MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN v. THE HON. RAMON P.

MAKASIAR
G.R. No. 82585
November 14, 1988

FACTS: Luis Beltran was a columnist for the newspaper Philippine Star. Maximo
Soliven was the paper’s editor-in-chief. They were sued for libel by then
President Corazon Aquino due to an article written by Beltran wherein he
alleged that the president “hid under the bed” during a bloody coup attempt
staged by military rebels in December 1989. The case was raffled to the sala
of Judge Ramon Makasiar. Judge Makasiar then issued a warrant of arrest
against Beltran et al.

Beltran et al filed a certiorari petition before the Supreme Court alleging,

among others, that (1) the warrants of arrest against them were irregularly
issued due to the fact that Judge Makasiar did not personally examine the
complainant (President Aquino) and her witnesses before issuing the arrest
warrants, and (2) President Aquino cannot file a complaint affidavit because
this would defeat her presidential immunity from suit. A president cannot be
sued, however, if a president would sue then the president would allow
herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would
be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president,
the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself
thus she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUES: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when the series of
information for libel were filed against them although the finding of the
existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently, by the President;

(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable
cause; and

(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution,
may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of
a complaint-affidavit.

S.C. (1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary
DECISION investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-
affidavits, he filed a “Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed,” in effect
waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due
process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case
actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is
deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

(2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal

responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly

laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed
before their courts.

(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity
from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free
from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive
of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's
time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue
of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any
other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in
which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as
a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so, the President may shed the protection
afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other
person.

(4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court finds no basis at this
stage to rule on the “chilling effect” point.