AAA's mother. When Inon Dama
left the place, Maron, Sajiron's father, suddenly
appeared with a gun and told AAA to come with
them. When AAA refused, Sajiron and Maron
tied her hands behind her back, covered her
mouth with a piece of cloth, and brought her to
the forest. There, AAA was untied and
undressed, leaving only her bra on. While Sajiron
was undressing AAA, she pleaded with him not
to abuse her, but Sajiron told her that if she
would submit to his desire, her life would be
spared. Sajiron held her breast, touched her
private parts and inserted his sex organ inside her
vagina. AAA resisted, but to no avail. She felt
pain and she noticed blood on her private parts.
She was sexually abused three times on the
ground, where she was made to lie down on a
bed of leaves. During the entire time that AAA
was being abused by Sajiron, Maron stood guard
and watched them. They left the forest at around
10:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day
and brought AAA to the house of Egap, where
she was detained in a room. Sajiron instructed
Egap to guard AAA and to shoot her if she would
attempt to escape. ITcCaS
On July 2, 1994, AAA's mother came to
get AAA, but Egap refused and threatened to kill
her daughter if she would report the matter to the
authorities. Out of fear of losing her daughter,
she went home and did not report the incident to
the police authorities. 6 Egap asked AAA if she
wanted to marry Sajiron, but she refused. AAA
was then forced to sign an unknown document,
which she was not able to read.
Nine days after the abduction, or on July
11, 1994, upon instruction of Egap, AAA and
Sajiron were married by Imam Musli
Muhammad. The marriage was solemnized
against AAA's will and without the presence of
her parents. After the marriage, AAA and Sajiron
lived in the house of Egap, together with the
latter's wife, children and mother-in-law. AAA
stayed in one room with Sajiron. While detained,
AAA did not try to escape, because her house
was very far from the place where she was held
captive, and her captors threatened to kill her and
her family if she would attempt to escape. During
her detention, Sajiron abused her twice every
night. She was free to roam within the vicinity of
the house but she was usually accompanied by
Egap's wife who served as her guard. She was
also guarded and threatened by Egap's sons. She
got pregnant after some time.
On November 24, 1994, BBB and Inon
Dama went to Puerto Princesa City to report
AAA's abduction to the proper authorities. AAA
was detained at the house of Egap from July 2,
1994 until December 15, 1994. On December 16,
1994, Sajiron and Egap were arrested by the
police.
The defense, on the other hand, denied
having committed the crimes charged. Sajiron
claimed that he and AAA were engaged for three
years prior to their elopement. During the period
of their engagement, Sajiron lived with AAA in
her mother's house. AAA married Sajiron
voluntarily and out of her own free will. The
sexual intercourse between AAA and Sajiron was
consensual. The defense further claimed that
AAA merely filed criminal charges against
Sajiron because he did not pay the dowry (dower)
in the amount of P10,000.00 to AAA's parents.
Sajiron asserted that he did not pay the dowry
because he had already rendered services to
AAA's family for about three years prior to his
marriage with AAA. After the marriage, Sajiron
and AAA were brought by the latter's father to
his house in Balabac, Palawan. They stayed there
for about four months. Then they went to Brgy.
Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan and stayed at the
house of Egap for about two weeks. Sajiron was
thereafter arrested by the authorities. He only
learned that a case for abduction with rape was
filed against him by AAA when he was being
interrogated by the Bataraza Police. IEDaAc
On July 25, 2002, the RTC rendered a
Decision 7 finding Sajiron and Maron guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
abduction with rape. Egap and Sajiron were also
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of serious illegal detention. The dispositive
portion of the Decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, this Court finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, to
suffer imprisonment as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No.
12281, the accused
Sa[j]iron Lajim
and Maron Lajim
are hereby
sentenced to suffer
the penalty
of Reclusion
Perpetua or forty
(years) and each of
the accused are
ordered to
indemnify the
complainant AAA
the same amount
of P50,000.00 as
and for civil
indemnity;
2. In Criminal Case No.
12309, the accused
Egap Madsali and
Sa[j]iron Lajim are
hereby sentenced
to suffer the
penalty
of Reclusion
Perpetua and both
accused are
ordered to
separately
indemnify the
complainant AAA
the amount of
P50,000.00 as and
for civil
indemnity.
 SO ORDERED.
Accused-Appellants filed a Notice of
Appeal, and the records of the case were
forwarded to this Court. However, pursuant to
this Court's ruling in People v. Mateo, 8 the case
was transferred to the CA. The CA rendered a
Decision dated July 31, 2007 affirming the
decision of the trial court in Criminal Case Nos.
12281 and 12309.
Hence, this petition assigning the
following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN
IGNORING THE IMPLICATION
OF THE 5-MONTH INACTION
BY THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT'S MOTHER IN
REPORTING THE ALLEGED
ADBUCTION n AND ILLEGAL
DETENTION OF HER
DAUGHTER; AND 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN
IGNORING THE UNREBUTTED
TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT'S OWN
FATHER.
With respect to the first assigned error,
accused allege that the five-month inaction of
BBB through his failure to report the alleged
abduction and illegal detention of her daughter is
totally inconsistent with AAA's claim that she
was abducted and illegally detained. aAcDSC
We are not persuaded.
Delay in reporting an incident of rape
due to death threats does not affect the credibility
of the complainant, nor can it be taken against
her. The charge of rape is rendered doubtful only
if the delay was unreasonable and
unexplained. 9 BBB explained that she did not
immediately report the abduction, rape and
detention of her daughter to the authorities,
because Egap threatened to kill AAA, 10 who
was then in his custody.
 Further, BBB testified that, on another
occasion, Egap threatened to kill her if she dared
to report the matter to the authorities. True
enough, when Egap learned that she did what he
forbade her to do, he made good his threat and
shot her at the back. 11 Thus, BBB's delay in
reporting the incident for five months should not
be taken against her.
Anent the second assignment of error,
accused argue that the unrebutted testimonies of
CCC and Imam Musli Muhammad cast a
reasonable doubt on the charge against them.
CCC testified that Sajiron courted his daughter
and proposed marriage after their three-year
courtship. He claimed that he gave his consent to
the marriage of his daughter to Sajiron. Prior to
the marriage, CCC said that he was even able to
talk to his daughter and his wife, and both were
amenable to the marriage. AAA never mentioned
to him anything about having been kidnapped or
raped. Neither did his wife tell him of their
daughter's alleged harrowing experience. He and
his wife were present during the marriage
celebration.
Again, the testimony of CCC fails to
persuade Us. AAA testified that she had never
seen her father since she was a child, as her
father had abandoned them. 12 BBB testified that
she and her husband had been separated for a
long time, and she did not know his whereabouts.
She further said that CCC left their place in
March 1983 to go to Malaysia, and that was the
last time she saw him. 13 CCC's allegation that
his wife was present during the marriage
celebration was also controverted by the
testimonies of AAA, her mother, and Imam
Musli Muhammad. Thus, save for CCC's self-
serving allegations, he could not muster any
sufficient evidence to beef up those allegations. It
is also very surprising that CCC, after his long
absence, suddenly appeared and testified for the
defense. CCC would like to impress upon this
Court that he has maintained constant
communication with his family; however, no
single witness was presented to corroborate this
claim.
