HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG v.

MELICOR (455 SCRA 460, 2005)

FACTS:

Bertuldo Hinog allegedly occupied and built a small house on a portion of a property owned by
respondents Balane for 10 years at a nominal annual rental. After 10 years, Bertuldo refused to heed
demands made by respondents to return said portion and to remove the house constructed thereon.
Respondents filed a complaint against him. Bertuldo filed his Answer, alleging ownership of the disputed
property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. Bertuldo died without completing his evidence during the
direct examination. Bertuldo’s original counsel was replaced by Atty. Petalcorin who entered his
appearance as new counsel for the heirs of Bertuldo. Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the
complaint from the record and nullify all court proceedings on the ground that private respondents
failed to specify in the complaint the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket
fees; and that under Manchester doctrine, nonpayment of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are barred by estoppel from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC

RULING:

YES. The petitioners are barred from questioning jurisdiction of the trial court. Although the issue of
jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that
a party may be barred from raising it on the ground of estoppel. After the deceased Bertuldo
participated in all stages of the case before the trial court, the petitioners merely stepped into the shoes
of their predecessor and are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging RTC’s jurisdiction.
MAGPALE v. CSC (215 SCRA 398, 1992)

FACTS:

Magpale, port manager of Philippine Ports Authority-Port Management Unit (PPAPMU) of Tacloban,
was found by the Secretary of DOTC guilty of Gross Negligence on two counts: (a) for his failure to
account for the 44 units of equipment and (b) for failing to render the required liquidation of his cash
advances amounting to P44,877.00 for a period of 4 yrs. He was also found guilty of frequent and
unauthorized absences. He was meted the penalty of dismissal from the service with the corresponding
accessory penalties. He appealed to the Merit System and Protection Board (MSPB) of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). The MSPB reversed the decision. PPA filed an appeal with the Civil Service Field
Office-PPA, which indorsed the appeal to CSC. Magpale moved for the implementation of the MSPB
decision which was opposed by the PPA. MSPB ordered the immediate implementation of its decision,
which became final and executory. Respondent CSC reversed MPSB’s decision and held Magpale guilty.

ISSUE: Whether the law authorized an appeal by the government from an adverse decision of the
MSBP?

RULING:

NO. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, decisions of the MPSB shall be final, except only “those
involving dismissal or separation from the service which may be appealed to the Commission” While it is
true that the CSC does have the power to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought
before it directly or on appeal, the exercise of the power is qualified by and should be read together
with Sec. 49 of Executive Order 292, which prescribes, among others that “(a) the decision must be
appealable.” Under Section 47 of the Administrative Code, the CSC shall decide on appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of: (a) a penalty of suspension for more than
30 days; (b) fine in an amount exceeding 30 days salary; (c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer; or (d)
removal or dismissal from office. The MPSB decision did not involve dismissal or separation from office,
rather, the decision exonerated petitioner and ordered him reinstated to his former position. The MSPB
decision was not a proper subject of appeal to the CSC. Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial functions acts without jurisdiction if no authority has been conferred by law to
hear and decide the case.
LUMBUAN v. RONQUILLO (489 SCRA 650, 2006)

FACTS:

Lumbuan (lessor) leased a lot to respondent Ronquillo (lessee) for 3 years at a rental of P5000/month.
They agreed that: (a) there will be an annual 10% increase in rent for the next 2 years; and (b) the leased
premises shall be used only for lessee’s fastfood business. Ronquillo failed to abide by the conditions,
and refused to pay or vacate the leased premises despite Lumbuan’s repeated verbal demands.
Lumbuan referred the matter to the Barangay Chairman’s Office but no amicable settlement was
reached. The barangay chairman issued a Certificate to File Action. Lumbuan filed an action for Unlawful
Detainer with MeTC of Manila which ordered respondent Ronquillo to vacate the leased premises and
to pay P46,000 as unpaid rentals. RTC set aside the MeTC decision and directed the parties to go back to
the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for further proceedings and to comply strictly with the
condition that should the parties fail to reach an amicable settlement, the entire case will be remanded
to the MeTC for it to decide the case anew. The CA reversed the RTC and ordered the dismissal of the
ejectment case, ruling that when a complaint is prematurely instituted, as when the mandatory
mediation and conciliation in the barangay level had not been complied with, the court should dismiss
the case and not just remand the records to the court of origin so that the parties may go through the
prerequisite proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA properly dismissed complaint for failure of the parties to comply with the mandatory
mediation and conciliation proceedings in the barangay level?

