I.
Preliminary Provision Whether or not Article 13 of the New Civil Code be repealed by EO 292 Sec
1. Nagkakaisang Maralita v. Military Shrine
2. CIR v. Primetown
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO,
petitioners,vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 162155.          August 28,2007.
Facts:
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, the Vice President of Primetown (respondent),
applied for refund of the income tax which they have paid on 1997. According to Yap,
the company accrued losses amounting to P/ 71,879,228. These losses enabledthem
to be exempt from paying income tax, which respondent paid diligently. Respondent
was therefore claiming a refund. Respondents submitted requirements but the
petitioners ignored their claim. On April 14, 2000, respondents filed a review in the
Court of Tax Appeals. The said Court, however, denied the petition stating that the
petition was filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for filing judicial claim for tax
refund.
According to Sec 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code, “no suit or proceedings
shall be filed after the expiration of 2-yearsfrom the date of the payment of the tax
regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment. Respondents paid
the last income tax return on April 14, 1998. Article 13 of the New Civil Code states
that a year is considered 365 days; months 30 days; days 24-hours; and night from
sunset to sunrise. Therefore, according to CTA, the date of filing a petition fell on the
731st day, which is beyond the prescriptive period.
Issues:
Whether the two-year/730-day prescriptive period ends on April 13, 2000 or April 14,
2000 considering that the last payment of tax was on April 14, 1998 and that year
2000 was a leap year.
31 Chap8 Book 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that when a subsequent law impliedly repeals a prior law, the new
law shall apply. In the case at bar, Art 13 of the New Civil Code, which states that a
year shall compose 365 days, shall be repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year shall be composed of 12 months
regardless of the number of days in a month. Therefore, the two-year prescriptive
period ends on April 14, 2000. Respondents filed petition on April 14, 2000 (which is
the last day prescribed to file a petition.
CIR v.Primetown, GR 162155, August 28, 2007
FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund
or credit of income tax which Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they are
entitled for a refund because they suffered losses that year due to the increase of
cost of labor and materials, etc. However, despite the losses, they still paid their
quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to
BIR. Hence, they were claiming for a refund. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer
Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to submit additional documents to which
Primetown complied with. However, its claim was not acted upon which prompted it
to file a petition for review in CTA on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it
was filed beyonf the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund
according to Sec 229 of NIRC. According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to
730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC. Since Primetown filed its final adjustment return
on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year, the petition was filed 731 days
after Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the reglementary
period. Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period
HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be
understood to be 12 calendar months. The SC defined a calendar month as a month
designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain. The
court held that Administrative Code of 1987 impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as the
provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is filed within
the 2-year reglementary period.
3. Bellis v. Bellis
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Bellis v. Edward Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678, 6 June 1967
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States. He had 5 legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had
divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3
illegitimate children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his
distributable estate should be divided in trust in the following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal
shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was
admitted to probate in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an
executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
“Executor’s Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of
stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate
children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition,
the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the
testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of
their legitimes as illegitimate children.
The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Which law must apply – Texas Law or Philippine Law?
RULING:
YES. Order of the probate court is hereby affirmed.
Doctrine of Processual Presumption:
The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof,
otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the
forum.
In the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours. Apply Philippine laws.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law
of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items:
(a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that
—ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes.
Under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.
Further, even if the deceased had given them share, such would be invalid because
the law governing the deceased does not allow such.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas; there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine
law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE’S

BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, executor. MARIA CRISTINA
BELLIS AND MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
No. L-23678. June 6, 1967.

FACTS:

Amos Bellis was a citizen of the state of Texas of the United States. In his first wife
whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children; by his second wife, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one
disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine Properties. In
both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children
opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to
which they should be entitled if Philippine law were to apply.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the sucessional
rights of the illegitimate children.

HELD: