301 350

CASE NO.
301
ART. III, SEC. 2: REQUISITES FOR A VALID WARRANT
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR SEARCH;
IN GENERAL
Betoy v. Judge
FACTS: A Letter-Complaint signed by Petitioner Bernardo Betoy, Sr. charges Respondent Judge with
Dereliction of Duty in an illegal possession of firearm case. Petitioner alleged that the Search & Seizure
Order by the respondent was issued solely relying on the mere affidavits of deponents police officers
which should be considered hearsay and no information personally known to the respondent Judge as
required by settled jurisprudence through examination with probing and exhaustive questions of witnesses
in order to determine probable cause. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted to the
Court a Memorandum wherein it found that respondent Judge was able to establish probable cause for the
issuance of the questioned search warrant; however, respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for having failed to conduct a judicial inquiry as to the whereabouts of the seized firearms and
ammunitions, in violation of Section 12(b), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge failed to thoroughly examine in a manner that would
sufficiently establish the existence of a probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant.
RULING: Yes. In the case at bar, the search and seizure warrant was issued in connection with the
offense of illegal possession of firearms, the elements of which are: (1) the existence of the subject
firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the license or permit to
possess the same. Probable cause as applied to illegal possession of firearms would therefore be such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that a person
is in possession of a firearm and that he does not have the license or permit to possess the same. Nowhere,
however, in the affidavit and testimony of the witness nor in the application for the issuance of a search
warrant was it mentioned that petitioner had no license to possess a firearm. While the witness testified
before the respondent judge that the firearms in the possession of petitioner are not licensed, this
does not qualify as "personal knowledge" but only "personal belief" because the witness neither
verified, much more secured, a certification from the appropriate government agency that
petitioner was not licensed to possess a firearm.
CASE NO. 302

IN GENERAL
20th Century Fox v. CA
FACTS: In a letter-complaint petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation through counsel sought the
NBI’s assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in connection with the latter's anti-film piracy
campaign. The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner
and filed 3 applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the private respondents.
The applications were consolidated and heard by the RTC which issued the desired search warrants.
Armed with the search warrants, the NBI accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets
and seized the items described therein. An inventory of the items seized was made and left with the
private respondents. However, a motion was filed by private respondents to lift the 3 search warrants
issued earlier and the same was granted by the RTC. Subsequently, RTC denied the MR filed by the
petitioner. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA to annul the ruling of the RTC.
CA dismissed. Hence, this petition. Petitioner maintains that the RTC issued the questioned search
warrants after finding the existence of a probable cause justifying their issuance and that the RTC arrived
at this conclusion on the basis of the depositions of applicant NBI's two witnesses which were taken
through searching questions and answers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrants were valid.
RULING: No. In the instant case, the RTC lifted the three questioned search warrants against the private
respondents in the absence of probable cause, on the ground that it acted on the application for the
issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its
witnesses that infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed. Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable invasion of
his privacy and liberty as to his person, papers and effects. The Court has explained in previous
cases why this right is important: it is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this
right, but it could be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area,
primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. What is sought to be guarded is a man's
prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his
individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind
of objects he wants around him.
CASE NO. 303

IN GENERAL
Columbia Pictures v. CA
FACTS: In 1986, the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB) applied for a warrant against Jose Jinco
(Jingco), owner of Showtime Enterprises for allegedly pirating movies produced and owned by Columbia
Pictures and other motion picture companies. Jingco filed a motion to quash the search warrant but the
same was denied in 1987. Subsequently, Jinco filed an Urgent Motion to Lift the Search Warrant and
Return the Articles Seized. In 1989, the RTC judge granted the motion. The judge ruled based on the
ruling in the 1988 case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. CA.
ISSUE: Whether the 20th Century Fox decision promulgated on August 19, 1988 is applicable to the
Motion to Quash Search Warrant.
RULING: No. In the recent Columbia Pictures, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. the case which resolved
the same issue involving the same petitioners but with different respondents, the Court en banc held that
mindful as it is of the ramifications of the doctrine of stare decisis and the rudiments of fair play, In 1986,
obviously the 1988 case of 20th Century Fox was not yet promulgated hence the 20th Century Fox ruling
cannot be retroactively applied to justify the quashal of Search Warrant. Petitioners' consistent position
that the search warrant was properly issued, there having been satisfactory compliance with the
then prevailing standards under the law for determination of probable cause, is indeed well taken.
The lower court could not possibly have expected more evidence from petitioners in their
application for a search warrant other than what the law and jurisprudence, then existing and
judicially accepted, required with respect to the finding of probable cause. The instant case also
differs from 20th Century Fox in that what herein private respondent put in issue was the application of
the ruling in that case, not the conduct of the Judge in the issuance of the Search Warrant. From the
records, it is clear that the Judge observed all the requirements necessary before the search warrant was
issued: he heard the testimonies and studied the despositions of the witnesses for the petitioners on the
existence of probable cause before issuing the warrant.
CASE NO. 304

FOR SEARCH;
PERSONALLY DETERMINED BY THE JUDGE
Placer v. Villanueva
FACTS: Petitioners, The City Fiscal of Butuan City and his assistants filed Informations in the City
Court of Butuan. These Informations were certified by the respective investigating Fiscals. Upon receipt
of said Informations, respondent Judge set the hearing of the criminal cases to determine propriety of
issuance of warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent Judge issued an order requiring petitioners to
submit to the court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the
Informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause
by petitioners. A petition for certiorari with mandamus to compel respondent Judge to issue warrants of
arrest was filed by the petitioners as they contended that the fiscal’s certification in the Informations of
the existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient justification for the Judge to issue warrants of arrest.
ISSUE: Whether the certification of the investigating fiscal in the information as to the existence of
probable cause obligates respondent City Judge to issue a warrant of arrest.
RULING: No. Petition dismissed. The Judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification for the existence
of probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification does
not bind the judge to come out with the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere
ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of issuing magistrate.
Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the information, the judge finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s certification and require submission of the affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at the conclusion as to existence of probable cause.
MAIN POINT: Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution— The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
CASE NO. 305

ART III SEC 2: REQUISITES FOR A VALID WARRANT
Lim vs. Judge Fenix
FACTS: Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts were attacked and killed by a lone
assassin somewhere in the Masbate Domestic Airport road. Dante Siblante, a security escort, survived
the assassination plot. For the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder, one of the accused is
herein petitioner Vicente Lim, Sr. The RTC of Masbate concluded that a probable cause has been
established for the issuance of warrants of arrest. Fiscal Alfane filed with the RTC-Masbate, 4 separate
informations of murder against the 12 accused with a recommendation of no bail. Petitioners filed a
verified petition for change of venue from the RTC-Masbate to the RTC-Makati. The cases were raffled
to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Felix. Petitioners filed with the respondent court several
motions and manifestations, among others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial
records of the preliminary investigation for the best enlightenment in its personal determination of the
existence of a probable cause. Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and
manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.
ISSUE: WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's
certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.
HELD: No. If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the
records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable
cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not
been satisfied. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause, or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Mere Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is
ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes and all other supporting
documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his
determination.
CASE NO. 306

People vs. Inting
FACTS: Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Regalado of Tanjay, Negros
Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, in the office
of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance
from COMELEC as required by law. After a preliminary investigation of Barba’s complaint, Provincial
Election Supervisor Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. He filed with the respondent RTC-
Dumaguete City a criminal case for violation of section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor. However, before the accused
could be arrested, the trial court set aside its order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to
determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court later
on quashed the information. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC through its Provincial Election Supervisor lacks jurisdiction to determine
the existence of probable cause in an election offense which it seeks to prosecute in court.
RULING: Yes. The determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the
Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the
Judge alone makes this determination. The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the
Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to
follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest
is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper-whether or not there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the Prosecutor.
CASE NO. 307

People vs. Delgado
FACTS: COMELEC received a report-complaint from the Election Registrar of Toledo City against
private respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC directed the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case who
eventually recommended the filing of an information against each of the private respondents. The
COMELEC en banc resolved to file the information against the private respondents as
recommended. Private respondents filed MRs and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the
respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. Later, an order was
issued by respondent court directing the COMELEC through the Regional Election Director of Region
VII to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases. The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration and opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the
Supreme Court that may review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC. This was
denied by the court.
ISSUE: WON the respondent Court has the power or authority to order the Comelec Law Department to
furnish said respondent the records of preliminary investigation of the above criminal cases for purposes
of determining a probable cause.
HELD: Yes. When the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary
investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the
information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. The records of the
preliminary investigation required to be produced by the court must be submitted by the COMELEC. The
trial court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token
that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary
investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless the court may require that the
record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable
cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The refusal of the COMELEC to comply
with the order of the trial court on the ground that only this Supreme Court may review its actions is
untenable.
CASE NO. 308

Allado vs. Diokno
FACTS: Petitioners, Allado and Mendoza, were both implicated as the masterminds of the kidnapping
and murder of Eugen Alexander Van Twist. An information for the said crime was filed against the
petitioners primarily on the strength of a sworn statement by Escolastico Umbal, who admitted that he
was among those who kidnapped and killed the victim upon the orders of the petitioners. Thereafter,
respondent judge, Roberto C. Diokno, ordered the arrest of the petitioners and no bail was recommended.
Petitioners, contending that their arrests was effected whimsically as there is no probable cause,
questioned their arrests. They further contend that the judge did not personally determine the admissibility
and sufficiency of the evidence where the investigation was based from.
ISSUE: WON the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest
of petitioners because he did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and
his witnesses.
RULING: Yes. Respondent judge merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable
cause existed. For, otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly
insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners. Probable cause may not be established simply by showing
that a trial judge subjectively believes that he has good grounds for his action. In the instant case that the
prosecutors have similarly misappropriated, if not abused, their discretion. If they really believed that
petitioners were probably guilty, they should have armed themselves with facts and circumstances in
support of that belief; for mere belief is not enough. They should have presented sufficient and credible
evidence to demonstrate the existence of probable cause.
CASE NO. 309

Gozos vs. Tac-an
FACTS: A shooting incident happened during a school party in Conception Aguila Memorial College in
Batangas. Several drunk men were trying to force their way through the school’s main gate. One of them
was Dyogi, who was armed with a handgun. Herein private respondents, who are members of the PNP,
arrived and demanded from Dyogi to surrender his gun and go with them to the station. Later on, the two
were grappling for possession of the gun. Apparently, Blanco fired at Gilbert Dyogi twice. Varez,
Investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman, charged private respondents with murder in an information
filed with the RTC-Batangas. Private respondents prayed that the Court first determine WON there is
probable cause before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner Edna Dyogi opposed the
motion. Respondent Judge Tac-an heard the parties and concluded that there is probable cause to hold the
accused to stand trial for Homicide. Petitioner Dyogi moved for a reconsideration, arguing that the crime
committed was murder, and that there was probable cause. Respondent judge partially reconsidered his
order but maintained the finding of probable cause for homicide. Petitioner filed another MR, contending
that the power to determine the nature of the offense to be charged was vested in the Provincial
Prosecutor and not in the RTC. However, petitioners motion was denied.
ISSUE: WON the Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in conducting another
preliminary investigation in a proceeding to determine probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest.
HELD: Yes. While the power of an investigator of the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military is
undoubted, no similar authority is vested in judges of Regional Trial Courts as they are not among those
authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. In this case, respondent judge conducted an inquiry, not
only for the purpose of determining whether there was probable cause to order the arrest of private
respondents but for the purpose of determining whether there was sufficient evidence to prosecute them
as well. He did not only determine the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest,
but also what the charge should be and who should be charged. In so doing, respondent judge exceeded
his authority. Article III Section 2 applies to the issuance of arrest and search warrants, which
should be distinguished from a preliminary investigation. The determination of probable cause for
the issuance of such orders is vested in the courts, but the conduct of preliminary investigations is
entrusted to the executive branch.
CASE NO. 310

ARTICLE III, SEC 2: 3. Requisite for a Valid Warrant
B. Personally Determined by the Judge
Flores vs. Sumaljag
Facts: Petitioners, et.al are members of the Sangguniang Pambarangay in Leyte, and were charged with
three counts of falsification of public document as defined in Art. 171, of the RPC. On November 25,
1996, respondent judge conducted a preliminary examination, during which the complainant, Gualberto
Parmis, and his witness, Diego Cala, Jr., testified in each of the criminal cases. Thereafter, respondent
judge ordered the arrest of herein complainants. By virtue of warrants of arrest, the herein complainants
were arrested and detained. They were later released on bail.
The complainants later instituted an administrative case against respondent judge upon which they
raised claims and one of them is that there was no cause under the law to arrest them as the possibility of
fleeing to escape the hands of justice is remote as they are barangay officials.
Issue: W/N the arrest of complainants ordered by respondent was without justification of doing so in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice?
Held: Yes. What differentiates the present rule from the previous one before the 1985 revision of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure is that while before, it was mandatory for the investigating judge to issue
a warrant for the arrest of the accused if he found probable cause, the rule now is that the
investigating judges power to order the arrest of the accused is limited to instances in which there is
a necessity for placing him in custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. The arrest of the
accused can be ordered only in the event the prosecutor files the case and the judge of the Regional Trial
Court finds probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
It is entirely new rule, and it is plain to see that it is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the
investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, even after having personally examined
the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, for the determination
of whether a probable cause exists and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion.
Accordingly, in Mantaring v. Roman,[7] we reprimanded a judge in a preliminary investigation for

issuing a warrant without any finding that it was necessary to place the accused in immediate custody in
order to prevent a frustration of justice. In this case, it appears that respondent ordered the issuance of a
warrant of arrest solely on his finding of probable cause, totally omitting to consider whether it was
necessary to do so in order not to frustrate the ends of justice
CASE NO. 311

C. Personal Examination
Bache & Co v Ruiz
Facts: On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz
requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in
relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and209, and
authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for search warrant which was
attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search
warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy
Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz
was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic
notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his
deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de
Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. The search was subsequently
conducted. Later Petitioners’ lawyers protested that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was
attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes of
documents.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal praying that the search warrant be
declared null and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay petitioners damages and attorney’s fees
but was dismissed by respondent judge hence the petition.
Issue: W/N there was a valid search warrant conducted in the case at bar?
Held: No. The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of
search warrant was limited to listening to the stenographer’s reading of her notes, to a few words of
warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his
witness. Thus, cannot be considered as a personal examination. If there was an examination at all of the
complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But the Constitution
and the rules required a personal examination by the judge.
MP: The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent judge did not constitute sufficient compliance
with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner respondent judge did not have
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and
follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to
conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-important question of whether
or not there was probable cause.
CASE NO. 312
Soliven V. Makasiar
Facts: Information for libel was filed against petitioners Luis Beltran, a broadcast journalist and
newspaper columnist and Maximino Soliven journalist and newspaper publisher and founder of
Philippine Star. Pres Cory Aquino filed the libel suit in 1991 against Beltran, who wrote in his
column that the then president 'hid under the bed' during a bloody coup attempt staged by
military rebels in December 1989. The article appeared in the newspaper. The Philippine Star so
its publisher, Maximo Soliven, was included in the suit. Mrs. Aquino said she filed the libel suit
because she was insulted by Beltran's article which ridiculed her stature as Philippines president and
chief of staff of the Armed Forces. Mr was filed by petitioners but On March 30, 1988, the Secretary
of Justice denied petitioners' MR and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the
City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President,
through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available
under the law has lost factual support.
Issue: whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge
issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any,
to determine probable cause.
Held and MP: NO. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.
CASE NO. 313

Luna v Plaza
Held: The Constitution, in Section 1(3), Article III, provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination of witnesses under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Conformably to said provision, Republic Act No. 3828,
approved June 22, 1963, inserted in Section 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 this paragraph: "No
warrant of arrest shall be issued by any justice of the peace in any criminal case filed with him unless he
first examines the witness or witnesses personally, and the examination shall be under oath and reduced to
writing in the form of searching questions and answers.
Facts: The respondent MTC judge, after examining the affiants and having them signed their respective
affidavits in his presence, who also signed after administering the oath and after considering other
evidence opined that there was reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had been committed
and the petitioner was probably guilty thereof hence, the issuance of warrant of arrest. Petitioner later
filed a motion that he be awarded bail due to weak evidence of guilt established, respondent issued an
order granting it, fixing it at P30,000.00; which however, respondent later revoked, and denied. The case
was subsequently remanded to CFI, after petitioner filed a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of murder and was then detained. Subsequently, petitioner filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the CFI claiming that he was being deprived of liberty without
due process of law, on the ground that the imprisonment and detention was the result of a warrant of
arrest issued by respondent Judge in violation of Republic Act No. 3828, and praying for the annulment
of the order for his arrest and his discharge from confinement. Herein respondents filed their answer,
alleging that RA. 3828 had been substantially complied with; that a motion to quash, and not a petition
for habeas corpus was the proper remedy; and that petitioner’s application for bail constituted a waiver of
the right to question the validity of the arrest. After trial, CFI rendered its decision holding that
respondent had substantially complied with RA. 3828, and consequently petition. Hence the appeal where
petitioner raised that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was a violation of the Constitution and of
procedural due process
Issue: W/N the issuance of the warrant of arrest of respondent was a violation of the Constitution thus
impairing substantial right of the petitioner?
Held: No. Before a Municipal Judge may issue a warrant of arrest under the foregoing provisions, the
following conditions must first be fulfilled: (1) he must examine the witnesses personally; (2) the
examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of
searching questions and answers. The existence of probable cause depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. In line with this principle is the view that
Republic Act No. 3828 does not prohibit the Municipal Judge from adopting the questions asked by a
previous investigator. In the instant case, the respondent Judge personally examined under oath the
witnesses by asking questions, that were adopted from a previous investigation, and considered by him as
sufficiently searching and which questions and the answers thereto were in writing and sworn to before
him prior to his issuance of the order of arrest
While it is true that the respondent Municipal Judge did not himself personally cause to be reduced to
writing in the form of questions and answers the examination of witnesses presented before him by the
person who filed the criminal complaint, SC is satisfied that, as shown by the evidence, respondent
Judge had personally examined the witnesses under oath and that the questions asked by the Judge
and the answers of the witnesses were reflected in writings which were actually subscribed and
sworned to before him. Moreover, the court are of the considered view that no substantial right of the
petitioner had been violated because, as hereinbefore adverted to, petitioner waived his right to
preliminary investigation after he was arrested, and he took the step of applying for bail before respondent
Municipal Judge. These acts of the petitioner subsequent to his arrest constitute an implied admission on
his part that there was a probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. Those acts of
the petitioner constitute a waiver of whatever irregularity, if any there was, that attended his arrest.
CASE NO. 314
Kho vs. Judge Makalintal
Facts: NBI received confidential information that the two houses of the petitioner in Paranaque were
being used as storage centres for unlicensed firearms and “chop-chop” vehicles. Teams of NBI agents had
conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in the two houses referred Respondent NBI applied
for the issuance of search warrant by Judge Roberto Makalintal and sought for the issuance of search
warrants in anticipation of criminal cases to be instituted against petitioner Kho. Respondent Judge
conducted the necessary examination of the applicants and the witnesses and thereby issuing a search
warrant. The next day, NBI agents searched subject premises at BF Homes, Paranaque, and they
recovered various high-powered firearms and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Another team of NBI
agents searched at Brgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque yielded several high-powered firearms with explosives
and more than a thousand rounds of ammunition. The simultaneous searches also resulted in the
confiscation of various radio and telecommunication equipment, two units of motor vehicles (Lite-Ace
vans) and one motorcycle. The confiscated firearms have never been issued a license. Likewise, the radio
transceivers recovered and motor-vehicles were unlicensed and unregistered. Petitioners questioned the
issuance of search warrant alleging that it has no probable cause.
Issue: W/N the search warrant was valid?
Held: Yes. Nothing improper is perceived in the manner the respondent Judge conducted the examination
of subject applicants for search warrants and their witnesses. He personally examined them under oath,
and asked them searching questions on the facts and circumstances personally known to them, in
compliance with prescribed procedure and legal requirements. It can be gleaned that the sworn statements
and affidavits submitted by the witnesses were duly attached to the pertinent records of the
proceedings. It was within the discretion of the examining Judge to determine what questions to ask
the witnesses so long as the questions asked are germane to the pivot of inquiry - the existence or
absence of a probable cause.
CASE NO. 315
ARTICLE III, SEC. 2: Personal Examination
Alvarez v. Court
FACTS: Herein petitioner is a money-lender, allegedly charging usurious rates. According to a reliable
information, the petitioner kept in his house articles in connection with the alleged activities violative of
the law. The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board presented to Judge David affidavit of the
allegation and thereafter made an oath. However, he did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his
own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person.
Nonetheless, the judge issued the search warrant based on the affidavit presented. Hence, petitioner prays
that said warrant be declared illegal (agent has no personal knowledge of the facts under oath) and that all
articles confiscated be returned to him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the personal examination made by the Judge is sufficient to determine probable
cause.
RULING/ MAIN POINT: No. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause. Thus, when the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains
sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that
there exists probable cause; when the applicant’s knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the
affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. As in this
case, the judge relied exclusively on the affidavit executed by the agent whose knowledge of the facts is
mere hearsay and not personal. Hence, the warrant issued is illegal.
CASE NO. 316

Bache v. Cruz
FACTS: Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue requested from respondent Judge the issuance
of a search warrant against petitioners (corporation and its president) for violation of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Then on the day when respondents (De Leon and his witness Logronio) went to court to
present the papers, relating to the requested search warrant, the judge was hearing a certain case. So,
respondent judge instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents. After the
session had adjourned, respondent Judge asked his stenographer to read the depositions aforementioned.
Thereafter, the judge asked Logronio to take the oath, and proceeded to sign respondent de Leon’s
application for search warrant and other pertinent documents. Nonetheless, the agents were able to yield
six boxes of documents 3 days after the signing of the questioned warrant. Thus, petitioners sought from
the Court of First Instance the declaration of nullity of the search warrant in question. Said petition,
nevertheless, was dismissed by the respondent judge hence this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the personal examination made by the Judge is in accordance with the mandate of
the Constitution and the rules.
RULING/MAIN POINT: No. In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by
respondent Judge of the complainant and his witness. Respondent Judge did not ask either of the two any
question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was
probable cause against herein petitioners. The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which
led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings
of her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath
to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination. If there was an
examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of
Court. The Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by the judge and not merely
delegated examination.
CASE NO. 317

Borlongan v. Pea (Compare with Bache case)
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Pea claims that a Contract of Agency was entered between him and herein
petitioner, wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and
squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Banks property. Consequently, respondent instituted a civil
case for recovery of agents compensation and expenses, damages, and attorneys fees against the
petitioners. When the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against them, the former
presented several documents supporting their case, but these documents were allegedly falsified. Hence,
four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents were filed against petitioners for which
the City Prosecutor found probable cause. Subsequently, MTCC trial judge issued the warrants for the
arrest of the petitioners. Nonetheless, petitioner filed Recall Warrants of Arrest due to denial of due
process on the ground that the the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit (because petitioners
were not afforded to file counter-affidavit) and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of
arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were denied due process when the trial judge merely considered the
complaint-affidavit, and its attachments, in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
RULING/MAIN POINT: No. A judge is not required to conduct a personal examination of the
complainant and witnesses. Rather, what is emphasized merely is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this end, he
may: (a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on
the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.
CASE NO. 318

People v. Mamaril
FACTS: An Information was filed against respondent Mamaril for the violation of Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972 for unlawfully possessing crushed marijuana and bricks of marijuana. During the pre-trial, the
parties admitted that a search was conducted in the supposed residence of respondent. However,
respondent questions the validity of the search warrant because the transcript of the searching questions
and answers made by Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos in connection with the application for Search
Warrant cannot be found; and based on the records, there is no stenographic notes. Nonetheless, the trial
court ruled against respondent hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was illegally issued.

RULING: Yes. In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge must
examine the complainant and his witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3)
the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers.
Although it is possible that Judge Ramos examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers, the fact remains that there is no evidence that the examination was put
into writing as required by law. Otherwise, the depositions in writing of the complainant and his
witnesses would have been attached to the record, together with the affidavits that the witnesses
submitted, as required by Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
MAIN POINT: The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them in record in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause. (Bernas reviewer)
CASE NO. 319

Ortiz v. Palaypayon
FACTS: Respondent Judge Lucio Palaypayon of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur
is administratively charged with gross ignorance of the law tainted with vindictiveness and oppression
relative to a criminal case pending before him. Herein complainant got involved, as a party to a criminal a
case of a collision between a mini-truck and Toyota Corolla. However, it appears that respondent judge
issued an order for the arrest of accused, including complainant, on the basis of mere affidavits by the
offended party and without conducting the preliminary investigation required by Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Hence, this administrative charge against respondent was filed by complainant.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge did not personally examine the complainant and the witnesses
as required by the Constitution.
RULING: Yes. In this case, respondent judge adopted the sworn statements of the owner and driver of
the car involved in the reckless imprudence case as his own preliminary examination without personally
examining the complainant and her witnesses. Hence, it is evident that there was no preliminary
investigation conducted. Thus, respondent judge did not personally examine the complainant and her
witnesses by asking searching questions and answers to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
as mandated by law.
MAIN POINT: A Judge must personally examine the complainant and witnesses to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause as mandated by law.
Case No. 320

Art III Section 2. Particularity of Description
People v. Veloso
Facts:
The building at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization known as the
Parliamentary Club which was owned and managed by Congressman Jose Ma. Veloso.
The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was a gambling
house.
The Chief of the gambling squad Townsend had been to the club and verified this fact. Detective
Geronimo of the secret service, applied for, and obtained a search warrant describing the building from
the municipal court judge.
Respondent Veloso was one of the 50 persons apprehended by the police in the Parliamentary Club.
Townsend showed Veloso the search warrant. Veloso defended that he is Representative Veloso and not
John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house.
Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe.
Long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.
Issue:
W/N a “John Doe” warrant satisfy the requirement of particularity of description.
Ruling:
YES. Provided that it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the
accused.
In this case, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the building to be
searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands." This, without
doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched.
As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building
occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso,
the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
Main point in bold. Detailed version below.

