(GR No L-24693) Ermita-Malate HMOA v. City of Manila

2/19/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 020
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 849

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City
Mayor of Manila
No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS

ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR, INC. and Go CHIU,
petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF
MANILA, respondent-appellant. VICTOR ALABANZA,
intervenor-appellee.
Constitutional Law; Municipal Corporations; Presumption as to

constitutionality of ordinance; Evidence is necessary to show invalidity.—
An ordinance, having been enacted by coun-cilors who must, in the very
nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular
municipality or city and with all the facts and circumstances which surround
the subject and necessitate action, must be presumed to be valid and should
not be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights
under the guise of police regulation. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void
on its face, the necessity for evidence to rebut its validity is unavoidable.
Where there was no factual foundation laid for overthrowing an ordinance
which is not void on its face, the presumption of constitution-ality must
prevail.
Same; Police power; Ordinance regulating hotels, motels, etc.—A
Manila ordinance regulating the operation of hotels, motels and lodging-
houses is a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard public
morals. As such, it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely
on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise
would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has
been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the great public needs".
Same; Nature of police power; Judicial inquiry.—On the legislative
organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rests the
exercise of the police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of
the people. In view of the requirements of certain constitutional guarantees,
850
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001705aded0e9b983dedc003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/18
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor
of Manila
the exercise of such police power, however, insofar as it may affect the life,
liberty or property of any person, is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such
exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical,
unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guarantee may call for correction by the courts.
Municipal Corporations; Municipal license fees.—Municipal license
fees can be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or
regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful
occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. Licenses for non-
useful occupations are incidental to the police power, and the right to exact a
fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing the
amount of license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a wide
discretion in this class of cases. Aside from applying the well-known legal
principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or
tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such
discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of
persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course,
generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind
of license fee.
Same; Discretion in fixing license fees.—Much discretion is given to
municipal corporations in determining the amount of license fees to be
imposed for revenue. The mere fact that some individuals in the community
may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a
living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. Persons licensed to
pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by
the exercise of the police power embark in those occupations subject to the
disadvantages which may result from the exercise of that power.
Constitutional Law; Due process; Standards of legal infirmity.—There
is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a
standard to which governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
The standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as
substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental
action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity, is responsiveness
to the supremacy of reason. obedience to the dictates of justice. It would be
an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet
what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious pro
portions as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. What should be
deemed unreasonable and what would amount
851
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 851
of Manila
to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted

deterioration of the state of public morals.
Same; Reasonableness of ordinance regulating hotels, etc.— The
provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, making it unlawful
for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any
hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent
any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso
that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a
transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is
neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence
between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the
legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct
amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.
Same; Public interest; Government interference.—The policy of
laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected
with public interest. If the liberty invoked were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more
rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most
rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider.
Statutes; When statute is void because of ambiguity.— What makes a
statute susceptible to a charge that it is void on its face for alleged vagueness
or uncertainty is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an
act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and diff er as to its application.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Panganiban, Abad & Associates Law Office for respondent-
appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez & Associates for intervenorappellee.
FERNANDO, J,:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower

court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of
the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower
court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore,
null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such
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Mayor of Manila
judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite

showing to sustain an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was
filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar,
Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general
manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of
the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged
with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of
Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution
and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the
petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and
protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating
hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly
licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes,
employing and giving livelihood, to not less than 2,5001
person and
representing an investment of more than P3 million." (par. 2). It was
then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City
of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963
by the then ViceMayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time
acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set
forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the
powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar
as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter
of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to
motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of
due procfess insofar as it would impose ?6,000.00 fee per annum for
first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels;
_______________
1 The eighteen members are Waldorf Hotel, Hotel Monte Carlo, Golden Gate
Motel, Miami Hotel, Palm Spring Hotel, Flamingo Motel, Holiday Motel, Rainbow
Motel, Palo Alto Hotel, Paradise Hotel, Mayfair Hotel, Siesta Court, Sun Valley
Hotel, Springfield Hotel, New Palace Hotel, Hotel del Mar, Longbeach Hotel and Ritz
Motel.
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Mayor of Manila,
that the provision in the same section which would require the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel,
motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any
guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person
or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open
to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname,
given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the
occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the
number of companions in the room, if any, with the name,
relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as
to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any,
coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has
personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of
such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with
such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also
being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels
and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City
Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized
representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process
grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but
also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the
alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-
incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying
motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in f irst class motels such as a telephone in each
room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends
against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and
oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the
ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that
the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a
person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels,
motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied
by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such
establishments to lease any room or portion
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Mayor of Manila
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due
process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty
provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a
subsequent conviction would cause the automatic cancellation of the
license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the

business and loss of its investments, there is once again a
transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and
for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and
unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from
enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of
the personal circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of
the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel
business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited
Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or
constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to
state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a
reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality,
a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the
guests or customers not before the court could complain of the
alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against
selfincrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the
preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent
Mayor prayed f or its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was
submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964, which
reads:
"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators

Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar, Inc. are duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila,
while the petitioner Go Chiu is the president and general manager of Hotel
del Mar, Inc., and
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VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 855

of Manila
the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the
capacity to sue and be sued;
"2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City
Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila charged with the general
power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the
necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances;
"3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of
operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
"4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by
Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the
absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662,
668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of
Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is
similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the
reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
"5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio
Astorga was submitted with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760)
to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
"6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of
P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including
herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila."
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22,

1965, wherein stress was laid on the presumption of the validity of
the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conf
ormity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing
not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American
authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the
arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely
two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for
petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the
petition, with citations of what they considered to be applicable
American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the
challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.
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Mayor of Manila
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the
petitioners association, and referring to the alleged constitutional
questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only
remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with
the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to
submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious
then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision
passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the
challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper
the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City
of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the
challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent
the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his
agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question.''"

Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent
regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought
to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping
condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be
allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural
and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the
absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that
attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of
validity. x x x The action of the elected representatives of the people
cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature
of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular
municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative
body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the wellbeing of the people. x x x The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is
not a clear invasion
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VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 857

Mayor of Manila
2
of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation."
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of
validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless
the statute or ordinance is void on its f ace, which is not the case
here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the3
leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,
where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely
and succinctly summed up the matter thus: "The statute here
questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police
power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specif
ic method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence
deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions
of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case,
the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the
stipulation of f acts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the
judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the
ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due process
clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with
the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular
manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to
safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity
resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow
the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as
the most essential, insistent and the
_______________
2 US. v. Salaveria (1918), 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation of the
presumption of validity of municipal ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria
decision in Eboña v. Daet, (1950) 85 Phil. 369.
3 282 US 251, 328, January 5, 1931.
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Mayor of Manila
4
least limitable5 of powers, extending as it does "to all the great
public needs." It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision,
to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or
allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public6
health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare.
Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in
the State which enables it to prohibit 7
all that is hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society."
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor Herminio
Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the
alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication
in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which
"provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and
exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and
________________
4 Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez, (1957) 101 Phil. 1155, at p. 1163. AIso: 'To Frankfurter
the police power, true to its etymology, is the power to shape policy. It def ies legal
definition; as a response to the dynamic aspects of society, it cannot be reduced to a
constitutional formula. The law must be sensitive to life; in resolving cases. it must
not fall back upon sterile claims; its judgments are not derived from an abstract duel
between liberty and the police power. Instead, in a world of trusts and unions and
large-scale industry, it must meet the challenge of drastic social change. For him as
for Holmes, 'society is more than bargain and business' and the jurist's art rises to no
higher peak than in vindicating interests not represented by the items in a balance-
sheet. In a progressive society, new interests emerge, new attitudes appear, social
consciousness quickens. In the face of the unknown one cannot choose with certainty.
Nor as yet, has the whole of truth been brought up from its bottomless well and how f
ragile in scientif ic proof is the ultimate validity of any particular economic
adjustment. Social development is a process of trial and error; in the making of policy
the f ullest possible opportunity must be given for the play of the human mind. If
Congress or legislature does not regulate, laissez faire—not the individual—must be
the regulator. (Hamilton, Pre view of a Justice (1939) 48 Yale Law Journal, 819).
5 Noble state Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 412.
6 U.S. v. Gomez-Jesus, (1915) 31 Phil. 218.
7 Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1918) 39 Phil. 660.
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VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 859

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs, City
Mayor of Manila
thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then "proposes to check

the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public
view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory
provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the
registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the
licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind
from operating for purpose other -than legal" and at the same time,
to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear
therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack
against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it,
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped
with the seal of its approval, ordinances punishing
8
vagrancy and
classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant; providing a license tax
for and9
regulating the maintenance
10
or operation of11 public dance12
halls; prohibiting gambling; prohibiting jueteng; and monte,
prohibiting playing
13
of panguingui on days other than Sundays 14
or
legal holidays; prohibiting the operation of pinball machines; and,
prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an
opium15 joint or visiting a place where opium is, smoked or otherwise
used, all of which are intended ,to protect public morals. ,
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or
local, primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which, it
cannot be too often emphasized, is the
________________
8 U.S. vs. Giner Cruz, (1918) 38 Phil. 677.

