3.
Soliven vs Makasair
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were
raised:
(1) whether petitioners were denied due process when
informations for libel were filed against them although
the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was
still under review by the Secretary of Justice and,
subsequently, by the President;
(2) whether the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant
for his arrest without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine
probable cause; and
(3) whether the President of the Philippines, under the
Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against
the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-
affidavit.
Where, subsequent events have rendered the first issue
moot and academic.
On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied
petitioners’ Motion for Recon and upheld the
resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining
the City Fiscal’s finding of a prima facie case against
petitioners.
Second Motion for Recon was also denied. On appeal,
the President, through the Executive Secretary,
affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on
May 2, 1988.
… Administrative remedies available under the law
have lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner
Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law
in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact
that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he
filed a "Motion to Declare Proceeding Closed", in
effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing
counter-affidavits.
Due process of law does not require that the respondent
in a criminal case actually file his counter- affidavits
before the preliminary investigation completed. All that
is required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so
minded.
Interpretation of the constitutional provision on the
issuance of warrants of arrest
The addition of the word "personally" after the word
"determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants
to "other responsible officers as may be authorized
by law", has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran
that the Constitution now requires the judge to
personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an
accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to
the existence of probable cause.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously
adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for
the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure
therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this
resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has
deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with
regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a
finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
(3) whether the President of the Philippines, under the
Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against
the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-
affidavit.

Beltran argues that “the reasons which necessitate

presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit.”

He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by

virtue of the President’s filing of her complaint-
affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness
for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial
court’s jurisdiction.

This, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege

immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness
stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt or perjury.

The rationale for the grant to the President of the

privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from
any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also
demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the

President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
only by the holder of the office; not by any other
person in the President's behalf.

Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the

President is complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would

prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus,
if so minded the President may shed the protection
afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's
jurisdiction.

The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to

waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a
decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any
other person.