A "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," warrant is void, without other
and further descriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in
acting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be
obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate
clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal
appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by
means of which he can be identified.
Case No. 321
Alvarez v. CFI
Facts:
The Anti-Usury Board of the DOJ presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that a certain Narciso
Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money lender/usurer charging
usurious rates in violation of law.
The chief of the task force didn’t say that the information was based on his personal knowledge but was
only received by him from a reliable source.
Judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez’ house.
Agents raided the subject place and seized different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs,
cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc.
The articles seized were not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW.
Petitioner Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all
articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued was illegal.
Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further
investigation.
CFI Judge sustained the board’s motion.
Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge
authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.
Issue:
W/N the search warrant does not satisfy the constitutional requirement of particularity of the description.
Ruling:
YES. Reference to "books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection
with his activities as money-lender, charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law" in the
search warrant is so general, loose and vague as to confer unlimited discretion upon the officer serving
the warrant to choose and determine for himself just what are the "books, documents, receipts, lists, chits
and other papers" used by the petitioner in connection with his alleged activities as money-lender. The
evident purpose and intent of the constitutional requirement is to limit the things to be seized to
those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant, to the end that unreasonable
searches and seizures may not be made, — that abuses may not be committed.
Case No. 322
Corro v. Lising
Facts:
Respondent judge issued a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of printed copies of
Philippine Times; manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times; newspaper
dummies of the Philippine Times; subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets,
banners; typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video machines
and tapes which have been used and are being used as instrument and means of committing the crime of
inciting to sedition.
Petitioner filed and urgent motion to recall warrant and to return documents alleging that the properties
seized are not connected with the offense of inciting to sedition.
Respondent judge denied the motion. Hence, this petition.
Respondents pray for dismissal of this petition justifying that articles seized were adequately described in
the search warrant and the padlocking of the searched premises was with the consent of petitioner’s wife.
Issue:
W/N the search warrant does not satisfy the constitutional requirement of particularity of the description.
Ruling:
YES. The search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed seizure of printed copies of the Philippine
Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies, subversive documents, articles,
etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines. Thus, the
language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable records and equipment of petitioner
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the
nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally objectionable.
Case No. 323

Pangandaman v. Casar
Facts:
5 persons dead and 2 wounded in a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur. What in
fact transpired is still unclear, either that a residence was attacked or the group was ambushed.
Atty. Batuampar, claiming to represent the widow of one of the victims, filed a letter-complaint with the
Provincial Fiscal, asking for a "full blast preliminary investigation" of the incident.
Respondent Judge received criminal complaint for multiple murder by Sergeant Laruan, but no case
relative to the incident was filed before him.
Respondent Judge "examined personally all 3 witnesses (brought by the sergeant). Thereafter "approved
the complaint and issued the corresponding warrant of arrest" against the fourteen (14) petitioners (who
were named by the witnesses) and fifty (50) "John Does."
Atty. Batuampar filed an "ex-parte" motion for reconsideration seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and
subsequent holding of a "thorough investigation" on the ground that the Judge's initial investigation had
been "hasty and manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions" having been propounded.
Respondent Judge denied the motion for "lack of basis;" hence the present petition.
Issue:
W/N the issuance of a warrant of arrest against 50 "John Does" transgressed the Constitutional provision
requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be seized.
Ruling:
YES. Insofar as said warrant is issued against 50 “John Does” not one of whom the witnesses to the
complaint could or would identify. Clearly such was violative of the constitutional injunction that
warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized, the warrant must, as
regards its unidentified subjects, be voided. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against
fifty “John Does.” The respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur
the record of the preliminary investigation of the complaint of his court for further appropriate action.
Case No. 324

Stonehill v. Diokno
Facts:
Respondent made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the petitioner and the corporation to
search persons and premises of several personal properties due to an alleged violation of Central Bank
Laws. of the Philippines. As a result, search and seizures were conducted in the both the residence of the
petitioner and in the corporation's premises. The warrant described the items to searched and seized as
describing books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence etc.
Petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution
and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus, he filed a petition with the SC for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from being introduced as evidence in
the deportation cases against the petitioner.
SC issued the writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's residence. Hence this petition.
Issue: W/N the description in the warrant is sufficient.
Ruling: NO. Reference to books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence
etc. amounts to a general warrant authorizing the officer to pick up anything he pleases.
Case No. 325

Section2, Article III
IV. In General
D. Particularity of Description
People v. Martinez
Facts: Accused-appellant Alexander Martinez, alias Abelardo Martinez y Montesor, was charged with (1)
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act and possession of illegal firearms in the Zamboanga City RTC after
a buy bust operation; Wherein the authorities w able to recover shabu and .38 caliber gun. The accused
appellant filed not guilty. accused-appellant argues that he is not the person named in the search warrant
issued in connection with the buy-bust operation, his name being Abelardo Martinez and not Alexander
Martinez. That being the case, all things seized by virtue of the said warrant are inadmissible in evidence.
Issue:W/N the wrong name in the search warrant in a buy bust operation invalidates the search warrant
Ruling: No. Granting arguendo that the search warrant issued against accused-appellant was invalid
because his true name is Abelardo Martinez and not Alexander Martinez as stated in the search warrant,
the same cannot render the articles seized inadmissible as evidence in court. As a matter of fact the
information filed identify him as “Alexander Martinez alias Abelardo Martinez y Montesor, accused.”
The accused-appellant was arrested as a result of a “buy-bust” operation and the ensuing search of the
premises was made as an incident to a lawful arrest. It is therefore clear that regardless of the alleged
defect of the search warrant in erroneously designating his first name, the seized articles may still
be used as evidence against accused-appellant, having been obtained from him and as such, fruits of
a lawful search incidental to a valid arrest.
Case No. 326

Section 2, Article III
IV. In General
Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp
Facts: an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp,
Inc. He observed that Microsoft Softwares (Windows Operating Systems) were being produced and
packaged within the premises of Maxicorp. They then bought a computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit
was pre-installed with a pirated copy of Windows, Using it as evidence. a computer technician, who
showed the judge that the software in the computer unit bought by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated.
The RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable cause for a case of copyright infringement and unfair
competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the corresponding warrant. Maxicorp argues that the
warrants issued against it are too broad in scope and lack the specificity required with respect to the
objects to be seized. After examining the wording of the warrants issued, the Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of Maxicorp and reversed the RTC’s Order
Issue: W/N THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE “GENERAL WARRANTS.” Meaning that the warrant
issued lacks description
Ruling: Yes. The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the Constitution renders
inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonable searchesand seizure.
Thus, all items seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or
f, should be returned to Maxicorp.
Case No. 327

IV. In General
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP
Facts: The military applied for a search warrant for 2 addresses of the newspaper WE Forum: 728 units C
& , RMS Building Quezon Avenue, QC and No 19, Road 3, Project 6, QC 2 warrants nonetheless was
made of the RMS Building address. The search of the latter is sought to be invalidated on the ground that
the place was not sufficiently describe.
Issue: W/N the not sufficiently described hence enough invalidate the search warrant
Ruling: The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. In determining the sufficiency of
description of the address, the executing officer’s prior knowledge to the intended in the warrant is
relevant. In this case the executing officer was also the affiant on whose affidavit of warrant had been
issued. Therefore he knew were the addresses refereed to.
Main Point: Typographical error in specifying the address to be search not sufficient to invalidate a
search warrant where the address intended to be searched also appears on the face of the warrant
Case No. 328
IV. In General
Frank Uy v. BIR
Facts: A certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish
Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in activities constituting violations of
the National Internal Revenue Code. 3 search warrants were issued for different violations. The
authorities searched in the premises. Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject
warrants that command their nullification. They point out inconsistencies in the description of the place to
be searched in Search Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom
Search Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued. they claim that the things to be seized were not described with
particularity. These defects, according to petitioners, render the objects seized inadmissible in evidence
Issue: W/N if a warrant for the search pf the place there is a mistake in the identification of the owner of
the place, does it invalidate the warrant
Ruling: Not if the place if properly described (Bernas p.47) The rule is that a description of a place to
be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community . Any designation
or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry
leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. In this case, it was not shown
that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in Cebu City. Nor was it established that the
enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises of Petitioner Corporation. That Search
Warrant A-1 therefore, inconsistently identified the city where the premise to be searched is, is not a
defect that would spell the warrant’s invalidation in this case.
Case No. 329

