SC's first Amparo case

FACTS:

Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging
to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA.
After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007. 

Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving
them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending,
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos
subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition
as amparo petition.

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of
amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of
the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial
investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the present places of official
assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and
records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to
reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.

HELD:

In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing
violation of the Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been
violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public
officials or employees and by private individuals or entities. xxx Understandably,
since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by
private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The
circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably
support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted,
tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court
explained. (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October
7, 2008)
REV. REYES VS GONZALES (2009)

FACTS:

Petitioner, Rev. Reyes was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel

siege on November 2007 and together with fifty (50) others, they were brought to
Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings.  On December 2007, a Hold Departure
Order List was issued ordering the Immigration to include the name of petitioner and
49 others for the alleged crime of Rebellion, in the interest of national security and
public safety.

Petitioner’s counsel wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO, in view of
the dismissal of his client’s criminal case on rebellion. That, the DOJ Secretary has
not acted on their request, petitioner then next recourse was for the availment of the
writ of amparo because of his alleged continued restraint of right to travel.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by
the issuance of the HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of
amparo.

HELD:

No. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. Here, the
restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the
criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to
establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it
amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there
exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.

The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise
in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. Where, as
in this case, there is no clear showing that the right to life, liberty or security of the
petitioner is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is
continuing. Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely speculative.

Petition is dismissed.

RODRIGUEZ VS ARROYO
FACTS:

Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan, a

peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). Under the
Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP members as an enemy of the state, making
its members an easy target of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances. On
September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio
Carlos in Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took him and forced him to get
inside a car where more men in civilian clothing were waiting (1 was holding a .45 caliber
pistol). The men started punching Rodriguez inside the car, and forced him to confess
that he is a member of the New People’s Army (NPA).On September 17, 2009,
Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him (accompanied by members of the CHR
– Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan). They insisted to take Rodriguez home with them to
Manila. Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military members
went inside their house and took pictures for around 30 minutes despite Rodriguez’s
effort to stop them.

On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend notices that several suspicious-looking

men are following them on the streets, jeepney and MRT. On December 7, Rodriguez
filed  a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with
Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and
Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009. The petition was filed against former
President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj.
Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt.
Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan. Respondents contend
that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been working as their informant/infiltrator in
the fight against NPA rebels.

ISSUE:

WON the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of amparo

and habeas data cases.

HELD:

Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether

respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of
Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his
rights. Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal,
civil or administrative liability, but this should not abate the applicability of the doctrine
of command responsibility. “In the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may
refer to the participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in enforced
disappearance. Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents who
are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry
the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden
of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.”
“Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No.
191805, and allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo
and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence
that former President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights
to life, liberty and property. He likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the
accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and
Callagan.” SC affirmed the decision of the CA, but with modifications. The case is
dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac,
Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.

LEE VS ILAGAN

FACTS:

Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data against
Joy, her former common law partner.

According to him, sometime in July 2011, he visited Joy’s condominium and rested
for a while. When he arrived at his office, he noticed his digital camera missing. On
August 23, 2011, Joy confronted him about a purported sex video she
discovered from the digital camera showing him and another woman.

He denied the video and demanded the return of the camera, but she refused. They
had an altercation where Neri allegedly slammed Joy’s head against a wall and then
walked away.

Because of this, Joy filed several cases against him, including a case for violation of
Republic Act 9262 and administrative cases before the Napolcom, utilising the
said video.

The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy and that of the
other woman, thus he had no choice but to file the petition for issuance of the writ
of habeas data.

RTC issued the writ and directed Joy to appear before the RTC and produce Neri’s
digital camera, as well as the original and copies of the video, and to make a return
within five days from receipt. In her return,. Joy admitted keeping the memory card of
the digital camera and reproducing the video but only for use as evidence in the
cases she filed against Neri. Neri’s petitions should be dismissed because its filing
was only aimed at suppressing the evidence in the cases she filed against him; and
she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the
person of Neri. The RTC granted Neri’s petition and ordered the turn-over of the
video to Neri and enjoined Joy from reproducing the same. It disregarded Joy’s
defense that she is not engaged in the collection, gathering and storage of data, and
that her acts of reproducing the same and showing it to other persons (Napolcom)
violated Neri’s right to privacy and humiliated him. It clarified that it ruling only on the
return of the video and not on its admissibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Joy filed the
instant petition before the Supreme Court.

HELD:

A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule),
was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to
address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances[1]. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to
privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals[2], which is
defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of
data about oneself[3].”

As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands
as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security
is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.”

Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the
Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among
others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the
petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other[4].
Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence
showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim[5]. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas
data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful[6].

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that
his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through
the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex
video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video –
which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet
for public consumption – he to failed to explain the connection between such interest
and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security.

Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012

FACTS

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos
Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and
classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly
without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information
gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the
Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to
privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a
Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their
capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the
right to privacy is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to
life, liberty or security.

RULING

NO.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect
the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual,
and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the
privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and
her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this
regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against
her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public
officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he
state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private
life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of
information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of
the writ of habeas data must be denied.

Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 153 (1999)

FACTS:

        Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City wnet to
the police station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment
shows in the City. At the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim
Lingan and accused policeman Navarro who was then having drinks outside the
headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of the
accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow, resulted the victim to
fell and died under treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on tape,
specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation that it was
the victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man ,
testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he
had made of the heated discussion at the police station between the accused police
officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of
the two.

ISSUES:

       1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA

4200, which prohibits wiretapping.

       2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the

part of the offended party and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be
appreciated in favor of the accused.

HELD:

       1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wiretapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he
had made.

       The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private

communications (Ramirez v Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording
is not prohibited.

       2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the accused,
constituted sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper
conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, annoying or irritating someone.
The provocation must be sufficient and must immediately precede the act; and in
order to be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong,
which must be accordingly proportionate in gravity. The mitigating circumstance of
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong must also be considered. The
exclamations made by Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him
showed that he had no intent to kill the latter.
RAMIREZ VS. CA G.R. NO. 93833 SEPTEMBER 28, 1995

Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging that the
private respondent in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted
and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to
petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy.” In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event
and sought moral damages, attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation in the
amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at
the trial court’s discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. the RTC granted the Motion. From the RTC’s
order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court,
which forthwith referred the case to the CA. Respondent CA declared the RTC’s
order null and void, and holding that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense
punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. Petitioner filed a MR which the CA denied.
Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the consent of both
of the party is a violation of R.A. 4200.

Held: Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes,” provides that it shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by
all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator. The unambiguity of the express
words of the provision, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent
court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Zulueta v. CA

FACTS:  Cecilia Zulueta, petitioner, entered the clinic of her husband, Alfredo Martin,
private respondent, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinets and took a total of 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between the private respondent and
and hi alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, respondent’s
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were to be used in evidence
in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from practice of medicine filed
by the petitioner against the private respondent.
Respondent then filed an action for the recovery of the documents and damages
against the petitioner which was granted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
decision of the RTC was then affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) hence this
petition for certiorary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documents obtained be admissible as evidence against

the respondent.

HELD: NO. Such documents are inadmissible in any proceeding. Even though the
petitioner and respondent are husband and wife, their contracting of marriage does
not shed the right of privacy of one of the contracting parties. And that, such
documents were obtained without the consent of the respondent.

The Supreme Court ruled that the right to privacy of the spouse as against the other
is preserved even after marriage. As elaborated by the Court, “the intimacies
between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to
him or to her.”

38. Waterouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997

Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.

YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren
Tablets at P384 per unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that
the price per bottle is P320.00. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the
discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.

YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference
represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice,
which was paid to Ms. Catolico. Said check was sent in an envelope addressed to
Catolico.

Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug
Corp. confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check amounting P640
payable to Catolico. Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts
of dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being
rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of
one’s person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.

Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence

Held:  Yes. Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights does not
protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by
private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens
have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel
admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this,
the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of
Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the
Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

39. MARQUEZ vs DESIERTO

FACTS: Marquez, branch manager of Union Bank Julia Vargas, received an Order
from Ombudsman to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in
camera. The Ombudsman wanted to conduct such in camera inspection on the
accounts based on a trail of manager’s checks by a certain Trivinio who purchased
51 managers checks for a total amount of P272M. Marquez agreed to the inspection.

Marquez wrote to the Ombudsman saying that the accounts in question cannot
readily be identified and asked for time to respond to the order. The Ombudsman
replied that the Bank should have preserved records despite the accounts being
dormant.

Ombudsman issued order to direct Marquez to produce the bank documents due to
the unjustified delay by the Bank since the in camera inspection had already been
extended twice.

Marquez filed for declaratory relief to clear the rights of petitioners under the bank
secrecy law

ISSUE/S: Whether the in camera inspection orders are allowed as an exception to

the bank secrecy law? NO

RULING: The in camera inspection is not allowed. There being no pending case
before a court of competent jurisdiction. An exception to the bank secrecy law is
when the money deposited is the subject matter of a litigation. Therefore, it may be
allowed on the ground of a pending case when:

1. The case is pending in court of competent jurisdiction

2. The account must be clearly identified

3. Inspection is limited to the subject matter of the pending case

4. The Bank personnel and account holder must be notified to be present during the
inspection

5. Such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case
The order for in camera inspection is based on a pending investigation of the
Ombudsman for violations of RA 3019, Sec 3(e)(g). Clearly, there is no pending
litigation yet before a court of competent authority. It is only an investigation by the
Ombudsman.

40. O P L E V S T O R R E S   ( 1 9 9 8 )

FACTS: A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12,
1996 for the Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. It
was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January. Petitioner filed
the instant petition against respondents, on the grounds that:

1. it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,

2. it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.

ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as enshrined in the Bill of
Rights.

HELD: The essence of privacy is the “right to be left alone.” The right to privacy as
such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it
is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The Court prescind from the premise
that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence,
it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on
two considerations:

1. the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and ;
2. the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services.

It is debatable whether the interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance
of the said order. The broadness, vagueness, and overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which
if implemented will put our people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger. In
the case at bar, the threat comes from which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the
people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the
pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Petition is granted. A.O. No. 308
is unconstitutional.
41. TELEBAP v. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881. on the ground (1)
that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2)
that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the
laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or
regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of
election.

Issue:  Whether is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or

regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of
election.

Held: No. The petition is dismissed. With the prohibition on media advertising by

candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are about the
only means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs
of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the
failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would
clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art. III, §7 of the Constitution
provides that “the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized,” while Art. XII, §6 states that “the use of property bears a social
function [and] the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises [is]
subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when
the common good so demands.”

To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their
obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an
election is maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers
but entities with free speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with
the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the diversity of views on
political issues. This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of
broadcast media. To affirm the validity of §92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the
people’s right to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears
a social function and is subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the common good.
Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever
altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that
common good

42. ABS-CBN v. COMELECBS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS: COMELEC issued a Resolution restraining ABS-CBN or any other groups

from conducting exit survey during the elections for national officials particularly for
President and Vice President. The electoral body believed that such project might
conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the
National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL).

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC Resolution restraining survey polls infringes

the Freedom of Speech and of the Press.

HELD: The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass
media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press.
Hence, the COMELEC cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean,
honest, orderly and credible elections. Quite the contrary, exit polls — properly
conducted and publicized — can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-
fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the
COMELEC so as to minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of
exit polls, without transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our people.

The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is
sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to
the equally vital right of suffrage. The Court cannot support any ruling or order “the
effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech.” When
faced with borderline situations in which the freedom of a candidate or a party to
speak or the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly
made to assure clean and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor of freedom. For
in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State’s power to regulate
should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts
to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.
43. SWS vs Comelec

 Facts : Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-
profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields, including
economics, politics, demography, and social development, and thereafter processing,
analyzing, and publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner
Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of
general circulation, which features news- worthy items of information including
election surveys Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act),
which provides: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen
(15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be
published seven (7) days be- fore an election. Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to
conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national
and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as
publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other
hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the
elections on May 14,2001

Issue : WON Sec. 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of
freedom of speech, expression, and the press.

HELD : What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of
§5.4? The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in
United States v. O 'Brien: [A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. This is so far the most influential test for
distinguishing content-based from content neutral regulations and is said to have
"become canonical in the review of such laws." is noteworthy that the O 'Brien test
has been applied by this Court in at least two cases First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet
criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal connection of expression to the
asserted governmental interest makes such interest "not related to the suppression
of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because
of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election,
Sec. 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the
expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists,
radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion takers Even if the
governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of
speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, §5.4
nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O'Brien test, namely, that the restriction
be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already
stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of
bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of
election cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the
regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right
of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful
acts, rather than speechbecause of apprehension that such speech creates the
danger of such evils To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it
imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a
limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be
achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.

A.M. No. 01-4-03-S.C.       June 29, 2001 RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE
OF THE TRIAL OF IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES
AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG
PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO
ROMULO, petitioners, 
vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
oppositors.

Nature: Motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners request for

permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before
the Sandiganbayan.

