Art. 774.
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION
of which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others
either by his will or by operation of law. (n)
Art. 775. In this Title, "decedent" is the general term
applied to the person whose property is transmitted
through succession, whether or not he left a will. If he
left a will, he is also called the testator. (n)
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property,
rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death. (659)
Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent.
(657a)
Art. 778. Succession may be:
(1) Testamentary;
(2) Legal or intestate; or
(3) Mixed. (n)
Art. 779. Testamentary succession is that which
results from the designation of an heir, made in a will
executed in the form prescribed by law. (n)
Art. 780. Mixed succession is that effected partly by
will and partly by operation of law. (n)
Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only
the property and the transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, but also
those which have accrued thereto since the opening
of the succession. (n)
Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession
either by the provision of a will or by operation of law.
Devisees and legatees are persons to whom gifts of
real and personal property are respectively given by
virtue of a will. (n)
CHAPTER 2
SECTION 1. - Wills
SUBSECTION 1. - Wills in General
Art. 783. A will is an act whereby a person is
permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to
control to a certain degree the disposition of this
estate, to take effect after his death. (667a)
Art. 784. The making of a will is a strictly personal act;
it cannot be left in whole or in part of the discretion of
a third person, or accomplished through the
instrumentality of an agent or attorney. (670a)
Art. 785. The duration or efficacy of the designation of
heirs, devisees or legatees, or the determination of
the portions which they are to take, when referred to
by name, cannot be left to the discretion of a third
person. (670a)
Art. 786. The testator may entrust to a third person
the distribution of specific property or sums of money
that he may leave in general to specified classes or
causes, and also the designation of the persons,
institutions or establishments to which such property
or sums are to be given or applied. (671a)
Art. 787. The testator may not make a testamentary
disposition in such manner that another person has to
determine whether or not it is to be operative. (n)
Art. 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of
different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be
operative shall be preferred. (n)
Art. 789. When there is an imperfect description, or
when no person or property exactly answers the
description, mistakes and omissions must be
corrected, if the error appears from the context of the
will or from extrinsic evidence, excluding the oral
declarations of the testator as to his intention; and
when an uncertainty arises upon the face of the will,
as to the application of any of its provisions, the
testator's intention is to be ascertained from the
words of the will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made, excluding
such oral declarations. (n)
Art. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their
ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear
intention to use them in another sense can be
gathered, and that other can be ascertained.
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their
technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a
contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears
that he was unacquainted with such technical sense.
(675a)
Art. 791. The words of a will are to receive an
interpretation which will give to every expression
some effect, rather than one which will render any of
the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will
prevent intestacy. (n)
Art. 792. The invalidity of one of several dispositions
contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of
the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that
the testator would not have made such other
dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not
been made. (n)
Art. 793. Property acquired after the making of a will
shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had
possessed it at the time of making the will, should it
expressly appear by the will that such was his
intention. (n)
Art. 794. Every devise or legacy shall cover all the
interest which the testator could device or bequeath
in the property disposed of, unless it clearly appears
from the will that he intended to convey a less
interest. (n)
Art. 795. The validity of a will as to its form depends
upon the observance of the law in force at the time it
is made. (n)
SUBSECTION 2. - Testamentary Capacity and Intent
Art. 796. All persons who are not expressly prohibited
by law may make a will. (662)
Art. 797. Persons of either sex under eighteen years of
age cannot make a will. (n)
Art. 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the
testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution.
(n)
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that
the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning
faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other
cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the
time of making the will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his
bounty, and he character of the testamentary act. (n)
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of
sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of
sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is
on the person who opposes the probate of the will;
but if the testator, one month, or less, before making
his will was publicly known to be insane, the person
who maintains the validity of the will must prove that
the testator made it during a lucid interval. (n)
Art. 801. Supervening incapacity does not invalidate
an effective will, nor is the will of an incapable
validated by the supervening of capacity. (n)
Art. 802. A married woman may make a will without
the consent of her husband, and without the
authority of the court. (n)
Art. 803. A married woman may dispose by will of all
her separate property as well as her share of the
conjugal partnership or absolute community property.
(n)
SUBSECTION 3. - Forms of Wills
Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in
a language or dialect known to the testator. (n)
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will,
must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write
his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will,
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page
thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used
upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under
his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed
and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to
the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n)
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of
the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of
Court. (n)
Art. 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he
must personally read the will, if able to do so;
otherwise, he shall designate two persons to read it
and communicate to him, in some practicable
manner, the contents thereof. (n)
Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read
to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing
witnesses, and again, by the notary public before
whom the will is acknowledged. (n)
Art. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud,
or undue and improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfections in the form of attestation
or in the language used therein shall not render the
will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact
executed and attested in substantial compliance with
all the requirements of Article 805. (n)
Art. 810. A person may execute a holographic will
which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no
other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (678, 688a)
Art. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall
be necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly
declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at
least three of such witnesses shall be required.
In the absence of any competent witness referred to
in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deem it
necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.
(619a)
Art. 812. In holographic wills, the dispositions of the
testator written below his signature must be dated
and signed by him in order to make them valid as
testamentary dispositions. (n)
Art. 813. When a number of dispositions appearing in
a holographic will are signed without being dated, and
the last disposition has a signature and a date, such
date validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever
be the time of prior dispositions. (n)
Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure
or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must
authenticate the same by his full signature. (n)
Art. 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is
authorized to make a will in any of the forms
established by the law of the country in which he may
be. Such will may be probated in the Philippines. (n)
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces
effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides,
or according to the formalities observed in his
country, or in conformity with those which this Code
prescribes. (n)
Art. 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or
subject of another country, which is executed in
accordance with the law of the country of which he is
a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and
allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the
same effect as if executed according to the laws of the
Philippines. (n)
Art. 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will
jointly, or in the same instrument, either for their
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person.
(669)
Art. 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article,
executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be
valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the
laws of the country where they may have been
executed. (733a)
SUBSECTION 4. - Witnesses to Wills

Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of

eighteen years or more, and not bind, deaf or dumb,
and able to read and write, may be a witness to the
execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this
Code. (n)

Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being

witnesses to a will:

(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines;

(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a

document, perjury or false testimony. (n)

Art. 822. If the witnesses attesting the execution of a

will are competent at the time of attesting, their
becoming subsequently incompetent shall not
prevent the allowance of the will. (n)

Art. 823. If a person attests the execution of a will, to

whom or to whose spouse, or parent, or child, a
devise or legacy is given by such will, such devise or
legacy shall, so far only as concerns such person, or
spouse, or parent, or child of such person, or any one
claiming under such person or spouse, or parent, or
child, be void, unless there are three other competent
witnesses to such will. However, such person so
attesting shall be admitted as a witness as if such
devise or legacy had not been made or given. (n)

Art. 824. A mere charge on the estate of the testator

for the payment of debts due at the time of the
testator's death does not prevent his creditors from
being competent witnesses to his will. (n)
 1. PNB v. Garcia

G.R. No.182839, June 2, 2014

Brion, J.

Topic: Article 777 | Transmission of Successional Rights

Facts:

The subject of the present case is a parcel of residential land acquired by respondent Jose Garcia Sr. (Jose
Sr.) during his marriage with Ligaya Garcia. Ligaya died on January 21, 1987. Without the knowledge and
consent of his children (herein co-respondents), Jose Sr. executed SPAs authorizing spouses Rogelio and
Celedonia Garcia (spouses Garcia) to secure any loan from the petitioner bank, and to convey and transfer
the subject property by way of mortgage. Jose Sr. also executed an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage in
favor of the petitioner bank. The SPAs and the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage are both inscribed on the
TCT of the subject property.

On maturity of the loan, spouses Garcia failed to pay their loan to the petitioner bank despite repeated
demands.

Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint for Nullity of the said Amendment against spouses Garcia and
PNB alleging that the property was conjugal, being acquired during the marriage of Jose Sr. to Ligaya and
they became owners pro indiviso upon the death of Ligaya on 1987.

PNB contends that the subject property was registered to Jose Sr. alone, and who was described in the as a
―widower‖ and not ―married.‖
Issue/s:

1. WON the subject property was conjugal;

2. WON the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage can be annulled entirely
Ruling:

1. Yes. Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, ―all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.‖
Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, their property relations
were governed by the conjugal partnership of gains. Upon the death of Ligaya, the conjugal partnership
was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership between the surviving spouse, on the one hand, and
the heirs of the deceased, on the other. Should a co-owner alienate or mortgage the co-owned property
itself, the alienation or mortgage shall remain valid but only to the extent of the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

2. No. The Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage constituted by Jose Sr. over the entire property without his
co-owners’ consent is not necessarily void in its entirety. The right of the petitioner bank as mortgagee is
limited though only to the portion which may be allotted to Jose Sr. in the event of a division and
liquidation of the subject property. The conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved upon Ligaya’s
death and the successional rights of her heirs vest, as provided under Article 777 of the Civil Code, which
states that ―[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.‖
 Accordingly, the mortgage contract is void insofar as it extends to the undivided shares of his children
(Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy) because they did not give their consent to the transaction.

Ining v Vega
G.R. No. 174727. August 12, 2013
DEL CASTILLO, J

Topic: General Provisions – Art 777

Facts:
Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, is the owner of a 3,120 square meters parcel of land (subject property)
in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan and
Gregoria Roldan Ining, who are now both deceased.

Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega
(also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo
M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.

Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children. In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon
Tresvalles and Roberto Tajonera, are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof. Tresvalles and Tajonera are
transferees of the said property.

In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana’s surviving heir,
Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan for partition, recovery of ownership and
possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs.

In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregoria’s heirs (through son Antipolo) claimed that Leonardo had no cause
of action against them; that they have become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who
acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez, who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and
Leonardo was aware of this fact.

The trial court found the deeds of sale to be spurious. It concluded that Leon never sold the property to
Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained part
of Leon’s estate at the time of his death in 1962. Leon’s siblings, Romana and Gregoria, thus inherited the
subject property in equal shares. Leonardo and the respondents are entitled to Romana’s share as the latter’s
successors.

However, the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from Leon’s death in 1962 – or up to 1992 – within
which to file the partition case. Since Leonardo instituted the partition suit only in 1997, the same was already
barred by prescription. Under Article 1141 of the Civil Code, an action for partition and recovery of ownership
and possession of a parcel of land is a real action over immovable property which prescribes in 30 years.
Leonardo was guilty of laches as well. Consequently, the property should go to Gregoria’s heirs exclusively.

The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC. It declared 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the
plaintiffs as successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan; as well as 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the
defendants as successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining. The trial court’s declaration of nullity of the
deeds of sale became final and was settled by petitioners’ failure to appeal the same. There was no prescription.
Prescription began to run not from Leon’s death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of
Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his co-‐ownership of the property with
Leonardo.

Issue/s:
(1) Whether the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the trial
court on the ground that Lucimo Francisco repudiated the co-ownership only on February 9, 1979

(2) Whether or not the appellate court erred in not upholding the decision of the trial court dismissing the
complaint on the ground of prescription and laches
Ruling/s:
No, the Court of Appeals is correct.

Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited the property
in equal shares. In turn, Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs – the parties herein – became entitled to the property
upon the sisters’ passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of death.

Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-
in‐law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora. One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent
does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent's property. Consequently, he
cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedent's heirs.

For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the
property has not been lost.

Likewise, petitioners’ argument that Leonardo’s admission and acknowledgment in his pleadings – that Lucimo
Sr. was in possession of the property since 1943 – should be taken against him, is unavailing. In 1943, Leon
remained the rightful owner of the land, and Lucimo Sr. knew this very well, being married to Teodora, daughter
of Antipolo, a nephew of Leon. More significantly, the property, which is registered under the Torrens system
and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leon’s name. Leon’s ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his death when
the property passed on to his heirs by operation of law.

In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-ownership, Leonardo could
seek partition of the property at any time.

Calalang-Parulan v. Calalang
G.R. No. 184148, June 9, 2014
Villarama, Jr., J:

Topic: General Provisions

Facts:
Respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile and Carlito Calalang asserted ownership over a
certain parcel of land against petitioners Nora Calalang-Parulan situated in Balagtas, Bulacan. It was allegedly
acquired by the respondents from their mother Encarnacion Silverio through succession as the latter’s
compulsory heirs. According to respondents, their father Pedro Calalang cnotracted two marriages. Th first was
with their mother Encarnacion. During the subsistence of the marriage, their parents acquired the land from
their maternal grandmother. Despite enjoying continuous possesion of the land, their parents failed to register
the same. On June 7, 1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion.
On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira Caalanf, who gave birth to
petitioners herein. It was only during this time that Pedro Calalang filed an application for free patent. According
to respondents, Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such application by claiming sole and exclusve ownership
over the land since 1935. As a result, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued an OCT in favor of Pedro
Calalang only. Respondents assail that the sale of the land was void because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain
their consent as co-owners of the same.
Petitioners argued that the parcel of land was acquired during the secod marriage with Elvira; and that the OCT
stated that it was issued in the name of “Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]”.

The trial court rendered a decision in for of respondents, ordering to reconvey to the latter their rightful share to
3/4 of 1/2 of the land for each of the three plaintiff. It found that the parcel of land was jointly acquired by teh
spouses Pedro Calalang and Ernacion fro the arents of the latter. Thus, it wa part of the conjugal property of the
first marriage. When the marriage was dissolved upon the death of Encarnacion, the corresponding shares to
the property were acquired by the heirs of the decedent according to the laws of succession. On apepal,
however, the CA modified the decision and held that Pedro Calalang was the sole and exclusive owner of the
subject parcel. However, the sale to Nora Calalang-Parulan was fraudulent and fictitious as the vendee was in
bad faith and the respondents were unlawfully deprived of their pro indiviso shares over the property.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the CA erred in declaring that Pedro Calalang deprived respondents of their respective shares
when he alienated the disputed property to Nora Calalang-Parulan?

Ruling/s:
Yes. In declaring Pedro Calalang as the sole and exclusive owner of the disputed property, the Court relied on
the fact that the free patent was issued solely in the name of Pedro Calalang and that it was issued more than 30
years after the death of Encarnacion and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first
marriage. Consequently, as the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey his property
in favor of Nora Calalang-Parulan. The CA, therefore, erred in ruling that Pedro Calalang deprived his heirs of
their respective shares over the disputed property when he alienated the same.

Art. 777 of the Civil Code provides that “the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent”. Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on Dec. 27, 1989 that his heirs
acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time
of the sale of the propert to Nora Calalang-Parulan, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the
heirs of Pedro Calalang. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not
duly supported by valuable consideration, the respondents, therefore, have no right to question the sale on the
ground that their father deprived them of their shares.

Alvarez vs IAC
G.R. No. L-68053, May 7, 1990
Fernan

Topic: (General Provisions/Wills/Testamentary Capacity)

Facts:
The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B which were originally
known as Lot 773 registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes.

Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita,
Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio
and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. It is not clear
why the latter is not included as a party in this case.

During the outbreak of World war II, the heirs of Aniceto were forced to leave the province and settle in another
place. From the Japanese occupation until peace time, they were not able to visit Lot 773. Upon their return,
they found out that Lot 773 was in possession of Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella, and Alvarez.

Fortunato Santiago was able to acquire a TCT registered in his name for the said lot and sold a portion of it to
Fuentebella. After Fuentebellas death, his wife sold his portion to Alvarez.

Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823.
The RTC of Negros ruled in favor of the heirs of Aniceto, ordering Alvarez to reconvey the said lots. However,
execution was unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773 as Rodolfo Siaoson, who was in possession of it, alleges
that he bought the lot from Alvarez.

As the execution cannot be enforce against Siason as he was not a party to the case, Teodora Yanes, et. al filed
another complaint, this time including Siason, for recovery of property with damages and cancellation of the
TCT, alleging that the sale made by Alavarez to Siason was null and void. Siason filed a manifestation stating
that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable
consideration without any knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said properties” as there was no
notice of lis pendens on the TCT.

