THE POWER OF SHAME

Author(s): Agnes Heller

Source: Dialectical Anthropology, Vol. 6, No. 3 (MARCH 1982), pp. 215-228
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/29790037
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THE POWER OF SHAME
Agnes Heller
Both shame and conscience are feelings. As
such they are the involvement of persons in the
judgement of authorities on human conduct.
In the case of shame, the authority is social
custom (rituals, habits, codes or schedules of
behaviour) represented by the eye of others.
In the case of conscience the authority is prac?
tical reason which can manifest itself as the
"internal voice". Both authorities can approve
as well as disapprove. A clear conscience is not
simply identical with the lack of pangs of
conscience, it is also a highly pleasant feeling,
and when we are praised in public and we
blush in shame, it is a great experience of
happy embarrasment. The disapproval of the
same authorities may elicit feelings which range
from simple uneasiness to the torments of
guilt.
Before any further analysis, I want to argue
for the primogeniture of shame as against
conscience.
The feeling of shame originates in the shame
affect. Affects are empirical human universals,
inborn in every healthy specimen of our species.
They are expressive, in facial expressions, in
intonations, in the modulation of the voice, in
gestures. Expressions of affect are not acquired.
They are communicative. They are feeling
responses to fairly complex structures of
stimuli and change over time. Affect intensity
Agnes Heller is Reader in Sociology at La Trobe University,
Australia.
0304-4092/82/0000-0000/$02.75 ? 1982 Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company
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215
can be diminished by habit and by turning
away from the objects of affect. Among affects
are the following: fear (with the expression of
fear), shame (with the expression of shame),
and rage, disgust, curiosity, gaiety, sadness
(with their respective expressions). Although
bodily pain is not an affect proper, it belongs
to the same family. Darwin, who made a com?
prehensive study of affects, defined them as
the remnants of instincts derived from a
lengthy process involving the erosion of in?
stinct regulation and its replacement by cul?
ture regulation. It is culture which provides
the objects for affects. However, shame (with
the expression of shame) has to be distin?
guished within the realm of affect. The shame
affect cannot even be conceived of prior to
culture (as, for instance, fear can be): culture
does not simply provide the object for the
affect of shame ? the latter is related to cul?
ture as a whole and is co-eval with it.
The feeling of shame is the very affect
which makes us conform to our cultural en?
vironment. The eye of others is the stimulus
which triggers the feeling response and the
expression of shame: it makes us blush, hide
our face, it arouses the desire to run away, to
sink into the earth, to disappear. Needless to
say, the shame affect, as all other affects, is
integrated into cognition during the course
of the educational process. It is in childhood
and in situations we are not prepared to face
that we can most observe the pure shame
216

affect. Normally, the feeling of shame is not
a mere shame affect but a shame emotion.
When speaking about the integration of cog?
nition into the shame affect, we have, first of
all, to bear in mind the affect's division into
"good" and "bad" shame. It seems to be odd
that the expression of shame is identical in
both cases. Whether someone is acclaimed or
ridiculed in public, the spontaneous reaction
can be similar: blushing, hiding one's face,
and so on, particularly if the person in question debt to the community or to the gods of the
was taken by surprise. It seems to be an ob?
vious explanation of the phenomenon that,
from a very early period in the history of civil?
ization, to excel beyond the performance of
one's fellow-men was trespassing as much as
remaining below the standard, and in that
sense both were shameful. The Greek notion
of hybris may support this suggestion, but
that can only be speculative.
The shame affect can justly be called a
moral feeling for it is a response to approba?
tion and/or disapprobation. It is the only in?
born moral feeling in us. No wonder then that
it has played and still plays an enormous part
in the process of socialisation. Since the emer?
gence of the internal authority of judgement
of moral conduct, namely conscience, the
power of shame has become more and more
ambiguous. Both because of its inborn character,
the shame affect will never be overcome. Con?
science cannot take over its role completely.
Where it should is a question I will try to
answer later on.
It is with some hesitation that I describe
the shame-affect as a moral feeling par excel?
lence for we respond so often to disapproval
with shame that we do not consider to be re?
lated to moral issues. But by the identifica?
tion of the same affect and moral feelings, I
mean a perfectly simple but crucial thing:
this is the feeling which regulates the person's
general behaviour in order to conform to the
regulations, norms and rituals of his or her
community. In all societies with homogeneous
rules of conduct, it is the shame-response
which expresses that the person has not acted
in keeping with the rules, or that he or she
has exceeded others in observing the rules.
The shame affect expresses deviation or deflec?
tion from the system of conduct in both cases.
It is in itself a recognition of the validity of
this system. Should deviation from norms
mean wrong-doing, recognition of the validity
of customs through the shame response alone
does not put things right. Shame expresses a
community (which amounts to the same), a
debt which has to be repaid.
External authority can regulate human con?
duct perfectly well if:
(a) the community is small;
(b) it is not stratified;
(c) it is predominantly closed.
Given the above conditions everyone knows
what proper conduct is and this applies equally
to everyone. It is only action, not motivation,
which counts. If these conditions are not met,
however, conscience regulation must supple?
ment shame regulation. Internal authority is
structurally more or less homologous with ex?
ternal authority, although their functions are
different. Even if the concrete values are highly
divergent or contradictory, the homology of
structure or authorities is noticeable.
If the rules of conduct cannot encompass
all possible situations which may occur in
human interaction, the rules are transformed
into norms which regulate human conduct in
all similar situations or occasions. Given that
a person intends to observe the norm (having
internalized it and since he or she has to avoid
shame and punishment), he or she has to
apply the norm to particular, often unforeseen
situations. This process of application presup?
poses at least some deliberation. The actor's
practical reason has to make the right decision.
This tendency is reinforced if society is strati?
fied and the rules of conduct are no longer
homogeneous, or if the community is not