Furthermore, CCC, in his Malayang
Sinumpaang Salaysay 14 dated December 28,
1995, alleged that in 1991, his wife wrote and
informed him that Sajiron asked for their
daughter's hand in marriage. CCC replied that he
was giving his permission for their daughter to
marry. In the same salaysay, he also said that
Egap wrote him a letter on July 4, 1994 and
instructed him to proceed to Malitub, Bataraza to
discuss the intended marriage of AAA and
Sajiron. However, records are bereft of proof of
the existence of these letters. Clearly, these
allegations, being unsupported by evidence, are
self-serving and cannot be given any probative
value. aCTHDA
Moreover, Imam Musli Mohammad,
while testifying as prosecution witness, attested
that the parents of AAA and Sajiron were not
present during the marriage, 15 thus
controverting CCC's allegation that he was
present and gave consent to the marriage.
Although Imam Musli Muhammad, when
presented as an accused witness, recanted his
earlier testimony that CCC was not present at the
wedding, the same cannot be given credit.
Recantations are frowned upon by the courts. A
recantation of a testimony is exceedingly
unreliable, for there is always the probability that
such recantation may later on be itself repudiated.
Courts look with disfavor upon retractions,
because they can easily be obtained from
witnesses through intimidation or for monetary
considerations. Hence, a retraction does not
necessarily negate an earlier declaration. They
are generally unreliable and looked upon with
considerable disfavor by the courts. 16 Moreover,
it would be a dangerous rule to reject the
testimony taken before a court of justice, simply
because the witness who has given it later on
changes his mind for one reason or another. 17
As to the defense of denial, the same is
inherently weak. Denial is a self-serving negative
evidence, which cannot be given greater weight
than that of the declaration of a credible witness
who testifies on affirmative matters. Like alibi,
denial is an inherently weak defense, which
cannot prevail over the positive and credible
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denial
cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of
prosecution witnesses who were not shown to
have any ill motive to testify against
petitioner. 18
The assertion of the accused that the
reason why a criminal case was filed against him
was his failure to pay the P10,000.00 dowry is
too lame to be accepted as true. No young
Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit
she has been raped unless that is the truth. Even
in these modern times, this principle holds the victim's testimony is credible, it may be the
true. 19 When the offended parties are young and sole basis for the accused's conviction. 25 This is
immature girls from 12 to 16, as in this case, so because, owing to the nature of the offense, in
courts are inclined to lend credence to their many cases, the only evidence that can be given
version of what transpired, considering not only regarding the matter is the testimony of the
their relative vulnerability, but also the public offended party. 26
humiliation to which they would be exposed by a
court trial, if their accusation were not true. 20 In the case at bar, the trial court found
AAA's testimony credible. The trial court held
It is highly improbable that a young girl, that AAA's testimony was clear, categorical and
such as AAA, would concoct a horrid story and consistent. She remained steadfast in her
impute to the accused a crime so grave and assertions and unfaltering in her testimony given
subject herself and her family to the humiliation in court on the unfortunate incident. 27 The trial
and invasive ordeal of a public trial just to court found that AAA positively identified
avenge the alleged non-payment of the dowry, Sajiron and Maron as her abductors and narrated
unless she be impelled by a genuine desire to how she was taken and thrice raped by Sajiron in
expose the truth, vindicate her honor and seek the forest. AAA recounted her sordid experience
justice she so greatly deserves. as follows:
Neither is the Court convinced of the AAA on Direct-Examination by
"sweetheart theory," the defense of the accused, Private Prosecutor
by alleging that AAA and Sajiron were engaged Narrazid.
for three years prior to their elopement and
marriage. If there were indeed romantic Q: On July 1, 1994 more or less at
3:30 p.m. do you
relationship between AAA and Sajiron, as the
latter claims, her normal reaction would have remember where you
were?
been to cover up for the man she supposedly
loved. On the contrary, AAA lost no time in A: Yes ma'am.
reporting the incident to the National Bureau of
Investigation, 21 right after she was rescued by Q: Where were you?
the authorities. CTEaDc A: We fetched water on July 1,
Moreover, the "sweetheart theory" 1994.
proffered by the accused is effectively an Q: Where?
admission of carnal knowledge of the victim,
which consequently places on him the burden of A: In a cave, ma'am.
proving the supposed relationship by substantial Q: Was there anything unusual that
evidence. 22 The "sweetheart theory" hardly happened during that time?
deserves any attention when an accused does not
present any evidence, such as love letters, gifts, A: Yes ma'am.
pictures, and the like to show that, indeed, he and
Q: What was that incident?
the victim were sweethearts. 23 In the case at bar,
Sajiron was unable to present any evidence to A: I noticed that Sahiron Lajim run
prove their relationship. Clearly, the "sweetheart towards me and held me
theory" is a self-serving defense and mere by my hair. He was
fabrication of the accused to exculpate himself carrying a Barong n and he
and his cohorts from the charges filed against was forcing me to go with
them. It bears stressing that during her testimony him but I refused
before the trial court, AAA vehemently denied ma'am. TaSEHC
that she and Sajiron were sweethearts and firmly
declared that the latter never lived in their Q: And what did you do if any
house. 24 when he forced you to go
with him?
More importantly, in rape cases, the
credibility of the victim's testimony is almost A: He threatened me to kill me if I
always the single most important factor. When will not go with him. What
 I did was to hold the hair
of Inon Dama who came to
my rescue, ma'am.
Q: What did Sahiron Lajim do if
any?
A: He hacked Inon Dama but was
not hit and it was the
container that was hit,
ma'am. And Sahiron Lajim
left and I was forced to go
with him telling me, "go
with me if you do not want
to die."
Q: When this Inon Dama left what
happened next and you
were left alone with
Sahiron Lajim?
A: His father suddenly appeared
who was also carrying a
gun.
Q: What happened next?
A: The father of Sahiron Lajim
told me to go with them
but I refused. What they
did was to tie my hands
behind my back and my
mouth was covered by
them by a piece of cloth,
ma'am.
Q: And after that what happened
next?
A: Then they brought me to the
forest ma'am.  ma'am.
Q: And when you were in the
forest what happened
next?
A: Sahiron Lajim raped me while
his father was watching
ma'am.
Q: And how did Sahiron Lajim
raped you?
A: When we reached the forest my
hands were untied and my
dress were removed and
only my bra was left
ma'am.
Q: Who removed your dress?
A: Sahiron Lajim ma'am.
Q: And you stated that it was only
your bra that was left in
your body how about your
panty?
A: It was already removed.
Q: While Sahiron Lajim was
undressing you what did
you do, if any? CHcTIA
A: I pleaded to him not to pursue
his intention and Sahiron
Lajim threatened me that if
I will allow him to do such
thing to me he will not kill
me, ma'am.
Q: And did he hold the private
parts of your body?
A: Yes ma'am. (witness pointing to
her bust, and the lower part
of her body)
Q: What other part did Sahiron
Lajim touch in your body?
A: My private part, my vagina,
ma'am.
Q: What else did he do to you?
A: He inserted his organ to my
vagina. Then after raping
me he required me to wear
my blouse. He repeated the
act again for two times up
to the following day,
Q: How long was the private part
of Sahiron Lajim inside
your private part?
A: A little bit long. Nearing one (1)
hour.
Q: That was the first time his organ
entered your private part?
A: Yes ma'am.
Q: Did you notice anything in your
private part?
A: I have seen blood. I was even
pushing him away.
Q: How did you feel at that time
when his organ was inside
your private part?
A: It was painful, ma'am.
Q: And you stated that his organ
entered your private part
again for the second time,
how long?