Keywords:  Live telecast of President Estrada’s Plunder Case, right to information,

MENDOZA, J

Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent
a letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of
the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E.
Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioners invoked other than the freedom
of the press, the constitutional right of the people to be informed of matters of public
concern which could only be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing live radio
and television coverage of the court proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and
television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring
the desired transparency in the administration of justice.

However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel filed by
then President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio
and television coverage of court proceedings in view of protecting the parties’ right to
due process, to prevent distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to avoid
miscarriage of justice.

Issue: Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to

information of public concern be given more weight  than the fundamental rights of
the accused.

Ratio: The petition is denied.

               

The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the
right to public information.  It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the
most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public
and in acquainting the public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within
the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the
accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its
constitutional proportions.

Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary
is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of
public's attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside
force or influence but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where
fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded."Television can work profound
changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on."The conscious or unconscious
effect that such coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision
of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a
vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.

Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him,
more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance.  A
public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly
condemned and that his rights are not compromised. A public trial is not synonymous
with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who
wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and
observe the trial process.  In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have
enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings,
not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the
trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report
what they have observed during the proceedings.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President

Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of
the Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in
its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine
should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b)
cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement
of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary
purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of
scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast
of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the
cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of
court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the
conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made
under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned
and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with
the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof
shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and
Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.

45. Newsounds Broadcasting vs. Dy, G.R. No. 170270, April 2, 2009
Nature: Petition for Review emanated from a petition for mandamus

Nature: Petition for Review emanated from a petition for mandamus

Keywords: Prior restraint, Permit to operate, Agricultural land to Commercial

Summary: RTC rendered a Decision denying the petition for mandamus. The RTC

upheld all the arguments of the respondents, including their right to deny the sought
after mayors permit unless they were duly satisfied that the subject property has
been classified as commercial in nature. The Decision made no reference to the
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, ruling that the RTC did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in impliedly denying the application for preliminary mandatory
injunction.

TINGA, J.:

Facts: Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM

radio broadcast station, and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station,
in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its
broadcasting station, management office, and transmitters on propery located in
Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.

On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified
that the commercial structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning
regulations, noting as well that the location is classified as a “commercial area”. The
radio station was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter.
In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayor’s permit, City
Zoning Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance
on the grounds that petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers showing
that the agricultural land was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the
court to compel the issuance of mayor’s permit but the court denied the action. In the
meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II office issued to
petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural to
commercial.

In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit,
attaching the DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of
Cauayan City denied the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did
not have record of the DAR Order.

The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma
Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due
to the prvosion of Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station
during the pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the
petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again by respondent
Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless,
COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections. Petitioners
filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayor’s permit but both courts
denied the petition.

A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and
permits, and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon
which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In
case of Cauayan City, the authority to require a mayor’s permit was enacted through
Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993. However, nothing in the ordinance requires
an application for a mayor’s permit to submit “either an approved land conversion
papers from DAR, showing that its property was converted from prime agricultural
land or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang
Panglungsod authorizing the reclassification of property from agricultural to
commercial land.

In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as
commercial. Petitioners are also armed with several certifications stating that the
property is indeed a commercial area. Also, petitioners paid real property taxes
based on the classification of property as commercial without objections raised by the
respondents.

Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of

Cauayan of the commercial character of the property constitutes estoppels against
respondents from denying the fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that
“the government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified
that this concept is understood to only refer to acts and mistakes of its official
especially to those which are irregular.

Issue: WON there is prior restraint against DZNC

Ratio: YES.

Petitioners have taken great pains to depict their struggle as a textbook case of
denial of the right to free speech and of the press. In their tale, there is undeniable
political color. They admit that in 2001, Bombo Radyo was aggressive in exposing
the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored
respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty. Respondent Ceasar
Dy is the brother of Faustino Dy, Jr., governor of Isabela from 2001 until he was
defeated in his re-election bid in 2004 by Grace Padaca, a former assistant station
manager at petitioners own DZNC Bombo Radyo. A rival AM radio station in
Cauayan City, DWDY, is owned and operated by the Dy family. Petitioners likewise
direct our attention to a 20 February 2004 article printed in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer where Dy is quoted as intending to file disenfranchisement proceedings
against DZNC-AM.

The partisan component of this dispute will no doubt sway many observers towards
one opinion or the other, but not us. The comfort offered by the constitutional shelter
of free expression is neutral as to personality, affinity, ideology and popularity. The
judges tasked to enforce constitutional order are expected to rule accordingly from
the comfort of that neutral shelter.

The following undisputed facts bring the issue of free expression to fore. Petitioners
are authorized by law to operate radio stations in Cauayan City, and had been doing
so for some years undisturbed by local authorities. Beginning in 2002, respondents in
their official capacities have taken actions, whatever may be the motive, that have
impeded the ability of petitioners to freely broadcast, if not broadcast at all. These
actions have ranged from withholding permits to operate to the physical closure of
those stations under color of legal authority. While once petitioners were able to
broadcast freely, the weight of government has since bore down upon them to
silence their voices on the airwaves. An elementary school child with a basic
understanding of civics lessons will recognize that free speech animates these
cases.

Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the
respondents, we can identify the bare acts of closing the radio stations or
preventing their operations as an act of prior restraint against speech,
expression or of the press. Prior restraint refers to official governmental
restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. While any system of prior restraint comes to
court bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality, not all prior
restraints on speech are invalid.

That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom
of expression of respondents who happen to be members of the press is clear
enough. There is a long-standing tradition of special judicial solicitude for free
speech, meaning that governmental action directed at expression must satisfy a
greater burden of justification than governmental action directed at most other forms
of behavior. We had said in SWS v. COMELEC: Because of the preferred status of
the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is
vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior restraints
of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity. . . . The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing
justification for the enforcement of such restraint. There is thus a reversal of the
normal presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation.

At the same time, jurisprudence distinguishes between  a content-neutral regulation,

i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls
the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; and a content-based 
restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech. Content-based laws are generally treated as more suspect than
content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation
of expression.[44] Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may
amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.

Ostensibly, the act of an LGU requiring a business of proof that the property from
which it operates has been zoned for commercial use can be argued, when applied
to a radio station, as content-neutral since such a regulation would presumably apply
to any other radio station or business enterprise within the LGU.

However, the circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of the
respondents as a content-based restraint.

35.3. The timing of respondents closure of petitioners radio stations is also very
telling. The closure comes at a most critical time when the people are set to exercise
their right of suffrage. Such timing emphasizes the ill motives of respondents.

In their Answer with Comment to the petition for mandamus, respondents admitted
that petitioners had made such exposes during the 2001 elections, though they
denied the nature and truthfulness of such reports. They conceded that the Philippine
Daily Inquirer story reported that Dy said he planned to file disenfranchisement
proceedings against [DZNC]-AM. While respondents assert that there are other AM
radio stations in Isabela, they do not specifically refute that station DWDY was owned
by the Dy family, or that DZNC and DWDY are the two only stations that operate out
of Cauayan.
Prior to 2002, petitioners had not been frustrated in securing the various local
government requirements for the operation of their stations. It was only in the
beginning of 2002, after the election of respondent Ceasar Dy as mayor of Cauayan,
that the local government started to impose these new requirements substantiating
the conversion of CDCs property for commercial use. Petitioners admit that during
the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyo was aggressive in exposing the widespread
election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored Respondent Dy and
other members of the Dy political dynasty.[52] Respondents efforts to close
petitioners radio station clearly intensified immediately before the May 2004
elections, where a former employee of DZNC Bombo Radyo, Grace Padaca, was
mounting a credible and ultimately successful challenge against the incumbent
Isabela governor, who happened to be the brother of respondent Dy. It also bears
notice that the requirements required of petitioners by the Cauayan City government
are frankly beyond the pale and not conventionally adopted by local governments
throughout the Philippines.

All those circumstances lead us to believe that the steps employed by respondents to
ultimately shut down petitioners radio station were ultimately content-based. The
United States Supreme Court generally treats restriction of the expression of a
particular point of view as the paradigm violation of the First Amendment. The facts
confronting us now could have easily been drawn up by a constitutional law professor
eager to provide a plain example on how free speech may be violated.

The Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant
heightened or strict scrutiny from the Court, the test which we have deemed
appropriate in assessing content-based restrictions on free speech, as well as
for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, of
laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal
protection.[54] The immediate implication of the application of the strict
scrutiny test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of
government to prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners
constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in the absence of
any compelling reason,[55] the burden lies with the government to establish
such compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the

Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant petition for mandamus is hereby
GRANTED and respondents are directed to immediately issue petitioners zoning
clearances and mayors permits for 2004 to petitioners

Notes: Whenever the force of government or any of its political subdivisions bears

upon to close down a private broadcasting station, the issue of free speech
infringement cannot be minimized, no matter the legal justifications offered for the
closure. In many respects, the present petitions offer a textbook example of how the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, expression and of the press may be
unlawfully compromised. Tragically, the lower courts involved in this case failed to
recognize or assert the fundamental dimensions, and it is our duty to reverse, and to
affirm the Constitution and the most sacred rights it guarantees.

46. Hector Villanueva v. PDI

DOCTRINE: Consistent with good faith, reasonable care and the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of the press, the press should not be held to account, to a point
of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of
language.  There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for
misjudgment.  Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they
courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy. A
newspaper, especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report
on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with
minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil
charges for malice or damages, i.e. libel, so long as the newspaper respects and
keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general
community.

For liability in libel cases to arise without offending press freedom, there is
this test to meet: "The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
‘actual malice’— that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." There can be no presumption of actual malice on
privileged communication, thus it must be sufficiently proved. Fair commentaries on
matters of public interest are privileged communication and constitute a valid defense
in an action for libel or slander for as such, no malice can be aptly be presumed on
them. The instant articles of the case dealt with matters of public interest.  These are
matters about which the public has the right to be informed, taking into account the
very public character of the election itself.  For this reason, they attracted media
mileage and drew public attention not only to the election itself but to the candidates.
Thus, no malice may be imputed on these articles for the action of libel to stand, it
must be sufficiently proved.

FACTS:

Petitioner was one of the mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros Oriental

during the May 11, 1992 elections.

On March 30, 1990, Ricardo Nolan, another mayoralty candidate, petitioned

for the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections.  Said petition,
however, was denied by the COMELEC.

Two days before the elections, or on May 9, 1992, respondent Manila Daily
Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Manila Bulletin) published the following story:

The Comelec has disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as

Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for having been
convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority
and harassment in 1987, while he was officer-in-charge of the mayor’s
 office of Bais City.
A day before the elections or on May 10, 1992, respondent Philippine Daily
Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) also came out with a similar story, to wit:

The Commission on Elections disqualified Hector G.

Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for
having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave
abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was the
officer-in-charge of the mayor’s office in the city.

On May 11, 1992, the national and local elections were held as
scheduled.  When results came out, it turned out that petitioner failed in his mayoralty
bid.

Believing that his defeat was caused by the publication of the above-quoted
stories, petitioner sued respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin as well as their
publishers and editors for damages before the RTC of Bais City.  He alleged that the
articles were “maliciously timed” to defeat him.  He claimed he should have won by
landslide, but his supporters reportedly believed the news items distributed by his
rivals and voted for other candidates.  He asked for actual damages of P270,000 for
the amount he spent for the campaign, moral damages of P10,000,000, an
unspecified amount of exemplary damages, attorney’s fees of P300,000 and costs of
suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Bulletin and Philippine Daily Inquirer are liable for
damages or libel for the published article.

RULING: NO

For liability in libel cases to arise without offending press freedom, there is
this test to meet: "The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
‘actual malice’— that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged communication and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or
slander for as such, no malice can be aptly be presumed on them.  The rule on
privileged communication had its genesis not in the nation’s penal code but in the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press.  As
early as 1918, in United States v. Cañete, this Court ruled that publications which are
privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of
freedom of speech.

In the instant case, there is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with
matters of public interest.  These are matters about which the public has the right to
be informed, taking into account the very public character of the election itself.  For
this reason, they attracted media mileage and drew public attention not only to the
election itself but to the candidates.

In the instant case, we find no conclusive showing that the published articles
in question were written with knowledge that these were false or in reckless disregard
of what was false or not. 
 Nevertheless, even assuming that the contents of the articles turned out to be
false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual
malice.  Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression
and debate.  Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be
held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the
choice of language.  There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for
misjudgment.  Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they
courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy.

A newspaper, especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free

to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest
with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or
civil charges for malice or damages, i.e. libel, so long as the newspaper respects and
keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general
community.

As aptly observed in Quisumbing v. Lopez, et al.:

Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name

and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under
the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused
the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such
leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and
effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In
the preparation of stories, press reporters and edition usually have
to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and
reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point
of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice
of words.

We find respondents entitled to the protection of the rules concerning

qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our Bill of Rights.  We
cannot punish journalists including publishers for an honest endeavor to serve the
public when moved by a sense of civic duty and prodded by their sense of
responsibility as news media to report what they perceived to be a genuine report.

47. G.R. No.  180291, July 27, 2010 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE

SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as PRESIDENT and
GENERAL MANAGER of the GSIS, Petitioners, vs. DINNAH VILLAVIZA,
ELIZABETH DUQUE, ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ, RODEL RUBIO, ROWENA
THERESE B. GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, and ANTONIO JOSE LEGARDA,
Respondents.