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 217

closed but interacts regularly with other com?
munities which have different systems of con?
duct. One can then raise the questions of what
good really is, of whether the traditional rules of which supposedly no one else does. We do not
conduct are the only good ones or even wheth?
er they are good at all. One can select from
among norms, accepting one, rejecting another. we conceal them with the usual gestures of
Reason becomes practical and good action or
behaviour will be more and more dependent
on good reasoning.
Pure shame regulation and pure conscience
regulation are extreme cases and hardly dis
cernable in present-day societies. But they need to Jocasta, everyone has incestuous dreams,
to be analyzed separately and in their purest
forms in order to discuss their co-existence
and to detect the moral problems involved in
them.
In the case of shame regulation, the norms,
rules and rituals of conduct we have to con?
form to are not rational Of course, they are
not irrational either. Their validity has to be,
and indeed is, accepted without reasoning. The
fact that the rules themselves are not rational
(since we cannot ask why they have to be ob?
served) does not mean that the observance of
rules is not rational. It is a matter of social
self-preservation to observe the rules of our
social environment and we are aware of the
risks involved if we fail to do so. Even now
there are several norms of this kind: we do not
walk naked on the streets in the heat of sum?
mer, although no one can reasonably convince
us why we should not do so.
As I have alreay mentioned, the violation of
external authority elicits the desire to disappear, and liability. Moreover, the structural homo
to hide, to sink into the earth. In the case of
more or less internalized shame, the fear of
being found out becomes perpetual. To tell a
lie as a first reflex when being questioned is
a well-known technique to avoid shame. Peter
lied about his being one of Jesus' disciples not
because he was afraid, but because he was
taken by surprise by a community whose
rules his master had clearly violated. His first
reflex was to avoid shame.
One can be ashamed both of acting differ
ently and of being different. It is not true that
we cannot be ashamed of a feeling or a desire:
we can, if, for instance, we desire something
publicly mention the feelings and desire which
would show us as being different from others;
shame-avoiding techniques. For external
authority, to be ^normal and to be amoral
amounts to the same. We are, however, not
concerned about motivations which we sup?
posedly share with everyone else. According
so there is nothing wrong with this: only actual
incest is a transgression.
The archaic and pre-rational character of
shame comes even more to the fore when its
relation to "we-consciousness" is being scruti?
nized. We can be ashamed not only of our
own actions and being, but of those of our
smaller or larger community as well. We can
be ashamed if our family members do not
match up to the norms or standards of our ex?
ternal authority, of our environment or social
group. This is a well-known fact in no need of
further elaboration. What has to be emphasized
here is that guilt ascribed to we-consciousness
involves liability, not responsibility. If my
father has disgraced the family name, I have to
put the shame right: I am liable but I am not
responsible. The increasing heterogeneity of
norms of conduct and the growing universaliza
tion of values do not put an end to the already
existing discrepancy between responsibility
logy of shame and conscience becomes clearly
apparent in this process. Wealthy people can
be terribly ashamed when confronted with
world poverty, and they often feel the guilt of
liability even though they are not responsible
for being born wealthy, or for the impoverish?
ment of those whose imaginary eyes rest upon
them.
In the case of a simple shame-culture, we
have to bear in mind that the codes, rules, and
rituals of conduct not only prescribe how the

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218
members of the community should act, but
also how they have to put things right if they
fail to do so. Even talion law is nothing but
the formalization of a shame culture: one
knows that one has to pay an eye for an eye,
a tooth for a tooth, a life for a life. For minor
wrong-doings shame alone was conceived of as
adequate punishment. Highly sophisticated
practices of "putting to shame" have outlived
pure shame cultures and have been found in
cultures of combined (internal and external)
authorities. However, the last two centuries
have brought about changes in various aspects
which one has to cope with both practically
and theoretically. Here is a sample of some of
them.
(a) Human beings no longer live in small and/
or integrated communities. If the father
eats sour grapes, the sons can move to an?
other village or into a city and thus their
teeth are not set on edge unless they de?
cide to return and to show that they have
put things right. Hiding has become
simpler than ever before: we can change
our social status, even our names, and
start afresh. So the pressure of shame can
easily be alleviated.
(b) The loss of communities and the presence
of the Others' (real or imaginary) eye led
to the loss of the Ideal Eye, the Eye of
God. There is hybris no longer and even
believers do not feel the steady presence
of the Almighty who can look into the
depths of their souls.
The loss of communal external authority
and of the ideal authority did not, however,
lead to the death of shame. We need once more
to recall the fact that the shame affect is in?
born in every healthy human being. It cannot
be circumvented, it can only be shifted. And it
has actually been shifted into two directions.
The external authority of human conduct has
been particularized and abstracted, on the one
hand, and universalized, on the other. The
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particularization of shame has come about in
two aspects: within the nuclear family, rules
lose their impersonality; and within societies
(in the plural) they lose their hierarchical struc?
ture.
The nuclear family is the only quasi-natural
community left in modern society. Since shame
is an inborn moral feeling, it is the primary
regulator of human conduct in ontogenesis as
well. For children, mother and father are ex?
ternal authorities of moral conduct before they
are capable of rational discrimination, that is
to say prior to the age at which their conscience
may develop. However, fathers and mothers
are no longer mediators of generally accepted
human conduct. They are no longer reposito?
ries of impersonal customs and habits: they
have themselves discriminated between these
very habits, accepted some, refused others.
Their authority thus becomes personal, as does
their attitude towards their children. In a com?
munity where all children have to acquire the
same habits (and all parents practise the same
ones), no child takes it as a personal offence
if he or she is obliged to fit into these com?
mon patterns. But should patterns of behav?
iour vary, and should parents expect children
to fit into their moral patterns, and should
their practices towards their children become
personal with regard to behavioural expecta?
tions as well, the sensitivity of the child is
amplified and his or her shame perpetuated.
Punishments are understood and experienced
as the loss of love and the outcome may be
unconscious hostility against this personal
authority.
The second trend in the particularization
of shame, the decline of a hierarchical order?
ing of norms of conduct, is an equally well
known phenomenon. Due to competition,
being unsuccessful has become shameful to
an ever-growing extent. To be good at some?
thing has always belonged to the constituents
of the system of rules but was never the
decisive one. For instance, if someone was
good at hunting but reluctant to share, the