A: I did not notice anymore how
long was it, ma'am.
Q: And you stated Madam Witness
that you were repeatedly
raped that night, is that
correct?
A: Yes ma'am. TSacAE
Q: Up to what time?
A: The first time that he raped me
was about 7:00 o'clock in
the evening, the second
was midnight. And the
third was 3:00 o'clock in
the morning.
Q: Were you able to sleep that
night?
A: No ma'am.
Q: At the time when you were
raped for the first time
where was the father of
Sahiron Lajim?
A: He was guarding ma'am.
Q: How far was his father?
A: He was near a tree which was
10 meters away from us.
Q: Now, the place where you were
brought by Sahiron Lajim
is a forest?
A: Yes ma'am.
Q: Was there a hut in that forest?
A: None ma'am, we were at a place
where there were big trees,
ma'am.
Q: So, you mean to say you were
raped on the ground?
A: Yes ma'am.
Q: Without any blanket?
A: He got some leaves of trees,
ma'am.
Q: What did he do with that leaves
of trees?
A: He secured some leaves and
placed it on the ground,
which served as mat,
ma'am.
Q: Now, the second and the third
time that Sahiron Lajim
raped you where was his
father? aCcADT
A: He was also there,
ma'am. 28 (Emphasis
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
As a rule, this Court gives great weight
to the trial court's evaluation of the testimony of a
witness, because the trial court had the
opportunity to observe the facial expression,
gesture, and tone of voice of a witness while
testifying, thus, putting it in a better position to
determine whether a witness was lying or telling
the truth. 29
However, the Court does not agree with
the findings of the CA affirming the trial court's
judgment finding Sajiron and Maron guilty of
abduction and rape in Criminal Case No. 12281.
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case
for review on any question, including one not
raised by the parties 30 Article 342 of
the Revised Penal Code spells out the elements of
the crime of forcible abduction, thus: (a) that the
person abducted is a woman, regardless of her
age, civil status, or reputation; (b) that the
abduction is against her will; and (c) that the
abduction is with lewd designs.
A reading of the Information in Criminal
Case No. 12281, for abduction with rape, would
readily show that the allegations therein do not
charge the accused with forcible abduction,
because the taking, as alleged, was not with lewd
designs. The only act that was alleged to have
been attended with lewd design was the act of
rape. Upon further perusal of the allegations in
the information, it appears that the crime charged
was actually the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and rape,
defined and penalized under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Although the information does not
specifically allege the term "kidnap or
detain," the information specifically used the
terms "take" and "carry away." To "kidnap" is
to carry away by unlawful force or fraud or to
seize and detain for the purpose of so carrying
away. 31 Whereas, to "take" is to get into one's
hand or into one's possession, power, or control
by force or strategem. 32 Thus, the
word take, plus the accompanying phrase carry
away, as alleged in the information, was
sufficient to inform the accused that they were
charged with unlawfully taking and detaining
AAA.
Further, the real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, they being conclusions of law
which in no way affect the legal aspects of the
information, but from the actual recital of facts as
alleged in the body of the information. 33 Simply
put, the crime charged is determined by the
information's accusatory portion and not by its
denomination.
The accusatory portion of the
information alleges that AAA was taken and
carried away by Sajiron and Maron against her
will and brought to the forest; and, on the
occasion thereof, Sajiron — by means of force,
threat, violence and intimidation — had carnal
knowledge of AAA. DcICEa
The elements of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code 34 are: (1) the offender is a private
individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in
any other manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is
illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense,
any of the following circumstances are present:
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more
than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating
public authority; or (c) any serious physical
injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d)
the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer. 35
In the case at bar, Sajiron and Maron,
who are private individuals, forcibly took and
dragged AAA, a minor, to the forest and held her
captive against her will. The crime of serious
illegal detention consists not only of placing a
person in an enclosure, but also of detaining him
or depriving him in any manner of his
liberty. 36 For there to be kidnapping, it is
enough that the victim is restrained from going
home. 37 Its essence is the actual deprivation of
the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable
proof of the intent of the accused to effect such
deprivation. 38 In the present case, although
AAA was not actually confined in an enclosed
place, she was clearly restrained and deprived of
her liberty, because she was tied up and her
mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth, thus, making
it very easy to physically drag her to the forest
away from her home.
The crime of rape was also proven
beyond reasonable doubt in this case. Sajiron
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA
through the use of force and intimidation. For
fear of losing her life, AAA had no choice but to
give in to Sajiron's beastly and lustful assault.
Clearly, conspiracy between Sajiron and
Maron attended the commission of forcible
abduction and the subsequent rape of AAA.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning a felony and
decide to commit it. 39 It may be inferred from
the acts of the accused before, during or after the
commission of the crime which, when taken
together, would be enough to reveal a community
of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is
frequently made by evidence of a chain of
circumstances. Once established, all the
conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals
regardless of the degree of participation of each
of them, for in the contemplation of the law, the
act of one is the act of all. 40 In the case at bar, it
was proven that Sajiron and Maron cooperated to
prevent AAA from resisting her abduction by
tying her hands behind her back and putting a
piece of cloth in her mouth. Maron watched and
stood guard to make sure that no one would
interrupt or prevent the bestial act perpetrated by
his son against AAA. Maron did not endeavor to
prevent his son from raping AAA thrice. The
next morning, Sajiron and Maron brought AAA
to the house of Egap to detain her there. CTaIHE
 The last paragraph of Art. 267 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that if the
victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall
be imposed. In People v. Larrañaga, 41 the
Court explained that this provision gives rise to a
special complex crime:
This amendment
introduced in our criminal statutes,
the concept of 'special complex
crime' of kidnapping with murder
or homicide. It effectively
eliminated the distinction drawn by
the courts between those cases
where the killing of the kidnapped
victim was purposely sought by the
accused, and those where the
killing of the victim was not
deliberately resorted to but was
merely an afterthought.
Consequently, the rule now is:
"Where the person kidnapped is
killed in the course of the
detention, regardless of whether
the killing was purposely sought or
was merely an afterthought, the
kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be
complexed under Art. 48, nor be
treated as separate crimes, but shall
be punished as a special complex
crime under the last paragraph of
Art. 267, as amended by R.A. No.
7659."
Where the law provides a
single penalty for two or more
component offenses, the resulting
crime is called a special complex
crime. Some of the special
complex crimes under the Revised
Penal Code are (1) robbery with
homicide, (2) robbery with rape,
(3) kidnapping with serious
physical injuries, (4) kidnapping
with murder or homicide, and (5)
rape with homicide. In a special
complex crime, the prosecution
must necessarily prove each of the
component offenses with the same
precision that would be necessary
if they were made the subject of
separate complaints. As earlier
mentioned, R.A. No.
7659 amended Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code by adding
thereto this provision: "When the
victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, or is
raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed; and that
this provision gives rise to a
special complex crime. (Italics in
the original)  
Thus, we hold that Sajiron and Maron are
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape in Criminal Case No. 12281.
In Criminal Case No. 12309, we also
find Sajiron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of serious illegal detention.