Facts: PGM Garcia, as President and General Manager of the GSIS, filed separate
formal charges against respondents and eventually found them guilty for Grave
Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and meting
out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant
thereto. The charges contained that respondent, wearing red shirt together with
some employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office
of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for
Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the
GSIS premises.

On appeal, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office
wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or
mass action proscribed above. CSC added that their actuations can be deemed an
exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA found no
cogent reason to deviate therefrom.

Issue: Whether or not the unruly mass gathering of twenty employees during office
hours, inside office premises to protest falls within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.

Ruling: Yes.

As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the

political rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or mass
action proscribed must be coupled with the intent of effecting work stoppage or
service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession. Wearing
similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with
them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the guards
and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or
service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force
concession.

The limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316

are there to temper and focus the application of such prohibition. Not all collective
activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we
would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression.

Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the
land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their
rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of
expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the
members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be
reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.

Respondents freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSCs

Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action
has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that definition,
respondents actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass
action.
 48. Soriano v. MTRCB

Facts:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program
Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days
after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were
lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner‘s remark,
was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

Issue: Whether or not Soriano‘s statements during the televised ―Ang Dating Daan‖
part of the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.

Held: No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering
the adverse effect of petitioner‘s utterances on the viewers‘ fundamental rights as
well as petitioner‘s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly
suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it
cannot be properly asserted that petitioner‘s suspension was an undue curtailment of
his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment.
Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public
trusteeship character of a broadcaster‘s role and the power of the State to regulate
broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary
effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few,
if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

The SC ruled that ―Soriano‘s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with
respect to the average child,‖ and thus his utterances cannot be considered as
protected speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said
that the analysis should be ―context based‖ and found the utterances to be obscene
after considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the
show, and the ―G‖ rating of the show, which are all factors that made the utterances
susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words
could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were
used.‖

The SC also said ―that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a ―form of
permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment.‖ In affirming the
power of the MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said that ―it is a
sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul
of the free speech clause.‖ visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the
suspension ―is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the
broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB,‖
rather, it was a sanction for ―the indecent contents of his utterances in a ―G‖ rated
TV program.‖ (Soriano v. Laguardia; GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009)
 Dissenting Opinion:

PUNO, J.:

In a separate dissenting opinion, said that a single government action could be both
a penalty and a prior restraint. The Chief Magistrate pointed out that the three month
suspension takes such form because it also acts as a restraint to petitioner‘s future
speech and thus deserves a higher scrutiny than the ―context based‖ approach that
the majority applied. In voting to grant Soriano‘s petition, the Chief Justice said that
―in the absence of proof and reason, he [Soriano] should not be penalized with a
three-month suspension that works as a prior restraint on his speech.

49. a SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., vs.ANTI-

TERRORISM COUNCIL, et. al G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010 chilling effect,
facial challenge, Human Security Act of 2007, in terrorem effect

FACTS: Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the
definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 (the Human Security Act of 2007)
in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace”
and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving
law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUE: Can the Human Security Act of 2007 be facially challenged on the grounds of
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines?

RULING: No. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases,
wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted. 

In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan it was held that: A facial challenge is allowed to be

made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling
effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is
allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech.

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, represented by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente

Navarra
vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
On February 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within the compound of
San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately 6×10 in size.
They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is
the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience
Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)/ Team Buhay” or “(Pro-RH)/Team
Patay”.
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption
of the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team
Buhay”:
Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued
a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop
Vicente M. Navarra, otherwise, COMELEC will be constrained to file an election
offense against the petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether the act of the COMELEC infringes the Freedom of Religion and
Freedom of Speech.

HELD:

On Freedom of Religion. As aptly argued by COMELEC, the tarpaulin, on its face,

“does not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic church.” That the position of
the Catholic church appears to coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding
the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of religious
speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified under
“Team Patay” and “Team Buhay” according to their respective votes on the RH Law.

On Freedom of Speech. Embedded in the tarpaulin, are opinions expressed by

petitioners. It is a specie of expression protected by our fundamental law. There are
several theories and schools of thought that strengthen the need to protect the basic
right to freedom of expression.

1. First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including
the right to criticize government actions. Speech that promotes dialogue on public
affairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent, should thus be protected
and encouraged.
2. Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place
of ideas.
3. Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity.
4. Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity.
5. Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to “protect individuals
and minorities against majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the] framework
[of democratic governance]. ”
6. Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. In order to
avoid this situation and prevent people from resorting to violence, there is a need
for peaceful methods in making passionate dissent. Free speech must, thus, be
protected as a peaceful means of achieving one’s goal, considering the possibility
that repression of nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means just to drive
a point.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality
of our civil and political institutions; and such priority “gives these liberties the
sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.
BAYAN v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA
G.R. NO. 169838; 25 APR 2006

Facts:
Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYAN’s rally
was violently dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a
peaceful mass action they was preempted and violently dispersed by the police.
KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa
No. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to
implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored
was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M.
Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of
their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally
which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in
front of the UST and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them
along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then
forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were
arrested.

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985,
some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as
the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit,
no rally” policy and the CPR policy announced on Sept. 21, 2005. 

Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the

Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other
human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. 

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It
also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression
clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which
the expression is sought. 

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional
as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of
grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also
characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and
allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually
prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that
alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being
void for being vague and for lack of publication.

KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and
therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And
even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are
unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and
convincingevidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the
five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant
public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to the CPR
policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before
the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order
supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of
B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on
the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-
routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in
the free flow of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place
and manner of holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the
Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the permit is
for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880
is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.

Issue: Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.

Held:
No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful
assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is
directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public
assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places.
The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies
really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and
entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all
rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is,
likewise, no priorrestraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the
regulation.

The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal
firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely
confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as
it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared
null and void. 

The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all
necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa
No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom
park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from
the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior
permitshall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in
the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with
Section 15 of the law.

IBP VS HON. MANILA MAYOR ATIENZA (2010)

FACTS:

In 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz, filed
an application with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila for a permit to rally at the
foot of Mendiola Bridge to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law
students and multi-sectoral organizations. Respondent Mayor Atienza issued a
permit allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated Plaza Miranda as
the venue, instead of the Mendiola Bridge. Aggrieved, petitioners filed before the CA
a petition for certiorari but having been unresolved within 24 hours from its filing,
petitioners again, filed before the SC assailing the appellate court’s inaction or refusal
to resolve the petition within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act of
1985.

The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge, and as alleged by the Petitioners,
the participants voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program. A
few days later, the MPD instituted a criminal action,against Cadiz for violating the
Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit.

ISSUE: Whether the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic
Assembly Act and violates the constitutional right to freedom of expression and
public assembly.

HELD: The Court finds for petitioners. In modifying the permit outright, respondent
gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who
should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The
opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may
directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit. Respondent failed to
indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard
of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable
condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil, which “blank” denial or modification would,
when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any
judicial scrutiny thereof.

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880

AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT

PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."

Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people peaceably to

assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital
to the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free
exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal
protection of the law.

Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:

(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or
any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of
presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any
particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political,
economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.

The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages

for religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances: Provided, however,
That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully
observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action
in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined
by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas
Pambansa Bilang 227.

(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge
or other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public
ownership where the people are allowed access.

(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military,
police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or
in the dispersal of the same.

(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the
public assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-
speakers or sound system and similar changes.

Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall be
required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public
place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or
made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in
which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational
institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational
institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as
provided for by law are not covered by this Act.

Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply with
the following guidelines:

(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof,
and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of
persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.

(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under
Section 8 hereof.

(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality
in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days
before the scheduled public assembly.

(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the
office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted
at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.

Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant
a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will
create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience,
public morals or public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two
(2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall
be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his
behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted
by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to
have been filed.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application within
twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies
the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an
appropriate court of law.

(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial
Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate
Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-
eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall
be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to
the applicant shall, be immediately executory.

(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24)
hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the
executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involve
the use, for an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue,
road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave
public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the
participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no
serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.

Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and responsibility of the

leaders and organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and
steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in
accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the
following:

(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;

(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators

from disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly;

(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end
that the public assembly may be held peacefully;

(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time
stated in the permit; and

(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act
unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public
assembly.

Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement

agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to
adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command
of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one
hundred (100) meter away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and
order at all times.

Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative for law
enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or
organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide
proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the
freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies
shall observe the following guidelines:

(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators
shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong
displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe
the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;

(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of
firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with
visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;

(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not
be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats
of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.

Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public assembly with a
permit shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police
may disperse such public assembly as follows:

(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the
latter to prevent any possible disturbance;

(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the
participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property
causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the
public assembly will be dispersed;

(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph

should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing
a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;

(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the
public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or
any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended:

(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during the public
assembly shall not constitute a group for dispersal.

Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the public assembly
is held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be
peacefully dispersed.
Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act:

(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or
organizer without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required
from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place
other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be
punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise
peaceful assembly;

(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the

provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf.

(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the
application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;

(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly;

(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency
or any person to disperse the public assembly;

(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;

(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the
area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof;

1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox,

bomb, and the like;

2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;

3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;

4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;

5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by

the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.

Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the
prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding Section shall be punished as
follows:

(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month

and one day to six months;

(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g)
shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;

(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six

months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential
Decree No. 1866;

(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by

imprisonment of one day to thirty days.

Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the country shall within
six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable
"freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable,
shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings
may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit.

In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall
establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity of this
Act.

Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be
affected thereby.

Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions,
orders, ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondentA.M.

No. P-02-1651      August 4, 2003

Facts:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been
living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years
and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she
entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.

According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed
therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the

Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They
allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their
congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue:

Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held:

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to
freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of
the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges
against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the
symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction
between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by
the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation
of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to
further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that
the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate
goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it
constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

Soriano v Laguardia

587 SCRA 79 (2009)

Velasco, Jr. J.:

FACTS:

            In the evening of 10 Aug 2004, petitioner Eliseo Soriano as hose of the

program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks directed
towards private respondent Michael Sandoval, a minister of the Iglesia ni Cristo and
a host of the program Ang Tamang Daan:

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling.  Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa

sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba,
[dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae
yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan
ng mga demonyong ito.

            Two days after, complaints were lodged by Jessie Galapon and other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo before the MTRCB.  On 16 Aug
2004, the MTRCB issued an order preventively suspending Ang Dating Daan for 20
days in accordance with Sec 3(d) of PD 1986.

            Petitioner sought for reconsideration praying that respondent Chairperson

Consoliza Laguardia recuse themselves from hearing the case but later withdrew his
motion followed by the filing for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the preventive
suspension order.

            On 27 Sept 2004, the MTRCB issued a decision imposing 3 months

suspension from the program Ang Dating Daan.

ISSUES:

 W/N MTRCB is authorized under PD 1986 to issue preventive suspension.

 W/N petitioner was deprived of due process and equal protection for lack of
due hearing in the case.
 W/N petitioner’s utterance was religious speech protected by religious
freedom.
 W/N petitioner’s utterance was protected by freedom of speech and
expression.
HELD:

            1.)  Yes.  The Court ruled that administrative agencies have powers and
functions which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or
quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as conferred by the Constitution or the law.  The
authority given should be liberally construed.  A perusal of the PD 1986 reveal the
possession of authority to issue preventive suspension as found in Sec 3(d), “To
supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel… exhibition, and/or television
broadcast… as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable…”  Any other
construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.

Preventive suspension is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step in an

administrative investigation.  And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if
granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and, during
such investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint.

Moreover, the assailed Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) issued by MTRCB
in pursuant to PD 1986 merely formalizes the power bestowed by said statute.  The
IRR provision on preventive suspension is applicable not only to motion pictures and
publicity materials but only beyond motion pictures.  The MTRCB would regretfully be
rendered ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions petitioner envisages.

2.)  No. The Court ruled that since MTRCB handed out the assailed order in
response to a written notice after petitioner appeared before that Board for a hearing
on private respondents complaint, no violation of the guarantee was made.  Under
Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986, preventive suspension shall issue any
time during the pendency of the case. In this particular case, it was done after
MTRCB duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated PD 1986 and of
administrative complaints that had been filed against him for such violation.  At any
event, that preventive suspension can validly be meted out even without a hearing

 Neither the guarantee of equal protection was denied.  Petitioner argues that he was
unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers.  The equal protection
clause demands that all persons subject to legislation should be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities
imposed.  The Court ruled that petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself in
the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing administrative
complaints before the MTRCB.  For another, he offers no proof to such allegations.

3.)  No.  The Court ruled that there is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the
complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed
evangelical mission.  The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised
bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a
religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be
elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners attempts to place his
words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution,
not by any religious conviction.

