This paper will explore the idea of the leap to faith with regard to the notion of the absurd

in Camus’
The Myth of Sisyphus. While Camus discusses the idea of the “leap” in this book, he refrains from
discussing faith. The ideas of God and Christianity appear, but he does not treat of the idea of faith
directly and how faith fits within his idea of the absurd. I will endeavor to show that while the leap is
not consistent with the absurd, the leap to faith is. The grounds for this rest on the idea that faith is not
a complete acceptance of a truth and retains the absurd in a slightly depreciated form.

To begin, I will provide an explanation of the absurd as it is found in The Myth of Sisyphus. Following
this is the nature of the leap as envisioned by Kierkegaard and Camus and how it applies to the absurd. I
will then move on to the idea of a leap to faith and conclude with an examination of the ideas presented
throughout the paper.

The idea of the absurd is not necessarily new with Camus, however his particular rendition of the absurd
is. The popular idea of the absurd is defined by contradictions, paradoxes, unintelligible happenings and
so forth. Camus’ idea of the absurd transcends all of these and gets to the root of the problem. The
Absurd manifests itself in the confrontation between man’s desire for order and meaning and the world
not providing that meaning (Camus, 30; IEP). For Camus, the absurd is not something that is part of man
or something that is part of the world, it is only found in the presence of man and the world together.

Due to the lack of man’s ability to find meaning in the world, man is left with himself alone. Thus, the
absurd entails a complete absence of hope, a continual rejection of the world, and a dissatisfaction with
the world (Camus, 31). Camus comments that the destruction of any of these requirements “ruins the
absurd” (Camus, 31). What it means that the absurd is “ruined” is crucial to the problem at hand, but
will follow a description of what in particular can ruin the absurd.

When faced with the absurd, a person has three choices: physical suicide, philosophical suicide, or
accept the absurd for what it is. The first choice is of little concern here, since suicide destroys the man
along with the absurd. Philosophical suicide, however, does not destroy the man but does destroy the
absurd and reason along with it. Acceptance is Camus’ answer to the absurd because it does not
destroy the absurd or reason.

Philosophical suicide is none other than the leap. Camus accuses former existentialist of philosophical
suicide because they rely on the leap as an answer to the absurd. When talking of former existentialist,
he focuses on Jaspers, Chestov, and Kierkegaard. The philosophy done by these three men differs in
many respects, but Camus thinks they are united in the fact that they all suggest an escape of the
absurd, which is the leap (Camus, 32). Particular focus here will be given to Camus’ treatment of
Kierkegaard’s leap.

When speaking of Kierkegaard and the leap, it is impossible to ignore the popular phrase “leap of faith”.
Kierkegaard himself never used this term, but he does talk about both the leap and faith quite a bit and
alludes to a “leap to faith”. Camus, however, is not concerned with the faith aspect per se. His concern
lies with the leap itself (Camus, 37).
In Kierkegaard’s book The Concept of Anxiety, he explores the idea of the leap. Commenting on the text
of The Concept of Anxiety, Reidar Thomte explains that a “transition from one quality to another can
only take place by a ‘leap’” (Kierkegaard, 232). To illustrate this, Kierkegaard uses the biblical story of
Adam’s move into sin. When Adam eats the forbidden fruit, he makes a qualitative leap into sin, this
being the change from the quality of not being in sin to being in sin. The current explanation of the leap
merely shows what in general a leap is. Exploring Camus’ treatment of the leap will bring the discussion
back on its current track.

With regard to Kierkegaard, Camus claims that he “does not maintain the equilibrium” (Camus, 38). The
equilibrium that he speaks of is man’s desire for meaning and the world not providing it. The absurd
exists solely in this fact. In the moment that a person effects the leap (or rather “leaps”), the person
escapes the absurd by setting aside the reason that brought about to the absurd. Setting aside reason,
destroys the absurd by escaping it. The leap is philosophical suicide because of the destruction of
reason.

Last is third choice in the face of the absurd, accepting it. Camus titles the section where this is found
“Absurd Freedom”. In it, he provides the means for living with the absurd and further discusses what
the absurd is in light of his previous discussion on physical and philosophical suicide. The beginning of
this section includes a well organized, if incomplete, explanation of the absurd life and a reproduction
will serve to advance the current discussion:

… I hold certain facts from which I cannot separate. What I know, what
is certain, what I cannot deny, what I cannot reject – this is what counts.
I can negate everything of that part of me that lives on vague nostalgias,
except this desire for unity, this longing to solve, this need for clarity
and cohesion. I can refute everything in this world surrounding me that
offends or enraptures me, except this chaos, this sovereign chance and
this divine equivalence which springs from anarchy. I don’t know
whether this world has a meaning that transcends it. But I know that I
do not know that meaning and that it is impossible for me just now to
know it. What can a meaning outside my condition mean to me? I can
understand only in human terms. What I touch, what resists me—that
is what I understand. And these two certainties—my appetite for the
absolute and for unity and the impossibility of reduction this world to a
rational and reasonable principle—I also know that I cannot reconcile
them. What other truth can I admit without lying, without bringing in a
hope I lack and which means nothing within the limits of my condition.
(Camus, 51)

Up to this point, the discussion centered on the absurd and the leap, now I will turn to faith and then
the leap to faith. In an attempt to avoid obscurities and possible misapprehensions on the sort of faith
that I am talking about, I will center my discussion on the faith that a person has in the Christian God.
Accepting that there are many, many different views on what this faith entails and what exactly this
faith is, I will try to limit the discussion to a core value that most Christian believers share, that of Jesus
Christ.

