Article III - Bill of Rights

BILL OF RIGHTS
1. PBM Employees Association vs. Philippine Blooming Mills
[G.R. No. L-31195. June 5, 1973]
Makasiar, J:

Facts:
PMBEO is a legitimate union which composed of the employees of PBM. The petitioners, who are union
officers were dismissed for allegedly violating the No Strike-No Lock Out provision of their collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) after staging a mass demonstration at Malacanang. PBMEO was set to stage
a mass demonstration, where employees on 1st, regular and 3rd shifts will participate. PMBEO informed
the company who days before the mass demo and asked to excused all workers participating. PBM
informed PBMEO that it is their constitutional right to stage a mass demo but it must not be at the
expense of normal operation of the company. Thus, the employees, without proper filing of LOA who fail
to report for the 1st and regular shift shall be dismissed. However, the officers argued that there was no
violation because the demo was against the Pasig Police and not the company; and that the rally was an
exercise of their freedom of speech.

In an order, CIR found herein petitioners guilty of bargaining in bad faith and for being directly
responsible for the mass demo, thus, dismissed from the company. PBMEO filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the CIR dismissed from the company two days late from the 10-day deadline
allowed by the court.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents CIR and PBM violated PBMEO’s freedom of expression and assembly on the
grounds that PBM illegally dismissed its employees for participating in the mass demo.

Held:
Yes. The rally was not against the company therefore there is no violation of the No Strike-No Lock Out
prisoner of their CBA. To charge PBMEO of bargaining in bad faith extends the jurisdiction of the CBA
and inhibits freedom of speech. The management has shown a complete lack of sympathetic
understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the
local police. It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income than to assist its employees in their
fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers.

Moreover, CIR could have easily accepted the motion for reconsideration. Procedural rules do not
supersede in a bid to achieve justice, especially in case of free speech. In the instant case, the procedural
rule of the CIR, a creature of Congress, must likely yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein
petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their
defense to the said charge.

2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANDRE MARTI

(G.R. No. 81561. 18 JANUARY 1991)
BIDIN, J.:

Facts:
Appellant with his common-law wife went to the booth of Manila Packing Export Forwarders to
send four gift wrapped packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes, the proprietress
asked the appellant if she could examine the packages. The appellant refused, assuring that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves. Anita Reyes no longer insisted on
inspecting the packages.
Before delivery of the appellant’s box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job
Reyes, the husband of Anita Reyes, following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes
for final inspection. When he opened appellant’s box, a foul odor emitted therefrom, arousing his
curiosity, he squeezed one of the boxes allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside
and took several grams of the contents thereof.
Mr. Job Reyes reported the shipment for laboratory examination and in the presence of the NBI
agents, opened the box and discovered dried marijuana leaves.
Issue/s: Whether the evidence was illegally searched and seized.
Held:
No. The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without
the intervention and participation of State authorities. In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.

3. ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC. v MARIA THERESA V. SANCHEZ

G.R. No. 212054. March 11, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts: On June 29, 2009, Sanchez was hired by petitioner St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) as a
Staff Nurse, and was eventually assigned at SLMC, Quezon City's Pediatric Unit until her termination on
July 6, 2011 for her purported violation of SLMC's Code of Discipline particularly Section 1, Rule 1 on
Acts of Dishonesty, i.e., Robbery, Theft, Pilferage, and Misappropriation of Funds.
She was directed to write an Incident Report explaining why she had the questioned items in her
possession. She complied with the directive and also submitted an undated handwritten letter of apology.
Highlighting that Sanchez expressly admitted that she intentionally brought out the questioned items.
SLMC, on July 4, 2011, informed Sanchez of its decision to terminate her employment effective closing
hours of July 6, 2011. This prompted her to file a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC.
In a Decision dated May 27, 2012, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that Sanchez was validly dismissed;
NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling and concluded that the punishment of dismissal was too harsh
and the one (1) month preventive suspension already imposed on and served by Sanchez was the
appropriate penalty. Accordingly, the NLRC ordered her reinstatement, and the payment of back wages,
other benefits, and attorney's fees. CA upheld the NLRC, ruling that the latter did not gravely abuse its
discretion in finding that Sanchez was illegally dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Sanchez was illegally dismissed by SLMC
Held: The right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, aptly called "management
prerogative," gives employers the freedom to regulate, according to their discretion and best judgment, all
aspects of employment, including work assignment, working methods, processes to... be followed,
working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline,
dismissal and recall of workers. In this light, courts often decline to interfere in legitimate business
decisions of employers. 
In fact, labor laws discourage interference in employers' judgment concerning the conduct of their
business.
Significantly, records show that Sanchez made a categorical admission in her handwritten letter, that
despite her knowledge of its express prohibition under the SLMC Code of Discipline, she still knowingly
brought out the subject medical items with her. While there were previous incidents of "hoarding," it
appears that such acts were in similar fashion furtively made and the items secretly kept, as any excess
items found in the concerned nurse's possession would have to be confiscated. Hence, the fact that no one
was caught and/or sanctioned for transgressing the prohibition therefor does not mean that the so-called
"hoarding" practice was tolerated by SLMC.