4.)  No.  The Court held that be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial injunction
against publication or threat of cancellation of license/franchise, or subsequent
liability, whether in libel and damage suits, prosecution for sedition, or contempt
proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of expression.  Prior restraint means
official government restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance
of actual publication or dissemination.  The freedom of speech may be regulated to
serve important public interests and it may not be invoked when the expression
touches upon matters of essentially private concern.  The freedom to express ones
sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor and
integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed within the proper forum and
with proper regard for the rights of others.  A speech would fall under the unprotected
type if the utterances involved are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step of truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.

The Petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the
average child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech.
Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the Court said that the analysis should
be context based and found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use
of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the “G” rating of
the show, which are all factors that made the utterances susceptible to children
viewers.  The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily
understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used.

Austria v. NLRC G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999

KTA: Relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an

employee is purely secular in nature because it has no relation with the practice of
faith, worship or doctrines of the church, such affairs are governed by labor laws.
The Labor Code applies to all establishments, whether religious or not.

Facts: The Seventh Day Adventists(SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine

law. The petitioner was a pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when
his services were terminated.

On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several

communications form Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking him to
admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by
his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.

The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was
Pastor Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings
since he was very ill to be able to do the collecting.

A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of

dismissal citing:

1) Misappropriation of denominational funds;

2) Willful breach of trust;

3) Serious misconduct;

4) Gross and habitual neglect of duties; and

5) Commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized

representative as grounds for the termination of his services.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the
SDA for reinstatement and backwages plus damages. Decision was rendered in
favor of petitioner.

SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical

affair, and, as such, involves the separation of church and state.

2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the
complaint filed by petitioner against the SDA.

Held/Ratio:

1. No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is
involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an
employee, which is purely secular because it has no relationship with the practice of
faith, worship or doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all
based on Art. 282 of Labor Code.

2. Yes. SDA was exercising its management prerogative (not religious prerogative) to
fire an employee which it believes is unfit for the job. It would have been a different
case if Austria was expelled or excommunicated from the SDA.

ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (IDCP) vs. Office of the
Executive Secretary, et al (2003)

FACTS: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-

governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people,
especially to Muslim communities. Among the functions petitioner carries out is to
conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to
qualified products and manufacturers. On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the
Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating the Philippine Halal Certification
Scheme and designating respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue
halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. Petitioner contends
that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church
and State and that it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and
guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only
religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the
Muslims.

ISSUE: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of

religion

RULING: The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the societal, legal, political
and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community"
and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between
the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into
purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the "free
exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental
law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it
is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man
to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes
he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."
Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the
standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the
exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the
religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino
Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to
itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to
accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the
prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to
show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must
minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to
exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. There is no
compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like
herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the
premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning
to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and
promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing
laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food
products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and
safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.
With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and check
the quality and safety of food products, the perceived danger against the health of
Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. The halal certifications
issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official religious
approval of a food product fit for Muslim consumption. The petition is GRANTED.
Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
CASE: Velarde v Social Justice Society (SJS)

DATE: April 28, 2004

PONENTE: Panganiban, J.

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the RTC of Manila,
Branch 49.

Topic in Syllabus: The Decision

FACTS:

 January 28, 2003, Social Justice Society (SJS) filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) – Manila against Mariano “Mike”
Velarde, His Eminence Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo,
Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Bro. Eliseo Soriano. SJS sought the interpretation
of certain constitutional provisions, specifically concerning the separation of
Church and State, as well as a petition for declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of religious leaders endorsing certain candidates and asking
members of their flock to vote for a specific candidate.
 All respondents of the initial case sought for the dismissal of the petition on
the common ground that aforesaid petition by the SJS did not state a cause of
action and had no justiciable controversy. They were ordered to submit a
pleading by way of advisement which was followed closely by another Order
that denied all Motions to Dismiss.
 Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Eraño
Manalo moved to reconsider the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal Sin,
asked for extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with
the first Order by submitting his Memorandum. The Motions for
Reconsideration were denied as well.
 Main contents of assailed Decision:
 Aforementioned actions of respondents in the initial case
 That the trial court had jurisdiction over the Petition because "in
praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the
respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental
Law, [the Petition] has raised only a question of law." A lengthy
discussion of the issue raised in the Petition – separation of Church
and State – followed.
 A quo, it also mentioned that "[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in
an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation
clause."
 After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a
dispositive in its Decision.
 Petition for Review thus filed by respondent Velarde.

ISSUES:
  Procedural Issue:
1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the SJS with the RTC of
Manila have the necessary requisites?
- Justiciable controversy?
- Ccause of action?
- Legal standing?
 Substantive Issues:
1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by
the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court? (MAIN ISSUE in
connection with the syllabus topic)
2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be
prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may
they be banned from campaigning against said candidates?
RULING:

The Petition of Bro. Mike Velarde is meritorious.

“WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde

is GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 49) are
hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS
Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of
action.”

REASONING:

 Petition for Declaratory Relief, Sec. 1 Rule 63 of the Rules of Court

"Section 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question
of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties thereunder."
 Procedural Issue:
Requisites for Petition for Declaratory Relief
 Justiciable Controversy
- Refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory
- SJS failed to show an existing controversy in their Petition, as well as
the legal right of petitioners being violated by the respondents therein
- Elections had not even started yet  SJS was questioning a mere
possibility
- Premise was highly speculative and theoretical, thus insufficient
- No factual allegation that SJS’ rights were being subjected to any
threatening, imminent and inevitable violation that should be
prevented by the declaratory relief sought
- Judicial power and duty of court cannot be exercised when there is
actual or threatened violation of right
- All that the 5-page SJS Petition prayed for was "that the question
raised in paragraph 9 hereof be resolved," seeking an opinion of court
more than anything else
- Courts, however, are proscribed from rendering advisory opinions
 Cause of Action
- An act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or
rights of another, causing injury to the latter
- Essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation
on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
former to the latter
- HOWEVER, in special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept
of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply,
only that a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or
at least threatened
- Petition of SJS, however, discloses no specific allegation. Interest can
only be inferred in so far as the SJS “has thousands of members who
are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested
in a judicial clarification of the constitutionality of the partisan
participation of religious leaders in Philippine politics and in the
process to insure adherence to the Constitution by everyone.”
- General averment  not enough to constitute a legal right or interest
- In the whole Petition, there is no single allegation of fact upon which
SJS could base a right of relief and even granting that it sufficiently
asserted a legal right it wanted to protect, there was no certainty that
such right would be invaded by said respondents
 Legal Standing
- Defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged act
- Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised
by taxation. In SJS’s Petition, there is no indication, whether implied or
explicit, of taxpayer’s money being wrongfully disbursed
- There was also no showing that as a political party or with
members as voters, they would be adversely affected by the alleged
acts if issue were not resolved. No allegation that they had suffered or
would be losing votes through the actions of the therein respondents.
- The allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are
citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too general and beyond the
contemplation of the standards set by Philippine jurisprudence
 Sans legal standing, SJS insisted that the Court take cognizance of the
Petition as it raised “issues of paramount public interest.” This had already
been done in a prior case, that of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora, where the Court entertained IBP’s petition despite a lack in locus
standi. In this case, however, despite being given the opportunity to
substantiate otherwise barren allegations concerning the supposed
constitutional issue, counsels for both sides – particularly respondent SJS
– made no satisfactory allegations or clarifications.
 Regarding proper proceedings before the trial court, the following must be
noted in order to not waste precious judicial time and effort:
(Copy-pasted from case because it’s too long and impossible to
shorten.)
Prefatorily, the trial court may -- motu proprio or upon motion of the
defendant -- dismiss a complaint (or petition, in a special civil action)
that does not allege the plaintiff’s (or petitioner’s) cause or causes of
action. A complaint or petition should contain "a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies
for his claim or defense." It should likewise clearly specify the relief
sought.
Upon the filing of the complaint/petition and the payment of the
requisite legal fees, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the
corresponding summons to the defendants or the respondents, with a
directive that the defendant answer within 15 days, unless a different
period is fixed by the court. The summons shall also contain a notice
that if such answer is not filed, the plaintiffs/petitioners shall take a
judgment by default and may be granted the relief applied for. The
court, however, may -- upon such terms as may be just -- allow an
answer to be filed after the time fixed by the Rules.
If the answer sets forth a counterclaim or cross-claim, it must be
answered within ten (10) days from service. A reply may be filed within
ten (10) days from service of the pleading responded to.
When an answer fails to tender an issue or admits the material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion
of that party, direct judgment on such pleading (except in actions for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal
separation). Meanwhile, a party seeking to recover upon a claim, a
counterclaim or crossclaim -- or to obtain a declaratory relief -- may, at
any time after the answer thereto has been served, move for a
summary judgment in its favor. Similarly, a party against whom a
claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim is asserted -- or a declaratory
relief sought -- may, at any time, move for a summary judgment in its
favor. After the motion is heard, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if there is a showing that, except as to the amount
of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Within the time for -- but before -- filing the answer to the complaint
or petition, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss based on any of
the grounds stated in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
During the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their
arguments on the questions of law, and their evidence on the
questions of fact. After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action
or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleadings. It
shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the
ground relied upon is not indubitable. In every case, the resolution
shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.
If the motion is denied, the movant may file an answer within the
balance of the period originally prescribed to file an answer, but not
less than five (5) days in any event, computed from the receipt of the
notice of the denial. If the pleading is ordered to be amended, the
defendant shall file an answer within fifteen (15) days, counted from
the service of the amended pleading, unless the court provides a
longer period.
After the last pleading has been served and filed, the case shall be
set for pretrial, which is a mandatory proceeding. A plaintiff’s/
petitioner’s (or its duly authorized representative’s) non-appearance at
the pretrial, if without valid cause, shall result in the dismissal of the
action with prejudice, unless the court orders otherwise. A similar
failure on the part of the defendant shall be a cause for allowing the
plaintiff/petitioner to present evidenceex parte, and the court to render
judgment on the basis thereof.
The parties are required to file their pretrial briefs; failure to do so
 shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pretrial. Upon the
termination thereof, the court shall issue an order reciting in detail the
matters taken up at the conference; the action taken on them, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings; and the agreements or
admissions, if any, made by the parties regarding any of the matters
considered. The parties may further avail themselves of any of the
modes of discovery, if they so wish.
Thereafter, the case shall be set for trial, in which the parties shall
adduce their respective evidence in support of their claims and/or
defenses. By their written consent or upon the application of either
party, or on its own motion, the court may also order any or all of the
issues to be referred to a commissioner, who is to be appointed by it
or to be agreed upon by the parties. The trial or hearing before the
commissioner shall proceed in all respects as it would if held before
the court.
Upon the completion of such proceedings, the commissioner shall
file with the court a written report on the matters referred by the
parties. The report shall be set for hearing, after which the court shall
issue an order adopting, modifying or rejecting it in whole or in part; or
recommitting it with instructions; or requiring the parties to present
further evidence before the commissioner or the court.
Finally, a judgment or final order determining the merits of the
case shall be rendered. The decision shall be in writing, personally
and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based, signed by the issuing
magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court
 Based on aforementioned procedure of court proceedings, following
conclusions may be made concerning proceedings conducted in the RTC
of Manila:
- Initial pleading of the SJS was grossly inadequate  did not even
specify relief
Relief - a specific coercive measure prayed for as a result of a
violation of the rights of a plaintiff or a petitioner
- Apparently, contrary to the requirement of Section 2 of Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court, the Motions (of therein respondents) were not heard.
Worse, the Order purportedly resolving the Motions to Dismiss did not
state any reason at all for their denial, in contravention of Section 3 of
the said Rule 16. There was not even any statement of the grounds
relied upon by the Motions; much less, of the legal findings and
conclusions of the trial court
- The RTC issued its "Decision" without allowing the parties to file their
answers. For this reason, there was no joinder of the issues
- The questioned Decison was utterly lacking in requirements
prescribed by the Constitution and the Rules of Court
- Trial court indeed acted with inexplicable haste, with total ignorance of
the law, with grave abuse of discretion
 Substantive Issues:
1. Fundamental Requirements of a Decision (MAIN ISSUE in
connection with the syllabus topic)
 Constitution, Sec.14 Article VIII:
"No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No
petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis
 therefor."
 Rules of Court, Sec. 1 Rule 36 (Civil Procedure)
"Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. – A judgment or final
order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally
and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him and filed with the
clerk of court."
 Rules of Court, Sec.2 Rule 120 (Criminal Procedure)
"Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The judgment must be
written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the
judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a
statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law
upon which the judgment is based.”
 Administrative Circular No. 1, January 28, 1988: Prompted all judges to
“to make complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize
closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence
presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form
conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are
deduced.”
 Court cannot simply give a judgment without justifying its action – such
could leave parties in the dark and be prejudicial to the losing party
desiring to take the case to a higher tribunal
 People v Bugarin
- Requirements: intended to inform parties of the reasons behind the
decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the
appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with
which he disagrees
- Also, to assure parties that judge reached judgment through legal
reasoning
 Madrid v Court of Appeals
- Instructed magistrates to exert effort to ensure that their decisions
would present a comprehensive analysis of the factual and legal
findings
 Decision assailed:
- Begins with the nature of the action and the question or issue
presented
- Brief discussion of the constitutional provisions involved and what the
petitioners sought to achieve
- Proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the
separation of Church and State
- Did not include a resolutory or dispositive portion
 Manalang v Tuason de Rickards
- Dispositive of a decision  investive or controlling factor that
determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions
settled therein
 Significance of factual findings  value of the decision as a precedent
 Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional
mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void
Parts of a Decision