IV. In General
Yousex Al-Ghoul v. CA
Facts: Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 125, Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-953 and 55-954 for the search and seizure
of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. The police
found unlicensed firearms and explosive and a caliber in Apartment 8 in the same area. Petitioners
contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights because the place
searched and articles seized were not described with particularity. Solicitor General avers that the search
of Apartment 2 was legal, and the items seized therein are admissible in evidence. However OSG agrees
with petitioner since There was no mention of Apartment No. 8. Thus, we find that the search conducted
at Apartment No. 8 clearly violated Sections 2 and 3 (2) of the Bill of Rights, in relation to Section 3 of
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: W/N items recovered from Apartment no. 8 cannot be used as evidence
Ruling: Yes. We note that the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners waived their right to raise any
attack on the validity of the search warrants at issue by their failure to file a motion to quash. But, in
conducting the search at Apartment No. 8, not just Apartment No. 2 as ordered specifically in the search
warrants, the police committed a gross violation we cannot condone. Thus, we conclude that the gun
seized in Apartment No. 8 cannot be used in evidence, but those articles including guns, ammunitions,
and explosives seized in Apartment No. 2 are admissible in evidence.
Main Point: Items recovered without particularity of description in search warrant cannot automatically
used as evidence.
CASE NO. 330

ART 3 SEC2: PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
People v. CA
FACTS: A search warrant was applied by Inspector James Brillantes, against Mr . Azfar Hussain, private
respondent, for allegedly possessing explosives and firearms at Abigail Variety Store, Apartment 1207
Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte Bulacan. After issuance of such
search warrant, the PNP searched the address other than the one indicated in the search warrant, instead of
Abigail Variety Store they went to an immediate adjacent area or Apartment 1 where the alleged
possessors of prohibit paraphernalia were found, they raised that the reason for the difference in the
address was just a typographical error. However, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the people, appealed
that such search warrant to be declared null and void for having contravene the search and warrant
procedure in the constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been unreasonable search and seizure committed by the police for
having searched a place which is different from that stated in the warrant and that there was only a
typographical error in the address.
RULING: Yes. The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an “obvious typographical
error” involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, but the search of a place different
from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant.
MAIN POINT: It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that
stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched, although not that specified in the
warrant, is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their
supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the
warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they
submitted to the court issuing the warrant.
CASE NO. 331

Paper Industries v. Asuncion
FACTS: Police inspector Pascua applied for a search warrant before the RTC of Quezon City. After
having the joint deposition, Judge Asuncion issued the contested warrant against Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP), herein petitioner, by only stating “PICOP COMPOUND”, Thus,
an appeal is made by herein petitioner to quash the warrant made by Judge Asuncion on the ground that it
does state particularity the place where such warrant is to be enforced.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statement “PICOP COMPOUND” complies with the particularity description
in a search warrant as required by the constitution.
RULING: No. The warrant only contains PICOP compound, which has multiple building and structures.
The warrant failed to indicate what building or particular location in that compound where the search
warrant is to be made. In view of the manifest objective of the constitutional safeguard against
unreasonable search, the Constitution and the Rules limit the place to be searched only to those
described in the warrant.
CASE NO. 332

Malalaon v. CA
*an issue regarding RTC’s territorial jurisdiction to issue a warrant, outside the topic.
FACTS: An application for a search warrant was made by Lt. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Center
before the RTC of Kalookan City. That a violation of PD 1866 or the illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition is perpetrated at Newport, Quezon City. After the search, herein petitioners argue that the
warrant was issued outside their jurisdiction, that only the RTC located in RTC may issue such warrant
because it is the only court that has jurisdiction over the area where the search warrant was initiated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may take cognizance of an application of a search warrant in connection
with an offense allegedly committed outside its territorial jurisdiction and to issue warrant to conduct a
search on a place likewise outside its territorial jurisdiction.
RULING: Yes. Petitioners argument that the search warrant is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
issuing judge is erroneous. It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the
prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply for a search warrant in view of
the uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It would be
doubly so if compliance with that requirement would be under pain of nullification of said warrant should
they file their application therefor in and obtain the same.
MAIN POINT: A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name
of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to
search for personal property and bring it before the court.
CASE NO. 333
People v. Estrada
FACTS: A search warrant was made and 52 boxes of drugs were confiscated. In the search warrant, it
failed to indicate whether such drugs are fake, misbranded, adulterated or unregistered. The accused now
asking for the return of such drugs on the ground that there was an unreasonable search warrant for the
warrant to failed to particular indicate the item to be seized.
ISSUE: Whether or not the invalidity of the warrant, for failure to particularly indicate the item to be
seized, is subject to the return of the confiscated drugs.
Ruling: No. Although the search warrant was declared illegal for not complying with the requirement of
particularity of description in a warrant. The confiscated items cannot be returned as the possessor
thereof, the accused, have not acquired a licensed to possess the items, though they are legal.
GOMEZ
CASE NO. 334
ART 3 SEC2: ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE A WARRANT
Salazar v. Achacoso
FACTS: Then Secretary of Labor and public respondent herein Tomas D. Achacoso issued a warrant to
seized the documents and paraphernalia used by hererin petitioner in running his illegal recruitment
agency. The warrant was made in pursuance of PD 1920 and EO 1022, which was enacted during the
Marcos Era.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor may issue a warrant of search and arrest.
RULING: No. The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. The 1987 constitution also made it clear
under Sec 2 of Article 3 that such warrant of search and arrest may only be done by a Judge.
MAIN POINT: Only a Judge may issue a warrant of search and arrest.
Case No. 335

ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: The Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) issued separate orders against
private respondents Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation to effect their
sequestration. PCGG also issued a “Search and Seizure Order” against Allied Banking Corporation. On
the basis of the PCGG’s order which read in part, “you are hereby directed to submit for search and
seizure all bank documents in the above-mentioned premises which our representative may find necessary
and relevant to the investigation being conducted by this Commission,” Allied contended that this is not
one for sequestration but is particularly a general search warrant which fails to meet the constitutional
requisites for its valid issuance.
ISSUE: Whether or not PCGG may validly issue a search and seizure order.
RULING: No. The PCGG has no authority to issue the order. It is not a judge, as clarified by the Court in
“Baseco,” and the PCGG cannot be considered as “such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law” because Executive Order No. 1 did not expressly nor impliedly grant the PCGG the power to issue
search warrants/orders.
MAIN POINT: Only a “judge” and “such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law” were
empowered by the Freedom Constitution to issue search warrants.
Case No. 336

