Chapter 18

The United Nations

PAUL TAYLOR • DEVON CURTIS

j i H
• Introduction 314

• A brief history of the United Nations and its principal organs 314

• The United Nations and the maintenance of international peace and security 319

• The United Nations and intervention within states 321

• The United Nations and economic and social questions 324

• The reform process in the economic and social arrangements of the United Nations 326

• Conclusion 327

Hi WM
Reader's Guide chapter argues that United Nations institutions have
taken on an increasing range of functions, and have
become much more involved within states. Justice
This chapter focuses on the development of the United
for individuals is increasingly seen as a concomitant
Nations (UN) and the changes and challenges that it
of international order. Serious deficiencies in human
has faced since its establishment in 1945. The UN is
rights, or in economic welfare, can lead to international
a grouping of states, and is therefore premised on the
tensions.This development has led to challenges to tra-
notion that states are the primary units in the interna-
ditional views about intervention within states. It has
tional system. The institutions of the United Nations
also led to the expansion of UN institutions to address
reflect an uneasy hybrid between traditions of great
an increased number of economic and social questions,
power consensus and traditions of universalism that
and the search for better ways to coordinate these
stress the equality of states. Furthermore, while the UN
activities.
was established as a grouping of sovereign states, the
 Introduction
The U n i t e d Nations ( U N ) is made up o f a group o f
i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions, w h i c h include the central
system located i n N e w York, the Specialized Agencies,
such as the W o r l d H e a l t h O r g a n i z a t i o n ( W H O ) a n d
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a b o u r O r g a n i z a t i o n ( I L O ) , and the
Programmes and Funds, such as the U n i t e d Nations
Children's F u n d ( U N I C E F ) and the U n i t e d Nations
Development P r o g r a m m e ( U N D P ) . W h e n created m o r e
t h a n h a l f a c e n t u r y ago i n the a f t e r m a t h o f the Second
W o r l d War, the U n i t e d N a t i o n s reflected the hope for a
just a n d peaceful global community. It is the o n l y global
i n s t i t u t i o n w i t h the l e g i t i m a c y that derives f r o m univer-
sal membership, and a mandate that encompasses secu-
rity, economic and social development, the p r o t e c t i o n
o f h u m a n rights, and the p r o t e c t i o n o f the e n v i r o n m e n t .
Yet the U N was created by states for states and the rela-
t i o n s h i p between state sovereignty and the p r o t e c t i o n
o f the needs and interests o f people has n o t been f u l l y
resolved. Questions about the m e a n i n g o f sovereignty
and the l i m i t s o f U N action have r e m a i n e d key issues.
Since the f o u n d i n g o f the U N , there has been an expan-
sion o f U N activities to address c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n states,
A brief history of the United Nations and its principal organs
The U n i t e d Nations was established o n 24 October 1945
by 51 countries, as a result o f initiatives taken by the
governments o f the states that had led the war against
Germany and Japan. By 2006, 192 countries were m e m -
bers o f the U n i t e d Nations, nearly every state i n the w o r l d .
W h e n j o i n i n g , member states agreed to accept the obli-
gations o f the United Nations Charter, an international
treaty that set out basic principles o f international rela-
tions. A c c o r d i n g to the Charter, the U N had four p u r -
poses: to m a i n t a i n international peace and security; to
develop f r i e n d l y relations among nations; to cooperate i n
solving international problems and i n p r o m o t i n g respect
for h u m a n rights; and to be a centre for h a r m o n i z i n g the
actions o f nations. A t the U N , all the member states—large:
and small, r i c h and poor, w i t h differing political views and
social systems—had a voice and a vote i n this process.
an i m p r o v e m e n t i n U N capacity i n its economic and
social w o r k , and an increased tendency to accord the
U N a m o r a l status. Threats to global security addressed
by the U N n o w i n c l u d e inter-state conflict, threats by
non-state actors, as w e l l as political, economic, and
social c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n states. Despite the g r o w t h i n
U N activities, however, there are some questions about
the relevance and effectiveness o f the U N . The fail-
ure b y the U S A a n d the U K to get clear U N Security
C o u n c i l a u t h o r i z a t i o n for the w a r i n I r a q i n 2003 led
to w e l l - p u b l i c i z e d c r i t i c i s m o f the U N and a crisis i n
i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations. Yet the t r o u b l e d aftermath o f the
invasion a n d persistent questions about the legitimacy
o f a war that was n o t sanctioned b y the U N show that
the U N has acquired i m p o r t a n t m o r a l status i n interna-
tional society.
After describing the m a i n organs o f the U N , this chapter
w i l l l o o k at the changing role o f the U N i n addressing mat-
ters o f peace and security, and then matters o f economic
and social development. It w i l l focus on h o w the UN's role
has evolved i n response to changes i n the global political
context, and o n some o f the problems that it still faces.
Interestingly, w h i l e the U n i t e d Nations was clearly cre-
ated as a g r o u p i n g o f states, the Charter referred to the
needs and interests o f peoples as well as those o f states
(see Box 18.1).
I n m a n y ways, the U n i t e d Nations was set up to correct
the problems o f its predecessor, the League of Nations.
The League o f Nations had been established after the
First W o r l d War, and was intended to make future wars
impossible, b u t a m a j o r p r o b l e m was the Leagues lack o f
effective power. There was n o clear division o f responsi-
b i l i t y between the m a i n executive committee (the League
C o u n c i l ) and the League Assembly, w h i c h included
all member states. B o t h the League Assembly and the
League C o u n c i l could o n l y make recommendations, not
b i n d i n g resolutions, and these recommendations had to
be unanimous. A n y government was free to reject any
 Box 18.1 Selected Articles of the UN Charter
The UN Charter contains references to both the rights of states and
the rights of people.
The Preamble of the U N Charter asserts that 'We the peoples of
the United Nations [are] determined [...] to reaffirm faith in funda-
mental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person,
in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small'.
Article 1 (2) states that the purpose of the UN is to develop 'friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples and to take other appropri-
ate measures to strengthen universal peace'.
Article 2(7) states that 'Nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state'.
Chapter VI deals with the 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes'.
recommendation. Furthermore, i n the League, there
was no mechanism for coordinating m i l i t a r y or eco-
nomic actions against miscreant states, w h i c h f u r t h e r
contributed to the League's weakness. Key states, such as
the United States, were n o t members o f the League. By
the Second W o r l d War, the League had already failed to
address a n u m b e r o f acts o f aggression.
The structure o f the U n i t e d Nations was intended
to avoid some o f the problems faced by the League
of Nations. The U n i t e d Nations has six m a i n organs: the
Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretariat,
the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council,
and the International C o u r t o f Justice (see Fig. 18.1).
The Security Council
In contrast to the League o f Nations, the United Nations
recognized great power prerogatives i n the Security
Council. The U N Security C o u n c i l was given the m a i n
responsibility for m a i n t a i n i n g international peace and
security. It was made up initially o f 11 states, and then,
after 1965, o f 15 states. It includes five permanent m e m -
bers, namely the USA, Britain, France, Russia (previously
the Soviet U n i o n ) , and China, as well as ten non-perma-
nent members. U n l i k e the League, the decisions o f the
Security C o u n c i l are binding, and must only be passed by
a majority o f nine out o f the 15 members, as well as each
o f the five permanent members. These five permanent
Article 33 states that 'The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, media-
tion, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agen-
cies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice'.
Chapter VII deals with 'Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace,
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression'.
Article 42 states that the Security Council 'may take such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security'. The Security Council has some-
times authorized member states to use 'all necessary means', and this
has been accepted as a legitimate application of Chapter VII powers.
Article 99 authorizes the Secretary-General to 'bring to the atten-
tion of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may
threaten the maintenance of international peace and security'.
members therefore have veto power over all Security
C o u n c i l decisions. The convention emerged that absten-
t i o n by a permanent member is not regarded as a veto.
The five permanent members o f the Security C o u n c i l
were seen as the major powers w h e n the U N was founded,
and they were granted a veto o n the v i e w that i f the great
powers were not given a privileged position, the U N
w o u l d not work. This v i e w stems f r o m Realist theory.
Indeed, this tension between the recognition o f power
politics t h r o u g h the Security C o u n c i l veto, and the u n i -
versal ideals u n d e r l y i n g the U n i t e d Nations, is a defining
feature o f the organization. There have been widespread
and frequent calls for the r e f o r m o f the Security Council,
but this is very difficult (see Box 18.2).
W h e n the Security C o u n c i l considers a threat to inter-
national peace, it first explores ways to settle the dispute
peacefully under the terms o f Chapter VI o f the U N
Charter (see Box 18.1). It m a y suggest principles for a set-
tlement or may suggest mediation. I n the event o f fight-
ing, the Security C o u n c i l tries to secure a ceasefire. It may
send a peacekeeping mission to help the parties main-
tain the truce and to keep opposing forces apart (see the
discussion o f peacekeeping below). The C o u n c i l can also
take measures to enforce its decisions under Chapter Vll
o f the Charter. It can, for instance, impose economic
sanctions or order an arms embargo. O n rare occasions,
the Security C o u n c i l has authorized member states to use
all necessary means, i n c l u d i n g collective m i l i t a r y action,
to see that its decisions are carried out.
 The United Nations System
?
G
Principal Organs