 Statement of a Case
- Legal definition of the nature of the action, whether civil or criminal,
etc.
- Criminal cases: verbatim reproduction of criminal information serves
 as a guide; importance emphasized when there is a question of
efficiency of the charges
- Mentions also: court of origin & case number
- Reproduction of the decretal portion of the assailed decision informs
the reader of how the appealed case was decided by the court a quo
 Statement of Facts
- Three ways:
i. Objective/reportorial method – summarizes without comment the
testimony of the witnesses
ii. Synthesis method - factual theory of the plaintiff or prosecution
and then that of the defendant or defense is summarized
according to the judge’s best light
iii. Subjective method - version of the facts accepted by the judge is
simply narrated without explaining what the parties’ versions are
iv. Combination of objective/subjective - testimony of each witness is
reported and the judge then formulates his or her own version of
the facts
 Issues or Assignments of Error
- Both factual and legal issues should be stated
- Though not specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues
may also be included, if deemed important for substantial justice to be
rendered
 The Court’s Ruling
- Includes a full discussion of the errors and issues involved in the case
 The Disposition or Dispositive Portion
- Criminal case: Innocence or guilt, specific crime, penalty imposed,
participation of the accused, modifying circumstance, if any then civil
liability and cost.
- Civil case: Whether complaint is granted or dismissed, specific relief
granted, costs.
- Test of completeness:
i. Parties should know rights and obligations
ii. Know how to execute decision under contingencies
iii. No need for further proceedings to dispose of issue
iv. Case should be terminated according to proper relief
2. Religious Leaders’ Endorsement of Candidates
 Issue deserved serious consideration. There was, however, a lack in
ultimate facts in the SJS Petition
 Counsel for SJS has utterly failed to convince the Court that there are
enough factual and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. On the
other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has sided with petitioner
insofar as there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed
Decision
 Assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution,
because it made no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void
and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this
Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just modify.

Taruc v. De la Cruz

Facts:
  The petitioners are lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC)
in Socorro, Surigao City.
 Petitioners led by Taruc clamored for the transfer of parish priest Rustom
Florano for the reason that Fr. Florano’s wife’s family belonged to a political
party opposed to petitioner Taruc’s. Bishop De la Cruz found this reason too
flimsy so he did not give in to the request.
 Things worsened when Taruc conducted an open mass for the town Fiesta
celebrated by Fr. Ambong who was not a member of the clergy of the diocese
of Surigao.
 Petitioners were then expelled/excommunicated from the PIC for the reason
of (1) disobedience to duly constituted authority, (2) inciting dissension
resulting in division of the Parish of Our Mother of Perpetual Help and (3)
threatening to forcible occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety among the
General Membership.
 Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against
Bishop De la Cruz and impleaded Fr. Florano and a certain Delfin Bordas for
conspiring with the Bishop. They said that their rights to due process were
violated because they were not heard before the order of expulsion was
made.

Issue: Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution – NO

Ratio: Section 5 of Article III

 A form of government where the complete separation of civil and

ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow
themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical in nature.
 In disputes involving religious institutions or organizations, there is one area,
which the Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences.
 To the power of excluding form the church those allegedly unworthy of
membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters, which are outside the
province of civil courts.

Comments: records show that Bishop De la Cruz pleaded with petitioners several
times not to commit acts inimical to the best interests of PIC. They were also warned
of the consequences of their actions yet these pleas and warnings fell on deaf ears.

Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. vs. Robredo

July 22,2014 | Brion J. | implementation of infrastructure project not subject to judicial
review

PETITIONER: Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc.

represented by its VP, Carlito Badion, et al
RESPONDENTS: Jessie Robredo in his capacity as Secretary of
DILG, et al

SUMMARY: Petitioners reside in the cites of San Juan, Navotas

and Quezon. LGU has a infrasture project that requires the
 eviction and demolition of illegally occupied areas by the
petitioners. Petitioners filed a case which argues that respondents
must first secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the court
prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279
and argued that the said RA was unconstitutional.

DOCTRINE: To justify judicial review to be conducted by the

Judicial department, the petitioners must establish facts that are
necessarily linked to the jurisdictional problem they presented in
this case.

FACTS:
 The members of petitioners were/are occupying parcels of land owned by and
located in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon

 These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant
to Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the
implementation and construction of infrastructure projects in the areas illegally
occupied by the petitioners

 Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions and demolitions without
any court order when:
o persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad
tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other
public places suchas sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; and
o persons or entities occupy areas where government infrastructure
projects with available funding are about to be implemented.

 On March 23, 2012, the petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus before the Court, seeking to compel the respondents to first
secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the court prior to their
implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.

 Petitioners argue that they have:

o No plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
o the respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 which are patently unconstitutional
for warranting demolition without any court order. (Section 6, Article 3
of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits the impairment of liberty of
abode unless there is a court order.)
o Violate their right to adequate housing, a universal right recognized in
Article 25 of Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights and Section 2 (a)
of RA 7279.
o Insist that they stand to be directly injured by the respondents’threats
of evictions and demolitions had previously conducted evictions and
demolitions in a violent manner, contrary to Section 10, Article 13 of
the 1987 Constitution.
o Also contend that the transcendental public importance of the issues
 raised in this case clothes them with legal standing.

 Respondent’s case:
o Respondents prays for the outright dismissal of the petition for its
serious procedural defects:
 Petitioners Ignored the hierarchy of courts
 Petitioners incorrectly availed themselves of a petition for
prohibition and mandamus in assailing the constitutionality of
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279

o For a writ of prohibition is merely to prevent the

public respondent’s usurpation of power or
improper assumption of jurisdiction, on the other
hand, a writ of mandamus only commands the
public respondent to perform his ministerial
functions. 

 the petitioners failed to particularly state the grave abuse of

discretion that the Mayor of Navotas allegedly committed.
 the petition does not present any justiciable controversy since
the City of Navotas had already successfully evicted the
petitioners in San Roque, Navotas 
 petition was filed out of time since the petitioners were
personally notified of the intended eviction and demolition on
September 23, 2011
 He further asserts that his faithful implementation of Section 28
(a) and (b) of RA 7279, which are presumed to be
constitutional, cannotbe equated to grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the petition should be dismissed for serious procedural defects – YES
(2) Whether Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 are violative of Sections 1 and 6,
Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution - NO
(3) Whether or not the petion may be subject to Judicial Review –NO

RULING: Petition is Dismissed

RATIO:
(1).

 The petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts when they

directly filed the petition before the Court.
 The petitioners appear to have forgotten that the Supreme Court is a court
of last resort, not a court offirst instance.
 The petitioners wrongly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition
and mandamus.
For a writ of prohibition is merely to prevent the public
respondent’s usurpation of power or improper assumption of
jurisdiction, on the other hand, a writ of mandamus only
commands the public respondent to perform his ministerial
functions. 
  The use of the permissive word "may" implies that the public respondents
have discretion when their duty to execute evictions and/or demolitions
shall be performed. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.
(2).

 The resolution of the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279

is not the lis mota (the cuase of the suit or action) of the case.
(3).

 The petition fails show the essential requisites that would warrant the
Court’s exercise of judicial review which are:
(1) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict
of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination;
(2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part ofthe
party raising the constitutional question;
(3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity;
and
(4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to
the decision of the case.

 the petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of
showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of
the constitutional question that he raised is unavoidable.

 Petitioners fail to show the necessity of examining the constitutionality of

Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3
of the 1987 Constitution. In the case of Magkalas v. NHA, this Court had
already ruled on the validity of evictions and demolitions without any court
order. 

 the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations that the public

respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing Section 28
(a) and (b) of RA 7279. Instead, theymerely imputed jurisdictional abuse
to the public respondents through general averments in their pleading, but
without any basis to support their claim.

Francisco Chavez vs. PCGG

(Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern)

FACTS:

Petitioner Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former gov’t official, impelled to bring
this action regarding several news reports on: (1) the alleged discovery of billions of
dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks and (2)
the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG)
and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
 Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information, demands that
respondents make public any negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s
task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise
on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of paramount public
interest, since it has a “debilitating effect on the country’s economy” that would be
greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino People. Hence, they have
the right to know the transactions effected by the Government.

Respondents, on the other hand, contended that petitioner’s action is premature,

because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the
negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be
compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the
Agreements have not become effective and binding.

Further, Pres. Ramos, in his Memorandum, commanded the PCGG Chairman

NOT to approve the Compromise Agreements. Embodied in the covenant that (a)
the Marcoses shall provide the gov’t assistance by way of testimony or disposition
on any information that may shed light on the cases; (b) the assets determined to
belong to the Marcoses shall be net of and exempt from, any form of taxes due the
Republic of the Philippines; (c) that all disclosures of assets shall not used as
evidence by the Gov’t in any criminal, civil, tax or administrative case against the
former.

ISSUES:

(A) Procedural:

1) W/N the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the
instant petition; and

2) W/N this Court is the proper court before which this action may be filed.

(B) Substantive:

1) W/N this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the
details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses;
and

2) W/N there exist any legal restraints against a compromise

agreement between the Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the
Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.

HELD:

First Procedural Issue

 YES. The Petitioner has the legal standing to file the instant petition.

In Legaspi vs. CSC, the Court declared that “when a mandamus proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the
general public which possesses the right.”

The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and
access to official records and documents which guaranteed under Sec. 7, Art. III of
the 1987 Constitution. Due to the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down
by decisional law to sustain petitioner’s legal standing, i.e. 1) the enforcement of a
public right; 2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, the Court ruled that the petition at bar
should be allowed.

Second Procedural Issue

YES. Section 5, Art. VIII of the Constitution expressly confers upon the SC
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto
and habeas corpus.

The Court ruled that this petition is not confined to the Agreements that have
already been drawn, but likewise to any other ongoing or future undertaking
towards any settlement on the alleged Marcos loot. Ineluctably, the core issue boils
down to the precise interpretation, in terms of scope, of the twin constitutional
provisions on “public transaction.” This broad and prospective relief sought by the
instant petition brings it out of the realm of Civil Case.

First Substantive Issue

YES. The Court can require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of
any agreement, whether perfected or not.

Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides that the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or
decisions, as well as to gov’t research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Such recognized restrictions are as follows: a) national security matters and

intelligence information; b) trade secrets and banking transactions; c) criminal
matters and; d) other confidential information.

The Court emphasized that ill-gotten wealth assumes a public character

which refers to assets and properties acquired, directly or indirectly, by former Pres.
Marcos, his family and relatives through or as a result of improper of illegal use of
government funds or properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their public
office; or their use of powers or influences resulting in their unjust enrichment and
causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino People and the Republic of the
Philippines.

Thus, the Court can require the PCGG to disclose sufficient public information on
any agreement that may arrived at and any proposed settlement concerning the
Marcoses’ purported ill-gotten wealth.

Second Substantive Issue

YES. There are Legal Restraints existed against the compromise agreement
between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs.

Generally, law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to

the following matters: 1) the civil status of persons, 2) the validity of a marriage of a
legal separation, 3) any ground for legal separation, 4) future support, 5) the
jurisdiction of courts, and 6) future legitimate. A Compromise must not be contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order.

In Republic & Campos Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, the power to grant criminal
immunity was conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended by EO
No. 14-A, which provides:

Section 5. The PCGG is authorized to grant immunity from criminal

prosecution to any person who provides information or testifies in an
investigation conducted by the Commission to establish the unlawful manner
in which any respondent, defendant or accused has acquired the properties in
question in any case where such information or testimony is necessary to
ascertain or prove the latter’s guilt or his civil liability. The immunity thereby
granted shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats such testimony
before the Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by the
Commission.
 In the case at bar, the compromise agreements revealed serious flaws. First,
the agreements did not conform to the requirements of EO 14 and 14-A. Criminal
immunity under section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal
defendants in the ill-gotten wealth cases. The provision is applicable mainly to
witnesses who provide information against a respondent, defendant or accused in an
ill-gotten wealth case.

Second, under the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from
all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear
violation of the Constitution. Sec. 28(4), Art. VI of the Constitution specifically
provides: “No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Member of the Congress.” The PCGG has
absolutely no power to grant such exemptions.

Third, under the Agreement, the government binds itself to cause the
dismissal of all cases against the Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan
and other court. This is a direct encroachment on judicial powers of the court which
has the jurisdiction on dismissal. Hence, PCGG cannot guarantee the dismissal of
all such criminal cases against the Marcoses.

Fourth, the government also waives all claims and counterclaims, whether
past, present, or future against the Marcoses. This stipulation is contrary to the Civil
Code which states that “an action for future fraud may not be waived.” Further, the
Agreements do not provide for a definite or determinable period within which the
parties shall fulfill their respective prestations.

Based on the foregoing discussion, it is crystal clear that the Agreements

which PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs violated the Constitution.

Petition GRANTED.

Republic Act No. 8493             February 12, 1998

AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE

THE SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled::

Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998."