4. Microsoft Corp vs Maxicorp
Facts:
On 25 July 1996, NBI Agent Dominador Samiano, Jr.
("NBI Agent Samiano") filed several applications for
search warrants in the RTC against Maxicorp for
alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 (copy
infringement) and Article 189 of the RPC.
[Article 189 – Unfair competition, fraudulent
registration of trade name, trademark, or service
mark, fraudulent designation of origin, and false
description.]
After conducting a preliminary examination of the
applicant and his witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon
issued Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453
and 96-454, all dated 25 July 1996, against Maxicorp.
Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted
on 25 July 1996 a search of Maxicorp's premises and
seized property fitting the description stated in the
search warrants.
On 2 September 1996, Maxicorp filed a motion to
quash the search warrants alleging that there was no
probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants
are in the form of "general warrants."
The RTC denied Maxicorp's motion on 22 January
1997. The RTC also denied Maxicorp's motion for
reconsideration.
The RTC found probable cause to issue the search
warrants after examining NBI Agent Samiano, John
Benedict Sacriz ("Sacriz"), and computer technician
Felixberto Pante ("Pante").
The three testified on what they discovered during their
respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI Agent Samiano also
presented certifications from petitioners that they have
not authorized Maxicorp to perform the witnessed
activities using petitioners' products.
On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA seeking to set aside the RTC's
order.
On 23 December 1998, the CA reversed the RTC's
order denying Maxicorp's motion to quash the search
warrants. Petitioners moved for reconsideration which
the CA denied.
CA held that NBIAgent Samiano failed to present
during the preliminary examination conclusive
evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the
counterfeit products. The CA pointed out that the sales
receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that
he bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name
of a certain “Joel Diaz.”
Issue:
1. Whether the petition raises question of law.
2. Whether the petitioners have legal personality to file
the petition.
3. Whether there was probable cause to issue the search
warrants
4. Whether the search warrants are general warrants.
Ruling:
1. Whether the petition raises question of law.
Of the three main issues raised in this petition — the
legal personality of the petitioners, the nature of the
warrants issued and the presence of probable cause —
only the first two qualify as questions of law. The
pivotal issue of whether there was probable cause to
issue the search warrants is a question of fact.
At first glance, this issue appears to involve a question
of law since it does not concern itself with the truth or
falsity of certain facts. Still, the resolution of this issue
would require this Court to inquire into the probative
value of the evidence presented before the RTC.
For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them.
Yet, this is precisely what the petitioners ask us to do
by raising arguments requiring an examination of the
TSNs and the documentary evidence presented during
the search warrant proceedings. In short, petitioners
would have us substitute our own judgment to that of
the RTC and the CA by conducting our own evaluation
of the evidence.
This is exactly the situation which Section 1, Rule 45
of the Rules of Court prohibits by requiring the petition
to raise only questions of law. This Court is not a trier
of facts. It is not the function of this court to analyze or
weigh evidence. When we give due course to such
situations, it is solely by way of exception. Such
exceptions apply only in the presence of extremely
meritorious circumstances.
Indeed, this case falls under one of the exceptions
because the findings of the CA conflict with the
findings of the RTC.
Since petitioners properly raised the conflicting
findings of the lower courts, it is proper for this Court
to resolve such contradiction.
2. Whether the petitioners have legal personality to file
the petition.
Maxicorp argues that petitioners have no legal
personality to file this petition since the proper party
to do so in a criminal case is the Office of the
Solicitor General as representative of the People of
the Philippines. Maxicorp states the general rule but
the exception governs this case.
We ruled in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. vs
CA that the petitioner-complainant in a petition for
review under Rule 45 could argue its case before this
Court in lieu of the SG if there is a grave error
committed by the lower court or lack of due process.
This avoids a situation where a complainant who
actively participated in the prosecution of a case would
suddenly find itself powerless to pursue a remedy due
to circumstances beyond its control. The circumstances
in the Columbia case are sufficiently similar to the
present case to warrant the application of this doctrine.
3. Whether there was probable cause to issue the search
warrants
The offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright
infringement under Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair
competition under Article 189 of the RPC. To support
these charges, petitioners presented the testimonies of
NBI Agent Samiano, computer technician Pante, and
Sacriz, a civilian.
The offenses that petitioners charged Maxicorp
contemplate several overt acts. The sale of counterfeit
products is but one of these acts. Both NBI Agent
Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how they
personally saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement
and unfair competition.
During the preliminary examination, the RTC
subjected the testimonies of the witnesses to the
requisite examination. NBI Agent Samiano testified
that he saw Maxicorp display and offer for sale
counterfeit software in its premises.
He also saw how the counterfeit software were
produced and packaged within Maxicorp's premises.
NBI Agent Samiano categorically stated that he was
certain the products were counterfeit because Maxicorp
sold them to its customers without giving the
accompanying ownership manuals, license agreements
and certificates of authenticity.
Sacriz testified that during his visits to Maxicorp, he
witnessed several instances when Maxicorp installed
petitioners' software into computers it had assembled.
Sacriz also testified that he saw the sale of petitioners'
software within Maxicorp's premises. Petitioners never
authorized Maxicorp to install or sell their software.
The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with
the object and documentary evidence they
presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of
probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there
is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright
infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of
petitioners.
Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and
insistent that the counterfeit software were not only
displayed and sold within Maxicorp's premises, they
were also produced, packaged and in some cases,
installed there.
[No law or rule states that probable cause requires a
specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule
for its determination exists.]
For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales
receipt is not the only proof that the sale of petitioners'
software occurred.
During the search warrant application proceedings,
NBI Agent Samiano presented to the judge the
computer unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, in
which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-installed
petitioners' software.
Sacriz, who was present when NBI Agent Samiano
purchased the computer unit, affirmed that NBI Agent
Samiano purchased the computer unit. Pante, the
computer technician, demonstrated to the judge the
presence of petitioners' software on the same computer
unit.
There was a comparison between petitioners' genuine
software and Maxicorp's software pre-installed in the
computer unit that NBI Agent Sambiano purchased.
Even if we disregard the sales receipt issued in the
name of "Joel Diaz," which petitioners explained was
the alias NBI Agent Samiano used in the operation,
there still remains more than sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for the issuance of the search
warrants.
[The fact that Sacriz did not actually purchase
counterfeit software from Maxicorp does not
eliminates the existence of probable cause.]
The Constitution and the Rules of Court only require
that the judge examine personally and thoroughly the
applicant for the warrant and his witnesses to determine
probable cause. The RTC complied adequately with the
requirement of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
4. Whether the search warrants are general warrants.
Maxicorp argues that the warrants issued against it
are too broad in scope and lack the specificity
required with respect to the objects to be seized.
It is only required that a search warrant be specific as
far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. The
description of the property to be seized need not be
technically accurate or precise.
trademarks owned by MICROSOFT
CORPORATION;
The scope of this description is all-embracing since it
covers property used for personal or other purposes not
related to copyright infringement or unfair competition.
Moreover, the description covers property that
Maxicorp may have bought legitimately from
Microsoft or its licensed distributors. Paragraph (c)
simply calls for the seizure of all items bearing the
Microsoft logo, whether legitimately possessed or not.
Neither does it limit the seizure to products used in
copyright infringement or unfair competition.
Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a
warrant, partially defective in specifying some items
sought to be seized yet particular with respect to the
other items, should be nullified as a whole.
A partially defective warrant remains valid as to the
items specifically described in the warrant. A search
warrant is severable, the items not sufficiently
described may be cut off without destroying the whole
warrant.
The exclusionary rule found inSection 3(2) of Article
III of the Constitution renders inadmissible in any
proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonable
searches and seizure. Thus, all items seized under
paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under
paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, should be returned to
Maxicorp.

