People v.

Genosa, 341 SCRA 493, 419 SCRA 537

FACTS:

The Appellant, Marivic Genosa, was married to the victim, Ben Genosa. In their first year of
marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but soon thereafter, the couple quarrel often and their
fights would become violent. Ben, a habitual drinker, became cruel to Marivic; he would provoke
her, slap her, pin her down on the bed, or beat her. These incidents happened several times and
Marivic would often run home to her parents. She had tried to leave her husband at least five times,
but Ben would always follow her and reconcile.

On the night of the killing, the appellant, who was then eight months pregnant, and the victim
quarreled. The latter beat her, however, she was able to run to another room. Allegedly there was no
provocation on her part when she got home that night, and it was her husband who began the
provocation. Frightened that her husband would hurt her and wanting to make sure she would
deliver her baby safely, the appellant admitted having killed the victim, who was then sleeping at
the time, with the use of a gun. She was convicted of the crime of parricide. Experts declare that
Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman syndrome (BMWS) and at the time she killed her
husband, her mental condition was that she was re-experiencing the trauma, together with the
imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.

ISSUES:

1. ) Whether or not the appellant can validly invoke the Battered Woman Syndrome as constituting
self-defense;

2.) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

RULING:
No, the Court ruled in the negative on both issues.

1.) The Court held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising from the
battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to
have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner; (b)
the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the
battered person mind an actual fear of imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that
she needed to use force to save her life, and (c) at the time of the killing, the batterer must have
posed probable – not necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused, based on the
history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these
circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense.

Under the existing facts of the case, however, not all of these were duly established. Here, there was
a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. In
fact, she had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s
bedroom. The attack had apparently ceased and the reality or even imminence of the danger he
posed had ended altogether. Ben was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat to her
life or safety.

2.) The Court ruled that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, to appreciate alevosia
(implies in committing a crime in a manner that prevents the victim from defending himself,
ensuring both its consummation and that the perpetrator remains unharmed), the method of assault
adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific
purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by
the party attacked. Here, there is no showing that the appellant intentionally chose a specific means
of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he
might make. It appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same
moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. Thus, in the absence of any convincing proof
that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime to
ensure its execution, the Court resolved the doubt in her favor.

People v. Bonoan, L-45130, 17 February 1937, 64 Phil. 87

FACTS:

Celestino Bonaon is charge with the crime of murder for stabbing Carlos Guison with knife,
which caused death three days afterwards. An arraignment was then called, but the defence
objected on the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined in
the Psychiatric Hospital. After several months of summons for doctors, production of the
defendant’s complete record of mental condition from the hospital and defendant’s admission to the
hospital for personal observation, assistant alienist Dr Jose Fernandez finally reported to the court
that Bonaon may be discharge for being a “recovered case”. After trial, the lower court found
Bonaon guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

The defence appealed, claiming the lower court made errors in finding Bonaon suffered
dementia occasionally and intermittently, did not show any kind of abnormality, that the defence
did not established the defendant’s insanity and finding cause guilty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty.

HELD:

Yes, the court finds the accused demented at the time he perpetrated the crime, which
consequently exempts him from criminal liability, and orders for his confinement in San Lazaro
Hospital or other hospital for the same.

Even the court did not rule the case under mitigating circumstance provided in Article 13,
paragraph 9 of the revise penal code, it is clear that there was lucid interval and that the defence was
not able to prove insanity during the time the crime was committed. The appellant has been given
the benefit of doubt that his exercise of will-power was diminished. He might be conscious
performing the act, but knowing his prior hospitalization, will constitute psychological impact in his
action.