All the elements of the crime of serious
illegal detention are present in the instant case:
AAA, a female and a minor, testified that on July
2, 1994, after she was raped in the forest, she was
brought to and detained at the house of Egap and
forced to cohabit with Sajiron. From the very
start of her detention on July 2, 1994, Egap
directed Sajiron to guard her, and shoot her if she
attempted to escape. 42 She did not dare to
escape because the accused threatened to kill her
and her family if she attempted to flee. 43
AAA was also guarded by Egap's
wife. 44 Even the two sons of Egap, upon the
latter's instruction, constantly guarded and
threatened her to keep her from leaving. 45 In
fine, the accused had successfully instilled fear in
AAA's mind that escaping would cause her not
only her own life, but also the lives of her loved
ones. ECTIHa
To give a color of legitimacy to AAA's
detention, Sajiron married AAA. However, the
marriage between her and Sajiron is considered
irregular under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws (Presidential Decree No. 1083). Art. 15 (b)
of said the law provides that no marriage contract
shall be perfected unless the essential requisite of
mutual consent of the parties be freely given.
And under Art. 32 of the same law, if the consent
of either party is vitiated by violence,
intimidation, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,
the marriage is considered irregular (fasid ) from
the time of its celebration.
 AAA did not give her consent to the
wedding. 46 The marriage was solemnized only
upon the instruction of Egap. 47 She was also
forced to sign the marriage contract without the
presence of her parents or any of her
relatives. 48 She did not want to marry Sajiron
because she did not love him. 49 The Imam who
solemnized their marriage did not even ask for
the consent of the parties. 50 He was merely
compelled to solemnize the marriage because he
was afraid of Egap, and the latter threatened
him. 51 Clearly, the marriage ceremony was a
farce, and was only orchestrated by the accused
in an attempt to exculpate themselves from
criminal responsibility.
Anent Criminal Case No. 12309, the
prescribed penalty for serious illegal detention
under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no
aggravating or modifying circumstance in the
commission of the offense, the proper penalty to
be imposed is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to
Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to Criminal Case No. 12281, the
penalty for the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and rape
is death. However, R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty
in the Philippines," which was approved on June
24, 2006, prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty. Thus, the penalty of death is reduced
to reclusion perpetua, 52 without eligibility for
parole. 53
As to accused Egap, his act of escaping
from his police escort during the pendency of his
case and his subsequent unexplained absence
during the promulgation of the decision
convicting him of the crime charged has divested
him of the right to avail himself of any remedy
that may be available to him, including his right
to appeal. In a recent case, this Court held that
once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, or escapes from prison or confinement,
he loses his standing in court; and unless he
surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the
court, he is deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief from it. 54 Hence, insofar as accused
Egap is concerned, the judgment against him
became final and executory upon the lapse of
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the
judgment. cEaCAH
As to the award of damages.
In Criminal Case No. 12281, AAA is
entitled to civil indemnity in line with prevailing
jurisprudence that civil indemnification is
mandatory upon the finding of rape. 55
In People v. Quiachon, 56 even if the
penalty of death is not to be imposed because of
the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil
indemnity of P75,000.00 is proper, because it is
not dependent on the actual imposition of the
death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the
death penalty attended the commission of the
offense. As explained in People v.
Salome, 57 while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains
that the penalty provided for by the law for a
heinous offense is still death, and the offense is
still heinous. Accordingly, the civil indemnity for
AAA is P75,000.00.
In addition, AAA is entitled to moral
damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code, 58 without the necessity of additional
pleadings or proof other than the fact of
rape. 59 Moral damages is granted in recognition
of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from
the odious crime of rape. 60 Such award is
separate and distinct from the civil
indemnity. 61 Therefore, the Court awards the
amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages.
In Criminal Case No. 12309, for serious
illegal detention, the trial court's award of
P50,000 civil indemnity to AAA was proper, in
line with prevailing jurisprudence. 62
We also find that AAA is entitled to
moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code, which provides that moral damages may
be recovered in cases of illegal detention. 63 This
is predicated on AAA's having suffered serious
anxiety and fright when she was detained for
more than five months. Thus, the Court awards
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. 64
Finally, AAA was sexually abused on
July 1, 1994 and gave birth on April 8, 1995.
There was no showing that AAA had previously
been sexually abused or had sexual relations with
other men. Further, Dr. Ma. Rebethia Alcala, a
Municipal Health Officer of Bataraza, Palawan,
testified that since AAA gave birth on April 8,
1995, the baby must have been conceived
sometime in July 1994, which was at or about the
time of the commission of the rape. Therefore, it
can be logically deduced that Sajiron is the father
of the child. Under Art. 345 of the Revised Penal
Code, 65 he is civilly liable for the support of his
offspring. Hence, he is directed to provide
support to the victim's child born out of the rape,
subject to the amount and conditions to be
determined by the trial court, after due notice and
hearing, in accordance with Art. 201 of
the Family Code. 66 aIcCTA
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00475
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as
follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 12281,
accused Sajiron Lajim and
Maron Lajim are found
guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special
complex crime of
kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with rape
under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, and are
sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, and
to pay jointly and
severally, the offended
party AAA, the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P75,000.00
as moral damages.
Accused Sajiron Lajim is
further ordered to support
the offspring born as a
consequence of the rape.
The amount of support
shall be determined by the
trial court after due notice
and hearing, with support
in arrears to be reckoned
from the date the appealed
decision was promulgated
by the trial court; and
(b) In Criminal Case No. 12309,
accused Sajiron Lajim is
found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the
crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention
under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, and is sentenced
to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and
to pay the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Silverio v. Republic
October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)
 PARTIES:
petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
respondent: Republic of the Philippines
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for
the change of his first name “Rommel Jacinto” to
“Mely” and his sex from male to female in his birth
certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason
of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male
transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and
acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in
favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with
the principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there
is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex
alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was
denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON change in name and sex in birth
certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.
HELD:
No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right.
It may be allowed in cases where the name is
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to
pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or
if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s
basis of the change of his name is that he intends his
first name compatible with the sex he thought he
transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says
that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and
no law allows the change of entry in the birth
certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment. The Court denied the petition.
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-
RECIO, petitioner, v. REDERICK A. RECIO,
respondent.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married
to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together
as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a
decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian
citizen and was married again to petitioner Grace
Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12, 1994 in
Cabanatuan City. In their application for a
marriage license, respondent was declared as “single”
and “Filipino.”
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent
lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of
their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her. On his Answer,
Rederick contended that his first marriage was
validly dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to
marry Grace.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s
wedding and while the suit for the declaration of
nullity was pending , respondent was able to secure a
divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the “marriage had irretrievably
broken down.”
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of
Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on the ground
that the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of
the couple thus there was no more marital union to
nullify or annul.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent
and Editha Samson was proven.
2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to
be legally capacitated to marry petitioner
RULING:
1st issue:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation
of the divorce decree of respondent’s marriage to
Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce decree between
respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court.
However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance
with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
2nd issue:
Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that
reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before
this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the
divorrecce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the
trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence
on this matter.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a
quo for the purpose of receiving evidence. The Court
mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer
to declare her marriage to respondent null and void
because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to
marry.
Te v. Choa, G.R. No. 126446, Nov. 29, 2000 (346
SCRA 327
FACTS:
In 1988, Arthur Te and Lilian Choa married in civil
rites. Although they did not live together, they would
usually see each other. In 1989, Liliana gave birth to
their daughter. Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting
her. In 1990, Arthur contracted another marriage
while still married to Liliana. Hence, Liliana filed a
bigamy case against Te and administrative case for
the revocation of his and his mistress’ engineering
license. Te filed a petition for nullity of marriage.
RTC rendered a decision on the bigamy case even the
petition for annulment was pending.