s
F

Economic and International Court

Trusteeship Council Security Council General Assembly Secretariat f
Social Council of Justice * o
w
i
Subsidiary Bodies Subsidiary Bodies Functional Commissions Specialized Agencies Departments and Offices a
M
Military Staff Committee UN Monitoring Verification and Main committees Commissions on: ILO International Labour . - OSG 3 Of ce of the <
Standing Committee and ad hoc bodies Inspection Commission (Iraq)
Human Rights Council
Narcotic Drugs Organization Secretary-General o
International Criminal Tribunal for the
(UNMOVIC) Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice FAO Food and Agriculture OIOS Office of Internal Oversight z
former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
United Nations Compensation Other sessional committees Science and Technology for Organization of the United Nations Services r>
Commission Standing committees and ad hoc bodies ' Development e
International Criminal Tribunal for
Other subsidiary organs / Sustainable Development
UNESCO United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural
OLA Office of Legal Affairs V
i-3
Rwanda (ICTR) Peacekeeping Operations and Missions DPA Department of Political Affairs
Status of Women Organization
Population and Development DDA Department for Disarmament
W H O Wortd Health Organization
Commission for Social Development Affairs
Advisory Subsidiary Body Statistical Commission DPKO Department of Peacekeeping
Programmes and Funds
United Nations kkv World Bank Group Operations
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on UNDP United Nations Development Commission IBRD International Bank
OCHA Office for the Coordination of
Trade and Development Programme Regional Commissions for Reconstruction and
Development Humanitarian Affairs
ITC International Trade Centre UNIFEM United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)
Development Fund for Women IDA International Development DESA Department of Economic and
(UNCTAD/WTO) Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)
WFP World Food Programme Association Social Affairs
UNDCP 1 United Nations Drug UNV United Nations Volunteers Economic Commission for Latin
U N R W A 2 United Nations Relief and DGACM Department for General
Control Programme UNCDF United Nations Capital IFC International Finance
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) Assembly and Conference
Development Fund Corporation
UNEP United Nations Environment in the Near East Economic and Social Commission for Management
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund MIGA Multilateral Investment
Programme UN-HABITAT United Nations Human Asia and the Paci c (ESCAP) DPI Department of Public Information
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Settlements Programme Guarantee Agency DM Department of Management
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund Economic and Social Commission for
Commissioner for Refugees ICSID International Centre for OHRLLS Office of the High
Western Asia (ESCWA)
Settlement of Investment Representative for the Least

Research and Training Institutes Other Bodies Disputes Developed Countries, Landlocked

Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues IMF International Monetary Fund Developing Countries and Small
UNICRI United Nations Interregional UNRISD United Nations Research INSTRAW International Research and ^' Island Developing States
(PFII) ICAO International Civil Aviation
Crime and Justice Research Institute Institute for Social Development Training Institute for the Advancement
DSS Department of Safety and
UNIDIR 2 United Nations Institute for of Women United Nations Forum on Forests Organization
UNITAR United Nations Institute for Security
Training and Research Disarmament Research Sessional and standing committees IMO International Maritime UNODC United Nations Office on
Expert, ad hoc and related bodies Organization Drugs and Crime
ITU International Telecommunication
Other U N Entities C3RJ
Union
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for UNU United Nations University
UPU Universal Postal Union
Human Rights UNSSC United Nations System Staff College Related Organizations UNOG UN Office at Geneva
W M O Wortd Meteorological
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS WTO World Trade Organization UNOV UN Office at Vienna
Organization
UNON UN Office at Nairobi
IAEA International Atomic Energy WIPO Wortd Intellectual Property
Agency
Other U N Trust Funds7 Organization
IFAD International Fund for
UNFIP United Nations Fund for International Partnerships UNDEF United Nations Democracy Fund
CTBTO Prep.Com5 PrepCom for the Agricultural Development Published by the United Nations
Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organization
NOTES: Solid lines from a Principal Organ indicate a direct reporting relationship; dashes indicate a non-subsidiary relationship. UNIDO United Nations Industrial Department of Public Information

1 The UN Drug Control Programme is part of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime O P C W 5 Organization for the Development Organization 06-39572-August 2006-10.000-DPI/2431
2 UNRWA and UNIDIR report only to the GA Prohibition of Chemical Weapons UN WTO World Tourism
3 The United Nations Ethics Office and the United Nations Ombudsman's Office report directly to the Secretary-General Organization
4 IAEA reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly (GA)
5 The CTBTO Prep.Com and OPCW report to the GA
6 Specialized agencies are autonomous organizations working with the UN and each other through the coordinating machinery of the ECOSOC at the
intergovernmental level, and through the Chief Executives Board for coordination (CEB) at the inter-secretariat level
7 UNFIP is an autonomous trust fund operating under the leadership of the United Nations Deputy Secretary-General. UNDEF's advisory board recommends
funding proposals for approval by the Secretary-General.

Source: Reproduced by permission of the United Nations Department of Public Information (see www.un.org/aboutun/chart.pdf).

