Estrada vs Escritor (August 4,

2003)
Estrada vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las

Pinas City.  Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F.
Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City,
requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living
with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually
begotten a son. Escritor’s husband, who had lived with another
woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary.  On the
other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. 
Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a
resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite.    According to the
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in
the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s

Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her
conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their
7religious beliefs.  After ten years of living together, she executed on
July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was
approved by the congregation.  Such declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their
union.  Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since
1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and
explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration
which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan,
Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch
Tower Central Office.           

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the

administrative charge of “gross and immoral conduct” and be
penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

HELD:

A distinction between public and secular morality and religious

morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends
only to public and secular morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent

neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious
exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary

by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and
decency.  “There is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court
Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this
interest is so compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of
religious freedom.  Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a
private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the
state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper
agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General”.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the

government be given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling
state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s position
that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is
within the scope of free exercise protection.  The Court could not
prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause
protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of
her right to religious freedom.  Furthermore, the court cannot simply
take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom but
must also apply the “compelling state interest” test.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court

Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case
where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and
centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to
present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override
respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the
means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to
respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded
thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of
this Decision.       

**Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its

secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold
religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits.

PBMEO v PBM
Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO)
decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to
express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig
Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine

Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the
PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was
confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the
demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact
an exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom
of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress
of grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would

interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the
loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility
that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the
rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their

appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those
from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to
participate , otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late
to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO
were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No
Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of
the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion
for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of
Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
 Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the
CBA.

Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the
primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because
these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,"
they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights
can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In
the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such
priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions."

The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful

assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when
directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our
right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.”

FACTS: Petitioners herein alleged that they informed

the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills of their
decision to have a mass demonstration at Malacañang, in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. The
company respondent pleaded to exclude the employees in
the first shift to join the mass demonstration, however
the petitioners still included them. As a result, the
company respondent filed a case thru the city
prosecutor and charged the demonstrating employees of
violation of the CBA. Trial court rendered judgment in
favor of the respondent company, and the petitioners
failed to file a timely motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON the case dismissal as a consequence of a

procedural fault violates due process.

HELD: Yes. The decision of the CIR to dismiss the

petition based on technicality (being 2 days late) was
rendered null and void. (The constitutional rights have
dominance over procedural rules.) And, the company was
directed to reinstate the eight officers with full
backpay from date of separation minus the one day's pay
and whatever earnings they might have realized from
other sources during their separation from service.
(The removal from employment of the officers were
deemed too harsh a punishment for their actions)

(People Power Revolution) Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, major general

Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth Dimaano
FACTS:
Immediately upon Pres. Corazon Aquino’s assumption to office, she issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO 1)
creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). EO 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to
recover
all ill-gotten wealth of former Pres. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates.
EO 1 vested the PCGG with the power “(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to
accomplish
and carry out the purposes of this order” and the power “(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may
be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order.” The PCGG, through Chairman Salonga, created an
AFP
Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by
AFP
personnel.
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of
respondent
Major General Josephus Q. Ramas. On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings
and
recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas.
In the report, it concluded that the Board finds a prima facie case against Ramas for ill-gotten wealth and
unexplained wealth in the amount of PHP2, 974, 134.00 and USD50,000.00—both of which were
confiscated
from a certain Elizabeth Dimaano’s premises. It also recommended that Ramas be prosecuted and tried for
violation of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379 or the Act for the Forfeiture
of
Unlawfully Acquired Property.
Hence, the PCGG filed a case against Ramas under RA 1379.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Sol. Gen. Chavez filed an Amended Complaint naming the
Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as defendant.
The
Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano as co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until
1986
while Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a
clerk-typist
at the office of Ramas. It further alleged that Ramas “acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out
of
proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property by
taking
undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed President
Ferdinand
Marcos.”
Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon
City,
valued at P700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other legitimate income and denied
ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment and other items
confiscated
from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano admitted her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas and claimed ownership of the
monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine
Constabulary
raiding team.
The Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioner’s presentation of evidence on the ground that the motion for
leave to amend complaint did not state when petitioner would file the amended complaint. Petitioner later
on
manifested its inability to proceed to trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further
evidence
to present. Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence
already
presented or to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the monies or
properties
subject of the forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year and ordered petitioner
to
prepare for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
Petitioner again and again admitted its inability to present further evidence. Private respondents then filed
their
motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino which held that PCGG does not have jurisdiction to
investigate
and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that they are
“subordinates”
of former President Marcos.
As such, the case was dismissed and the confiscated items were ordered to be returned. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner and the Sandiganbayan denied such.
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:
1. The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr.
v.
Sandiganbayan and Republic v. Migrino which involve the same issues.
2. No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against Ramas
and
Dimaano.
3. The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.
4. There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
ISSUES:
1. Whether PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition
against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
2. Whether Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of
petitioner’s evidence.
3. Whether the respondent court seriously erred in holding that the articles and things from the
house of respondent Dimaano were illegally seized and therefore excluded as evidence.
HELD:
The petition is dismissed and the ruling of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed.
1. The PCGG has no jurisdiction.
2. The PCGG can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel
who fall under either of the two categories: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten
wealth during the
administration of former President Marcos by being the latter’s immediate family, relative, subordinate
or close
associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x x; or (2)
AFP
personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to
the
PCGG.
Ramas does not fall under (2); hence, he must fall under (1) as a subordinate. However, his position
alone as
Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major General does not suffice to make
him a
“subordinate” of former President Marcos for purposes of EO 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to
provide
a prima facie showing that Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the same
manner that
 business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him.
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture
petitions not
falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth
amassed on or
before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority to file the
corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor General.
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary
investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for violation of
RA No.
1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan.
The right
of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or
estoppel.
2. The Sandiganbayan did NOT ERR in dismissing the case.
The Petitioner has only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. It had
almost two
years to prepare its evidence. However, it kept on delaying such presentation by filing numerous
motions for
postponements and extensions.
The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioner’s delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays
with the
filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong even more the disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the
case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against private
respondents. This
alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture case
against private
respondents.
3. The warrant did not include the articles and things seized from the house of
Dimaano; hence, they were illegally seized.
Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation
No. 1.
Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the 1973
Constitution
which guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right. Moreover, petitioner argues that the
exclusionary
right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of
the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its
embryonic
stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken
from
Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private
respondents did
not enjoy any constitutional right.
The petitioner is partly right in their arguments that the 1973 Constitution was inoperative during the
interregnum. However, the Supreme Court rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the
Covenant
and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by no
constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights
because
there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution,
the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom
Constitution.
The revolutionary government assumed responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the
Covenant
to which the Philippines is a signatory. The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory,
provides in
its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Although it is not intended as a
legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary
government
was also obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration.
Furthermore, the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international
law,
and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the
Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in
the
same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government
could
not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under
international