Section 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases. - In all cases cognizable by the

Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional
Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall, after arraignment,
order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of Facts;

(c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties;

(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and

(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.

Section 3. Pre-Trial Agreement. - All agreements or admissions made or entered

into during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced to writing and signed by the
accused and counsel, otherwise the same shall not be used in evidence against the
accused. The agreements in relation to matters referred to in Section 2 hereof is
subject to the approval of the court: Provided, That the agreement on the plea of the
accused to a lesser offense may only be revised, modified, or annulled by the court
when the same is contrary to law, public morals, or public policy.

Section 4. Nonappearance at Pre-Trial Conference. - Where counsel for the

accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not
offer an acceptable excuse for his/her lack of cooperation, the pre-trial justice or
judge may impose proper sanctions or penalties.

Section 5. Pre-Trial Order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an
order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such
order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the
course of action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest
injustice.

Section 6. Time Limit for Trial. - In criminal cases involving persons charged of a
crime, except those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of
One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties,
the justice or judge shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the
counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-
term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no
case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first
day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.

Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and

Between Arraignment and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be held
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused
has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending,
whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the
accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence
within thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by the court.

If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether
he/she interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require
the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an
affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove
such defense by clear and convincing evidence.
Section 8. Time Limit Following an Order for New Trial. - If the accused is to be
tried again following an order of a court for a new trial, the trial shall commence within
thirty (30) days from the date the order for a new trial becomes final, except that the
court retrying the case may extend such period but in any case shall not exceed one
hundred eighty (180) days from the date the order for a new trial becomes final if
unavailability of witnesses or other factors resulting from passage of time shall make
trial within thirty (30) days impractical.

Section 9. Extended Time Limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of

this Act, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity, the time
limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by Section 7 of this
Act shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period the
time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month
period the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial shall be eighty
(80) days.

Section 10. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in

computing the time within which trial must commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused,
including but not limited to the following:

(1) delay resulting from an examination of the accused, and hearing on his/her
mental competency, or physical incapacity;

(2) delay resulting from trials with respect to charges against the accused;

(3) delay resulting from interlocutory appeals;

(4) delay resulting from hearings on pre-trial motions: Provided, That the delay does
not exceed thirty (30) days,

(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of

venue of cases or transfer from other courts;

(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial question; and

(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during
which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement.

(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the accused or
an essential witness.

For purposes of this subparagraph, an accused or an essential witness shall be

considered absent when his/her whereabouts are unknown and, in addition, he/she is
attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or his/her whereabouts cannot be
determined by due diligence. An accused or an essential witness shall be considered
unavailable whenever his/her whereabouts are known but his/her presence for trial
cannot be obtained by due diligence or he/she resists appearing at or being returned
for trial.

(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is mentally
incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.

(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a
charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, or any offense required to
be joined with that offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was
dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the
subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.

(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-
accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or as to whom the time
for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted.

(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any justice or judge
motu propio or on motion of the accused or his/her counsel or at the request of the
public prosecutor, if the justice or judge granted such continuance on the basis of
his/her findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the
best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of
delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this
subparagraph shall be excludable under this section unless the court sets forth, in
the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends
of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of
the public and the accused in a speedy trial.

Section 11. Factors for Granting Continuance. - The factors, among others, which
a justice or judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under
subparagraph (f) of Section 10 of this Act are as follows:

(a) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely
to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of
justice.

(b) Whether the case taken as a whole is so novel, so unusual and so complex, due
to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is
unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established
by this Act.

No continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 shall be granted because of

general congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to
obtain available witnesses on the part of the public prosecutor.

Section 12. Public Attorney's Duties Where Accused is Imprisoned. - If the

public attorney knows that a person charged of a crime is preventively detained,
either because he/she is charged of a bailable crime and has no means to post bail,
or is charged of a non-bailable crime, or is serving a term of imprisonment in any
penal institution, the public attorney shall promptly:

(a) Undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a notice to be
served on the person having custody of the prisoner mandating such person to so
advise the prisoner of his/her right to demand trial.

(b) Upon receipt of a notice, the person having custody of the prisoner shall promptly
advise the prisoner of the charge and of his/her right to demand trial. If at any time
thereafter the prisoner informs the person having custody that he/she demands trial,
such person shall cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the public
attorney.

(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the
presence of the prisoner for trial.

(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the public attorney
a properly supported request for temporary custody of the prisoner for trial, the
prisoner shall be made available to that public attorney.
Section 13. Remedy Where Accused is Not Brought to Trial Within the Time
Limit. - If an accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 7
of this Act as extended by Section 9, the information shall be dismissed on motion of
the accused. The accused shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion
but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence in
connection with the exclusion of time under Section 10 of this Act.

In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall
consider, among other factors, the seriousness of the offense, the facts and
circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal, and the impact of a
reprosecution on the implementation of this Act and on the administration of justice.
Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty
shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.

Section 14. Sanctions. - In any case in which counsel for the accused, the public
prosecution or public attorney:

(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact that a
necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;

(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he/she knows is totally
frivolous and without merit;

(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he/she knows
to be false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or

(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the
provisions of this Act, the court may, without prejudice to any appropriate criminal
and/or administrative charges to be instituted by the proper party against the erring
counsel if and when warranted, punish any such counsel or attorney, as follows:

(1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an
accused, by imposing a fine not exceeding; fifty percent (50%) of the compensation
to which he/she is entitled in connection with his/her defense of the accused;

(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de officio or public prosecutor a fine not
exceeding Ten thousand pesos (10,000.00); and

(3) by denying any defense counsel or public prosecutor the right to practice before
the court considering the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days.

The authority to punish provided for by this section shall be in addition to any other
authority or power available to the court. The court shall follow the procedures
established in the Rules of Court in punishing any counsel or public prosecutor
pursuant to this section.

Section 15. Rules and Regulations. - The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules,
regulations, administrative orders and circulars which shall seek to accelerate the
disposition of criminal cases. The rules, regulations, administrative orders and
circulars formulated shall provide sanctions against justices and judges who willfully
fail to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions of this Act.

Section 16. Funding. - For the effective implementation of the rules, regulations,

administrative orders and circulars promulgated under this Act, the amount of Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) annually shall be appropriated from the allocation of
the Supreme Court under the General Appropriations Act. Thereafter, such additional
amounts as may be necessary for its continued implementation shall be included in
the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 17. Act Not a Bar to Speedy Trial Claim Under the Constitution. - No
provision of this Act shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial
as required by Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 18. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders,

rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 19. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act is declared

unconstitutional, the other provisions shall remain in effect.

Section 20. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation:
Provided, That Section 7 of this Act shall become effective after the expiration of the
aforementioned third-calendar-month period provided in Section 9 of this Act.

Estrada v DesiertoGR Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 Ponente : Puno, J.

Facts :

1. In 1998, Joseph Estrada was elected President of the Philippines, while Gloria
Macapagal- Arroyo was elected Vice-President. The president was accused with
corruption, culminating in Ilocos Sur Governor ChavitSingson’s accusations that the
president received millions of pesos from jueteng lords.

2. The Senate and the House of Representatives began early investigations

regarding the accusation, while key socio-political figures like Cardinal Sin, former
Presidents Aquino and Ramos, the vice president, senior advisers and cabinet
members called on the president to resign, and resigned from their cabinet posts
themselves.

3. The impeachment trial began on 7 December 2000, with 21 senator-judges

presided over by Chief Justice HilarioDavide. At a point when 11 senator-judges
ruled against opening a second envelope of evidence showing the president’s P3.3
billion bank account under the name “Jose Velarde”, the public prosecutors resigned
and a mass demonstration at EDSA began.

4. CJ Davide granted Senator Raul Roco’s motion to postpone the impeachment trial
until the House of Representatives resolved the lack of public prosecutors.

5. With the defection of more officials and of the army and police from the Estrada
administration, the president attempted to appease public sentiment by announcing a
snap election and by allowing the second envelope to be opened. The measures
failed, and the calls for resignation strengthened.

6. On 20 January 2001, the president negotiated with representatives of the vice-

president. News broke out that Chief Justice HilarioDavide would administer the oath
of presidency to the vice president at EDSA Shrine. Estrada issued two statements -
one stating reservations on the constitutionality of Arroyo’s presidency, and another
stating that he is incapable of dispensing his responsibilities as president, thus
allowing Arroyo to be the acting president.
7. The Arroyo administration was met with acceptance by the different branches of
government, by majority of the public, and by the international community. The
impeachment trial was closed, despite sentiments such as those of Senator
Defensor- Santiago that the impeachment court had failed to resolve the case,
leaving open questions regarding Estrada’s qualifications to run for other elected
posts.

8. The Office of the Ombudsman proceeded to file a series of cases regarding the
corruption of Estrada. Estrada filed a motion compelling the Ombudsman to refrain
from further proceedings until his term as president was over. He also filed a petition
to be confirmed as the lawful and incumbent president, temporarily unable to fulfill his
duties, thus making Arroyo an acting president only.

9. The Supreme Court ruled a) to inform the parties that they did not declare the
Office of the President vacant on 20 January 2001, b) to prohibit either party from
discussing in

public the merits of the case while in its pendency, c) to enjoin the Ombudsman from
resolving pending criminal cases against Estrada for 30 days.

Issues:

I. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.

II. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner
Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.

III. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for

the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption
that petitioner is still president, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.

IV. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground
of prejudicial publicity

Ruling:

I. The petitions present a justiciable controversy because the cases at bar pose legal,
and not political, questions. Hence, the cases are within the jurisdiction of the Court
to decide.

·  Definition of ‘political questions’: “...those questions which, under the

Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government.” --Former CJ Roberto
Concepcion

·  Arroyo’s government is NOT revolutionary in character, since her oath was

taken under the 1987 Constitution.

·  EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and the right

to assembly. It is intra constitutional in this regard (within the scope of the
Constitution). The resignation of Estrada that it caused and the subsequent
succession of of Arroyo are subject to judicial review. II. Estrada is NOT a
President on leave while Arroyo is Acting President.
·  Under Section 11 Article VII, Estrada says that only Congress has the
ultimate authority to determine whether the President is incapable of
performing his functions in the manner provided by said provision.

·  Hence, Arroyo has no power to judge Estrada’s inability to do his job as

President.

·  However, both houses of Congress expressed their recognition and support

of Arroyo as the new President, and it is implicitly clear in this recognition that
Estrada’s inability is no longer temporary. Thus, Congress has rejected
Estrada’s claim of inability.

·  Furthermore, Court cannot exercise its judicial power to revise decision of

Congress in recognizing Arroyo. To do so would be to transgress principle of
separation of powers, since this is a political issue. III. Estrada contends that
he has not been convicted in the impeachment case and that he enjoys
immunity from all kinds of suit.

·  Executive immunity provision of 1973 Constitution was no longer included

in the 1986 Constitution. This is in accordance with SC ruling in In Re:
Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from
being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but
not beyond.

·  When the president has resigned, then proper criminal and civil cases may
already be filed against him ·IV. Estrada argued that respondent Ombudsman
should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against
him because of prejudicial publicity on his guilt, and that respondent has also
developed bias.

·  In People v Teehankee, Jr. and Larranaga v Court of Appeals it was laid
down that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
press. Responsible press.

·  Our judges are smart enough to know the law and to disregard camera
drama and off-court evidence. Their exposure to media does not affect their
impartiality.

RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE

MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR
ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL.,
June 14, 2011 A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC

FACTS:

On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media

practitioners were killed on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. This
tragic incident came to be known as Maguindanao massacre´ spawned
charges for 57 counts of murder and additional charges of rebellion against
197 accused, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-162148-72, Q-09-
162216-31, Q-10-162652-66, and Q-10-163766, commonly entitled People v.
Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. Following the transfer of venue and the
reraffling of the cases, the cases are being tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn
Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
Almost a year later on November 19 2010, the National Union of Journalists
of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA
Network Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media
entities and members of the academe filed a petition before this court praying
that live television and radio coverage of the trial in this criminal cases be
allowed, recording devises be permitted inside the court room to assist the
working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the
broadcast coverage and the use of devices. The Court docketed the petition
as A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.
President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22, 2010 addressed to
Chief Justice Renato Corona, came out in support of those who have
petitioned this Court to permit television and radio broadcast of the trial." The
Court docketed the matter as A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC.

By separate Resolutions of November 23, 2010, the Court consolidated A.M.

No. 10-11-7-SC with A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.

Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has
attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime,
prominence of the accused, and the number of media personnel killed. They
inform that reporters are being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders,
and cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict orders of the trial court
against live broadcast coverage, the number of media practitioners allowed
inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media
institution.
Hence, the present petitions which assert the exercise of right to a fair and
public trial and the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio
coverage of court proceedings. They principally urge the Court to revisit the
1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President
Corazon C. Aquinos Libel Case and the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV
Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the
Former President Joseph E. Estrada which rulings, they contend, violate the
doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be narrowly
construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable
alternative.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for radio and television coverage of the
Maguindanao Massacre should be allowed

HELD:
The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners’ prayer for a live
broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to guidelines.
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of
trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar
as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances
test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the
right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that
pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair
trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a
judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is
not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a
fair trial.