ISSUE: W/N the annulment should be resolved first
before the criminal and administrative case be
decided upon.
HELD:
NO. Outcome The annulment case had no bearing on
Te’s guilt in the bigamy case. The ground cited by Te
for the annulment was for voidable marriage. Hence,
he was still validly married when he committed
bigamy.
REPUBLIC vs ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780               October 16, 2013
This is a case of MARRIAGE FOR
CONVENIENCE.
FACTS
Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee
Fringer, an American citizen. She later on filed a
petition to nullify their marriage. She alleged that
immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never
really had any intention of entering into a married
state or complying with any of their essential marital
obligations. She said that she contracted Fringer to
enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof,
she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that
after the ceremony, the parties went their separate
ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and
never again communicated with her; and that, in turn,
she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never
processed her petition for citizenship. She described
their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null
and void ab initio.
The RTC ruled in her favor.
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC
ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal
and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception. In its resolution
denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the
RTC went on to explain that the marriage was
declared void because the parties failed to freely give
their consent to the marriage as they had no intention
to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means
for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before
the CA. The CA, however, upheld the RTC decision.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that
the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein
case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a
marriage in jest considering that the parties only
entered into the marriage for the acquisition of
American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They
never intended to enter into a marriage contract and
never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family.
The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and
Fringer be declared null and void.
RULING:
No, respondent’s marriage is not void.
The court said:
“Based on the above, consent was not lacking
between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was
also conscious and intelligent as they understood the
nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired
their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage.
Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a
clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage
so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal
tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.”
The court also explained that “There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for
purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and
formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it
is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by
law, it shall be declared valid.”
“No less than our Constitution declares that marriage,
as an in violable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State. It
must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot
leave the impression that marriage may easily be
entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and
just as easily nullified when no longer needed.”
Buccat v. Buccat
G.R. No. 47101, 25 April 1941
FACTS:
It was established before the trial court: The Plaintiff
met the defendant in March 1938. After several
interviews, both were committed on September 19 of
that year .On November 26 the same year, the
plaintiff married the defendant in a Catholic
Cathedral in Baguio. They, then, cohabited for about
eighty-nine days. Defendant gave birth to a child of
nine months on February 23, 1939. Following this
event, Plaintiff and Defendant separated. On March
20, 1939 the plaintiff filed an action for annulment of
marriage before the CFI of Baguio City. The plaintiff
claimed that he consented to the marriage because the
defendant assured him that she was virgin. The trial
court dismissed the complaint.
Hence, this appeal. Basically, Godofredo Buccat
(Plaintiff) and Luida Mangonon (Defendant) got
married on November 26, 1938. Luida gave birth
after 89 days and on March 20, 1939 Godofredo filed
for annulment of marriage before the CFI because he
was led to believe by Luida that she was a virgin. The
trial court dismissed the complaint, so Godofredo
appealed.
ISSUE: Should the annulment for Godofredo
Buccat’s marriage be granted on the grounds that
Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?
RULING:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to
nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which the
State is interested and where society rests.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there
was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a
ground for annulment. It was unlikely that
Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect
anything about Luida’s condition considering that she
was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly
developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged
stomach ) when they got married. As she gave birth
less than 3 months after they got married, she must
have looked very pregnant even before they were
married. Thus, consent freely given: ARTICLE 4 and
45 FC.
SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. Costs to
plaintiff-appellant.
MIGUELA R. VILLANUEVA,
RICHARD R. VILLANUEVA,
and MERCEDITA
VILLANUEVA-TIRADOS, petit
ioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, CENTRAL BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ILDEFONSO C. ONG, and
PHILIPPINE VETERANS
BANK, respondents.
Antonio M. Albano for petitioners.
Wilfredo I. Untalan and Mariano
Y. Navarro for respondent Philippine Veterans Bank.
Linzag Arcilla & Associates Law Office for
private respondent.
Armando L. Suratos, Aloysius C. Alday, Sr.,
Vicente S. Aquino and Alexander L. Ang for
respondent Central Bank.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; WHEN
OFFER BECOMES INEFFECTIVE. — Under
Article 1323 of the Civil Code, an offer becomes
ineffective upon the death, civil interdiction, insanity,
or insolvency of either party before acceptance is
conveyed. The reason for this is that: [T]he contract
is not perfected except by the concurrence of two
wills which exist and continue until the moment that
they occur. The contract is not yet perfected at any
time before acceptance is conveyed; hence, the
disappearance of either party or his loss of capacity
before perfection prevents the contractual tie from
being formed. (ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, Civil
Code of the Philippines, vol. IV, 463 [1985 ed.,]
citing 2-1 Ruggiero 283 and 5 Salvat 34-35)
2. COMMERCIAL LAWS; BANKS;
INSOLVENCY; APPOINTMENT OF A
RECEIVER; EFFECT; APPLICATION IN CASE
AT BAR. — It has been said that where upon the
insolvency of a bank a receiver therefor is appointed,
the assets of the bank pass beyond its control into the
possession and control of the receiver whose duty it
is to administer the assets for the benefit of the
creditors of the bank. (10 Am. Jur. 2d Banks, §764
[1963]). Thus, the appointment of a receiver operates
to suspend the authority of the bank and of its
directors and officers over its property and effects,
such authority being reposed in the receiver, and in
this respect, the receivership is equivalent to an
injunction to restrain the bank officers from
intermeddling with the property of the bank in any
way. (65 Am. Jur. 2d Receivers, §146 [1963]. In a
nutshell, the insolvency of a bank and the consequent
appointment of a receiver restrict the bank's capacity
to act, especially in relation to its property. Applying
Article 1323 of the Civil Code, Ong's offer to
purchase the subject lots became ineffective because
the PVB became insolvent before the bank's
acceptance of the offer came to his knowledge.
Hence, the purported contract of sale between them
did not reach the stage of perfection.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
Do petitioners have a better right than
private respondent Ildefonso Ong to purchase
from the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) the
two parcels of land described as Lot No. 210-D-1
and Lot No. 210-D-2 situated at Muntinglupa,
Metro Manila, containing an area of 529 and 300
square meters, respectively? This is the principal
legal issue raised in this petition.
In its decision of 27 January 1994 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 35890, 1 the Court of Appeals held
for Ong, while the trial court, Branch 39 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, ruled for
the petitioners in its joint decision of 31 October
1991 in Civil Case No. 87-42550 2 and Sp. Proc.
No. 85-32311. 3
The operative antecedent facts are set
forth in the challenged decision as follows:
The disputed lots were
originally owned by the spouses
Celestino Villanueva and Miguela
Villanueva, acquired by the latter
during her husband's sojourn in the
United States since 1968.
Sometime in 1975, Miguela
Villanueva sought the help of one
Jose Viudez, the then Officer-in-
Charge of the PVB branch in
Makati if she could obtain a loan
from said bank. Jose Viudez told
Miguela Villanueva to surrender
the titles of said lots as collaterals.
And to further facilitate a bigger
loan, Viudez, in connivance with
one Andres Sebastian, swayed
Miguela Villanueva to execute a
deed of sale covering the two (2)
disputed lots, which she did but
without the signature of her
husband Celestino. Miguela
Villanueva, however, never got the
loan she was expecting.
