SERMONIA VS.

CA

FACTS:
Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy on 26 May 1992 for contracting marriage with Ma.
Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while having a subsisting marriage to Virginia C. Nievera.
Petitioner, through a motion to quash, argued that his criminal liability for bigamy has been
extinguished by prescription.
On the order of the respondent (judge) on 1 October 1992, the motion to quash was denied. On
27 October 1992, respondent also denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial.
Having brought the case to the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that his criminal liability
for bigamy has prescribed. He argues that given his second marriage was registered with the
Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, such registration made informed the public of him
contracting a new marriage. The offended party therefore had notice of the subsequent
marriage as of 1975, hence, prescription began on the day the marriage contract was
registered. He argued that the bigamy case against him should have been filed on or before
1990, not on 1992.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the criminal liability of Sermonia for bigamy has prescribed.

DECISION:
No. To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would
amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of
the bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its registration, the
offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and those
concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he
is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous
marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known
to be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstances,
the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. The
prescriptive period for bigamy should be counted only from the day of the discovery of the by
the offended party, the authorities or their agency.
____________________________________________________________________________

People vs De Leon

FACTS:
In the early morning, around 2 o'clock of January 7, 2000, Eduardo Zulueta and Fortunato
Lacambra III, both gasoline boys; Julieta Amistoso, cashier; and Edralin Macahis, security
guard; all employees of Energex Gasoline Station, located at Barangay Guinayan, San Mateo,
Rizal, were on duty when a mint green-colored Tamaraw FX arrived for service at the said
gasoline station.
Eduardo Zulueta was the one who attended to the said vehicle. He saw through the lowered
window shield that there were about six to seven persons aboard the vehicle. The driver told
him that the engine of the vehicle would not start.4 Eduardo Zulueta offered to give the vehicle a
push. While Eduardo Zulueta and fellow gasoline boy Fortunato Lacambra III were positioned at
the back of the vehicle. The six male passengers of the same vehicle, except the driver, alighted
and announced a hold-up. They were armed with a shotgun and .38 caliber pistol.

Fortunato Lacambra III was ordered to lie down, while Eduardo Zulueta was directed to go near
the Car Wash Section.

Appellant, who guarded Eduardo Zulueta, poked a gun at the latter and took the latter's wallet
containing a pawnshop ticket and P50.00, while the companion of the former, hit the latter on
his nape with a gun.

Meanwhile, four members of the group went to the cashier's office and took the money worth
P3,000.00.10 Those four robbers were also the ones who shot Edralin Macahis in the
stomach.11 Thereafter, the same robbers took Edralin Macahis' service firearm.12

After he heard successive gunshots, Eduardo Zulueta saw appellant and his companions
immediately leave the place. The robbers boarded the same vehicle and proceeded toward San
Mateo, Rizal. When the robbers left, Eduardo Zulueta stood up and found Julieta Amistoso, who
told him that the robbers took her bag and jewelry. He also saw that Edralin Macahis had a
gunshot wound in the stomach. He immediately hailed a vehicle which transported the injured
Edralin Macahis to the hospital. Later on, Edralin Macahis died at the hospital due to the
gunshot wound.
The following day, Eduardo Zulueta identified appellant as one of the robbers who poked a gun
at him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a complex crime was committed.

DECISION:
YES. A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime, consisting of a
series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. Although there is a series of acts, there
is only one crime committed; hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.

In the case before Us, [appellant] and his companions intended only to rob one place; and that
is the Energex gasoline station. That they did; and in the process, also took away by force the
money and valuables of the employees working in said gasoline station. Clearly inferred from
these circumstances are the series of acts which were borne from one criminal resolution. A
continuing offense is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse
and operated by an intermittent force, however long a time it may occupy.
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MONTEVERDE VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
In August 1991, Antonio R. Araza, Jose Salvatierra, Santos L. Lopez, and Narciso Cruz,
residents of Brgy. 124, charged the petitioner and Bella Evangelista, then Barangay Treasurer,
with Malversation of the following funds: 1.) P82,500.00 from the Barangay General Fund; 2.)
P44,800.00 from the PAGCOR; and 3.) P600.00 allowance of Kagawad Lito Galinda from the
period July 16, to December 1990.
The appellant was charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of a
commercial document. However, even if the Sandiganbayan itself doubted whether the
Information had properly charged a complex crime, it was, as quoted earlier, “constrained to go
along with the supposition that what has been charged is that of a complex crime, otherwise the
logical consequence is that the accused has been indicted with two crimes -- that of Estafa and
that of Falsification of Commercial Document which is not beneficial to her.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there a complex crime of falsification with estafa.