Figure 18.1 The structure of the United Nations system

 Box 18.2 The reform of the Security Council
Since the Security Council is the main executive body within the
United Nations with primary responsibility for maintaining interna-
tional peace and security, it is not surprising that many discussions of
UN reform have focused on the Security Council.
The founders of the UN deliberately established a universal
General Assembly and a restricted Security Council that required
unanimity among the great powers. Granting permanent seats and
the right to a veto to the great powers of the time, the United States,
the Soviet Union (now Russia), France, the United Kingdom, and
China, was an essential feature of the deal.
The composition and decision-making procedures of the Security
Council were increasingly challenged as membership of the United
Nations grew, particularly after decolonization.Yet the only significant
reform of the Security Council occurred in 1965, when the Council
was enlarged from 11 to 15 members and the required majority from
seven to nine votes. Nonetheless, the veto power of the permanent
five (P-5) members was left intact.
The Council also makes recommendations to the
General Assembly o n the appointment o f a new Secretary-
General and o n the admission o f new members to the
UN.
The General Assembly
The recognition o f power politics t h r o u g h veto power
in the Security C o u n c i l can be contrasted w i t h the u n i -
versalist principles u n d e r l y i n g the other organs o f the
United Nations. A l l U N member states are represented i n
the General Assembly—a 'parliament o f nations'—which
meets to consider the world's most pressing problems.
Each member state has one vote. A t w o - t h i r d s major-
ity i n the General Assembly is required for decisions on
key issues such as international peace and security, the
admission o f new members, and the U N budget. A simple
majority is required for other matters. However, the deci-
sions reached by the General Assembly o n l y have the sta-
tus o f recommendations, rather than b i n d i n g decisions.
One o f the few exceptions is the General Assembly's Fifth
Committee, w h i c h makes decisions o n the budget that
are b i n d i n g o n members.
The General Assembly can consider any matter w i t h i n
the scope o f the U N Charter. There were 156 items o n the
agenda o f the sixty-first session o f the General Assembly
(2006-7), i n c l u d i n g topics such as globalization, the role o f
diamonds i n fuelling conflict, international cooperation i n
The Security Council does not reflect today's distribution of mili-
tary or economic power, and does not reflect a geographic balance.
Germany and Japan have made strong cases for permanent member-
ship. Developing countries have demanded more representation on
the Security Council, with countries such as South Africa, India, Egypt,
Brazil, and Nigeria making particular claims. However, it has proved
to be impossible to reach agreement on new permanent members.
Should the European Union be represented instead of Great Britain,
France, and Germany individually? How would Pakistan feel about
India's candidacy? How would South Africa feel about a Nigerian
seat? What about representation by an Islamic country? These issues
are not easy to resolve. Likewise, it is very unlikely that the P-5 coun-
tries will relinquish their veto.
Nonetheless, while large-scale reform has proved impossible,
there have been changes in Security Council working procedures that
have made it more transparent and accountable.
the peaceful uses o f outer space, peacekeeping operations,
sustainable development, and international migration.
Since General Assembly resolutions are non-binding, they
cannot force action by any state, but its recommendations
are i m p o r t a n t indications o f w o r l d o p i n i o n and represent
the m o r a l authority o f the c o m m u n i t y o f nations.
The Secretariat
The Secretariat carries out the substantive and a d m i n -
istrative w o r k o f the U n i t e d Nations as directed by the
General Assembly, the Security C o u n c i l , and the other
organs. It is led by the Secretary-General, w h o provides
overall administrative guidance. I n December 2006, Ban
K i - M o o n f r o m South Korea was sworn i n as the eighth
Secretary-General. The Secretariat consists o f depart-
ments and offices w i t h a total staff o f 8,900 under the
regular budget, and a nearly equal n u m b e r under special
funding.
O n the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f the other bodies, the
Secretariat also carries out a n u m b e r o f research func-
tions and some quasi-management functions. Yet the
role o f the Secretariat remains p r i m a r i l y bureaucratic
and it lacks the political power and the right o f initia-
tive of, for instance, the C o m m i s s i o n o f the European
U n i o n . The one exception to this is the power o f the
Secretary-General under A r t i c l e 99 o f the Charter, to
b r i n g situations that are likely to lead to a breakdown o f
international peace and security to the attention o f the
Security Council. This Article, w h i c h may appear i n n o c -
uous at first, was the legal basis for the remarkable expan-
sion o f the diplomatic role o f the Secretary-General,
compared w i t h its League predecessor. D u e to this, the
Secretary-General is empowered to become involved i n
a large range o f areas that can be loosely interpreted as
threats to peace, i n c l u d i n g economic and social prob-
lems, and h u m a n i t a r i a n crises.
The Economic and Social Council
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), under the
overall authority o f the General Assembly, is intended to
coordinate the economic and social w o r k o f the United
Nations and the U N family o f organizations. It also consults
w i t h non-governmental organizations (NGOs), thereby
maintaining a vital l i n k between the United Nations and civil
society. ECOSOCs subsidiary bodies include: Functional
Commissions, such as the Commission o n the Status o f
Women; Regional Commissions, such as the Economic
Commission for Africa; and other bodies (see Fig. 18.1).
A l o n g w i t h the Secretariat and the General Assembly,
E C O S O C is responsible for overseeing the activities
o f a large n u m b e r o f other institutions k n o w n as the
U n i t e d Nations system. This includes the Specialized
Agencies and the Programmes and Funds (see Fig. 18.1).
The Specialized Agencies, such as the W o r l d Health
Organization (WHO) and the International Labour
Organization ( I L O ) , have their o w n constitutions, reg-
ularly assessed budgets, executive heads, and assem-
blies o f state representatives. They are self-contained
constitutionally, financially, and politically, and n o t sub-
ject to the management o f the central system.
The Programmes and Funds are m u c h closer to
the central system i n the sense that their management
arrangements are subject to direct General Assembly
supervision, can be m o d i f i e d by Assembly resolution,
and are largely f u n d e d on a v o l u n t a r y basis. Since the
establishment o f the U n i t e d Nations i n 1945, a n u m b e r
o f new issues have come o n to the international agenda,
such as the rights and interests o f w o m e n , climate change,
resource depletion, population growth, terrorism, and
the spread o f H I V / A I D S . Frequently, those issues led
to a new organization i n the Programmes and Funds.
Examples o f Programmes and Funds include the U n i t e d
Nations Development Programme ( U N D P ) , and the
U n i t e d Nations Children's F u n d ( U N I C E F ) .
Whereas the League o f Nations attributed responsi-
b i l i t y for economic and social questions to the League
Assembly, the Charter o f the U n i t e d Nations established
E C O S O C to oversee economic and social institutions.
This change was a consequence o f t h i n k i n g i n m o r e
functionalist terms. Organizations were set up to deal
w i t h specific economic and social problems. However,
E C O S O C was n o t given the necessary management
powers. It can o n l y issue recommendations and receive
reports f r o m the Specialized Agencies. I n consequence,
the UN's economic and social organizations have con-
tinuously searched for better ways o f achieving effec-
tive management (see discussion o f the r e f o r m process
below).
The Trusteeship Council
W h e n the U n i t e d Nations was created, the Trusteeship
C o u n c i l was established to provide international supervi-