The Court thus holds that the dismissal of Sanchez was for a just cause, supported by substantial
evidence, and is therefore in order. By declaring otherwise, bereft of any substantial bases, the NLRC
issued a patently and grossly erroneous ruling tantamount to grave abuse of discretion, which, in turn,
means that the CA erred when it affirmed the same. In consequence, the grant of the present petition is
warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Labor Arbiter's Decision finding respondent Maria
Theresa V. Sanchez to have been validly dismissed by petitioner St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. is hereby
REINSTATED.
4. SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL v. SOLUTA
(G.R. No. 163087. February 20, 2006)
CARPIO MORALES, J:
FACTS:
In late 1987, the security agency of Silahis Hotel allegedly received information of illegal
activities including the sale of marijuana going on in the union office at the hotel. In the morning
of January 11, 1988, Panlilio, Maniego, security guard Steve Villanueva, and their companions,
entered the union office located at the hotel basement, searched the premises in the course of
which Villanueva found a plastic bag yielding dry leaves of marijuana under a table. The
respondent’s version was that Loida, a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight and saw five
men forcibly opening the door of the union office at dawn. In the morning, Loida narrated to
union officer Soluta what she had witnessed at dawn. Soluta immediately lodged a complaint
before the Security Officer and fetched a locksmith. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed
with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio thereupon instructed
Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions
began searching the office, over the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a
search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police
conducted an investigation of the incident, the 13 union officers (including Soluta) were charged
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act for which they were acquitted due to inadmissibility of
evidence coupled by the suspicious circumstance of confiscation. The CA affirmed with
modification the trial court’s decision. It found the petitioners civilly liable for damages for
violation of their constitutional right against illegal search.
Panlilio and the hotel contends that the search of the union office was entirely reasonable under
circumstances. Being private persons, they assert that the constitutional protection against illegal
searches and seizures is not meant to be invoked against private individuals. The search of the
union office was reasonable under the circumstances, given that the hotel owns the room where
the union holds office; the search was not without probable cause as it was conducted precisely
due to reports received by petitioners that the union office was being used as a venue for illegal
activities, particularly the sale and/or use of prohibited drugs; and that the search was conducted
with the consent and in the presence of union officer Babay.
ISSUE:
 1. Whether or not there was an express or implied waiver of the personal right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
HELD:
1. NO. Babay’s account of why petitioners and company went to the union office to
consider Panlilio’s suggestion to settle the mauling incident is more credible, as is his
claim that he protested the search, and even asked if they were armed with a search
warrant. While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is
a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication
cannot be presumed. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention
to relinquish it to constitute a waiver thereof. There must be proof of the following: (a)
that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. In other words, the waiver must be voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently made. The evidence shows otherwise, however. As for
petitioners contention that property rights justified the search of the union office, the
same does not lie. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office, had the right
to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW

1. ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
(G.R No. L-7995, May 31 1957)
LABRADOR,J.

Facts: Petitioners Lao Ichong in his own behalf and other alien residents affected by Republic Act No.
1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” which nationalizes the retail trade business
prohibits persons not citizens of the Philippines from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
brought an action to obtain judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional because it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their property and liberty without due process of
law. In answer, the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the state, which exercise is
authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 1180 deprives of their liberty and property without due process
of law

Held: NO
The bill proposes to regulate the retail business and to prevent persons who are not citizens of the
Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the aliens who owes no allegiance to
the Republic and does not care about the people’s welfare will take over the country’s retail business then
the Filipino people will lose their means of livelihood. This is what the said Act is preventing to take
away from the hands of the persons who are not citizens of the Philippines power to paralyze all aspects
of national life and endanger the national security of the people. The approval of this bill is necessary for
national survival. In this case, it is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can
infringe the constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of the
people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.

2.

3. YNOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

(G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987)
CRUZ, J.:

Facts: On January 13, 1984, petitioner Restituto Ynot transported six carabaoas in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo. Upon arrival in Iloilo, the police station commander confiscated the carabaos alleging
violation of EO 626-A (An Order Prohibiting the Slaughtering of Carabaos and Buffalos for the
Protection of Small Farmers). Said Eo 626-A prohibited interprovincial movement of carbaaos and
carabeefs; while giving discretion to government officers to decide regarding the confiscated carabaos
and carabeefs. Petitiner sued for recovery with the RTC of Iloilo claiming that EO 626-A is
unconstitutional. Without ruling on the constitutionality issue, the RTC sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos. Petition then appealed to the IAC but was denied. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of EO 626-A on several grounds. On the main, petitioner asserts
that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation, and that its penalty suffers
from invalidity because it is imposed without giving the owner a right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.

Issue: Whether  EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.

Held: Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard, and is immediately condemned and punished. Moreover, the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is clear encroachment of judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers.

The penalty is invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be

heard. Here, no trial is prescribed and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the
police and declared as forfeited for the government. Concededly, there are certain occasions when notice
and hearing can be validly dispensed with, such as summary abatement of a public nuisance, summary
destruction of pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. However, these are justified
for reasons of immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and urgency of the need to correct it. In
the instant case, no such pressure is present. The manner by which the disposition of the confiscated
property also presents a case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since the officers mentioned
(Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited discretion. The usual
standard and reasonable guidelines that said officers must observe in making the distribution are nowhere
to be found; instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit.

4. ALONTE vs. SAVELLANO

G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998]

Facts: An information for rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of
Biñan, Laguna, and Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan.
That on or about Sept. 12, 1996, complainant-child was given a drinking water which made her dizzy and
weak. Alonte did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
Juvielyn against her will and consent. Buenaventura, also one of the accused, without having participated
as principal or accessory assisted in the commission of the offense by bringing Juvie-lyn to the rest house
of the accused Bayani and was paid P1,000. The criminal case was docketed and assigned to Branch 25
RTC of Biñan, Laguna. Juvie-lyn’s counsel petitioned for a Change of Venue to have the case transferred
and tried by any of the RTCs in Metro Manila through an affidavit of desistance due to the long judicial
process, thus withdrawing her complaint for rape and other charge for child abuse. Atty. Casino, on
behalf of petitioners moved to have the petition for change of venue dismissed on the grount that it had
become moot in view of complainant’s affidavit of desistance. The ACSP, Guiyab, asserted that he was
not aware of the desistance of Juvie-lyn and opined that the desistance would not produce any legal effect
since it was the public prosecutor who had direction and control of the prosecution of the criminal action.
The Court granted the petition to transfer the venue of said criminal case to prevent possible miscarriage
of justice.