DECISION:
Yes, there is. The Supreme Court rejected the argument of petitioner that since she was
acquitted of estafa, she could no longer be convicted of falsification of a commercial document.
Having been charged of two distinct crimes, acquittal in one will not necessarily lead to acquittal
in the other. Each crime will be evaluated based on its own and conviction will depend on the
proof in each particular offense.
When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, it is axiomatic
that the prosecution must allege in the information and prove during the trial all the elements of
all the offenses constituting the complex crime.
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PEOPLE VS. GUILLEN

FACTS:
On March 10, 1947, in an event sponsored by the Liberal Party at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo,
Manila, Guillen planted a hand grenade near the stage and threw another one toward then
President Manuel Roxas in an apparent assassination attempt. General Castaneda managed to
kick the grenade off the stage. However, its explosion caused the death of Simeon Varela
(Barrela). It also caused the injuries of Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carillo, and Emilio
Maglalang.
Guillen pleaded not guilty to the consequent charges of murder and multiple frustrated murder
filed against him. he even tried to use the insanity excuse, but was found to have been mentally
stable.
Later on, he confessed to his crimes. He was subsequently found guilty of all the charges and
was sentenced to death.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a complex crime.
DECISION:

Yes, there is. The Court said that by a single act, throwing a hand grenade at President Roxas,
he committed two grave felonies: (1) murder and (2) multiple attempted murder.
In the end the Court affirmed the death sentence handed out by the lower court.
____________________________________________________________________________

RISOS-VIDAL VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:
Former President Estrada was convicted of the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the
period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo granted him pardon, which
provides that Estrada is restored of his civil and political rights.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy,for a local
elective post of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the
COMELEC because of Estrada’s conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan which sentenced
him to suffer reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on
Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC)
The COMELEC-Second Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that
President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon
vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim
sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as that of Vidal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as
a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.

DECISION:
Yes, he is qualified. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon which fully
restored all of his civil and political rights, including the right to seek public elective office. The
wording of the pardon is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly
remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the
text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
____________________________________________________________________________

People vs Maluenda

____________________________________________________________________________
Estrada vs Sandiganbayan SEE PREVIOUS ESTRADA
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People vs Quinanola
FACTS:
Catalina Carciller her cousin 15-year-old Rufo Ginto and another male companion named
Richard Diaz, went to attend a dance at around ten o'clock in the evening of 05 March 1994 in
Sitio Bangag Tangil, Dumanjug, Cebu. The three unsuspecting youngsters stopped momentarily
to rest at a waiting shed beside the Tangil Elementary School. Accused Agapito Quiñanola
a.k.a. "Petoy" and accused Eduardo Escuadro a.k.a. "Botiquil" who were both armed with guns
suddenly turned up Quiñanola beaming his flashlight at the trio while Escuadro stood by
focused his attention on Catalina. Quiñonala announced that he and Escuardo were members
of New People's Army ("NPA"). Quiñonala instructed Escuadro to take care of the male
companions of Catalina while he (Quiñanola) held the latter at gunpoint.Quiñanola with his gun
pointed at Catalina, forcibly brought her towards the nearby school. Catalina heard a gunfire but
Quiñanola assured her that it was only an exploding firecracker. When Escuadro again showed
up, Catalina asked about her two friends. Quiñanola replied that he had ordered them to go
home. Catalina begged that she herself be allowed to leave. Pretending to agree, they walked
the path towards the road behind the school. Then, unsuspectingly, Quiñanola forced Catalina
to sit on the ground. She resisted but Quiñanola, pointing his gun at her, warned her that if she
would not accede to what he wanted he would kill her. Catalina started to cry. Quiñanola told
Escuadro to remove her denim pants. Catalina struggled to free herself from Escuadro's hold
but to no avail. Escuadro ultimately succeeded in undressing her. Quiñanola unzipped his pants
and laid on top of her while Escuadro held her legs Quiñanola "started to pump, to push and
pull" 5 even as Catalina still tried desperately to free herself from him. She felt his organ "on the
lips of (her) genitalia." 6 When Quiñanola had satisfied his lust, Escuadro took his turn by placing
himself on top of Catalina. Catalina could feel the sex organ of Escuadro "on the lips of (her)
vulva" 7 while he made a push and pull movement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is frustrated or consumated rape.