sion for 11 Trust Territories administered by seven m e m -
ber states and to ensure that adequate steps were taken to
prepare the territories for self-government or independ-
ence. By 1994, all Trust Territories had attained self-gov-
ernment or independence, either as separate states or by
j o i n i n g n e i g h b o u r i n g independent countries. The last to
do so was the Trust Territory o f the Pacific Islands, Palau,
w h i c h had been previously administered by the U n i t e d
States. Its w o r k completed, the Trusteeship C o u n c i l n o w
consists o f the five permanent members o f the Security
Council. It has amended its rules o f procedure to allow it
to meet w h e n necessary.
The International Court of Justice
The International C o u r t o f Justice is the m a i n j u d i c i a l
organ o f the U N . Consisting o f 15 judges elected j o i n t l y
by the General Assembly and the Security C o u n c i l , the
C o u r t decides disputes between countries. Participation
by states i n a proceeding is voluntary, b u t i f a state agrees
to participate, it is obligated to c o m p l y w i t h the Court's
decision. The C o u r t also provides advisory opinions
to other U N organs and Specialized Agencies u p o n
request.
 Key Points
• The United Nations was established to preserve peace between
states after the Second World War.
• In a number of ways, the institutions of the United Nations reflected
lessons learned from its predecessor, the League of Nations.
• The institutions and mechanisms of the United Nations reflect both
the demands of great power politics (i.e. Security Council veto) and
The United Nations and the maintenance of international
peace and security
The performance o f the U n i t e d Nations i n questions o f
peace and security has been shaped by the global political
context. Clearly, there have been changes i n international
society since the U N was founded i n 1945 that have had
an impact on the U N system. The cold war between the
United States and the Soviet U n i o n hampered the func-
tioning o f the U N Security Council, since the veto could
be used whenever the m a j o r interests o f the U n i t e d States
or Soviet U n i o n were threatened. F r o m 1945 to 1990,193
substantive vetoes were invoked i n the Security Council,
compared to o n l y 19 substantive vetoes f r o m 1990 to 2007.
Furthermore, w h i l e the U N Charter provided for a stand-
ing army to be set up by agreement between the Security
Council and consenting states, the East-West cold war
rivalry made this impossible to implement. The end result
was that the U N Security C o u n c i l could not f u n c t i o n i n
the way i n w h i c h the U N founders had expected.
Since m e m b e r states could not agree u p o n the arrange-
ments laid out i n Chapter V I I o f the Charter, especially
w i t h regard to setting up a U N army, there followed a
series o f improvizations to address matters o f peace and
security. First, a procedure was established under w h i c h
the Security C o u n c i l agreed to a mandate for an agent to
act o n its behalf. This occurred i n the Korean conflict i n
1950, and the G u l f War i n 1990, w h e n action was under-
taken principally by the U n i t e d States and its allies.
Second, there have been many instances o f classical
peacekeeping. N o reference to peacekeeping exists i n the
U N Charter, but classical peacekeeping mandates and
mechanisms are based o n Chapter V I o f the U N Charter.
Classical peacekeeping involves the establishment o f a
universalism. They also reflect demands to address the needs and
interests of people, as well as the needs and interest of states. The
tensions between these various demands are a key feature of UN
development.
U N force under U N c o m m a n d to be placed between the
parties to a dispute after a ceasefire. Such a force only uses
its weapons i n self-defence, is established w i t h the con-
sent o f the host state, and does not include forces f r o m
the major powers. This mechanism was first used i n 1956,
w h e n a U N force was sent to Egypt to facilitate the exodus
o f the British and French forces f r o m the Suez canal area,
and then to stand between Egyptian and Israeli forces.
Since the Suez crisis, there have been a n u m b e r o f classi-
cal peacekeeping missions, for instance, m o n i t o r i n g the
Green Line i n Cyprus, and i n the Golan Heights.
Third, there has been a new k i n d o f peacekeeping,
sometimes called multidimensional peacekeeping or peace
enforcement, w h i c h emerged after the end o f the cold
war. These missions are more likely to use force to achieve
humanitarian ends. The new peacekeeping mandates are
sometimes based on Chapter V I I o f the U N Charter. Such
forces have been used w h e n order has collapsed w i t h i n
states, and therefore address civil wars as well as interna-
tional conflict. A key problem has been that the peacekeep-
ers have f o u n d it increasingly difficult to maintain a neutral
position and have been targeted by belligerents. Examples
include the intervention i n Somalia i n the early 1990s and
intervention i n the former Yugoslavia i n the mid-1990s.
U N peacekeeping went t h r o u g h a rapid expansion i n
the early 1990s. I n 1994, U N peacekeeping operations
involved nearly 80,000 m i l i t a r y personnel around the
w o r l d , seven times the figure for 1990 (Pugh 2001: 115).
I n early 2007, the total n u m b e r o f peacekeeping person-
nel ( m i l i t a r y and police) i n the UN's 15 ongoing peace-
keeping operations was just over 82,000.
Increased attention to conditions within states
The new peacekeeping was the product o f a greater pre-
paredness to intervene w i t h i n states. This challenged the
traditional belief that diplomats should ignore the internal
affairs o f states i n order to preserve international stability.
A n increasing n u m b e r o f people believed that the inter-
national c o m m u n i t y , w o r k i n g t h r o u g h the U N , should
address i n d i v i d u a l political and civil rights, as well as the
right to basic provisions like food, water, health care, and
accommodation. U n d e r this view, violations o f i n d i v i d u -
als' rights were a major cause o f disturbances i n relations
between states: a lack o f internal justice risked interna-
tional disorder. The U N reinforced this new perception
that pursuing justice for individuals, or ensuring human
security, was an aspect o f national interest.
In some states, contributions to activities such as
peacekeeping were defended i n terms o f national inter-
est. Indeed, states like Canada c o u l d j u s t i f y their contri-
butions to peacekeeping as a 'moral' course o f action, but
it was also i n their national interest since Canada gained
status i n the international c o m m u n i t y t h r o u g h such con-
tributions. The Japanese also responded to m o r a l pressure
founded i n national interest w h e n they contributed sub-
stantially to defraying the cost o f British involvement i n
the 1990-1 G u l f War. This act can be explained i n terms
o f the synthesis o f m o r a l i t y and interest. For some states,
reputation i n the U n i t e d Nations had become an i m p o r -
tant national good.
These actions reflected an increasing concern w i t h
questions o f justice for individuals and conditions w i t h i n
states. Yet i n the past, the U n i t e d Nations had helped pro-
mote the t r a d i t i o n a l view o f the p r i m a c y o f international
order between states over justice for individuals, so the
Box 18.3 An agenda for peace
In the early 1990s after the end of the cold war, the U N agenda for
peace and security expanded quickly.Then Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali outlined the more ambitious role for the U N in his
seminal report, An Agenda for Peace (1992). The report described
interconnected roles for the U N to maintain peace and security in
the post-cold war context. These included:
• Preventive diplomacy: involving confidence-building measures,
fact-finding, and preventive deployment of U N authorized forces.
• Peacemaking: designed to bring hostile parties to agreement,
essentially through peaceful means. However, when all peaceful
new focus o n i n d i v i d u a l rights was a significant change.
W h a t accounts for this change?
First, the international e n v i r o n m e n t had changed. The
cold war stand-off between the East and the West had
meant that member states d i d not want to question the
conditions o f the sovereignty o f states. Jean Kirkpatrick's