In one of Kierkegaard’s discussion on the leap and the absurd (footnote, absurd not the same), he
details his notion of the absolute paradox. The paradox, in a depreciated form, is the fact that Jesus is
both man and God. This claim, arguably, is a central facet of Christianity. Faith in this, requires the
setting aside of reason that was discussed earlier, because reason cannot reconcile a being that is 100%
man and 100% God. There are arguments which attempt this reconciliation, but all of these attempts
amount to a probability of being true. The truth of this claim is ineffable, unexplainable by man. That is
exactly why faith is needed. Faith, then, is the belief in a claim. In this case the claim that Jesus is both
man and God.

As Kierkegaard explains in Philosophical Fragments this sort of faith requires a leap, it requires the
qualitative change from non-faith to faith. The leap from non-faith to faith is an occasion, a momentary
act on the part of the person effecting the leap. If it is not, then the leap is part of faith and is not an act
on the part of the person. Thus, after the moment that the leap to faith is made, the leap is left behind
and the person has faith.

Now that the absurd, the leap, and the leap to faith have been explained, the next task is to analyze the
previously presented content and see whether or not faith retains the absurd as Camus envisions it. I
think there are three crucial aspects to this: Camus’ argument against the leap, the qualitative change
made by the leap (Is the change from absurd to faith?), and faith with respect to the absurd.

It will not take long to show that Camus’ is justified in his treatment of the leap. The leap is the moment
in which a person annihilates the absurd by rejecting it. In this single moment, the person relinquishes
the facts that are known through in the absurd by giving up reason which made certain the facts of the
absurd. The question, then, is if it follows that all of this is still given up after the leap is made.

As shown above, the leap and faith are distinct from each other and therefore must be treated
separately from each other with regard to the absurd. Since faith is the belief in a claim, i.e. the truth of
that claim is not accepted fully. Furthermore, it is impossible that the particular claim in question (Jesus
God/Manness) be accepted fully. Thus, a person who has faith still retains the possibility that the claim
is false and therefore can retain any claim that is contrary, or even contradictory, to their faith. If this is
in fact the case, then on the surface it seems that the person who leapt and now has faith can have both
faith and the absurd. However, there are a number of problems with this.

First, if the person realized the absurd before the leap, negated the absurd with the leap, and now have
the absurd and faith, this person lost the absurd in the process and then gained it back. It is my opinion
that his does not pose a problem as it is impossible to retain the absurd at all times even when it is
accepted fully, at least initially. This impossibility stems from the nature of the human mind. I think it
can be agreed that even after the absurd is accepted, doubts will arise.
Next is the problem that faith brings meaning to a person’s life, whereas the absurd is the recognition of
the meaningless. This is something that cannot be denied. In faith, meaning is provided by God and this
contradicts the meaninglessness of the world. However, contradictions are still possible in faith.

Finally, the question of what one knows in faith. In the above reproduction of Camus’ summary of what
one knows in the absurd, he makes many claims that would seem to destroy the theory that faith and
the absurd can coexist in an individual. A couple of examples will suffice to illustrate the current
problem:

… What I know, what is certain, what I cannot deny, what I cannot reject
– this is what counts. … I don’t know whether this world has a meaning
that transcends it. But I know that I do not know that meaning and that
it is impossible for me just now to know it. … I can understand only in
human terms. What I touch, what resists me—that is what I
understand. (Camus, 51; emphasis mine)

The crucial point here is “that is what I can understand”. If faith is a belief, then it does not bring
understanding with it. Faith is not a gaining of understanding, it is the gaining of belief. Understanding
requires more than mere belief. It is possible, then, that in faith all I understand is the absurd, but I have
faith that there may be more.

Up to this point, faith and the absurd can co-exist on the grounds that faith is not a negation of the
absurd, rather it accepts the absurd as all that I can understand. However, there is one more major
problem, the problem of hope.

Camus claims that the absurd is ruined if there is not a complete absence of hope (Camus, 31). The
problem of meaninglessness was averted by saying that the only thing the person can understand is
meaninglessness and at the same time have faith. The problem of the complete absence of hope,
however, cannot be answered this way due to the fact that there is not understanding involved. Having
a complete absence of hope is all encompassing, applying to both faith and understanding, as it is a
complete absence. It may be argued that faith has no hope, but I think that undermines the definition of
faith.