DECISION:
CONSUMATED RAPE. In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code, "carnal knowledge"
unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the
vagina be penetrated or that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured.36 The
crime of rape is deemed consummated even when the man's penis merely enters the labia or
lips of the female organ37 or, as once so said in a case, by the "mere touching of the external
genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act."
____________________________________________________________________________
People vs. Ong (YOU MAY EXCLUDE SOME OF THE DECISIONS TO SHORTEN THIS
CASE)
FACTS:
That on or about April 23 to April 24, 1971, inclusive, in the municipality of Parañaque, province
of Rizal, Philippines the above-named accused, being then private individuals, for the purpose
of killing one Henry Chua and thereafter extorting money from his family through the use of a
ransom note, kidnap(ped) and carry(ied) away said Henry Chua, initially by means of a friendly
gesture and later through the use of force, in an automobile, and later after having taken him to
an uninhabited place in Caloocan City, with the use of force detained him (Henry Chua) and
kill(ed) him in the following manner to wit: The accused after gagging and tying up Henry Chua
and repeatedly threatening him with death, assured him that if he would write and sign a ransom
note for the payment by his family of the sum of $50,000.00 (US), he would not be killed and
would be released upon receipt of the ransom money, but after said Henry Chua agreed and did
execute such a ransom note, he was again gagged and tied up by the accused, and thereafter
stabbed in the abdominal region several times with an icepick, inflicting upon him (Henry Chua)
mortal wounds on his vital organs, which directly caused his death.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstances are present in this case.

DECISION.
YES AND NO. Treachery (alevosia) qualified the killing to murder. Undisputed facts show that
Henry Chua's hands were tied and his mouth was gagged with a flannel cloth before he was
stabbed twice with an icepick and buried in a shallow grave near a creek. These facts portray
well that the tied hands of the victim rendered him defenseless and helpless thereby allowing
the accused to commit the crime without risk at all to their person.
With regards to the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the same should be
deemed absorbed in treachery. This position is itself supported by the Acting Solicitor General
in his brief and is sustained in a long line of decisions.
In the same vein, the accused would like the aggravating circumstance of nighttime
(nocturnidad) to be absorbed in treachery in that it forms part of the peculiar treacherous means
and manner adopted to insure the execution of the crime.
The purposive selection of an uninhabited place (despoblado) is likewise clear from the
evidence. The killing was done in Barrio Makatipo, Novaliches, Caloocan City, an isolated place
that resembled that of an abandoned subdivision. The place was ideal not merely for burying
the victim but also forkilling him for it was a place where the possibility of the victim receiving
some help from third persons was completely absent. The accused sought the solitude of the
place in order to better attain their purpose without interference, and to secure themselves
against detection and punishment.
In the case of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence (abuso de confianza), it
appears that the lower court wrongly appreciated this circumstance. In order for this
circumstance to obtain, it is necessary that there be a relation of trust and confidence between
the accused and the one against whom the crime was committed, and that the accused made
use of such relation to commit the crime. 60 It is essential too that the confidence be a means of
facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's
belief that the former would not abuse said confidence.
More convincing this time is the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle in the
commission of the crime. The Biscayne car of Benjamin Ong was used in trailing the victim's
Mustang car from Wigwam Nightclub up to the time that it was overtaken and blocked. It carried
the victim on the way to the scene of the killing, it contained at its baggage compartment the
pick and shovel used in digging the grave; it was the fast means of fleeing and absconding from
the scene. Again, the motor vehicle facilitated the stark happening. It has been held that the use
of a motor vehicle is aggravating in murder where the said vehicle was used in transporting the
victim and the accused.
Cruelty (ensanamiento) as an aggravating circumstance, cannot be considered here. The brief
of the Acting Solicitor General agrees with that of the accused in denying the attendance of
cruelty as an aggravating circumstance. Indeed, as it appears from the record, the group
intended merely to kill the victim, bury him, and flee from the locale of the fearful crime. For
cruelty to exist, it must be shown that the accused enjoyed and delighted in making their victim
suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical or moral pain in the
consummation of the criminal act. 66 Even granting that the victim died because of asphyxiation
when he was buried and not hemorrhage from stab wounds, as testified to by Dr. Ibarrola 67,
which however, has been contradicted by his own necropsy report which shows that the cause
of death was the "punctured wounds in the abdomen," and by Dr. Lara who testified that the two
wounds could have produced death due to shock, it appears that the victim's burial was not
meant to make him suffer any longer but simply to conceal his body and the crime itself.