(1979) notorious essay, w h i c h recommended tolerat-
i n g abhorrent dictatorships i n L a t i n A m e r i c a i n order to
fight c o m m u n i s m , was a reasonable report o f the situa-
t i o n at that time: unsavoury r i g h t - w i n g regimes i n Latin
A m e r i c a were tolerated because they were anti-Soviet,
and interfering i n the other's sphere risked escalation o f
conflict (Forsythe 1988: 259-60).
Second, the process o f decolonization had privileged
statehood over justice. The U N reflected the claims o f
colonies to become states, and had elevated the right to
statehood above any tests o f viability, such as the existence
o f a nation, adequate economic performance, defensibil-
ity, or a prospect for achieving justice for citizens. This
u n c o n d i t i o n a l right to independence was enunciated i n
the General Assembly Declaration on the G r a n t i n g o f
Independence to C o l o n i a l Countries and Peoples i n 1960.
There emerged a convention that the claims o f elites i n
the putative states could be a sufficient i n d i c a t i o n o f pop-
ular enthusiasm, even w h e n the elites were crooks and the
claims misleading.
Charles Beitz was one o f the first to question this w h e n
he concluded that statehood should not be unconditional:
attention had to be given to the situation o f individuals
after independence (Beitz 1979). M i c h a e l Waltzer and
Terry N a r d i n produced arguments leading to similar con-
clusions: states were conditional entities i n that their right
to exist should be dependent o n a c r i t e r i o n o f p e r f o r m -
ance w i t h regard to the interests o f their citizens (Walzer
means have failed, peace enforcement authorized under Chapter
VII of the Charter may be necessary. Peace enforcement may occur
without the consent of the parties.
Peacekeeping: the deployment of a U N presence in the field with
the consent of all parties (this refers to classical peacekeeping).
Post-conflict peacebuilding: to develop the social, political, and
economic infrastructure to prevent further violence and to con-
solidate peace.
 Box 18.4 The UN Peacebuilding Commission
The U N Peacebuilding Commission was established in December
2005 as an advisory subsidiary body of the General Assembly and
the Security Council. It was first proposed by the Secretary-General's
High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in December
2004, and again in the Secretary-General's Report In Larger Freedom
in March 2005 ( U N 2005). Existing mechanisms at the U N were
thought to be insufficient in responding to the particular needs of
countries emerging from conflict. Many countries, such as Liberia,
Haiti, and Somalia in the 1990s, had signed peace agreements and
hosted U N peacekeeping missions, but reverted to violent conflict.
The Peacebuilding Commission aims to provide targeted support to
countries in the volatile post-conflict phase to prevent the recurrence
of conflict. It will propose integrated strategies and priorities for post-
1977; N a r d i n 1983). Such writings helped alter the m o r a l
content of diplomacy.
The new relationship between order and justice was,
therefore, a product o f particular circumstances. After the
cold war, it was felt that threats to international peace and
security d i d not o n l y emanate f r o m aggression between
states. Rather, global peace was also threatened by civil
conflict (including refugee flows and regional instability),
humanitarian emergencies, violations of global standards
of h u m a n rights, and other conditions such as poverty
and inequality. I n 1992, then Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali outlined a new ambitious U N agenda for
peace and security i n a report called An Agenda for Peace
(see Box 18.3). M o r e recently, other types o f non-state-
Key Points
The cold war and the decolonization process had discouraged more
active involvement by the United Nations within states.
After the cold war, it became more difficult for states and diplomats
to accept that what happened within states was of no concern to
outsiders.
It became more common for governments to see active member-
ship in the United Nations as serving their national interest as well
as being morally right.
The United Nations and intervention within states
As issues o f peace and security were increasingly under-
stood to include human security and justice, the U N
was expected to take o n a stronger role i n m a i n t a i n i n g
standards for individuals w i t h i n states. A difficulty w i t h
conflict recovery, in order to improve coordination among the myriad
of actors involved in post-conflict activities. The establishment of the
Peacebuilding Commission is indicative of a growing trend at the U N
to coordinate security and development programming.
The organizational committee of the Peacebuilding Commission
is made up of 31 member states, and the first session was held in June
2006.The Peacebuilding Support Fund, with a target of $250 million,
is designed to support the activities of the Commission. There are
also country-specific meetings to look at the post-conflict strategies,
priorities, and programming for specific countries.The first two coun-
tries considered by the Peacebuilding Commission are Sierra Leone
and Burundi.
based threat, such as terrorism and the proliferation o f
small arms and weapons of mass destruction, have an
increasingly p r o m i n e n t place o n the U N security agenda.
Partly due to the terrorist attacks i n the USA i n 2001 as
well as the impasse reached i n the U N Security C o u n c i l
over I r a q i n 2003, then Secretary-General K o f i A n n a n
named a high-level panel to examine the major threats
and challenges to global peace. The 2004 final report
emphasized the interconnected nature o f security threats,
and presented development, security, and h u m a n rights as
mutually reinforcing. M a n y o f the reports recommenda-
tions were not implemented, but some were, notably the
establishment o f a new U N Peacebuilding Commission
(see Box 18.4).
By the mid-1990s the U N had become involved in maintaining
international peace and security by resisting aggression between
states, by attempting to resolve disputes within states (civil wars),
and by focusing on conditions within states, including economic,
social, and political conditions.
carrying out the new tasks was that it seemed to r u n
against the d o c t r i n e o f n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n . Intervention
was traditionally defined as a deliberate i n c u r s i o n into
a state w i t h o u t its consent by some outside agency, i n
order to change the f u n c t i o n i n g , policies, and goals o f its
government and achieve effects that favour the interven-
i n g agency (Vincent 1974) (see Ch. 30).
A t the f o u n d i n g o f the U N , sovereignty was regarded
as central to the system o f states. States were equal m e m -
bers o f international society, and were equal w i t h regard
to international law. Sovereignty also implied that states
recognized no higher authority than themselves, and that
there was no superior jurisdiction. The governments of
states had exclusive j u r i s d i c t i o n w i t h i n their o w n fron-
tiers, a principle w h i c h was enshrined i n Article 2(7) of the
United Nations Charter. Intervention i n the traditional
sense was i n opposition to the principles of international
society, and it could only be tolerated as an exception to
the rule.
I n earlier periods, however, states had intervened i n
each other's business and thought that they had a right to
do so. The United States refused to accept any curtailment
of their right to intervene i n the internal affairs o f other
states i n their hemisphere u n t i l 1933, w h e n they con-
ceded the point at the seventh International Conference
of American States. The US position was very similar to
the Brezhnev doctrine of the 1970s, w h i c h held that the
Soviet U n i o n had the right to intervene i n the member
states of the socialist commonwealth to protect the p r i n -
ciples of socialism.
M u c h earlier, the British had insisted o n the aboli-
t i o n of slavery i n their relations w i t h other states. They
stopped ships o n the h i g h seas, and imposed the abolition
o f slavery as a condition i n treaties (Bethell 1970). There
were also occasions when states tried to b i n d other states
to respect certain principles i n their internal affairs. A
number o f states i n Eastern Europe, such as Hungary and
Bulgaria, were b o u n d to respect the rights o f minorities