Esteban Morano, Chan Sau Wah, and Fuh Yan Fun v. Hon. Martiniano Vivo
FACTS: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen arrived in the Philippines to visit her cousin. She arrived in the
Philippines with Fu Yan Fun, her minor son by the first marriage. She and her minor son were permitted
only into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two months and after they posted a cash
bond of 4,000 pesos. Months later, she married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. To
prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. Upon
the expiration of the last extension, a letter from the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau
Wah and her son to leave the country upon a certain date with a warning that upon failure to do so, he will
issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the warrant of arrest by the Commissioner is valid.
RULING: Yes. Power to deport aliens is an attribute of sovereignty planted on the accepted maxim of
international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to
self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions. Article III of the Constitution,
does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance
with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as
a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceeding for a given offense or administrative action,
not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order
of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.
MAIN POINT: The constitutional guarantee set forth in Article III of the Constitution requiring that the
issue of probable cause be determined by a judge does not extend to deportation proceedings.
Case No. 337

Sy v. Commissioner of Immigration
FACTS: Chiu Wan Hong, a Chinese citizen, came to the Philippines and was admitted as a non-
immigrant or temporary visitor. Over five (5) years later, the Commissioner of Immigration caused
petitioner who now claims to be Aurora Villamin Sy, to be arrested preparatory to proceedings for her
deportation for overstaying. Petitioner claimed that she is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because the
warrant for her deportation is allegedly illegal or void. Having been issued in compliance with a decision
of the Board of Commissioners of Immigration, the legality of said warrant depends upon that of said
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant issued by the Commissioner is valid.
RULING and MAIN POINT: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Bureau of Immigration may issue a
warrant of arrest only for the purpose of carrying out a final decision of deportation or when there is
sufficient proof of the guilt of the alien.
Case No. 338
Lucien Tran Van Nghia v. Liwag
FACTS: Petitioner, Lucien Tran Van Nghia, is a French national with temporary address in Sta. Ana,
Manila. Originally admitted to the Philippines as a temporary visitor, his status was changed to that of an
immigrant based on his representation that he is financially capable and will invest in the Philippines.
However, petitioner has not made any investment and has engaged only in French tutoring and practice of
acupressure. Respondent CID Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag received a sworn complaint from
petitioner’s landlord, accusing petitioner of being an undesirable alien for “committing acts inimical to
public safety and progress.” Respondent issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner after the latter twice
refused to go to the CID headquarters for verification of his status.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued and petitioner’s subsequent arrest were valid and
legal.
RULING: No. Petitioner was “invited” by a combined team of CID agents and police officers at his
apartment unit on the strength of a mission order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration based on a
sworn complaint of a single individual. The essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously
absent.
MAIN POINT: It is essential that there should be a specific charge against the alien to be deported and
arrested.
Case No. 339
Board of Commissioners v. Judge dela Rosa
FACTS: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the BOI as a native
born Filipino citizen. William Gatchalian, then a twelve year old minor, arrived in Manila and sought
admission as Filipino citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special inquiry. The then
Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum directing the Board of Commissioners to review all
cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen, including that of
respondents Gatchalian. Petitioner Board reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, admitting
respondents Gatchalian as Filipino citizens. Petitioner Commissioner of Immigration issued a mission
order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by Commissioner of Immigration was valid.
RULING: No. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for
the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only is null and void for being
unconstitutional. A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner
of Immigration clearly indicates that the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of the
suspects, respondent Gatchalian included.
Case No. 340

Art III Sec 2. Only a Judge May Issue a Warrant
Harvey v. Santiago
FACTS: Petitioners Harvey, Sherman (both Americans) and Van Elshout (Dutch) were suspected alien
pedophiles after 3 months of close surveillance by the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID) agents. Respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Warrants of Arrest against
petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Petitioners question the validity of their detention as there is no provision in the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, which
legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending
determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest was valid.
RULING: YES. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of
arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also
provide that an arrest wit a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1)
when such person has committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his
presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section 5). The arrest of
petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for 3 months, which justified
the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. Further, that
petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal because they found with young
boys in their respective rooms, and Sherman was even naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents
had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual
perversion involving children".
Case No. 341

Art III Sec 2. Only a Judge May Issue a Warrant
Ho v. People
FACTS: Petitioners were charged in an information with a violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) before the Sandiganbayan. Attached to the information were the resolution of
Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Labrador and the memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer (SPO)
Tamayo. Pursuant to such information, the Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest against petitioners
who questioned such issuance, alleging that in determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant
for their arrest, the Sandiganbayan merely relied on the information and the resolution attached thereto,
filed by the Ombudsman without other supporting evidence, in violation of Art III Sec 2 of the
Constitution and settled jurisprudence.
ISSUE: May a judge issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the report and recommendation of the
investigating prosecutor, without personally determining probable cause by independently examining
sufficient evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation?
RULING: NO. Art III Sec 2 states that xxx no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce xxx. Following established
doctrine and procedure, the judge shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard
the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. In the instant case, the public respondent
relied fully and completely upon the resolution of the graft investigation officer and the memorandum of
the reviewing prosecutor, attached to the information. It had no other documents from which to sustain its
own conclusion that probable cause exists and issued challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the
prosecutors findings and recommendation.
Case No. 342
Art III Sec 2. Of Whatever Nature and for Any Purpose
Material Distributions (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Felipe Natividad and Lope Sarreal
FACTS: Lope Sarreal filed a complaint seeking a money judgment against petitioners Material
Distributors (Phil.) Inc. and Harry Lyons, and filed a motion for the production and inspection of the
books or papers of said petitioners, which the respondent Judge granted and consequently required the
petitioners to produce the same. Petitioners argued that Sarreal is not entitled to the production and
inspection of the said documents because his only purpose, was to find out if a case of falsification has
been made. Sarreal contended that the inspection of said documents was to enable him to designate with
particularity in the subpoena duces tecum, to be obtained in connection with the trial of the case, the
specific books and papers containing the entry of receipts and payments made by the petitioners, such
books and papers being material to the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the production and inspection of the books and papers would violate the
petitioners’ right against unreasonable searches and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose.
RULING: NO. The orders in question, issued in virtue of the provisions of Rule 21 of the Rules of
Court, pertain to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused with the unreasonable
searches prohibited by the Constitution. But in the erroneous hypothesis that the production and
inspection of books and documents in question is tantamount to a search warrant, the procedure
outlined by Rule 21 and followed by respondent Judge placed them outside the realm of the
prohibited unreasonable searches. Sarreal has an interest in the books and documents in question
because such contain evidence material to the matters involving the issues between him and petitioners,
that justice will be better served if all the facts pertinent to the controversy are placed before the trial
court.
Rule 21 of the Rules of Court: xxx Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court may
(a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection of any designated documents, papers, books
oraccounts which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which
are in his possession, custody or control xxx
Case No. 343