On public trial, Estrada basically discusses:

An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him,
more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in
balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not
be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete
conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it
only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit
in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial
process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough
facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings,
not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to
distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be
totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.
Compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a workable
solution to the concerns raised in these administrative matters, while, at the
same time, maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in the two
previous cases.
The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm ─ [a] trial of any kind or in any
court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be
treated as a means of entertainment, and to so treat it deprives the court of
the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest
for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated. The observation
that massive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself
can so alter and destroy the constitutionally necessary atmosphere and
decorum stands.
The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to revisit the question
of live radio and television coverage of court proceedings in a criminal case. It
held that the propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involves the
weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the
right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the
accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to
control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial In so allowing pro
hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao
Massacre cases, the Court lays down the following guidelines toward
addressing the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada:

(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be

made both for documentary purposes and for transmittal to live radio and
television broadcasting.

(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application,
manifesting that they intend to broadcast the audio-visual recording of the
proceedings and that they have the necessary technological equipment and
technical plan to carry out the same, with an undertaking that they will
faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations and cover the entire
remaining proceedings until promulgation of judgment. No selective or partial
coverage shall be allowed. No media entity shall be allowed to broadcast the
proceedings without an application duly approved by the trial court.

(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside

the courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial
court. No panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting
or downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary
equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated official
or employee of the Supreme Court. The camera equipment should not
produce or beam any distracting sound or light rays. Signal lights or signs
showing the equipment is operating should not be visible. A limited number of
microphones and the least installation of wiring, if not wireless technology,
must be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court. The Public
Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall coordinate
and assist the trial court on the physical set-up of the camera and equipment.

(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to
the media entities shall be conducted in such a way that the least physical
disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings and the exclusivity of the access to the media entities.

The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the camera

equipment monitoring the proceedings shall be for the account of the media
entities, which should employ technology that can (i) avoid the cumbersome
snaking cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary ingress or
egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude undue commotion in case of technical
glitches.

If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the media
entities facilities, the media entities shall access the audio-visual recording
either via wireless technology accessible even from outside the court
premises or from one common web broadcasting platform from which
streaming can be accessed or derived to feed the images and sounds. At all
times, exclusive access by the media entities to the real-time audio-visual
recording should be protected or encrypted.
(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be
continuous and in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof where Sec. 21
of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court[27] applies, and where the trial court
excludes, upon motion, prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in
instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved identification issues or there
are issues which involve the security of the witnesses and the integrity of their
testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of corroborative testimonies is material,
minority of the witness). The trial court may, with the consent of the parties,
order only the pixelization of the image of the witness or mute the audio
output, or both.

(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no

commercial break or any other gap shall be allowed until the days
proceedings are adjourned, except during the period of recess called by the
trial court and during portions of the proceedings wherein the public is
ordered excluded.

(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going
proceedings, the proceedings shall be broadcast without any voice-overs,
except brief annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to
explain them at the start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary shall
observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court;

(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after
the finality of judgment, except brief footages and still images derived from or
cartographic sketches of scenes based on the recording, only for news
purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject to
the contempt power of the court;

(i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum

and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and
exhibition in accordance with law.

(j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the
supervision and control of the trial court which may issue supplementary
directives, as the exigency requires, including the suspension or revocation of
the grant of application by the media entities.

(k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study,
design and recommend appropriate arrangements, implementing regulations,
and administrative matters referred to it by the Court concerning the live
broadcast of the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the above-
outlined guidelines. The Special Committee shall also report and recommend
on the feasibility, availability and affordability of the latest technology that
would meet the herein requirements.It may conduct consultations with
resource persons and experts in the field of information and communication
technology.

(l) All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial
court (i.e., prohibition on recording devices such as still cameras, tape
recorders; and allowable number of media practitioners inside the courtroom)
shall be observed in addition to these guidelines.

RESOLUTION October 23, 2011

Petitioners Tiamzon and Legarta take issue on provisos (t), (g), and (h) of
the enumerated guidelines in the June 14, 2011 Resolution and allege that
these must be struck down for being unconstitutional, as they constitute prior
restraint on free expression because they dictate what media can and cannot
report about the "Maguindanao massacre" trial.
Accused Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan) also filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated June 27, 2011, alleging that the June 14, 2011
Resolution "deprives him of his rights to due process, equal protection,
presumption of innocence, and to be shielded from degrading psychological
punishment."

This Court partially grants reconsideration of the June 14, 2011 Resolution
and deny the Partial Motion for Reconsideration dated June 29, 2011 of
petitioners Editha Mirandilla Tiamzon and Glenna Legarta. The Court is now
disallowing the live media broadcast of the trial of the "Maguindanao
massacre" cases but is still allowing the filming of the proceedings for (1) the
real-time transmission to specified viewing areas, and (2) documentation.
In a constitutional sense, public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial.
The right to a public trial belongs to the accused. The requirement of a public
trial is satisfied by the opportunity of the members of the public and the press
to attend the trial and to report what they have observed. The accused's right
to a public trial should not be confused with the freedom of the press and the
public's right to know as a justification for allowing the live broadcast of the
trial. The tendency of a high profile case like the subject case to generate
undue publicity with its concomitant undesirable effects weighs heavily
against broadcasting the trial. Moreover, the fact that the accused has legal
remedies after the fact is of no moment, since the damage has been done
and may be irreparable. It must be pointed out that the fundamental right to
due process of the accused cannot be afforded after the fact but must be
protected at the first instance

To address the physical impossibility of accommodating the large number of

interested parties inside the courtroom in Camp Bagong Diwa, it is not
necessary to allow the press to broadcast the proceedings here and abroad,
but the Court may allow the opening of closed-circuit viewing areas outside
the courtroom where those who may be so minded can come and watch the
proceedings. Aside from providing a viewing area outside the courtroom in
Camp Bagong Diwa, closed-circuit viewing areas can also be opened in
selected trial courts in Maguindanao, Koronadal, South Cotabato, and
General Santos City where most of the relatives of the accused and the
victims reside, enabling them to watch the trial without having to come to
Camp Bagong Diwa. These viewing areas will, at all times, be under the
control of the trial court judges involved, subject to this Court's supervision.

The disallowing the live media broadcast of the trial in Criminal Case Nos. Q-
09-162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-1 0-162652-66, and Q-10-163766 is
subject to the following guidelines on audio visual recording and streaming of
the video coverage:

a. An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be

made both for documentary purposes and for transmittal to specified closed-
circuit viewing areas: (i) outside the courtroom, within the Camp Bagong Diwa
's premises; and (ii) selected trial courts in Maguindanao, Koronadal, South
Cotabato, and General Santos City where the relatives of the accused and
the victims reside. Said trial courts shall be identified by the Office of the
Court Administrator. These viewing areas shall be under the control of trial
court judges involved, subject to this Court's supervision.

b. The viewing area will be installed to accommodate the public who want to
observe the proceedings within the Camp Bagong Diwa premises. The
streaming of this video coverage within the different court premises in
Mindanao will be installed so that the relatives of the parties and the
interested public can watch the proceedings in real time.

c. A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the

courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial court.
No panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or
downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary
equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated official
or employee of the Supreme Court.

d. The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to

the closed-circuit viewing areas shall be conducted in such a way that the
least physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings.

e. The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator
shall coordinate and assist the trial courts involved on the physical set-up of
the camera and equipment.

f. The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and

the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition
in accordance with law.

g. The audio-visual recording of the proceedings and its transmittal shall be

made under the control of the trial court which may issue supplementary
directives, as the exigency requires, subject to this Court
 h. In all cases, the witnesses should be excluded from watching the
proceedings, whether inside the courtroom or in the designated viewing
areas. The Presiding Judge shall issue the appropriate orders to insure
compliance with this directive and for the imposition of appropriate sanctions
for its violation.

Jonathan Cariaga v. CA

June 6, 2001

Gonzaga-Reyes

Nature:

Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA affirming RTC decision

convicting Jonathan Cariaga of qualified theft

Facts:

Luis Aboitiz was the systems analyst of Davao Light & Power Company (DLPC).
He received reports that some private electricians were involved in the sale of DLPC
supplies. He initiated a covert operation to ascertain the matter and catch the
perpetrators.

In October 1988, he sought assistance of Sgt. Villasis, Chief of the Theft &
Robber Section of METRODISCOM-Davao. He also hired Florencio Siton as an
undercover agent under the pseudonym “Canuto Duran”.

‘Duran’ became acquainted with Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician, and he

said that his ‘boss’ needs some electrical materials to be used in Diwalwal, a gold
panning area. Ricardo offered to supply the materials saying that his cousin can
supply the same to him. ‘Duran’ was able to purchase some wires which came from,
as Ricardo said, his cousin named Jonathan Cariaga (accused). Jonathan was the
driver of a DLPC service truck. On November 1988, ‘Duran’ and Jonathan were
introduced to each other. After which, more transactions were made between the
two.

‘Duran’s undercover work came to an end when Sgt. Villasis ‘apprehended’ him
on February 1989. ‘Duran’ then ‘confessed’ in order to persuade Ricardo and the
others involved to come out with the truth. Ricardo and another person came to the
police station and confessed to their participation as “fence” for Jonathan Cariaga.

The prosecution, however, was unable to present Ricardo as witness as the

subpoena cannot be personally served to him as he was in Sultan Kudarat. Ricardo
was able to give a sworn statement pertaining to the stealing for a labor case
between Jonathan and DLPC for the latter’s alleged illegal dismissal.

Issues:
(1) WON Ricardo’s sworn statement is admissible as evidence
(2) WON Siton is a credible witness
(3) WON guilt beyond reasonable doubt proven

Held / Ratio:

Judgment affirmed with modifications.

(1) Not admissible. The RTC & CA erred when it admitted the sworn statement of
Ricardo as evidence in the instant case. Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence and Sec. 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure both speak
of admissibility of a testimony of a witness “unable to testify” in court. In Tan v.
CA, the Court has held that “unable to testify” does not cover cases of witnesses
subpoenaed but did not appear. Ricardo was only subpoenaed once. He was
neither dead nor out of the country. In fact he is in Sultan Kudarat which is merely
4 hours drive away from Davao. The Court must exercise its coercive power to
arrest, but, it did not in the present case.
(2) Credible. Contradictions in the affidavit and his testimony in the court do not
always militate against a witness’s credibility. Affidavits, which are usuall ex
parte, are often incomplete and inaccurate and, generally, inferior to a testimony
in an open court which is subject to cross examination.

Siton’s statement on direct examination that he “corrected” his affidavit does not
necessarily discredit him. The payment was made in exchange for his services as
agent and not for concocting a story. The other alleged inaccuracies are
negligible (e.g., description of Jonathan’s house)
(3) Yes. Jonathan cited testimonies of witnesses which seem to confirm that there
were no stolen goods. A more careful examination of the testimony reveals
otherwise.
The determination of sufficiency of evidence is based on the credibility and
quality, not on the number. Witnesses are weighed, not numbered, and the
testimony of one, if credible, is sufficient to convict. The defense’s bare denial
cannot prevail over the unimpeached testimony of Ricardo.

Mere circumstance that Jonathan is an employee of DLPC is insufficient to create

relation of confidence which is required for the crime of qualified theft. However,
access to the place where the taking took place OR access to the stolen goods
changes the crime to a qualified theft.

Appreciation of the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle is

proper even if not alleged in the information. A generic aggravating circumstance
may be proven even if not alleged. The truck was used to store & transport the
materials to the place where they are sold.

People vs Ong
G.R. No. 137348
June 21, 2004
Criminal Case Digest

Facts:

Based on prosecution through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, in the

afternoon of July 23, 1998, a confidential informant (CI) of the Special Operations
Division (SOD), PNP Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ignatius D.
Ferro about the alleged illicit drug activities of accused William Ong and Ching De
Ming @ Robert Tiu. As per order of Chief Inspector Ferro, a team of eight decided to
conduct a buy-bust operation. Once, CI confirmed the meeting time and venue with
the drug dealer, and exchanges of gift-wrapped packages rendered of one (1) sealed
plastic bag with a white crystalline substance by the accused Ong and boodle money
placed in a “W. Brown” plastic bag by SPO1 Gonzales, thereafter, the latter arrested
Ong while the CI and the back-up agents arrested co-accused De Ming.

The two (2) accused were brought to the police office where the corresponding
booking sheets and arrest report were prepared. The plastic bag containing the
illegal drug substance, was referred to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory for examination, positive for methyl amphetamine hydrochloride or shabu,
a regulated drug.

However, the appellants denied the story of the prosecution. Accused William Ong, a
Chinese citizen from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), claimed that he came to
the Philippines in 1997 to look for a job. Initially, he worked in a pancit factory in
Quezon City, but later hunted for another job, was referred by his friend Kian Ling to
Ong Sin for a possible job as a technician in a bihon factory owned by Sin.
Subsequently, without any knowledge of his new job, William Ong was later taken to
the police station and there he met the other accused Ching De Ming for the first
time. He maintained innocence to the crime charged.