Judge Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte and
Concepcion. Judge Savellano allowed the prosecution to present evidence relative only to the question of
the voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of desistance. Petitioner Alonte filed a second, third, fourth
and fifth motion in respect of his application for bail but none of these motions were acted upon Judge
Savellano. Alonte filed the instant “Ex Abudante Ad Cautelam” respondent Judge, and for Disciplinary
Action stating that Savellano committed grave abuse of discretion amounting when he rendered a
Decision in the case without affording the petitioner his Constitutional right to due process of law.

Issue/s: Whether or not the submission of the “Affidavit of Desistance” warranting the instant dismissal
of said criminal case and denying the petition for bail is considered a violation of due process for
petitioners.

Ruling: Yes. Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, hereinbefore quoted, does not
contain any statement that disavows the veracity of her complaint against petitioners but merely seeks to
"be allowed to withdraw" her complaint and to discontinue with the case for varied other reasons.
Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-called "private
crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been instituted. The
affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight or
probative value, like any other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for proper evaluation. The two
(2) accused did not present any countervailing evidence during the trial. They did not take the witness
stand to refute or deny under oath the truth of the contents of the private complainant's aforementioned
affidavit which she expressly affirmed and confirmed in Court, but, instead, thru their respective lawyers,
they rested and submitted the case for decision merely on the basis of the private complainant's so called
"desistance" which, to them, was sufficient enough for their purposes. They left everything to the so-
called "desistance" of the private complainant. Due process in crminal proceedings require (a) that the
court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused
is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. The
above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own
criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable.

5. ANIAG VS. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 104961. October 7, 1994)
BBELLOCILLO, JR. J.:

Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 2323, “Gun Ban”, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of
firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of
security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the
election period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification
of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces,
and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of
the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the
House of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from
petitioner’s house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by
Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was
apprehended and detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that
Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard.
Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and
Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he should not
be disqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of
Resolution No. 2327. He argues that “gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons” and
other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus,
according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of
petitioner from running in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in
the elections.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was validly prosecuted without violating his right to due process.

Held: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority.
However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited
to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellano’s waist nor placed within his
reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these
circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as the package
without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to
the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the
firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It
was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the
checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. The City Prosecutor did not inform him that he was a respondent in the preliminary
investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to due process. The argument of the COMELEC
that petitioner was given the chance to be heard because he was invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor
regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver does not comply with the requirement of the
due process, which essence is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may
have in support of his defense. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the
opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was himself a respondent
in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized
during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-
0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.

6. People v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015
PERALTA, J.:

Facts:
The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and
acquitted private respondents Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola of the crime
of rape for the prosecution's failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

According to the prosecution, in the evening of 25 March 2004, the abovementioned accused conspired,
confederated, and mutually helped one another to forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an
intoxicating liquor and once intoxicated, brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at
Alquizola Lodging house, where the accused Carampatana and Oporto took turns in having sexual
intercourse against the will of AAA while Alquizola kissed her against her will and consent. However,
the accused pleaded not guilty and contended that AAA gave her consent to the acts done to her by the
accused. The CA gave more credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA consented to the
events that happened.

Issue: Did the Court of Appeals act with grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the private respondents?

Held: Yes, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion with tegards to their judgment of acquittal of the
respondents. The judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court if it is proven that the lower court exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to the
denial of due process. If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioner’s prayer is not tantamount
to putting private respondents in double jeopardy. In a special civil action for certiorari filed under
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the
petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In the said case, petitioner AAA has the personality to
bring the action to court because she is the subject of the violation being complained of.

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA
merely relied on the evidence presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution.
Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence presented,
regardless of the party who offered the same. Thus, the CA’s blatant disregard of material prosecution
evidence and outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion resulting in
violation of petitioner’s right to due process.

7. ANG TIBAY VS COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

(G.R. No. 46496. February 27, 1940)
LAUREL, J.:

Facts: Ang Tibay is a leather company. There was shortage of leather soles so it was necessary
to temporarily lay off members of the National Labor Union. According to the Union however,
this was unsupported, merely a scheme to systematically terminate the employees from work and
prevent forfeiture of bond despite breach of contract with Philippine army. It claims that Ang
Tibay is guilty of unjust labor practice because employees laid off were members of NLU while
no members of the rival labor union, National Workers Brotherhood (NWB), were laid off. NLU
claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence and that these documents are of such far-reaching importance and
effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered. Such evidence is so inaccessible before to the NLU that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court
of Industrial Relations.
Issue: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
Held: Yes. SC said there was a failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved due to failure to
receive all relevant evidence. But to begin with the issue is to realize the functions of the CIR.
The CIR is a special court created under Commonwealth Act No. 103. It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It not only
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers
and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter
controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers,
and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to,
and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103. SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR
is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of
the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical
rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable. The fact, however, that CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental requirements
of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings.
(1)The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof (2)the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented (3)the decision must have something to support itself (4) not only must there
be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial (5)the
decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected (6)the CIR or any of its judges must act on his or its
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate (7)the CIR, in all controversial questions involved, render its decision in
such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered.