w i t h i n their frontiers based on agreements made at the
Berlin Conference o f 1878 by the great powers. I n prac-
tice, then, intervention was a c o m m o n feature of interna-
tional politics, sometimes for good cause.
By the 1990s, some people believed that there should
be a return to this earlier period where intervention was
justified, but it was felt that a wider range of instruments
should be used to protect generally accepted standards.
They insisted on a key role for the United Nations i n grant-
ing a licence to intervene. It was pointed out that the U N
Charter d i d not assert merely the rights o f states, but also
the rights o f peoples: statehood could be interpreted as
being conditional u p o n respect for such rights. There was
ample evidence i n the U N Charter to justify the view that
extreme transgressions o f h u m a n rights could be a justifi-
cation for intervention by the international community.
The major pronouncements of the U N General
Assembly o n humanitarian assistance referred to the
p r i m a r y responsibility o f states for dealing w i t h complex
crises w i t h i n their frontiers. A 1991 General Assembly
resolution implied some relaxation o f this principle
w h e n it held that "The sovereignty, territorial integrity
and national u n i t y o f States must be fully respected in
accordance w i t h the Charter o f the U n i t e d Nations. In
this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided
w i t h the consent o f the affected c o u n t r y and i n princi-
ple on the basis o f an appeal by the affected country' (A/
RES/46/182). The use o f the phrase ' i n principle', and the
t e r m 'should', i m p l i e d that there could be occasions where
intervention was necessary even w h e n consent i n the tar-
get state was not possible. I n the Outcome D o c u m e n t of
the 2005 W o r l d Summit, the General Assembly said that if
national authorities are 'manifestly failing to protect their
populations f r o m genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
and crimes against h u m a n i t y ' and i f peaceful means are
inadequate, the international c o m m u n i t y could take col-
lective action t h r o u g h the U N Security C o u n c i l accord-
ing to Chapter V I I o f the Charter (A/RES/60/1, para. 138
and 139). This document echoes recommendations f r o m
the Responsibility to Protect, the 2001 final report of the
International C o m m i s s i o n o n Intervention and State
Sovereignty (see Ch.30).
Yet the n u m b e r o f occasions where a U N resolution
justified intervention due to gross infringements o f the
rights of individuals has remained limited. The justifica-
t i o n o f intervention i n Kosovo represented a break f r o m
the past i n that it included a clear humanitarian element.
Kosovo was arguably the first occasion i n w h i c h interna-
tional forces were used i n defiance o f a sovereign state i n
order to protect humanitarian standards. N A T O launched
the air campaign i n M a r c h 1999 i n Kosovo against the
Republic o f Yugoslavia w i t h o u t a mandate f r o m the
Security Council, since Russia had declared that it w o u l d
veto such action. Nonetheless, N A T O states noted that by
intervening to stop ethnic cleansing and crimes against
h u m a n i t y i n Kosovo they were acting i n accordance w i t h
the principles of the U N Charter.
The Iraq War in 2003 was questionably another case,
although the legality of intervention under existing
Security C o u n c i l resolutions is contested, especially i n
 Case Study The 2003 intervention in Iraq
In March 2003, a US-led coalition launched a highly controversial
war in Iraq, which removed Saddam Hussein from power.The jus-
tification for war stressed Iraq's possession of weapons of mass
destruction, in defiance of earlier U N resolutions. Unlike in Kosovo,
the gross violation of human rights was not given as a main justi-
fication for the invasion until later. Yet the failure to find weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq as well as the ongoing civil war, have
fuelled the claims of critics that the war was unjustified.
There was no agreement over whether the UN Security Council
authorized military action in Iraq. American and British diplomats
view o f the failure to obtain a second U N Security C o u n c i l
resolution to give an explicit mandate for the action (see
Case Study). The US action against Afghanistan i n 2001
is an exceptional case i n w h i c h the U N Security C o u n c i l
acknowledged the right o f a state w h i c h had been
attacked—referring to the events o f 11 September 2001
i n the U n i t e d States—to respond i n its o w n defence.
Arguably, earlier instances o f intervention d i d n o t
explicitly breach sovereignty. The 1991 Security C o u n c i l
resolution sanctioning intervention i n I r a q (S/Res/688) at
the end o f the G u l f War d i d n o t breach I r a q i sovereignty
i n so far as its i m p l e m e n t a t i o n depended o n Saddam
Husseins consent. The 1992 Security C o u n c i l resolu-
t i o n (S/Res/733) that first sanctioned U N involvement i n
Somalia was based o n a request by Somalia. A later reso-
l u t i o n for Somalia (S/Res/794) authorizing the U n i t e d
States to intervene d i d not m e n t i o n the consent o f Somali
authorities, but b y that t i m e a central Somali government
d i d n o t exist.
The difficulty i n relaxing the principle o f non-interven-
t i o n should n o t be underestimated. For instance, the U N
has been reluctant to send peacekeepers to D a r f u r w i t h -
out the consent o f the Sudanese government. Some fear a
pointed to UN Security Council Resolution 687 of 1991, which
required the destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
under UN supervision, and UN Security Council Resolution 1441
of 2002 which threatened 'serious consequences' if this were not
done. Yet efforts to reach a Security Council resolution in the win-
ter of 2003 that would clearly authorize the use of force against
Iraq were unsuccessful. France and Russia threatened to veto a
second Security Council resolution authorizing force.
The credibility of the U N was damaged by the failure to agree
on a second Security Council resolution, and by the decision of
the US and British administrations, along with a small number
of allies, to use force against Iraq without clear UN authoriza-
tion. There are fears of an increased tendency for the USA to act
without UN authorization. The Bush administration's National
Security Strategy of September 2002 states that '[W]e will be
prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibili-
ties require' (NSS 2002:31).
Nonetheless, the aftermath of the invasion and the contin-
ued difficulties in establishing security in Iraq highlight the need
for international cooperation.The UN enhances the legitimacy of
military action, and can also help share in global risks, burdens, and
strategies for rebuilding.
slippery slope whereby a relaxation o f the non-interven-
t i o n principle by the U N w i l l lead to m i l i t a r y action by
i n d i v i d u a l states w i t h o u t U N approval. It could be argued
that the action against I r a q i n 2003 illustrates the danger
(see Case Study). There are significant numbers o f non-
U N actors, i n c l u d i n g regional organizations, involved i n
peace operations, and several countries are suspicious o f
what appears to be the granting o f a licence to intervene
i n their affairs.
I n summary, an increasing readiness by the U N to
intervene w i t h i n states i n order to p r o m o t e internal jus-
tice for individuals w o u l d indicate a movement towards
global governance and away f r o m u n c o n d i t i o n a l sover-
eignty. There have been some signs o f movement i n this
direction, but principles o f state sovereignty and non-
intervention remain i m p o r t a n t . There is n o clear consen-
sus o n these points. There is still some support for the view
that A r t i c l e 2(7) o f the U N Charter should be interpreted
strictly: that there can be n o intervention w i t h i n a state
w i t h o u t the express consent o f the government o f that
state. Others believe that intervention w i t h i n a c o u n t r y
to promote h u m a n rights is o n l y justifiable o n the basis
o f a threat to international peace and security. Evidence
 Box 18.5 Selected documents related to the changing role of the United Nations system
Development of the economic and social organizations
A/32/197, Dec. 1977. The first major General Assembly resolution
on reform of the economic and social organizations.