____________________________________________________________________________

PEOPLE V. ANGEL RIOS

FACTS:

Ambrocio and Anacita Benedicto owned a sari-sari store in their house in Marigold Subdivision.
On or about the 7th day of February 1996, in the municipality of San Jose del Monte, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, the accused, armed with bladed instrument and with intent to kill
Ambrocio Benedicto, stabbed with the bladed instrument Ambrocio Benedicto, in
abovementioned location, hitting the latter on his body, thereby causing him serious physical
injuries which directly caused his death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an aggravating circumstance of dwelling.

DECISION:
Dwelling was correctly considered aggravating. The word dwelling includes every dependency
of the house that forms an integral part thereof and therefore it includes the staircase of the
house, and much more, its terrace. When a crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended
party and the latter has not given provocation, dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance. Provocation in the aggravating circumstance of dwelling must be: (a) given by the
offended party, (b) sufficient, and (c) immediate to the commission of the crime.

____________________________________________________________________________

De vera vs De vera

FACTS:

Petitioner Rosario T. de Vera accused her spouse Geren A. de Vera (Geren) and Josephine F.
Juliano (Josephine) of Bigamy. They were thus indicted in an Information, the accusatory
portion of which reads:

That on or about the 31st day of July, 2003, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Geren A. De
Vera being previously united in lawful marriage with Rosario Carvajal Tobias-De Vera, and
without said marriage having been legally dissolved, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with accused Josephine Juliano y Francisco, who
likewise has previous knowledge that accused Geren A. De Vera's previous marriage with
Rosario T. De Vera is still valid and subsisting, said second marriage having all the essential
requisites for its validity.

Upon arraignment, Geren pleaded "Guilty." However, in a Motion dated April 8, 2005, he prayed
that he be allowed to withdraw his plea in the meantime in order to prove the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. The motion was opposed by petitioner on the ground that
not all the elements of the mitigating circumstance of "voluntary surrender" were present. She
added that "voluntary surrender" was raised only as an afterthought, as Geren had earlier
invoked a "voluntary plea of guilty" without raising the former. Finally, she posited that since the
case was ready for promulgation, Geren's motion should no longer be entertained.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the voluntary surrender is a valid mitigating circumstance in this case.

DECISION:
No. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: 1) the
offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority or the latter's agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary
surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to
the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the
trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture. Without these elements,
and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the
need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be
characterized as "voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance.

__________________________________________________________________________

BACABAC v. PEOPLE

FACTS:
Following a heated argument in a dance hall which resulted in a brawl, the Talanquines brothers
proceeded to confront their enemies armed with guns. They were accompanied by Jonathan
Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and Jesus Delfin (Jesus). In the dance hall, they encountered
Hernani Quidato and Eduardo Selibio. After a physical confrontation, The Talanquines brothers
shot Quidato and Selibio. Quidato and Selibio later died from their wounds. The Talanquines
brothers, together with Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and Jesus Delfin was
charged and found guilty of the crime of Murder. Ricardo Bacabac (Bacabac) appealed his
conviction, contending that he cannot be deemed to be in conspiracy with the other accused
because he was not the one who pulled the trigger. Petitioner alleged that even if he was
convicted of murder, the correctness of the pronouncement of guilt should have been attended
by the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, in the same manner
as the other accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not vindication of a grave offense, in this case, is a mitigating circumstance.

HELD:

No, it is not. Petitioner’s invocation of the mitigating circumstance of “immediate vindication of a

grave offense,” fails. For such mitigating circumstance to be credited, the act should be,
following Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, “committed in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense to the one committing a felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the
same degree.”

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People vs Maglian SEE DIGEST FROM MANUEL

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NORMA DEL SOCORRO V. WILSEM CASE DIGEST - CIVIL LAW

FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond
ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter,
Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise
to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in
the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina
and resides again the Philippines particularly in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma
filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an
alien

ISSUES:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine
law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

RULING:

1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to
do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son
altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of
and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent
upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon
the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give
justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is
obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing,
even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines
because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the
latter is entitled thereto.

2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living
here in the Philippines and committed the offense here.