The lower court ruled that was Siason a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration abnd ordered the Heirs
of Alvarez to pay the Yaneses the actual value of the land plus damages because the sale of Alvarez to Siason
was without court approval. The Heirs of Alvarez appealed to the IAC, but the IAC affirmed the lower courts
decision insofar as to the payment of P20,000 representing the value of the land.

Thus, this petition to the SC, contending that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made
by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his
estate, after his death.
Issue/s:

Whether or not the Heirs of Alvarez are liable for the actual value arising from sale of Lot 773-A and 773-B.

Ruling/s:
Yes. Contention of the heirs is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the
general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs.

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to
the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case where
the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received from
the decedent.

Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their
father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the
property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved
into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in
their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate

It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance.
With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other properties left by the deceased
which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to
disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Gevero v. IAC

G.R. No. 77029, August 30, 1990

Paras, J.

Topic: (General Provisions – Art. 777)

Facts:

The parcel of land under litigation, identified as Lot No. 2476, was acquired by purchase from the late Luis
Lancero on September 15, 1964 in favor of Del Monte Development Corporation (DELCOR). Luis Lancero, in
turn acquired the same parcel of land from Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 per deed of sale executed by
Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No.
7610 covering the mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha — ½ share
and her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and Ursula, all surnamed surnamed Gevero, ½
undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122 square meters.

Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by her six children aforementioned. The
heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17,1966 executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of the
estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial
settlement and partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I,
inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the Land Registration Commission, Lot
2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-judicial
settlement and partition in 1966. DELCOR filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet
title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the
land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476.

The trial court declared DELCOR as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot No. 2476. Petitioners
Gevero appealed to the IAC. Petitioners aver that the ½ share of interest of Teodorica (mother of Ricardo) in
Lot 2476 under OCT No. 7610 was not included in the deed of sale as it was intended to limit solely to
Ricardos' proportionate share out of the undivided ½ of the area pertaining to the six (6) brothers and sisters
listed in the Title and that the Deed did not include the share of Ricardo, as inheritance from Teodorica,
because the Deed did not recite that she was deceased at the time it was executed. The appellate court
affirmed the decision appealed. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied.

Hence, the present petition.

Issue/s:

WoN the ½ share of interest of Teodorica Babangha in one of the litigated lots, lot no. 2476 under OCT No.
7610 is included in the deed of sale

Ruling/s:

YES. The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of
the death of the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no
legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately
after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of
the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]).

Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were transmitted from
the moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the date of extrajudicial
partition, when Ricardo received his share in the lot as inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when
Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share which he inherited from Teodorica was also included unless
expressly excluded in the deed of sale.
 Locsin VS. CA
G.R. No. 89783, February 19, 1992
Narvasa, C. J

Topic: Transmission of succession

Facts:
The late Getulio Locsin had three children (Mariano, Julian and Magdalena). His properties in Albay and
Sorsogon were divided among his children: (a) Coconut land of some 700 hectares in Sorsogon to Magdalena;
(b) 106 hectares of coconut land to Julian, Mariano, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin; and (c) More than
40 hectares of coconut land in Bogtong, and 18 hectares of riceland in Daraga as well as residential lots to
Mariano.

The properties of Mariano were brought into his marriage. On his Last Will and Testament, Catalina
Juanica(wife), was named as the sole and universal heir to all his properties. The spouses also agreed that
should both of them die, their respective properties would return to their sides of the family. Upon Mariano’s
death, his will was probated in a special proceeding. 9 years after the death of Mariano, Catalina began
disposing their properties to their nieces and nephews.

After Catalina’s death in 1977, her will affirmed and ratified all the transfers she made during her lifetime in favor
of her husband’s, and her own, relatives. Said relatives all agreed not to submit it to the court for probate since
the properties were already conveyed to them during Catalina’s lifetime.

In 1989, some of Catalina’s nieces and nephews who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares
from their estate filed with the RTC an action to recover properties conveyed to the Locsin’s, alleging that the
conveyances were officious, without consideration, and intended to circumvent the laws on succession. The
trial court ruled in favor of the complainants. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue/s:

WON the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC, allowing the recovery of the properties conveyed to the
Locsin’s?
Ruling/s:
YES. The CA and the trial court erred in holding that the private respondents are entitled to inherit the
properties which she had already disposed of more than 10 years before her death. Those properties
no longer formed part of the hereditary estate. The rights to a person’s succession are transmitted
from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. Even if those transfers
were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and
compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents
since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs.

There is no basis for assuming that Catalina’s intention for transferring those properties was to
circumvent the laws on succession. All that the private respondents had was a mere expectancy
which does not restrict Catalina’s freedom to dispose of even her entire estate, subject to the
limitations under Art. 750.

The lower courts capitalized on the fact that Catalina was 90 years of age when she died, which may
lead to her being unduly influenced and morally pressured by her husband’s nephews. However, the
facts presented do not support this view. There was not the slightest suggestion in the record that
Catalina was mentally incompetent when she made the dispositions. The fact that she was
transferring properties to the Locsin’s as well as the private respondents negate the allegations of her
incompetence.

The trial court should have already dismissed the action for recovery on the grounds of prescription.
The subject transactions had already prescribed after 4 years following its registration in the Registry
of Property, whether based on fraud, or one to redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs.
Registration is a constructive notice to the whole world. The decision of the CA was reversed and set
aside.

Opulencia vs. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 385,

G.R. No. 125835 July 30, 1998

Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.

Topic: Succession; Probate Proceedings; Sales

Facts:

Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in their favor a
―CONTRACT TO SELL‖ of a lot in Sta. Rosa, Laguna at P150.00 per square meters. Plaintiffs paid a
downpayment of P300,000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations under
the contract. Private respondents therefore prayed that petitioner be ordered to perform her contractual
obligations and to further pay damages, attorney’s fee and litigation expenses. However the petitioner put
forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property subject of the contract formed part of the Estate
of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner’s father), in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna; that at the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of
the pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not approved by the probate court; that
realizing the nullity of the contract petitioner had offered to return the downpayment received from private
respondents, but the latter refused to accept it.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the Contract to Sell executed by the petitioner and private respondents without the requisite
probate court approval is valid.

Ruling/s:

No. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable,
because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or
administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the ―lawful owner‖ and seller of the
subject parcel of land. She also explained the reason for the sale to be ―difficulties in her living‖ conditions
and consequent ―need of cash.‖ These representations clearly evince that she was not acting on behalf of the
estate under probate when she entered into the Contract to Sell. Accordingly, the jurisprudence cited by
petitioner has no application to the instant case.

We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent’s death.
Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of
judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to
sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.

The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner’s offer to sell is contingent on the ―complete clearance of the
court on the Last Will and Testament of her father.‖ Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was
perfected between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings,
the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private respondents is
subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of the testate
proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner’s apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in
a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that ―the sale made
by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of
such administration.‖

Petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representations in her valid Contract to Sell with private
respondents, from whom she had already received P300,000 as initial payment of the purchase price.
Petitioner may not renege on her own acts and representations, to the prejudice of the private respondents
who have relied on them. Jurisprudence teaches us that neither the law nor the courts will extricate a party
from an unwise or undesirable contract he or she entered into with all the required formalities and with full
awareness of its consequences.
 EMNACE vs. CA
G.R. No. 126334, November 23, 2001
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J

Topic: (General Provisions/Wills/Testamentary Capacity)

Facts:
Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business concern
known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. They decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of
partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them, consequent to Jacinto Divinagracia's
withdrawal from the partnership.

Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanao's untimely demise, petitioner
failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render an
accounting of the partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs
the deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership despite formal demand for payment thereof.

Consequently, Tabanao's heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment
of shares, division of assets and damages. The following day, respondents filed an amended complaint,
incorporating the additional prayer that petitioner be ordered to "sell all (the partnership's) assets and thereafter
pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs" their corresponding share in the proceeds thereof. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss, but the same was denied by the trial court.

The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, upon a finding that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
the trial court in issuing orders denying petitioner's motions to dismiss.

Petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue since she was never
appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the
estate of the deceased to appear as party plaintiff, when there is no intestate case and filed by one who was
never appointed by the court as administratrix of the estates
Ruling/s: NO
Petitioner's objection is misplaced. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix
of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of
Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao's death, his rights insofar as the partnership was
concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death
of the decedent.

Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to
respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which
the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted.
Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao
died.

A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or administratrix, is
not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes
of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action originally pertaining to the decedent. They,
therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the court's intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

Rabadilla VS. CA
G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000
Purisima, J.
 Topic: Obligations not extinguished by death

Facts:
In a Codicil appended to the last will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, the
predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner was instituted as a devisee of 511,855sqm of the parcel of land in
Bacolod. Said Codicil was duly probated and duly admitted in a special proceeding. Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983,
leaving behind his wife and four children.

In 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint before the RTC against the heirs of
Dr. Rabadilla to enforce the provisions of the Codicil. She alleged that the petitioners violated the conditions of
the Codicil in that they failed to sell, lease, or mortgage Lot No. 1392 only to the nearest descendants and sister
of the testatrix, instead, they mortgaged the same to PNB.

During the pre-trial, the petitioner and the private respondents reached an agreement wherein the former would
deliver 100 piculs of sugar to the latter. However, only 50.80 piculs of sugar mas delivered. The RTC rendered a
decision dismissing the complaint of the private respondents, albeit there was non-compliance of the
agreement, for being premature. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court, ruling that the petitioners have
failed to comply with the agreement under the Codicil. The court ordered for the reversion of Lot No. 1392.

Issue/s:

WON the CA erred in ordering the reversion of Lot No. 1392?

Ruling/s:
NO. The petitioner argued that Art. 882(Modal Institutions) of the NCC does not apply since there was
no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution. That there can be no
substitution since the testatrix died single and without issue; that the substitute heir is not definite,
as only referred to as “near descendants” without definite identity or reference. This argument of the
petitioner is bereft of merit.

As a general rule on succession, successional right are transmitted to the heirs at the moment of
death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate
descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.
The petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of Dr. Rabadilla succeed the latter by
operation of law.

Under Art. 776 of the NCC, inheritance include all properties, rights and obligations, not extinguished
by his death. Whatever obligation of Dr. Rabadilla had under the Codicil were transmitted to his
forced heirs, at the time of his death. As provided for in the Codicil, Dr. Rabadilla was designated as
the devisee of the lot and is obliged to deliver usufruct thereof to the private respondents. Upon his
death, the petitioner assumed this obligation. Hence, the private respondent had a cause of action
against him.

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or
heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the
designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die
before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or
(2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently
to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil contemplates neither of the
two.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
incapacity, predecease or renunciation. Under the Codicil, should Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill
the conditions imposed upon in the Codicil, the property shall be seized and transferred to the
testatrix’s nearest descendants. Art. 882 does apply to the case. In a modal institution, the testator
states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the
testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation
upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.

It was clear that Dr. Rabadilla was to inherit the property, however, it was likewise clear that the
testatrix imposed an obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to the private respondents. Suffice it to
state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his
property, to take effect after his death. Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends
how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed.
Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very
purpose of making a Will.

The petition was dismissed.

Ta edo vs. CA

G.R. No. 104482, January 22, 1996

Panganiban, J.

Topic: (General Provisions – Art. 777)

Facts:

On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Ta edo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor of his eldest
brother, Ricardo Ta edo, and the latter s wife, Teresita arera, private respondents herein, whereby Lazaro
conveyed to the latter in consideration of P1,500.00, "one hectare of whatever share I shall have over Lot No.
191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of
Deeds of Tarlac", the said property being his "future inheritance" from his parents.

Upon the death of their father Matias, Lazaro executed an "Affidavit of Conformity" dated February 28, 1980
to "re-affirm respect, acknowledge and validate the sale I made in 1962."

On January 13, 1981, Lazaro executed another notarized deed of sale in favor of private respondents
covering his "undivided ONE TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of land known as Lot 191 . . .". He acknowledged
therein his receipt of P10,000.00 as consideration therefor
On June 7, 1982, private respondents recorded the Deed of Sale in their favor in the Registry of Deeds and
the corresponding entry was made in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 166451

On July 16, 1982, elinda Ta edo, et al, who are the children of Lazaro and petitioners herein, filed before
the trial court a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of sale executed by Lazaro in favor of
private respondents covering the property inherited by Lazaro from his father

Petitioners claimed that their father, Lazaro, executed an "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated December 29, 1980,
conveying to his ten children his allotted portion under the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of
Matias, which deed included the land in litigation (Lot 191).

Petitioners also presented in evidence a private writing purportedly prepared and signed by Matias dated
December 28, 1978, stating that it was his desire that whatever inheritance Lazaro would receive from him
should be given to his (Lazaro's) children

The trial court decided in favor of private respondents, holding that petitioners failed "to adduce a
preponderance of evidence to support (their) claim."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, ruling that the Deed of Sale dated
January 13, 1981 was valid and that its registration in good faith vested title in said respondents.

Issue/s:

Should the sale made by Lazaro to private respondents be declared void and invalid?

Ruling/s:

No. The sale made in 1962 involving future inheritance is not really at issue here. In context, the assailed Decision
conceded "it may be legally correct that a contract of sale of anticipated future inheritance is null and void."

But to remove all doubts, we hereby categorically rule that, pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, "(n)o contract
may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law."

Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any
obligation between the parties.

Hence, the "affidavit of conformity" dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or ratify the 1962 sale, is
also useless and, in the words of the respondent Court, "suffers from the same infirmity." Even private respondents in
their memorandum concede this.

However, the documents that are critical to the resolution of this case are:

(a) the deed of sale of January 13, 1981 in favor of private respondents covering Lazaro's undivided inheritance of one-
twelfth (1/12) share in Lot No. 191, which was subsequently registered on June 7, 1982; and

(b) the deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners covering the same property.

These two documents were executed after the death of Matias (and his spouse) and after a deed of extra-judicial
settlement of his (Matias') estate was executed, thus vesting in Lazaro actual title over said property. In other words,
these dispositions, though conflicting, were no longer infected with the infirmities of the 1962 sale.
 Santos v Lumbao

G.R. No. 169129; March 28, 2007

Chico-Nazario, J

Topic: Art 1311

Facts:

Petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and surviving heirs
of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on October 1985. Respondents Spouses Lumbao are the
alleged owners of the 107-square meter lot (subject property), which they purportedly bought from Rita during
her lifetime.

Rita sold 100 sqm of her inchoate share in her mother’s estate to Spouses Lumbao. An additional 7 sqm was
added to the land as evidenced by a document denominated as ― ilihan ng Lupa.‖

After acquiring the property, spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected thereon a house
which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to the present.

Spouses Lumbao made several demands upon Rita and thereafter upon herein petitioners for them to
execute necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title. They further alleged that prior to her
death, Rita informed respondent Spouses Lumbao that she could not deliver the title to the subject property
because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned.

Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one another, executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs, the
estate left by Maria, which included the subject property already sold to respondents. They sent a formal
demand letter to petitioners but the latter still failed and refused to reconvey the subject property.

Issue/s:

WON Spouses Santos must reconvey the subject property to Spouses Lumbao

Ruling/s:
Yes.

General rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest applies in the
present case. Article 1311 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from the said provision that whatever
rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of
succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value
of the inheritance of the heirs.

Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-
interest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor.

Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what
rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against them.
The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right and the
rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly,
nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the
subject matter of the contract.

In the end, despite the death of the petitioners' mother, they are still bound to comply with the provisions of
the "Bilihan ng Lupa,". Consequently, they must reconvey to herein respondents Spouses Lumbao the 107-
square meter lot which they bought from Rita, petitioners' mother.

NHA V. Almeida

G.R. No. 162784; June 22, 2007

Puno, C.J

Topic: Succession (Art.774)

Facts:

The Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita several portions of land which are part of the
Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The award was evidenced by an agreement to sell. LTA was
succeeded by DAR and thereafter, DAR was succeeded by the National Housing Authority (NHA).

