DE LEON vs. CA. G.R. No.

127182, January 22, 2001

FACTS:
Respondent Atty. Jacob F. Montesa, who is not a Career Executive Service Officer
(CESO) or a member of the Career Executive Service, was appointed as "Ministry Legal
Counsel - CESO IV in the Ministry of Local Government" (now DILG), by then Minister
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. Private respondent's appointment was approved as permanent by
the Civil Service Commission.
On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated EO 262, reorganizing
the DILG. On April 8, 1988, then Secretary Luis T. Santos, who succeeded Minister
Pimentel, designated Nicanor M. Patricio as chief, Legal Service in place of Montesa
who, in turn, was directed to report to the office of the Secretary to perform special
assignments.
Montesa filed a petition for quo warranto against then Secretary Luis T. Santos and
Nicanor Patricio and the court ruled in favor of Montesa and ordered his reinstatement
to his former position.
Meanwhile, the Salary Standardization Law took effect on July 1, 1989. Pursuant
thereto, the position of "Department Service Chiefs," which include the Department
Legal Counsel, was reclassified and ranked with "Assistant Bureau Directors" under the
generic position title of "Director III".
In 1994, then Secretary Alunan III, citing as reasons the interest of public service and
the smooth flow of operations in the concerned offices, issued DO No. 94-370, relieving
private respondent of his current duties and responsibilities and reassigning him as
"Director III (Assistant Regional Director), Region XI," Private respondent, however, did
not report to his new assigned position. Instead, he filed a 90-day sick leave, and upon
the expiration thereof, he submitted a memorandum for then acting Secretary Aguirre,
signifying his intention to re-assume his position as Department Legal Counsel/Chief,
Legal Services. The memorandum was denied the same with his motion for
reconsideration.
Private respondent appealed to the Civil Service Commission but the latter sustained
his reassignment to Region XI, on the ground that the subject reassignment was not
violative of the due process clause of the Constitution or of Montesa's right to security of
tenure; the reassignment did not entail any reduction in rank or status and that Montesa
could be reassigned from one station to another without his consent as the rule against
unconsented transfer applies only to an officer who is appointed to a particular station,
and not merely assigned thereto.
Montesa on the otherhand still did not comply. President Fidel V. Ramos, upon the
recommendation of the Department, issued Administrative Order No. 235, dropping
Montesa, Director III. Legal Service, from the roster of public servants for serious
neglect of duty and absences without leave (AWOL).
ISSUE:
Whether a person who lacks the necessary qualification (eligibility) for a public position
be appointed to it in a permanent capacity.
RULING:
No. It must be stressed that the position of Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV is
embraced in the Career Executive Service. Under the Integrated Reorganization Plan,
appointment thereto shall be made as follows:
Appointment to appropriate classes in the Career Executive Service shall be made by
the President from a list of career executive eligible recommended by the Board. Such
appointments shall be made on the basis of rank. The President may, however, in
exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a Career Executive Service eligible;
provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the required Career Executive
Service examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until qualifies in
such examination.
At the initial implementation of this Plan, an incumbent who holds a permanent
appointment to a position embraced in the Career Executive Service shall continue to
hold his position, but may not advance to a higher class of position in the Career
Executive Service unless or until he qualifies for membership in the Career Executive
Service.
Corollarily, the required Career Executive Service eligibility may be then acquired by
passing the CES examination that will entitle the examinee to a conferment of a CES
eligibility and the inclusion of his name in the roster of CES eligible.
In the case at bar, there is no question that Montesa as he admits does not have the
required CES eligibility.
The court ruled by citing the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, et al., which provides that:
"It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only 'to a person who meets
all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility prescribed.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically
confer security or tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required
qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in
turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite
qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an
exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence
of appropriate eligible. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as
permanent even if it may be so designated."
Evidently, private respondent's appointment did not attain permanency. Not having
taken the necessary Career Executive Service examination to obtain requisite eligibility,
he did not at the time of his appointment and up to the present, possess the needed
eligibility for a position in the Career Executive Service. Consequently, his appointment
as Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV/ Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III,
was merely temporary. Such being the case, he could be transferred or reassigned
without violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Petitioners,
v.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V.
ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEÑA,
PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA
QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,
SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL,
and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 171947 : February 15, 2011

FACTS:
The Supreme Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48 ordering petitioners to
clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their different capacities.
The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate the quarterly
progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said
decision and to monitor the execution phase.
In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended that time
frames be set for the agencies to perform their assigned tasks.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the recommendation by the Committee is an encroachment over the
powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President of the
Philippines.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Adjudicative function
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial
power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but
an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court.
While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of
action, data or status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the execution
stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Petition is DENIED

Limketkai Sons Milling Inc v CA (Constitution)

GR No. 118509 September 5, 1996
FACTS:
(1) Motion of petitioner Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc., for reconsideration of the Court' s
resolution of March 29, 1996, which set aside the Court' s December 1, 1995 decision
and affirmed in toto the Court of Appeals' decision dated August 12, 1994.
(2) Petitioner questions the assumption of Chief Justice Narvasa of the chairmanship of
the Third Division and arrogantly ramsits idea on how each Division should be chaired,
i.e., the First Division should have been chaired by Chief J ustice Narvasa, the Second
Division by Mr. Justice Padilla, the next senior Justice, and the Third Division by Mr. J
ustice Regalado, the third in line. We need only to stress that the change in the
membership of the three divisions of the Court was inevitable by reason of Mr. Justice
Feliciano' s retirement. Such reorganization is purely an internal matter of the Court to
which petitioner certainly has no business at all. (3) In this Manifestation, petitioner
merely moved for the inhibition of the Chief Justice on the ground that the Chief Justice
previously acted as counsel for one of the respondents, which allegation the Chief J
ustice vehemently denied by saying that the information upon which the petitioner relied
"it utterly without foundation in fact and is nothing but pure speculation or wistful
yearning"
(4) Counsel for the petitioner additionally insinuates that the ponente employed a
"double standard" in deciding the case and professes bewilderment at the ponente ' s
act of purportedly taking a position in the ponencia contrary to ponente' s act of
purportedly taking a position in the ponencia contrary to ponente' s standing his book.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be referred to Court En banc.
HELD:
ACCORDINGLY, petitioner's motion for reconsideration and motion to refer the case to
the Court En Banc are hereby DENI ED WI TH FIN ALI TY, without prejudice to any and
all appropriate actions that the Court may take not only against counsel on record for
the petitioner for his irresponsible remarks, but also against other persons responsible
for the reckless publicity anent this case calculated to maliciously erode the people's
faith and confidence in the integrity of this Court.

RATIO:
This reorganization, like those before it, was made only upon prior consultation with and
approval of the Members of theCourt. The petitioner itself found such reorganization
"long overdue"

NOTE:
Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.cralaw
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those
involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.cralaw (3) Cases or matters
heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon, and in no case
without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number
is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en bancor in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.