person in question was not regarded as good
at all. If being good is dissociated from the
totality of behaviour, the Others' Eye will in?
creasingly approve or disapprove of persons
in this respect. In this regard, the process of
formalization is prompted by the external
authority to the same extent, even though in
a different way, as by the internal one. One
can be successful at almost anything and the
means of achieving success matter less and less.
Even if in certain areas and societies the rules
of fair play have to be observed, great success
overrules them and their observance does not
prevent anyone from being regarded by others
as a "failure". If women are not loved by their
husbands or are left by their lovers they hide
this from society. Not to be elected to or se?
lected for a position, to fail in an examination,
to be rebuked in a committee, to go bankrupt
and so on are equally experienced as shame?
ful. It is, however, a delusion to think that ex?
ternal authority has lost its homogenizing
power. Being different remains shameful, since
the interpretation of "success" is superimposed
on individuals by the external authority. It is
precisely this which we call prestige.
The shift of shame to match our Ego-ideal
where the Ego-ideal is defined by prestige, and
the other shift towards the less important
which we can cope with through simple shame
avoiding practices, does not mean a decrease in
the power of shame. We succumb to shame to
no less an extent than we did before. And if
we take into consideration the growing com?
plexity of shame within the family, we can
conclude that suffering from shame has not
been mitigated.
External authority not only prescribes proper
behaviour but also offers modes of conduct
for individual deviation as well. Repentance
means putting things right and everyone knows
how, in which way, they can be put right.
Shame is a tormenting feeling, it needs outlets
and the meticulous prescription of proper "re?
payments" serves as such. The "crumbled"
person regains his or her posture, the disgraced,
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219
his or her honour, if the "debt" is repaid. This
kind of ritualization of repayment is in the
main preserved within authoritarian families.
But since parents are no longer mediators of a
homogeneous world of customs but rather
superimpose their own chosen values, their
own consciences, upon their children, this
ritualization assumes a personal character.
Apologizing is a typical form of ritualized re?
payment. But if the parental moral code be?
comes more or less personal and if it depends
on their mood when and whether apologizing
is required, shame is not mitigated by ritual.
Either ritual is no longer internalized, or it be?
comes excessive, virtually present even when
not required: it is transformed into a sense of
guilt.
However, outside the nuclear family ritual?
ized outlets of shame have disappeared almost
completely. But it has to be emphasized that
since positive shame has preserved its affect
character more than its negative counterpart,
its ritualized outlets have also persevered and
have only changed on the surface. When ac?
claimed in public, we do basically the same
things our ancestors did. We react to shame
with overemphasized modesty, even with some
kind of self-humiliation, by pointing to the
merits of others, those of our friends, family,
colleagues, institutions. We "diminish" our?
selves by words, gestures (such as bowing),
acknowledgments.
The realm of negative shame considerably
extended the boundaries of the shame-affect
and this is precisely why the ritualization of
"putting things right" could be increasingly
diminished. The formalization and abstraction
of external authority makes the ritualized re?
payment of a social "debt" basically impossible.
If we accept the prestige scale of our environ?
ment (as most people do, more or less), failing
in front of Others' (Eyes) can only be requited
by success. Apart from the fact that all success
is relative in comparison to that of another
person and we may, therefore, constantly be
in debt without being able to repay, the reci
220
procity involved in the gesture of putting some?
thing right is completely gone. Normally, a
violation of external authority can be requited
by atonement, that is to say, by inflicting some
suffering on ourselves which restores social
justice. In case of a formalized prestige author?
ity, we can mitigate (or even eliminate) shame
through pleasure (success), by causing pain to
others, and through the reinforcement of so?
cial injustice. Moreover, liberation from shame
is a strategy, as a result, no single shame ex?
perience can be mitigated by any kind of
ritualization, no outlet is offered. And if this
is so, only one outlet remains: aggression (or
self-aggression).
Men can easily kill if put to shame or ridi?
culed. But to requite debts by killing was fair?
ly widespread in certain cultures, supposedly
far more so than the similar reaction to shame
in the absence of ritualized outlets today. The
question is why? ? given the fact that a state
monopoly on violence obviously does not de?
crease violence. I have already referred to the
transindividuality of shame; I have also argued
for the distinction between liability and re?
sponsibility. Now, if we can be ashamed for
the deeds of our family members, nation or
institution, the same identification may
equally occur the other way round: we can
interpret our own shame intersubjectively. If
we are put to shame, it may not be us as in?
dividuals who are being shamed but our
family, nation, group or institution.
If the external authority which put us to
shame is internalized and shame is interpreted
intersubjectively, we get the same responses
to negative shame that we are familiar with
in the case of positive shame: instead of ag?
gression, humiliation with all its expressions.
The shame-affect can appear in its pure forms
as well. If external authority is only partially
internalised and shame is interpreted inter
subjectively, external signs of self-humiliation
can trigger off guilt feelings transformed into
internal grudges, resentment or hatred against
the authority the actor succumbed to. This is
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usually the case when the intersubjective inter?
pretation of shame is ideological, namely when
the actor discharges his or her personal shame
by imputing aggression against his or her own
class, sex or community to the external author?
ity. Shame is thus channelled into projection,
and resentment becomes projective. The third
typical possibility, is, to use Sartre's term,
the radicalization of evil. The judgment is ac?
cepted but reversed. What was regard by the
Others' Eye as deviation is accepted as the
norm; the shame falls back on the authority.
The shame is no longer experienced as the
Others' Eye, we are the Eye, we see others
through our own eyes. The spell of external
authority is broken. But this reversal of shame
does not mean the substitution of conscience
for shame. In reversing the signs of the deter?
mination we have not chosen an internal au?
thority instead of an external one. The fact
that the spell of external authority is broken
means only that through our identification we
project back our own shame. It is no longer
our shame but that of others who put us to
shame.
In a pluralistic society the intersubjective
interpretation of shame is institutionalized
and channelled. The more democratic a society
is, the more possibilities it offers for a chan?
neled discharge of resentment and hatred and
for the reversion of shame. It is now possible
to transform our offenses into social issues.
The devastating consequences of the formal?
ization and abstraction of shame are thus
counterbalanced by the existence of institu?
tions through which and in which shame can
be depersonified and discharged. In order to
avoid all misunderstandings, I do not mean
that various institutions and movements were
created or came about in order to discharge
shame, but only that they can serve as chan?
nels for non-ritualized shame-discharge and
shame-reversion.
The intersubjective interpretation of shame,
its reversion, the discharge of shame into
public channels, is not always possible even if

no moral offence is involved. There are situa?
tions in which human beings are ashamed with?
out being guilty of any transgression. The
norms of civility, according to which only the
evil should be ridiculed, can only mitigate
them. Shame without liability can be called
"residual shame". When feeling it, we hide our
face, we symbolically sink into the ground and
feel miserable: it is thus that we pay our debt
for being human.
Juliet said: " 'Tis but thy name that is my
enemy... What's in a name!" Indeed, "Mon?
tague" "is nor hand, nor foot, nor arm, nor
any part belonging to a man". Conscience,
the voice of practical reason is basically nomi?
nalist. Norms, obligations, values, goods ?
what are they? They are not of flesh and blood,
one cannot grasp them, they are not real Why
obey them then? Why succumb to them? They
may well be fancies, ghosts, apparitions. But
they are not innocent fancies or apparitions.
They are coercive. They are thirsty gods who
live on human blood and sweat.
To stand up against external authority the
way Juliet did involves contrasting the chosen
value, conceived of as superior, essential, real
and rational, with accepted values. Juliet is
not a drop-out girl who could not resist pas?
sion: like Faust's Margaret, she does not care
for "honour"; she only desires to be faithful
to her promise given in good faith, with the
conviction that this was the right thing to do.
Internal authority is autonomy. To obey
nothing but our conscience means that we are
authors of our actions and of our character,
thus we take full responsibility for both our
actions and our character.
Practical reason implies the will to act and
to be good. Will is a rational desire and it im?
plies that the means to achieve a goal are at
my disposal. Since internal direction is involved,
failure cannot be hidden irrespective of wheth?
er others are aware of it or not.
In case of a discrepancy, discord or contra?
diction between our will to act and to be good
and our actual behaviour, the vans of con
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221
science emerges, a feeling often more torment?
ing and painful than shame. Conscience being
an internal authority, a pure pang of conscience
is not a signal of any debt we owe to others
but of one we owe to ourselves. Thus the
forms of its requital are not and cannot be
ritualized. We can ritually mitigate a pure
pang of conscience only if we transform it
into shame via confession, when the Others
will tell us how the debt can and must be paid.
But if we confess only in order to alleviate the
pangs of conscience and not in order to ac?
cept the judgment of others as well, it will be,
to use Dostoevsky's term, "disorderly re?
pentance". There are two further ways to put
an end to the torments of conscience, not
ritualized but frequent. One is pretending not
to know what we in fact know, pushing know?
ledge into the unconscious. This is inauthen
ticity often accompanied by anxiety and
permanent guilt-feeling. The other is "regain?
ing our posture," putting our character right.
The latter resembles the gesture of requital
but they are not identical. We put our char?
acter right if we do not repeat the deed which
was interpreted as guilt by our conscience; we
reform our character according to our will.
We recall bygone events with intellectual re?
morse but without pangs of conscience.
Deviation from our internal authority has
to be explained. The general explanation, as
old as conscience, is to put the blame on
"nature". Our feelings, desires, emotions,
instincts resist the sovereign rule of practical
reason. This contrast is irrelevant in terms of
shame regulation. Adam and Eve sinned by
eating an apple from the tree of knowledge,
not from the tree of feeling. The sharp distinc?
tion between intention and consequence re?
solves the problem in a different way. "Oedi?
pus the King" and "Oedipus at Colonos," if
compared, testify to the penetration of con?
science culture into the Athenian sensus com
munis. But the distinction between intention
and consequences may eventually lead to a
total alienation of conscience: the fault is in
222
others, not in us. The alienation of conscience
resembles certain shame-avoiding techniques
but it is not the same thing, since even when
others do not accuse us we still justify our?
selves by seeing others as responsible.
There are various types of conscience regu?
lation, such as:
(a) complementary conscience;
(b) conscience as the ultimate arbiter;
(c) conscience as the sole arbiter (in practical
decisions).
(a) Complementary conscience can be appli?
cative, corrective and interpretative. Con?
science is applicative if the internal author?
ity decides about the application of ac?
cepted norms of conduct in concrete situ?
ations. Corrective conscience already im?
plies a choice from among various rules
of proper conduct, however, without re?
jecting any of them by amplifying some
of them. Interpretative conscience re?
interprets commonly held values and
norms. It queries their generally accepted
meaning and content. It differentiates be?
tween "opinion" and "true knowledge"
according to the meaning of values. It is
resolved to determine rationally the true
meaning of values but it never turns
against generally held values for it ac?
cepts their validity.
(b) Conscience as the ultimate arbiter is homo?
logous with the growing articulation and
abstraction of external authority, and
with the subsequent loss of a sensus com?
munis regarding the supreme values (be
they virtues or articles of divine law). As
the process of rationalization erodes more
and more traditional norms of conduct,
individual reason can become the ultimate
arbiter in moral decisions. This being a
highly complicated and manifold process,
only three basic types of conscience can
be briefly mentioned as ultimate arbiters:
the legislative conscience, the sceptical
conscience and the bad conscience.
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Legislative and sceptical conscience have
something in common, namely the devaluation
of external authority. Both denounce images of
"honour," accepted values and rules of con?
duct as mere "names". It is here that the nomi?
nalism of conscience really comes to the fore.
When Hamlet says that there is nothing good
or bad in the world, only thinking makes them
good or bad, he sums up clearly what nominal?
ism of conscience is all about.
Even though the point of departure is identi?
cal, sceptical and legislative conscience draw
entirely different conclusions. Contrary to
interpretative conscience, legislative conscience
not only discriminates between "opinion" and
"true knowledge" when it comes to the inter?
pretation of the same value: values themselves
are considered as "mere opinions" unless think?
ing can "make them good". Legislative con?
science chooses among values, accepting some,
rejecting others. The choice cannot, however,
fall on just any of the values since legislative
conscience is not the sole, only the ultimate
arbiter of moral decisions. Thus those values
are chosen from the present or past systems
of values which function as revelatory authori?
ties for practical reason.
Legislative conscience is not defensive but
offensive. It raises the claim to the empirical
universalization of its chosen values. If the ex?
ternal authority is coercive, it becomes in?
tolerant. If the external authority is more or
less revelatory, it becomes dialectical.
Sceptical conscience is, however, defensive.
Here the will of practical reason does not
transcend individual conduct, it does not
claim empirical universalization (this is why
it is not legislative). Liberal, permissive and
contemptuous in its judgments, without zeal
or hatred, it is the purest form of conscience
as the ultimate arbiter ? the purest, since it
is completely indifferent to the approbation
or disapprobation of external authorities.
Persons with a highly developed sceptical
internal authority cannot be put to shame at
all. In spite of all this, sceptical conscience is
not the sole, but the ultimate arbiter of moral