Margarita had two children namely, Beatriz and Francisca. Beatriz predeceased her mother and left heirs.
efore the death of Margarita on October 27,1971, she executed a ―Sinumpaang Salaysay‖ which recognizes
the agreement to sell entered into between her and NHA. A stipulation also includes a statement that the
lands which will be awarded to her will go to her daughter Francisca when ―sakaling ako’y bawian na ng Dios
aking buhay.‖ The said document was made on Oct. 7, 1960.
On August 22, 1974, Francisca, the remaining child of the late Margarita executed a Deed of Self-
Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the
deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita.

The surviving heirs of Beatriz filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication before the CFI. The
decision was rendered in their favor declaring the deed null and void.

During the trial of the case, Francisca filed an application with NHA to purchase the disputed lots which
respondent Almeida, one of the heirs of Beatriz, protested the application. NHA granted the application in
favor of Francisca. It based its decision on the Sinumpaang Salaysay that all rights and interest to the
disputed lots shall be transferred to Francisca. It considered the document as assignment of rights which
takes effect upon the execution of the document. The Office of the President affirmed the decision of NHA.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed was an assignment of rights in favor of Francisca.

Ruling/s:

No. We are not impressed. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted
that the effectivity of the said document commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in her
words "sakaling ako'y bawian nang Dios ng aking buhay . . ." Hence, in such period, all the interests of the
person should cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her
heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that:

―Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either
by his will or by operation of law.‖

The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita Herrera had an
existing Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was
neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both parties — Margarita Herrera and
NHA. Obligations are transmissible. Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of
her death either by will or by operation of law.

When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the next
"person" likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price.
We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate court to determine.

PEOPLE vs. GLORIA UMALI y AMADO AND SUZETH UMALI y AMADO

G.R. No. 8445 February 4, 1991
MEDIALDEA, J.:

Topic: Witness
Facts:
Pierre Pangan, a minor was investigated by Pat. Felino Noguerra for drug dependency and for an alleged
crime of robbery. In the course of the investigation, the policemen discovered that Pierre Pangan was
capable of committing such only if under the influence of drug. Leopoldo Pangan, father of the minor
asked the police investigators if something could be done to determine the source of the marijuana
which has not only socially affected his son, but other minors in the community like the case of Francisco
Manalo, who was likewise investigated by operatives of the Tiaong, Quezon Police Department and for
which a case for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act was filed against him, and other cases. Manalo
although a detention prisoner was touched by the appeal made to him by the policeman and agreed to
help in the identification of the source of the marijuana. In return he asked the policeman to help him in
some cases pending against him.

With the consent of Francisco Manalo, Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the Investigation Division gave him four
(4) marked P5.00 bills to buy marijuana from sources known to him. Few minutes there after, Manalo
returned with two (2) foils of dried marijuana which lie allegedly bought from the accused Gloria Umali.
Thereafter, he was asked by the police investigators to give a statement on the manner and
circumstances
Issue/s:
Whether or not Manalo should be disqualified as a witness
Ruling/s:
NO. Time and again, it is stressed that this Court is enjoined from casually modifying or rejecting the
trial court's factual findings. Such factual findings, particularly the trial judge's assessment of the
credibility of the testimony of the witnesses are accorded with great respect on appeal for the trial judge
enjoys the advantage of directly and at first hand observing and examining the testimonial and other
proofs as they are presented at the trial and is therefore better situated to form accurate impressions
and conclusions on the basis thereof. The findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight, and
should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked certain facts of
weight and importance, it being acknowledged that the court below, having seen and heard the
witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies. Hence, in the absence of
any showing that the trial court had overlooked certain substantial facts, said factual findings are
entitled to great weight, and indeed are binding even on this Court.

Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving
can make known their perception to others may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.

The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account Article 821 of
the Civil Code which states that persons 91 convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false
testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will."

Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to disqualify
him as a witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the fact that said
witness is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a
witness. The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence that
he was actuated by improper motive, in the absence of any evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was
actuated by improper motive, his testimony must be accorded full credence.

Appellant's contention that she was a victim of a "frame-up" is devoid of merit.1âwphi1 "Courts must be
vigilant. A handy defense in such cases is that it is a frame-up and that the police attempted to extort
from the accused. Extreme caution must be exercised in appreciating such defense. It is just as easy to
concoct as a frame-up. At all times the police, the prosecution and the Courts must be always on guard
against these hazards in the administration of criminal justice."

Torres & Lopez V. Lopez

G.R. No. 24569; February 26, 1926

Malcolm, J

Topic: Testamentary Capacity

Facts:

Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila Philippine Islands. On February 25, 1924, leaving a considerable
estate. Shortly thereafter Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will asked that the will of
Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased on the
grounds: (1) That the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of senile dementia and was under
guardianship; (2) that undue influence had been exercised by the persons benefited in the document in
conjunction with others who acted in their behalf; and (3) that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the
document was obtained through fraud and deceit.

After a prolonged trial judgment was rendered denying the legalization of the will declaring that Tomas was
physically and mentally incapacitated to take care of himself and manage his estate shows in a clear and
conclusive manner that at the time of signing the supposed will of Tomas Rodriguez did not possess such
mental capacity as was necessary to be able him to dispose of his property by the supposed will.

Issue/s:

Whether or not Tomas Rodriguez has testamentary capacity to consider the will valid;

Ruling/s:
 Yes. Tomas has testamentary capacity to constitute a will. Though there was a conflict of medical
opinions on the soundness of mind of the testator. Drs. Calderon, Domingo, and Herrera claimed that
testator had full understanding of the acts he was performing and that they were witness in the said
signing of the will. Rules of Court proscribes a requisite that the testator be of ―sound mind.‖ A sound
mind is a disposing mind. With such, the court has adopted a definition of ―testamentary capacity‖ as
the capacity to comprehend the nature of transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to
recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have
claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his
property among the objects of his bounty.

On the issue of testamentary capacity, the evidence should be permitted to take a wide range in order
that all facts may be brought out which will assist in determining the question. The testimony of
subscribing witnesses to a will concerning the testator's mental condition is entitled to great weight
where they are truthful and intelligent. The evidence of those present at the execution of the will and of
the attending physician is also to be relied upon. The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only
when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that
the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document.

Aluad vs Aluad

GR No. 176943, Oct. 17, 2008

CARPIO MORALES, J

Topic: (General Provisions/Wills/Testamentary Capacity)

Facts:

Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses
Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin). Crispin was the owner of six lots in Capiz. After Crispin died, his
wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.

On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a Deed of Donation in favor of Maria covering all the six lots which
Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin. The Deed of Donation provided that such will become effective upon
the death of the Donor, but in the event that the Donee should die before the Donor, the present donation shall
be deemed rescinded. Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them who
should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of the land.

Matilde sold one of the lots to Zenaido and subsequently, Matilde executed a last will and testament devising four (4) of
the lots to Maria and the remaining lot to Zenaido. Maria died a few months after Matilde’s death.
Thereafter, Maria’s heirs (herein petitioners) filed before the RTC a complaint for declaration and recovery of ownership
and possession of the two lots conveyed and donated to Zenaido, alleging that no rights have been transmitted to the
latter because such lots have been previously alienated to them to Maria via the Deed of Donation.

The lower court decided in favor of the petitioners however, CA reversed said decision upon appeal of Zenaido which
held that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos and as such it had to, but did not,
comply with the formalities of a will.

Due to the denial of the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the present Petition for Review has been filed.

Issue/s:

a. Whether or not the Deed of Donation is donation inter vivos

b. Whether or not the Deed of Donation is valid.

Ruling/s:

a. NO, the donation is Donation Mortis Causa

The Court finds the donation to Maria Aluad (petitioner’s mother) one of mortis causa, it having the following
characteristics:

It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor, or what amounts to
the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
while alive;

That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable, by the transferor at will, ad
nutum, but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed; and

That the transfer should be void of the transferor should survive the transferee.

The phrase in the Deed of Donation “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other
interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioner’s
mother during the former’s lifetime. Further the statement, “anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone
of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein
donated,” means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For
the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership.
The phrase, “anyone of them who should survive” is out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it
would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor.

b. NO, the Deed is VOID.

The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it
was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code. It is void and
transmitted no right to the petitioner's mother. But even assuming that the formalities were observed, since it was
not probated, no right to the two lots was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed of the lot to Zenaido
by her last will and testament, subject to the qualification that her will must be probated. With respect to the
conveyed lot, the same had been validly sold by Matilde to Zenaido.

CONCHITA GLORIA AND MARIA LOURDES GLORIA-PAYDUAN, Petitioners, v. BUILDERS SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent.
G.R.No. 202324, June 04, 2018
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.

Topic: Testamentary Capacity

Facts:

Spouses Juan and herein petitioner Conchita Gloria (Conchita) are registered owners of a parcel of land located
in Kamuning, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35814 (TCT 35814). Petitioner Maria
Lourdes Gloria-Payduan (Lourdes) is their daughter.

On August 14, 1987, Juan passed away.

Conchita and Lourdes filed before the RTC a complaint against Builders Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(Builders Savings) for declaration of null and void real estate mortgage, promissory note, cancellation of notation
in the transfer certificate of title, and damages. Conchita and Lourdes claimed that Biag duped them into
surrendering TCT 35814 to him under the pretense that Biag would verify the title, which he claimed might have
been fraudulently transferred to another on account of a fire that gutted the Quezon City Registry of Deeds; that
Biag claimed that the title might need to be reconstituted; that Biag instead used the title to mortgage the
Kamuning property to respondent Builders Savings; that Conchita was fraudulently made to sign the subject loan
and mortgage documents by Biag, who deceived Conchita into believing that it was actually Lourdes who
requested that these documents be signed; that the subject Mortgage and Promissory Note contained the
signature not only of Conchita, but of Juan, who was by then already long deceased, as mortgagor and co-
maker; that at the time the loan and mortgage documents were supposedly executed, Conchita was already
sickly and senile, and could no longer leave her house; that Biag and Builders Savings conspired in the execution
of the forged loan and mortgage documents, that the forged loan and mortgage documents were not
signed/affirmed before a notary public; that on account of iag and uilders Savings’ collusion, the subject
property was foreclosed and sold at auction to the latter; and that the loan and mortgage documents, as well as
the foreclosure and sale proceedings, were null and void and should he annulled.

Issue/s:

Whether or not petitioner MARIA LOURDES GLORIA-PAYDUAN as coowner of subject property is a real party of
interest in the case.

Ruling/s:

Yes. The evidence reveals that Lourdes is the daughter of Juan and Conchita. There is on record a CertiBcation
of Birth 18 issued by the Lipa City OJce of the Local Civil Registrar indicating that Lourdes was born to Juan and
Conchita; this document was marked as Exhibit "H" during the proceedings below, and remains uncontested.

Moreover, Lourdes categorically testiBed during trial that she was the natural child of Juan and Conchita, thus:
Being the daughter of the deceased Juan and Conchita, Lourdes has an interest in the subject property as heir to
Juan and co-owner with Conchita. The fact that she was not judicially declared as heir is of no moment, for, as
correctly argued by petitioners, there was no need for a prior declaration of heirship before heirs may commence
an action arising from any right of their predecessor, such as one for annulment of mortgage. "[N]o judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may assert his or her right to the property of the
deceased.

Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494 of the Civil Code, from the death
of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is the right to ask for partition at any time or to
terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so demanding partition private respondents
merely exercised the right originally pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-in-interest.
MODULE 2
ALUAD v. ALUAD
Facts: Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot
Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar
Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde
adjudicated the lots to herself. The couple were
childless. Matilde executed a document entitled "Deed of
Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Maria
Aluad covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited
from her husband Crispin. The deed contained a
provisions stating that it is ―to become effective upon
the death of the DONOR.‖ Later however, Matilde sold
Lot No. 676 to Zenaida Aluad by a Deed of Absolute Sale
of Real Property and later, Matilde executed a last will
and testament, devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and
680 to Maria, and her "remaining properties" including
Lot No. 674 to Zenaida. After the death of Matilde and
Maria, Maria's heirs filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint, for declaration and
recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674
and 676, and damages against Zenaida claiming that
they succeeded by inheritance by right of representation
from their deceased mother, Maria Aluad who is the sole
and only daughter of Matilde Aluad. The trial court held
that Matilde could not have transmitted any right over Lot
Nos. 674 and 676 to Zanaida, she having previously
alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. The
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, it
holding that the Deed of Donation was actually a
donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it
had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will.
Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed
by only two witnesses and had no attestation clause
which is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil
Code.
Issue: Whether or not Zanaida has a better right over
lots 674 and 676
Held: Yes. The statement in the Deed of Donation
reading "anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or
anyone of them who should survive, they could use,
encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels
of land herein donated" means that Matilde retained
ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to
dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without
other limitations than those established by law is an
attribute of ownership. The donation being then mortis
causa, the formalities of a will should have been
observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only
two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805
of the Civil Code.
Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that
the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will from
the requisite that the will be "attested and subscribed by
[the instrumental witnesses]. The respective intents
behind these two classes of signature[s] are distinct
from each other. The signatures on the left-hand
corner of every page signify, among others, that the
witnesses are aware that the page they are signing
forms part of the will. On the other hand, the
signatures to the attestation clause establish that
the witnesses are referring to the statements contained
in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation
clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the
will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an
unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses
signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the
unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot
demonstrate these witnesses' undertakings in the
clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page
were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
. . . It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are
required under Article 805 to state the number of
pages used upon which the will is written; the fact that
the testator had signed the will and every page thereof;
and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses
have stated these elemental facts would be their
signatures on the attestation clause.
Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the
will before the notary public, which is not in accordance
with the requirement of Article 806 of the Civil Code that
every will must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witnesses.
More. The requirement that all the pages of the will
must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the
upper part of each page was not also followed.
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed,
one of mortis causa, not having followed the formalities
of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to Maria.
But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were
observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot
Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria. Matilde
thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by
her last will and testament, subject of course to the
qualification that her (Matilde's) will must be probated.
The heirs failed to raise the issue of acquisitive
prescription before the lower courts, however, they
having laid their claim on the basis of inheritance from
their mother. As a general rule, points of law, theories,
and issues not brought to the attention of the trial
court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
ALVARADO v. GAVIOLA

