Opinion Syrian crisis

The danger of repeating past mistakes in Syria

We must not confuse a military response with the need to intervene for humanitarian reasons

MARY KALDOR

Why has the horror of the Syrian war not elicited the same empathetic international response as the Bosnian conflict? © AP

Mary Kaldor APRIL 14, 2018

There is little international sympathy for the suffering in Syria. During the Bosnian war,
people across Europe and beyond collected food and clothing, drove lorries to deliver them,
campaigned for safe havens, war crime trials and humanitarian corridors. Refugees were
welcomed.

Why has the horror of the Syrian war — half a million killed, over half the population forcibly
displaced, widespread torture, sexual violence, forced conscription, large-scale arrests and
detention, not to mention the use of hideous weapons such as barrel bombs, nerve agents and
chlorine — not elicited the same empathetic response?

The idea of humanitarian intervention to protect people in the case of genocide, ethnic
cleansing and massive violations of human rights gained traction during the 1990s as a
consequence of the wars in the Balkans and in Africa, especially the Rwandan genocide, and
associated with a public outpouring of concern.

By the end of the decade, the concept had been reframed as the Responsibility to Protect,
formally accepted by the UN General Assembly in 2005. Yet there is little public pressure to
alleviate the plight of the Syrian people, either by exercising Responsibility to Protect or
humanitarian intervention.

The explanation lies in the disastrous experience of intervention over the past two decades.
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were not, of course, humanitarian interventions; they were
classic geo-political military interventions. They were about western interests not about the
interests of the Afghan or Iraqi people, even if humanitarian language was used both by Tony
Blair, the UK prime minister, and US president George W Bush. In both cases, the
interventions ended up fuelling violence, instability and terrorism.

The wars in Kosovo and Libya were explicitly framed in terms of humanitarian intervention
in the first case and Responsibility to Protect in the latter; they may have succeeded in some
aspects. In the case of Kosovo, Albanians who were forcibly expelled were able to return to
their homes as a consequence of Nato’s intervention in 1999. In the case of Libya, Gaddafi’s
military apparatus was destroyed and could not be used to attack civilians.

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But in both cases, the main methods, air strikes, could not directly protect civilians — indeed
they risked the lives of the very people they were supposed to protect. And in both cases, the
interventions empowered armed groups on the ground, leading to a totally dysfunctional
government in Kosovo and long-term violence in Libya.

What has never been properly appreciated is the difference between humanitarian
intervention and classic military intervention. Humanitarian intervention might involve the
use of military forces but the aim is to save lives and protect local populations rather than to
defeat enemies. This goal requires different means. Humanitarian intervention should be
more like policing or law enforcement than fighting a war.

Techniques that were developed in Bosnia such as safe havens, the investigation and arrest of
war criminals, international human rights monitoring, or no fly zones are all part of the
repertoire of humanitarian intervention. The personnel involved should be both military and
civilian including police, health professionals, aid workers, mine clearance teams and others.
International authorisation through the UN is necessary to underscore the humanitarian
imperative and provide legitimacy.

So what might this mean in the case of Syria? International attention has at last focused on
the crisis, after seven years of confusion and false starts. But we are in danger, once again, of
confusing a military response with the need to intervene for humanitarian reasons.

Doing nothing is not an option — the taboo against the use of chemical weapons is being
undermined and every norm of decency is being challenged in Syria. Alongside the
investigation by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the UN Security
Council should authorise a UN presence in Ghouta with a strong mandate to maintain
security, protect civilians (who are now being threatened with arrest and forcible
conscription), carry out disarmament, monitor the ceasefire (including the use of drones),
keep the Islamist groups — the main rebel presence — out of Ghouta.

Doing nothing is not an option — the taboo against the use of

chemical weapons is being undermined and every norm of
decency is being challenged in Syria
The objection to this proposal is, of course, the Russian veto in the Security Council. What is
needed is international public pressure.

On the ground, Syrians themselves are trying to construct solutions. The ceasefire in Ghouta
was agreed after the chemical attack at the end of last week through negotiation by local
groups.

Local pressure was a very important factor in finding a resolution; a radical preacher who had
obstructed the talks was constrained by demonstrators who broke into his house and dragged
him out by the beard. It has worked elsewhere in Syria; according to one count there were 44
ceasefires in the last year. But these are vulnerable to the regime: a UN presence could be
important.

The lack of public concern about the carnage has become an obstacle to ending it. The only
alternative to ineffective, perilous military action is robust international support for the
efforts of the Syrian people to stop the violence.

The writer is director of the conflict and civil society research unit at the London School of
Economics

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