Art III Sec 2. Of Whatever Nature and for Any Purpose
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling (U.S. Case)
NOTE: Walling was the federal official authorized by law to investigate whether certain businesses were
acting consistently with the Federal Labor Standards Act.
FACTS: The instant case concerns Administrator Walling’s right to judicial enforcement of
subpoenas duces tecum (an order to compel the production of documents). The subpoenas sought the
production of specified records to determine whether petitioners were violating the Fair Labor Standards
Act. Petitioners, newspaper publishing corporations, refused to have their books and records examined,
claiming that the enforcement of the subpoenas would permit the Administrator to conduct general
fishing expeditions into petitioners' books, records and papers, in order to secure evidence that they have
violated the Act, without a prior charge or complaint and simply to secure information upon which to
base one, all allegedly in violation of the search and seizure provisions
ISSUE: Whether or not the enforcement of the subpoenas duces tecum would violate the provisions on
search and seizure.
RULING: NO. The records in the instant case present no question of actual search and seizure, but raise
only the question whether orders of court for the production of specified records have been validly made;
and no sufficient showing appears to justify setting them aside. No officer or other person has sought to
enter petitioners' premises against their will, to search them, or to seize or examine their books, records or
papers without their assent, otherwise than pursuant to orders of court authorized by law. The very
purpose of the subpoena and of the order, as of the authorized investigation, is to discover and
procure evidence, not to prove a pending charge or complaint, but upon which to make one.
Further, petitioners were corporations. The only records or documents sought were corporate ones
and were relevant to the authorized inquiry, the purpose of which was to determine two issues,
whether petitioners were subject to the Act and, if so, whether they were violating it. These were
subjects of investigation authorized by Section 11(a) of the act. It is not to be doubted that Congress
could authorize investigation of these matters.
Case No. 344

ART III SEC 2: Of Whatever Nature and for Any Purpose
Camara v. Municipal Court
FACTS: A housing inspector from San Francisco’s health department entered an apartment building to
conduct a routine inspection to locate possible code violations. The building manager informed the
inspector that Camara might be using his space contrary to permitted policy. The inspector approached
Camara to enter the area, but the Camara denied entrance for lack of a search warrant. The inspector
returned twice more, again without a search warrant, and was again denied entry. A complaint was
subsequently filed against Camara, and he was arrested for violating a city code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Camara has a constitutional right to refuse an inspection without a warrant.
RULING: YES. Administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon
the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such searches, when authorized and
conducted without a warrant procedure, lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth
Amendment guarantees to an individual. In other words, building inspection by administrative officers
shall comply with the warrant procedure.
Case No. 345
ART III SEC 2: Warrantless Search and Seizure
People v. Aminuddin
FACTS: On the basis of a tip, Aminuddin was arrested and searched upon disembarking from M/V
Wilcon in Iloilo City. The detention and search yielded marijuana. The officers were not armed with a
warrant although the officers had at least two days to obtain a warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid.
RULING: NO. As a general rule, an officer shall first obtain a warrant before conducting a search
and seizure. In this case, the officers had all the time to obtain a warrant.
Case No. 346
People v. Valdez
FACTS: Abe Valdez was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted,
cultivated and cultured 7 fully grown marijuana plants. The prosecution presented its witnesses, all
members of the police force, who testified how the information was received, the commencement of their
operation and its details under the specific instruction of Inspector Parungao. Accordingly, they found
appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his
kaingin and saw 7 five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows. They uprooted the seven
marijuana plants, took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and arrested him.
RULING: NO. In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers
themselves, it is clear that they had at least 1 day to obtain a warrant to search appellant’s farm. Their
informant had revealed his name to them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted was
pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that there
was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the
plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and
inconvenient to them.
Case No. 347

People v. Oliver Edano
FACTS: Oliver arrived on board a space wagon driven by Siochi. The informant approached Oliver and
talked to him inside the vehicle. Afterwards, the informant waved at PO3 Corbe. When PO3 Corbe was
approaching the appellant, the latter went out of the vehicle and ran away. They chased the appellant;
PO3 Corbe was able to grab Oliver, causing the latter to fall on the ground. PO3 Corbe recovered a "knot-
tied" transparent plastic bag from the appellant’s right hand, while PO3 Alcancia seized a gun tucked in
the appellant’s waist. The other members of the police arrested Siochi. Thereafter, the police brought the
appellant, Siochi and the seized items to the police station for investigation.
RULING: NO. In this case, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was unlawful,
the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag
containing white crystalline substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come from an
invalid search and seizure. Moreover, trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed,
and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt.
Case No. 348
Dale Grady v. North Carolina
FACTS: Dale Grady was convicted of two sexual offenses. After being released for the second time, a
trial court civilly committed Grady to take part in North Carolina’s satellite-based monitoring program for
the duration of his life. The program required participants to wear a GPS monitoring bracelet so that
authorities can make sure that participants are complying with prescriptive schedule and location
requirements. Grady challenged the constitutionality of the program and argued that the constant tracking
amounted to an unreasonable search. Both the trial court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals held
that wearing a GPS monitor did not amount to a search.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of GPS monitoring bracelet constitutes a search.
RULING: YES. The Court held that participation in the North Carolina program amounted to a
search because requiring someone to wear a bracelet that tracks the person’s whereabouts
constitutes a “physical occupation of private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”
CASE NO. 349

ART. III SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
WHEN IS A SEARCH A SEARCH?
Valmonte v General De Villa
FACTS: As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners herein aver
that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular
searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or
court order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of the checkpoints is constitutional.
RULING: Yes. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine
checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and
seizure or other rights. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a
judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.
MP: A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case.
CASE NO. 350
ART. III SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
WHEN IS A SEARCH A SEARCH?
Guazon v De Villa
FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and police
officers represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation
Drives" in Metro Manila. The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of
human rights abuses. In all these drives, the police officers conduct this having no specific target house in
mind, in the dead of the night or early morning hours, police and military units without any search
warrant or warrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one residence and sometimes whole barangay or
areas of barangay in Metro Manila. Most of them are in civilian clothes and without nameplates or
identification cards. A
ISSUE: Whether or not the saturation drive conducted by the police force violated the rights guaranteed
under Section 2 of Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING: No. The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed.
However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We see
nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas
Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go in force to the combat
areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny or
rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights.
MP: The individual's right to immunity from such invasion of his body was considered as "far
outweighed by the value of its deterrent effect" on the evil sought to be avoided by the police action.

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CASE NO.

CASE NO. 302

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrants were valid.

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Accordingly, in Mantaring v. Roman,[7] we reprimanded a judge in a preliminary investigation for

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ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was illegally issued.

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Case No. 320

Main point in bold. Detailed version below.

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Issue: W/N the description in the warrant is sufficient.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest was valid.

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CASE NO. 349

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