On his part, accused Ching De Ming testified that he is a legitimate businessman

engaged in the RTW business. On that same date of the commission of the crime,
while waiting for his girlfriend and her mother, whose mother Avenlina Cardoz,
testified in De Ming’s favor and corroborated with his story, that he was approached
by persons unknown to him. He was misidentified as one of the accused and
dragged him out of his car and brought to the other car, took his clutch bag, then
after a few hours, at Camp Crame, they removed his blindfold. He denied knowing
Ong and the charge of conspiring with him to deliver shabu in New Manila, Quezon
City.

On November 18, 1998 the trial court convicted appellants as charged and imposed
on them the penalty of death. It likewise ordered each of them to pay a fine of P1
million pesos. However, the case was on automatic review. Appellants insist on their
innocence. They claim that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:

(a) Whether or not the arraignment of appellants violates Rule 116, Section (a) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure?

Held:

The aforementioned provision on Arraignment and Plea provides that (a) The
accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was
filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge
of clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading
the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads
guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those
named in the complaint or information.

The trial court held that the arraignment of appellants violated the above rule.
Appellants are Chinese nationals. Their Certificate of Arraignment states that they
were informed of the accusations against them. It does not, however, indicate
whether the information was read in the language or dialect known to them.

Both accused Ong and De Ming were arraigned, assisted by counsel de parte, and
both entered a plea of not guilty. From the records, it was clear that appellants only
knew the Chinese language, however the appellants were arraigned on an
information written in the English language. The requirement that the information
should be read in a language or dialect known to the accused is mandatory. It must
be strictly complied with as it is intended to protect the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause the of the accusation against him.
The constitutional protection is part of due process. Failure to observe the rules
necessarily nullifies the arraignment. After the arraignment and in the course of the
trial, the lower court had to secure the services of a certain Richard Ng Lee as
Chinese interpreter.

Hence, it is abundantly clear that it was the CI who made the initial contact, and he
was likewise the one who closed the deal with accused William Ong, and set the
venue and time of the meeting. Since only the CI had personal knowledge of the offer
to purchase shabu, the court held that SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the “poseur-
buyer” but merely the deliveryman. His testimony therefore on material points of the
sale of shabu is hearsay and standing alone cannot be the basis of the conviction of
the appellants.

The buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been
accepted as a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law.
However, to determine whether there was valid entrapment or whether proper
procedures were undertaken by the police officers, in effecting the buy-bust
operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the
operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and
competent evidence.

In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is
incomplete. The confidential information who had sole knowledge of how the alleged
illegal sale of shabu started and how it was perfected was not presented as a
witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal
knowledge of the same and not part of the buy-bust operation.

Although, the court is sharply aware of the compelling considerations why

confidential informants are usually not presented by the prosecution. Likewise, once
the identity of the informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to
resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable.

In sum, there is no fixed rule with respect to disclosure of the identity of an informer.
The problem has to be resolved on a case to case basis and calls for balancing the
state interest in protecting the people from crimes against the individual’s right to
prepare his defense. The balance must be adjusted by giving due weight to the
following factors, among others: (1) the crime charged, (2) the possible defenses, (3)
the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and (4) other relevant factors.

In the present case, the crime charged against the appellants is capital in character
and can result in the imposition of the death penalty. The prosecution has to prove all
the material elements of the alleged sale of shabu and the resulting buy-bust
operation. Where the testimony of the informer is indispensable. It should be
disclosed. The liberty and the life of a person enjoy high importance in our scale of
values. It cannot be diminished except by a value of higher significance. Moreover,
the mishandling and transfer of custody of the alleged confiscated methyl
amphetamine hydrochloride further shattered the case of the prosecution. There is
no crime of illegal sale of regulated drug when there is a nagging doubt on whether
the substance confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be
regulated drug.

The court decided to reverse and set aside its former decision. Appellants Ong and
De Ming @ Tiu are acquitted of the crime of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, as amended, and are ordered immediately released from custody unless
held for some other lawful cause. 

People of the Philippines vs. Federico M. Chua Hiong

G.R. No. 10413-R October 20, 1954

Facts:

Federico Chua Hiong is the uncle of Cesareo Gacheco. Gacheco and his family were
defeated in a civil case in the CFI of Manila, which, if not overturned by the SC,
would lead to Gacheco and co. losing 2/3s of the inheritance left by a Paulino
Gacheco. Hiong sided with the party that defeated Gacheco. This created tension
and Gacheco wrote the Chief Finance Agent of the Department of Finance charging
Hiong with tax evasion and using a fake citizenship. He then wrote a letter to Vice
President Fernando Lopez accusing Hiong of illegal transactions with the
government.

A letter was written by a certain Benito Solipco to Hiong. (The SC says Solipco was
undoubtedly if not

Gacheco himself, acting under Gacheco’s inducement.) It said that the members of
the Go Family Association, of which Gocheco belonged, told Solipco that they will
make every vengeance against Hiong, such as paying some persons to kill him, or
reporting him to every Philippine Government Authority that he is a communist and
other kinds of vengeance. The letter warned Hiong to be careful as the Go Family
wee all his enemies now and that they will make every vengeance against him at all
cost. The letter was contained in an envelope along with a rope which contained a
note saying “this serves for your personal use.” Hiong received threats on the phone
and was denounced as a communist through anonymous letters. Gocheco then
caused to be published articles entitled “Doubtful Citizenship” in the Feb 11, 1952
issue of the Manila Chronicle. It said that while the Commissioner of Immigration had
certain evidences supporting the Filipino citizenship of Hiong, the Commisisoner’s
decision was based on questionable proofs. It then proceeded to enumerate the
evidences such as:

1. Mr. Frederico M. Chua Hiong and his family, as shown, by the Master List of
alien registered in 1941 with the Bureau of Immigration, were registered
under reg no.s. 199-461 to 199466.
2. The proceedings of the Board of Special Inquiry at the Port of Manila, under
Chinese Board Report No. 1451, show that Mr. Chua Hiong was admitted into
the country as legitimate minor son of Chua Pe on September 23, 1913.
3. A certified Chinese Marriage Certificate secured from the local Civil Registrar
shows that his marriage was performed by the Chinese Consul at the
Chinese YMCA in 1926.
4. Affidavits sworn to by residents of Aparri, Cagayan, the place where the
alleged mother (of Hiong) lives, and submitted by the Chief of Police at the
instance of the investigator in this case, show that the alleged mother has
never left Aparri, much less the Philippines, and therefore could not give birth
to Hiong who was born in China.

In response, Hiong caused Seriously Speaking to be published in the Manila

Chronicle. It said: “This investigation was only one of a series of other investigations
conducted by different agencies of our government at the instigation of Mr. Gocheco,
who appears to be obsessed with a persecution mania in order to besmirch my name
and reputation and harass me and my family. To my eternal shame and misfortune,
Mr. Cesario T. Gocheco is my nephew. As such, he is cognizant of all of the facts of
my life for he has known me for the past 25 years….Why then this sudden concern
over my citizenship? Why this mad desire to bring harm to me and my family? The
reason is not hard to find – personal revenge is the moving passion in this drama of
intrigues and persecution to which I and my family have been subjected.… It is easy
to imagine the gloom, despondency and despair, that must have seized the Gocheco
family when the above decision was handed down as that would divest them of
everything that they now have and thus face stark poverty… It is obvious that the
name “Benito Sulipco” is fictitious, as it is the most natural thing that my enemies
should cowardly hide behind the cloak of anonymity, but, one need not stretch the
imagination too far to be able to guess the “mastermind behind these threats... For
what could be better or more convenient to my enemies than my untimely death, or
for that matter, my deportation from this country had they been able to prove their
charges filed with the different government agencies. What better or more convenient
weapon can my enemies avail of then a this systematic and malicious persecution in
order to coerce or cajole me into submitting to their demands that I should desist
from proceeding with the civil case I have instituted against the Gocheco family which
shall ultimately reduce them to the poverty of the

proverbial church-mouse?” Because of the article above, Hiong was found guilty of
libel by the RTC. He now appeals.

Issue: Whether or not Chua Hiong’s libelous publication was a proper act of self-
defense
Ruling: Yes

Self-defense applies to the crime of libel. Self-defense is a man’s inborn right. In a

physical assault, retaliation becomes unlawful after the attack has ceased, because
there would be no further harm to repel. But that is not the case when it is aimed at a
person’s good name. Once the aspersion is cast its sting clings and the one thus
defamed may avail himself of all necessary means to shake it off. He may hit back
with another libel which, if adequate, will be justified. Granting that the “Seriously
Speaking” column of the Manila Chronicle caused by Hiong was libelous, is it
unnecessarily libelous? It was intended to counteract the impression left in the mind
of the public by the article “Doubtful Citizenship” which Gocheco caused to be
published in the Manila Chronicle on Feb. 11, 1952. Hiong was living as a Filipino,
his livelihood depended mainly upon enterprises only Filipinos can engage in. It is
perfectly conceivable that any attempt to assail his Filipino citizenship should meet
the keenest defense from him. To flout in public the genuineness of one’s citizenship
is slanderous, nobody would dare deny, the more so Hiong’s case for obvious
reasons. The Doubtful Citizenship column makes it appear that his citizenship was
acquired through questionable means and that an investigation is currently being
conducted with respect to the legality of his citizenship. Gocheco’s purpose was to
malign Hiong. Because he lost in the civil case, Gocheco decided to air his
grievances through the press. Hiong’s Seriously Speaking Column is not necessarily
libelous because Hiong is entitled to show Gocheco’s motive behind Doubtful
Citizenship and to dispel the bad impression about him of those who had read it.

People v Malimit

DOCTRINE: The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of appellant's

identity immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human
experience. In fact the natural reticence of most people to get involved in criminal
prosecutions against immediate neighbors, as in this case, is of judicial notice.

FACTS:
 At 8 pm, Onofre Malaki(victim) was attending to his store. Malaki's houseboy
Edilberto Batin, was busy cooking supper at the kitchen located at the back of the
store
 Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. to purchase chemical
for his rice farm
 Batin had just finished cooking, he proceeded directly to the store to ask Malaki if
supper is to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store, he saw accused
Ercarnacion “Manolo” Malimit coming out of the store with a bolo while his boss,
bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on the floor struggling for his life
 Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the store, also
saw accused Malimit rushing out through the front door of Malaki's store with a
blood-stained bolo
o Aided by the illumination coming from a pressure lamp inside the
store, Rondon clearly recognized Malimit
 Both Batin and Rondon rushed to the nearby house of Malaki's brother-in-law
Eutiquio Beloy and informed Beloy of the tragic incident which befell Malaki.
 Batin, along with Beloy, went back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless body
of Malaki in a pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that
the store's drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was
 missing from his pocket

TC: Convicted accused for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide

One of the contentions of accused Malimit in this appeal is that the trial court erred in
giving credence to the testimonies of Rondon and Batin. He questions the credibility
of the 2 witnesses because they only revealed that they have knowledge of the crime
and identified the accused as the perpetrator, 5 months after the incident.
Date of the crime: April 15, 1991
Witnesses pointed at accused: September 17, 1991

ISSUE:
WON the testimonies of the witnesses may be appreciated by the court? YES

HELD:

Accused haphazardly concluded that Rondon and Batin implicated the appellant to
this gruesome crime only on September 17, 1991. The aforementioned date
however, was merely the date when Rondon and Batin executed their respective
affidavits, narrating that they saw the appellant on the night of April 15, 1991 carrying
a bolo stained with blood and rushing out of Malaki's store.

As to his claim of delay, suffice it to state that extant from the records are ample
testimonial evidence negating his assertion, to wit:
1. After having discovered the commission of the crime, Rondon and Batin
immediately looked for Eutiquio Beloy, Malaki's brother-in-law, and informed
him that appellant was the only person they saw running away from the crime
scene;
2. Beloy and Batin reported the crime with the CAFGU detachment in their
barangay where Batin declared that it was appellant who robbed Malaki on
that fateful night; and
3. Batin again made a similar statement later at the Silago Police Station.

Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the appellant only on
September 15, 1991, or after the lapse of five months from commission of the crime,
this fact alone does not render their testimony less credible.

The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of appellant's identity

immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human
experience. In fact the natural reticence of most people to get involved in criminal
prosecutions against immediate neighbors, as in this case, is of judicial notice.

At any rate, the consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is that the findings of the
trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses are given weight and the highest
degree of respect by the appellate court. This is the established rule of evidence, as
the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is a function best
performed by the trial court which can weigh said testimony in the light of the
witness" demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial. And although the rule admits of
certain exceptions, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the statements of
witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are
clearly unsupported by the evidence, we found none in this case.

Additional info:
The non-presentation by the prosecution of the police blotter which could prove if
accused was indeed implicated right away by Batin to the crime was not necessary
for the prosecution to present as evidence. Entries in the police blotter are merely
corroborative evidence of the uncontroverted testimony of Batin that he identified the
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime before the Silago police. As such, its
presentation as evidence is not indispensable. Besides, if appellant believed that he
was not identified therein, then he should have secured a copy thereof from the
Silago Police Station and utilized the same as controverting evidence to impeach
Batin's credibility as witness. Having failed to do so, appellant cannot now pass the
blame on the prosecution for some