Garcia v.

Recio

FACTS: - Rederick Recio (Filipino) was married to Editha Samson (Australian citizen) in Malabon, Rizal in
1987 and lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, their marriage was dissolved by
decree of divorce issued by the Australian Family Court. - In 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen as
shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" from the Australian government. - In 1994, Recio
married petitioner Grace Garcia (a Filipina) in Cabanatuan City where the respondent was declared as
"single" and "Filipino" - In 1995, Recio and Garcia lived separately without prior dissolution of marriage
and their conjugal properties were divided in 1996 in Australia. - In 1998, Garcia filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of "bigamy" because Recio was alleged to have a
subsisting marriage at the time of his marriage with Garcia in 1994. Garcia claimed that she only knew
about the previous marriage in 1997.

ISSUE(S): (a) Whether or not the divorce between Recio and Samson was proven (b) Whether or not
Recio has legal capacity to remarry

HELD/RATIO: (a) Yes. Samson and Recio's divorce appeared to be authentic as issued by an Australian
family court. Compliance with the Family Code is not necessary since Recio, having acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992, was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws. Naturalization is the legal act of
adopting an alien and clothing him with a political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. By becoming an
Australian, Recio severed his allegiance to the Philippine and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws. (b) No. The court held that respondent’s presentation of a decree or an
interlocutory decree, a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce, showed that the divorce obtained
may have been restricted; it did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to
national law. Respondent also failed to submit a Certificate of Legal Capacity together with the
application for a marriage license required by Article 21 of the Family Code which would have been
admitted as a prima facie evidence of his legal capacity to marry. The Court finds no absolute evidence
that proves that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to
marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.

Van Dorn v. Ronillo, Jr., et al

FACTS: - Alicia Reyes (petitioner) is a Filipino citizen while the private respondent is an American citizen.
The two were married in Hongkong in 1972; then established their residence in the Philippines. The
parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alicia Reyes re-married in Nevada this time to Theodore
Van Dorn. Private respondent filed suit against Alicia Reyes Van Dorn stating that petitioner's business
(Galleon Shop) in Ermita, Manila is a conjugal property of the parties and asking that the petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business and that private respondent be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property.Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of
action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property". The Court denied
the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce
Decree had no bearing in the case.

ISSUE: - W/N the Galleon Shop is a conjugal property of the petitioner and the private respondent even
after their divorce obtained in USA

HELD/RATIO: - No. Pursuant to the national law of the private respondent, he is no longer the husband
of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. He is bound by the decision of his county, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him. He is also estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain that the private respondent is still married to the
petitioner is unjust. Petitioner should not be subject to a wife's obligation. The private respondent
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.