Subsequent attempts to contact
Jose Viudez proved futile, until
Miguela Villanueva thereafter
found out that new titles over the
two (2) lots were already issued in
the name of the PVB. It appeared
upon inquiry from the Registry of
Deeds that the original titles of
these lots were canceled and new
ones were issued to Jose Viudez,
which in turn were again cancelled
and new titles issued in favor of
Andres Sebastian, until finally new
titles were issued in the name of
PNB [should be PVB] after the lots
were foreclosed for failure to pay
the loan granted in the name of
Andres Sebastian.
Miguela Villanueva sought
to repurchase the lots from the
PVB after being informed that the
lots were about to be sold at
auction. The PVB told her that she
can redeem the lots for the price of
P110,416.00. Negotiations for the
repurchase of the lots nevertheless
were stalled by the filing of
liquidation proceedings against the
PVB on August of 1985.
Plaintiff-appellant [Ong]
on the other hand expounds on his
claim over the disputed lots in this
manner:
"In October 1984,
plaintiff-appellant offered
to purchase two pieces of
land that had been
acquired by PVB through
foreclosure. To back-up
plaintiff-appellant's offer
he deposited the sum of
P10,000.00.
In 23 November
1984, while appellant was
still abroad, PVB approved
his subject offer under
Board Resolution No.
10901-84. Among the
conditions imposed by
PVB is that: 'The purchase
price shall be P110,000.00
(less deposit of
P10,000.00) payable in
cash within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of
approval of the offer.'
In mid-April 1985,
appellant returned to the
country. He immediately
verified the status of his
offer with the PVB, now
under the control of CB,
where he was informed
that the same had already
been approved. On 16
April 1985, appellant
formally informed CB of
his desire to pay the
subject balance provided
the bank should execute in
his favor the
corresponding deed of
conveyance. The letter was
not answered.
Plaintiff-appellant
sent follow-up letters that
went unheeded, the last of
which was on 21 May
1987. On 26 May 1987,
appellant's payment for the
balance of the subject
properties were accepted
by CB under Official
Receipt #0816.
On 17 September
1987, plaintiff-appellant
through his counsel, sent a
letter to CB demanding for
the latter to execute the
corresponding deed of
conveyance in favor of
appellant. CB did not
bother to answer the same.
Hence, the instant case.
While appellant's
action for specific
performance against CB
was pending, Miguela
Villanueva and her
children filed their claims
with the liquidation court."
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 3-
4). 4
From the pleadings, the following
additional or amplificatory facts are established:
The efforts of Miguela Villanueva to
reacquire the property began on 8 June 1983
when she offered to purchase the lots for
P60,000.00 with a 20% downpayment and the
balance payable in five years on a quarterly
amortization basis. 5
Her offer not having been
accepted,6 Miguela Villanueva increased her bid
to P70,000.00. It was only at this time that she
disclosed to the bank her private transactions
with Jose Viudez. 7
After this and her subsequent offers were
rejected, 8 Miguela sent her sealed bid of
P110,417.00 pursuant to the written advice of the
vice president of the PVB. 9
The PVB was placed under receivership
pursuant to Monetary Board (MB) Resolution
No. 334 dated 3 April 1985 and later, under
liquidation pursuant to MB Resolution No. 612
dated 7 June 1985. Afterwards, a petition for
liquidation was filed with the RTC of Manila,
which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 85-32311
and assigned to Branch 39 of the said court. Cdpr
On 26 May 1987, Ong tendered the sum
of P100,000.00 representing the balance of the
purchase price of the litigated lots.10 An
employee of the PVB received the amount
conditioned upon approval by the Central Bank
liquidator.12 It was raffled to Branch 47 thereof.
Upon learning that the PVB had been placed
under liquidation, the presiding judge of Branch
47 ordered the transfer of the case to Branch 39,
the liquidation court.13
On 15 June 1989, then Presiding Judge
Enrique B. Inting issued an order allowing the
purchase of the two lots at the price of
P150,000.00.14 The Central Bank liquidator of
the PVB moved for the reconsideration of the
order asserting that it is contrary to law as the
disposal of the lots should be made through
public auction.15
On 26 July 1989, Miguela Villanueva
filed her claim with the liquidation court. She
averred, among others, that she is the lawful and
registered owner of the subject lots which were
mortgaged in favor of the PVB thru the
falsification committed by Jose Viudez, the
manager of the PVB Makati Branch, in collusion
with Andres Sebastian; that upon discovering this Civil Case No. 87-
fraudulent transaction, she offered to purchase 42550 entitled
the property from the bank; and that she reported "Ildefonso Ong vs.
the matter to the PC/INP Criminal Investigation Central Bank of
Service Command, Camp Crame, and after the Phils., et al.;
investigation, the CIS officer recommended the
2. Dismissing the claim of
filing of a complaint for estafa through
falsification of public documents against Jose Ildefonso Ong
over the two
Viudez and Andres Sebastian. She then asked
that the lots be excluded from the assets of the parcels of land
originally covered
PVB and be conveyed back to her. 16 Later, in
view of the death of her husband, she amended by TCT No.
438073 and
her claim to include her children, herein
petitioners Mercedita Villanueva-Tirados and 366364 in the
names of Miguela
Richard Villanueva. 17
Villanueva and
On 31 October 1991, the trial court Celestino
rendered judgment 18 holding that while the Villanueva,
board resolution approving Ong's offer may have respectively which
created in his favor a vested right which may be are now covered
enforced against the PVB at the time or against by TCT No.
the liquidator after the bank was placed under 115631 and
liquidation proceedings, the said right was no 115632 in the
longer enforceable, as he failed to exercise it name of the PVB;
within the prescribed 15-day period. As to
3. Declaring the Deed of
Miguela's claim, the court ruled that the principle
of estoppel bars from questioning the transaction Absolute Sale
bearing the
with Viudez and the subsequent transactions
because she was a co-participant thereto, though signature of
Miguela
only with respect to her undivided one-half (1/2)
conjugal share in the disputed lots and her one- Villanueva and the
falsified signature
third (1/3) hereditary share in the estate of her
husband. llcd of Celestino [sic]
Viudez under date
Nevertheless, the trial court allowed her May 6, 1975 and
to purchase the lots if only to restore their status all transactions
as conjugal properties. It further held that by and related
reason of estoppel, the transactions having been documents
perpetrated by a responsible officer of the PVB, executed thereafter
and for reasons of equity, the PVB should not be referring to the
allowed to charge interest on the price of the lots; two lots covered
hence, the purchase price should be the PVB's by the above
claim as of 29 August 1984 when it considered stated titles as null
the sealed bids, i.e., P110,416.20, which should and void;
be borne by Miguela Villanueva alone.