8.ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY v. HON. IGNACIO CAPULONG (RTC-

Presiding Judge) (G.R. No. 99327. May 27, 1993)
ROMERO, J:

Facts: On 8, February 1991, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law School,
held its initiation rites for students interested in joining its ranks. As a result of such, a first-year
student died of serious physical injuries, and another freshman was hospitalized for the same
reason. Petitioner sent a notice creating a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee to investigate and submit a report on the circumstances surrounding the death of the
student and requiring respondent students to submit their written statements within 24-hours
from receipt, which however, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on
preventive suspension. The said committee after receiving the written statements and hearing the
testimonies of witnesses, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of
Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled “Discipline”. Respondent students, through counsel,
requested that the investigation be held in abeyance, pending action on their request for copies of
the evidence against them. Respondents students was then informed among others that, the
proceedings against them will be summary in nature; that they have no right to cross-examine the
affiants-neophytes. The Board of Discipline pronounced respondent students guilty of hazing.
However, in view of the lack of unanimity among its members, the board left the imposition of
the penalty to the University Administration. Fr. Bernas, as President of petitioner University,
accepted the factual findings of the Board and imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent
students. Respondent students thus, filed with the RTC of Makati for a petition pf certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus which centered on the alleged lack of procedural due process in their
dismissal because they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written
statements which became the basis of petitioner’s order. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent
students and ordered the petitioners to reinstate them and to conduct special examinations.
Hence, this petition. The threshold argument of respondent students is that the decision of Fr.
Bernas to expel them was arrived at without affording them their right to procedural due process.
Issue: Whether or not respondent students were accorded due process in their dismissal.
Held: YES. In the case of Guzman v. National University, the minimum standards to be satisfied
in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institution was laid out, thus; a.) the
students be informed in writing of the nature and cause of accusations against them; b.) they
shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
c.) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; d.) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; e.) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. It cannot be asserted
that these requirements were not met. Respondent students were notified and required to submit
their written statements on the incidents, they were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence
in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them. The requisite of counsel was met
from the very start of the investigations. Respondent students may not use the argument that,
since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which
became the bases of petitioner’s order of dismissal, that they were denied procedural due
process. Disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross
examination, an administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students need not be clothed
with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous requirements
of criminal due process, due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings identical to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
justice. We deem this sufficient for purposes of the investigation under scrutiny
In light also of the “Academic Freedom” granted by the Constitution to educational
institutions of higher learning, we affirm the petitioner’s imposition of the penalty of dismissal
upon respondent students.

9. CUDIA VS. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PMA

(G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)

Facts: On Janury 7, 2014, Maj. Hindang reported 1CL Cudia to the Honor Committee in violation of the
honor code for Lying. 1CL Cudia told Maj. Hindang that he was late because his 4 th period class ended at
1500H that made him late in the succeeding class. On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to
conduct a preliminary investigation on the reported honor violation of Cadet 1CL Cudia. The Foxtrot
Company was designated as the investigating team and was composed of Cadet 1CL Hasigan as Presiding
Officer, and Cadets 1CL Mogol, 1CL Raguindin, 2CL Gumilab, 2CL Saldua, 3CL Espejo, and 3CL
Poncardas as members. Soon after, the team submitted its Preliminary Investigation Report
recommending that the case be formalized. The first formal hearing started late evening of January 20,
2014 and lasted until early morning the next day. Cadet 1CL Cudia was informed of the charge against
him, as to which he pleaded "Not Guilty." Among those who testified were Cadet 1CL Cudia, Maj.
Hindang, and Cadets 1CL Arcangel and Narciso. On the second night of the hearing held on January 21,
2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia again appeared and was called to the witness stand along with Cadets Brit and
Barrawed. Dr. Costales also testified under oath via phone on a loudspeaker. Deliberation among the HC
voting members followed. After that, the ballot sheets were distributed. The members cast their votes
through secret balloting and submitted their accomplished ballot sheets together with their written
justification. The result was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. Cadet 1CL Dalton John G. Lagura (Cadet
1CL Lagura) was the lone dissenter. Allegedly, upon the order of HC Chairman Cadet 1CL Mogol, the
Presiding Officer and voting members went inside a chamber adjoining the court room for further
deliberation. After several minutes, they went out and the Presiding Officer announced the 9-0 guilty
verdict. Cadet 1CL Cudia, who already served nine (9) touring hours, was then informed of the
unanimous votes finding him guilty of violating the Honor Code. He was immediately placed in the PMA
Holding Center until the resolution of his appeal. On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez
(Col. Briguez), the Commandant of Cadets, affirmed the HC findings and recommended to Vice Admiral
Edgar Abogado, then PMA Superintendent, the separation from the PMA of Cadet 1CL Cudia for
violation of the First Tenet of the Honor Code (Lying, pursuant to Sec. VII.12.b of the CCAFPR S-2008).
On the same date, Special Orders No. 26 was issued by the PMA Headquarters placing Cadet 1CL Cudia
on indefinite leave of absence without pay and allowances effective February 10, 2014 pending approval
of his separation by the AFP-GHQ, barring him from future appointment and/or admission as cadet, and
not permitting him to qualify for any entrance requirements to the PMA. Two days later, Vice Admiral
Abogado approved the recommendation to dismiss Cadet 1CL Cudia.
Issue: Whether or not 1CL was deprived of his constitutional right to due process
Held: NO. In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1CL Cudia's Honor Code violation followed the
prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report from Maj.
Hindang. He was then given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed about his
options and the entire process that the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately
followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team
submitted a written report together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter
reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the honor case was submitted for formal
investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing,
he was informed of the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to
explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough
discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the
guilty verdict underwent the review process at the Academy level from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA, to
the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also conducted
by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted
by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and
the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had
the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings.

10. Mortel vs. Kerr

G.R No. 156296. November 12, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts:
Respondent Salvador E. Kerr (Kerr) instituted a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against Dennis Q.
Mortel (Mortel). Petitioner who duly filed an answer through Atty. Leonuel N. Mas (Atty. Mas) of the
Public Attorney's Office. The pre-trial was re-set four times for various reasons, but on the fifth setting,
Mortel and Atty. Mas were not around when the case was called. On motion of Kerr's counsel, the RTC
declared Mortel as in default and allowed Kerr to present evidence ex parte. Since his first counsel, Atty.
Mas is not appearing to represent the petitioner, he was replaced by Atty. Lacambra and finally by Atty.
Tumulak. Unfortunately, despite several replacements of counsel, was not properly represented as in the
word of the Supreme Court, it seemed like they don’t know the rules of procedures due to
inappropriateness of the remedies that they applied in the case of Mortel in the lower courts.