A/48/162, Dec. 1993. A major step towards reform of the economic
and social organization of the United Nations, especially ECOSOC.
Development of the UN's role in maintaining interna-
tional peace and security
SC Res. 678, Nov. 1990, sanctioned the use of force against Saddam
Hussein.
SC Res. 816, Apr. 1993, enforced the no-fly zone over Bosnia in that
it permitted NATO war planes to intercept Bosnian Serb planes in
the zones.
SC Res. 1160,1199, and 1203 contained arguments relevant to the
action on Kosovo. SC Res. 1244 contained the agreement at the end
of the bombing.
o f a threat to international peace and security could be
the appearance o f significant numbers o f refugees, or the
judgement that other states m i g h t intervene militarily.
Some Liberals argue that this c o n d i t i o n is flexible enough
to justify intervention to defend h u m a n rights whenever
possible.
Overall, then, the UN's record o n the maintenance
o f international peace and security has been mixed. O n
the one hand, there has been a stronger assertion o f the
responsibility o f international society, represented by the
U n i t e d Nations, for gross offences against populations.
Nonetheless, the practice has been patchy. Intimations o f
a new world order i n the aftermath o f the G u l f War i n
1991 quickly gave way to despondency w i t h what were
The United Nations and economic and social questions
As described above, there has been an increased ten-
dency to view threats to peace and security i n terms o f
traditional threats such as aggression between states, but
also civil conflict w i t h i n states, threats emanating f r o m
non-state actors, and threats relating to economic and
social conditions w i t h i n states. This view believes that
conditions w i t h i n states, i n c l u d i n g h u m a n rights, jus-
tice, development, and equality have a bearing o n global
peace. The more integrated global context has meant that
economic and social problems i n one part o f the w o r l d
may impact other areas. Furthermore, p r o m o t i n g social
Development of humanitarian action through the UN
SC Res. 688, Apr. 1991, sanctioned intervention at the end of the
Gulf War to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq.
SC Res. 733, Jan. 1992, sanctioned UN involvement in Somalia.
A/46/182, Apr. 1992, is the major document on the development
of the machinery for humanitarian assistance.
SC Res. 794, Dec. 1992, sanctioned American intervention in
Somalia under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The government of
Somalia had ceased to exist in the eyes of the member states of the
Security Council.
SC Res. 1441, Nov. 2002, resolution on Iraq which threatened seri-
ous consequences if Saddam Hussein failed to reveal his weapons of
mass destruction to the team of UN inspectors.
seen as failures i n Somalia, Rwanda, other parts o f Africa,
and the f o r m e r Yugoslavia, and increasing disagreement
about the proper role o f the U N i n Kosovo and Iraq.
Compared to the enthusiasm about the potential for the
U N i n the early 1990s, the debates and disagreements at
the time o f the war i n I r a q i n 2003 were striking.
Key Points
• New justifications for intervention in states were being consid-
ered by the 1990s.
• Most operations of the United Nations were justified in the tra-
ditional way: as a response to a threat to international peace
and security.
and economic development is an i m p o r t a n t U N goal i n
itself. The preamble o f the U N Charter talks o f p r o m o t i n g
'social progress and better standards o f life i n larger free-
dom', and the need to 'employ international machinery
for the p r o m o t i o n o f the economic and social advance-
ment o f all peoples'.
The n u m b e r o f institutions w i t h i n the U N system
that address economic and social issues has significantly
increased since the f o u n d i n g o f the U N . Nonetheless, the
m a i n contributor states have been giving less and less to
economic and social institutions. By the mid-1990s, there
 Box 18.6 The UN Conference on Environment and Development: the Earth Summit
The UN Conference on Environment and Development (Earth
Summit) held in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro was unprecedented for a UN
conference in both its size and its scope of concerns. Representatives
of 172 countries, as well as 2,400 NCOs, discussed ways to help reach
the goal of sustainable development.
The Rio Earth Summit was held twenty years after the first UN
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. That 1972
Conference had stimulated the creation of national environmental
ministries around the world, and established the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP).
The central concern of the Rio Earth Summit was the need for
broad-based, environmentally sustainable development. As a result
of the Summit, 108 governments adopted three major agreements
concerned with changing the traditional approach to development.
These agreements included: the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development (a series of principles defining the rights and responsi-
was a c r i p p l i n g financial crisis i n the regular Assessed
Budget for the U N , and i n the budget for peacekeeping
operations. This was o n l y mitigated w h e n the U n i t e d
States agreed, under certain conditions, to repay what
it owed the U N and w h e n it returned to f u l l f u n d i n g i n
December 2002.
Paradoxically, despite the shortage o f funds, the U N
has acquired skills a n d resources w i t h regard to key eco-
n o m i c and social problems. D u r i n g the 1990s, a n u m b e r
of n e w issues were b r o u g h t o n to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
agenda. Several Global Conferences were convened to
discuss pressing problems, such as e n v i r o n m e n t a l issues
at a conference i n Rio de Janeiro (1992), h u m a n rights at
a conference i n V i e n n a (1993), p o p u l a t i o n questions
at a conference i n C a i r o (1994), and women's issues
at a conference i n B e i j i n g (1995). These conferences
each spawned a C o m m i s s i o n to c a r r y f o r w a r d the
p r o g r a m m e . Such conferences represented a g r o w -
ing sense o f interdependence and the globalization o f
h u m a n concerns. They also s t i m u l a t e d a renewed inter-
est i n t r a n s l a t i n g b r o a d socioeconomic concerns i n t o
m o r e specific manageable p r o g r a m m e s (see Box 18.6).
F o l l o w - u p conferences were h e l d ten years later to take
stock o f progress.
bilities of states), the Statement of Forest Principles, and Agenda 21
(a comprehensive programme of action to attain sustainable devel-
opment on a global scale). In addition, the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity were
signed by many governments.
The U N Commission on Sustainable Development was
formed after the 1992 Earth Summit to ensure follow-up and to
report on the implementation of Earth Summit agreements at the
local, national, regional, and international levels. A five-year review
of Earth Summit progress took place in New York in 1997 and a ten-
year review at the World Summit on Sustainable Development
held in Johannesburg in 2002. There were significant divisions at the
Johannesburg Summit. The conference was thought to be too large
and the outcome was generally seen as disappointing. Nonetheless,
by 2002 it was clear that environmental questions were prominent
issues on the UN agenda.
I n 2000, the U N convened a M i l l e n n i u m Summit,
where heads o f state c o m m i t t e d themselves to a series o f
measurable goals and targets, k n o w n as the M i l l e n n i u m
Development Goals ( M D G s ) . These goals, to be achieved
by 2015, include reducing b y half the n u m b e r o f people
l i v i n g o n less than a dollar a day, achieving universal pri-
m a r y education, and reversing the spread o f H I V / A I D S
and malaria (A/55/L.2). Since 2000, the U N has been inte-
grating the M D G s into all aspects o f its w o r k at the coun-
t r y level, but progress o n reaching the M D G s has been
very uneven.
Key Points
• The number of institutions within the UN system that address
economic and social issues has significantly increased. Several
Programmes and Funds were created in response to Global
Conferences.
• Despite a shortage of funds and coordination problems, the UN
has done important work in key economic and social areas.
• The Millennium Development Goals have focused attention on