____________________________________________________________________________

People vs Punzalan SEE DIGEST FROM MANUEL

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Ladonga vs People
FACTS:
In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculam’s regular
customers in his pawnshop business. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a
P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No.
284743, post dated to July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990
and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of
P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to July 26, 1990 issued by
Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the
amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990
issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason “CLOSED
ACCOUNT”; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated
demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them. While admitting that the checks issued by
Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the
Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an
agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature; and, that petitioner is
not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. The RTC
rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction of petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three checks that bounced
but her co-accused husband under the latter’s account could be held liable for violations of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.

DECISION:
There is no conspiracy. Article 8 of the RPC provides that “a conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.” To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt
act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute
or implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that
petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Apparently, the only
semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first
check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the
criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the
scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose
____________________________________________________________________________
PEOPLE vs. ENRIQUEZ
FACTS:

ISSUE:

DECISION:
The rules on stages of execution of a felony are inapplicable to offenses governed by special laws.—The
subjective phase in the commission of a felony is that portion of its execution starting from the point
where the offender begins by overt acts to pursue the crime until he is prevented, against his will, by some
outside cause from performing all of the acts which would produce the offense. If the subjective phase
has not yet passed, then the crime is only attempted. If that phase has been done but the felony is not
produced, the crime is frustrated. The crime is consummated if, following the subjective phase, the last of
the elements of the felony meets to concur. These rules are inapplicable to offenses governed by special
laws.
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PEOPLE vs. LOPEZ

FACTS:
That on or about the 15th day of November, 1991, in the evening, at Brgy. Nancalabasaan,
municipality of Umingan, province of Pangasinan, New Republic of the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused together with one John Doe,
whose identity has not yet been established, armed with a short firearm, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot ROGELIO SELDERA and RODOLFO PADAPAT which caused their
immediate death and on the same occasion and with treachery and evident premeditation
wound MARIO SELDERA on his breast to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Rogelio
Seldera and Rodolfo Padapat and also to the damage and prejudice of said Mario Seldera.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime committed is frustrated.

DECISION:
The crime committed is not frustrated, but only attempted murder, where the injuries sustained
by the victim were not life threatening.– The crime was not frustrated, but only attempted
murder. This is the gist of our rulings in several cases. For the injuries sustained by Mario
Seldera were not life threatening. Dr. Santos, the attending physician, certified that Mario’s
injuries would heal in seven days. In fact, he was not confined at the hospital. He was referred
to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital only for x-ray examination of his injuries. There is no
evidence that he was given further medical attention by this hospital other than what Dr. Santos
had requested.
____________________________________________________________________________

Jacinto vs. People

FACTS:
In June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed the petitioner, a collector of Mega Foam, a post dated
check worth P10,000 as payment for Baby’s purchases from Mega Foam International, Inc. The
check was deposited to the account of Jacqueline Capitle’s husband-Generoso. Rowena
Recablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land
Bank, who was looking for Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO check deposited had been
dishonored. Thereafter, Joseph Dyhenga talked to Baby to tell that the BDO Check bounced.
However, Baby said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000 cash in August 1997 as
replacement for the dishonored check.

Dyhengco filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an
entrapment operation with its agents. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested. The
NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two (2) and Jacqueline Capitle.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime committed falls the definition of Impossible Crime.

DECISION:
Yes, Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner’s act of receiving the cash
replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the Theft.
The requisites of an impossible crime are:
1. That the Act performed would be an offer against persons or property;
2. That the act was alone with evil intent; and
3. hat the accomplishment was inherently impossible or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual.
The time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed
all the acts to consummate that crime of theft had it not been impossible of accomplishment in
this case.
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an
impossible crime and suffer the penalty of Six (6) months of arresto mayor and pay courts.
____________________________________________________________________________
GARCIA vs. CA

FACTS:
On or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8, 1995
elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B.
Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District Supervisor Renato R.
Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board
of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera,
conspiring with, confederating together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there,
willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in
the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine (159) precincts of the Statement of Votes
by Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417, 008418, 008419, 008420, 008421,
008422 and 008423 to one thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the
Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of Canvass with Serial
No. 436156 with a difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes.

ISSUE:

Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se or mala
prohibita? Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

DECISION:

Mala in se. Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code.
When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they
are punished by a special law.8 Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the
other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that
are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only
because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law
has been violated.

The discrepancy may be validly attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a
decrease of 5,000 votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass is
substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain on record unchallenged, especially when the error
results from the mere transfer of totals from one document to another.