Facts: On November 5, 1977, 79-year old Brigido

Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling
Habilin"
wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son, Cesar
Alvarado and expressly revoked a previously executed
holographic will at the time awaiting probate before the
RTC. Atty. Bayani Rino, as the lawyer who drafted the
eight-paged document, read the same aloud in the
presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses
and the notary public. The three instrumental witnesses
were persons known to Brigido, one being his physician
(Dr. Crescente Evidente) and another (Potenciano C.
Ranieses) being known to him since childhood.The latter
four followed the reading with their own respective
copies previously furnished them. Later, a codicil
entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya
na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa Nobiembre
5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing
some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash
for the testator's eye operation. Brigido was then
suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and
revocatory clauses were unchanged. Again, Brigido did
not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead,
it was Atty. Rino who read it aloud in his presence and in
the presence of the same three instrumental witnesses
and the notary public who followed the reading using
their own copies. A petition for the probate of the
notarial will and codicil was filed upon Brigido’s death by
Atty. Rino as the executor. Cesar in turn, filed an
opposition claiming that the will sought to be probated
was not executed in accordance with law since the
double-reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code
was admittedly not complied with.
Issue: Whether or not the will shall be invalidated for
not having been executed in accordance with law.
Held: No. In the case of Garcia v. Vasquez, the Court
explained that "The rationale behind the requirement of
reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable
of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to
make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he
may be able to object if they are not in accordance with
his wishes.‖
Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only
to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or
another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." It was
not disputed that Brigido was not totally blind at the
time the will and codicil were executed. However, his
vision on both eyes was only of "counting fingers at
three (3) feet" by reason of the glaucoma which he had
been suffering from for several years even prior to his
first consultation with an eye specialist. Since Brigido
Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his
will and codicil on the separate occasions of their
execution due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred"
vision, there can be no other course but to conclude that
Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term
"blind" as it is used in Art. 808.
Article 808 requires that in case of testators like
Brigido, the will shall be read twice; once, by one of the
instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public
before whom the will was acknowledged. The purpose
is to make known to the incapacitated testator the
contents of the document before signing and to give
him an opportunity to object if anything is contrary to
his instructions. That Art. 808 was not followed strictly
is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary public and an
instrumental witness, it was the lawyer, Rino who
drafted the eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil
who read the same aloud to the testator, and read
them only once, not twice as Art. 808 requires.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held in a number
of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable
where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the
reason being that the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills are intended to protect the testator
from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never
intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the
testamentary privilege. In this case, it was not only
Atty. Rino who read the documents. The notary public
and the three instrumental witnesses, who were
persons known to Brigido, likewise read the will and
codicil, albeit silently.
It was held in Abangan v. Abangan that: ―The object
of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is
to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
the substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty
their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on the
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one
must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object
of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right
to make a will. So when an interpretation already given
assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever,
that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely
unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's
will, must be disregarded"
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ:
TABOADA v. ROSAL
Facts: Apolonio Taboada filed a petition for probate of
the will of the late Dorotea Perez and presented as
evidence the alleged will and the testimony of one of
the subscribing witnesses thereto. However, the trial
court disallowed the will for want of formality in its
execution because the will was signed at the bottom of
the page solely by the testatrix and at the left hand
margin by three instrumental witnesses. Judge Ramon
C. Pamatian interpreted Article 805 of the Civil Code to
require that, for a notarial will to be valid, it is not
enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end" but all
the three subscribing
witnesses must also sign at the same place or at the
end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one another
because the attesting witnesses to a will attest not
merely the will itself but also the signature of the
testator. It is not sufficient compliance to sign the page,
where the end of the will is found, at the left-hand
margin of that page. Pending resolution of motion for
reconsideration, Judge Pamatian was transferred to his
new station and his position was assumed by
respondent Judge Avelino S. Rosal. Judge Rosal
affirmed Judge Pamatian’s findings.
Issue: Whether or not probate was properly denied
Held: No. Under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must
be subscribed or signed at its end by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by another
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another. It must be noted that the law uses the terms
attested and subscribed. Attestation consists in
witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to
see and take note mentally that those things are done
which the statute requires for the execution of a will and
that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the
other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses'
names upon the same paper for the purpose of
identification of such paper as the will which was
executed by the testator.
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be
desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms
should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of
the will is not assailed. Insofar as the requirement of
subscription is concerned, the will in this case was
subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose
of identification. As to the attestation, the signatures of
the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first
page of the will attested not only to the genuineness of
the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution
of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
Lastly, that the attestation clause failed to state the
number of pages used in writing the will does not cause
its invalidity. This would have been a fatal defect were it
not for the fact that, it is discernible from the entire will
that it is really and actually composed of only two pages
duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses. The page which is marked as "Pagina dos"
comprises the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that
"This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages
including this page."
DY YIENG SEANGIO v. REYES
Facts: Private respondents Alfredo, Alberto, Elisa, Victor,
Alfonso, Shirley, Betty and James, all surnamed
Seangio,
filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the late Segundo Seangio and praying for the
appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio-
Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem
of Dy Yieng Seangio. Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all
surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition contending
that
1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of
her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a
general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her
the power to manage and exercise control and
supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3)
Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as
the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she
is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a
holographic will entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng
Mana, disinheriting Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view
of the purported holographic will, they averred that in
the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the
intestate proceedings are to be automatically
suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the
probate of the will. Subsequently, Dy Yieng, Barbara
and Virginia, filed a petition for the probate of the
holographic will of Segundo, reiterating that testate
proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over
intestate proceedings. Private respondents moved for
the dismissal of the probate proceedings on the ground
that the document purporting to be the holographic will
of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the
estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the
definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code.
The will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by
the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing
else, hence, there is preterition which would result to
intestacy.
Issue: Whether or not the holographic will should have
been probated
Held: Yes. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of
the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected
through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be
specified. With regard to the reasons for the
disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his
document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken
as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment
of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter
presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a
child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the
Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed
by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no
other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Segundo's
document, although it may initially come across as a
mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is
written, dated and signed by
the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose
mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of
the instrument, and while it does not make an
affirmative disposition of the latter's property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. The disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in
favor of those who would succeed in the absence of
Alfredo.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or
the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within
the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the
supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are
designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It
is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to
law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by
one who is not learned in the law, should be construed
more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking
into account the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the instrument and the intention of the
testator. In this regard, the Court is convinced that the
document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis
ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last
testamentary act and was executed by him in
accordance with law in the form of a holographic will.
Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be
given effect.
With regard to the issue on preterition, the compulsory
heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It
was Segundo's last expression to bequeath his estate to
all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of
Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the
exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere
mention of the name of one of Virginia, in the document
did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her
name was included plainly as a witness to the
altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
CONDE v. ABAYA
Facts: Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural
children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she states she
had by Casiano Abaya, moved the settlement of
Casiano’s intestate succession. Roman Abaya, a son of
the said Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia, the
parents of the late Casiano Abaya, came forward and
opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as
being the nearest relative of Casiano. Paula Conde, filed
a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the
relationship alleged by Roman Abaya, but that she
considered that her right was superior to his. The trial
court, in recognizing Jose and Teopista as the natural
children of Casiano, postulated that an ordinary action
for the acknowledgment of natural children under
articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code, might be brought
in special
probate proceedings, and that the mother of such
presumed natural child, as heir to the latter, may bring
an action to enforce the acknowledgment of her
deceased child in accordance with articles 135 and 137
of the Civil Code.
Issue: whether or not the mother of a natural child now
deceased, but who survived the person who, it is
claimed, was his natural father, also deceased, may
bring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural
filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his
behalf to receive the inheritance from the person who
is supposed to be his natural father.
Held: NO. In this case, the Court made a comparison
between an action to claim the legitimacy, and one to
enforce acknowledgment.
FIRST, The right of action that devolves upon the child
to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while
the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural
child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents.
SECOND, Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to
the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole
life, he may exercise it either against the presumed
parents, or their heirs; while the right of action to
secure the acknowledgment of a natural child, since it
does not last during his whole life, but depends on that
of the presumed parents, as a general rule can only be
exercised against the latter.
THIRD, Usually the right of action for legitimacy
devolving upon the child is of a personal character and
pertains exclusively to him, only the child may exercise
it at any time during his lifetime. As an exception, and
in three cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of
the child, to wit, if he died during his minority, or while
insane, or after action had been already instituted.
An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child
may, as an exception, be exercised against the heirs of
the presumed parents in two cases: First, in the event
of the death of the latter during the minority of the
child, and second, upon the discovery of some
instrument of express acknowledgment of the child,
executed by the father or mother, the existence of
which was unknown during the life of the latter. But as
such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child
can only be exercised by him. It can not be transmitted
to his descendants, or to his ascendants.
The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his
legitimacy is in all respects superior to that of the child
who claims acknowledgment as a natural child. And it is
evident that the right of action to claim his legitimacy is
not one of those rights which the legitimate child may
transmit by inheritance to his heirs; it forms no part of
the
component rights of his inheritance. If it were so, there
would have been no necessity to establish its
transmissibility to heirs as an exception in the terms and
conditions of article 118 of the code. So that, in order
that it may constitute a portion of the child's inheritance,
it is necessary that the conditions and the terms
contained in article 118 shall be present, since without
them, the right that the child held during his lifetime,
being personal and exclusive in principle, and therefore,
as a general rule not susceptible of transmission, would
and should have been extinguished by his death.
Therefore, where no express provision like that of article
118 exists, the right of action for the acknowledgment
of a natural child is, in principle and without exception,
extinguished by his death, and can not be transmitted
as a portion of the inheritance of the deceased child.
The existence of a provision for the one case and the
absence thereof for the other is a conclusive argument
that inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, and it can not be
understood that the provision of law should be the same
when the same reason does not hold in the one case as
in the other.
On the other hand, if said right of action formed a part
of the child's inheritance, it would be necessary to
establish the doctrine that the right to claim such an
acknowledgment from the presumed natural father and
from his heirs is an absolute right of the heirs of the child,
not limited by certain circumstances as in the case of
the heirs of a legitimate child; and if it is unreasonable
to compare a natural child with a legitimate one to place
the heirs of a natural child and his inheritance on a
better footing than those of a legitimate child would not
only be unreasonable, but, most absurd and illegal in the
present state of the law and in accordance with the
general principles thereof.
PAMPLONA v. MORETO
Facts: "Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were
husband and wife. During their marriage, they acquired
adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba
Friar Land Estate, situated in Calamba, Laguna,
containing 781-544 and 1,021 square meters
respectively, and covered by certificates of title issued in
the name of "Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica
Maniega." The spouses begot during their marriage 6
children, namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo,
and Leandro, all surnamed Moreto. More than 6 years
after the death of his wife, Flaviano, without the consent
of the children, and before any liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, executed in favor of Geminiano
Pamplona, married to Apolonia Onte, a deed of absolute
sale covering lot No. 1495. As a result of the sale, a new
transfer certificate of title was issued in the name of
Geminiano Pamplona married to Apolonia Onte.
Spouses Pamplona constructed their house on the
eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time
of the sale, pointed to it as the land which he sold to
Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly thereafter, Rafael
Pamplona, son of the spouses Geminiano and Apolonia,
also built his house within lot 1496 about one meter
from its boundary with the adjoining lot. Flaviano and
Geminiano thought all the time that the portion of 781
square meters which was the subject matter of their
sale transaction was No. 1495 although the fact is that
the said portion sold thought of by the parties to be lot
No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496. Germiniano and
Apolonia continued to enlarge their house and they even
constructed a piggery corral at the back of their said
house about one and one-half meters from the eastern
boundary of lot 1496. After Flaviano died intestate, the
children demanded on the Pamplonas to vacate the
premises where they had their house and piggery on
the ground that Flaviano had no right to sell the lot as
the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of
Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was
already dead when the sale was executed without the
consent of the children who are the heirs of Monica.
The spouses Pamplona refused to vacate the premises
occupied by them and hence, a suit was instituted by
the children as heirs of Monica seeking for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale. The Trial
Court rendered a decision declaring that the deed of
absolute sale pertaining to the eastern portion of Lot
1496 covering an area of 781 square meters null and
void as regards one half of it or the 390.5 square meters
of which the children, as heirs, are declared the rightful
owners and entitled to its possession. Spouses
Pamplona, not being satisfied with said judgment,
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
judgment, hence they now come to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the spouses Pamplona are
entitled to full ownership of the property consisting of
781 sqm
Held: Yes. Without the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the estate became the property of a
community between the surviving husband, Flaviano,
and his children with the deceased in the concept of a
co- ownership. There was a partial partition of the co-
ownership when at the time of the sale Flaviano
pointed out the area and location of the 781 sq. meters
sold by him to the spouses Pamplona. And since
Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of
the entire land area of 2,346 sqm or 1,173 sq. meters
as his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to
dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona
spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder of some
392 sq. meters belonging to him at the time of the sale.
Flaviano, the vendor, had the legal right to more than
781 sq. meters of the communal estate, a title which he
could dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-
Pamplona. The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but
the moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its
location and even indicated the boundaries over which
the fences were to be erected without objection, protest
or complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary
they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation,
occupation and possession. For 9 years, the Pamplonas
and the heirs were neighbors yet the latter lifted no
finger to question the occupation, possession and
ownership of the land purchased by the Pamplonas.
Therefore, the heirs are in estoppel by laches to claim
half of the property in dispute as null and void. Estoppel
by laches is a rule of equity which bars a claimant from
presenting his claim when, by reason of abandonment
and negligence, he allowed a long time to elapse
without presenting the same.The factual partition or
termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was
created, and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano, but
also his heirs, the children from asserting as against the
vendees-Pamplonas any right or title in derogation of
the deed of sale executed by said vendor Flaviano.
GUERRERO v. BIHIS
PROLOGUE: The Scriptures tell the story of the brothers
Jacob and Esau, siblings who fought bitterly over the
inheritance of their father Isaac’s estate. Jacob and
Esau were the sons of Isaac and Rebekah. Even before
they were born, they were struggling against each other
in the womb of their mother. Their prenatal striving
foreshadowed later conflict. (Genesis 25:21–26) Jacob,
the younger of the two, desired Esau’s birthright—the
special honor that Esau possessed as the older son which
entitled him to a double portion of his father’s inheritance.
Jacob was later on able to acquire not only Esau’s
birthright and superior right to inheritance but also their
father’s blessing. Jurisprudence is also replete with
cases involving acrimonious conflicts between brothers
and sisters over successional rights.
Facts: Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura is the mother of
Bella A. Guerrero and Resurreccion A. Bihis. When Felisa
died, Guerrero filed a petition for the probate of the last
will and testament of Felisa in the RTC of Quezon City.
Guerrero alleged that she was validly and willfully
named as executrix in the decedent’s will and she was
legally qualified to act as such. Bihis opposed her elder
sister’s petition on the grounds (1) that the ―will was not
executed and attested as required by law; its attestation
clause and acknowledgment did not comply with the
requirements of the law and (2) that the signature of
the testatrix was procured by fraud and Guerrero and her
children procured the will through undue and improper
pressure and influence. Guerrero was appointed as
temporary special
administratrix. However, the trial court later denied the
probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of the Civil
Code was not complied with because the will was
―acknowledged‖ by the testatrix and the witnesses at
the testatrix’s residence at No. 40 Kanlaon Street,
Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a
commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City.
CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the will ―acknowledged‖ by the
testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a
notary public acting outside the place of his
commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806
of the Civil Code
Held: No. One of the formalities required by law in
connection with the execution of a notarial will is that it
must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. This formal requirement is
one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a
will. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent
officer and declaring it to be his act or deed. In the case
of a notarial will, that competent officer is a lawyer duly
commissioned as a notary public. The acknowledgment
of a notarial will
(1) coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses
to declare before an officer of the law, the notary
public, that they executed and subscribed to the will as
their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under
oath and under pain of perjury, thus paving the way for
the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in
the execution of spurious wills, or those executed
without the free consent of the testator. (2) It also
provides a further degree of assurance that the testator
is of a certain mindset in making the testamentary
dispositions to the persons instituted as heirs or
designated as devisees or legatees in the will. A notary
public’s commission is the grant of authority in his favor
to perform notarial acts. It is issued ―within and for‖ a
particular territorial jurisdiction and the notary public’s
authority is co-extensive with it. In other words, a
notary public is authorized to perform notarial acts,
including the taking of acknowledgments, within that
territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his
commission, he is bereft of power to perform any
notarial act; he, is not a notary public. Any notarial act
outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no force and
effect. As this Court categorically pronounced in
Tecson
v. Tecson: ―An acknowledgment taken outside the
territorial limits of the officer’s jurisdiction is void as if
the person taking it were wholly without official
character.‖ Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned
notary public for and in Quezon City, he lacked the
authority to take the acknowledgment of the testatrix
and the instrumental witnesses. In the same vein, the
testatrix and her witnesses could not have validly
acknowledged the will before him. Thus, Felisa Tamio
de Buenaventura’s last will and testament was, in
effect, not acknowledged as
required by law. Moreover, Article 5 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of
mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except
when the law itself authorizes their validity.
The violation of a mandatory or a prohibitory statute
renders the act illegal and void unless the law itself
declares its continuing validity. Here, mandatory and
prohibitory statutes were transgressed in the execution of
the alleged ―acknowledgment.‖ The compulsory
language of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not
complied with and the interdiction of Article 240 of the
Notarial Law was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the
testatrix, her witnesses and Atty. Directo were all
completely void.
MENDOZA v. CALIXTO PILAPIL
Facts: Father Eleuterio Pilapil, being parish priest of
Mualboal of Cebu Province, died in the city on December
6, 1935. On his will, he appointed his nephew, Adrian
Mendoza as the executor. The probate of the will was
opposed by Eleuterio’s brother, Calixto Pilapil and
others. The grounds on which the appellants rely on to
argue that legalization is not appropriate for any of the
two documents expressed as a testament of the late P.
Eleuterio Pilapil , are these: (a) They contain erasures and
alterations that the respondent failed to explain; (b)
That has not been proved that the deceased ,
prescinding from what is stated in those documents
exhibits A and C , it was appropriate age for testing; (c)
is not proved that the deceased owned Spanish is the
language in which referrals are written documents ; (d)
That in one of the clauses of these documents there is
ban which aired in the courts ; (e) neither it has been
prepared , signed and witnessed in accordance with the
provisions of Article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Issue: Whether or not the will should be legalized
(probated) by the court
Held: Yes. The disposition of the testator that his "Last
Will and Testament not be heard by the court" can not
strip the courts of their authority to determine if your will
is referred legalizable or not. There are stakeholders in
one way or another on an issue, which can confer or
remove jurisdiction and authority to the courts to
resolve and decide what we want the same law is
resolved and decided. The law requires, under penalty,
to be delivered to the court the Wills made by a testator
dies after this, by the person entrusted with their care,
so they can undoubtedly determine whether their
Legalization and can at the same time dispose of their
property as mandated therein; or, on the contrary,
should declare died intestate, not be subject to
legalization which has been granted. In addition, the
testator not being a lawyer,
it's no wonder he has stated in his will the ban, - using
their very words, "normal ventilation in the Court ".
And insofar as the exhibits A and C can not be legalized
because they were not prepared or were signed in
accordance with the law , saying that their pages are
not numbered with letters ; and because in its clause
witnessing is not expressed that they were signed by
the three attesting witnesses , in the presence of the
testator
, it is sufficient to draw attention to the fact that the
bottom of the first page is in letters note that says
clearly: "Go to 2 "page "and the fact that , at the
bottom of the second page, there is this other note : "
Go to 3; " page. " and suffice also draw attention to the
first two lines of said third page is the last, where to
complete the provision is contained in the last
paragraph of the previous page , or second , it is
stated:
" * * * It consists of two articles , contains sixteen
provisions and is written on three pages " which agrees
closely with the true facts as they appear in the
aforementioned two exhibits , because actually contain
two items and sixteen provisions , not more , not less .
In the attestation clause on again and copy the object
Testament issue, three attesting witnesses who signed
it states that "pre-inserted the Last Will and Testament
, has been signed , and jury declared by the testator ,
Rev.
P. Eleuterio Pilapil in the presence of us all"; and
immediately afterwards , by the same witnesses also it
states : "to beg of the testator , we signed each one of
us, here in Cebu, Cebu , IF, today 27 November 1935.
" The phrase "to beg of the testator", coupled with that
signed and signed his will in the presence of attesting
witnesses, permits and justifies the inference that the
testator was present when the last stamped their
signatures there.
The purpose of the law to establish the formalities
required in a will, it is undoubtedly ensure and
guarantee their authenticity against bad faith and
fraud, to prevent those who have no right to succeed
the testator will happen and win-win with the
legalization of same. Has fulfilled that purpose in the
event that there has been talk because, in the same
body of the will and in the same page where the clause
witnessing appears, or the third, expresses the will
consists of three pages and that each one of the first
two has been in part the note in letters, and partly the
note in figures, they are respectively the first and
second pages of the same. These facts clearly excludes
all fear, suspicion, or shadow of a doubt that it has
replaced one of its pages with another.