4. Ordering the Register of
The dispositive portion of the decision of Deeds of Makati
the trial court reads as follows: which has
jurisdiction over
WHEREFORE, judgment the two parcels of
is hereby rendered as follows: land in question to
1. Setting aside the order re-instate in his
of this court issued land records, TCT
on June 15, 1989 No. 438073 in the
under the caption name of Miguela
 Villanueva and hereby REVERSED and SET
TCT No. 366364 ASIDE, and a new one entered
in the name of ordering the disputed lots be
Celestino awarded in favor of plaintiff-
Villanueva who appellant Ildefonso Ong upon
were the registered defendant-appellee Central Bank's
owners thereof, execution of the corresponding
and to cancel all deed of sale in his favor. 20
subsequent titles
emanating In support thereof, the Court of Appeals declared
that Ong's failure to pay the balance within the
therefrom; and
prescribed period was excusable because the
5. Ordering the Liquidator PVB neither notified him of the approval of his
to reconvey the bid nor answered his letters manifesting his
two lots described readiness to pay the balance, for which reason he
in TCT No. could not have known when to reckon the 15-day
115631 and period prescribed under its resolution. It went
115632 and further to suggest that the Central Bank was in
executing the estoppel because it accepted Ong's late payment
corresponding of the balance. As to the petitioners' claim, the
deed of Court of Appeals stated: prLL
conveyance of the
said lots upon the The conclusion reached by
the lower court favorable to
payment of One
Hundred Ten Miguela Villanueva is, as aptly
pointed out by plaintiff-appellant,
Thousand Four
Hundred Sixteen indeed confusing. While the lower
court's decision declared Miguela
and 20/100
(P110,416.20) Villanueva as estopped from
recovering her proportionate share
Pesos without
interest and less and interest in the two (2) disputed
lots for being a "co-participant" in
the amount
deposited by the the fraudulent scheme perpetrated
by Jose Viudez and Andres
claimant, Miguela
Villanueva in Sebastian — a factual finding
which We conform to and which
connection with
the bidding where Miguela Villanueva does not
controvert in this appeal by not
she had
participated and filing her appellee's brief, yet it
ordered the reconveyance of the
conducted by the
PVB on August disputed lots to Miguela
Villanueva as the victorious party
29, 1984.
upon her payment of P110,416.20.
Cost against Ildefonso Ong Would not estoppel defeat the
and the PVB. claim of the party estopped? If so,
which in fact must be so, would it
SO ORDERED. 19 not then be absurd or even defiant
Only Ong appealed the decision to the for the lower court to finally entitle
Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as Miguela Villanueva to the disputed
CA-G.R. CV No. 35890. In its decision of 27 lots after having been precluded
January 1994, the Court of Appeals reversed the from assailing their subsequent
decision of the trial court and ruled as follows: conveyance in favor of Jose
Viudez by reason of her own
WHEREFORE, premises negligence and/or complicity
considered, the assailed decision is therein? The intended punitive
 effect of estoppel would merely be
a dud if this Court leaves the lower
court's conclusion unrectified. 21
Their motion for
reconsideration22 having been denied,23 the
petitioners filed this petition for review
on certiorari.24
Subsequently, the respondent Central
Bank apprised this Court that the PVB was no
longer under receivership or liquidation and that
the PVB has been back in operation since 3
August 1992. It then prayed that it be dropped
from this case or at least be substituted by the
PVB, which is the real party in interest. 25
In its Manifestation and Entry of
Appearance, the PVB declared that it submits to
the jurisdiction of this Court and that it has no
objection to its inclusion as a party respondent in
this case in lieu of the Central Bank.26 The
petitioners did not object to the substitution.27
Later, in its Comment dated 10 October
1994, the PVB stated that it "submits to and shall
abide by whatever judgment this Honorable
Supreme Tribunal may announce as to whom
said lands may be awarded without any touch of
preference in favor of one or the other party
litigant in the instant case."28
In support of their contention that the
Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that
Ong is better entitled to purchase the disputed
lots, the petitioners maintain that Ong is a
disqualified bidder, his bid of P110,000.00 being
lower than the starting price of P110,417.00 and
his deposit of P10,000.00 being less than the
required 10% of the bid price; that Ong failed to
pay the balance of the price within the 15-day
period from notice of the approval of his bid; and
that his offer of payment is ineffective since it
was conditioned on PVB's execution of the deed
of absolute sale in his favor.
On the other hand, Ong submits that his
offer, though lower than Miguela Villanueva's
bid by P417.00, is much better, as the same is
payable in cash, while Villanueva's bid is payable
in installment; that his payment could not be said
to have been made after the expiration of the 15-
day period because this period has not even
started to run, there being no notice yet of the
approval of his offer; and that he has a legal right
to compel the PVB or its liquidator to execute the
corresponding deed of conveyance. LLpr
There is no doubt that the approval of
Ong's offer constitutes an acceptance, the effect
of which is to perfect the contract of sale upon
notice thereof to Ong. 29 The peculiar
circumstances in this case, however, pose a legal
obstacle to his claim of a better right and deny
support to the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals.
Ong did not receive any notice of the
approval of his offer. It was only sometime in
mid-April 1985 when he returned from the
United States and inquired about the status of his
bid that he came to know of the approval.
It must be recalled that the PVB was
placed under receivership pursuant to the MB
Resolution of 3 April 1985 after a finding that it
was insolvent, illiquid, and could not operate
profitably, and that its continuance in business
would involve probable loss to its depositors and
creditors. The PVB was then prohibited from
doing business in the Philippines, and the
receiver appointed was directed to "immediately
take charge of its assets and liabilities, as
expeditiously as possible collect and gather all
the assets and administer the same for the benefit
of its creditors, exercising all the powers
necessary for these purposes."
Under Article 1323 of the Civil Code, an
offer becomes ineffective upon the death, civil
interdiction, insanity, or insolvency of either
party before acceptance is conveyed. The reason
for this is that:
[T]he contract is not
perfected except by the
concurrence of two wills which
exist and continue until the
moment that they occur. The
contract is not yet perfected at any
time before acceptance is
conveyed; hence, the
disappearance of either party or his
loss of capacity before perfection
prevents the contractual tie from
being formed. 30
It has been said that where upon the
insolvency of a bank a receiver therefor is
appointed, the assets of the bank pass beyond its
control into the possession and control of the
receiver whose duty it is to administer to assets
for the benefit of the creditors of the
bank.31 Thus, the appointment of a receiver
operates to suspend the authority of the bank and
of its directors and officers over its property and
effects, such authority being reposed in the
receiver, and in this respect, the receivership is
equivalent to an injunction to restrain the bank
officers from intermeddling with the property of
the bank in any way.32
Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, as
amended, provides thus:
SEC. 29. Proceedings
upon insolvency. — Whenever,
upon examination by the head of
the appropriate supervising or
examining department or his
examiners or agents into the
condition of any bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions, it shall be
disclosed that the condition of the
same is one of insolvency, or that
its continuance in business would
involve probable loss to its
depositors or creditors, it shall be
the duty of the department head
concerned forthwith, in writing, to
inform the Monetary Board of the
facts. The Board may, upon
finding the statements of the
department head to be true, forbid
the institution to do business in the
Philippines and designate an
official of the Central Bank or a
person of recognized competence
in banking or finance as receiver to
immediately take charge of its
assets and liabilities, as
expeditiously as possible collect
and gather all the assets and
administer the same for the benefit
of its creditors . . . exercising all
the powers necessary for these
purposes . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The assets of an institution
under receivership or liquidation
shall be deemed in custodia
legis in the hands of the receiver or
liquidator and shall, from the
moment of such receivership or
liquidation, be exempt from any
order or garnishment, levy,
attachment, or execution.
In a nutshell, the insolvency of a bank
and the consequent appointment of a receiver
restrict the bank's capacity to act, especially in
relation to its property. Applying Article 1323 of
the Civil Code, Ong's offer to purchase the
subject lots became ineffective because the PVB
became insolvent before the bank's acceptance of
the offer came to his knowledge. Hence, the
purported contract of sale between them did not
reach the stage of perfection. Corollarily, he
cannot invoke the resolution of the bank
approving his bid as basis for his alleged right to
buy the disputed properties.