conduct, not only because it chooses certain
substantive values from among many (as legis?
lative conscience does) but also because in?
different to shame as it is, it is not indifferent
to the Others' Eye. It selects "its own" Others
from among men of conscience who have the
same substantive values. It accepts their judg?
ment, the approval or disapproval of "the
other part of the soul". If this "other part of
the soul" disapproves of an action of the man
of sceptical conscience, he is not ashamed but
feels pangs of conscience.
Bad conscience (which is not to be confused
with pangs of conscience), typical in Calvinism
and the Counter-Reformation, has been ana?
lyzed so often that I feel free to describe it in
a very sketchy way. In this type of conscience
the duplication of external authority char?
acteristic of all religious cultures has been pre?
served. However, this worldly authority is no
longer the lawgiver to, or the fountainhead of,
his wordly institutions. He is the idealized
moral person giving personal orders to the in?
dividual who has to obey them and continuous?
ly live up to them. It is the same structural
change described in respect of the ethical func?
tion of parents, even if a reverse one. The
supreme external authority does not function
as an external authority internalized but as
internal authority externalized. Being external?
ized he does not put us to shame but he is the
cause of continuous pangs of conscience as a
punishment for our unwillingness to obey.
Shame can be extinguished; our debt to an ex?
ternal authority can be requited, as to God,
by sacrifice and repentance. The quantity and
quality of requital is fixed by the community
or institutions which mediate His will. But no
requital is basically established in case of ex?
ternalised internal authority: we are always in
debt and the debt cannot ever be repaid.
(c) Conscience as the sole arbiter in moral
decision, action and conduct can be: formal?
ized conscience, calculative conscience, narcis?
sistic conscience and good conscience. All re?
fuse to acknowledge any kind of external
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223
authority, be it secular or divine, or any kind
of material value as the norm of practical
reason.
Formalized conscience is morality without
ethics. It is a theoretical construction rather
than a real type of conscience. Kant made a
case for it, but even he had to reconcile one
formula of the categorical imperative with a
material value, since the universal maxim ac?
cording to which human beings should not
serve each other as mere means, is a universal?
ization and formalization of material values
(of the values of humankind, personal free?
dom and dignity, and the like). But even the
resolution itself to formalize conscience cuts
the umbilical cord with external authority
and thus the applicative, corrective and inter?
pretative functions of conscience are excluded.
Phronesis is replaced by deduction.
Calculative conscience is homologous with
the abstraction of external authority (approval
of success, disapproval of failure). It is divided
into private and public calculative conscience.
Its religion is just the opposite of formalized
conscience: it presupposes the use of other
human beings as mere means for individual or
public goals. Thus conscience becomes the
prompter and the repository of instrumental
rationality.
The Ego is the only reality (das Einzige) for
the calculative-private conscience. It is not
concerned about values or the fate of others
unless they can serve as means for its break?
through. Everything which is useful for the
Ego is good and there is no other good but
what is useful. Every step of the break-through
must be calculated cautiously, no misstep is
allowed. The contrast between reason and
emotion is reinforced. Emotions can mislead
calculation and this is why they have to be
eliminated. Love, empathy, charity and sym?
pathy are conceived of as "weaknesses" by
calculative reason, but so are aggression, jeal?
ousy and eventually pride.
The public calculative conscience substi
tues a group for the Ego. Good is not defined
224