measurable socioeconomic targets and have further integrated
the work of the UN at the country level, but progress towards
reaching the goals has been uneven.
 The reform process in the economic and social arrangements
of the United Nations
I n the m i d - to late 1990s, alongside g r o w i n g U N involve-
m e n t i n development issues, the U N economic and
social arrangements u n d e r w e n t r e f o r m at t w o levels:
first, reforms concerned w i t h operations i n the c o u n t r y
(field) level; a n d second, reforms at the general or head-
quarters level.
Country level
The c o n t i n u i n g complaints o f N G O s about p o o r U N per-
formance i n the field served as a p o w e r f u l stimulus for
reform. A key feature o f the reforms at the c o u n t r y (field)
level was the a d o p t i o n o f C o u n t r y Strategy Notes. These
were statements about the overall development proc-
ess tailored to the specific needs o f i n d i v i d u a l countries.
They were w r i t t e n o n the basis o f discussions between the
Specialized Agencies, Programmes a n d Funds, donors,
and the host country, a n d described the plans o f the vari-
ous institutions a n d donors i n a particular country. The
m e r i t o f the C o u n t r y Strategy Notes is that they clearly set
out targets, roles, a n d priorities.
A n o t h e r r e f o r m at the c o u n t r y level was the strength-
ening o f the Resident C o o r d i n a t o r , usually an employee o f
the U n i t e d Nations Development P r o g r a m m e ( U N D P ) .
He or she became the responsible officer at the coun-
t r y level, a n d was p r o v i d e d w i t h m o r e t r a i n i n g to f u l f i l
this role. Field-level officers were also given enhanced
authority, so that they c o u l d make decisions about the
redeployment o f funds w i t h i n a p r o g r a m m e without
referring to headquarters. There was also an effort to
i n t r o d u c e i m p r o v e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n facilities and i n f o r -
mation-sharing. The activities o f the various U N organi-
zations were b r o u g h t together i n single locations or ' U N
houses', w h i c h facilitated inter-agency c o m m u n i c a t i o n
and collegiality. The n e w country-level approach was
called an Integrated Programmes approach. The adop-
t i o n o f the M i l l e n n i u m Development Goals f r a m e w o r k
has also helped c o u n t r y field staff achieve a m o r e coher-
ent approach to development. This can be contrasted to
earlier arrangements whereby the various agencies w o u l d
w o r k separately o n distinct projects, often i n ignorance of
each other's presence i n the same country.
Headquarters level
I f the U N role i n economic and social affairs at the coun-
t r y level was to be effective, r e f o r m was also required at
the headquarters level. The U n i t e d Nations f a m i l y o f eco-
n o m i c a n d social organizations has always been a polyc-
entric system. Historically, there was n o organization or
agent w i t h i n the system that was capable o f m a n a g i n g the
w i d e range o f economic and social activities u n d e r the
U N umbrella. R e f o r m efforts i n the 1990s focused o n the
reorganization a n d rationalization o f the E c o n o m i c a n d
Social C o u n c i l ( E C O S O C ) .
I n the U N Charter, the powers given to the General
Assembly a n d E C O S O C were modest. E C O S O C c o u l d
o n l y issue recommendations and receive reports. By
contrast, U N r e f o r m i n the m i d - to late 1990s allowed
E C O S O C to become m o r e assertive a n d to take a leading
role i n the c o o r d i n a t i o n o f the U N system. E C O S O C was
to ensure that General Assembly policies were appropri-
ately i m p l e m e n t e d o n a system-wide basis. E C O S O C was
given the power to take final decisions o n the activities o f
its subsidiary bodies a n d o n other matters relating to sys-
t e m - w i d e c o o r d i n a t i o n i n economic, social, and related
fields (A/50/227, para. 37).
O n e o f ECOSOC's responsibilities was to review
c o m m o n themes i n the w o r k o f the n i n e Functional
Commissions, such as the C o m m i s s i o n o n Narcotic
Drugs, the C o m m i s s i o n o n Sustainable Development,
and the C o m m i s s i o n o n the Status o f W o m e n (see Fig.
18.1). The r e f o r m effort aimed to eliminate duplication
a n d overlap i n the w o r k o f the F u n c t i o n a l Commissions.
E C O S O C w o u l d integrate the w o r k o f its Functional
C o m m i s s i o n s and provide i n p u t to the General Assembly,
w h i c h was responsible for establishing the broader eco-
n o m i c and social p o l i c y f r a m e w o r k . The Boards o f the
Programmes and Funds were also reformed to enhance
their day-to-day management.
Overall, economic and social reorganization meant
that the two poles o f the system were better coordinated:
the pole where intentions are defined t h r o u g h global con-
ferences and agendas, and the pole where programmes
are implemented. Programmes at the field level were bet-
ter integrated and field officers were given enhanced dis-
cretion. The r e f o r m o f E C O S O C sharpened its capacity to
shape broad agreements into cross-sectoral programmes
with well-defined objectives. A t the same time, E C O S O C
acquired greater capacity to act as a conduit t h r o u g h
which the results o f field-level m o n i t o r i n g could be con-
veyed upwards to the Functional Commissions. These
Conclusion
Changes i n the role o f the U N reflect the changes i n percep-
tions o f international society and the nature o f sovereign
states. Over the past sixty years, the rules governing the
international system have become increasingly numer-
ous and specific, covering a large range o f the activities
of relations between states. Concerns have expanded to
include n o t o n l y the protection o f the rights o f states, but
also the rights o f individuals. Yet obtaining the agreement
of governments to principles o f i n d i v i d u a l rights is o n l y
a first step i n b u i l d i n g a m o r e orderly and just w o r l d . It is
also necessary to have consistent and reliable instruments
to trigger action w h e n standards are breached.
The U n i t e d Nations Security C o u n c i l is the instru-
ment that comes closest to meeting these aims. Despite
the flaws o f the Security C o u n c i l , it is s t r i k i n g that even
the largest states prefer to get authorization f r o m the
United Nations Security C o u n c i l for any action they p r o -
pose. I n Kosovo, the states that participated i n the N A T O
intervention wanted to demonstrate that they were acting
according to the U N Charter and the relevant Security
Council resolutions. I n Iraq, the US and U K govern-
ments invested considerable diplomatic energy i n get-
new processes h a d the effect o f strengthening the norms
o f a multilateral system.
Key Points
• In the mid- to late 1990s under the leadership of then Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, the UN embarked on an overarching reform
effort.
• Reform of the economic and social arrangements of the UN
aimed at improving coordination, eliminating duplication, and
clarifying spheres of responsibility.
• These efforts strengthened the norms of the multilateral
system.
t i n g a second Security C o u n c i l resolution i n support o f
m i l i t a r y action. The effort failed, but nevertheless it was
attempted.
Participation i n the U n i t e d Nations gives governments
status i n the international system. M e m b e r s h i p and suc-
cess i n the U N has come to be regarded as l e g i t i m i z i n g
state autonomy. Hence h o l d i n g office, taking the initia-
tive, p r o v i d i n g personnel, and p o l i c i n g n o r m s are seen to
have value because they add to the self-esteem as well as
to power o f the state. The U N has become the essential
club for states.
The capacity o f the U N i n its economic and social w o r k ,
its development w o r k , and its management o f peacekeep-
ing and post-conflict reconstruction has expanded since
the 1990s. Nonetheless, the predominance o f U n i t e d
States m i l i t a r y power, the possibility that the U S A w i l l
act again w i t h o u t clear U N authorization, the heightened
concern over t e r r o r i s m and weapons o f mass destruction,
the inability to respond effectively to the crisis i n Darfur,
and the pervasiveness o f inequality and injustice across
the w o r l d , signal that further changes and adaptations
w i t h i n the U N system w i l l be necessary.