The nature of the description should vary according to

whether the identity of the property or its character is a
matter of concern.

Measured against this standard we find that paragraph

(e) is not a general warrant. The articles to be seized
were not only sufficiently identified physically, they
were also specifically identified by stating their relation
to the offense charged.

Paragraph (e) specifically refers to those articles used

or intended for use in the illegal and unauthorized
copying of petitioners' software. This language meets
the test of specificity.

However, we find paragraph (c) of the search

warrant lacking in particularity.

Paragraph (c) states:

c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints,
packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and
other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or

8. Umil vs Ramos
Facts:
These are 8 petitions for habeas corpus filed before the
Court, which have been consolidated because of the
similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective
respondents to produce the bodies of the persons
named therein and to explain why they should not be
set at liberty without further delay.
Respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners
as they have been legally arrested and are detained by
virtue of valid informations filed in court against them.
Petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as
their arrests were made without warrant and, that no
preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that
the informations filed against them are null and void.
The record of the instant cases would show that the
persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas
corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were
actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so
that their arrests without a warrant were clearly
justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue
of valid informations filed against them in court.
I. GR No. 81567 (Umil vs Ramos)
Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation
squad, responsibe for the killing of 2 CAPCOM
soldiers the day before in Caloocan City.
In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was
transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the
CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined
thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was
positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman
who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile
patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers
seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon
and CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification,
Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal
who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the
RTC of Caloocan City an information charging
Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of
Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons
in Authority.
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not
arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he
arrested just after the commission of the said offense
for his arrest came a day after the said shooting
incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is
unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a
member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is
justified as it can be said that he was committing an
offense when arrested.
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and
are in the nature of continuing crimes.
II. GR No. 84581-82 (Roque vs De Villa)
The arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra,
without warrant, is also justified. When apprehended at
the house of Renato Constantino in Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted
that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters
to Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel
group.
Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a member of
the National United Front Commission, in charge of
finance, and admitted ownership of subversive
documents found in the house of her sister in Caloocan
City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a
fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or
authority to possess.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27
June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of
the NPA, who had surrendered to the military
authorities, told military agents about the operations of
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the
New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila.
He identified some of his former comrades as "Ka
Mong", a staff member of the Communications and
Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia" a staff member in
charge of finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from
Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka
Totoy". He also pointed to a certain house occupied by
Renato Constantino located in the Villaluz Compound,
Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila, which is used as a safehouse of the National
United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
III. GR No. 84583 – 84 (Anonuevo vs Ramos)
The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple,
without warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both
are admittedly members of the standing committee of
the NUFC and, when apprehended in the house of
Renato Constantino, they had a bag containing
subversive materials, and both carried firearms and
ammunition for which they had no license to possess or
carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about
7:30 o'clock in the evening of 13 August 1988,
Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at
the house of Renato Constantino at Marikina Heights,
Marikina, which was still under surveillance by
military agents. The military agents noticed bulging
objects on their waist lines.
When frisked, the agents found them to be loaded guns.
Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their permit
or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunition,
but they could not produce any. Hence, they were
brought to PC Headquarters for investigation.
IV. GR No. 83162 (Ocaya vs Aguirre)
The arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is justified
under the Rules, since she had with her an unlicensed
ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this
case shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC
Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP
Command, armed with a search warrant issued by
Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house
located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by
Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA.
In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya armed in a car
driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and
several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were
found in the car of Vicky Ocaya.
As a result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were
brought to the PC Headquarters for investigation.
When Vicky Ocaya could not produce any permit or
authorization to possess the ammunition, an
information charging her with violation of PD 1866
was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case
No. 73447. Danny Rivera, on the other hand, was
released from custody.
V.
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo,
Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque claim that the
firearms, ammunition and subversive documents
alleged to have been found in their possession when
they were arrested, did not belong to them, but were
"planted" by the military agents to justify their illegal
arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any
evidence to support their aforesaid claim. On the
other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the
arresting officers that would cause the said arresting
officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely,
has been shown.
Besides, the arresting officers in these cases do not
appear to be seekers of glory and bounty hunters for, as
counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say,
"there is absolutely nothing in the evidence submitted
during the inquest that petitioners are on the 'AFP
Order of Battle with a reward of P15,000.00 on each on
their heads.' "
On the other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor
General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of
a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an
in- depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by
no less than former comrades of the petitioners in the
rebel movement.
VI. GR No. 85727 (Espiritu vs Lim)
In G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on
habeas corpus of the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu,
who is detained by virtue of an Information for
Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code
(Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, is similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is
the General Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan
ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an
association of drivers and operators of public service
vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their mutual
aid and protection.
VII. GR No. 86332 (Nazareno vs Station Commander)
We also find no merit in the submission of Narciso
Nazareno that he was illegally arrested and is
unlawfully detained. The record of this case shows that
at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning of 14 December
1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of
men near the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets
in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila.
One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regala
who was arrested by the police on 28 December 1988.
Upon questioning, Regala pointed to Narciso Nazareno
as one of his companions in the killing of the said
Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers,
without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and
brought him to the police headquarters for questioning.
Obviously, the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong
because on January 1989, an information charging
Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and (2) others, with
the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The
case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
been committed and the person making the arrest has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person arrested has committed it.
We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon
the said doctrine. It is based upon express provision of
the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the
law. The fears expressed by the petitioners are not
really unremediable.
As the Court sees it, re- examination or reappraisal,
with a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case
doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better
practice would be, not to limit the function of habeas
corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the court
which issued the process, judgment or order of
commitment or before whom the detained person is
charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process,
judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case.

VIII.

It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here

considered, criminal charges have been filed in the
proper courts against the petitioners.

The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of

his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge
had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order,
or if such person is charged before any court, the writ
of habeas corpus will not be allowed.

Issue: Whether the warrantless inflagrante delicto

arrests made were valid and lawful. YES

Ruling:

The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the

parties in their respective pleadings, and it finds that
the persons detained have not been illegally arrested
nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to
liberty, and that the circumstances attending these cases
do not warrant their release on habeas corpus.

An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5

paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, is justified when the person
arrested is caught in inflagrante delicto, viz., in the act
of committing an offense; or when an offense has just

9. People vs Nuevas
Facts:
Accused, Jesus Nuevas, Reynaldo Din, and Fernando
Inocencio were charged before the RTC of Olongapo
City, Branch 75 with Illegal Possession of Marijuana in
violation of Section 8, Article 2 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.
Upon arraignment, Nuevas, Din, and Inocencio pleaded
not guilty to the charges.
As the evidence in the cases was common and the
prosecution would utilize the same witnesses, the cases
were consolidated.
After a joint trial on the merits, the accused were all
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Prosecution’s evidence and version of events
PO3 Teofilo B. Fami (Fami) testified that in the
morning of 27 September 1997, he and SPO3 Cesar B.
Cabling (Cabling) conducted a stationary surveillance
and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking along
Perimeter Street, Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo City.
They had received information that a certain male
person, more or less 5'4" in height, 25 to 30 years old,
with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually
wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a
delivery of marijuana dried leaves.
While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who fit
the description, carrying a plastic bag, later identified
as Nuevas, alight from a motor vehicle. They accosted
Nuevas and informed him that they are police officers.
Fami asked Nuevas where he was going. Nuevas
answered arrogantly but afterwards, calmed down.
Nuevas and Fami conversed in the Waray dialect.
Nuevas informed him that there were other stuff in the
possession of a certain Vangie, an associate, and two
other male persons. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily
pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when
opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks
wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape
charges, Nuevas disclosed where the 2 other male
persons would make the delivery of MJ weighing more
or less 5 kilos.
Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas, then
proceeded to Purok 12, Old Cabalan, Olongapo City,
which according to Nuevas was where his two (2)
companions, Din and Inocencio, could be located.
From there, they saw and approached two (2) persons
along the National Highway, introducing themselves as
police officers.
Din was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked,
Din disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Fami
then took the bag and upon inspection found inside it
"marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein."
After confiscating the items, Fami and Cabling brought
Nuevas, Din and Inocencio to the police office at Purok
III for proper documentation. Fami further testified that
a receipt for the property seized was issued by Cabling
and that a field test was duly conducted on the
confiscated items.
All three accused were likewise physically examined
on the basis of which corresponding medical
certificates were issued. The corresponding booking
sheets and arrest report were also accomplished. Fami
stated that he and Cabling executed a joint affidavit in
connection with the arrest of all the accused and the
confiscation of the items.
Defense’s evidence and version of events
Nuevas:
He testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997,
he was walking along Perimeter Street, on his way
home from the Barangay Hall, when Fami called him.
Nuevas approached Fami, who was then in front of his
house, and asked why Fami had called him. Fami
poked his gun at Nuevas and asked him to go inside the
room where Fami handcuffed Nuevas's hands, got
Nuevas's wallet, took out P1,500.00 and put it in his
(Fami's) wallet.
Fami then confronted Nuevas with shabu use but the
latter denied the charge. Before leaving the house with
Nuevas, Fami brought out a plastic bag and told
Nuevas to carry it. Subsequently, they boarded a red
owner — type jeep and proceeded to Station B where
Nuevas was put in jail. Nuevas further stated that he
did not know Din or Inocencio.
Din:
At about 10 am in the September 27, 1997, while
Inocencio was visiting, 2 men entered his house
looking for a woman. The 2 introduced themselves as
police officers.
Then, Din and Inocencio were immediately
handcuffed. They were not informed of the reason for
their arrest and were told that the reason will be
explained to them in court. Next, they were brought to
the Cabalan precinct where the investigator asked for
their names, and subsequently to Station B where they
were ordered to stand up and be photographed with
Nuevas, who Din first met in jail. Inside the room
where they had their fingerprints taken, he saw
marijuana placed on top of the table.
Incocencio:
He went to his 'compadre' Din's house in the morning
of 27 September 1997 to sell his fighting cocks as he
needed money to redeem his driver's license. While
there, he and Din were arrested by two persons, one of
whom pointed a gun at them while the other searched
the house for a lady named Vangie.
Afterwards, he and Din were brought to the Cabalan
Police Precinct and then to Station B where he first
came to know Nuevas. He denied that a plastic bag
containing marijuana was recovered from them and
claimed that he only saw such evidence on the day he
gave his testimony.
He also stated that when a photograph was taken of the
three of them, he and Din were ordered to point to a
"wrapped thing." When the photograph was taken, they
were not assisted by counsel. He also does not recall
having signed a receipt of property seized. Afterwards,
they were brought to a detention cell. And when they
asked the police what they did wrong, the police
replied that they will just explain it in court.
All three were found guilty as charged and the
judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court for
automatic review. However, on 14 July 2003, Nuevas
filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw appeal.
20 The Court granted Nuevas's withdrawal of appeal
and considered the case closed and terminated as to
him, in a Resolution 21 dated 25 August 2003.
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Validity of the warrantless searches and seizure
made by the police officers and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained thereof.
Ruling:
The courts below anchor appellants’ conviction on
the ground that the searches and seizure conducted
in the instant case based on a tip from an
informant fall under one of the exceptions as
Nuevas, Din and Inocencio all allegedly
voluntarily surrendered the plastic bags containing
marijuana to the police officers.
First, the Court holds that the searches and seizures
conducted do not fall under the first exception,
warrantless search incidental to lawful arrests
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not
committing a crime in the presence of the police
officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling
did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating
that the persons to be arrested had committed an
offense.
The searches conducted on the plastic bag then cannot
be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest.
Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The
rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform
some overt act that would indicate that he "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense."
Secondly, neither could the searches be justified under
the plain view doctrine.
Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were
inside the plastic bags that Nuevas and Din were
carrying and were not readily apparent or transparent to
the police officers. In Nuevas's case, the dried
marijuana leaves found inside the plastic bag were
wrapped inside a blue cloth.
In Din's case, the marijuana found upon inspection of
the plastic bag was "packed in newspaper and wrapped
therein." It cannot be therefore said the items were in
plain view which could have justified mere seizure of
the articles without further search.
On the other hand, the Court finds that the search
conducted in Nuevas's case was made with his consent.
In Din's case, there was none.

In Nuevas’s case, the Court is convinced that he indeed

voluntarily surrendered the incriminating bag to the
police officers.

The prosecution failed to clearly show that Din

intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable
searches. While it may not be contrary to human nature
for one to be jolted into surrendering something
incriminating to authorities, Fami's and Cabling's
testimonies do not show that Din was in such a state of
mind or condition. Fami and Cabling did not testify on
Din's composure — whether he felt surprised or
frightened at the time — which fact we find necessary
to provide basis for the surrender of the bag.

There was no mention of any permission made by the

police officers to get or search the bag or of any
consent given by Din for the officers to search it. It is
worthy to note that in cases where the Court upheld the
validity of consented search, the police authorities
expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent
of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the
accused was established by clear and positive proof.

Turning to Inocencio's case, the Court likewise finds

that he was wrongly convicted of the crime charged.

Inocencio's supposed possession of the dried marijuana

leaves was sought to be shown through his act of
looking into the plastic bag that Din was carrying.

Taking a look at an object, more so in this case

peeping into a bag while held by another, is not the
same as taking possession thereof. To behold is not
to hold.

Indeed, the act attributed to Inocencio is insufficient to

establish illegal possession of the drugs or even
conspiracy to illegally possess the same.

The prosecution failed to show by convincing proof

that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag and that
he conspired with Din to possess the illegal items.
Inocencio was firm and unshakeable in his testimony
that he had no part in any delivery of marijuana dried
leaves.
10. People vs del Rosario
Facts:
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias
"Jun," Virgilio Santos alias "Boy Santos" and John Doe
alias "Dodong" were charged with the special complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robbed
Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of
P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion
thereof shot and killed her.
While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty,
3 Virgilio "Boy" Santos and John Doe alias "Dodong"
remained at large. Ernesto "Jun" Marquez was killed in
a police encounter. Only Joselito del Rosario was tried.
Prosecution’s evidence and version of events
Eyewitness account of tricycle driver Paul Vincent
Alonzo: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the
evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of
Nita's Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City,
when three women flagged him. Parked at a distance of
about one and a-half (11⁄2) meters in front of him was a
tricycle driven by accused Joselito del Rosario.
At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman
grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold of
the bag one of the two men armed with a gun started
chasing a man who was trying to help the woman,
while the other snatcher kicked the woman sending her
to the ground.
Soon after, the armed man returned and while the
woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head.
The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle
of accused del Rosario where someone inside received
the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver
while his companion entered the sidecar.
When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and
was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also
recognized the driver, after which he went to the
nearest police headquarters and reported the incident.
Defense’s evidence and version of events
At around 5:30 in the afternoon he was hired for
P120.00 by a certain "Boy" Santos, his co-accused.
Their original agreement was that he would drive him
to a cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum.
However despite their earlier arrangement Boy Santos
directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch
"Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya. He (del Rosario)
acceded. Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the
parking lot of Merced Drugstore at the public market.
Subsequently, he was asked to proceed and stop at the
corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where Bisaya
alighted on the pretext of buying a cigarette.
The latter then accosted the victim Virginia Bernas and
grappled with her for the possession of her bag. Jun
Marquez alighted from the tricycle to help "Dodong"
Bisaya.
Accused del Rosario tried to leave and seek help but
"Boy Santos" who stayed inside the tricycle
prevented him from leaving and threatened in fact
to shoot him.
Meanwhile, "Dodong" Bisaya succeeded in taking the
victim's bag, but before boarding the tricycle "Jun"
Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while
she was lying prone on the ground.
After the shooting, "Dodong" Bisaya boarded the
sidecar of the tricycle while "Jun" Marquez rode
behind del Rosario and ordered him to start the engine
and drive towards Dicarma. While inside his tricycle,
del Rosario overheard his passengers saying that they
would throw the bag at Zulueta St. where there were
cogon grasses.
Upon arriving at Dicarma, the three (3) men
alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the
police authorities about the incident otherwise he
and his family would be harmed. Del Rosario then
went home. Because of the threat, however, he did
not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle
nor to the barangay captain and the police.
 and they became aware of his identity as the driver
Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest of del Rosario of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial
was valid. NO investigation.

Ruling: However, the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's

When a police officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an
arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a),
Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his
presence or within his view.
arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court a quo
because even in instances not allowed by law, a
warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any
objection thereto is waived when the person arrested
submits to arraignment without any objection, as in this
case.

In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the

accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught
immediately after the consummation of the act.

The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the

purview of the aforequoted rule since he was
arrested on the day following the commission of the
robbery with homicide.

On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113,

necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before a
warrantless arrest can be effected:
(1) an offense has just been committed; and,
(2) the person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed it.

Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy

between the time the offense was committed and the
time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse
of time between the arrest and the commission of the
crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.

Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also

mandatory that the person making the arrest must have
personal knowledge of certain facts indicating that the
person to be taken into custody has committed the
crime.

Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not comply with

these requirements since, as earlier explained, the arrest
came a day after the consummation of the crime and
not immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not
been "just committed" at the time the accused was
arrested.

Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal

knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed the offense since they were
not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the
crime,