as "useful to me" but as "useful for a class, a they normally compromise. To be hated, ridi?
nation, the majority" and the like. But even in culed and despised by our fellow-creatures is
this case, no external authority concerning the not an easy burden to carry. The label of "de?
forms of conduct is accepted. The Ego claims viation", of "abnormality," is even more diffi?
to no less an extent that it can find out ? via cult to cope with. And this is not only a
mere calculation ? what would be useful (and matter of cowardice or weakness, for it is
good) for a group or how the greatest happi? legitimate to raise the question: how do we
ness of the greatest number could be achieved. know that we and we alone are right, and
Any concrete value can be devalued (even our fellow creatures are wrong? Does our con?
those accepted and practiced by the target science always tell the truth? When the
group or the "majority"), if it is considered to Others' Eye rests upon us and rejects us, can
be harmful from the standpoint of calculative we be absolutely sure that our internal voice
reason. Human beings can be and, in fact, are is not the voice of the Devil? There are ob?
used as mere means. viously cases in which this question ought to
Conscience as the sole arbiter of moral be? be answered straightforwardly in the affirma?
haviour also appears in the form of narcissistic tive, but usually there is room for doubt.
conscience. Being introspective and introverted, But how about conscience as the sole ar?
it is preoccupied only with its own self-' biter of human conduct? Can it be generalized?
development. It distinguishes between emo? And if so, can autonomy replace heteronomy?
tion and reason, but practical reason becomes I want to argue that conscience as the sole
self-analytic. The analysis of its own "soul" arbiter of human conduct is as equally expan?
is its sole preoccupation. Narcissistic consciencesive as legislative conscience and that its gener?
does not use others as mere means on purpose. alization produces new types of external author?
It simply notices others only indirectly ? ities of peculiar provenance. All of these new
through the imprint of their remote existence. authorities represent, however, new forms of
The notion of "good conscience" was first domination. Herein lies the "cunning of practi?
used with this meaning by Nietzsche. As we cal reason".
know, in the case of bad conscience, conscience Private calculative reason in the process of
is externalized in the form of the God/Father. generalization produces public opinion as an
This God is the God-of-Conscience, not only external authority. This public opinion can?
a powerful, but a personal one. His judgements not be the outcome of unrestricted argumenta?
do not presuppose the mediation of a com? tion, to use Habermas' term, since it is pro?
munity or an institution. Should this God, to duced by "monological" goal-directed behav?
speak again in Nietzsche's language, die, all his iour. It is the instrumentalized, the manipu?
powers would become the powers of those lated public opinion. It directs and guides
who externalized him. Good conscience is man monological personal behaviour as much as
deified. The will of God becomes the will of traditional norms of human conduct did. But
man, the will of the omnipotent, the will to it is void of moral value. Rationality (in the
power. The source of good and evil does not form of private practical reason) becomes
acknowledge any good and evil: it is truly be? rationalization, observance of rules becomes
yond good and evil. conformity. When Riesmann analyzed modern
Legislative and sceptical conscience are al? "other-directedness," or Benedict the recur?
most always exterminated in statu nascendi. rence of shame-culture, they referred to this
They more or less succumb to the pressure of phenomenon. Being different and acting differ?
external authority, to the power of shame. ently is not only penalized by rationalized
And even if not completely exterminated, public opinion, it is also mostly prevented.