DOLAR v. DIANCIN

Facts: The purported will of the deceased Paulino

Diancin was submitted for probate in the Court of First
Instance
of Iloilo. A thumbmark appears at the end of the will
and on the left hand margin of each of its pages in the
following manner: "Paulino Diancin, Su Signo, Por Pedro
Diamante." The witnesses to the will were the same Pedro
Diamante, Inocentes Deocampo, and Juan Dominado.
The will is detailed in nature, and disposes of an estate
amounting approximately to P50,000. For comparative
purposes, Exhibit 8, a document of sale containing an
admittedly genuine thumbmark of Paulino Diancin, was
presented. Photographs of the thumbmarks on the will
and of the thumbmark on Exhibit 8 were also offered in
evidence. One, Carlos J. Jaena, attempted to qualify as
an "expert," and thereafter gave as his opinion that the
thumbmarks had not been made by the same person.
One, Jose G. Villanueva, likewise attempted to qualify as
an "expert" and gave as his opinion that the
thumbmarks were authentic. The petition to permit the
will to be sent to Manila to be examined by an expert
was denied. On one fact only were the opposing
witnesses agreed, and this was that the ink used to
make the thumbmarks on the will was of the ordinary
type which blurred the characteristics of the marks,
whereas the thumbmark on Exhibit 8 was formed clearly
by the use of the special ink required for this purpose.
The trial judge expressed his personal view as being
that great differences existed between the questioned
marks on the will and the genuine mark on Exhibit 8.
The will was denied probate on the sole ground that the
thumbmarks appearing thereon were not the
thumbmarks of the testator.
Issue: Whether or not the denial of probate is proper
Held: No. The requirement of the statute that the will shall
be "signed" is satisfied not only by the customary
written signature but also by the testator's or testatrix'
thumbmark. Expert testimony as to the identity of
thumbmarks or fingerprints is of course admissible. The
method of identification of fingerprints is a science
requiring close study. Where thumb impressions are
blurred and many of the characteristic marks far from
clear, thus rendering it difficult to trace the features
enumerated by experts as showing the identity or lack
of identity of the impressions, the court is justified in
refusing to accept the opinions of alleged experts and in
substituting its own opinion that a distinct similarity in
some respects between the admittedly genuine
thumbmark and the questioned thumbmarks, is evident.
The Court considered as a strong indication of the
genuineness of the will is that the three instrumental
witnesses united in testifying concerning the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. It
was stated that in addition to the testator and
themselves, one other person, Diosdado Dominado, was
present. This latter individual was called as a witness by
the oppositors to the will to identify Exhibit 8. He was
later placed on the
witness stand by the proponent on rebuttal, and
thereupon declared positively that he was the one who
prepared the will for the signature of Paulino Diancin;
that the thumbmarks appearing on the will were those
of Paulino Diancin, and that he say Paulino Diancin
make these impressions.
YAP TUA v. YAP CA KUAN
Facts: On August 23, 1909, Perfecto Gabriel,
representing Yap Tua, presented a petition in the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila, asking that the
will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be admitted to
probate, as the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga
Yap Caong, who died on August 11, 1090. The judge,
Honorable A. S. Crossfield, on the 29th day of
September, 1909, ordered that the last will and
testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be allowed
and admitted to probate and ordered that Yap Tua be a
appointed as executor of the will, upon the giving of a
bond. On February 28, 1910, Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca
Llu appeared and presented a petition, alleging that
they were interested in the matters of the sail will and
desired to intervene asked that a guardian ad litem be
appointed to represented them in the cause. The court
appointed Gabriel La O as guardian ad litem of said
parties. Thereafter, Gabriel La O appeared in court and
presented a motion in which he alleged that the will
admitted to probate was null and void and should not
be admitted to probate. He requested that Yap Ca Kuan
and Yap Ca Llu who were then minors, be given an
opportunity to present new proof even though they had
been negligent in presenting their opposition to the
legalization of the will, said negligent was excusable, on
account of their age. One of the grounds upon which
the new trial was requested was that the deceased,
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, had not signed the will of
the 11th of August, 1909 but executed another will,
with all the formalities required by law, upon the 6th
day of August, 1909. They presented Tomasa Puzon, a
professor and an expert in handwriting, who upon being
shown the will, testified that the name and surname on
the will of August
11 (Exhibit A), in his judgment were written by two
different hands, though the given name is the same as
that upon the will of August 6, 1909 (Exhibit 1),
because he found in the name "Tomasa" in Exhibit A, a
similarity in the tracing to the "Tomasa" in Exhibit 1; that
comparing the surname on Exhibit A with the surname
on Exhibit 1 he found that the character of the writing
was thoroughly distinguished and different by the
tracing and by the direction of the letters in the said
two exhibits; that from his experience and observation
he believed that the name "Tomasa" and "Yap Caong,"
appearing in the signature on Exhibit A were written by
different persons. The oppositors of the will also made
a strong effort to show that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong
did not sign her name in the presence of the witnesses
and that they did not sign
their names in her presence nor in the presence of each
other. An effort was made to show that the will was
signed by the witnesses in one room and by Tomasa in
another. They also presented the testimony of Rufino R.
Papa for the purpose of supporting the allegation that
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was mentally incapacitated
to make the will dated August 11, 1909. Papa declared
that he was a physician and that he visited Tomasa on
the 8th
, 9 th and 10th of August before the latter’s death on
the 11th . He states that Tomasa was very weak from
her sickness, in the third stage tuberculosis; that she
was lying in bed; and that on the third day of his visit
on the 10th of August, Tomasa had lost all her
intelligence that when he asked Tomasa whether she
was feeling any pain or anything of that kind, she did
not answer at all; that she was in a condition of stupor,
induced, as he believed, by the stage of uraemia from
which she was suffering.
Issue: Whether or not the will has been properly
executed Held: Yes.
As to Tomasa’s soundness of mind:
While the testimony of Dr. Papa is very strong relating
to the mental condition of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong,
yet, nevertheless, his testimony related to a time
perhaps twenty-four hours before the execution of the
will in question. Several witnesses testified that at the
time the will was presented to her for her signature, she
was of sound mind and memory and asked for a pen and
ink and kept the will in her possession for ten or fifteen
minutes and finally signed it. The lower court found that
there was a preponderance of evidence sustaining the
conclusion that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was of sound
mind and memory and in the possession of her faculties
at the time she signed this will. In view of the conflict in
the testimony of the witnesses and the finding of the
lower court, the Court does not feel justified in reversing
his conclusions upon that question.
As to authenticity of the signature:
Several witnesses testified that they saw her write the
name "Tomasa." One of the witnesses testified that she
had written he full name. The SC is of the opinion, that
if Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed any portion of her
name to the will, with the intention to sign the same, that
will amount to a signature. It has been held time again
that one who makes a will may sign the same by the use
of a mark, the name having been written by others. If
the writing of a mark simply upon a will is sufficient
indication of the intention of the person to make and
execute it, then certainly the writing of a portion or all
of the name ought to be accepted as a clear indication
of intention to execute it. The man who cannot write and
who is obliged to make his mark simply therefor, upon
the will, is held to
"sign" as effectually as if he had written his initials or
his full name. It would seem to be sufficient, under the
law requiring a signature by the person making a will, to
make his mark, to place his initials or all or any part of
his name thereon. In the present case we think the
proof shows, by a large preponderance, that Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong, if she did not sign her full name,
did at least sign he given name "Tomas," and that is
sufficient to satisfy the statute.
As to the presence of Witnesses:
While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will
must sign the same in the presence of the witnesses
and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of
each other, as well as in the presence of the one
making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of
the signatures made is not necessary. A plan of the
room or rooms in which the will was signed was
presented as proof and it was shown that there was
but one room; that one part of the room was one or
two steps below the floor or the other; that the table
on which the witnesses signed the will was located
upon the lower floor of the room. It was also shown
that from the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was
possible for her to see the table on which the witnesses
signed the will. While the rule is absolute that one who
makes a will must sign the same in the presence of the
witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the
presence of each other, as well as in the presence of
the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual
seeing of the signatures made is not necessary. It is
sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible
for each of the necessary parties, if they desire to see,
may see the signature placed upon the will.
AVERA v. GARCIA
Facts: In the proceedings instituted by Eutiquia Avera
for probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia, contest
was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the
latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose
Garcia and Cesar Garcia. Upon the date appointed for
the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one of
the three attesting witnesses who testified that the will
was executed with all necessary external formalities,
and that the testator was at the time in full possession of
disposing faculties. When the proponent rested, the
attorney for the opposition introduced a single witness
whose testimony tended to show in a vague and
indecisive manner that at the time the will was made
the testator was so debilitated as to be unable to
comprehend what he was about. The trial judge found
that the testator at the time of the making of the will
was of sound mind and disposing memory and that the
will had been properly executed. He accordingly
admitted the will to probate. From this judgment an
appeal was taken in behalf of the persons
contesting the will, presenting the following questions:
first, whether a will can be admitted to probate, where
opposition is made, upon the proof of a single attesting
witness, without producing or accounting for the
absence of the other two; and, secondly, whether the
will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact
that the signature of the testator and of the three
attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of
each page of the will instead of the left margin.
Issue: Whether or not the will is properly admitted to
probate
Held: Yes. As to there being a single attesting
witness:
While it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will
may be proved by the testimony of only one of the three
attesting witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs.
Delfiando, this court declared after an elaborate
examination of the American and English authorities
that when a contest is instituted, all of the attesting
witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of
the process of the court.
In the present case, however no explanation was made
at the trial as to why all three of the attesting witnesses
were not produced, but the probable reason is found in
the fact that, although the petition for the probate of
this will had been pending from December 21, 1917,
until the date set for the hearing, which was April 5,
1919, no formal contest was entered until the very day
set for the hearing; and it is probable that the attorney
for the proponent, believing in good faith that probate
would not be contested, repaired to the court with only
one of the three attesting witnesses at hand, and upon
finding that the will was contested, incautiously
permitted the case to go to proof without asking for a
postponement of the trial in order that he might produce
all the attesting witnesses. Furthermore, while the Court
would probably be compelled to reverse this case on the
ground that the execution of the will had not been
proved by a sufficient number of attesting witnesses,
this issue was not raised by the opposition in the lower
court either upon the submission of the cause for
determination in that court or upon the occasion of the
filing of the motion for a new trial. Accordingly this
question cannot now be raised for the first time in this
court.
As to the signatures on the right margin:
It is true that the statute says that the testator and the
instrumental witnesses shall sign their names on the left
margin of each and every page; and it is undeniable
that the general doctrine is to the effect that all
statutory requirements as to the execution of wills must
be fully complied with. Still some details at times creep
into legislative enactments which are so trivial that it
would be
absurd to suppose that the Legislature could have
attached any decisive importance to them. The
provision to the effect that the signatures of the
testator and witnesses shall be written on the left
margin of each page
— rather than on the right margin — seems to be of
this character. So far as concerns the authentication of
the will, and of every part thereof, it can make no
possible difference whether the names appear on the
left or no the right margin, provided they are on one or
the other.
Mr. Justice Avanceña, in a case where the signatures
were placed at the bottom of the page and not in the
margin, said:
"The object of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments
and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore
the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a
way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the
other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that
it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the
exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any
other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless
and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
disregarded."
In the case before us, where ingenuity could not
suggest any possible prejudice to any person, as
attendant upon the actual deviation from the letter of
the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial
to invalidate the instrument.
NAYVE v. MOJAL
Facts: Filomena Nayve instituted a proceeding for the
probate of the will of her deceased spouse Antonio
Mojal. The will in question, Exhibit A, is composed of
four sheets with written matter on only one side of
each, that is, four pages written on four sheets. The
four sides or pages containing written matter are paged
""Pag. 1," Pag. 2," "Pag. 3,", "Pag. 4," successively.
Each of the first two sides or pates, which was used,
was signed by the testator and the three witnesses on
the margin, left side of the reader. On the third page
actually used, the signatures of the three witnesses
appear also on the margin, left side of the reader, but
the signature of the testator is not on the margin, but
about the middle of the page, at the end of the will and
before the attestation clause. On the fourth page, the
signatures of the witnesses do not appear on the
margin, but at the bottom of the attestation clause, it
being the signature of the testator that is on the
margin, left side of the reader. The probate is opposed
by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister and niece,
respectively, of the deceased.
The defects attributed to the will are: (a) The fact of not
having been signed by the testator and the witnesses on
each and every sheet on the left margin; (b) the fact of
the sheets of the document not being paged with
letters;
(c) the fact that the attestation clause does not state the
number of sheets or pages actually used of the will; and
(d) the fact that the testator does not appear to have
signed all the sheets in the presence of the three witnesses,
and the latter to have attested and signed all the sheets in
the presence of the testator and of each other. The Court of
first Instance of Albay, which tried the case, overruled the
objections to the will, and ordered the probate thereof.
Hence, an appeal before the Court.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid and properly
executed according to the formalities required by law
Held: Yes.
(a) The rule laid down in Avera v. Garcia is that the
document contained the necessary signatures on each page,
whereby each page of the will was authenticated and
safeguarded against any possible alteration. In that case, the
validity of the will was sustained, and consequently it was
allowed to probate. Applying that doctrine to the instant
case, we hold that, as each and every page used of the will
bears the signatures of the testator and the witnesses, the
fact that said signatures do not all appear on the left margin
of each page does not detract from the validity of the will.
(b) In the case of Unson vs. Abella the Court held that
paging with Arabic numerals and not with letter, as in the case
before us, is within the spirit of the law and is just as valid as
paging with letters.
(c) It must be noted that the last paragraph of the will
here in question and the attestation clause, coming next to it,
are of the following tenor: "In witness whereof, I set my hand
unto this will here in the town of Camalig, Albay, Philippine
Islands, this 26th day of November, nineteen hundred and
eighteen, composed of four sheets, including the next:”
As may be seen, the number of sheets is stated in said
last paragraph of the will. It is true that in the case of
Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, it was held that the
attestation clause must state the number of sheets or
pages composing the will; but when, as in the case
before us, such fact, while it is not stated in the
attestation clause, appears at the end of the will proper,