Nor may the acceptance by an employee
of the PVB of Ong's payment of P100,00.00
benefit him since the receipt of the payment was
made subject to the approval by the Central Bank
liquidator of the PVB thus: LexLib
Payment for the purchase
of the former property of
Andres Sebastian per
approved BR No. 10902-
84 dated 11/13/84, subject
to the approval of CB
liquidator. 33
This payment was disapproved on the ground
that the subject property was already in custodia
legis, and hence, disposable only by public
auction and subject to the approval of the
liquidation court. 34
The Court of Appeals therefore erred
when it held that Ong had a better right than the
petitioners to the purchase of the disputed lots.
Considering then that only Ong appealed
the decision of the trial court, the PVB and the
Central Bank, as well as the petitioners, are
deemed to have fully and unqualifiedly accepted
the judgment, which thus became final as to them
for their failure to appeal.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
GRANTED and the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals of 27 January 1994 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 35890 is hereby SET ASIDE. The
decision of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila of 31 October 1991 in Civil Case No.
87-42550 and Sp. Proc. No. 85-32311 is hereby
REINSTATED.
Respondent Philippine Veterans Bank is
further directed to return to private respondent
Ildefonso C. Ong the amount of P100,000.00.
 No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Jimenez vs. Canizares
L-12790, August 31, 1960
FACTS:
Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the
annulment of his marriage with Remedios
Canizares on the ground that the orifice of her
genitals or vagina was too small to allow the
penetration of a male organ for copulation. It has
existed at the time of the marriage and continues to
exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two
nights and one day after the marriage. The court
summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the
latter did not file any answer. The wife was
ordered to submit herself to physical examination
and to file a medical certificate within 10 days.
She was given another 5 days to comply or else it
will be deemed lack of interest on her part and
therefore rendering judgment in favor of the
petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be
annulled with only the testimony of the husband.
HELD:
The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her
husband did not avail of the opportunity to defend
herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly
be concluded. It is a well-known fact that women
in this country are shy and bashful and would not
readily and unhesitatingly submit to a physical
examination unless compelled by competent
authority. Such physical examination in this case is
not self-incriminating. She is not charged with any
offense and likewise is not compelled to be a
witness against herself. Impotence being an
abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
case was remanded to trial court.
Alcazar v Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451, October 13,
2009
FACTS: Veronica and Rey got married. After their
wedding, they lived in Rey’s house in Occidental
Mindoro. Then they returned to Manila, but Rey
did not live with Veronica in her home in Tondo.
Rey then left for Riyahd where he was working. He
never contacted his wife since he left. About a year
and a half, Veronica was informed that her husband
is coming home. But she was surprised that he did
not go directly to her in Tondo but to his house in
Mindoro instead. Thus, petitioner concluded that
respondent was physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her, providing
sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family
Code. Respondent has been uncooperative to the
investigation. Dr. Tayag testified that Rey was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
hence, it is a sufficient ground for declaration of
nullity of marriage. RTC denied. CA also denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE W/N the respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform his essential marriage
obligations
HELD: SC denied. The action originally filed was
annulment of marriage based on Article 45,
paragraph 5 of the Family Code. Article 45(5) of
the Family Code refers to lack of power to
copulate.[16] Incapacity to consummate denotes
the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to
perform the complete act of sexual intercourse. No
evidence was presented in the case at bar to
establish that respondent was in any way physically
incapable to consummate his marriage with
petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her
cross-examination that she and respondent had
sexual intercourse after their wedding and before
respondent left for abroad. Petitioner was actually
seeking for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
respondent based on the latter’s psychological
incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. he
Court declared that “psychological incapacity”
under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It
should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage.
Martinez v. Tan, 12 Phil 731
FACTS: There was received in evidence at the trial
what is called Rosalia Martinez and Angel Tan
were married before a justice of the peace in Leyte.
They executed an expediente de matrimonio civil.
It is written in Spanish and consists, first, of a
petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated
on the 25th of September, 1907, signed both by
Martinez and Tan, in which they state that they
have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of
marriage before the justice of the peace, and ask
that the justice solemnize the marriage. Marriage
was solemnized with two witnesses. The couple did
not live together and when Martinez went home to
Ormoc, her relatives convinced her to file charges
claiming that the marriage was not valid since she
signed the document in her own home thinking that
it was a paper authorizing Tan to ask the consent of
her parents to the marriage.
ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid.
HELD:
Yes. They were married since there was an
expression of mutual consent and both of them
appeared before the justice of the peace. They both
understood Spanish thus they knew the contents of
the document they were signing.
Madridejo v. De Leon
Facts
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife,
had but one child, Domingo de Leon. The wife and
son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year
1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived
with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of
births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna,
shows that on June 1, 1917, a child was born to
Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was
named Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data
being furnished by Pedro Madridejo. On June 17,
1917, a 24-day old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a
son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of
the father. On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being
at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a
bachelor, 30 years of age, by the parish priest of
Siniloan. She died on the following day, July 9,
1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by
Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio
Madridejo, as well as her alleged second husband,
Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the
2nd of May, 1928. Lower Court ruled that the
marriage of Madridejo and Perez was valid and the
Melecio Madridejo was legitmated by that
marriage. Appellant (Gonzalo de leon) contends
that trial court erred in declaring that the marriage
in question was valid and that Pedro Madridejo was
legitimated by that marriage.
Issues
Whether or not the marriage of Flaviana Perez to
Pedro Madridejo is valid
Whether or not the marriage subsequently
legitimated Melecio Madridejo
HELD
With regard to the first assignment of error, the
mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna,
who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez,
failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to
the municipal secretary does not invalidate the
marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the
essential requisites required by law for its validity
were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding
of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of
said essential requisites.
In the second issue, it is evident that Melecio
Madridejo has not been acknowledged by Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or
by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and
therefore said marriage did not legitimate him.
Morigo vs. People
GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates
in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after
receiving a card from Barrete and various
exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts.
They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to
Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for
divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In
1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently
filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity
on the ground that there was no marriage
ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy
and moved for a suspension of arraignment since
the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question
in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty
claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab
initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second
marriage in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed
declaration for the nullity of his marriage with
Barrete before his second marriage in order to be
free from the bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio
considering that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between them by a
solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed
a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need
to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage
when he contracted his second marriage with 2. declare in the presence of not less than two
Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
is acquitted in the case filed. husband and wife.
RENE RONULO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF The first requirement is present since petitioner
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. admitted to it. The second requirement is likewise
present since the prosecution, through the testimony
G.R. No. 182438, 2 July 2014. of its witnesses, proved that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to husband and wife.
marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in
Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law,
wedding, the church's officiating priest refused to specifically Article 44, which states that:
solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage
license. Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of
any provision of this Act not specifically penalized,
With the couple and the guests already dressed for or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper
the wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan Church. authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more
The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not
conducted a ceremony on the same day where the more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the
couple took each other as husband and wife in front court.
of the guests. This was despite Petitioner's knowledge
of the couple's lack of marriage license. As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating
Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty.
352 of the RPC for performing an illegal marriage
ceremony.
The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that
what he did was an act of blessing and was not
tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was
found guilty.
The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the
CA.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal
marriage.
RULING: Yes.
Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized
solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize
any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this
crime are: 
1. authority of the solemnizing officer; and 
2. his performance of an illegal marriage
ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner himself
admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage.
The second element is present since the alleged
"blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
There is no prescribed form or rite for the
solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of
the Family Code provides that it shall be necessary: 
1. for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer; and