RULING

NO. It should be noted that although no pangkat was formed since no amicable settlement was reached
by the parties before the Katarungang Pambarangay, there was substantial compliance with Section
412(a) of R.A. 7160. While admittedly no pangkat was constituted, the parties met at the office of the
Barangay Chairman for possible settlement. Thereby, the act of petitioner Lumbuan in raising the matter
to the Katarungang Pambarangay and the subsequent confrontation of the lessee and lessor before the
Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court.
This is true notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410(b) of the same law that the Barangay Chairman
shall constitute a pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts. Section 410(b) should be construed together
with Section 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case. On this score, it is
significant that the Barangay Chairman or Punong Barangay is herself the Chairman of the Lupon under
the Local Government Code.
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE v. ASUNCION (170 SCRA 274, 1989)

FACTS:

Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) filed a complaint against Uy for the consignation of a premium refund
on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity. Uy was declared in
default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. Uy filed a complaint in the
RTC for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment initially against
petitioner SIOL, but thereafter included Philipps and Warby as additional defendants. The complaint
sought the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees,
expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the
amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about
P50,000,000. Uy paid only P210.00 as docket fee, which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his
objection for under-assessment of docket fees. Petitioners allege that while Uy had paid P182,824.90 as
docket fee, and considering that the total amount sought in the amended and supplemental complaint
is P64,601,623.70, the docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or
less. Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all
incidents arising therefrom should be annulled.

ISSUE: Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over case when the correct and proper docket fee
has not yet been paid?

RULING:

YES. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing
of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by
the court, the additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and
collect the additional fee. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefore
is paid.
CGR CORP. V. TREYES (522 SCRA 765, 2007)

FACTS:

CGR Corporation, Herman Benedicto and Alberto Benedicto, petitioners, claim to have occupied 37 ha.
of public land in Negros Occidental, pursuant to a lease agreement granted to them by the Secretary of
Agriculture for a period of 25 years (to last October 2000 to December 2024). On November 2000,
however, respondent Treyes allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased premises and
barricaded the entrance to the fishponds of the petitioners. Treyes and his men also harvested tons of
milkfish and fingerlings from the petitioners’ ponds. Petitioners then filed a complaint for Forcible Entry
with the MTC. Another complaint to claim for damages was also filed by the petitioners against the
same respondent Treyes grounded on the allegations that Treyes and his men also destroyed and
ransacked the Chapel Chapel built by petitioner CGR Corporation and decapitated the heads of the
religious figures.

ISSUE:

Whether during the pendency of a separate complaint for Forcible Entry, the petitioner can
independently institute and maintain an action for damages which they claim arose from incidents
occurring after the forcible entry of Treyes and his men?

RULING:

YES. The only recoverable damages in the forcible entry and detainer cases instituted first by the
petitioners with the MTC are the “rents” or fair rental value of the property from the time of
dispossession by the respondent. Hence, other damages being claimed by the petitioners must be
claimed in another ordinary civil action. It is noteworthy that the second action instituted by the
petitioners (complaint for damages) have NO direct relation to their loss of possession of the leased
premises – which is the main issue in the first action they instituted. The second action for claim of
damages had to do with the harvesting and carting away of milkfish and other marine products, as well
as the ransacking of the chapel built by CGR Corp. Clearly, the institution of the two cases is not a
splitting of a cause of action, since both are concerned with entirely different issues.