so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number of
the sheets of the will, then there can be no doubt that it
complies with the intention of the law that the number
of sheets of which the will is composed be shown by the
document itself, to prevent the number of the sheets of
the will from being unduly increased or decreased.
(d) The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing
reciprocally the signing of the will is one which cannot be
proven by the mere exhibition the will unless it is stated in
the document. And this fact is expressly stated in the
attestation clause now before us. But the fact of the testator
and the witnesses having signed all the sheets of the will may
be proven by the mere examination of the document,
although it does not say anything about this, and if that is
the fact, as it is the instant case, the danger of fraud in this
respect, which is what the law tries to avoid, does not exist.
Therefore, as in the instant case the fact that the testator and
the witnesses signed each and every page of the will is
proven by the mere examination of the signatures in the
will, the omission to expressly state such evident fact does
not invalidate the will nor prevent its probate.
ABADA v. ABAJA
Facts: Spouses Alipio Abada and Paola Toray died
without legitimate children. Abada however, have
natural children, Eulogio Abaja and Rosario Cordova.
Alipio Abaja, the son of Eulogio filed with the CFI of
Negros Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a petition,
for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of
Abada. Nicanor Caponong opposed the petition on the
ground that Abada left no will when he died in 1940.
Alleged intestate heirs of Abada also opposed the
petition. Later, Alipio filed another petition before the
RTC-Kabankalan, for the probate of the last will and
testament of Toray. Caponong and the others also
opposed the same. Thereafter, Caponong filed a petition
before the RTC-Kabankalan, praying for the issuance in
his name of letters of administration of the intestate
estate of Abada and Toray. RTC-Kabankalan admitted
to probate the will of Toray and the same became final
and executory. Later, RTC-Kabankalan designated
Belinda Caponong-Noble Special Administratrix of the
estate of Abada and Toray. Caponong-Noble moved for
the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will of
Abada but the same was denied. During the
proceedings, it was discovered that the former presiding
judge already issued a decision admitting the will of
Abada to probate. The same was embodied in a
resolution by RTC-Kabankalan. Not satisfied with the
Resolution, Caponong-Noble filed a notice of appeal
contesting the formalities of the will:
(1) the will of Abada does not indicate that it is written
in a language or dialect known to the testator.
(2) that the will is not acknowledged before a notary
public.
(3) that the attestation clause fails to state the number
of pages on which the will is written.
(4) that the attestation clause does not expressly state
the circumstances that the witnesses
 witnessed and signed the will and all its pages in
the presence of the testator and of each other.
Issue: Whether or not the will of Abada has complied
with the formalities prescribed by law
Held:
As to the notarization:
Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in
force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 or the Old
Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a
notary is not necessary in the execution of any will.
Therefore, Abada's will does not require
acknowledgment before a notary public.
As to the language of the will:
There is no statutory requirement to state in the will
itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used
in the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by
proof aliunde. Alipio testified that Abada used to gather
Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these
gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the
Spanish language. This sufficiently proves that Abada
speaks the Spanish language.
As to the statement of number of pages:
The Spanish phrase inserted which means "in the left
margin of each and every one of the two pages
consisting of the same" shows that the will consists of
two pages. The pages are numbered correlatively with
the letters "ONE" and "TWO" as can be gleaned from the
phrase "las cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con
las letras "UNO" y "DOS."
As to the number of witnesses:
While the attestation clause does not state the number
of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that
three witnesses signed it.
The court explained the extent and limits of the
rule on liberal construction:
[T]he so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or
difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious
consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and
where to stop; they draw the dividing line with
precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a
void in any part of the document or supply
missing details that should appear in the will itself.
They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration
within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to
determine the existence or absence of the requisite
formalities of law. This clear,
sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to
banish any fear of dire results.
The phrase "en presencia de nosotros" or "in our
presence" coupled with the signatures appearing on
the will itself and after the attestation clause could only
mean that: (1) Abada subscribed to and professed
before the three witnesses that the document was his
last will, and
(2) Abada signed the will and the left margin of each
page of the will in the presence of these three
witnesses.
As to failure to state the circumstance that the
witnesses witnessed and signed the will:
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation
clause is desirable. However, it is not imperative that a
parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It
is sufficient if from the language employed it can
reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause
fulfills what the law expects of it.
CANEDA v. CABRERA
Facts: Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children
and already in the twilight years of his life, executed a
last will and testament at his residence in Talisay, Cebu
before three attesting witnesses, and was duly assisted
by his lawyer, and a notary public in the preparation of
that last will. The part of the will containing the
testamentary dispositions is expressed in the Cebuano-
Visayan dialect and is signed at the foot thereof by the
testator. The attestation clause in question, on the
other hand, is recited in the English language and is
likewise signed at the end thereof by the three
attesting witnesses thereto. Four months later,
Caballero himself applied for the probate of his will.
The testator passed away before his petition could
finally be heard by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera,
one of the legatees named in the will, sought his
appointment as special administrator of the testator's
estate, and was so appointed. Thereafter, herein
petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the
testator, instituted a second petition for intestate
proceedings and opposed thereat the probate of the
testator's will and the appointment of a special
administrator for his estate, claiming that on the
alleged date of its execution, the testator was already
in a poor state of health such that he could not have
possibly executed the same. William Cabrera was
appointed as special administrator when Benoni died.
The probate court found that the will was executed in
accordance with all the requisites of law and thus
admitted to probate. The petitioners elevated the case
to the CA, asserting that the will in question is null and
void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally
defective since it fails to specifically state that the
instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the
testator signing the will in their presence and that they
also signed the will and all the
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another. CA affirmed the decision of the probate court
upon finding of substantial compliance.
Issue: Whether or not the will is properly admitted to
probate
Held: No.
As to the language of the Attestation:
In the case of an ordinary or attested will, its attestation
clause need not be written in a language or dialect
known to the testator since it does not form part of the
testamentary disposition. Furthermore, the language
used in the attestation clause likewise need not even be
known to the attesting witnesses. The last paragraph of
Article 805 merely requires that, in such a case, the
attestation clause shall be interpreted to said witnesses.
An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary
will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the
instrument has been executed before them and to the
manner of the execution of the same. Under the third
paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete
lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will,
should state (1) the number of pages used upon which
the will is written; (2) that the testator signed, or
expressly caused another to sign, the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and
(3) that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by
the testator of the will and all its pages, and that said
witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one another.
The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state
the number of pages on which the will is written is to
safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of
one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or
decrease in the pages; whereas the subscription of the
signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses is
made for the purpose of authentication and
identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very
same instrument executed by the testator and attested
to by the witnesses.
Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the
witnesses thereby declare the due execution of the will
as embodied in the attestation clause. The attestation
clause therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for
the due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity
thereof. As it appertains only to the witnesses and not
to the testator, it need be signed only by them. Where it
is left unsigned, it would result in the invalidation of the
will as it would be possible and easy to add the clause
on a subsequent occasion in the absence of the testator
and the witnesses.
Attestation v. Subscription
"Attestation" and "subscription" differ in meaning.
Attestation is that act of the senses, while subscription
is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the latter
mechanical, and to attest a will is to know that it was
published as such, and to certify the facts required to
constitute an actual and legal publication; but to
subscribe a paper published as a will is only to write on
the same paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole
purpose of identification.
As to the absence of the statement that the
witnesses signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of
one another.
The absence of that statement required by law is a
fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily
result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought
to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in
pointing out that the aforestated defect in the
attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as
merely involving the form of the will or the language
used therein which would warrant the application of the
substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in Article
809 of the Civil Code.
The substantial compliance rule:
under Article 809, the defects or imperfections must
only be with respect to the form of the attestation or
the language employed therein. Such defects or
imperfections would not render a will invalid should it
be proved that the will was really executed and
attested in compliance with Article 805. In this regard,
however, the manner of proving the due execution and
attestation has been held to be limited to merely an
examination of the will itself without resorting to
evidence aliunde, whether oral or written. The foregoing
considerations do not apply where the attestation clause
totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed
each and every page of the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other.
Article 809 presupposes that the defects in the
attestation clause can be cured or supplied by the text
of the will or a consideration of matters apparent
therefrom which would provide the data not expressed
in the attestation clause or from which it may
necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts
not stated in the omitted textual requirements were
actually complied with in the execution of the will. In
other words, the defects must be remedied by intrinsic
evidence supplied by the will itself.
LABRADOR v. CA
Facts: Melecio Labrador died in the Municipality of Iba,
province of Zambales, where he was residing, leaving
behind a parcel of land (Lot 1916) and a holographic
will
written in Ilocano, to his heirs: Sagrado, Enrica,
Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria
and Jovita, all surnamed Labrador. Sagrado, Enrica and
Cristobal filed a petition for the probate of the
holographic will. Subsequently, Jesus and Gaudencio
filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that
on September 30, 1971, that is, before Melencio’s
death, the will has been extinguished or revoked by
implication of law, alleging that Melecio executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and
conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio
Lot No. 1916 and the latter were issued a title therefor.
Jesus even sold the land to Navat. Sagrado thereupon
filed, against his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the
annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale
over a parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly had
already acquired by devise from their father Melecio
Labrador under a holographic will executed on March
17, 1968. Jesus and Gaudencio claim that the date 17
March 1968 in the will was when the testator and his
beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves
about "the partitioning and assigning the respective
assignments of the said fishpond," and was not the date of
execution of the holographic will; hence, the will is more of
an "agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries
thereof to the prejudice of other compulsory heirs like the
respondents. This was thus a failure to comply with Article
783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a person is
permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control
to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect
after his death." The trial court allowed the probate of the
holographic will and declared null and void the Deed of
Absolute Sale, ordering Jesus and Gaudencio to reimburse to
the petitioners the redemption price of the property. CA
denied the allowance of the probate of the will for being
undated and reversing the order of reimbursement.
Issue: Whether or not the holographic will should be
probated
Held: Yes. The holographic will is really dated, although
the date is not in its usual place. The will has been
dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect
compliance with Article 810. It was written in the first
paragraph of the second page of the holographic will.
The law does not specify a particular location where the
date should be placed in the will. The only requirements
are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the
hand of the testator. These requirements are present in
the subject will.
RODELAS v. ARANZA
Facts: Marcela Rodellas filed a petition with the CFI of
Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo
B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in
her favor. The petition was opposed by Amparo Aranza
Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias
and Ephraim Bonilla, alleging among others that the
alleged holographic will itself, and not an alleged copy
thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce
no effect. Initially, he opposition was denied by the
court but upon motion for reconsideration, the petition
for the probate of the will was dismissed, the court
stated: In view of the lapse of more than 14 years from
the time of the execution of the will to the death of the
decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not
be located shows to our mind that the decedent had
discarded before his death his allegedly missing
Hollographic Will.
Issue: Whether or not a holographic will which was lost
or cannot be found can be proved by means of a
photostatic copy
Held: Yes. If the holographic will has been lost or
destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can
not be probated because the best and only evidence is
the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is
necessary that there be a comparison between sample
handwritten statements of the testator and the
handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy
of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of
the testator. In the case of Gan vs. Yap, the Court
ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the
bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or
read such will. The will itself must be presented;
otherwise, it shall produce no effect.
The law regards the document itself as material proof
of authenticity. But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it
says that ―Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic
or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon
copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be
exhibited and tested before the probate court.‖
Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or
destroyed holographic will may be admitted because
then the authenticity of the handwriting of the
deceased can be determined by the probate court.
CODOY v. CALUGAY
Facts: Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and
Eufemia Patigas, being the devisees and legatees of the
holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. De
Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Misamis Oriental, a petition for probate of the said
holographic will. On the other hand, Eugenia Ramonal
Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition thereto,
alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that
the same was even illegible which gives an impression
that a "third hand" of an interested party other than the
true hand of Matilde Seno Vda. De Ramonal executed
the holographic will. At the hearing, Calugay, Salcedo
and Patigas presented six ordinary witnesses who
attested that they are familiar with the deceased’s
handwriting, and various documentary evidence.
Eugenia and Manuel, instead of presenting their
evidence, filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial
court granted. Calugay et. al. appealed, and in support
thereof, they once again reiterated the testimony of
their ordinary witnesses who testified as to the similarity,
authenticity genuiness of the signature of the deceased
