Conclusion.

- Texas City Refinery (BP) Explosion and Fire disaster left us with the important of
brainstorming session and authorized personnel at a plant site. This disaster had taken
many life’s away, injured more than 100 people and gave a large impact on the asset
and environmental itself.
- After the March 23, 2005, incident, BP has publicly pledged to eliminate all of its 17
atmospheric blowdown systems in flammable service at all five of its U.S. refineries.
- Suitable equipment, full potential risk assessment and trained personnel can avoid the
disaster from happening.
 Cause of the accident
- effectively incorporated human factor considerations in its training, staffing, and work
schedule for operations personnel.
- lack of automated controls in the splitter tower triggered by high-level, which would
have prevented the unsafe level.
- inadequate instrumentation to warn of overfilling in the splitter tower.
 Result of disaster.
- 15 people were killed and 180 were injured.
- 2 trailers were destroyed and damaged several vehicles and over 50 large storage tanks
were damaged.

Recommendation.

 Trailer Siting Recommendations

- The American Petroleum Institute (API) to develop new guidelines to ensure that
occupied trailers and similar temporary structures are placed safely away from
hazardous areas of process plants was issued by CSB and API and the National
Petrochemical and Refiners Association (NPRA) called for both to issue a safety alert
urging their members to take prompt action to ensure that trailers are safely located.
 Blowdown Drum and Stack Recommendations
- The CSB recommended that API revise “Recommended Practice 521, Guide for Pressure
Relieving and Depressuring Systems,” to identify the hazards of this equipment, to
address the need to adequately size disposal drums, and to urge the use of inherently
safer alternatives such as flare systems
- The CSB recommendation to OSHA to conduct a national emphasis program for oil
refineries focused on the hazards of blowdown drums and stacks that release
flammables to the atmosphere and on inadequately sized disposal drums.
 Trained Personnel at plant site
- To monitor the work of unexperienced worker to avoid any mistake or unawareness
about equipment when conducting it.
 Safety Culture Recommendation
- CSB issued an urgent safety recommendation to the BP Group Executive Board of
Directors that it convene an independent panel of experts to examine BP’s corporate
safety management systems, safety culture, and oversight of the North American
refineries.