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Men who according to calculative private rea?
son use other men as mere means, contribute
only to their "one-dimensionality"; the power
of shame becomes paramount.
While private calculative reason is related
to competition and formal equality, public
calculative reason is related to inequality.
Since the goal is conceived of as a "common"
one (the glory of the nation, the happiness
of the greatest number, the power of a class
or a party), but practical reason is monologi
cal, it has to be assumed that only few ?
namely the "best" - can calculate correctly.
These few establish the goals, choose the
means (other human beings as means, of
course), and they either persuade or force all
others to serve as means for the purpose of the
"great man," the scientist, the elite. "The
world-spirit on horseback," as Hegel put it,
this unforgettable seducer of generations
was nothing but the public-calculative con?
science disguised as the redeemer. The pseudo
religion of modern charisma has been thus
created. The modern "hero" is different from
Mucius Scaevola, the modern "saint" is differ?
ent from Francis of Assisi. The former acted in
keeping with the traditional normative ex?
ternal authority with corrective conscience,
for they surpassed the average in courage and
resolution. The modern "hero" and the
modern "saint" provide norms for others; the
honour of the others is mere obedience. This
high-flown and arrogant individuality and its
calculative rationality thus creates a new kind
of collectivity. It is shame-collectivity for it
has no values of its own but only "emanated"
ones. The source of value emanation is the
great calculator himself. Needless to say
Bolshevism is based on calculative-collective
conscience in its extreme form, and Stalin
was its "purest" representation. In Darkness at
Noon, Koestler's Rubashov ponders in his
prison cell in this way: "Must one also pay for
righteous acts? Was there another measure be?
sides that of reason!" And the main slogan of
the Bolshevik youth organization was the fol
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225
lowing: "the party is our reason, honour and
conscience".
This conscience is externalized into institu?
tions. Anxiety contained in it is fear of the
external authority whose judgement we accept.
But we do not know, and cannot ever know
for sure, what our transgressions are and we
cannot ever be sure when we commit trans?
gressions and how. One can be loyal, yet be
judged (and hanged) for being disloyal; one
can be obedient, yet condemned as disobedient.
Thus conscience is not only externalized, it is
also crushed. One has to succumb to the judge?
ment of external authority as if it were one's
own conscience ? but it is not. On the ruins
of this crushed conscience, shame takes the
lead victoriously.
But, and therein lies the dialectical twist,
the crushed conscience which has succumbed
to the power of shame does not "wither away"
completely. The feeling of this "secondary"
anxiety, the voice of the crushed conscience,
has to be extinguished, and usually is, through
ever more unconditional "loyalty," stricter
"obedience," through making ourselves ac?
complices to crimes we have never even dreamt
of. Occasionally, it can lead to the "reconstruc?
tion of conscience" too. Since we have to pay,
we may well have failed to act in a "right"
way, not in the sense of the external author?
ity but in that of our ? allegedly totally
crushed ? conscience. Should this question be
raised, however, the spell of shame is broken.
Good conscience is not calculative, it is
total identification with our being as being
superior. It does not imply using others as
means of a calculated goal. It implies the de?
structionof others in the process of the self
realization of this being. Private good con?
science is an exceptional case ... if an isolated
private person acts and behaves according to
his or her good conscience, he or she sooner
or later collides with the penal code. But even
private good conscience restitutes shame. The
man of good conscience is never solitary. He
has his entourage, his admirers. He holds hum
226

an souls on strings. He calls himself the new
Jesus Christ. His flock is characterized by
hatred towards external authority and a quasi
religious love felt towards him. This love is
absolute, erotic and hysterical. The flock has
no longer a conscience of its own: it external?
izes its conscience to the man of good con?
science. This man's Eye is judgement and it
is the only one. He has no need to rationalize
his purposes, no need to have any purpose at
all: his will, his desire are purpose and com?
mand in themselves. But there is a certain kind
of perverted reciprocity in this externalization.
If his conscience is externalized the follower is
reborn in the eye of the leader. He becomes a
man of good conscience himself through
obedience. As long as he admires his God and
obeys him, he is a superman as well. As long
as he is loyal, he need be afraid of nothing.
Rubashov's question of whether one "has to
pay for righteous deed," cannot even be raised,
since, on the one hand, the follower will never
pay if he is only loyal, and, on the other,
"right" or "wrong" are exclusively defined as
obedience or disobedience. Let me reiterate
that good conscience is originally bad con?
science emancipated from God in Heaven.
Thus, externalization does not happen by
crushing conscience. Here the unity of external
and internal authorities is realized. In the case
of Nazism, millions of miniature "supermen"
went on with the work of destruction, the
Fuehrer was the ideal type for the follower.
"Loyalty is our honour," the Nazi slogan said.
The slightest doubt in the Fuehrer meant at
the same time a doubt of our own superiority.
The power of shame became inpenetrable.
Conscience as an agent of internal authority,
as a check and critique of external authority,
could only be regained if the Fuehrer was killed so much needed as in earlier times, since we
inside.
As long as pre-rational (traditional) norms of family, except within institutional frameworks
conduct are observed, with or without selection, where the rules of the game are set, and
human behaviour is rational, even if individual
reason is not critical. Acting according to the are exhausted. In short, moral behaviour has
code of honour means acting according to
values embodied in norms. But if the rules of
conduct are outcomes of mere calculation or if
it is the self-realization (deification) of individ?
uals or groups that constitutes them, the rules
of conduct themselves cease to be pre-rational
and become irrational. The rules of conduct
thus institutionalized cannot be rationally ob?
served and the Others' Eye becomes the "evil
eye".
If conscience as the ultimate arbiter of
human behaviour challenges all norms of exist?
ing external authority, there is always room for
doubt about whether we were really right. But
there is one exception. If external authority
becomes the externalization of the public cal?
culative reason or of good conscience, that is
to say, if observing external rules becomes ir?
rational, one cannot raise the slightest doubt
as to whether the protest of the internal voice
is right. In this case the "internal voice" be?
comes a value-in-itself and for-itself, the only
value left is resistance against the irrational ex?
ternalization of conscience. Let me quote
Koestler again: "Proof disproved proof, and
finally we had to recur to faith ? to axiomatic
faith in the Tightness of one's own reasoning".
In this case, and in this case alone, the feeling
of "I am right (and everyone else is wrong)"
ought to be chosen with the gesture of ultimate
faith, since it is only this faith that can endow
us with value for our conduct.
Traditional systems of conduct have not dis?
appeared completely, in liberal capitalist
democracies, but they are in a state of continu?
ous decomposition. As well, different types
of conscience exist side by side, even if pri?
vate calculative conscience has become para?
mount. Moral deliberation before an action
taken is, however, quite sporadic. It is not even
rarely meet our fellow-civilians outside the
played, perforce, in a fair way until our duties
become highly pragmatic. But this pragmatism