in the holographic will. The Court of Appeals allowed the
probate of the will, citing Azoala v. Singson: ―Where the
will is holographic, no witness need be present, and the
rule requiring production of three witnesses (under
Article 811) must be deemed merely permissive if absurd
results are to be avoided.-xxx- What the law deems
essential is that the court is convinced of the
authenticity of the will.‖
Issue: Whether or not Article 811 is merely permissive.
Held: No. Article 811 of the Civil Code provides, as a
requirement for the probate of a contested holographic
will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare
that the signature in the will is the genuine
signature of the testator. Based on the language
used, the provision is mandatory. The word "shall" in a
statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and
is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a
statute is mandatory.
In this case, not all the witnesses presented by the
Calugay testified explicitly that they were familiar with the
handwriting of the testator. In the case of Augusto Neri,
clerk of court, Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental,
he merely identified the record of Special Proceedings
for the probate of the holographic will before said court.
He was not presented to declare explicitly that the
signature appearing in the holographic was that of the
deceased.
In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, the SC said
that "the object of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments
and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore,
the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a
way as to attain these primordial ends. But on the other
hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is
not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the
exercise of the right to make a will." However, the Court
cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document
being adjudged as the will
of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is
contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare
that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
Further casting doubt is the fact that the will was found
not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with
one of the respondents, who kept it even before the
death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms.
Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her
possession as early as 1985, or five years before the
death of the deceased. There was no opportunity for an
expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of
the deceased with other documents signed and
executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at
comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms.
Binanay when the lawyer of Codoy asked Ms. Binanay
to compare the documents which contained the
signature of the deceased with that of the holographic
will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the
former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to
the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic convinced the
Court that the strokes are different when compared
with other documents written by the testator. The
signature of the testator in some of the disposition is
not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and
erasures on the will. Comparing the signatures in the
holographic will dated August 30, 1978, and the
signatures in several documents such as the application
letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, and
a letter dated June 16, 1978, the strokes are different.
In the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes,
evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike
that of the holographic will. The Court, therefore,
cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the
handwriting by the deceased.
AJERO v. CA
Facts: Spouses Roberto and Thelma Ajero filed a
petition for allowance of Annie Sand’s holographic will
in which they are named devisees together with
Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia
Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose
Ajero, Sr., and their children. Clemente Sand opposed
the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testament's body nor the signature therein was in
decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and
corrections which were not duly signed by decedent;
and, the will was procured by petitioners through
improper pressure and undue influence. The petition
was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested
the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in
Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said
property could not be conveyed by decedent in its
entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court
admitted
the will to probate. CA reversed the decision and
dismissed the petition for probate stating that, "the
holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its
validity‖ particularly Articles 813 and 814 of the New
Civil Code. The Court alluded to certain dispositions in
the will which were either unsigned and undated, or
signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures,
alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been
authenticated by decedent.
Issue: Whether or not the will should be rendered invalid
Held: No. In a petition to admit a holographic will to
probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether
the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last
will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3)
whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary
capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4)
whether the execution of the will and its signing were
the voluntary acts of the decedents.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these
formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation,
and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805
and 806 of the New Civil Code.
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand,
what assures authenticity is the requirement that they
be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator
himself, Failure to strictly observe other formalities will
not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that
is unquestionably handwritten by the testator. A reading
of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its
requirement affects the validity of the dispositions
contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If
the testator fails to sign and date some of the
dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot
be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render
the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to
probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 814. Unless the unauthenticated
alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the
date of the holographic will or on testator's signature,
their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The
lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of
such changes. It is also proper to note that the
requirements of authentication of changes and signing
and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles
813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the
necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic
will (Article 810).
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are
limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the
will
sought to be probated. However, in exceptional
instances, courts are not powerless to do what the
situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain
provisions of the will. In the case at bench, decedent
herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that
the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late
father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose
Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its
entirety.). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court,
she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which
she shares with her father's other heirs.
The will was admitted to probate with qualification as
regards the Cabadbaran property.
AZOALA v. SINGSON
Facts: Federico Azaola filed a petition for the probate of
Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance’s holographic will whereby
Maria Milagros Azaola was made the sole heir as
against the nephew of the deceased Cesario Singson.
Francisco Azaola was presented as witness who
testified that the penmanship appearing in the
aforesaid documentary evidence is in the handwriting
of the testatrix as well as the signatures appearing
therein are the signatures of the testatrix. Cesario
Singson opposed. The probate was denied on the
ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the
proponent must present three witnesses who could
declare that the will and the signature are in the writing
of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and
because the lone witness presented by the proponent
"did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was
written in the handwriting of the testatrix." Azaola
appealed, urging: First, that he was not bound to
produce more than one witness because the will's
authenticity was not questioned; and second, that
Article 811 does not mandatorily require the production
of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and
signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity
should be denied by the adverse party.
Issue: Whether or not the proponent in this case is
required to present more than one witness
Held: No. Since the authenticity of the holographic will
was not contested, proponent was not required to
produce more than one witness; but even if the
genuineness of the holographic will were contested,
Article 811 of our present Civil Code cannot be
interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation
of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the
testator, under penalty of having the probate denied.
Since no witness may have been present at the
execution of a holographic will, none being required by
law, it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses
possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter
beyond the control of the proponent.
 Where the will is holographic, no witness need be
present and the rule requiring production of three
witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd
results are to be avoided.
Under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is
conditioned by the words "if the Court deem it
necessary", which reveals that what the law deems
essential is that the Court should be convinced of the
will's authenticity.
NAZARENO V. CA
Facts: Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete
were husband and wife who had five children,
namely: Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and
Maximino, Jr. Petitioners are Natividad and
Maximino, Jr., while the estate of Maximino, Sr.,
Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the
respondents.
Upon the death of their father, Romeo was
appointed administrator of his father’s estate. In the
course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo
discovered that his parents had executed several
deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties
in favor of his sister, Natividad. One of the deeds
involved six lots in Quezon City which were allegedly
sold by Maximino, Sr., with the consent of Aurea, to
Natividad on January 29, 1970 for the total amount
of P47,800.00. By virtue of this deed, transfer
certificates of title were issued to Natividad. Among
the lots covered by the above Deed of Sale is Lot 3-
B, which had been occupied by Romeo, his wife
Eliza, and by Maximino, Jr. since 1969. Unknown to
Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B on July 31, 1982 to
Maximino, Jr.
When Romeo found out about the sale to
Maximino, Jr., he and his wife Eliza locked
Maximino, Jr. out of the house. Hence, Maximino, Jr.
brought an action for recovery of possession and
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On
December 12, 1986, the trial court ruled in favor of
Maximino, Jr. Which the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Romeo in turn filed, on behalf of the estate of
Maximino, Sr., the present case for annulment of
sale with damages against Natividad and Maximino,
Jr. on the ground that both sales were void for lack
of consideration. Meanwhile, Natividad and
Maximino, Jr. filed a third-party complaint against the
spouses Romeo and Eliza, alleging that Lot 3, which
was included in the Deed of Absolute Sale of
January 29, 1970 to Natividad, had been
surreptitiously appropriated by Romeo by securing
for himself a new title in his name. They therefore
sought the annulment of the transfer to Romeo and
the cancellation of his title, the eviction of Romeo
and his wife Eliza and all persons claiming rights
from Lot 3, and the payment of damages.
The issues having been joined, the case was
set for trial. Romeo presented evidence to show that
Maximino and Aurea Nazareno never intended to
sell the six lots to Natividad and that Natividad was
only to hold the said lots in trust for her siblings. He
presented the Deed of Partition and Distribution
dated June 28, 1962 executed by Maximino Sr. and
Aurea and duly signed by all of their children, except
Jose, who was then abroad and was represented by
their mother, Aurea. By virtue of this deed, the nine
lots subject of this Deed of Partition were assigned
by raffle.
Romeo further testified that, although the
deeds of sale executed by his parents in their favor
stated that the sale was for a consideration, they
never really paid any amount for the supposed sale.
The transfer was made in this manner in order to
avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Romeo
denied stealing Lot 3 from his sister but instead
claimed that the title to said lot was given to him by
Natividad in 1981 after their father died.
On the other hand, Natividad and Maximino,
Jr. claimed that the Deed of Partition and Distribution
executed in 1962 was not really carried out. Instead,
their parents offered to sell to them the six lots in
Quezon City. However, it was only Natividad who
bought the six properties because she was the only
one financially able to do so.
The trial court declared the nullity of the Deed
of Sale dated January 29, 1970. Except as to Lots 3,
3-B, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third
persons, the defendant Natividad shall hold the rest
in trust for Jose Nazareno to whom the same had
been adjudicated.
Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Sale in favor of
Natividad dated January 29, 1970 was void for lack
of consideration.
Held:
―Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with
other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of
the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous
title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.‖
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.
RIVERA v. IAC
Facts: a prominent and wealthy resident of that town
named Venancio Rivera died. Jose Rivera, claiming to be
the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration over
Venancio's estate. This petition was opposed by
Adelaido
J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of the
decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father
and did not die intestate but in fact left two holographic
wills. Adelaido J. Rivera filed, also with the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City, a petition for the probate of the
holographic wills. Jose Rivera opposed. The two cases
were consolidated and after joint trial, Judge Eliodoro B.
Guinto found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the
decedent but of a different Venancio Rivera who was
married to Maria Vital. The Venancio Rivera whose
estate was in question was married to Maria Jocson, by
whom he had seven children, including Adelaido. Jose
Rivera had no claim to this estate because the decedent
was not his father. The holographic wills were also
admitted to probate. IAC affirmed the decision of the
trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the presentation of 3 witnesses is
necessary to admit the will to probate.
Held: No. The Court found that Jose Rivera is not the
son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in
question. If it is true that he was the legitimate son of
Venancio Rivera, how come Jose did not assert his right
as such when his father was still alive. By his own
account, Jose supported himself — and presumably also
his mother Maria Vital — as a gasoline attendant and
driver for many years. All the time, his father was
residing in the same town — and obviously prospering
— and available for support. Further, Maria Vital was not
even presented at the trial to support her son's
allegations. Even if it was true that she was already old
and bedridden, there was no impediment to the taking
of her deposition in her own house.
Hence, being a mere stranger, Jose had no personality
to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not
have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses.
The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who
authenticated the wills as having been written and
signed by their father, was sufficient.
SPOUSES CAPITLE v. ELBAMBUENA
Facts: A Certificate of Land Ownership Award was
issued to Cristobal Olar covering a lot of 1.8144
hectares on account of which he was issued Transfer
Certificate of Title. Fortunata Elbambuena and
Rosalinda Olar, spouse and daughter-in-law,
respectively, of Olar, now deceased, claim that Olar
relinquished one-half or 0.9072 hectare of the lot to
Rosalinda by a "Kasunduan" dated July 17, 1992 and
that the remaining portion of the lot was surrendered to
Fortunata by an undated document. Spouses Iluminada
and Cirilo Capitle on the other hand, claiming that they
have been in possession of the lot since 1960,
presented a "Waiver of Rights" executed by Olar
wherein he renounced in their favor his rights and
participation over the lot; a "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
wherein Olar acknowledged that he co-possessed the lot
with petitioner Capitle since 1960; and a Pinagsamang
Patunay from the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
Chairman and barangay chairman of Valle certifying
that they are the actual tillers and possessors of the lot.
Spouses Capitle further claim that since 1959,
Fortunata was already separated from Olar and she
even remarried, thus giving her no right to inherit from
Olar. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator ruled
in favor of Spouses Capitle. DARAB set aside the
PARAD’s decision, awarding the land to the heirs of
Olar. Appellate Court Affirmed in toto.
Issue: Whether or not the heirs of Olar have better
rights over the land
Held: Yes. Capitle’s argument that "[i]t would be
absurd for [Olar] to bequeath his property to his
estranged wife not to a relative who had indeed helped
him in tilling the property and [took] good care of his
needs," is a virtual admission that their possession was
not in the concept of owners, they having merely
"helped" in tilling the lot, thereby acknowledging that
Olar was the actual possessor and tiller.
Even assuming arguendo that the Capitles were indeed
the actual tillers of the lot, their petition for the
cancellation of the CLOA issued in favor of Olar would
not bind respondents as they were not impleaded.