9 U.S. vs. Rodriguez, (1918) 38 Phil. 759. See also Sarmiento v. Belderol, L-
15719, May 31, 1961; Lapera v. Vicente, L-18102, June 30, 1962.
10 U.S. v. Pacis, (1915) 31 Phil. 524.
11 U.S. vs. Espiritu-Santo, (1912) 23 Phil. 610; U.S. vs. Joson, (1913) 26 Phil. 1;
People vs. Chan Hong, (1938) 65 Phil. 625
12 U.S. v. Tamparong, (1915) 31 Phil. 321.
13 U.S. v. Salaveria, (1918) 39 Phil. 102.
14 Uy Ha v. The City Mayor, L-14149, May 30, 1969; Miranda v. City of Manila,
L-17252, May 31, 1961.
15 U.S. v. Ten Yu, (1912) 24 Phil. 1.
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Mayor of Manila
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,

good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable
constitutional guaranties, however, the exercise of such police power
insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is
subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may
be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the
courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill 16tone, in
which the objection is raised to the question of due process. There
is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes
though a standard to which the governmental action should conform
in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate. case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process
which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to
free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that
matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its
doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to
the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official
action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason
and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any
official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has
been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment
of
_______________
16 There is no occasion to consider even cursorily the alleged invasion of the right
of privacy or the prohibition against self-incrimination. Petitioners obviously are not
the proper parties to do so. Nor may such an incurable defect be remedied by an
accommodating intervenor "who has always taken advantage of, as he exclusively
relies on, the facilities, services and accommodations offered by petitioner-motels. A
general merchant, doing business not only in Baguio City but in the City of Manila,
has no legitimate cause for complaint. At least, not according to the case as it has
been developed.
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Mayor of Manila
17
the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty "to those strivings for
justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the
light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness18 that reflect
[democratic] traditions of legal and political thought." It is not a
narrow or "technical conception
19
with fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause
requiring a "close
20
and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles
of our society." Questions of due process are not 21to be treated
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance
enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body
considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and
capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be
deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of
the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted
deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial
measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged
ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, and, as has
been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance
of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the
due process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of
deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No.
4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the
increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of
freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged
vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license
fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for
________________
17 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, (1938) pp. 32-33.
18 Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche, (1960) 363 U.S. 420, at 487.
19 Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, (1961) 367 U.S. 1230.
20 Bartkus v. Illinois, (1959) 359 U.S. 121.
21 Pearson v. McGraw, (1939) 308 U.S. 313.
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Mayor of Manila
both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the
latter, f irst-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee
and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law
however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be
classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular
enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful 22
occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. As was
explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: "(2) Licenses
for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power
and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license
and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal
corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of
cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known
legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable,
oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to
interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint
upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-
usef ul enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the
determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. Hence
license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have
frequently been upheld, especially in cases of licenses for the sale of
liquors. In fact,23 in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared
unreasonable."
________________
22 Cu Unjieng v. Patstone, (1922) 42 Phil. 818, 828.

23 Citing Swarth v. People, 109 111. 621; Dennehy v. City of Chicago, 120 111.
627; 12 N.E., 227; United States Distilling Co. v. City of Chicago, 112 111. 19; Drew
County v. Bennet, 43 Ark. 364; Merced County v. Fleming, 111 Cal. 46; 43 Pac. 392;
Williams v. City Council of West Point, 68 Ga. 816; Cheny v. Shellbyville, 19 Ind.
84; Wiley v. Owens, 39 Ind. 429; Sweet v. City of Wabash, 41 Ind. 7; Jones v. Grady,
25 La. Ann. 586; Goldsmith v. City of New Orleans, 31 La. Ann. 646; People ex rel.,
Cramer v. Medberry, 39 N.Y.S. 207; 17 Misc. Rep., 8; McGuigan v. Town of
Belmont, 89 Wis. 637; 62 N.W., 421; Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Craig v. Burnett,
32 Ala., 728, and Muhlenbrinck v. Long Branch Commissioner, 42 N.J.L. 364; 36

Am. Rep., 518. At pp. 829-830.
863
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 863