Issue:
Whether or not Mortel was deprived of his property without due process of law

Held:
Yes, The Supreme Court held that Mortel was deprived of his property without due process of law as a
result of the negligence of the several counsels who initially handled his case. The negligence and
mistakes committed by his several counsels were so gross and palpable that they denied due process to
Mortel and could have cost him his valuable asset. They thereby prevented him from presenting his side,
which was potentially highly unfair and unjust to him on account of his defense being plausible and
seemingly meritorious. He stated that he had already paid the principal of the loan and the interest,
submitting in support of his statement. He also stated that he had actually overpaid in view of his
arrangement for Kerr to withdraw P6,000.00 each month from Mortel's bank account as payment of the
interest, a statement that he would confirm in court through the testimony of a bank representative.

We held in Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that when the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience
of counsel is so great and the result is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is
prejudiced and denied his day in court, the client deserves another chance to present his case; hence, the
litigation may be reopened for that purpose. Also, when an unsuccessful party has been prevented from
fully and fairly presenting his case because of his attorney's professional delinquency or infidelity the
litigation may be reopened to allow the party to present his side. Lastly, where counsel is guilty of gross
ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's being held liable for damages
in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such
ground.
11. JESUS C. GARCIA v. HON. RAY ALAN T. DRILON, et. al
(G.R. No. 81561. 18 JANUARY 1991)
BIDIN, J.:

Facts:
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition
before the RTC of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against
her husband, Jesus C. Garcia, pursuant to RA 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse,
emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner (the husband), with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support.
Her husband assails the constitutionality of RA 9262 for being violative of due process to which
he says,  "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond,
the husband is stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and
reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened."
Issue/s: Whether RA 9262 is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.
Held:

No. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"  the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or
property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary
to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence,
which is about to recur.

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim
is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to
the petition.

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just
like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in
which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the
hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts
could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of
women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

12. Legaspi v. City of Cebu

G.R. No. 159110 December 10, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
 
Facts: On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance
No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle
violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in the Traffic Code of Cebu City. On
August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) sued in the RTC the City of Cebu, demanded the
delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu City, and
damages. He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a
portion of the sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of
the anay exterminator, upon returning outside, his car was towed by the group even if it was not
obstructing the flow of traffic. The RTC rendered its decision declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as
null and void The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the
decision of the RTC declaring the Ordinance No. 1664 valid. Upon the denial of his motion for
reconsideration Legaspi came to the Court for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the requirements for validity and
constitutionality, particularly the limitations set by the Constitution and the relevant statutes.

Held: The first substantive requirement for a valid ordinance is the adherence to the constitutional
guaranty of due process of law. The guaranty is embedded in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.

The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part of
the Government, whether committed by the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary. It is a protection
essential to every inhabitant of the country.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the Court expounded on the aspects of the guaranty of due process of law
as a limitation on the acts of government, namely Procedural due process and Substantive due process.
Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with that kind of notice and what form of hearing the
government must provide when it takes a particular action. While Substantive due process asks whether
the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property. Case law in
the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level
of scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied,
substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.
But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the
government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a
compelling government purpose.

Legaspi contends that Ordinance No. 1664 violated the constitutional guaranty of due process for being
arbitrary and oppressive; and that its provisions conferring upon the traffic enforcers the absolute
discretion to be the enforcers, prosecutors, judges and collectors all at the same time were vague and
ambiguous. He reminds that the grant of police powers for the general welfare under the LGC was not
unlimited but subject to constitutional limitations;

Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as
well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy. The
subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in
the City of Cebu at all times". WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitions for review
on certiorari for their lack of merit.

13. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORP. (PHILCOMSAT) v.

ALCUAZ
(G.R. No. 84818. December 18, 1989)
REGALADO, J:
FACTS:
Pursuant to EO 196, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of
respondent National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), including all its facilities and
 services and the fixing of rates. The NTC required petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate
of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as
the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor. The petitioners seek to annul and set aside
an Order issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the NTC which directs the
provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified lines
of its services by 15% with the reservation to make further reductions later, for being violative of
the constitutional prohibition against a denial of due process of law. Alcuaz ordered said
reduction on the following ground: “The Commission in its on-going review of present service
rates takes note that after an initial evaluation by the Rates Regulation Division of the Common
Carriers Authorization Department of the financial statements of applicant, there is merit in a
REDUCTION in some of applicant's rates, subject to further reductions, should the Commission
finds (sic) in its further evaluation that more reduction should be effected either on the basis of a
provisional authorization or in the final consideration of the case.”
Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and
hence quasi-judicial, not quasi-legislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the absence
thereof results in a violation of due process. Respondents insist that the questioned Order was
issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not
necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore,
temporary in nature
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the NTC Order violates due process.
HELD:
1. YES. In The Central Bank of the Philippines v. Cloribel, it was held that as a general rule
notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the
administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions;
but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts
are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or
property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing. In this case, the NTC
Order no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact
that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a
finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the
rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without
affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the
financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered
nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose
as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner
could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business
requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of
the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and
magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that
an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its
service to the public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to
undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC
based its questioned order.
14. Republic of the Philippines represented by Bureau of Food and Drugs (Now Food and Drug
Administration) vs. Drugmaker’s Laboratories Inc.
(G.R No. 190837, March 5 2014)
PERLAS-BERNABE,J.