Although estranged from Olar, Fortunata remained his

wife and legal heir, mere estrangement not being a
legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving
spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. Rosalinda,
on the other hand, is the surviving spouse of Olar's son.
The two are thus real parties-in-interest who stand to
be injured or benefitted by the judgment on the
cancellation of the CLOA issued in Olar's name.

SAMANIEGO-CELADA v. ABENA

Facts: Margarita Mayores died single and without any

ascending nor descending heirs as her parents,
grandparents and siblings predeceased her. She was
survived by her first cousins Catalina Samaniego-
Bombay, Manuelita Samaniego Sajonia, Feliza
Samaniego, and Paz Samaniego-Celada. Before her
death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament
wherein she left all her personal properties to Lucia
Abena whom she likewise designated as sole executor
of her will. Samaniego-Celada filed a petition for letters
of administration of the estate of Margarita before the
RTC of Makati. Meanwhile, Abena filed a petition for
probate of the will of Margarita before the RTC of
Makati. RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will
and testament of Margarita probated and Abena as the
executor of the will. CA Affrimed in toto. Samaniego-
Cedana sought to have the will declared invalid for
failure to comply with the formalities required by law.
Issue: Whether or not the will should be probated
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and
did not find it necessary to disturb the findings of fact of
the RTC as upheld by CA in this case:
With to the contention of the oppositors that the
testator [Margarita Mayores] was not mentally capable
of making a will at the time of the execution thereof, the
same is without merit. The oppositors failed to establish,
by preponderance of evidence, said allegation and
contradict the presumption that the testator was of
sound mind. In fact, witness for the oppositors, Dr.
Ramon Lamberte, who, in some occasions, attended to
the testator months before her death, testified that
Margarita Mayores could engage in a normal
conversation and he even stated that the illness of the
testator does not warrant hospitalization.
. . . Not one of the oppositor's witnesses has mentioned
any instance that they observed act/s of the testator
during her lifetime that could be construed as a
manifestation of mental incapacity. The testator may be
admitted to be physically weak but it does not
necessarily follow that she was not of sound mind. [The]
testimonies of contestant witnesses are pure
aforethought.
Anent the contestants' submission that the will is fatally
defective for the reason that its attestation clause states
that the will is composed of three (3) pages while in
truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only
because the attestation is not a part of the notarial will,
the same is not accurate. While it is true that the
attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court,
after examining the totality of the will, is of the
considered opinion that error in the number of pages of
the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material
to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the
subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages
A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the
possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The
error must have been brought
about by the honest belief that the will is the whole
instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of
the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The
position of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine
of liberal interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the
Civil Code.
The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors
that the signatures of the testator were affixed on
different occasions based on their observation that the
signature on the first page is allegedly different in size,
texture and appearance as compared with the
signatures in the succeeding pages. After examination
of the signatures, the court does not share the same
observation as the oppositors. The picture shows that
the tertator was affixing her signature in the presence
of the instrumental witnesses and the notary.
Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue
influence was exerted on the testator to execute the
subject will. In fact, the picture reveals that the
testator was in a good mood and smiling with the other
witnesses while executing the subject will
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON VS. RICAFORTE
Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title
and Reconveyance with Damages against
respondent Gaudioso Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E.
Ypon." They alleged that Magdaleno Ypon
(Magdaleno) died intestate and childless leaving
behind a parcel of land. Claiming to be the sole heir
of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the
aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their
subsequent transfer in his name to the prejudice of
petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives
and successors-in-interest. On the other hand,
Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of
Magdaleno.
RTC issued an Order finding that the subject
complaint failed to state a cause of action against
Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein
had established their relationship with Magdaleno in
a previous special proceeding for the issuance of
letter of administration, this did not mean that they
could already be considered as the decedent’s
compulsory heirs. It also ruled that petitioners should
have established their heirship in a special
proceeding for such purpose and not in an action for
annulment of title and reconveyance of property.
Issue:
Whether or not the case be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action?
Held:
Yes, the case should be dismissed since the
petitioners failed to establish their relationship with
Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for
purposes of heirship.
The general rule is that the determination of who are
the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the
proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not
in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or
possession. It is decisively clear that the declaration
of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right. An exception to
the general rule is for practicality, as when the
parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the
issue to the trial court and already presented their
evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the
RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,
or when a special proceeding had been instituted but
had been finally closed and terminated, and hence,
cannot be re-opened.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or
those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, the
case should be dismissed.
REBUSQUILLO V. GUALVEZ
Facts:
Petitioners Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo (Avelina)
and Salvador Orosco (Salvador) filed a Complaint
for annulment and revocation of an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Petitioners alleged that Avelina was one of the
children of Eulalio Abarientos (Eulalio) and Victoria
Villareal (Victoria).
Eulalio died intestate, survived by his wife Victoria,
six legitimate children, and one illegitimate child,
namely: (1) Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo,
petitioner in this case; (2) Fortunata Abarientos-
Orosco, the mother of petitioner Salvador; (3)
Rosalino Abarientos; (4) Juan Abarientos; (5)
Feliciano Abarientos; (6) Abraham Abarientos; and
(7) Carlos Abarientos. His wife Victoria eventually
died intestate. On his death, Eulalio left behind an
untitled parcel of land in Legazpi City.
In 2001, Avelina was made to sign two documents
by her daughter Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez
(Emelinda) and her son-in-law Domingo Gualvez
(Domingo), respondents in this case, on the pretext
that the documents were needed to facilitate the
titling of the lot. It was only in 2003 that Avelina
realized that what she signed was an Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of respondents.
As respondents purportedly ignored her, Avelina
went before the RTC to declare null and void the
documents. Respondents admitted that the
execution of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the
Deed of Sale was intended to facilitate the titling of
the subject property. However, it was agreed by all
of the heirs that the property’s tax declaration should
be transferred to respondents Spouses Emelinda
and Domingo who will spend all the cost of titling.
This is subject to reimbursement by all other heirs in
case the property is sold.
The RTC rendered a decision, annulling the Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Avelina on the grounds that (1) with
regard to the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, she was
not the sole heir of her parents and was not
therefore solely entitled to their estate; and (2) in the
case of the Deed of Absolute Sale, Avelina did not
really intend to sell her share in the property as it
was only executed to facilitate the titling of such
property.
On appeal, respondents argued that the Deed of
Sale cannot be annulled being a public document
that has for its object the creation and transmission
of real rights over the immovable subject property.
The fact that Avelina’s testimony was not offered in
evidence, the signature on the adverted deed
remains as concrete proof of her agreement to its
terms. Lastly, the complaint filed before the RTC is
not the proper remedy provided by law for those
compulsory heis unlawfully deprived of their
inheritance. Pending the resolution of the court,
Avelina died intestate, leaving behind several living
heirs including respondent Emelinda.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. It held
that the RTC erred in annulling the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication simply on petitioners’ allegation of the
existence of the heirs of Eulalio, considering that
issues on heirship must be made in administration or
intestate proceedings, not in an ordinary civil action.
Further, the appellate court observed that the Deed
of Absolute Sale cannot be nullified as it is a
notarized document that has in its favor the
presumption of regularity. Aggrieved, Avelina’s heirs,
except respondents Emelinda and Domingo, come
before this court ascribing the error on the CA’s
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the issues on heirship must
be made in administrative or intestate
proceedings?
Whether or not the Deed of Absolute sale
cannot be nullified as it is a notarized
document?
Held:
Yes. This Court has ruled that the declaration
of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, and not in an independent civil
action. However, recourse to administration
proceedings to determine who the heirs are
is sanctioned only if there is a good and
compelling reason for such recourse. Hence,
the Court had allowed exceptions to the rule
requiring administration proceedings as when
the parties in the civil case already presented
their evidence regarding the issue of
heirship, and the RTC had consequently
rendered judgment upon the issues it defined
during the pre-trial.
In this case, there appears to be only one parcel of
land being claimed by the contending parties as the
inheritance from Eulalio. It would be more practical
to dispense with a separate special proceeding for
the determination of the status of petitioner Avelina
as sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact
that respondents spouses Gualvez admitted in court
that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was
not the sole heir of Eulalio and that petitioner
Salvador was one of the other living heirs with rights
over the subject land.
No. the fact that the questioned Deed of
Absolute Sale was reduced to writing and
notarized does not accord it the quality of
incontrovertibility otherwise provided by the
parole evidence rule. The form of a contract
does not make an otherwise simulated and
invalid act valid.
Moreover, Avelina was not in the right position to sell
and transfer the absolute ownership of the subject
property to respondents. As she was not the sole
heir of Eulalio and her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
is void, the subject property is still subject to
partition. Avelina did not have the absolute
ownership of the subject property but only an aliquot
portion. What she could have transferred to
respondents was only the ownership of such aliquot
portion. It is apparent from the admissions of
respondents and the records of this case that
Avelina had no intention to transfer the ownership, of
whatever extent, over the property to respondents.
Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing more
than a simulated contract that should be voided and
nullified.
HEIRS OF VALENTIN BASBAS V. BASBAS
Facts:
Both parties, petitioners, Heirs of Valentin Basbas
(Valentin), and respondent Ricardo Basbas trace
their claim of ownership over herein Lot 39(subject
property) to Severo Basbas.
Petitioners filed an Action for Annulment of Title,
Reconveyance with Damages against Crispiniano
and respondent Ricardo in the MTC of Sta Rosa,
Laguna seeking to: (1) annul Transfer Certificate
issued in the names of Crispiniano and Ricardo
covering the contested lot, and (2) recover
possession of the subject property.
Countering petitioners’ allegations, Crispiniano and
Ricardo denied petitioners’ ownership over Lot No.
39 and contended that upon Severo’s death, his
estate, was divided equally. Herein subject property,
Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate, and
Lot No. 40, adjacent thereto, among them. Lot No.
40 was inherited by Valentin (grandfather of
petitioners), while Lot No. 39 went to Nicolas
(paternal grandfather of respondents). Respondents
also contend that Nicolas was the son of Severo
Basbas.
MTC ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the
cancellation of the TCT in the name of respondents
and to surrender its possession.
RTC affirmed the MTC ruling in toto.
However, the CA reversed the RTC ruling and state
that the lower court erred in affirming the decision of
the MTC, as the MTC had ruled on filiation and
heirship, matters which fall within the jurisdiction of a
probate court, which the MTC or RTC of Sta. Rosa,
Laguna were not designated to be and also opined
that it is proper that these particular matters be
threshed out in a special proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in in ruling that the
MTC and the RTC, acting in their general
jurisdiction, did not have authority to rule on issues
of filiation and heirship of the parties to the decedent
Severo, as such matters should be sorted and
established in a special proceeding and falling within
the jurisdiction of a probate court.
Held:
No. Not only is the petitioners’ heirship to Severo
uncontroverted. The status of Valentin as a
compulsory heir of Severo and of petitioners’
statuses as heirs of Valentin and Severo are
stipulated facts agreed to by Crispiniano and
respondent Ricardo.
Valentin’s long-possessed status as a legitimate
child and thus, heir of Severo, need no longer be the
subject of a special proceeding for declaration of
heirship as envisioned by the Court of Appeals.
There is no need to re-declare his status as an heir
of Severo. Valentin’s rights to the succession vested
from the moment of death of the decedent Severo.
In turn, petitioners’, as Heirs of Valentin, who is an
uncontested heir of decedent Severo, rights to the
succession vested from the moment of Valentin’s
death. As such, they own Lot No. 39, undisputedly
titled in Severo’s name and forming part of Severo’s
estate, and are entitled to the titling thereof in their
names.
MITRA v. GUEVARRA
Facts: Margie Santos Mitra filed a petition for the
probate of the notarial will of Remedios Legaspi y
Reyes with prayer for issuance of letters testamentary
before the RTC. It was alleged that Mitra is the de facto
adopted daughter of Legaspi; that Legaspi, single, died
on December 22, 2004 in Caloocan City; that Legaspi
left a notarial will, instituting the Mitra, Orlando Castro,
Perpetua Sablan Guevarra, and Remigio Legaspi
Sablan, as her heirs, legatees and devisees; that
Legaspi left real and personal properties with the
approximate total value of One Million Thirty-Two
Thousand and Two Hundred Thirty Seven Pesos; and
that Legaspi named Mary Ann Castro as the executor of
the will. Perpetua L. Sablan- Guevarra and Remegio L.
Sablan, who claim to be Legaspi's legal heirs, opposed
the petition. They aver that the will was not executed in
accordance with the formalities required by law; that
since the last page of the will, which contained the
Acknowledgement, was not signed by Legaspi and her
instrumental witnesses, the will should be declared
invalid; that the attestation clause failed to state the
number of pages upon which the will was written; and
that the will was executed under undue and improper
pressure, thus, Legaspi could not have intended the
document to be her last will and testament. RTC
admitted Legaspi’s will to probate stating that the last
page of the will is but a mere continuation of the
Acknowledgement portion, which the testator and the
witnesses are not required to sign. Also, it held that
inasmuch as the number of pages upon which the will
was written was stated in the Acknowledgement, the
will must
be admitted to probate. CA in reversing the judgment of
the RTC to the view of strictly complying with the
requirement of stating the number of pages of the will
in the attestation clause.
Issue: Whether or not the will complies with the
formalities of the law
Held: As to the absence of signature in the last
page:
Yes. When Article 805 of the Civil Code requires the
testator to subscribe at the end of the will, it necessarily
refers to the logical end thereof, which is where the last
testamentary disposition ends. As the probate court
correctly appreciated, the last page of the will does not
contain any testamentary disposition; it is but a mere
continuation of the Acknowledgment.
As to the alleged failure to state the number of
pages:
What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite
the existence of omissions is that such omissions must
be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without
the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence. "However,
those omissions which cannot be supplied except by
evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the
attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself."
An examination of the will in question reveals that the
attestation clause indeed failed to state the number of
pages comprising the will. However, as was the
situation in Taboada, this omission was supplied in the
Acknowledgment. It was specified therein that the will is
composed of four pages, the Acknowledgment included.
In sum, Legaspi's last will and testament has
substantially complied with all the formalities required of
a notarial will. It has been proven that Legaspi and the
instrumental witnesses signed on every page of the will,
except on the last, which refers to the Acknowledgment
page. With regard to the omission of the number of
pages in the attestation clause, this was supplied by the
Acknowledgment portion of the will itself without the
need to resort to extrinsic evidence.
LOPEZ v. LOPEZ
In Re: Petition for the Probate of the will and
testament of Enrique S. Lopez, Richard B. Lopez
VS. Lopez
Facts: Enrique S. Lopez died leaving his wife, Wendy B.
Lopez, and their four legitimate children, namely,
Richard
B. Lopez, Diana Jeanne Lopez, Marybeth de Leon and
Victoria L. Tuazon as compulsory heirs. Before Enrique's
death, he executed a Last Will and Testament and
constituted Richard as his executor and administrator.
Richard Fled a petition for the probate of his father's
Last Will and Testament before the RTC of Manila with
prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary in his
favor. Marybeth opposed the petition contending that
the purported last will and testament was not executed
and
attested as required by law, and that it was procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of Richard. The said opposition was also adopted
by Victoria. RTC disallowed the probate of the will for
failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which
requires a statement in the attestation clause of the
number of pages used upon which the will is written.
While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will
consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC
observed that it has pages including the
acknowledgment portion. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not there is substantial compliance
with the formalities so as to allow probate of the will
Held: No. The law is clear that the attestation must
state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against
possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its
pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the
pages.
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for
defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard
likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the
Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and
testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the
page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are
written" cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The
will actually consists of 8 pages including its
acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be
explained by mere examination of the will itself but
through the presentation of evidence aliunde.
On this score is the comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes
regarding the application of Article 809, to wit:
. . . The rule must be limited to disregarding those
defects that can be supplied by an examination of the
will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively
numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and
every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are
three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that
the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions
concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely
disregarded. But the total number of pages, and
whether all persons required to sign did so in the
presence of each other must substantially appear in the
attestation clause, being the only check against perjury
in the probate proceedings.

TABOADA v. ROSAL

Facts: Apolonio Taboada filed a petition for probate of

the will of the late Dorotea Perez written in Cebuano-
Visayan dialect and consisting of 2 pages. Taboada
presented as evidence the alleged will and the
testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses thereto,
Vicente Timkang. The first page contains the entire
testamentary dispositions and is
signed at the end or bottom of the page by the
testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the
three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page
which contains the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment is signed at the end of the
attestation clause by the three attesting witnesses
and at the left hand margin by the testatrix. There
was no opposition. However, the trial court
disallowed the will for want of formality in its
execution because the will was signed at the bottom
of the page solely by the testatrix and at the left hand
margin by three instrumental witnesses. Judge
Avelino Rosal interpreted Article 805 of the Civil Code
to require that, for a notarial will to be valid, it is not
enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end" of
the will but all the three subscribing witnesses must
also sign at the same place or at the end, in the
presence of the testatrix and of one another,
because the attesting witnesses to the will attest not
merely the will itself but also the signature of the
testator.
Issue: Whether or not there was compliance with the
formalities of a will
Held: Yes. Under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the
will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by
another person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested
and subscribed. Attestation consists in witnessing the
testator's execution of the will in order to see and
take note mentally that those things are done which
the statute requires for the execution of a will and
that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On
the other hand, subscription is the signing of the
witnesses' names upon the same paper for the
purpose of identification of such paper as the will
which was executed by the testator.
Insofar as the requirement of subscription is
concerned, it is our considered view that the will in
this case was subscribed in a manner which fully
satisfies the purpose of identification. The signatures
of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of
the first page of the will attested not only to the
genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also
the due execution of the will as embodied in the
attestation clause. While perfection in the drafting of a
will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from
the usual forms should be ignored, especially where
the authenticity of the will is not assailed.
The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying
and fundamental objective permeating the provisions
on the law on wills in this project consists in the
liberalization of the manner of their execution with
the end in view of
giving the testator more freedom in expressing his
last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and
restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and
the exercise of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the testator. This objective is in
accord with the modern tendency in respect to the
formalities in the execution of a will"
As to the failure of the attestation clause to
state the number of pages used in writing
the will:
This would have been a fatal defect were it not for
the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the
entire will that it is really and actually composed of
only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first
page which contains the entirety of the
testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix
at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental
witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page
which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the
attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The
acknowledgment itself states that "This Last Will and
Testament consists of two pages including this
page."
JABONETA VS. GUSTILO
Facts:
On the 26th day of December 1901, Macario
Jaboneta executed under the following
circumstances the document in question, which
has been presented for probate as his will:
"Being in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in Jaro,
in this province, he ordered that the document in
question be written, and calling Julio Javellana,
Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses,
executed the said document as his will. They
were all together, and were in the room where
Jaboneta was, and were present when he signed
the document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as
a witness, at his request, and in his presence and
in the presence of the other two witnesses.
Aniceto Jalbuena then signed as a witness in the
presence of the testator, and in the presence of
the other two persons who signed as witnesses.
At that moment Isabelo Jena, being in a hurry to
leave, took his hat and left the room. As he was
leaving the house Julio Javellana took the pen in
his hand and put himself in position to sign the
will as a witness, but did not sign in the presence
of Isabelo Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had
left the room the said Julio Javellana signed as a
witness in the presence of the testator and of the
witness Aniceto Jalbuena.‖
Jaboneta asked Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena
and Isabelo Jena to serve as witnesses. According,
the order of signing was in this manner: Jena –
Jalbuena – Javellana. However, during Jena’s
testimony, he mentioned that he is not categorically
sure if Javellana signed because as the latter was
signing, he was about to go out of the room. He
merely said that Javellana had ―taken the pen in his
hand, as it appeared, for the purpose of signing, and
when I was near the door I happened to turn my
face and I saw that he had his hand with the pen
resting on the will, moving it as if for the purpose of
signing‖
Issue:
Whether the presence requirement in witnessing a
will was met given that one witness did not fully
witness the actual signing of another witness.
Held:
YES, the purpose of a statutory requirement that
the witness sign in the presence of the testator is
said to be that the testator may have ocular
evidence of the identity of the instrument
subscribed by the witness and himself. The
generally accepted tests of presence are vision
and mental apprehension. It is sufficient if the
witnesses are together for the purpose of
witnessing the execution of the will, and in a
position to actually see the testator write, if they
choose to do so.
then sign his name to the will, convinces us that
the signature was affixed in the presence of Jena.
The fact that he was in the act of leaving and that
his back was turned while a portion of the name
of the witness was being written, is of no
importance. He, with the other witnesses and the
testator, had assembled for the purpose of
executing the testament, and were together in the
same room for that purpose, and at the moment
when the witness Javellana signed the document
he was actually and physically present and in
such position with relation to Javellana that he
could see everything which took place by merely
casting his eyes in the proper direction, and
without any physical obstruction to prevent his
doing so, therefore the document was in fact
signed before he finally left the room.
The true test of presence of the testator and the
witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether
they actually saw each other sign, but whether
they might have seen each other sign, had they
chosen to do so, considering their mental and
physical condition and position with relation to
each other at the moment of inscription of each
signature.
The instrument propounded in these proceedings
was satisfactorily proven to be the last will and
testament of Macario Jaboneta, deceased, and that
it should therefore be admitted to probate. The
judgment of the trial court is reversed.

The fact that Jena was still in the room when he

saw Javellana moving his hand and pen in the act
of affixing his signature to the will, taken together
with the testimony of the remaining witnesses,
which shows that Javellana did in fact there and