Mayor of Manila
24
Moreover, in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta this Court
affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme
Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police
power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the
broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of
1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a
wide range of subjects with the only limitation
25
that the tax so levied
is for public purposes, just and uniform.
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude
enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it
has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to
municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license
fee of the operator of a massage
26
clinic, even if it were viewed purely
as a police power measure. The discussion of this particular matter
may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of
significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the
enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful
occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls
in the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in
refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city
markets under certain conditions is permitted. x x x And surely, the
mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived
of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living
cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a
case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the
public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police
power embark in these occupations
________________
24 98 Phil. 148 (1955), citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412,
81 L. Ed. 1193; U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed 477; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579. The Lutz decision was followed in Republic v.
BacolodMurcia Milling, L-19824, July 9, 1966.
25 Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, L-24322, July 21, 1967.
26 Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board, (1957) 101 Phil. 1142.
864

Mayor of Manila
subject to the disadvantages

27
which may result from the legal
exercise of that power."
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the
challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging
house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that
in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different
conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a
transgression against the command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such
premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being
devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there
appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an
undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of
conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by
Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs
through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent.
It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for
the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and
order of society and the general wellbeing. No man can do exactly
as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right
of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good. x x x The liberty of the citizen
may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public
order and28
safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police
power."
_______________
27 Co Kian & Lee Ban v. City of Manila, (1955) 96 Phil. 649, 654, citing City of
New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 L. Ann. 417.
28 Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1919) 39 Phil. 660, at 706, citing Hall v. Geiger-
Jones (1916), 242 U.S. 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz (1914), 189
Ala. 66.
865
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 865

Mayor of Manila,
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare,

then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in
order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons
and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens,
in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state x x x. To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of
the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which
life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual
will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance
of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
29
equilibrium,
which means peace and order and happiness for all."
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying
legislation because30 of undue deprivation of freedom to contract,
People v. Pomar, no longer "retains its virtuality as a living
principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to
the assumption by the government of the right of intervention
31
even
in contractual relations affected with public interest." What may be
stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of
the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental
acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope
of regulatory
________________
29 Calalang v. Williams (1940), 70 Phil. 726, at 733-734

30 46 Phil 440 (1924). The Philippines was then under American sovereignty,
American Supreme Court decisions hav-ing thus an obligatory effect. No alternative
was left to this Court except to follow the then controlling decision in Adkins v.
Children's Hospital (1924), 261 U.S. 525, which subsequently was overruled in West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937), 300 U.S. 379
31 Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court (1940) 70 Phil. 340, at 360, quoting a
concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay v. Court, G.R. No. 46496.
866

Mayor of Manila
32
measure is wider. How justify then the allegation of a denial of due
process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another

due process ground by invoking the principle of vagueness or
uncertainty. It would appear/from a recital in the petition itself that
what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the
provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or
uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest
should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or
companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for
determining whether the companion or companions referred to are
those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry
or entering the room with him at about the same time or coming at
any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections
which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a
motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators;
another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess
as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such
lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be
asked, do these allegations suffice to render the
_______________
32 Cf. "In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish between

the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for
transmitting the principles of the First Amendment and those cases in which it is
applied for its own sake. The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth
Amendment, because it also collides with the principles of the First, is much more
definite than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of
the due process clause disappears when the specific prohibition of the First become its
standard. The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well
include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the
restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms
of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may well be infringed on such
slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent an immediate
danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect." (West Virginia State Bd. of
Edu. v. Barnette, (1942), 319 U.S. 624, at 639).
867
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 867

Acuña vs. Yatco
ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To

ask the question33 is to answer it. From 34
Connally v. General
Construction Co. to Adderley v. Florida, the principle has been
consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a
charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an
act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before
us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We

agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit, but there is no canon against using common
35
sense in
construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due
allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor and
determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so
uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the
appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the
injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,

Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., are on official leave.
Judgment reversed.
___________
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(GR No L-24693) Ermita-Malate HMOA v. City of Manila

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2/19/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 020

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 849

No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS

Constitutional Law; Municipal Corporations; Presumption as to

850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 851

to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower

852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 853

854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the

"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 855

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22,

856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question.''"

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 857

858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 859

thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then "proposes to check

8 U.S. vs. Giner Cruz, (1918) 38 Phil. 677.

860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 861

862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

22 Cu Unjieng v. Patstone, (1922) 42 Phil. 818, 828.

32 Ala., 728, and Muhlenbrinck v. Long Branch Commissioner, 42 N.J.L. 364; 36

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 863

864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

subject to the disadvantages

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 865

A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare,

29 Calalang v. Williams (1940), 70 Phil. 726, at 733-734

866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another

32 Cf. "In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish between

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 867

ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To

us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,

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