Facts: The FDA was created pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 3720 otherwise known as the “Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act” primarily in order to establish safety and efficacy standards and quality
measures for foods, drugs and devices, and cosmetic products. The Department of Health(DOH), issued
Administrative Order 67 which required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine
products with the FDA before they may release the same to the market for sale. In this relation, a
satisfactory bioavailability/bioequivalence(BA/BE) test is needed for the manufacturer to secure CPR for
these products but was put on hold but was restored by Circular No. 8 1997. Respondents Drugmaker’s
Laboratories Inc. manufacture and trade a “multisource pharmaceutical product” with the generic name of
rifampicin branded as “Refam 200 mg/5mL Suspension for the treatment of adults and children suffering
pulmonary and extra-pulmonary tuberculosis. Respondents applied for and was issued CPR valid for 5
years. At the time of CPR’S issuance. Refam did not undergo BA/BE testing since there was no facility
capable of conducting it. Respondents were granted numerous renewals with the condition that they
submit to the said test. Respondents engaged the services of University of the Philippines Manila
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology, College of Medicine to conduct the BA/BE testing on
Refam which were submitted to FDA. FDA sent a letter to respondents stating that Refam is not
bioequivalent with the reference drug. FDA still revalidated respondent’s CPR which came with a
warning that no more revalidations shall be granted if no BA/BE tests will be submitted. Respondents
filed a petition for prohibition of the annulment of Circular nos. 1 and 8 alleging that DOH and not FDA
which granted the authority to issue and implement rules concerning RA 3720. The issuance of the
circulars and in the manner of promulgation contravened the constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the there is a need to determine if the aforesaid circulars partake of administrative
rules and regulations

Held: YES
A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances would reveal that AO 67, s. 1989 is actually the rule that
originally introduced the BA/BE testing requirement as a component of applications for the issuance of
CPRs covering certain pharmaceutical products. As such, it is considered an administrative regulation – a
legislative rule to be exact – issued by the Secretary of Health in consonance with the express authority
granted to him by RA 3720 to implement the statutory mandate that all drugs and devices should first be
registered with the FDA prior to their manufacture and sale. Considering that neither party contested the
validity of its issuance, the Court deems that AO 67, s. 1989 complied with the requirements of prior
hearing, notice, and publication pursuant to the presumption of regularity accorded to the government in
the exercise of its official duties. 4herefore, the FDA has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and
since they would not affect the substantive rights of the parties that they seek to govern – as they are not,
strictly speaking, administrative regulations in the first place – no prior hearing, consultation, and
publication are needed for their validity.

15.

16. GMA NETWORK, INC. V. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

(G.R. No. 19611, February 26, 2014)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Facts: GMA filed with the NTC an application for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience
(CPC) to install, operate and maintain an AM radio station in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. Pending
approval, the NTC issued an Order dated 14 January 1997, provisionally authorizing GMA to install,
operate and maintain the radio station. The provisional authority (PA) was valid for 18 months from date,
or until July 14, 1998. GMA failed to renew its PA upon its expiration on 14 July 1998. Nevertheless, it
continued its broadcast operations on the basis of temporary permits issued by the NTC. On 13 September
2002, (4) years after the expiration of its PA, GMA filed with the NTC an ex-parte motion for the
issuance of their CPC. Meanwhile, GMA continued to operate its radio station, still without a renewed
PA, on the strength of temporary permits issued by the NTC in 2004 and 2007. In an order dated 25 May
2009, the NTC renewed GMA’s PA for 3 years and pursuant to Sec. 21 of the Public Service Act,
imposed a fine upon GMA for Php152,100 for operating with an expired PA from 14 July 1998 to 13
September 2002 or for 1,521 days. The fine was pegged at the rate of Php100 per day. However in an
order dated 8 January 2010, the NTC reduced its imposed fine to the amount of Php76,050 or for the rate
of Php50 a day. GMA elevated the matter to the CA which was dismissed, hence their petition to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the ₱76,050.00 fine imposed by the NTC upon GMA.

Held: Petition denied. The NTC’s authority to impose fines for a public service utility’s violation or
failure to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate/s issued by it is expressly sanctioned
under Section 21 of the Public Service Act (PSA). Sec 21 states that every public service violating or
failing to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions, or regulations
of the Commission shall be subject to a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos for every day during
which such default or violation continues; and the Commission is hereby authorized or empowered to
impose such fine, after due notice and hearing. The conscionability of the amount imposed should not be
at issue as it is the law itself which had provided the allowable threshold for the amount therefor. GMA
avers that it cannot be said to have operated its radio station illegally and without authority from the NTC
because the latter had successively issued temporary permits which encompass the period during which
GMA allegedly operated the same station on an expired PA. The SC agreed with the NTC's submission
that although GMA was granted numerous temporary permits, it does not remove the fact that it was
operating on an expired PA, which infraction is subject to the penalty of fine under Sec. 21 of the PSA.

The SC made emphasis to the need for a hearing before a fine may be imposed, as it is clearly a
punitive measure undertaken by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Inherently, notice and hearing are indispensable for the valid exercise by an administrative agency of its
quasi- judicial functions. Sec. 21 requires notice and hearing because a fine is a sanction, regulatory, and
even punitive in character. Indeed, the requirement is the essence of due process. Notice and hearing are
the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be
respected even in administrative proceedings. The right is guaranteed by the Constitution itself and does
not need legislative enactment. The statutory affirmation of the requirement serves merely to enhance the
fundamental precept. The right to notice and hearing is essential to due process and its non-observance
will, as a rule, invalidate the administrative proceedings.

EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS

1. PEOPLE vs. VERA
[G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937]

Facts:
Petitioners, the People of the Philippines (PH) and the Hongkong and Shanghai Corporation (HSC) filed a
criminal case against defendant Mariano Cu Unijieng in the Court of First Instance of Manila (CFIM)
wherein Jose O. Vera is the Judge ad interim. Petitioner HSC intervenes as a private prosecutor. After a
protracted trial uparralleled in the annals of PH jurisprudence, CFIM rendered a judgment of conviction
sentencing Mariano to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to
8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to HSC. Upon appeal, the
sentece was modified to an indeterminate penalty of 5 years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7
years, 6 months and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Mariano
filed a motion for reconsideration and 4 successive motions for new trial which were denied with a final
judgment. Mariano thereupon sought to have the case elevated to the Supreme Court but was denied.
Judge Vera heard the application of Mariano for probation in the aforesaid criminal case.

The proceedings involve the application for probation filed by Mariano under the provisions of Act No.
4221 of the defuct Philippine Legislature stating in his petition that he is innocent of the crime of which
he was convicted. On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of
probation by Judge Vera. The private prosecution also filed an opposition, alleging among other things,
that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution,
is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and
because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective
or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition
on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation
of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City
Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised
concerning the constitutionality of Act No. 4221.

Issue/s: Whether or not Act No. 4221 or Probation Act denies the equal protection of the laws.

Ruling: Yes. The Probation Act is contended to be violative against the provisions of the Bill of Rights
which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The petitioners came to this
court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in
the Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng
for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to
criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final
judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."

The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial
boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, is a "roving
commission" which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the
Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to
the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other
words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not
wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the
needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of
any other interpretation. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.

2. ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ

(G.R. No. L-7995. May 31, 1957)
LABRADOR, J.:

Facts: The government passed Republic Act No. 1180 (Act to Regulate the Retail Business) whose
resolution was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from having domination upon
the people’s economic life. The act is a prohibition which is against aliens and any association,
corporations, or partnerships of whom are not entirely owned by Filipinos in engaging directly or
indirectly in retail trade. Any foreigners engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are permitted to
continue their business, except if their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until voluntary
retirement or death. However, for juridical persons, it is ten years after the approval of the Act or until
their term expires. Moreover, the United States citizens and juridical entities were exempted from the
effects of the Act.

The petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, “An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business,” filed to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional contending that: (1)
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title
thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession,
and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the
retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 denies the alien residents equal protection of the laws.

Held: The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds
exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due
process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens
already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of
the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident—as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary—and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the
Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not
interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity
and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to
be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on
the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to
prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which
it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

3. Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho

G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978
FERNANDEZ, J.:

FACTS: 
The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22,
1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968.

City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:

AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE

 PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE
ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY
OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE
3
MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

4
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate
in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual,
without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of
P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the
technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those
working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or
denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.

Respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition praying for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance
No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void

Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground
that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only
to purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an
exercise of the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature.

ISSUE: Whether or Not Ordinance No.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.

HELD: Ordinance No. 6537 violates the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution. It is
obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation. The P50.00 fee
is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial
differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection
clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be
based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular
legislation. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the
exercise of his discretion. Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard
or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power, which has been granted to him by the
ordinance. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila
who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the
Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood.

4. DUMLAO VS COMELEC
(G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980)
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Facts: Petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya who has filed a
certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor in the elections of January 30, 1980.
Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who has
taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo
Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the
Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as
disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official who has received payment of
the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of
age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the cited provision is directed insidiously against him, and
that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class
legislation."
Issue: Whether or not Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is class legislation.
Held: No. The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safe guard of equal
protection is not well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For
purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age have been validly classified differently
from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement,
while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city
or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from
which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood
assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would
like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the
application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection
neither does it permit of such denial. Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What it proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That
constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
belonging to the same class. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood
in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, cannot be
considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by
theoretical inconsistencies"

5. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS INC. v. HON. FRANKLIN

DRILON
(G.R. No. 81958. June 30, 1988)
SARMIENTO, J:

Facts: Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Department Order No. 1 S.1988 of DOLE in
the character of “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers” on the grounds of discrimination against male or females,
that it does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills. Petitioner also invoked the Constitutional provision which provides for worker
participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may
be provided by law and the non-impairment clause. The solicitor general defended that the order
is in the nature of a police power of the State.
Issue: Whether or not Department Order No. 1. S. 1988 allows for discrimination and violates
the equal protection of the laws.
Held: NO. There is no question that the Department Order applies only to “female contract
workers’, but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. Equality
before the law under the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men
and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made rests on substantial distinctions. The
Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by physical and
personal abuse, even rape and various forms of torture, which are compelling motives for urgent
Government actions. The same, however cannot be said of our male workers, there is no
evidence that, except for isolated instances, our men abriad have been afflicted with an identical
predicament. This Court is content that the distinctions are borne by the evidence and in this case
is justified. There is likewise no doubt that such classification is germane to the purpose behind
the measure, it is the avowed objective of the order to enhance the protection for Filipino female
overseas workers. The Order also does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is
intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. As a stop-gap measure, it is
possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case. The Court
finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers.
That it does not apply to ‘all Filipina workers’ is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the
ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For
obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is
the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of
such a person or group or resulting in a unfair advantage to another person r group of persons.
Among the other issues of the challenged order (violation of the right to travel, the non-
impairment clause and the invalid exercise of legislative power), we do not find it to be tainted
with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.

6. GARCIA VS. DRILON

(G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Facts:
In 2004, Congress enacted RA No. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children”. It defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children
(VAWC) perpetrated by women’s intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has
or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child.

Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children for a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim
of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the
part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. The
husband now, assails the constitutionality of RA 9262 as being violative of the equal protection clause.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 9262 violated the husband’s constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws

Held:
NO. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but
on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they
were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It
does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 

7. Himagan vs. People

[G.R. No. 113811, October 7, 1994]
Kapunan, J.:

FACTS: 
Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder and
attempted murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the
murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and
substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6)
years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case
is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90)
days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that  Sec 42 of PD 807
of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an
imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a
violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD:  
No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged
criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned
is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate
witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman
criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and
the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the
mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90
days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.
8. ELEAZAR P. QUINTO, et. al v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(G.R. No. 189698. 22 JANUARY 2010)
PUNO, CJ.:

Facts:
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr.
to declare as unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678, mainly on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. The petitioners obtained a favorable judgment thus paved the way for public
appointive officials to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives and functions of their office
notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.
The COMELEC filed a motion for reconsideration which the court resolves in this case.
Issue/s: Whether Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is violative of the equal
protection clause for considering appointive officials ipso facto resigned from their respective
offices upon filing of a certificate of candidacy.
Held:
No. The Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned provisions
challenged in the case at bar violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution in Farias, et
al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. it ruled:
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute,
but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the
equal protection guarantee in this manner:
 
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not.

9. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission

(G.R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010)
MENDOZA, J.:

Facts: The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May
2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch
condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap."
The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective,
catapulted the good senator to the presidency. 

Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive
Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI
of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public
office and to appropriate funds therefor.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order
No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).

Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause

Held: The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional
safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that
the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an
"adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission
must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of
former President Arroyo. 

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.
Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. 

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative
of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration “only.” The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order. 

Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of
searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least,
have the authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is
permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. 
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the
provisions of Executive Order No. 1. 

10. ALMONTE v. VAZQUEZ

(G.R. No. 84818. December 18, 1989)
MENDOZA, J:
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum
and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa
Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for
the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for
1988" and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders. Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly
Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal
Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection
with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been
written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of
Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of the
Ombudsman. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . .
can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities
fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters
suffice to start an investigation.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there is violation of petitioner’s right to equal protection of the laws.
HELD:
1. NO. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the
Constitution itself which expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed "in
any form or manner" concerning official acts or omissions. Thus, Art. XI, Sec. 12 provides:
“The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and shall in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of
the action taken and the result thereof.” Similarly, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6770),
Sec. 26(2): “The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in
whatever form concerning an official act or omission. It shall act on the complaint
immediately and if it finds the same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the same and inform
the complainant of such dismissal citing the reasons therefor. If it finds a reasonable ground
to investigate further, it shall first furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a
summary of the complaint and require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two
hours from receipt thereof. If the answer is found satisfactory, it shall dismiss the case.”
Accordingly, in Diaz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that testimony given at a fact-finding
investigation and charges made in a pleading in a case in court constituted a sufficient basis
for the Ombudsman to commence investigation, because a formal complaint was really not
necessary.
In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and
in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of
the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court
had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other
investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its
jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay
 or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand complainants are more often
than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.

11. Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs The Treasurer of Ormoc City

(G.R. No. L-23794 February 17 1968)
BENGZON,J.P.,J.

Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any
and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a
municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and
other foreign countries."  Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon
the Solicitor General, a complaint 3 against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board
and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution)

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1964 is violative of the Equal Protection Clause

Held: YES

The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: "nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) I The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically
situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, A perusal of the
requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal
sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the
taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the
city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions
as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if
later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points
only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

12. Bartolome v. SSS

(G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014)

FACTS: John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., onboard
the vessel Maersk Danville. As such, he was enrolled under the government’s Employees’
Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred onboard the
vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the following day.
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for
death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La
Union. However, the SSS La Union office denied the claim. The denial was appealed to the
Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union
Branch. In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against
petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no
longer be considered John’s primary beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister
Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather. Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.
Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary even
if it were proven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated: “This
Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a legitimate parent of the deceased,
having given up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption
divested her of the status as the legitimate parent of the deceased.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the
legitimate parents is valid?

HELD: No, because it miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the classification
is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing government concern or interest
that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand
and the rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its
mandate, and the policy of PD 626 — that employees and their dependents may promptly secure
adequate benefits in the event of work-connected disability or death — will be better served if
Art. 167(j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate
ones, there can be no other course of action to take other than to strike down as unconstitutional
the phrase “illegitimate” as appearing in Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.
In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially,
and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective.
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals
as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The
test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally
to all members of the same class. “Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.”

13. OBERGEFELL V. HODGES

(576 US ____ 2015)
KENNEDY, A.:

Facts: The petitioners are 14 same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased. The
respondents are state officials responsible for enforcing the laws in question. The petitioners claim the
respondents violate the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have their
marriages, lawfully performed in another State, given full recognition. The petitioners filed these suits in
the District Courts in their homes states which all ruled in their favor. However, once appealed by the
respondents to the US Court of Appeals (CoA) for the Sixth Circuit, the lower courts decisions’ were
reversed and held that a state has no constitutional obligation to license same-sex marriages or to
recognize these marriages performed out of State. Hence this certiorari petition.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two
people of the same sex. (2) Whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to recognize a
same-sex marriage licensed and performed in a State which does grant that right.

Held: The SC of the US reversed the decision of the CoA and held that (1) same-sex couples may
exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States. The SC also held that (2) there is no lawful basis for
a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its
same-sex character. The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-
sex may not be deprived of that and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to
marry.
Under the constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-
sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.
The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment
is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. The Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way, though they set forth
independent principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on
different precepts and are not always co- extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to
the meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the
essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in
the identification and definition of the right. This dynamic was reflected in the landmark cases of Loving
and Zablocki wherein the SC invalidated a law banning interracial marriage and a law barring fathers
delinquent on child-support payments from marrying by invoking both the Equal Protection Clause and
the Due Process Clause. Similarly, the SC has long before invoked equal protection principles to
invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality in marriage.

It is clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and it must be further
acknowledged that they abridge the central precepts of equality. Here the marriage laws enforced by the
respondents are in essence unequal: same-sex couples are denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex
couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long history of
disapproval of their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and
continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and
subordinate them. The Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohibits this unjustified
infringement of the fundamental right to marry.