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passable in the routine of daily life makes us
vulnerable in borderline situations. Unless we
can apply general norms of conduct to every
occasion, we cannot cope with exceptional
situations. This is an incipient danger, for it
opens the way to irrational actions in a situa?
tion of social instability. The circumstance
that the usual conflicts between shame and
conscience are mostly trivial is also an alarm?
ing sign, all the more so since the changing
fashion of public opinion does not correct,
but rather reinforces, the identification of the
successful with the good by external authority.
If basic values cannot be gained from the
norms of conduct, conscience becomes in?
capable of questioning the rules of the game
and of arguing on behalf of new ones (or
particular new ones) in a rational way.
Thus instrumental rationality has become
paramount in decision-making and value
rationality has become residual. But there is
a certain type of cure which can kill the
patient, namely the revitalization of funda?
mentalism. Neo-fundamentalism proposes
the re-introduction of fixed and hierarchized
value-systems (systems of norms of conduct)
into modern life, of evaluated modes of be?
haviour that every person has to obey. Tradi?
tional external authority re-established this
way would function again as coercive author?
ity. This means to fall short of enlightenment
in a process of de-enlightenment. Democracy
in all its forms has always occurred together
with an increasing rationality of public con?
duct, even if private life and behaviour were
organized in keeping with religious morality
(as in America). Democracy is victimized by
the preponderance of instrumental rationality
but it cannot survive at all under the auspices
of a homogeneous and pre-rational external
authority.
But one cannot dismiss the claim to funda?
mentalism as an absurd idea simply because it
contradicts the main trend hitherto observed.
We have no knowledge about the future, thus
we are not entitled to exclude the possibility
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227
of a fundamentalist restoration even if we opt
against it. The less so since I have argued that
the total rationalization of conscience con?
cludes in a total shame-culture, and any at?
tempt to formalize value-rationality complete?
ly is doomed to failure. Yet even if we have no
right to depict the prospects of neo
fundamentalism in a derisive way as sheer ab?
surdity, we do have the right, and solid grounds,
for assuming that the vicious circle of coercive
external authority ? rationalized internal au?
thority ? is by no means inevitable, that reve?
latory external and internal authority can
meet and reinforce each other. This can only
happen if at least one material value is accepted
as an ultimate one, as the one which is beyond
rationality, which cannot be questioned, which
has to be accepted, to which all argument,
interpretation and action should be related.
Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment is the
immortal moral story about the break-through
of the vicious circle. At the beginning of the
novel, we see Raskolnikov in shame. He hides
in a dirty hole, he turns his face away from
the Eyes of Others. The Others represent the
external authority of tradition. They are
mother, sister, friend. They are religious. Their
charity is traditional, so are their values.
Raskolnikov did not live up to this authority:
he feels guilty and he is guilty. He cherishes
the idea of revolt against this authority in his
soul, the ideas of calculative conscience. His
shame is thus reinforced. Two types of author?
ity live together in one person. Conscience as
the sole arbiter of conduct clashes with the
acceptance of any external authority. This
collision usually leads to neurotic anxiety. In
order to get rid of this anxiety, Raskolnikov
decides to renounce all binding values of tradi?
tional external authority, and listen only to
the voice of calculative conscience. His calcula?
tive conscience is a combination of private and
public calculative conscience ? he conjectures
to murder someone for his own benefit, but
also for humankind. (Of course, the archetype
of calculative conscience is Napoleon.) How
228

ever, Raskolnikov's calculations fail by chance.
But this chance is representative since all calcu?
lations can fail, and often do: at least one of
the victims had nothing to do either with
Raskolnikov's benefit or with that of human?
kind. The persecuting law is an external author?
ity but not the traditional one: it is external
authority as calculation. Raskolnikov and
Porfiry fight with basically the same weapon:
the law could never become a revelatory au?
thority for Raskolnikov. But Sonia could.
Sonia is the opposite pole of calculation for
she sacrificed herself for others. But at the
same time, Sonia is the opposite of traditional
norms of conduct as well. She is the one who
took shame upon herself willingly. The prosti?
tute is the symbol of shame, the embodiment
of lost honour. Sonia's religion is personal,
so is her god. It is thus that she becomes a
revelatory authority for Raskolnikov who
bows to her, not as a person, but as the em?
bodiment of the suffering of humankind.
Humility before this suffering was a material
value revealed by Sonia, the value which an?
nulled all the temptations of mere calculative
conscience. Raskolnikov accepted this value
by a gesture. What we accept with a gesture,
is beyond reasoning: it cannot be questioned,
it cannot be called a mere name, it is ultimate.
Raskolnikov did not return to the hearth of
traditional external authority and he did not
renounce conscience either. The repentance
came from within, although the revelatory
material value was embodied in the Others.
The Eye of the Other judged, and the judge?
ment was voluntarily accepted, since it was
mirrored by conscience.
The young Luk?cs said that the novels of
Dostoevsky belong to a world not yet born.
On the level of artistic parable this may be
true. But even if moral conduct should revert
to an ultimate gesture, theory cannot and
should not. One has to argue for the accep?
tance of this ultimate gesture.

Dialectical Anthropology 6 (1982) 215-228

Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - Printed in The Netherlands

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